DATA AND COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, EIGHTH EDITION
A comprehensive survey that has become the standard in the field, covering (1) data communications, including transmission, media, signal encoding, link control, and multiplexing; (2) communication networks, including circuit- and packet-switched, frame relay, ATM, and LANs; (3) the TCP/IP protocol suite, including IPv6, TCP, MIME, and HTTP, as well as a detailed treatment of network security. Received the 2007 Text and Academic Authors Association (TAA) award for the best Computer Science and Engineering Textbook of the year. ISBN 0-13-243310-9

COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND ARCHITECTURE, EIGHTH EDITION
A unified view of this broad field. Covers fundamentals such as CPU, control unit, microprogramming, instruction set, I/O, and memory. Also covers advanced topics such as RISC, superscalar, and parallel organization. Fourth and fifth editions received the TAA award for the best Computer Science and Engineering Textbook of the year. ISBN 978-0-13-607373-4

OPERATING SYSTEMS, SIXTH EDITION
A state-of-the-art survey of operating system principles. Covers fundamental technology as well as contemporary design issues, such as threads, microkernels, SMPs, real-time systems, multiprocessor scheduling, embedded OSs, distributed systems, clusters, security, and object-oriented design. Received the 2009 Text and Academic Authors Association (TAA) award for the best Computer Science and Engineering Textbook of the year. ISBN 978-0-13-600632-9

BUSINESS DATA COMMUNICATIONS, SIXTH EDITION
A comprehensive presentation of data communications and telecommunications from a business perspective. Covers voice, data, image, and video communications and applications technology and includes a number of case studies. ISBN 978-0-13-606741-2

COMPUTER NETWORKS WITH INTERNET PROTOCOLS AND TECHNOLOGY
An up-to-date survey of developments in the area of Internet-based protocols and algorithms. Using a top-down approach, this book covers applications, transport layer, Internet QoS, Internet routing, data link layer and computer networks, security, and network management. ISBN 0-13141098-9
AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

NETWORK SECURITY ESSENTIALS, FOURTH EDITION
A tutorial and survey on network security technology. The book covers important network security tools and applications, including S/MIME, IP Security, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, SET, and X509v3. In addition, methods for countering hackers and viruses are explored.

COMPUTER SECURITY (with Lawrie Brown)
A comprehensive treatment of computer security technology, including algorithms, protocols, and applications. Covers cryptography, authentication, access control, database security, intrusion detection and prevention, malicious software, denial of service, firewalls, software security, physical security, human factors, auditing, legal and ethical aspects, and trusted systems. Received the 2008 Text and Academic Authors Association (TAA) award for the best Computer Science and Engineering Textbook of the year. ISBN 0-13-600424-5

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKS, Second Edition
A comprehensive, state-of-the art survey. Covers fundamental wireless communications topics, including antennas and propagation, signal encoding techniques, spread spectrum, and error correction techniques. Examines satellite, cellular, wireless local loop networks and wireless LANs, including Bluetooth and 802.11. Covers Mobile IP and WAP. ISBN 0-13-191835-4

HIGH-SPEED NETWORKS AND INTERNETS, SECOND EDITION
A state-of-the art survey of high-speed networks. Topics covered include TCP congestion control, ATM traffic management, Internet traffic management, differentiated and integrated services, Internet routing protocols and multicast routing protocols, resource reservation and RSVP, and lossless and lossy compression. Examines important topic of self-similar data traffic. ISBN 0-13-03221-0
To Antigone never
dull never boring
the smartest
person I know
This page intentionally left blank
# CONTENTS

Notation xiii  
Preface xv  
About the Author xxiii  

Chapter 0 Reader's Guide 1  
0.1 Outline of This Book 2  
0.2 A Roadmap for Readers and Instructors 2  
0.3 Internet and Web Resources 4  
0.4 Standards 5  

Chapter 1 Overview 7  
1.1 Computer Security Concepts 9  
1.2 The OSI Security Architecture 14  
1.3 Security Attacks 15  
1.4 Security Services 19  
1.5 Security Mechanisms 23  
1.6 A Model for Network Security 25  
1.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 27  
1.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 29  

PART ONE SYMMETRIC CIPHERS 31  

Chapter 2 Classical Encryption Techniques 31  
2.1 Symmetric Cipher Model 33  
2.2 Substitution Techniques 38  
2.3 Transposition Techniques 53  
2.4 Rotor Machines 55  
2.5 Steganography 57  
2.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 59  
2.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 60  

Chapter 3 Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard 66  
3.1 Block Cipher Principles 68  
3.2 The Data Encryption Standard (DES) 77  
3.3 A DES Example 85  
3.4 The Strength of DES 88  
3.5 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis 89  
3.6 Block Cipher Design Principles 92  
3.7 Recommended Reading and Web Site 96  
3.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 97  

Chapter 4 Basic Concepts in Number Theory and Finite Fields 101  
4.1 Divisibility and the Division Algorithm 103  
4.2 The Euclidean Algorithm 105
CONTENTS

4.3 Modular Arithmetic 108
4.4 Groups, Rings, and Fields 116
4.5 Finite Fields of the Form GF(p) 120
4.6 Polynomial Arithmetic 122
4.7 Finite Fields of the Form GF(2^n) 129
4.8 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 141
4.9 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 141

Appendix 4A The Meaning of mod 144

Chapter 5 Advanced Encryption Standard 47
5.1 The Origins AES 148
5.2 AES Structure 150
5.3 AES Round Functions 155
5.4 AES Key Expansion 166
5.5 An AES Example 169
5.6 AES Implementation 174
5.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 178
5.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 179

Appendix 5A Polynomials with Coefficients in GF(2^8) 180
Appendix 5B Simplified AES 183

Chapter 6 Block Cipher Operation 192
6.1 Multiple Encryption and Triple DES 193
6.2 Electronic Codebook Mode 198
6.3 Cipher Block Chaining Mode 201
6.4 Cipher Feedback Mode 203
6.5 Output Feedback Mode 205
6.6 Counter Mode 206
6.7 XTS Mode for Block-Oriented Storage Devices 210
6.8 Recommended Web Site 214
6.9 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 214

Chapter 7 Pseudorandom Number Generation and Stream Ciphers 218
7.1 Principles of Pseudorandom Number Generation 219
7.2 Pseudorandom Number Generators 226
7.3 Pseudorandom Number Generation Using a Block Cipher 229
7.4 Stream Ciphers 232
7.5 RC4 234
7.6 True Random Numbers 237
7.7 Recommended Reading 238
7.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 239

PART TWO ASYMMETRIC CIPHERS 243

Chapter 8 More Number Theory 243
8.1 Prime Numbers 245
8.2 Fermat’s and Euler’s Theorems 248
8.3 Testing for Primality 251
8.4 The Chinese Remainder Theorem 254
Chapter 8 Discrete Logarithms 257
8.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 262
8.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 263

Chapter 9 Public-Key Cryptography and RSA 266
9.1 Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems 269
9.2 The RSA Algorithm 277
9.3 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 291
9.4 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 291
Appendix 9A Proof of the RSA Algorithm 296
Appendix 9B The Complexity of Algorithms 297

Chapter 10 Other Public-Key Cryptosystems 300
10.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 301
10.2 ElGamal Cryptosystem 305
10.3 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic 308
10.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 317
10.5 Pseudorandom Number Generation Based on an Asymmetric Cipher 321
10.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 323
10.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 324

PART THREE CRYPTOGRAPHIC DATA INTEGRITY ALGORITHMS 327

Chapter 11 Cryptographic Hash Functions 327
11.1 Applications of Cryptographic Hash Functions 329
11.2 Two Simple Hash Functions 333
11.3 Requirements and Security 335
11.4 Hash Functions Based on Cipher Block Chaining 341
11.5 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 342
11.6 SHA-3 352
11.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 353
11.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 353
Appendix 11A Mathematical Basis of Birthday Attack 356

Chapter 12 Message Authentication Codes 362
12.1 Message Authentication Requirements 364
12.2 Message Authentication Functions 365
12.3 Message Authentication Codes 372
12.4 Security of MACs 374
12.5 MACs Based on Hash Functions: HMAC 375
12.6 MACs Based on Block Ciphers: DAA and CMAC 380
12.7 Authenticated Encryption: CCM and GCM 383
12.8 Pseudorandom Number Generation Using Hash Functions and MACs 389
12.9 Recommended Reading 392
12.10 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 393

Chapter 13 Digital Signatures 395
13.1 Digital Signatures 396
13.2 ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme 400
CONTENTS

13.3 Schnorr Digital Signature Scheme 402
13.4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 403
13.5 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 406
13.6 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 407

PART FOUR MUTUAL TRUST 410

Chapter 14 Key Management and Distribution 410
14.1 Symmetric Key Distribution Using Symmetric Encryption 412
14.2 Symmetric Key Distribution Using Asymmetric Encryption 421
14.3 Distribution of Public Keys 423
14.4 X.509 Certificates 428
14.5 Public Key Infrastructure 436
14.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 438
14.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 439

Chapter 15 User Authentication Protocols 444
15.1 Remote User Authentication Principles 445
15.2 Remote User Authentication Using Symmetric Encryption 448
15.3 Kerberos 452
15.4 Remote User Authentication Using Asymmetric Encryption 470
15.5 Federated Identity Management 472
15.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 478
15.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 479
Appendix 15A Kerberos Encryption Techniques 481

PART FIVE NETWORK AND INTERNET SECURITY 485

Chapter 16 Transport-Level Security 485
16.1 Web Security Issues 486
16.2 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 489
16.3 Transport Layer Security (TLS) 502
16.4 HTTPS 506
16.5 Secure Shell (SSH) 508
16.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 519
16.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 519

Chapter 17 Wireless Network Security 521
17.1 IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Overview 523
17.2 IEEE 802.11i Wireless LAN Security 529
17.3 Wireless Application Protocol Overview 543
17.4 Wireless Transport Layer Security 550
17.5 WAP End-to-End Security 560
17.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 563
17.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 563

Chapter 18 Electronic Mail Security 567
18.1 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 568
18.2 S/MIME 587
18.3 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) 603
18.4 Recommended Web Sites 610
18.5 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 611
Appendix 18A Radix-64 Conversion 612

Chapter 19 IP Security 615
19.1 IP Security Overview 616
19.2 IP Security Policy 622
19.3 Encapsulating Security Payload 627
19.4 Combining Security Associations 634
19.5 Internet Key Exchange 638
19.6 Cryptographic Suites 647
19.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites 648
19.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems 649

APPENDICES 651
Appendix A Projects for Teaching Cryptography and Network Security 651
A.1 Sage Computer Algebra Projects 652
A.2 Hacking Project 653
A.3 Block Cipher Projects 653
A.4 Laboratory Exercises 654
A.5 Research Projects 654
A.6 Programming Projects 655
A.7 Practical Security Assessments 655
A.8 Writing Assignments 655
A.9 Reading/Report Assignments 656

Appendix B Sage Examples 657
B.1 Chapter 2: Classical Encryption Techniques 659
B.2 Chapter 3: Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard 662
B.3 Chapter 4: Basic Concepts in Number Theory and Finite Fields 666
B.4 Chapter 5: Advanced Encryption Standard 673
B.5 Chapter 6: Pseudorandom Number Generation and Stream Ciphers 678
B.6 Chapter 8: Number Theory 680
B.6 Chapter 9: Public-Key Cryptography and RSA 685
B.7 Chapter 10: Other Public-Key Cryptosystems 688
B.8 Chapter 11: Cryptographic Hash Functions 693
B.9 Chapter 13: Digital Signatures 695

References 699
Index 711

ONLINE CHAPTERS

PART SIX SYSTEM SECURITY
Chapter 20 Intruders
20.1 Intruders
20.2 Intrusion Detection
Appendix D  Standards and Standards-Setting Organizations
   D.1 The Importance of Standards
   D.2 Internet Standards and the Internet Society
   D.3 National Institute of Standards and Technology

Appendix E  Basic Concepts from Linear Algebra
   E.1 Operations on Vectors and Matrices
   E.2 Linear Algebra Operations over \( Z_n \)

Appendix F  Measures of Security and Secrecy
   F.1 Perfect Secrecy
   F.2 Information and Entropy
   F.3 Entropy and Secrecy

Appendix G  Simplified DES
   G.1 Overview
   G.2 S-DES Key Generation
   G.3 S-DES Encryption
   G.4 Analysis of Simplified DES
   G.5 Relationship to DES

Appendix H  Evaluation Criteria for AES
   H.1 The Origins of AES
   H.2 AES Evaluation

Appendix I  More on Simplified AES
   I.1 Arithmetic in \( GF(2^4) \)
   I.2 The Mix Column Function

Appendix J  Knapsack Public-Key Algorithm
   J.1 The Knapsack Problem
   J.2 The Knapsack Cryptosystem
   J.3 Example

Appendix K  Proof of the Digital Signature Algorithm

Appendix L  TCP/IP and OSI
   L.1 Protocols and Protocol Architectures
   L.2 The TCP/IP Protocol Architecture
   L.3 The Role of an Internet Protocol
   L.4 IPv4
   L.5 IPv6
   L.6 The OSI Protocol Architecture

Appendix M  Java Cryptographic APIs
   M.1 Introduction
   M.2 JCA and JCE Architecture
   M.3 JCA Classes
   M.4 JCE Classes
   M.5 Conclusion and References
M.6 Using the Cryptographic Application
M.7 JCA/JCE Cryptography Example

Appendix N The Whirlpool Hash Function
N.1 Whirlpool Hash Structure
N.2 Block Cipher W
N.3 Performance of Whirlpool

Appendix O Data Compression Using ZIP
O.1 Compression Algorithm
O.2 Decompression Algorithm

Appendix P PGP Random Number Generation
P.1 True Random Numbers
P.2 Pseudorandom Numbers

Appendix Q International Reference Alphabet

Glossary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D, K</td>
<td>D(K, Y)</td>
<td>Symmetric decryption of ciphertext Y using secret key K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D, PRa</td>
<td>D(PRa, Y)</td>
<td>Asymmetric decryption of ciphertext Y using A's private key PRa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D, PUa</td>
<td>D(PUa, Y)</td>
<td>Asymmetric decryption of ciphertext Y using A's public key PUa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, K</td>
<td>E(K, X)</td>
<td>Symmetric encryption of plaintext X using secret key K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, PRa</td>
<td>E(PRa, X)</td>
<td>Asymmetric encryption of plaintext X using A's private key PRa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, PUa</td>
<td>E(PUa, X)</td>
<td>Asymmetric encryption of plaintext X using A's public key PUa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Secret key</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRa</td>
<td>Private key of user A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUa</td>
<td>Public key of user A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC, K</td>
<td>MAC(K, X)</td>
<td>Message authentication code of message X using secret key K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF(p)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The finite field of order p, where p is prime. The field is defined as the set ( \mathbb{Z}_p ) together with the arithmetic operations modulo p.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF(2^n)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The finite field of order ( 2^n )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Z_n )</td>
<td></td>
<td>Set of nonnegative integers less than n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gcd</td>
<td>gcd(i, j)</td>
<td>Greatest common divisor; the largest positive integer that divides both i and j with no remainder on division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mod</td>
<td>a mod m</td>
<td>Remainder after division of a by m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mod, =</td>
<td>a \equiv b (mod m)</td>
<td>a \equiv b (mod m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mod, \neq</td>
<td>a \not\equiv b (mod m)</td>
<td>a \not\equiv b (mod m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dlog</td>
<td>\text{dlog}_{a, p}(b)</td>
<td>Discrete logarithm of the number b for the base a (mod p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varphi )</td>
<td>( \phi(n) )</td>
<td>The number of positive integers less than n and relatively prime to n. This is Euler's totient function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Sigma )</td>
<td>( \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i )</td>
<td>( a_1 + a_2 + \cdots + a_n )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Pi )</td>
<td>( \prod_{i=1}^{n} a_i )</td>
<td>( a_1 \times a_2 \times \cdots \times a_n )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$i \mid j$</td>
<td>$i$ divides $j$, which means that there is no remainder when $j$ is divided by $i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x \parallel y$</td>
<td>$x$ concatenated with $y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\approx$</td>
<td>$x \approx y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\oplus$</td>
<td>$x \oplus y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$</td>
<td>$\lfloor x \rfloor$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\in$</td>
<td>$x \in S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\leftrightarrow$</td>
<td>$A \leftrightarrow (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“The tie, if I might suggest it, sir, a shade more tightly knotted. One aims at the perfect butterfly effect. If you will permit me —”

“What does it matter, Jeeves, at a time like this? Do you realize that Mr. Little’s domestic happiness is hanging in the scale?”

“There is no time, sir, at which ties do not matter.”

—Very Good, Jeeves! P.G. Wodehouse

In this age of universal electronic connectivity, of viruses and hackers, of electronic eavesdropping and electronic fraud, there is indeed no time at which security does not matter. Two trends have come together to make the topic of this book of vital interest. First, the explosive growth in computer systems and their interconnections via networks has increased the dependence of both organizations and individuals on the information stored and communicated using these systems. This, in turn, has led to a heightened awareness of the need to protect data and resources from disclosure, to guarantee the authenticity of data and messages, and to protect systems from network-based attacks. Second, the disciplines of cryptography and network security have matured, leading to the development of practical, readily available applications to enforce network security.

OBJECTIVES

It is the purpose of this book to provide a practical survey of both the principles and practice of cryptography and network security. In the first part of the book, the basic issues to be addressed by a network security capability are explored by providing a tutorial and survey of cryptography and network security technology. The latter part of the book deals with the practice of network security: practical applications that have been implemented and are in use to provide network security.

The subject, and therefore this book, draws on a variety of disciplines. In particular, it is impossible to appreciate the significance of some of the techniques discussed in this book without a basic understanding of number theory and some results from probability theory. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to make the book self-contained. The book presents not only the basic mathematical results that are needed but provides the reader with an intuitive understanding of those results. Such background material is introduced as needed. This approach helps to motivate the material that is introduced, and the author considers this preferable to simply presenting all of the mathematical material in a lump at the beginning of the book.

INTENDED AUDIENCE

The book is intended for both academic and a professional audiences. As a textbook, it is intended as a one-semester undergraduate course in cryptography and network security for computer science, computer engineering, and electrical engineering majors. It covers the
material in IAS2 Security Mechanisms, a core area in the Information Technology body of knowledge; NET4 Security, another core area in the Information Technology body of knowledge; and IT311, Cryptography, an advanced course; these subject areas are part of the ACM/IEEE Computer Society Computing Curricula 2005.

The book also serves as a basic reference volume and is suitable for self-study.

**PLAN OF THE BOOK**

The book is divided into seven parts (see Chapter 0 for an overview):

- Symmetric Ciphers
- Asymmetric Ciphers
- Cryptographic Data Integrity Algorithms
- Mutual Trust
- Network and Internet Security
- System Security
- Legal and Ethical Issues

The book includes a number of pedagogic features, including the use of the computer algebra system Sage and numerous figures and tables to clarify the discussions. Each chapter includes a list of key words, review questions, homework problems, suggestions for further reading, and recommended Web sites. The book also includes an extensive glossary, a list of frequently used acronyms, and a bibliography. In addition, a test bank is available to instructors.

**ONLINE DOCUMENTS FOR STUDENTS**

For this new edition, a tremendous amount of original supporting material has been made available online, in the following categories.

- **Online chapters:** To limit the size and cost of the book, four chapters of the book are provided in PDF format. This includes three chapters on computer security and one on legal and ethical issues. The chapters are listed in this book’s table of contents.

- **Online appendices:** There are numerous interesting topics that support material found in the text but whose inclusion is not warranted in the printed text. A total of fifteen online appendices cover these topics for the interested student. The appendices are listed in this book’s table of contents.

- **Homework problems and solutions:** To aid the student in understanding the material, a separate set of homework problems with solutions are available. These enable the students to test their understanding of the text.

- **Key papers:** Twenty-four papers from the professional literature, many hard to find, are provided for further reading.

- **Supporting documents:** A variety of other useful documents are referenced in the text and provided online.

- **Sage code:** The Sage code from the examples in Appendix B in case the student wants to play around with the examples.
Purchasing this textbook now grants the reader six months of access to this online material. See the access card bound into the front of this book for details.

**INSTRUCTIONAL SUPPORT MATERIALS**

To support instructors, the following materials are provided:

- **Projects Manual**: Suggested project assignments for all of the project categories listed below.
- **PowerPoint Slides**: A set of slides covering all chapters, suitable for use in lecturing.
- **PDF Files**: Reproductions of all figures and tables from the book.
- **Test Bank**: A chapter-by-chapter set of questions.

All of these support materials are available at the Instructor Resource Center (IRC) for this textbook, which can be reached via personhighered.com/stallings or by clicking on the button labeled “Book Info and More Instructor Resources” at this book’s Web Site WilliamStallings.com/Crypto/Crypto5e.html. To gain access to the IRC, please contact your local Prentice Hall sales representative via pearsonhighered.com/educator/replocator/requestSalesRep.page or call Prentice Hall Faculty Services at 1-800-526-0485.

**INTERNET SERVICES FOR INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS**

There is a Web site for this book that provides support for students and instructors. The site includes links to other relevant sites, transparency masters of figures and tables in the book in PDF (Adobe Acrobat) format, and PowerPoint slides. The Web page is at WilliamStallings.com/Crypto/Crypto5e.html. For more information, see Chapter 0.

New to this edition is a set of homework problems with solutions available at this Web site. Students can enhance their understanding of the material by working out the solutions to these problems and then checking their answers.

An Internet mailing list has been set up so that instructors using this book can exchange information, suggestions, and questions with each other and with the author. As soon as typos or other errors are discovered, an errata list for this book will be available at WilliamStallings.com. In addition, the Computer Science Student Resource site at WilliamStallings.com/StudentSupport.html provides documents, information, and useful links for computer science students and professionals.

**PROJECTS AND OTHER STUDENT EXERCISES**

For many instructors, an important component of a cryptography or security course is a project or set of projects by which the student gets hands-on experience to reinforce concepts from the text. This book provides an unparalleled degree of support, including a projects component in the course. The IRC not only includes guidance on how to assign and structure
the projects, but it also includes a set of project assignments that covers a broad range of topics from the text.

- **Sage Projects:** Described in the next section.
- **Hacking Project:** This exercise is designed to illuminate the key issues in intrusion detection and prevention.
- **Block Cipher Projects:** This is a lab that explores the operation of the AES encryption algorithm by tracing its execution, computing one round by hand, and then exploring the various block cipher modes of use. The lab also covers DES. In both cases, an online Java applet is used (or can be downloaded) to execute AES or DES.
- **Lab Exercises:** A series of projects that involve programming and experimenting with concepts from the book.
- **Research Projects:** A series of research assignments that instruct the student to research a particular topic on the Internet and write a report.
- **Programming Projects:** A series of programming projects that cover a broad range of topics and that can be implemented in any suitable language on any platform.
- **Practical Security Assessments:** A set of exercises to examine current infrastructure and practices of an existing organization.
- **Writing Assignments:** A set of suggested writing assignments organized by chapter.
- **Reading/Report Assignments:** A list of papers in the literature — one for each chapter — that can be assigned for the student to read and then write a short report.

See Appendix A for details.

---

**THE SAGE COMPUTER ALGEBRA SYSTEM**

One of the most important new features for this edition is the use of Sage for cryptographic examples and homework assignments. Sage is an open-source, multiplatform, freeware package that implements a very powerful, flexible, and easily learned mathematics and computer algebra system. Unlike competing systems (such as Mathematica, Maple, and MATLAB), there are no licensing agreements or fees involved. Thus, Sage can be made available on computers and networks at school, and students can individually download the software to their own personal computers for use at home. Another advantage of using Sage is that students learn a powerful, flexible tool that can be used for virtually any mathematical application, not just cryptography.

The use of Sage can make a significant difference to the teaching of the mathematics of cryptographic algorithms. This book provides a large number of examples of the use of Sage covering many cryptographic concepts in Appendix B.

Appendix C lists exercises in each of these topic areas to enable the student to gain hands-on experience with cryptographic algorithms. This appendix is available to instructors at the IRC for this book. Appendix C includes a section on how to download and get started with Sage, a section on programming with Sage, and includes exercises that can be assigned to students in the following categories:

- **Chapter 2 — Classical Encryption:** Affine ciphers and the Hill cipher.
- **Chapter 3 — Block Ciphers And The Data Encryption Standard:** Exercises based on SDES.
• Chapter 4 — Basic Concepts In Number Theory And Finite Fields: Euclidean and extended Euclidean algorithms, polynomial arithmetic, and GF(24).

• Chapter 5 — Advanced Encryption Standard: Exercise based on SAES.

• Chapter 6 — Pseudorandom Number Generation And Stream Ciphers: Blum Blum Shub, linear congruential generator, and ANSI X9.17 PRNG.

• Chapter 8 — Number Theory: Euler’s Totient function, Miller Rabin, factoring, modular exponentiation, discrete logarithm, and Chinese remainder theorem.

• Chapter 9 — Public-Key Cryptography And RSA: RSA encrypt/decrypt and signing.

• Chapter 10 — Other Public-Key Cryptosystems: Diffie-Hellman, elliptic curve

• Chapter 11 — Cryptographic Hash Functions: Number-theoretic hash function.

• Chapter 13 — Digital Signatures: DSA.

---

WHAT’S NEW IN THE FIFTH EDITION

The changes for this new edition of *Cryptography and Network Security* are more substantial and comprehensive than those for any previous revision.

In the three years since the fourth edition of this book was published, the field has seen continued innovations and improvements. In this new edition, I try to capture these changes while maintaining a broad and comprehensive coverage of the entire field. To begin this process of revision, the fourth edition was extensively reviewed by a number of professors who teach the subject. In addition, a number of professionals working in the field reviewed individual chapters. The result is that, in many places, the narrative has been clarified and tightened, and illustrations have been improved. Also, a large number of new “field-tested” problems have been added.

One obvious change to the book is a revision in the organization, which makes for a clearer presentation of related topics. There is a new Part Three, which pulls together all of the material on cryptographic algorithms for data integrity, including cryptographic hash functions, message authentication codes, and digital signatures. The material on key management and exchange, previously distributed in several places in the book, is now organized in a single chapter, as is the material on user authentication.

Beyond these refinements to improve pedagogy and user friendliness, there have been major substantive changes throughout the book. Highlights include:

• **Euclidean and extended Euclidean algorithms (revised):** These algorithms are important for numerous cryptographic functions and algorithms. The material on the Euclidean and extended Euclidean algorithms for integers and for polynomials has been completely rewritten to provide a clearer and more systematic treatment.

• **Advanced Encryption Standard (revised):** AES has emerged as the dominant symmetric encryption algorithm, used in a wide variety of applications. Accordingly, this edition has dramatically expanded the resources for learning about and understanding this important standard. The chapter on AES has been revised and expanded, with additional illustrations and a detailed example, to clarify the presentation. Examples and assignments using Sage have been added. And the book now includes an AES cryptography lab, which enables the student to gain hands-on experience with AES cipher internals and modes of use. The lab makes use of an AES calculator applet, available at this book’s Web site, that can encrypt or decrypt test data values using the AES block cipher.
• **Block Cipher Modes of Operation (revised):** The material in Chapter 6 on modes of operation has been expanded and the illustrations redrawn for greater clarity.

• **Pseudorandom number generation and pseudorandom functions (revised):** The treatment of this important topic has been expanded, with the addition of new material on the use of symmetric encryption algorithms and cryptographic hash functions to construct pseudorandom functions.

• **ElGamal encryption and digital signature (new):** New sections have been added on this popular public-key algorithm.

• **Cryptographic hash functions and message authentication codes (revised):** The material on hash functions and MAC has been revised and reorganized to provide a clearer and more systematic treatment.

• **SHA-3 (new):** Although the SHA-3 algorithm has yet to be selected, it is important for the student to have a grasp of the design criteria for this forthcoming cryptographic hash standard.

• **Authenticated encryption (new):** The book covers the important new algorithms, CCM and GCM, which simultaneously provide confidentiality and data integrity.

• **Key management and distribution (revised):** In the fourth edition, these topics were scattered across three chapters. In the fifth edition, the material is revised and consolidated into a single chapter to provide a unified, systematic treatment.

• **Remote user authentication (revised):** In the fourth edition, this topic was covered in parts of two chapters. In the fifth edition the material is revised and consolidated into a single chapter to provide a unified, systematic treatment.

• **Federated identity (new):** A new section covers this common identity management scheme across multiple enterprises and numerous applications and supporting many thousands, even millions, of users.

• **HTTPS (new):** A new section covers this protocol for providing secure communication between Web browser and Web server.

• **Secure shell (new):** SSH, one of the most pervasive applications of encryption technology, is covered in a new section.

• **DomainKeys Identified Mail (new):** A new section covers DKIM, which has become the standard means of authenticating e-mail to counter spam.

• **Wireless network security (new):** A new chapter covers this important area of network security. The chapter deals with the IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) security standard for wireless local area networks; and the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) security standard for communication between a mobile Web browser and a Web server.

• **IPsec (revised):** The chapter on IPsec has been almost completely rewritten. It now covers IPsecv3 and IKEv2. In addition, the presentation has been revised to improve clarity and breadth.

• **Legal and ethical issues (new):** A new online chapter covers these important topics.

• **Online appendices (new):** Fifteen online appendices provide additional breadth and depth for the interested student on a variety of topics.

• **Sage examples and problems (new):** As mentioned, this new edition makes use of the open-source, freeware Sage computer algebra application to enable students to have hands-on experience with a variety of cryptographic algorithms.
With each new edition it is a struggle to maintain a reasonable page count while adding new material. In part, this objective is realized by eliminating obsolete material and tightening the narrative. For this edition, chapters and appendices that are of less general interest have been moved online as individual PDF files. This has allowed an expansion of material without the corresponding increase in size and price.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This new edition has benefited from review by a number of people who gave generously of their time and expertise. The following people reviewed all or a large part of the manuscript: Marius Zimand (Towson State University), Shambhu Upadhyaya (University of Buffalo), Nan Zhang (George Washington University), Dongwan Shin (New Mexico Tech), Michael Kain (Drexel University), William Bard (University of Texas), David Arnold (Baylor University), Edward Allen (Wake Forest University), Michael Goodrich (UC-Irvine), Xunhua Wang (James Madison University), Xianyang Li (Illinois Institute of Technology), and Paul Jenkins (Brigham Young University).

Thanks also to the many people who provided detailed technical reviews of one or more chapters: Martin Bealby, Martin Hlavac (Department of Algebra, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic), Martin Rublik (BSP Consulting and University of Economics in Bratislava), Rafael Lara (President of Venezuela’s Association for Information Security and Cryptography Research), Amitab Saxena, and Michael Spratte (Hewlett-Packard Company). I would especially like to thank Nikhil Bhargava (IIT Delhi) for providing detailed reviews of various chapters of the book.

Joan Daemen kindly reviewed the chapter on AES. Vincent Rijmen reviewed the material on Whirlpool. Edward F. Schaefer reviewed the material on simplified AES.

Nikhil Bhargava (IIT Delhi) developed the set of online homework problems and solutions. Dan Shumow of Microsoft and the University of Washington developed all of the Sage examples and assignments in Appendices B and C. Professor Sreekanth Malladi of Dakota State University developed the hacking exercises. Lawrie Brown of the Australian Defence Force Academy provided the AES/DES block cipher projects and the security assessment assignments.

Sanjay Rao and Ruben Torres of Purdue University developed the laboratory exercises that appear in the IRC. The following people contributed project assignments that appear in the instructor’s supplement: Henning Schulzrinne (Columbia University); Cetin Kaya Koc (Oregon State University); and David Balenson (Trusted Information Systems and George Washington University). Kim McLaughlin developed the test bank.

Finally, I would like to thank the many people responsible for the publication of the book, all of whom did their usual excellent job. This includes my editor Tracy Dunkelberger, her assistant Melinda Hagerty, and production manager Rose Kernan. Also, Jake Warde of Warde Publishers managed the reviews.

With all this assistance, little remains for which I can take full credit. However, I am proud to say that, with no help whatsoever, I selected all of the quotations.
This page intentionally left blank
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

William Stallings has made a unique contribution to understanding the broad sweep of technical developments in computer security, computer networking and computer architecture. He has authored 17 titles, and counting revised editions, a total of 42 books on various aspects of these subjects. His writings have appeared in numerous ACM and IEEE publications, including the Proceedings of the IEEE and ACM Computing Reviews.

He has 11 times received the award for the best Computer Science textbook of the year from the Text and Academic Authors Association.

In over 30 years in the field, he has been a technical contributor, technical manager, and an executive with several high-technology firms. He has designed and implemented both TCP/IP-based and OSI-based protocol suites on a variety of computers and operating systems, ranging from microcomputers to mainframes. As a consultant, he has advised government agencies, computer and software vendors, and major users on the design, selection, and use of networking software and products.

He created and maintains the Computer Science Student Resource Site at WilliamStallings.com/StudentSupport.html. This site provides documents and links on a variety of subjects of general interest to computer science students (and professionals). He is a member of the editorial board of Cryptologia, a scholarly journal devoted to all aspects of cryptology.

Dr. Stallings holds a PhD from M.I.T. in Computer Science and a B.S. from Notre Dame in electrical engineering.
This page intentionally left blank
READER’S GUIDE

0.1 Outline of This Book

0.2 A Roadmap for Readers and Instructors
   Subject Matter
   Topic Ordering

0.3 Internet and Web Resources
   Web Sites for This Book
   Other Web Sites
   Newsgroups and Forums

0.4 Standards
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

—The Art of War, Sun Tzu

This book, with its accompanying Web site, covers a lot of material. Here we give the reader an overview.

0.1 OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK

Following an introductory chapter, Chapter 1, the book is organized into seven parts:

Part One: Symmetric Ciphers: Provides a survey of symmetric encryption, including classical and modern algorithms. The emphasis is on the two most important algorithms, the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This part also covers the most important stream encryption algorithm, RC4, and the important topic of pseudorandom number generation.

Part Two: Asymmetric Ciphers: Provides a survey of public-key algorithms, including RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adelman) and elliptic curve.

Part Three: Cryptographic Data Integrity Algorithms: Begins with a survey of cryptographic hash functions. This part then covers two approaches to data integrity that rely on cryptographic hash functions: message authentication codes and digital signatures.

Part Four: Mutual Trust: Covers key management and key distribution topics and then covers user authentication techniques.

Part Five: Network Security and Internet Security: Examines the use of cryptographic algorithms and security protocols to provide security over networks and the Internet. Topics covered include transport-level security, wireless network security, e-mail security, and IP security.

Part Six: System Security: Deals with security facilities designed to protect a computer system from security threats, including intruders, viruses, and worms. This part also looks at firewall technology.

Part Seven: Legal and Ethical Issues: Deals with the legal and ethical issues related to computer and network security.

A number of online appendices at this book’s Web site cover additional topics relevant to the book.

0.2 A ROADMAP FOR READERS AND INSTRUCTORS

Subject Matter

The material in this book is organized into four broad categories:

- Cryptographic algorithms: This is the study of techniques for ensuring the secrecy and/or authenticity of information. The three main areas of study in
this category are: (1) symmetric encryption, (2) asymmetric encryption, and (3) cryptographic hash functions, with the related topics of message authentication codes and digital signatures.

- **Mutual trust:** This is the study of techniques and algorithms for providing mutual trust in two main areas. First, key management and distribution deals with establishing trust in the encryption keys used between two communicating entities. Second, user authentication deals with establishing trust in the identity of a communicating partner.

- **Network security:** This area covers the use of cryptographic algorithms in network protocols and network applications.

- **Computer security:** In this book, we use this term to refer to the security of computers against intruders (e.g., hackers) and malicious software (e.g., viruses). Typically, the computer to be secured is attached to a network, and the bulk of the threats arise from the network.

The first two parts of the book deal with two distinct cryptographic approaches: symmetric cryptographic algorithms and public-key, or asymmetric, cryptographic algorithms. Symmetric algorithms make use of a single key shared by two parties. Public-key algorithms make use of two keys: a private key known only to one party and a public key available to other parties.

**Topic Ordering**

This book covers a lot of material. For the instructor or reader who wishes a shorter treatment, there are a number of opportunities.

To thoroughly cover the material in the first three parts, the chapters should be read in sequence. With the exception of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), none of the material in Part One requires any special mathematical background. To understand AES, it is necessary to have some understanding of finite fields. In turn, an understanding of finite fields requires a basic background in prime numbers and modular arithmetic. Accordingly, Chapter 4 covers all of these mathematical preliminaries just prior to their use in Chapter 5 on AES. Thus, if Chapter 5 is skipped, it is safe to skip Chapter 4 as well.

Chapter 2 introduces some concepts that are useful in later chapters of Part One. However, for the reader whose sole interest is contemporary cryptography, this chapter can be quickly skimmed. The two most important symmetric cryptographic algorithms are DES and AES, which are covered in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively.

Chapter 6 covers specific techniques for using what are known as block symmetric ciphers. Chapter 7 covers stream ciphers and random number generation. These two chapters may be skipped on an initial reading, but this material is referenced in later parts of the book.

For Part Two, the only additional mathematical background that is needed is in the area of number theory, which is covered in Chapter 8. The reader who has skipped Chapters 4 and 5 should first review the material on Sections 4.1 through 4.3.

The two most widely used general-purpose public-key algorithms are RSA and elliptic curve, with RSA enjoying wider acceptance. The reader may wish to skip the material on elliptic curve cryptography in Chapter 10, at least on a first reading.
In Part Three, the topics in Sections 12.6 and 12.7 are of lesser importance. Parts Four, Five, and Six are relatively independent of each other and can be read in any order. These three parts assume a basic understanding of the material in Parts One, Two, and Three. The four chapters of Part Five, on network and Internet security, are relatively independent of one another and can be read in any order.

0.3 INTERNET AND WEB RESOURCES

There are a number of resources available on the Internet and the Web to support this book and to help readers keep up with developments in this field.

Web Sites for This Book

There is a Web page for this book at WilliamStallings.com/Crypto/Crypto5e.html. The site includes the following:

- Useful Web sites: There are links to other relevant Web sites, organized by chapter, including the sites listed throughout this book.
- Errata sheet: An errata list for this book will be maintained and updated as needed. Please e-mail any errors that you spot to me. Errata sheets for my other books are at WilliamStallings.com.
- Figures: All of the figures in this book are provided in PDF (Adobe Acrobat) format.
- Tables: All of the tables in this book are provided in PDF format.
- Slides: A set of PowerPoint slides are provided, organized by chapter.
- Cryptography and network security courses: There are links to home pages for courses based on this book; these pages may be useful to other instructors in providing ideas about how to structure their course.

I also maintain the Computer Science Student Resource Site, at WilliamStallings.com/StudentSupport.html. The purpose of this site is to provide documents, information, and links for computer science students and professionals. Links and documents are organized into six categories:

- Math: Includes a basic math refresher, a queuing analysis primer, a number system primer, and links to numerous math sites
- How-to: Advice and guidance for solving homework problems, writing technical reports, and preparing technical presentations
- Research resources: Links to important collections of papers, technical reports, and bibliographies
- Miscellaneous: A variety of other useful documents and links.
- Computer science careers: Useful links and documents for those considering a career in computer science.
- Humor and other diversions: You have to take your mind off your work once in a while.
Other Web Sites

There are numerous Web sites that provide information related to the topics of this book. In subsequent chapters, pointers to specific Web sites can be found in the Recommended Reading and Web Sites section. Because the addresses for Web sites tend to change frequently, the book does not provide URLs. For all of the Web sites listed in the book, the appropriate link can be found at this book’s Web site. Other links not mentioned in this book will be added to the Web site over time.

Newsgroups and Forums

A number of USENET newsgroups are devoted to some aspect of cryptography or network security. As with virtually all USENET groups, there is a high noise-to-signal ratio, but it is worth experimenting to see if any meet your needs. The most relevant are as follows:

- **sci.crypt.research**: The best group to follow. This is a moderated newsgroup that deals with research topics; postings must have some relationship to the technical aspects of cryptology.
- **sci.crypt**: A general discussion of cryptology and related topics.
- **sci.crypt.random-numbers**: A discussion of cryptographic-strength random number generators.
- **alt.security**: A general discussion of security topics.
- **comp.security.misc**: A general discussion of computer security topics.
- **comp.security.firewalls**: A discussion of firewall products and technology.
- **comp.security.announce**: News and announcements from CERT.
- **comp.risks**: A discussion of risks to the public from computers and users.
- **comp.virus**: A moderated discussion of computer viruses.

In addition, there are a number of forums dealing with cryptography available on the Internet. Among the most worthwhile are

- **Security and Cryptography forum**: Sponsored by DevShed. Discusses issues related to coding, server applications, network protection, data protection, firewalls, ciphers, and the like.
- **Cryptography forum**: On Topix. Fairly good focus on technical issues.
- **Security forums**: On WindowsSecurity.com. Broad range of forums, including cryptographic theory, cryptographic software, firewalls, and malware.

Links to these forums are provided at this book’s Web site.

0.4 STANDARDS

Many of the security techniques and applications described in this book have been specified as standards. Additionally, standards have been developed to cover management practices and the overall architecture of security mechanisms.
and services. Throughout this book, we describe the most important standards in use or being developed for various aspects of cryptography and network security. Various organizations have been involved in the development or promotion of these standards. The most important (in the current context) of these organizations are as follows:

- **National Institute of Standards and Technology:** NIST is a U.S. federal agency that deals with measurement science, standards, and technology related to U.S. government use and to the promotion of U.S. private-sector innovation. Despite its national scope, NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publications (SP) have a worldwide impact.

- **Internet Society:** ISOC is a professional membership society with worldwide organizational and individual membership. It provides leadership in addressing issues that confront the future of the Internet and is the organization home for the groups responsible for Internet infrastructure standards, including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). These organizations develop Internet standards and related specifications, all of which are published as Requests for Comments (RFCs).

- **ITU-T:** The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is an international organization within the United Nations System in which governments and the private sector coordinate global telecom networks and services. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is one of the three sectors of the ITU. ITU-T’s mission is the production of standards covering all fields of telecommunications. ITU-T standards are referred to as Recommendations.

- **ISO:** The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)\(^1\) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies from more than 140 countries, one from each country. ISO is a nongovernmental organization that promotes the development of standardization and related activities with a view to facilitating the international exchange of goods and services and to developing cooperation in the spheres of intellectual, scientific, technological, and economic activity. ISO’s work results in international agreements that are published as International Standards.

A more detailed discussion of these organizations is contained in Appendix D.

---

\(^1\)ISO is not an acronym (in which case it would be IOS), but it is a word derived from the Greek, meaning *equal.*
OVERVIEW

1.1 Computer Security Concepts
   A Definition of Computer Security
   Examples
   The Challenges of Computer Security

1.2 The OSI Security Architecture

1.3 Security Attacks
   Passive Attacks
   Active Attacks

1.4 Security Services
   Authentication
   Access Control
   Data Confidentiality
   Data Integrity
   Nonrepudiation
   Availability Service

1.5 Security Mechanisms

1.6 A Model for Network Security

1.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

1.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) security architecture provides a systematic framework for defining security attacks, mechanisms, and services.

Security attacks are classified as either passive attacks, which include unauthorized reading of a message or file and traffic analysis or active attacks, such as modification of messages or files, and denial of service.

A security mechanism is any process (or a device incorporating such a process) that is designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack. Examples of mechanisms are encryption algorithms, digital signatures, and authentication protocols.

Security services include authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, nonrepudiation, and availability.

This book focuses on two broad areas: cryptographic algorithms and protocols, which have a broad range of applications; and network and Internet security, which rely heavily on cryptographic techniques.

Cryptographic algorithms and protocols can be grouped into four main areas:

- **Symmetric encryption:** Used to conceal the contents of blocks or streams of data of any size, including messages, files, encryption keys, and passwords.
- **Asymmetric encryption:** Used to conceal small blocks of data, such as encryption keys and hash function values, which are used in digital signatures.
- **Data integrity algorithms:** Used to protect blocks of data, such as messages, from alteration.
- **Authentication protocols:** These are schemes based on the use of cryptographic algorithms designed to authenticate the identity of entities.

The field of network and Internet security consists of measures to deter, prevent, detect, and correct security violations that involve the transmission of information. That is a broad statement that covers a host of possibilities. To give you a feel for the areas covered in this book, consider the following examples of security violations:

1. User A transmits a file to user B. The file contains sensitive information (e.g., payroll records) that is to be protected from disclosure. User C, who is
not authorized to read the file, is able to monitor the transmission and capture a copy of the file during its transmission.

2. A network manager, D, transmits a message to a computer, E, under its management. The message instructs computer E to update an authorization file to include the identities of a number of new users who are to be given access to that computer. User F intercepts the message, alters its contents to add or delete entries, and then forwards the message to computer E, which accepts the message as coming from manager D and updates its authorization file accordingly.

3. Rather than intercept a message, user F constructs its own message with the desired entries and transmits that message to computer E as if it had come from manager D. Computer E accepts the message as coming from manager D and updates its authorization file accordingly.

4. An employee is fired without warning. The personnel manager sends a message to a server system to invalidate the employee’s account. When the invalidation is accomplished, the server is to post a notice to the employee’s file as confirmation of the action. The employee is able to intercept the message and delay it long enough to make a final access to the server to retrieve sensitive information. The message is then forwarded, the action taken, and the confirmation posted. The employee’s action may go unnoticed for some considerable time.

5. A message is sent from a customer to a stockbroker with instructions for various transactions. Subsequently, the investments lose value and the customer denies sending the message.

Although this list by no means exhausts the possible types of network security violations, it illustrates the range of concerns of network security.

1.1 COMPUTER SECURITY CONCEPTS

A Definition of Computer Security

The NIST Computer Security Handbook [NIST95] defines the term computer security as follows:

**COMPUTER SECURITY**

The protection afforded to an automated information system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information system resources (includes hardware, software, firmware, information/data, and telecommunications).
This definition introduces three key objectives that are at the heart of computer security:

- **Confidentiality**: This term covers two related concepts:
  - **Data confidentiality**: Assures that private or confidential information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals.
  - **Privacy**: Assures that individuals control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to whom that information may be disclosed.

- **Integrity**: This term covers two related concepts:
  - **Data integrity**: Assures that information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner.
  - **System integrity**: Assures that a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system.

- **Availability**: Assures that systems work promptly and service is not denied to authorized users.

These three concepts form what is often referred to as the **CIA triad** (Figure 1.1). The three concepts embody the fundamental security objectives for both data and for information and computing services. For example, the NIST standard FIPS 199 *(Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information*...)

---

1RFCS 2828 defines *information* as “facts and ideas, which can be represented (encoded) as various forms of data,” and *data* as “information in a specific physical representation, usually a sequence of symbols that have meaning; especially a representation of information that can be processed or produced by a computer.” Security literature typically does not make much of a distinction, nor does this book.
and Information Systems) lists confidentiality, integrity, and availability as the three security objectives for information and for information systems. FIPS 199 provides a useful characterization of these three objectives in terms of requirements and the definition of a loss of security in each category:

- **Confidentiality:** Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.

- **Integrity:** Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, including ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity. A loss of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of information.

- **Availability:** Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or use of information or an information system.

Although the use of the CIA triad to define security objectives is well established, some in the security field feel that additional concepts are needed to present a complete picture. Two of the most commonly mentioned are as follows:

- **Authenticity:** The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or message originator. This means verifying that users are who they say they are and that each input arriving at the system came from a trusted source.

- **Accountability:** The security goal that generates the requirement for actions of an entity to be traced uniquely to that entity. This supports nonrepudiation, deterrence, fault isolation, intrusion detection and prevention, and after-action recovery and legal action. Because truly secure systems are not yet an achievable goal, we must be able to trace a security breach to a responsible party. Systems must keep records of their activities to permit later forensic analysis to trace security breaches or to aid in transaction disputes.

**Examples**

We now provide some examples of applications that illustrate the requirements just enumerated. For these examples, we use three levels of impact on organizations or individuals should there be a breach of security (i.e., a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability). These levels are defined in FIPS PUB 199:

- **Low:** The loss could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on operational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. A limited adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability

---

2 These examples are taken from a security policy document published by the Information Technology Security and Privacy Office at Purdue University.
might (i) cause a degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is noticeably reduced; (ii) result in minor damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in minor financial loss; or (iv) result in minor harm to individuals.

• **Moderate**: The loss could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. A serious adverse effect means that, for example, the loss might (i) cause a significant degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is significantly reduced; (ii) result in significant damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in significant financial loss; or (iv) result in significant harm to individuals that does not involve loss of life or serious, life-threatening injuries.

• **High**: The loss could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. A severe or catastrophic adverse effect means that, for example, the loss might (i) cause a severe degradation in or loss of mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is not able to perform one or more of its primary functions; (ii) result in major damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in major financial loss; or (iv) result in severe or catastrophic harm to individuals involving loss of life or serious, life-threatening injuries.

**Confidentiality** Student grade information is an asset whose confidentiality is considered to be highly important by students. In the United States, the release of such information is regulated by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Grade information should only be available to students, their parents, and employees that require the information to do their job. Student enrollment information may have a moderate confidentiality rating. While still covered by FERPA, this information is seen by more people on a daily basis, is less likely to be targeted than grade information, and results in less damage if disclosed. Directory information, such as lists of students or faculty or departmental lists, may be assigned a low confidentiality rating or indeed no rating. This information is typically freely available to the public and published on a school’s Web site.

**Integrity** Several aspects of integrity are illustrated by the example of a hospital patient’s allergy information stored in a database. The doctor should be able to trust that the information is correct and current. Now suppose that an employee (e.g., a nurse) who is authorized to view and update this information deliberately falsifies the data to cause harm to the hospital. The database needs to be restored to a trusted basis quickly, and it should be possible to trace the error back to the person responsible. Patient allergy information is an example of an asset with a high requirement for integrity. Inaccurate information could result in serious harm or death to a patient and expose the hospital to massive liability.
An example of an asset that may be assigned a moderate level of integrity requirement is a Web site that offers a forum to registered users to discuss some specific topic. Either a registered user or a hacker could falsify some entries or deface the Web site. If the forum exists only for the enjoyment of the users, brings in little or no advertising revenue, and is not used for something important such as research, then potential damage is not severe. The Web master may experience some data, financial, and time loss.

An example of a low integrity requirement is an anonymous online poll. Many Web sites, such as news organizations, offer these polls to their users with very few safeguards. However, the inaccuracy and unscientific nature of such polls is well understood.

**Availability:** The more critical a component or service, the higher is the level of availability required. Consider a system that provides authentication services for critical systems, applications, and devices. An interruption of service results in the inability for customers to access computing resources and staff to access the resources they need to perform critical tasks. The loss of the service translates into a large financial loss in lost employee productivity and potential customer loss.

An example of an asset that would typically be rated as having a moderate availability requirement is a public Web site for a university; the Web site provides information for current and prospective students and donors. Such a site is not a critical component of the university’s information system, but its unavailability will cause some embarrassment.

An online telephone directory lookup application would be classified as a low availability requirement. Although the temporary loss of the application may be an annoyance, there are other ways to access the information, such as a hardcopy directory or the operator.

**The Challenges of Computer Security**

Computer and network security is both fascinating and complex. Some of the reasons follow:

1. Security is not as simple as it might first appear to the novice. The requirements seem to be straightforward; indeed, most of the major requirements for security services can be given self-explanatory, one-word labels: confidentiality, authentication, nonrepudiation, or integrity. But the mechanisms used to meet those requirements can be quite complex, and understanding them may involve rather subtle reasoning.

2. In developing a particular security mechanism or algorithm, one must always consider potential attacks on those security features. In many cases, successful attacks are designed by looking at the problem in a completely different way, therefore exploiting an unexpected weakness in the mechanism.

3. Because of point 2, the procedures used to provide particular services are often counterintuitive. Typically, a security mechanism is complex, and it is not obvious from the statement of a particular requirement that such elaborate measures are
needed. It is only when the various aspects of the threat are considered that elaborate security mechanisms make sense.

4. Having designed various security mechanisms, it is necessary to decide where to use them. This is true both in terms of physical placement (e.g., at what points in a network are certain security mechanisms needed) and in a logical sense [e.g., at what layer or layers of an architecture such as TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) should mechanisms be placed].

5. Security mechanisms typically involve more than a particular algorithm or protocol. They also require that participants be in possession of some secret information (e.g., an encryption key), which raises questions about the creation, distribution, and protection of that secret information. There also may be a reliance on communications protocols whose behavior may complicate the task of developing the security mechanism. For example, if the proper functioning of the security mechanism requires setting time limits on the transit time of a message from sender to receiver, then any protocol or network that introduces variable, unpredictable delays may render such time limits meaningless.

6. Computer and network security is essentially a battle of wits between a perpetrator who tries to find holes and the designer or administrator who tries to close them. The great advantage that the attacker has is that he or she need only find a single weakness, while the designer must find and eliminate all weaknesses to achieve perfect security.

7. There is a natural tendency on the part of users and system managers to perceive little benefit from security investment until a security failure occurs.

8. Security requires regular, even constant, monitoring, and this is difficult in today’s short-term, overloaded environment.

9. Security is still too often an afterthought to be incorporated into a system after the design is complete rather than being an integral part of the design process.

10. Many users and even security administrators view strong security as an impediment to efficient and user-friendly operation of an information system or use of information.

The difficulties just enumerated will be encountered in numerous ways as we examine the various security threats and mechanisms throughout this book.

### 1.2 THE OSI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

To assess effectively the security needs of an organization and to evaluate and choose various security products and policies, the manager responsible for security needs some systematic way of defining the requirements for security and characterizing the approaches to satisfying those requirements. This is difficult enough in a centralized data processing environment; with the use of local and wide area networks, the problems are compounded.
ITU-T\(^3\) Recommendation X.800, *Security Architecture for OSI*, defines such a systematic approach.\(^4\) The OSI security architecture is useful to managers as a way of organizing the task of providing security. Furthermore, because this architecture was developed as an international standard, computer and communications vendors have developed security features for their products and services that relate to this structured definition of services and mechanisms.

For our purposes, the OSI security architecture provides a useful, if abstract, overview of many of the concepts that this book deals with. The OSI security architecture focuses on security attacks, mechanisms, and services. These can be defined briefly as

- **Security attack**: Any action that compromises the security of information owned by an organization.
- **Security mechanism**: A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that is designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack.
- **Security service**: A processing or communication service that enhances the security of the data processing systems and the information transfers of an organization. The services are intended to counter security attacks, and they make use of one or more security mechanisms to provide the service.

In the literature, the terms *threat* and *attack* are commonly used to mean more or less the same thing. Table 1.1 provides definitions taken from RFC 2828, *Internet Security Glossary*.

### 1.3 SECURITY ATTACKS

A useful means of classifying security attacks, used both in X.800 and RFC 2828, is in terms of *passive attacks* and *active attacks*. A passive attack attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources. An active attack attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation.

---

\(^3\)The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a United Nations-sponsored agency that develops standards, called Recommendations, relating to telecommunications and to open systems interconnection (OSI).

\(^4\)The OSI security architecture was developed in the context of the OSI protocol architecture, which is described in Appendix L. However, for our purposes in this chapter, an understanding of the OSI protocol architecture is not required.
Passive Attacks

Passive attacks are in the nature of eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions. The goal of the opponent is to obtain information that is being transmitted. Two types of passive attacks are the release of message contents and traffic analysis.

The release of message contents is easily understood (Figure 1.2a). A telephone conversation, an electronic mail message, and a transferred file may contain sensitive or confidential information. We would like to prevent an opponent from learning the contents of these transmissions.

A second type of passive attack, traffic analysis, is subtler (Figure 1.2b). Suppose that we had a way of masking the contents of messages or other information traffic so that opponents, even if they captured the message, could not extract the information from the message. The common technique for masking contents is encryption. If we had encryption protection in place, an opponent might still be able to observe the pattern of these messages. The opponent could determine the location and identity of communicating hosts and could observe the frequency and length of messages being exchanged. This information might be useful in guessing the nature of the communication that was taking place.

Passive attacks are very difficult to detect, because they do not involve any alteration of the data. Typically, the message traffic is sent and received in an apparently normal fashion, and neither the sender nor receiver is aware that a third party has read the messages or observed the traffic pattern. However, it is feasible to prevent the success of these attacks, usually by means of encryption. Thus, the emphasis in dealing with passive attacks is on prevention rather than detection.

Active Attacks

Active attacks involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream and can be subdivided into four categories: masquerade, replay, modification of messages, and denial of service.

A masquerade takes place when one entity pretends to be a different entity (Figure 1.3a). A masquerade attack usually includes one of the other forms of active attack. For example, authentication sequences can be captured and replayed after a valid authentication sequence has taken place, thus enabling an authorized entity with few privileges to obtain extra privileges by impersonating an entity that has those privileges.

Replay involves the passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission to produce an unauthorized effect (Figure 1.3b).

Modification of messages simply means that some portion of a legitimate message is altered, or that messages are delayed or reordered, to produce an unauthorized effect (Figure 1.3c). For example, a message meaning “Allow John Smith to read confidential file accounts” is modified to mean “Allow Fred Brown to read confidential file accounts.”

The denial of service prevents or inhibits the normal use or management of communications facilities (Figure 1.3d). This attack may have a specific target; for example, an entity may suppress all messages directed to a particular destination.
1.3 / SECURITY ATTACKS

(a) Release of message contents

(b) Traffic analysis

Figure 1.2 Passive Attacks

(e.g., the security audit service). Another form of service denial is the disruption of an entire network, either by disabling the network or by overloading it with messages so as to degrade performance.

Active attacks present the opposite characteristics of passive attacks. Whereas passive attacks are difficult to detect, measures are available to prevent their success.
On the other hand, it is quite difficult to prevent active attacks absolutely because of the wide variety of potential physical, software, and network vulnerabilities. Instead, the goal is to detect active attacks and to recover from any disruption or delays caused by them. If the detection has a deterrent effect, it may also contribute to prevention.
X.800 defines a security service as a service that is provided by a protocol layer of communicating open systems and that ensures adequate security of the systems or of data transfers. Perhaps a clearer definition is found in RFC 2828, which provides the following definition: a processing or communication service that is provided by
a system to give a specific kind of protection to system resources; security services implement security policies and are implemented by security mechanisms.

X.800 divides these services into five categories and fourteen specific services (Table 1.2). We look at each category in turn.\(^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.2</th>
<th>Security Services (X.800)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHENTICATION</strong></td>
<td>The assurance that the communicating entity is the one that it claims to be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer Entity Authentication</td>
<td>Used in association with a logical connection to provide confidence in the identity of the entities connected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data-Origin Authentication</td>
<td>In a connectionless transfer, provides assurance that the source of received data is as claimed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACCESS CONTROL</strong></td>
<td>The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource (i.e., this service controls who can have access to a resource, under what conditions access can occur, and what those accessing the resource are allowed to do).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DATA CONFIDENTIALITY</strong></td>
<td>The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Confidentiality</td>
<td>The protection of all user data on a connection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectionless Confidentiality</td>
<td>The protection of all user data in a single data block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective-Field Confidentiality</td>
<td>The confidentiality of selected fields within the user data on a connection or in a single data block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic-Flow Confidentiality</td>
<td>The protection of the information that might be derived from observation of traffic flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DATA INTEGRITY</strong></td>
<td>The assurance that data received are exactly as sent by an authorized entity (i.e., contain no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Integrity with Recovery</td>
<td>Provides for the integrity of all user data on a connection and detects any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of any data within an entire data sequence, with recovery attempted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Integrity without Recovery</td>
<td>As above, but provides only detection without recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective-Field Connection Integrity</td>
<td>Provides for the integrity of selected fields within the user data of a data block transferred over a connection and takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified, inserted, deleted, or replayed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectionless Integrity</td>
<td>Provides for the integrity of a single connectionless data block and may take the form of detection of data modification. Additionally, a limited form of replay detection may be provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective-Field Connectionless Integrity</td>
<td>Provides for the integrity of selected fields within a single connectionless data block; takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NONREPUDIATION</strong></td>
<td>Provides protection against denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonrepudiation, Origin</td>
<td>Proof that the message was sent by the specified party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonrepudiation, Destination</td>
<td>Proof that the message was received by the specified party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\)There is no universal agreement about many of the terms used in the security literature. For example, the term *integrity* is sometimes used to refer to all aspects of information security. The term *authentication* is sometimes used to refer both to verification of identity and to the various functions listed under integrity in this chapter. Our usage here agrees with both X.800 and RFC 2828.
Authentication

The authentication service is concerned with assuring that a communication is authentic. In the case of a single message, such as a warning or alarm signal, the function of the authentication service is to assure the recipient that the message is from the source that it claims to be from. In the case of an ongoing interaction, such as the connection of a terminal to a host, two aspects are involved. First, at the time of connection initiation, the service assures that the two entities are authentic, that is, that each is the entity that it claims to be. Second, the service must assure that the connection is not interfered with in such a way that a third party can masquerade as one of the two legitimate parties for the purposes of unauthorized transmission or reception.

Two specific authentication services are defined in X.800:

- **Peer entity authentication**: Provides for the corroboration of the identity of a peer entity in an association. Two entities are considered peers if they implement the same protocol in different systems; e.g., two TCP modules in two communicating systems. Peer entity authentication is provided for use at the establishment of, or at times during the data transfer phase of, a connection. It attempts to provide confidence that an entity is not performing either a masquerade or an unauthorized replay of a previous connection.

- **Data origin authentication**: Provides for the corroboration of the source of a data unit. It does not provide protection against the duplication or modification of data units. This type of service supports applications like electronic mail, where there are no prior interactions between the communicating entities.

Access Control

In the context of network security, access control is the ability to limit and control the access to host systems and applications via communications links. To achieve this, each entity trying to gain access must first be identified, or authenticated, so that access rights can be tailored to the individual.

Data Confidentiality

Confidentiality is the protection of transmitted data from passive attacks. With respect to the content of a data transmission, several levels of protection can be identified. The broadest service protects all user data transmitted between two users over a period of time. For example, when a TCP connection is set up between two systems, this broad protection prevents the release of any user data transmitted over the TCP connection. Narrower forms of this service can also be defined, including the protection of a single message or even specific fields within a message. These refinements are less useful than the broad approach and may even be more complex and expensive to implement.

The other aspect of confidentiality is the protection of traffic flow from analysis. This requires that an attacker not be able to observe the source and destination, frequency, length, or other characteristics of the traffic on a communications facility.
Data Integrity

As with confidentiality, integrity can apply to a stream of messages, a single message, or selected fields within a message. Again, the most useful and straightforward approach is total stream protection.

A connection-oriented integrity service, one that deals with a stream of messages, assures that messages are received as sent with no duplication, insertion, modification, reordering, or replays. The destruction of data is also covered under this service. Thus, the connection-oriented integrity service addresses both message stream modification and denial of service. On the other hand, a connectionless integrity service, one that deals with individual messages without regard to any larger context, generally provides protection against message modification only.

We can make a distinction between service with and without recovery. Because the integrity service relates to active attacks, we are concerned with detection rather than prevention. If a violation of integrity is detected, then the service may simply report this violation, and some other portion of software or human intervention is required to recover from the violation. Alternatively, there are mechanisms available to recover from the loss of integrity of data, as we will review subsequently. The incorporation of automated recovery mechanisms is, in general, the more attractive alternative.

Nonrepudiation

Nonrepudiation prevents either sender or receiver from denying a transmitted message. Thus, when a message is sent, the receiver can prove that the alleged sender in fact sent the message. Similarly, when a message is received, the sender can prove that the alleged receiver in fact received the message.

Availability Service

Both X.800 and RFC 2828 define availability to be the property of a system or a system resource being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized system entity, according to performance specifications for the system (i.e., a system is available if it provides services according to the system design whenever users request them). A variety of attacks can result in the loss of or reduction in availability. Some of these attacks are amenable to automated countermeasures, such as authentication and encryption, whereas others require some sort of physical action to prevent or recover from loss of availability of elements of a distributed system.

X.800 treats availability as a property to be associated with various security services. However, it makes sense to call out specifically an availability service. An availability service is one that protects a system to ensure its availability. This service addresses the security concerns raised by denial-of-service attacks. It depends on proper management and control of system resources and thus depends on access control service and other security services.
Table 1.3 lists the security mechanisms defined in X.800. The mechanisms are divided into those that are implemented in a specific protocol layer, such as TCP or an application-layer protocol, and those that are not specific to any particular protocol layer or security service. These mechanisms will be covered in the appropriate places in the book. So we do not elaborate now, except to comment on the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS</th>
<th>PERVERSIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encipherment</td>
<td>Mechanisms that are not specific to any particular OSI security service or protocol layer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of mathematical algorithms to transform data into a form that is not readily intelligible. The transformation and subsequent recovery of the data depend on an algorithm and zero or more encryption keys.</td>
<td>Trusted Functionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Signature</td>
<td>That which is perceived to be correct with respect to some criteria (e.g., as established by a security policy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery (e.g., by the recipient).</td>
<td>Security Label</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Control</td>
<td>The marking bound to a resource (which may be a data unit) that names or designates the security attributes of that resource.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A variety of mechanisms that enforce access rights to resources.</td>
<td>Event Detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Integrity</td>
<td>Detection of security-relevant events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A variety of mechanisms used to assure the integrity of a data unit or stream of data units.</td>
<td>Security Audit Trail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentication Exchange</td>
<td>Data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security audit, which is an independent review and examination of system records and activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity by means of information exchange.</td>
<td>Security Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Padding</td>
<td>Deals with requests from mechanisms, such as event handling and management functions, and takes recovery actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The insertion of bits into gaps in a data stream to frustrate traffic analysis attempts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routing Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enables selection of particular physically secure routes for certain data and allows routing changes, especially when a breach of security is suspected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notarization</td>
<td>The use of a trusted third party to assure certain properties of a data exchange.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.4  Relationship Between Security Services and Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Encipherment</th>
<th>Digital Signature</th>
<th>Access Control</th>
<th>Data Integrity</th>
<th>Authentication Exchange</th>
<th>Traffic Padding</th>
<th>Routing Control</th>
<th>Notarization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peer Entity Authentication</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Origin Authentication</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Control</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidentiality</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Flow Confidentiality</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Integrity</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonrepudiation</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6 A MODEL FOR NETWORK SECURITY

A model for much of what we will be discussing is captured, in very general terms, in Figure 1.4. A message is to be transferred from one party to another across some sort of Internet service. The two parties, who are the principals in this transaction, must cooperate for the exchange to take place. A logical information channel is established by defining a route through the Internet from source to destination and by the cooperative use of communication protocols (e.g., TCP/IP) by the two principals.

Security aspects come into play when it is necessary or desirable to protect the information transmission from an opponent who may present a threat to confidentiality, authenticity, and so on. All the techniques for providing security have two components:

- A security-related transformation on the information to be sent. Examples include the encryption of the message, which scrambles the message so that it is unreadable by the opponent, and the addition of a code based on the contents of the message, which can be used to verify the identity of the sender.

The model is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Some secret information shared by the two principals and, it is hoped, unknown to the opponent. An example is an encryption key used in conjunction with the transformation to scramble the message before transmission and unscramble it on reception.\(^6\)

A trusted third party may be needed to achieve secure transmission. For example, a third party may be responsible for distributing the secret information to the two principals while keeping it from any opponent. Or a third party may be needed to arbitrate disputes between the two principals concerning the authenticity of a message transmission.

This general model shows that there are four basic tasks in designing a particular security service:

1. Design an algorithm for performing the security-related transformation. The algorithm should be such that an opponent cannot defeat its purpose.
2. Generate the secret information to be used with the algorithm.
3. Develop methods for the distribution and sharing of the secret information.
4. Specify a protocol to be used by the two principals that makes use of the security algorithm and the secret information to achieve a particular security service.

Parts One through Five of this book concentrate on the types of security mechanisms and services that fit into the model shown in Figure 1.4. However, there are other security-related situations of interest that do not neatly fit this model but are considered in this book. A general model of these other situations is illustrated by Figure 1.5, which reflects a concern for protecting an information system from unwanted access. Most readers are familiar with the concerns caused by the existence of hackers, who attempt to penetrate systems that can be accessed over a network. The hacker can be someone who, with no malign intent, simply gets satisfaction from breaking and entering a computer system. The intruder can be a disgruntled employee who wishes to do damage or a criminal who seeks to exploit computer assets for financial gain (e.g., obtaining credit card numbers or performing illegal money transfers).

---

\(^6\)Part Two discusses a form of encryption, known as a symmetric encryption, in which only one of the two principals needs to have the secret information.
Another type of unwanted access is the placement in a computer system of logic that exploits vulnerabilities in the system and that can affect application programs as well as utility programs, such as editors and compilers. Programs can present two kinds of threats:

- **Information access threats:** Intercept or modify data on behalf of users who should not have access to that data.
- **Service threats:** Exploit service flaws in computers to inhibit use by legitimate users.

Viruses and worms are two examples of software attacks. Such attacks can be introduced into a system by means of a disk that contains the unwanted logic concealed in otherwise useful software. They can also be inserted into a system across a network; this latter mechanism is of more concern in network security.

The security mechanisms needed to cope with unwanted access fall into two broad categories (see Figure 1.5). The first category might be termed a gatekeeper function. It includes password-based login procedures that are designed to deny access to all but authorized users and screening logic that is designed to detect and reject worms, viruses, and other similar attacks. Once either an unwanted user or unwanted software gains access, the second line of defense consists of a variety of internal controls that monitor activity and analyze stored information in an attempt to detect the presence of unwanted intruders. These issues are explored in Part Six.

### 1.7 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

[STAL02] provides a broad introduction to both computer and network security. [SCHN00] is valuable reading for any practitioner in the field of computer or network security: It discusses the limitations of technology, and cryptography in particular, in providing security and the need to consider the hardware, the software implementation, the networks, and the people involved in providing and attacking security.

It is useful to read some of the classic tutorial papers on computer security; these provide a historical perspective from which to appreciate current work and thinking. The papers to read are [WARE79], [BROW72], [SALT75], [SHAN77], and [SUMM84]. Two more recent, short treatments of computer security are [ANDR04] and [LAMP04]. [NIST95] is an exhaustive (290 pages) treatment of the subject. Another good treatment is [NRC91]. Also useful is [FRAS97].

| **FRAS97** | Fraser, B. Site Security Handbook. RFC 2196, September 1997. |
Because URLs sometimes change, they are not included. For all of the Web sites listed in this and subsequent chapters, the appropriate link is at this book’s Web site at williamstallings.com/Crypto/Crypto5e.html.


Recommended Web Sites:

The following Web sites are of general interest related to cryptography and network security:

- **IETF Security Area**: Material related to Internet security standardization efforts.
- **The Cryptography FAQ**: Lengthy and worthwhile FAQ covering all aspects of cryptography.
- **Tom Dunigan’s Security page**: An excellent list of pointers to cryptography and network security Web sites.
- **Peter Gutmann’s home page**: Good collection of cryptography material.
- **Helgar Lipma’s Cryptology Pointers**: Another excellent list of pointers to cryptography and network security Web sites.
- **Cryptology ePrint archive**: Provides rapid access to recent research in cryptology; consists of a collection of un refereed papers.
- **IEEE Technical Committee on Security and Privacy**: Copies of their newsletter and information on IEEE-related activities.
- **Computer Security Resource Center**: Maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); contains a broad range of information on security threats, technology, and standards.
- **Computer and Network Security Reference Index**: A good index to vendor and commercial products, FAQs, newsgroup archives, papers, and other Web sites.
- **Security Focus**: A wide variety of security information, with an emphasis on vendor products and end-user concerns.
- **SANS Institute**: Similar to Security Focus. Extensive collection of white papers.

---

7Because URLs sometimes change, they are not included. For all of the Web sites listed in this and subsequent chapters, the appropriate link is at this book’s Web site at williamstallings.com/Crypto/Crypto5e.html.
• **Risks Digest**: Forum on risks to the public in computers and related systems.

• **Institute for Security and Open Methodologies**: An open, collaborative security research community. Lots of interesting information.

• **Center for Internet Security**: Provides freeware benchmark and scoring tools for evaluating security of operating systems, network devices, and applications. Includes case studies and technical papers.

## 1.8 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

### Key Terms

| access control | denial of service | passive threat |
| active threat | encryption | replay |
| authentication | integrity | security attacks |
| authenticity | intruder | security mechanisms |
| availability | masquerade | security services |
| data confidentiality | nonrepudiation | traffic analysis |
| data integrity | OSI security architecture |

### Review Questions

1.1 What is the OSI security architecture?

1.2 What is the difference between passive and active security threats?

1.3 List and briefly define categories of passive and active security attacks.

1.4 List and briefly define categories of security services.

1.5 List and briefly define categories of security mechanisms.

### Problems

1.1 Consider an automated teller machine (ATM) in which users provide a personal identification number (PIN) and a card for account access. Give examples of confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements associated with the system and, in each case, indicate the degree of importance of the requirement.

1.2 Repeat Problem 1.1 for a telephone switching system that routes calls through a switching network based on the telephone number requested by the caller.

1.3 Consider a desktop publishing system used to produce documents for various organizations.

   a. Give an example of a type of publication for which confidentiality of the stored data is the most important requirement.

   b. Give an example of a type of publication in which data integrity is the most important requirement.

   c. Give an example in which system availability is the most important requirement.

1.4 For each of the following assets, assign a low, moderate, or high impact level for the loss of confidentiality, availability, and integrity, respectively. Justify your answers.

   a. An organization managing public information on its Web server.

   b. A law enforcement organization managing extremely sensitive investigative information.
c. A financial organization managing routine administrative information (not privacy-related information).

d. An information system used for large acquisitions in a contracting organization contains both sensitive, pre-solicitation phase contract information and routine administrative information. Assess the impact for the two data sets separately and the information system as a whole.

e. A power plant contains a SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) system controlling the distribution of electric power for a large military installation. The SCADA system contains both real-time sensor data and routine administrative information. Assess the impact for the two data sets separately and the information system as a whole.

1.5 Draw a matrix similar to Table 1.4 that shows the relationship between security services and attacks.

1.6 Draw a matrix similar to Table 1.4 that shows the relationship between security mechanisms and attacks.
2.1 Symmetric Cipher Model

Cryptography
Cryptanalysis and Brute-Force Attack

2.2 Substitution Techniques

Caesar Cipher
Monoalphabetic Ciphers
Playfair Cipher
Hill Cipher
Polyalphabetic Ciphers
One-Time Pad

2.3 Transposition Techniques

2.4 Rotor Machines

2.5 Steganography

2.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

2.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
“I am fairly familiar with all the forms of secret writings, and am myself the author of a trifling monograph upon the subject, in which I analyze one hundred and sixty separate ciphers,” said Holmes.

—The Adventure of the Dancing Men, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

### KEY POINTS

- Symmetric encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using the same key. It is also known as conventional encryption.
- Symmetric encryption transforms plaintext into ciphertext using a secret key and an encryption algorithm. Using the same key and a decryption algorithm, the plaintext is recovered from the ciphertext.
- The two types of attack on an encryption algorithm are cryptanalysis, based on properties of the encryption algorithm, and brute-force, which involves trying all possible keys.
- Traditional (precomputer) symmetric ciphers use substitution and/or transposition techniques. Substitution techniques map plaintext elements (characters, bits) into ciphertext elements. Transposition techniques systematically transpose the positions of plaintext elements.
- Rotor machines are sophisticated precomputer hardware devices that use substitution techniques.
- Steganography is a technique for hiding a secret message within a larger one in such a way that others cannot discern the presence or contents of the hidden message.

Symmetric encryption, also referred to as conventional encryption or single-key encryption, was the only type of encryption in use prior to the development of public-key encryption in the 1970s. It remains by far the most widely used of the two types of encryption. Part One examines a number of symmetric ciphers. In this chapter, we begin with a look at a general model for the symmetric encryption process; this will enable us to understand the context within which the algorithms are used. Next, we examine a variety of algorithms in use before the computer era. Finally, we look briefly at a different approach known as steganography. Chapters 3 and 5 examine the two most widely used symmetric cipher: DES and AES.

Before beginning, we define some terms. An original message is known as the plaintext, while the coded message is called the ciphertext. The process of converting from plaintext to ciphertext is known as enciphering or encryption; restoring the plaintext from the ciphertext is deciphering or decryption. The many schemes used for encryption constitute the area of study known as cryptography. Such a scheme is known as a cryptographic system or a cipher. Techniques used for deciphering a
message without any knowledge of the enciphering details fall into the area of **cryptanalysis**. Cryptanalysis is what the layperson calls “breaking the code.” The areas of cryptography and cryptanalysis together are called **cryptology**.

### 2.1 SYMMETRIC CIPHER MODEL

A symmetric encryption scheme has five ingredients (Figure 2.1):

- **Plaintext:** This is the original intelligible message or data that is fed into the algorithm as input.
- **Encryption algorithm:** The encryption algorithm performs various substitutions and transformations on the plaintext.
- **Secret key:** The secret key is also input to the encryption algorithm. The key is a value independent of the plaintext and of the algorithm. The algorithm will produce a different output depending on the specific key being used at the time. The exact substitutions and transformations performed by the algorithm depend on the key.
- **Ciphertext:** This is the scrambled message produced as output. It depends on the plaintext and the secret key. For a given message, two different keys will produce two different ciphertexts. The ciphertext is an apparently random stream of data and, as it stands, is unintelligible.
- **Decryption algorithm:** This is essentially the encryption algorithm run in reverse. It takes the ciphertext and the secret key and produces the original plaintext.

There are two requirements for secure use of conventional encryption:

1. We need a strong encryption algorithm. At a minimum, we would like the algorithm to be such that an opponent who knows the algorithm and has access to one or more ciphertexts would be unable to decipher the ciphertext or figure out the key. This requirement is usually stated in a stronger form: The

![Figure 2.1 Simplified Model of Symmetric Encryption](image)

Plaintext input

Encryption algorithm (e.g., AES)

Transmitted ciphertext

Decryption algorithm (reverse of encryption algorithm)

Plaintext output
opponent should be unable to decrypt ciphertext or discover the key even if he or she is in possession of a number of ciphertexts together with the plaintext that produced each ciphertext.

2. Sender and receiver must have obtained copies of the secret key in a secure fashion and must keep the key secure. If someone can discover the key and knows the algorithm, all communication using this key is readable.

We assume that it is impractical to decrypt a message on the basis of the ciphertext plus knowledge of the encryption/decryption algorithm. In other words, we do not need to keep the algorithm secret; we need to keep only the key secret. This feature of symmetric encryption is what makes it feasible for widespread use. The fact that the algorithm need not be kept secret means that manufacturers can and have developed low-cost chip implementations of data encryption algorithms. These chips are widely available and incorporated into a number of products. With the use of symmetric encryption, the principal security problem is maintaining the secrecy of the key.

Let us take a closer look at the essential elements of a symmetric encryption scheme, using Figure 2.2. A source produces a message in plaintext, $X = \{X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M\}$. The $M$ elements of $X$ are letters in some finite alphabet. Traditionally, the alphabet usually consisted of the 26 capital letters. Nowadays, the binary alphabet $\{0, 1\}$ is typically used. For encryption, a key of the form $K = \{K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_J\}$ is generated. If the key is generated at the message source, then it must also be provided to the destination by means of some secure channel. Alternatively, a third party could generate the key and securely deliver it to both source and destination.
With the message $X$ and the encryption key $K$ as input, the encryption algorithm forms the ciphertext $Y = [Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_N]$. We can write this as

$$Y = E(K, X)$$

This notation indicates that $Y$ is produced by using encryption algorithm $E$ as a function of the plaintext $X$, with the specific function determined by the value of the key $K$.

The intended receiver, in possession of the key, is able to invert the transformation:

$$X = D(K, Y)$$

An opponent, observing $Y$ but not having access to $K$ or $X$, may attempt to recover $X$ or $K$ or both $X$ and $K$. It is assumed that the opponent knows the encryption (E) and decryption (D) algorithms. If the opponent is interested in only this particular message, then the focus of the effort is to recover $X$ by generating a plaintext estimate $\hat{X}$. Often, however, the opponent is interested in being able to read future messages as well, in which case an attempt is made to recover $K$ by generating an estimate $\hat{K}$.

**Cryptography**

Cryptographic systems are characterized along three independent dimensions:

1. **The type of operations used for transforming plaintext to ciphertext.** All encryption algorithms are based on two general principles: substitution, in which each element in the plaintext (bit, letter, group of bits or letters) is mapped into another element, and transposition, in which elements in the plaintext are rearranged. The fundamental requirement is that no information be lost (that is, that all operations are reversible). Most systems, referred to as **product systems**, involve multiple stages of substitutions and transpositions.

2. **The number of keys used.** If both sender and receiver use the same key, the system is referred to as symmetric, single-key, secret-key, or conventional encryption. If the sender and receiver use different keys, the system is referred to as asymmetric, two-key, or public-key encryption.

3. **The way in which the plaintext is processed.** A **block cipher** processes the input one block of elements at a time, producing an output block for each input block. A **stream cipher** processes the input elements continuously, producing output one element at a time, as it goes along.

**Cryptanalysis and Brute-Force Attack**

Typically, the objective of attacking an encryption system is to recover the key in use rather than simply to recover the plaintext of a single ciphertext. There are two general approaches to attacking a conventional encryption scheme:

- **Cryptanalysis:** Cryptanalytic attacks rely on the nature of the algorithm plus perhaps some knowledge of the general characteristics of the plaintext or
even some sample plaintext–ciphertext pairs. This type of attack exploits the characteristics of the algorithm to attempt to deduce a specific plaintext or to deduce the key being used.

- **Brute-force attack:** The attacker tries every possible key on a piece of ciphertext until an intelligible translation into plaintext is obtained. On average, half of all possible keys must be tried to achieve success.

If either type of attack succeeds in deducing the key, the effect is catastrophic: All future and past messages encrypted with that key are compromised.

We first consider cryptanalysis and then discuss brute-force attacks.

Table 2.1 summarizes the various types of cryptanalytic attacks based on the amount of information known to the cryptanalyst. The most difficult problem is presented when all that is available is the ciphertext only. In some cases, not even the encryption algorithm is known, but in general, we can assume that the opponent does know the algorithm used for encryption. One possible attack under these circumstances is the brute-force approach of trying all possible keys. If the key space is very large, this becomes impractical. Thus, the opponent must rely on an analysis of the ciphertext itself, generally applying various statistical tests to it. To use this approach, the opponent must have some general idea of the type of plaintext that is concealed, such as English or French text, an EXE file, a Java source listing, an accounting file, and so on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Known to Cryptanalyst</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ciphertext Only</td>
<td>• Encryption algorithm&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known Plaintext</td>
<td>• Encryption algorithm&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext&lt;br&gt;• One or more plaintext–ciphertext pairs formed with the secret key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosen Plaintext</td>
<td>• Encryption algorithm&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext&lt;br&gt;• Plaintext message chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding ciphertext generated with the secret key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosen Ciphertext</td>
<td>• Encryption algorithm&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding decrypted plaintext generated with the secret key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosen Text</td>
<td>• Encryption algorithm&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext&lt;br&gt;• Plaintext message chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding ciphertext generated with the secret key&lt;br&gt;• Ciphertext chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding decrypted plaintext generated with the secret key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ciphertext-only attack is the easiest to defend against because the opponent has the least amount of information to work with. In many cases, however, the analyst has more information. The analyst may be able to capture one or more plaintext messages as well as their encryptions. Or the analyst may know that certain plaintext patterns will appear in a message. For example, a file that is encoded in the Postscript format always begins with the same pattern, or there may be a standardized header or banner to an electronic funds transfer message, and so on. All these are examples of known plaintext. With this knowledge, the analyst may be able to deduce the key on the basis of the way in which the known plaintext is transformed.

Closely related to the known-plaintext attack is what might be referred to as a probable-word attack. If the opponent is working with the encryption of some general prose message, he or she may have little knowledge of what is in the message. However, if the opponent is after some very specific information, then parts of the message may be known. For example, if an entire accounting file is being transmitted, the opponent may know the placement of certain key words in the header of the file. As another example, the source code for a program developed by Corporation X might include a copyright statement in some standardized position.

If the analyst is able somehow to get the source system to insert into the system a message chosen by the analyst, then a chosen-plaintext attack is possible. An example of this strategy is differential cryptanalysis, explored in Chapter 3. In general, if the analyst is able to choose the messages to encrypt, the analyst may deliberately pick patterns that can be expected to reveal the structure of the key.

Table 2.1 lists two other types of attack: chosen ciphertext and chosen text. These are less commonly employed as cryptanalytic techniques but are nevertheless possible avenues of attack.

Only relatively weak algorithms fail to withstand a ciphertext-only attack. Generally, an encryption algorithm is designed to withstand a known-plaintext attack.

Two more definitions are worthy of note. An encryption scheme is unconditionally secure if the ciphertext generated by the scheme does not contain enough information to determine uniquely the corresponding plaintext, no matter how much ciphertext is available. That is, no matter how much time an opponent has, it is impossible for him or her to decrypt the ciphertext simply because the required information is not there. With the exception of a scheme known as the one-time pad (described later in this chapter), there is no encryption algorithm that is unconditionally secure. Therefore, all that the users of an encryption algorithm can strive for is an algorithm that meets one or both of the following criteria:

- The cost of breaking the cipher exceeds the value of the encrypted information.
- The time required to break the cipher exceeds the useful lifetime of the information.

An encryption scheme is said to be computationally secure if either of the foregoing two criteria are met. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to estimate the amount of effort required to cryptanalyze ciphertext successfully.
All forms of cryptanalysis for symmetric encryption schemes are designed to exploit the fact that traces of structure or pattern in the plaintext may survive encryption and be discernible in the ciphertext. This will become clear as we examine various symmetric encryption schemes in this chapter. We will see in Part Two that cryptanalysis for public-key schemes proceeds from a fundamentally different premise, namely, that the mathematical properties of the pair of keys may make it possible for one of the two keys to be deduced from the other.

A brute-force attack involves trying every possible key until an intelligible translation of the ciphertext into plaintext is obtained. On average, half of all possible keys must be tried to achieve success. Table 2.2 shows how much time is involved for various key spaces. Results are shown for four binary key sizes. The 56-bit key size is used with the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm, and the 168-bit key size is used for triple DES. The minimum key size specified for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is 128 bits. Results are also shown for what are called substitution codes that use a 26-character key (discussed later), in which all possible permutations of the 26 characters serve as keys. For each key size, the results are shown assuming that it takes 1 μs to perform a single decryption, which is a reasonable order of magnitude for today’s machines. With the use of massively parallel organizations of microprocessors, it may be possible to achieve processing rates many orders of magnitude greater. The final column of Table 2.2 considers the results for a system that can process 1 million keys per microsecond. As you can see, at this performance level, DES can no longer be considered computationally secure.

### Table 2.2  Average Time Required for Exhaustive Key Search

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Size (bits)</th>
<th>Number of Alternative Keys</th>
<th>Time Required at 1 Decryption/μs</th>
<th>Time Required at 10^6 Decryptions/μs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>(2^{32} = 4.3 \times 10^9)</td>
<td>(2^{31} \mu s = 35.8 \text{ minutes})</td>
<td>2.15 milliseconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>(2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16})</td>
<td>(2^{55} \mu s = 1142 \text{ years})</td>
<td>10.01 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>(2^{128} = 3.4 \times 10^{38})</td>
<td>(2^{127} \mu s = 5.4 \times 10^{24} \text{ years})</td>
<td>5.4 \times 10^{18} \text{ years}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>(2^{168} = 3.7 \times 10^{50})</td>
<td>(2^{167} \mu s = 5.9 \times 10^{36} \text{ years})</td>
<td>5.9 \times 10^{30} \text{ years}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 characters (permutation)</td>
<td>(26! = 4 \times 10^{26})</td>
<td>(2 \times 10^{26} \mu s = 6.4 \times 10^{12} \text{ years})</td>
<td>6.4 \times 10^{6} \text{ years}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2  SUBSTITUTION TECHNIQUES

In this section and the next, we examine a sampling of what might be called classical encryption techniques. A study of these techniques enables us to illustrate the basic approaches to symmetric encryption used today and the types of cryptanalytic attacks that must be anticipated.

The two basic building blocks of all encryption techniques are substitution and transposition. We examine these in the next two sections. Finally, we discuss a system that combines both substitution and transposition.
A substitution technique is one in which the letters of plaintext are replaced by other letters or by numbers or symbols.\(^1\) If the plaintext is viewed as a sequence of bits, then substitution involves replacing plaintext bit patterns with ciphertext bit patterns.

**Caesar Cipher**

The earliest known, and the simplest, use of a substitution cipher was by Julius Caesar. The Caesar cipher involves replacing each letter of the alphabet with the letter standing three places further down the alphabet. For example,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{plain:} & \quad \text{meet me after the toga party} \\
\text{cipher:} & \quad \text{PHHW PH DIWHU WKH WRJD SDUWB}
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the alphabet is wrapped around, so that the letter following Z is A. We can define the transformation by listing all possibilities, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{plain:} & \quad \text{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z} \\
\text{cipher:} & \quad \text{D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C}
\end{align*}
\]

Let us assign a numerical equivalent to each letter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>e</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>g</th>
<th>h</th>
<th>i</th>
<th>j</th>
<th>k</th>
<th>l</th>
<th>m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>o</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>q</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>u</th>
<th>v</th>
<th>w</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then the algorithm can be expressed as follows. For each plaintext letter \( p \), substitute the ciphertext letter \( C \).\(^2\)

\[
C = E(3, p) = (p + 3) \mod 26
\]

A shift may be of any amount, so that the general Caesar algorithm is

\[
C = E(k, p) = (p + k) \mod 26 \quad (2.1)
\]

where \( k \) takes on a value in the range 1 to 25. The decryption algorithm is simply

\[
p = D(k, C) = (C - k) \mod 26 \quad (2.2)
\]

---

\(^1\)When letters are involved, the following conventions are used in this book. Plaintext is always in lowercase; ciphertext is in uppercase; key values are in italicized lowercase.

\(^2\)We define \( a \mod n \) to be the remainder when \( a \) is divided by \( n \). For example, 11 mod 7 = 4. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of modular arithmetic.
If it is known that a given ciphertext is a Caesar cipher, then a brute-force cryptanalysis is easily performed: simply try all the 25 possible keys. Figure 2.3 shows the results of applying this strategy to the example ciphertext. In this case, the plaintext leaps out as occupying the third line.

Three important characteristics of this problem enabled us to use a brute-force cryptanalysis:

1. The encryption and decryption algorithms are known.
2. There are only 25 keys to try.
3. The language of the plaintext is known and easily recognizable.

In most networking situations, we can assume that the algorithms are known. What generally makes brute-force cryptanalysis impractical is the use of an algorithm that employs a large number of keys. For example, the triple DES algorithm, examined in Chapter 6, makes use of a 168-bit key, giving a key space of $2^{168}$ or greater than $3.7 \times 10^{50}$ possible keys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY</th>
<th>PHHW PH DIWHU WKH WRJD SDUWB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>oggv og chvgt vjg vqic rctva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>nffu nf bgufs uif uphb qbsuz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>meet me after the toga party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ldds ld zeskq wd gndz qzqsz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>kc rek ydrcp rfc rmy nyprw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>jbbq jb xcqbo qeb qldx mxqsv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>iaap ia wbpan pda pkcw lwpnu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>hzzo hz vaoz ocz ojbv kvmot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>gyn yz uzyn nby niau julns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>fmxm fx tynmxk max nhzr itkmr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ewl ew sxwlg lzw lgye hslq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>dcvk dv rwwk kyv kfxr girkp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>cuuj cu qvjuh jxv jouh fdpjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>bttt bt puitg iwt idyp epgin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>ashh as othsf hve hcuo dofhn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>zrrg zr nsgre gur gbtz cnegl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>yqff yq mrfqf ftz fasm bmdk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>xppe xp lqepc esp ezrl alcje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>wood wo kpdob dro dykz zkdbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>vnnc vn jocna cqn cpxv yhach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>ummb um inbmz bpm bwoi xzbg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>tlll tll hmalv aol avhr whyaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>skks sk glzkx znk zumg vxzge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>rjyy rj fkyjw ymj ytlf ufwyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>qixi qj ejxv xli kske tevxc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3 Brute-Force Cryptanalysis of Caesar Cipher
The third characteristic is also significant. If the language of the plaintext is unknown, then plaintext output may not be recognizable. Furthermore, the input may be abbreviated or compressed in some fashion, again making recognition difficult. For example, Figure 2.4 shows a portion of a text file compressed using an algorithm called ZIP. If this file is then encrypted with a simple substitution cipher (expanded to include more than just 26 alphabetic characters), then the plaintext may not be recognized when it is uncovered in the brute-force cryptanalysis.

**Monoalphabetic Ciphers**

With only 25 possible keys, the Caesar cipher is far from secure. A dramatic increase in the key space can be achieved by allowing an arbitrary substitution. Before proceeding, we define the term *permutation*. A permutation of a finite set of elements $S$ is an ordered sequence of all the elements of $S$, with each element appearing exactly once. For example, if $S = \{a, b, c\}$, there are six permutations of $S$:

$\{a, b, c\}, \{a, c, b\}, \{b, a, c\}, \{b, c, a\}, \{c, a, b\}, \{c, b, a\}$

In general, there are $n!$ permutations of a set of $n$ elements, because the first element can be chosen in one of $n$ ways, the second in $n - 1$ ways, the third in $n - 2$ ways, and so on.

Recall the assignment for the Caesar cipher:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>plain:</th>
<th>a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cipher:</td>
<td>D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If, instead, the “cipher” line can be any permutation of the 26 alphabetic characters, then there are 26! or greater than $4 \times 10^{26}$ possible keys. This is 10 orders of magnitude greater than the key space for DES and would seem to eliminate brute-force techniques for cryptanalysis. Such an approach is referred to as a **monoalphabetic substitution cipher**, because a single cipher alphabet (mapping from plain alphabet to cipher alphabet) is used per message.

There is, however, another line of attack. If the cryptanalyst knows the nature of the plaintext (e.g., noncompressed English text), then the analyst can exploit the regularities of the language. To see how such a cryptanalysis might
As a first step, the relative frequency of the letters can be determined and compared to a standard frequency distribution for English, such as is shown in Figure 2.5 (based on [LEWA00]). If the message were long enough, this technique alone might be sufficient, but because this is a relatively short message, we cannot expect an exact match. In any case, the relative frequencies of the letters in the ciphertext (in percentages) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>8.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.5  Relative Frequency of Letters in English Text
Comparing this breakdown with Figure 2.5, it seems likely that cipher letters P and Z are the equivalents of plain letters e and t, but it is not certain which is which. The letters S, U, O, M, and H are all of relatively high frequency and probably correspond to plain letters from the set {a, h, i, n, o, r, s}. The letters with the lowest frequencies (namely, A, B, G, Y, I, J) are likely included in the set {b, j, k, q, v, x, z}.

There are a number of ways to proceed at this point. We could make some tentative assignments and start to fill in the plaintext to see if it looks like a reasonable “skeleton” of a message. A more systematic approach is to look for other regularities. For example, certain words may be known to be in the text. Or we could look for repeating sequences of cipher letters and try to deduce their plaintext equivalents. A powerful tool is to look at the frequency of two-letter combinations, known as digrams. A table similar to Figure 2.5 could be drawn up showing the relative frequency of digrams. The most common such digram is th. In our ciphertext, the most common digram is ZW, which appears three times. So we make the correspondence of Z with t and W with h. Then, by our earlier hypothesis, we can equate P with e. Now notice that the sequence ZWP appears in the ciphertext, and we can translate that sequence as “the.” This is the most frequent trigram (three-letter combination) in English, which seems to indicate that we are on the right track.

Next, notice the sequence ZWSZ in the first line. We do not know that these four letters form a complete word, but if they do, it is of the form th_t. If so, S equates with a.

So far, then, we have

```
UZQSOVUOHXMOVPGOPZPEVSGZWSZOPFPESXUBMETSMXAIZe e e te a that e e a a
VUEPHZHMDZSHZOWSFAPPDTSSPQPUZMXUZUHSX t a t ha e ee a e th t a
EPYEPQPZSUFPPOMBZWPUPZMDJUDTMOMQ e e e tat e the t
```

Only four letters have been identified, but already we have quite a bit of the message. Continued analysis of frequencies plus trial and error should easily yield a solution from this point. The complete plaintext, with spaces added between words, follows:

```
it was disclosed yesterday that several informal but
direct contacts have been made with political
representatives of the viet cong in moscow
```

Monoalaphabetic ciphers are easy to break because they reflect the frequency data of the original alphabet. A countermeasure is to provide multiple substitutes, known as homophones, for a single letter. For example, the letter e could be assigned a number of different cipher symbols, such as 16, 74, 35, and 21, with each homophone assigned to a letter in rotation or randomly. If the number of symbols assigned to each letter is proportional to the relative frequency of that letter, then single-letter frequency information is completely obliterated. The great mathematician Carl
Friedrich Gauss believed that he had devised an unbreakable cipher using homophones. However, even with homophones, each element of plaintext affects only one element of ciphertext, and multiple-letter patterns (e.g., digram frequencies) still survive in the ciphertext, making cryptanalysis relatively straightforward.

Two principal methods are used in substitution ciphers to lessen the extent to which the structure of the plaintext survives in the ciphertext: One approach is to encrypt multiple letters of plaintext, and the other is to use multiple cipher alphabets. We briefly examine each.

**Playfair Cipher**

The best-known multiple-letter encryption cipher is the Playfair, which treats digrams in the plaintext as single units and translates these units into ciphertext digrams.\(^3\)

The Playfair algorithm is based on the use of a 5 \(\times\) 5 matrix of letters constructed using a keyword. Here is an example, solved by Lord Peter Wimsey in Dorothy Sayers’s *Have His Carcase*:\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>I/J</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the keyword is *monarchy*. The matrix is constructed by filling in the letters of the keyword (minus duplicates) from left to right and from top to bottom, and then filling in the remainder of the matrix with the remaining letters in alphabetic order. The letters I and J count as one letter. Plaintext is encrypted two letters at a time, according to the following rules:

1. Repeating plaintext letters that are in the same pair are separated with a filler letter, such as x, so that balloon would be treated as ba lx lo on.
2. Two plaintext letters that fall in the same row of the matrix are each replaced by the letter to the right, with the first element of the row circularly following the last. For example, ar is encrypted as RM.
3. Two plaintext letters that fall in the same column are each replaced by the letter beneath, with the top element of the column circularly following the last. For example, mu is encrypted as CM.
4. Otherwise, each plaintext letter in a pair is replaced by the letter that lies in its own row and the column occupied by the other plaintext letter. Thus, hs becomes BP and ea becomes IM (or JM, as the encipherer wishes).

The Playfair cipher is a great advance over simple monoalphabetic ciphers. For one thing, whereas there are only 26 letters, there are 26 \(\times\) 26 = 676 digrams, so

---

\(^3\)This cipher was actually invented by British scientist Sir Charles Wheatstone in 1854, but it bears the name of his friend Baron Playfair of St. Andrews, who championed the cipher at the British foreign office.

\(^4\)The book provides an absorbing account of a probable-word attack.
that identification of individual digrams is more difficult. Furthermore, the relative frequencies of individual letters exhibit a much greater range than that of digrams, making frequency analysis much more difficult. For these reasons, the Playfair cipher was for a long time considered unbreakable. It was used as the standard field system by the British Army in World War I and still enjoyed considerable use by the U.S. Army and other Allied forces during World War II.

Despite this level of confidence in its security, the Playfair cipher is relatively easy to break, because it still leaves much of the structure of the plaintext language intact. A few hundred letters of ciphertext are generally sufficient.

One way of revealing the effectiveness of the Playfair and other ciphers is shown in Figure 2.6, based on [SIMM93]. The line labeled plaintext plots the frequency distribution of the more than 70,000 alphabetic characters in the Encyclopaedia Britannica article on cryptology. This is also the frequency distribution of any monoalphabetic substitution cipher, because the frequency values for individual letters are the same, just with different letters substituted for the original letters. The plot was developed in the following way: The number of occurrences of each letter in the text was counted and divided by the number of occurrences of the letter e (the most frequently used letter). As a result, e has a relative frequency of 1, t of about 0.76, and so on. The points on the horizontal axis correspond to the letters in order of decreasing frequency.

Figure 2.6 also shows the frequency distribution that results when the text is encrypted using the Playfair cipher. To normalize the plot, the number of occurrences of each letter in the ciphertext was again divided by the number of occurrences of e.

---

5I am indebted to Gustavus Simmons for providing the plots and explaining their method of construction.
in the plaintext. The resulting plot therefore shows the extent to which the frequency distribution of letters, which makes it trivial to solve substitution ciphers, is masked by encryption. If the frequency distribution information were totally concealed in the encryption process, the ciphertext plot of frequencies would be flat, and cryptanalysis using ciphertext only would be effectively impossible. As the figure shows, the Playfair cipher has a flatter distribution than does plaintext, but nevertheless, it reveals plenty of structure for a cryptanalyst to work with.

**Hill Cipher**

Another interesting multiletter cipher is the Hill cipher, developed by the mathematician Lester Hill in 1929.

**CONCEPTS FROM LINEAR ALGEBRA** Before describing the Hill cipher, let us briefly review some terminology from linear algebra. In this discussion, we are concerned with matrix arithmetic modulo 26. For the reader who needs a refresher on matrix multiplication and inversion, see Appendix E.

We define the inverse $M^{-1}$ of a square matrix $M$ by the equation $M(M^{-1}) = M^{-1}M = I$, where $I$ is the identity matrix. $I$ is a square matrix that is all zeros except for ones along the main diagonal from upper left to lower right. The inverse of a matrix does not always exist, but when it does, it satisfies the preceding equation. For example,

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 8 \\ 17 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \quad A^{-1} \mod 26 = \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 2 \\ 1 & 15 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$AA^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} (5 \times 9) + (8 \times 1) & (5 \times 2) + (8 \times 15) \\ (17 \times 9) + (3 \times 1) & (17 \times 2) + (3 \times 15) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} 53 & 130 \\ 156 & 79 \end{pmatrix} \mod 26 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

To explain how the inverse of a matrix is computed, we begin by with the concept of determinant. For any square matrix $(m \times m)$, the **determinant** equals the sum of all the products that can be formed by taking exactly one element from each row and exactly one element from each column, with certain of the product terms preceded by a minus sign. For a $2 \times 2$ matrix,

$$\begin{pmatrix} k_{11} & k_{12} \\ k_{21} & k_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

the determinant is $k_{11}k_{22} - k_{12}k_{21}$. For a $3 \times 3$ matrix, the value of the determinant is $k_{11}k_{22}k_{33} + k_{21}k_{32}k_{13} + k_{31}k_{12}k_{23} - k_{12}k_{21}k_{33} - k_{21}k_{12}k_{33} - k_{11}k_{32}k_{23}$. If a square matrix $A$ has a nonzero determinant, then the inverse of the matrix is

---

6This cipher is somewhat more difficult to understand than the others in this chapter, but it illustrates an important point about cryptanalysis that will be useful later on. This subsection can be skipped on a first reading.
computed as $[A^{-1}]_{ij} = (\det A)^{-1}(-1)^{i+j}(D_{ji})$, where $(D_{ji})$ is the subdeterminant formed by deleting the $j$th row and the $i$th column of $A$, $\det(A)$ is the determinant of $A$, and $(\det A)^{-1}$ is the multiplicative inverse of $(\det A) \mod 26$.

Continuing our example,

$$\det \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 8 \\ 17 & 3 \end{pmatrix} = (5 \times 3) - (8 \times 17) = -121 \mod 26 = 9$$

We can show that $9^{-1} \mod 26 = 3$, because $9 \times 3 = 27 \mod 26 = 1$ (see Chapter 4 or Appendix E). Therefore, we compute the inverse of $A$ as

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 8 \\ 17 & 3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$A^{-1} \mod 26 = 3 \begin{pmatrix} 3 & -8 \\ -17 & 5 \end{pmatrix} = 3 \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 18 \\ 9 & 5 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 54 \\ 27 & 15 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 2 \\ 1 & 15 \end{pmatrix}$$

**The Hill Algorithm** This encryption algorithm takes $m$ successive plaintext letters and substitutes for them $m$ ciphertext letters. The substitution is determined by $m$ linear equations in which each character is assigned a numerical value ($a = 0$, $b = 1$, $\ldots$, $z = 25$). For $m = 3$, the system can be described as

$$c_1 = (k_{11}p_1 + k_{12}p_2 + k_{13}p_3) \mod 26$$

$$c_2 = (k_{21}p_1 + k_{22}p_2 + k_{23}p_3) \mod 26$$

$$c_3 = (k_{31}p_1 + k_{32}p_2 + k_{33}p_3) \mod 26$$

This can be expressed in terms of row vectors and matrices:

$$(c_1 \ c_2 \ c_3) = (p \ p_2 \ p_3) \begin{pmatrix} k_{11} & k_{12} & k_{13} \\ k_{21} & k_{22} & k_{23} \\ k_{31} & k_{32} & k_{33} \end{pmatrix} \mod 26$$

or

$$C = PK \mod 26$$

where $C$ and $P$ are row vectors of length 3 representing the plaintext and ciphertext, and $K$ is a $3 \times 3$ matrix representing the encryption key. Operations are performed $\mod 26$.

For example, consider the plaintext “paymoremoney” and use the encryption key

$$K = \begin{pmatrix} 17 & 17 & 5 \\ 21 & 18 & 21 \\ 2 & 2 & 19 \end{pmatrix}$$

---

7Some cryptography books express the plaintext and ciphertext as column vectors, so that the column vector is placed after the matrix rather than the row vector placed before the matrix. Sage uses row vectors, so we adopt that convention.
The first three letters of the plaintext are represented by the vector \((15 \ 0 \ 24)\). Then 
\((15 \ 0 \ 24)K = (303 \ 303 \ 531) \mod 26 = (17 \ 17 \ 11) = \text{RRL}\). Continuing in this fashion, the ciphertext for the entire plaintext is RRLMWBKASPDH.

Decryption requires using the inverse of the matrix \(K\). We can compute 
\[
\det K = 23, \quad \text{and therefore,} \quad (\det K)^{-1} \mod 26 = 17. \quad \text{We can then compute the inverse as}
\]
\[
K^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix}
4 & 9 & 15 \\
15 & 17 & 6 \\
24 & 0 & 17
\end{pmatrix}
\]

This is demonstrated as
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
17 & 17 & 5 \\
21 & 18 & 21 \\
2 & 2 & 19
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
4 & 9 & 15 \\
15 & 17 & 6 \\
24 & 0 & 17
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
443 & 442 & 442 \\
858 & 495 & 780 \\
494 & 52 & 365
\end{pmatrix} \mod 26
= \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

It is easily seen that if the matrix \(K^{-1}\) is applied to the ciphertext, then the plaintext is recovered.

In general terms, the Hill system can be expressed as
\[
\begin{align*}
C &= E(K, P) = PK \mod 26 \\
P &= D(K, C) = CK^{-1} \mod 26 = PKK^{-1} = P
\end{align*}
\]

As with Playfair, the strength of the Hill cipher is that it completely hides single-letter frequencies. Indeed, with Hill, the use of a larger matrix hides more frequency information. Thus, a \(3 \times 3\) Hill cipher hides not only single-letter but also two-letter frequency information.

Although the Hill cipher is strong against a ciphertext-only attack, it is easily broken with a known plaintext attack. For an \(m \times m\) Hill cipher, suppose we have \(m\) plaintext–ciphertext pairs, each of length \(m\). We label the pairs \(P_j = (p_{ij}p_{ij} \ldots p_{mj})\) and \(C_j = (c_{ij}c_{ij} \ldots c_{mj})\) such that \(C_j = P_jK\) for \(1 \leq j \leq m\) and for some unknown key matrix \(K\). Now define two \(m \times m\) matrices \(X = (p_{ij})\) and \(Y = (c_{ij})\). Then we can form the matrix equation \(Y = XK\). If \(X\) has an inverse, then we can determine \(K = X^{-1}Y\). If \(X\) is not invertible, then a new version of \(X\) can be formed with additional plaintext–ciphertext pairs until an invertible \(X\) is obtained.

Consider this example. Suppose that the plaintext “hillcipher” is encrypted using a \(2 \times 2\) Hill cipher to yield the ciphertext HCRZSSXNSP. Thus, we know that 
\((78)K \mod 26 = (72); \quad (1111)K \mod 26 = (17 \ 25); \quad \text{and so on. Using the first two plaintext–ciphertext pairs, we have}
\]
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
7 & 2 \\
17 & 25
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
7 & 8 \\
11 & 11
\end{pmatrix} \mod 26
\]

The inverse of \(X\) can be computed:
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
7 & 8 \\
11 & 11
\end{pmatrix}^{-1}
= \begin{pmatrix}
25 & 22 \\
1 & 23
\end{pmatrix}
\]
This result is verified by testing the remaining plaintext–ciphertext pairs.

Polyalphabetic Ciphers

Another way to improve on the simple monoalphabetic technique is to use different monoalphabetic substitutions as one proceeds through the plaintext message. The general name for this approach is **polyalphabetic substitution cipher**. All these techniques have the following features in common:

1. A set of related monoalphabetic substitution rules is used.
2. A key determines which particular rule is chosen for a given transformation.

**Vigenère Cipher** The best known, and one of the simplest, polyalphabetic ciphers is the Vigenère cipher. In this scheme, the set of related monoalphabetic substitution rules consists of the 26 Caesar ciphers with shifts of 0 through 25. Each cipher is denoted by a key letter, which is the ciphertext letter that substitutes for the plaintext letter $a$. Thus, a Caesar cipher with a shift of 3 is denoted by the key value $d$.

We can express the Vigenère cipher in the following manner. Assume a sequence of plaintext letters $P = p_0, p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_{n-1}$ and a key consisting of the sequence of letters $K = k_0, k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_{m-1}$, where typically $m < n$. The sequence of ciphertext letters $C = C_0, C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_{n-1}$ is calculated as follows:

$$C = C_0, C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_{n-1} = E(K, P) = E[(k_0, k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_{m-1}), (p_0, p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_{n-1})]$$

$$= (p_0 + k_0) \mod 26, (p_1 + k_1) \mod 26, \ldots, (p_{m-1} + k_{m-1}) \mod 26,$$

$$= (p_{m} + k_0) \mod 26, (p_{m+1} + k_1) \mod 26, \ldots, (p_{2m-1} + k_{m-1}) \mod 26,$$

Thus, the first letter of the key is added to the first letter of the plaintext, mod 26, the second letters are added, and so on through the first $m$ letters of the plaintext. For the next $m$ letters of the plaintext, the key letters are repeated. This process continues until all of the plaintext sequence is encrypted. A general equation of the encryption process is

$$C_i = (p_i + k_{i \mod m}) \mod 26 \quad (2.3)$$

Compare this with Equation (2.1) for the Caesar cipher. In essence, each plaintext character is encrypted with a different Caesar cipher, depending on the corresponding key character. Similarly, decryption is a generalization of Equation (2.2):

$$p_i = (C_i - k_{i \mod m}) \mod 26 \quad (2.4)$$

To encrypt a message, a key is needed that is as long as the message. Usually, the key is a repeating keyword. For example, if the keyword is `deceptive`, the message “we are discovered save yourself” is encrypted as
key: deceptive deceptive deceptive  
plaintext: wearediscovered saveyourself  
ciphertext: ZICVTWQNGRZGYTVAVZHCQYGGMGJ

Expressed numerically, we have the following result.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>key</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>plaintext</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ciphertext</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strength of this cipher is that there are multiple ciphertext letters for each plaintext letter, one for each unique letter of the keyword. Thus, the letter frequency information is obscured. However, not all knowledge of the plaintext structure is lost. For example, Figure 2.6 shows the frequency distribution for a Vigenère cipher with a keyword of length 9. An improvement is achieved over the Playfair cipher, but considerable frequency information remains.

It is instructive to sketch a method of breaking this cipher, because the method reveals some of the mathematical principles that apply in cryptanalysis.

First, suppose that the opponent believes that the ciphertext was encrypted using either monoalphabetic substitution or a Vigenère cipher. A simple test can be made to make a determination. If a monoalphabetic substitution is used, then the statistical properties of the ciphertext should be the same as that of the language of the plaintext. Thus, referring to Figure 2.5, there should be one cipher letter with a relative frequency of occurrence of about 12.7%, one with about 9.06%, and so on. If only a single message is available for analysis, we would not expect an exact match of this small sample with the statistical profile of the plaintext language. Nevertheless, if the correspondence is close, we can assume a monoalphabetic substitution.

If, on the other hand, a Vigenère cipher is suspected, then progress depends on determining the length of the keyword, as will be seen in a moment. For now, let us concentrate on how the keyword length can be determined. The important insight that leads to a solution is the following: If two identical sequences of plaintext letters occur at a distance that is an integer multiple of the keyword length, they will generate identical ciphertext sequences. In the foregoing example, two instances of the sequence “red” are separated by nine character positions. Consequently, in both cases, r is encrypted using key letter e, e is encrypted using key letter p, and d is encrypted using key letter t. Thus, in both cases, the ciphertext sequence is VTW. We indicate this above by underlining the relevant ciphertext letters and shading the relevant ciphertext numbers.

An analyst looking at only the ciphertext would detect the repeated sequences VTW at a displacement of 9 and make the assumption that the keyword is either three or nine letters in length. The appearance of VTW twice could be by chance
and not reflect identical plaintext letters encrypted with identical key letters. However, if the message is long enough, there will be a number of such repeated ciphertext sequences. By looking for common factors in the displacements of the various sequences, the analyst should be able to make a good guess of the keyword length.

Solution of the cipher now depends on an important insight. If the keyword length is \( m \), then the cipher, in effect, consists of \( m \) monoalphabetic substitution ciphers. For example, with the keyword DECEPTIVE, the letters in positions 1, 10, 19, and so on are all encrypted with the same monoalphabetic cipher. Thus, we can use the known frequency characteristics of the plaintext language to attack each of the monoalphabetic ciphers separately.

The periodic nature of the keyword can be eliminated by using a nonrepeating keyword that is as long as the message itself. Vigenère proposed what is referred to as an **autokey system**, in which a keyword is concatenated with the plaintext itself to provide a running key. For our example,

- **key:** deceptivewearediscoveredsav
- **plaintext:** wearediscoveredsaveyourself
- **ciphertext:** ZICVTWQNGKZEIIIGASXSTSLVVWLA

Even this scheme is vulnerable to cryptanalysis. Because the key and the plaintext share the same frequency distribution of letters, a statistical technique can be applied. For example, \( e \) enciphered by \( e \), by Figure 2.5, can be expected to occur with a frequency of \( (0.127)^2 \approx 0.016 \), whereas \( t \) enciphered by \( t \) would occur only about half as often. These regularities can be exploited to achieve successful cryptanalysis.\(^8\)

**Vernam Cipher** The ultimate defense against such a cryptanalysis is to choose a keyword that is as long as the plaintext and has no statistical relationship to it. Such a system was introduced by an AT&T engineer named Gilbert Vernam in 1918. His system works on binary data (bits) rather than letters. The system can be expressed succinctly as follows (Figure 2.7):

\[
c_i = p_i \oplus k_i
\]

where

- \( p_i \) = \( i \)th binary digit of plaintext
- \( k_i \) = \( i \)th binary digit of key
- \( c_i \) = \( i \)th binary digit of ciphertext
- \( \oplus \) = exclusive-or (XOR) operation

Compare this with Equation (2.3) for the Vigenère cipher.

---

\(^8\)Although the techniques for breaking a Vigenère cipher are by no means complex, a 1917 issue of *Scientific American* characterized this system as “impossible of translation.” This is a point worth remembering when similar claims are made for modern algorithms.
Thus, the ciphertext is generated by performing the bitwise XOR of the plaintext and the key. Because of the properties of the XOR, decryption simply involves the same bitwise operation:

\[ p_i = c_i \oplus k_i \]

which compares with Equation (2.4).

The essence of this technique is the means of construction of the key. Vernam proposed the use of a running loop of tape that eventually repeated the key, so that in fact the system worked with a very long but repeating keyword. Although such a scheme, with a long key, presents formidable cryptanalytic difficulties, it can be broken with sufficient ciphertext, the use of known or probable plaintext sequences, or both.

**One-Time Pad**

An Army Signal Corp officer, Joseph Mauborgne, proposed an improvement to the Vernam cipher that yields the ultimate in security. Mauborgne suggested using a random key that is as long as the message, so that the key need not be repeated. In addition, the key is to be used to encrypt and decrypt a single message, and then is discarded. Each new message requires a new key of the same length as the new message. Such a scheme, known as a **one-time pad**, is unbreakable. It produces random output that bears no statistical relationship to the plaintext. Because the ciphertext contains no information whatsoever about the plaintext, there is simply no way to break the code.

An example should illustrate our point. Suppose that we are using a Vigenère scheme with 27 characters in which the twenty-seventh character is the space character, but with a one-time key that is as long as the message. Consider the ciphertext

\[
\text{ANKYODKYUREPFJBYOJDSSPLREYIUNOFDOIUERFPLUYTS}
\]

We now show two different decryptions using two different keys:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ciphertext:  ANKYODKYUREPFJBYOJDSSPLREYIUNOFDOIUERFPLUYTS} \\
\text{key:  } \quad pxlmvmsydofuyrvzwc \text{ tnlebnecvgdupahfzzlmnyihi} \\
\text{plaintext:  mr mustard with the candlestick in the hall}
\end{align*}
\]
Suppose that a cryptanalyst had managed to find these two keys. Two plausible plaintexts are produced. How is the cryptanalyst to decide which is the correct decryption (i.e., which is the correct key)? If the actual key were produced in a truly random fashion, then the cryptanalyst cannot say that one of these two keys is more likely than the other. Thus, there is no way to decide which key is correct and therefore which plaintext is correct.

In fact, given any plaintext of equal length to the ciphertext, there is a key that produces that plaintext. Therefore, if you did an exhaustive search of all possible keys, you would end up with many legible plaintexts, with no way of knowing which was the intended plaintext. Therefore, the code is unbreakable.

The security of the one-time pad is entirely due to the randomness of the key. If the stream of characters that constitute the key is truly random, then the stream of characters that constitute the ciphertext will be truly random. Thus, there are no patterns or regularities that a cryptanalyst can use to attack the ciphertext.

In theory, we need look no further for a cipher. The one-time pad offers complete security but, in practice, has two fundamental difficulties:

1. There is the practical problem of making large quantities of random keys. Any heavily used system might require millions of random characters on a regular basis. Supplying truly random characters in this volume is a significant task.

2. Even more daunting is the problem of key distribution and protection. For every message to be sent, a key of equal length is needed by both sender and receiver. Thus, a mammoth key distribution problem exists.

Because of these difficulties, the one-time pad is of limited utility and is useful primarily for low-bandwidth channels requiring very high security.

The one-time pad is the only cryptosystem that exhibits what is referred to as perfect secrecy. This concept is explored in Appendix F.

2.3 TRANSPOSITION TECHNIQUES

All the techniques examined so far involve the substitution of a ciphertext symbol for a plaintext symbol. A very different kind of mapping is achieved by performing some sort of permutation on the plaintext letters. This technique is referred to as a transposition cipher.

The simplest such cipher is the rail fence technique, in which the plaintext is written down as a sequence of diagonals and then read off as a sequence of rows. For example, to encipher the message “meet me after the toga party” with a rail fence of depth 2, we write the following:

m e m a t r h t g p r y
e t e f e t e o a a t
The encrypted message is

**MEMATRHTGPRYETEFETEOAAT**

This sort of thing would be trivial to cryptanalyze. A more complex scheme is to write the message in a rectangle, row by row, and read the message off, column by column, but permute the order of the columns. The order of the columns then becomes the key to the algorithm. For example,

Key: 4 3 1 2 5 6 7
Plaintext: a t t a c k p
         o s t p o n e
         d u n t i l t
         w o a m x y z
Ciphertext: TTNAAPTMTSUOAODWCOIXKNLYPETZ

Thus, in this example, the key is 4312567. To encrypt, start with the column that is labeled 1, in this case column 3. Write down all the letters in that column. Proceed to column 4, which is labeled 2, then column 2, then column 1, then columns 5, 6, and 7.

A pure transposition cipher is easily recognized because it has the same letter frequencies as the original plaintext. For the type of columnar transposition just shown, cryptanalysis is fairly straightforward and involves laying out the ciphertext in a matrix and playing around with column positions. Digram and trigram frequency tables can be useful.

The transposition cipher can be made significantly more secure by performing more than one stage of transposition. The result is a more complex permutation that is not easily reconstructed. Thus, if the foregoing message is reencrypted using the same algorithm,

Key: 4 3 1 2 5 6 7
Input: t t n a a p t
       m t s u o a o
       d w c o i x k
       n l y p e t z
Output: NSCYAUOPTTWLTMDNAOIEPAXTTOKZ

To visualize the result of this double transposition, designate the letters in the original plaintext message by the numbers designating their position. Thus, with 28 letters in the message, the original sequence of letters is

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

After the first transposition, we have

03 10 17 24 04 11 18 25 02 09 16 23 01 08
15 22 05 12 19 26 06 13 20 27 07 14 21 28
which has a somewhat regular structure. But after the second transposition, we have

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccccc}
17 & 09 & 05 & 27 & 24 & 16 & 12 & 07 & 10 & 02 & 22 & 20 & 03 & 25 \\
15 & 13 & 04 & 23 & 19 & 14 & 11 & 01 & 26 & 21 & 18 & 08 & 06 & 28
\end{array}
\]

This is a much less structured permutation and is much more difficult to cryptanalyze.

### 2.4 Rotor Machines

The example just given suggests that multiple stages of encryption can produce an algorithm that is significantly more difficult to cryptanalyze. This is as true of substitution ciphers as it is of transposition ciphers. Before the introduction of DES, the most important application of the principle of multiple stages of encryption was a class of systems known as rotor machines.9

The basic principle of the rotor machine is illustrated in Figure 2.8. The machine consists of a set of independently rotating cylinders through which electrical pulses can flow. Each cylinder has 26 input pins and 26 output pins, with internal wiring that connects each input pin to a unique output pin. For simplicity, only three of the internal connections in each cylinder are shown.

If we associate each input and output pin with a letter of the alphabet, then a single cylinder defines a monoalphabetic substitution. For example, in Figure 2.8, if an operator depresses the key for the letter A, an electric signal is applied to the first pin of the first cylinder and flows through the internal connection to the twenty-fifth output pin.

Consider a machine with a single cylinder. After each input key is depressed, the cylinder rotates one position, so that the internal connections are shifted accordingly. Thus, a different monoalphabetic substitution cipher is defined. After 26 letters of plaintext, the cylinder would be back to the initial position. Thus, we have a polyalphabetic substitution algorithm with a period of 26.

A single-cylinder system is trivial and does not present a formidable cryptanalytic task. The power of the rotor machine is in the use of multiple cylinders, in which the output pins of one cylinder are connected to the input pins of the next. Figure 2.8 shows a three-cylinder system. The left half of the figure shows a position in which the input from the operator to the first pin (plaintext letter a) is routed through the three cylinders to appear at the output of the second pin (ciphertext letter B).

With multiple cylinders, the one closest to the operator input rotates one pin position with each keystroke. The right half of Figure 2.8 shows the system’s configuration after a single keystroke. For every complete rotation of the inner cylinder, the middle cylinder rotates one pin position. Finally, for every complete rotation of the middle cylinder, the outer cylinder rotates one pin position. This is the same type of operation seen with an odometer. The result is that there are $26 \times 26 \times 26 = 17,576$ different substitution alphabets used before the system

---

9Machines based on the rotor principle were used by both Germany (Enigma) and Japan (Purple) in World War II. The breaking of both codes by the Allies was a significant factor in the war’s outcome.
Figure 2.8  Three-Rotor Machine with Wiring Represented by Numbered Contacts
repeats. The addition of fourth and fifth rotors results in periods of 456,976 and 11,881,376 letters, respectively. As David Kahn eloquently put it, referring to a five-rotor machine [KAHN96, page 413]:

A period of that length thwarts any practical possibility of a straightforward solution on the basis of letter frequency. This general solution would need about 50 letters per cipher alphabet, meaning that all five rotors would have to go through their combined cycle 50 times. The ciphertext would have to be as long as all the speeches made on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives in three successive sessions of Congress. No cryptanalyst is likely to bag that kind of trophy in his lifetime; even diplomats, who can be as verbose as politicians, rarely scale those heights of loquacity.

The significance of the rotor machine today is that it points the way to the most widely used cipher ever: the Data Encryption Standard (DES). This we examine in Chapter 3.

2.5 STEGANOGRAPHY

We conclude with a discussion of a technique that (strictly speaking), is not encryption, namely, steganography.

A plaintext message may be hidden in one of two ways. The methods of steganography conceal the existence of the message, whereas the methods of cryptography render the message unintelligible to outsiders by various transformations of the text.10

A simple form of steganography, but one that is time-consuming to construct, is one in which an arrangement of words or letters within an apparently innocuous text spells out the real message. For example, the sequence of first letters of each word of the overall message spells out the hidden message. Figure 2.9 shows an example in which a subset of the words of the overall message is used to convey the hidden message. See if you can decipher this; it’s not too hard.

Various other techniques have been used historically; some examples are the following [MYER91]:

- **Character marking:** Selected letters of printed or typewritten text are overwritten in pencil. The marks are ordinarily not visible unless the paper is held at an angle to bright light.
- **Invisible ink:** A number of substances can be used for writing but leave no visible trace until heat or some chemical is applied to the paper.

---

10 *Steganography* was an obsolete word that was revived by David Kahn and given the meaning it has today [KAHN96].
CHAPTER 2 / CLASSICAL ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES

• **Pin punctures:** Small pin punctures on selected letters are ordinarily not visible unless the paper is held up in front of a light.

• **Typewriter correction ribbon:** Used between lines typed with a black ribbon, the results of typing with the correction tape are visible only under a strong light.

Although these techniques may seem archaic, they have contemporary equivalents. [WAYN93] proposes hiding a message by using the least significant bits of frames on a CD. For example, the Kodak Photo CD format’s maximum resolution is $2048 \times 3072$ pixels, with each pixel containing 24 bits of RGB color information. The least significant bit of each 24-bit pixel can be changed without greatly affecting the quality of the image. The result is that you can hide a 2.3-megabyte message in a single digital snapshot. There are now a number of software packages available that take this type of approach to steganography.

Steganography has a number of drawbacks when compared to encryption. It requires a lot of overhead to hide a relatively few bits of information, although using a scheme like that proposed in the preceding paragraph may make it more effective. Also, once the system is discovered, it becomes virtually worthless. This problem, too, can be overcome if the insertion method depends on some sort of key (e.g., see Problem 2.20). Alternatively, a message can be first encrypted and then hidden using steganography.

The advantage of steganography is that it can be employed by parties who have something to lose should the fact of their secret communication (not necessarily the content) be discovered. Encryption flags traffic as important or secret or may identify the sender or receiver as someone with something to hide.

---

Figure 2.9 A Puzzle for Inspector Morse
(From *The Silent World of Nicholas Quinn*, by Colin Dexter)
2.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

For anyone interested in the history of code making and code breaking, the book to read is [KAHN96]. Although it is concerned more with the impact of cryptology than its technical development, it is an excellent introduction and makes for exciting reading. Another excellent historical account is [SING99].

A short treatment covering the techniques of this chapter, and more, is [GARD72]. There are many books that cover classical cryptography in a more technical vein; one of the best is [SINK66]. [KORN96] is a delightful book to read and contains a lengthy section on classical techniques. Two cryptography books that contain a fair amount of technical material on classical techniques are [GARR01] and [NICH99]. For the truly interested reader, the two-volume [NICH96] covers numerous classical ciphers in detail and provides many ciphertexts to be cryptanalyzed, together with the solutions.

An excellent treatment of rotor machines, including a discussion of their cryptanalysis is found in [KUMA97].

[KATZ00] provides a thorough treatment of steganography. Another good source is [WAYN96].

---


---

Recommended Web Sites:
- **American Cryptogram Association**: An association of amateur cryptographers. The Web site includes information and links to sites concerned with classical cryptography.
**2.1** What are the essential ingredients of a symmetric cipher?

**2.2** What are the two basic functions used in encryption algorithms?

**2.3** How many keys are required for two people to communicate via a cipher?

**2.4** What is the difference between a block cipher and a stream cipher?

**2.5** What are the two general approaches to attacking a cipher?

**2.6** List and briefly define types of cryptanalytic attacks based on what is known to the attacker.

**2.7** What is the difference between an unconditionally secure cipher and a computationally secure cipher?

**2.8** Briefly define the Caesar cipher.

**2.9** Briefly define the monoalphabetic cipher.

**2.10** Briefly define the Playfair cipher.

**2.11** What is the difference between a monoalphabetic cipher and a polyalphabetic cipher?

**2.12** What are two problems with the one-time pad?

**2.13** What is a transposition cipher?

**2.14** What is steganography?

**Problems**

**2.1** A generalization of the Caesar cipher, known as the affine Caesar cipher, has the following form: For each plaintext letter \( p \), substitute the ciphertext letter \( C \):

\[
C = E([a, b], p) = (ap + b) \mod 26
\]
A basic requirement of any encryption algorithm is that it be one-to-one. That is, if \( p \neq q \), then \( E(k, p) \neq E(k, q) \). Otherwise, decryption is impossible, because more than one plaintext character maps into the same ciphertext character. The affine Caesar cipher is not one-to-one for all values of \( a \). For example, for \( a = 2 \) and \( b = 3 \), then \( E([a, b], 0) = E([a, b], 13) = 3 \).

a. Are there any limitations on the value of \( b \)? Explain why or why not.

b. Determine which values of \( a \) are not allowed.

c. Provide a general statement of which values of \( a \) are and are not allowed. Justify your statement.

2.2 How many one-to-one affine Caesar ciphers are there?

2.3 A ciphertext has been generated with an affine cipher. The most frequent letter of the ciphertext is ‘B’, and the second most frequent letter of the ciphertext is ‘U’. Break this code.

2.4 The following ciphertext was generated using a simple substitution algorithm.

```
53‡‡†305) 6*;4826(4†;4†;}806*;48†8Q60))85;:J8*;:‡*8‡83
(88)5‡;46(88*96?;8)*†(;485);5*‡;:*‡(;4956*2(5*4)8Q8*
;4069285);)6‡8)4‡‡;1†9;48081;8;8‡1;48†85;4)485†528806*81
(‡9;48(88;4‡†34;48)4‡†161;:188;‡?;
```

Decrypt this message.

Hints:

1. As you know, the most frequently occurring letter in English is e. Therefore, the first or second (or perhaps third?) most common character in the message is likely to stand for e. Also, e is often seen in pairs (e.g., meet, fleet, speed, seen, been, agree, etc.). Try to find a character in the ciphertext that decodes to e.

2. The most common word in English is “the.” Use this fact to guess the characters that stand for t and h.

3. Decipher the rest of the message by deducing additional words.

Warning: The resulting message is in English but may not make much sense on a first reading.

2.5 One way to solve the key distribution problem is to use a line from a book that both the sender and the receiver possess. Typically, at least in spy novels, the first sentence of a book serves as the key. The particular scheme discussed in this problem is from one of the best suspense novels involving secret codes, Talking to Strange Men, by Ruth Rendell. Work this problem without consulting that book!

Consider the following message:

```
SIDKHKDM AF HCRKIABIE SHIMC KD LFEAILA
```

This ciphertext was produced using the first sentence of The Other Side of Silence (a book about the spy Kim Philby):

```
The snow lay thick on the steps and the snowflakes driven by the wind looked black in the headlights of the cars.
```

A simple substitution cipher was used.

a. What is the encryption algorithm?

b. How secure is it?

c. To make the key distribution problem simple, both parties can agree to use the first or last sentence of a book as the key. To change the key, they simply need to agree on a new book. The use of the first sentence would be preferable to the use of the last. Why?

2.6 In one of his cases, Sherlock Holmes was confronted with the following message.

```
534 C2 13 127 36 31 4 17 21 41
DOUGLAS 109 293 5 37 BIRLSTONE
26 BIRLSTONE 9 127 171
```
CHAPTER 2 / CLASSICAL ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES

Although Watson was puzzled, Holmes was able immediately to deduce the type of cipher. Can you?

2.7 This problem uses a real-world example, from an old U.S. Special Forces manual (public domain). A copy is available at this book’s Web site.
   a. Using the two keys (memory words) *cryptographic* and *network security*, encrypt the following message:

   Be at the third pillar from the left outside the lyceum theatre tonight at seven.
   If you are distrustful bring two friends.

   Make reasonable assumptions about how to treat redundant letters and excess letters in the memory words and how to treat spaces and punctuation. Indicate what your assumptions are. *Note:* The message is from the Sherlock Holmes novel, *The Sign of Four*.
   b. Decrypt the ciphertext. Show your work.
   c. Comment on when it would be appropriate to use this technique and what its advantages are.

2.8 A disadvantage of the general monoalphabetic cipher is that both sender and receiver must commit the permuted cipher sequence to memory. A common technique for avoiding this is to use a keyword from which the cipher sequence can be generated. For example, using the keyword *CIPHER*, write out the keyword followed by unused letters in normal order and match this against the plaintext letters:

   | Plain:  | a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z |
   | Cipher: | C I P H E R A B D F G J K L M N O Q S T U V W X Y Z |

   If it is felt that this process does not produce sufficient mixing, write the remaining letters on successive lines and then generate the sequence by reading down the columns:

   | C I P H E R |
   | A B D F G J |
   | K L M N O Q |
   | S T U V W X |
   | Y Z |

   This yields the sequence:

   C A K S Y I B L T Z P D M U H F N V E G O W R J Q X

   Such a system is used in the example in Section 2.2 (the one that begins “it was disclosed yesterday”). Determine the keyword.

2.9 When the PT-109 American patrol boat, under the command of Lieutenant John F. Kennedy, was sunk by a Japanese destroyer, a message was received at an Australian wireless station in Playfair code:

   | K X J E Y U R E B E Z W E H E W R Y T U H E Y F S |
   | K R E H E G O Y F I W T T U O L K S Y C A J P O |
   | B O T E I Z O N T X B Y B N T G O N E Y C U Z W R |
   | G D S O N S X B O U Y W R H E B A A H Y U S E D Q |

   The key used was *royal new zealand navy*. Decrypt the message. Translate TT into tt.

2.10 a. Construct a Playfair matrix with the key *largest*.
   b. Construct a Playfair matrix with the key *occurrence*. Make a reasonable assumption about how to treat redundant letters in the key.
2.11  a. Using this Playfair matrix:

```
M  F  H  I/J  K
U  N  O  P  Q
Z  V  W  X  Y
E  L  A  R  G
D  S  T  B  C
```

Encrypt this message:
Must see you over Cadogan West. Coming at once.

Note: The message is from the Sherlock Holmes story, *The Adventure of the Bruce-Partington Plans*.

b. Repeat part (a) using the Playfair matrix from Problem 2.10a.
c. How do you account for the results of this problem? Can you generalize your conclusion?

2.12  a. How many possible keys does the Playfair cipher have? Ignore the fact that some keys might produce identical encryption results. Express your answer as an approximate power of 2.
b. Now take into account the fact that some Playfair keys produce the same encryption results. How many effectively unique keys does the Playfair cipher have?

2.13  What substitution system results when we use a $25 \times 1$ Playfair matrix?

2.14  a. Encrypt the message “meet me at the usual place at ten rather than eight o’clock” using the Hill cipher with the key $\begin{pmatrix} 9 & 4 \\ 5 & 7 \end{pmatrix}$. Show your calculations and the result.
b. Show the calculations for the corresponding decryption of the ciphertext to recover the original plaintext.

2.15  We have shown that the Hill cipher succumbs to a known plaintext attack if sufficient plaintext–ciphertext pairs are provided. It is even easier to solve the Hill cipher if a chosen plaintext attack can be mounted. Describe such an attack.

2.16  It can be shown that the Hill cipher with the matrix $\begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}$ requires that $(ad - bc)$ is relatively prime to 26; that is, the only common positive integer factor of $(ad - bc)$ and 26 is 1. Thus, if $(ad - bc) = 13$ or is even, the matrix is not allowed. Determine the number of different (good) keys there are for a $2 \times 2$ Hill cipher without counting them one by one, using the following steps:
a. Find the number of matrices whose determinant is even because one or both rows are even. (A row is “even” if both entries in the row are even.)
b. Find the number of matrices whose determinant is even because one or both columns are even. (A column is “even” if both entries in the column are even.)
c. Find the number of matrices whose determinant is even because all of the entries are odd.
d. Taking into account overlaps, find the total number of matrices whose determinant is even.
e. Find the number of matrices whose determinant is a multiple of 13 because the first column is a multiple of 13.
f. Find the number of matrices whose determinant is a multiple of 13 where the first column is not a multiple of 13 but the second column is a multiple of the first modulo 13.
g. Find the total number of matrices whose determinant is a multiple of 13.
h. Find the number of matrices whose determinant is a multiple of 26 because they fit cases parts (a) and (e), (b) and (e), (c) and (e), (a) and (f), and so on.
i. Find the total number of matrices whose determinant is neither a multiple of 2 nor a multiple of 13.
2.17 Using the Vigenère cipher, encrypt the word “explanation” using the key leg.

2.18 This problem explores the use of a one-time pad version of the Vigenère cipher. In this scheme, the key is a stream of random numbers between 0 and 26. For example, if the key is 3 19 5..., then the first letter of plaintext is encrypted with a shift of 3 letters, the second with a shift of 19 letters, the third with a shift of 5 letters, and so on.

a. Encrypt the plaintext sendmoremoney with the key stream

b. Using the ciphertext produced in part (a), find a key so that the cipher text decrypts to the plaintext cashnotneeded.

2.19 What is the message embedded in Figure 2.9?

2.20 In one of Dorothy Sayers’s mysteries, Lord Peter is confronted with the message shown in Figure 2.10. He also discovers the key to the message, which is a sequence of integers:

a. Decrypt the message. *Hint:* What is the largest integer value?

b. If the algorithm is known but not the key, how secure is the scheme?

c. If the key is known but not the algorithm, how secure is the scheme?

### Programming Problems

2.21 Write a program that can encrypt and decrypt using the general Caesar cipher, also known as an additive cipher.

2.22 Write a program that can encrypt and decrypt using the affine cipher described in Problem 2.1.

---

**Figure 2.10 A Puzzle for Lord Peter**

I thought to see the fairies in the fields, but I saw only the evil elephants with their black backs. Woe! how that sight awed me! The elves danced all around and about while I heard voices calling clearly. Ah! how I tried to see—throw off the ugly cloud—but no blind eye of a mortal was permitted to spy them. So then came minstrels, having gold trumpets, harps and drums. These played very loudly beside me, breaking that spell. So the dream vanished, whereat I thanked Heaven. I shed many tears before the thin moon rose up, frail and faint as a sickle of straw. Now though the Enchanter gnash his teeth vainly, yet shall he return as the Spring returns. Oh, wretched man! Hell gapes, Erebus now lies open. The mouths of Death wait on thy end.
2.23 Write a program that can perform a letter frequency attack on an additive cipher without human intervention. Your software should produce possible plaintexts in rough order of likelihood. It would be good if your user interface allowed the user to specify “give me the top 10 possible plaintexts.”

2.24 Write a program that can perform a letter frequency attack on any monoalphabetic substitution cipher without human intervention. Your software should produce possible plaintexts in rough order of likelihood. It would be good if your user interface allowed the user to specify “give me the top 10 possible plaintexts.”

2.25 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt using a $2 \times 2$ Hill cipher.

2.26 Create software that can perform a fast known plaintext attack on a Hill cipher, given the dimension $m$. How fast are your algorithms, as a function of $m$?
CHAPTER 3

BLOCK CIPHERS AND THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD

3.1 Block Cipher Principles
   - Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers
   - Motivation for the Feistel Cipher Structure
   - The Feistel Cipher

3.2 The Data Encryption Standard
   - DES Encryption
   - DES Decryption

3.3 A Des Example
   - Results
   - The Avalanche Effect

3.4 The Strength of Des
   - The Use of 56-Bit Keys
   - The Nature of the DES Algorithm
   - Timing Attacks

3.5 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
   - Differential Cryptanalysis
   - Linear Cryptanalysis

3.6 Block Cipher Design Principles
   - DES Design Criteria
   - Number of Rounds
   - Design of Function F
   - Key Schedule Algorithm

3.7 Recommended Reading and Web Site

3.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
All the afternoon Mungo had been working on Stern’s code, principally with the aid of the latest messages which he had copied down at the Nevin Square drop. Stern was very confident. He must be well aware London Central knew about that drop. It was obvious that they didn’t care how often Mungo read their messages, so confident were they in the impenetrability of the code.

—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell

**KEY POINTS**

- A **block cipher** is an encryption/decryption scheme in which a block of plaintext is treated as a whole and used to produce a ciphertext block of equal length.
- Many block ciphers have a Feistel structure. Such a structure consists of a number of identical rounds of processing. In each round, a substitution is performed on one half of the data being processed, followed by a permutation that interchanges the two halves. The original key is expanded so that a different key is used for each round.
- The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been the most widely used encryption algorithm until recently. It exhibits the classic Feistel structure. DES uses a 64-bit block and a 56-bit key.
- Two important methods of cryptanalysis are differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. DES has been shown to be highly resistant to these two types of attack.

The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the principles of modern symmetric ciphers. For this purpose, we focus on the most widely used symmetric cipher: the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Although numerous symmetric ciphers have been developed since the introduction of DES, and although it is destined to be replaced by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), DES remains the most important such algorithm. Furthermore, a detailed study of DES provides an understanding of the principles used in other symmetric ciphers.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the general principles of symmetric block ciphers, which are the type of symmetric ciphers studied in this book (with the exception of the stream cipher RC4 in Chapter 7). Next, we cover full DES. Following this look at a specific algorithm, we return to a more general discussion of block cipher design.

Compared to public-key ciphers, such as RSA, the structure of DES and most symmetric ciphers is very complex and cannot be explained as easily as RSA and similar algorithms. Accordingly, the reader may wish to begin with a simplified version of DES, which is described in Appendix G. This version allows the reader to perform encryption and decryption by hand and gain a good understanding of the working of
the algorithm details. Classroom experience indicates that a study of this simplified version enhances understanding of DES.¹

### 3.1 BLOCK CIPHER PRINCIPLES

Many symmetric block encryption algorithms in current use are based on a structure referred to as a Feistel block cipher [FEIS73]. For that reason, it is important to examine the design principles of the Feistel cipher. We begin with a comparison of stream ciphers and block ciphers. Then we discuss the motivation for the Feistel block cipher structure. Finally, we discuss some of its implications.

**Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers**

A **stream cipher** is one that encrypts a digital data stream one bit or one byte at a time. Examples of classical stream ciphers are the autokeyed Vigenère cipher and the Vernam cipher. In the ideal case, a one-time pad version of the Vernam cipher would be used (Figure 2.7), in which the keystream \((k_i)\) is as long as the plaintext bit stream \((p_i)\). If the cryptographic keystream is random, then this cipher is unbreakable by any means other than acquiring the keystream. However, the keystream must be provided to both users in advance via some independent and secure channel. This introduces insurmountable logistical problems if the intended data traffic is very large.

Accordingly, for practical reasons, the bit-stream generator must be implemented as an algorithmic procedure, so that the cryptographic bit stream can be produced by both users. In this approach (Figure 3.1a), the bit-stream generator is a key-controlled algorithm and must produce a bit stream that is cryptographically strong. Now, the two users need only share the generating key, and each can produce the keystream.

A **block cipher** is one in which a block of plaintext is treated as a whole and used to produce a ciphertext block of equal length. Typically, a block size of 64 or 128 bits is used. As with a stream cipher, the two users share a symmetric encryption key (Figure 3.1b). Using some of the modes of operation explained in Chapter 6, a block cipher can be used to achieve the same effect as a stream cipher.

Far more effort has gone into analyzing block ciphers. In general, they seem applicable to a broader range of applications than stream ciphers. The vast majority of network-based symmetric cryptographic applications make use of block ciphers. Accordingly, the concern in this chapter, and in our discussions throughout the book of symmetric encryption, will primarily focus on block ciphers.

**Motivation for the Feistel Cipher Structure**

A block cipher operates on a plaintext block of \(n\) bits to produce a ciphertext block of \(n\) bits. There are \(2^n\) possible different plaintext blocks and, for the encryption to be reversible (i.e., for decryption to be possible), each must

¹However, you may safely skip Appendix G, at least on a first reading. If you get lost or bogged down in the details of DES, then you can go back and start with simplified DES.
produce a unique ciphertext block. Such a transformation is called reversible, or nonsingular. The following examples illustrate nonsingular and singular transformations for $n = 2$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reversible Mapping</th>
<th>Irreversible Mapping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plaintext</td>
<td>Ciphertext</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the latter case, a ciphertext of 01 could have been produced by one of two plaintext blocks. So if we limit ourselves to reversible mappings, the number of different transformations is $2^n!$.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the logic of a general substitution cipher for $n = 4$. A 4-bit input produces one of 16 possible input states, which is mapped by the substitution cipher into a unique one of 16 possible output states, each of which is represented by 4 ciphertext bits. The encryption and decryption mappings can be

---

2The reasoning is as follows: For the first plaintext, we can choose any of $2^n$ ciphertext blocks. For the second plaintext, we choose from among $2^n - 1$ remaining ciphertext blocks, and so on.
defined by a tabulation, as shown in Table 3.1. This is the most general form of block cipher and can be used to define any reversible mapping between plaintext and ciphertext. Feistel refers to this as the *ideal block cipher*, because it allows for the maximum number of possible encryption mappings from the plaintext block [FEIS75].

**Table 3.1** Encryption and Decryption Tables for Substitution Cipher of Figure 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plaintext</th>
<th>Ciphertext</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>1110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>1101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010</td>
<td>0110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1011</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>0101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
<td>1001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111</td>
<td>0111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ciphertext</th>
<th>Plaintext</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>1110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1011</td>
<td>0110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>0101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
<td>0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111</td>
<td>0101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But there is a practical problem with the ideal block cipher. If a small block size, such as \( n = 4 \), is used, then the system is equivalent to a classical substitution cipher. Such systems, as we have seen, are vulnerable to a statistical analysis of the plaintext. This weakness is not inherent in the use of a substitution cipher but rather results from the use of a small block size. If \( n \) is sufficiently large and an arbitrary reversible substitution between plaintext and ciphertext is allowed, then the statistical characteristics of the source plaintext are masked to such an extent that this type of cryptanalysis is infeasible.

An arbitrary reversible substitution cipher (the ideal block cipher) for a large block size is not practical, however, from an implementation and performance point of view. For such a transformation, the mapping itself constitutes the key. Consider again Table 3.1, which defines one particular reversible mapping from plaintext to ciphertext for \( n = 4 \). The mapping can be defined by the entries in the second column, which show the value of the ciphertext for each plaintext block. This, in essence, is the key that determines the specific mapping from among all possible mappings. In this case, using this straightforward method of defining the key, the required key length is \((4 \text{ bits}) \times (16 \text{ rows}) = 64 \text{ bits}\). In general, for an \( n \)-bit ideal block cipher, the length of the key defined in this fashion is \( n \times 2^n \) bits. For a 64-bit block, which is a desirable length to thwart statistical attacks, the required key length is \( 64 \times 2^{64} = 2^{70} \approx 10^{21} \) bits.

In considering these difficulties, Feistel points out that what is needed is an approximation to the ideal block cipher system for large \( n \), built up out of components that are easily realizable [FEIS75]. But before turning to Feistel’s approach, let us make one other observation. We could use the general block substitution cipher but, to make its implementation tractable, confine ourselves to a subset of the \( 2^n! \) possible reversible mappings. For example, suppose we define the mapping in terms of a set of linear equations. In the case of \( n = 4 \), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
y_1 &= k_{11}x_1 + k_{12}x_2 + k_{13}x_3 + k_{14}x_4 \\
y_2 &= k_{21}x_1 + k_{22}x_2 + k_{23}x_3 + k_{24}x_4 \\
y_3 &= k_{31}x_1 + k_{32}x_2 + k_{33}x_3 + k_{34}x_4 \\
y_4 &= k_{41}x_1 + k_{42}x_2 + k_{43}x_3 + k_{44}x_4
\end{align*}
\]

where the \( x_i \) are the four binary digits of the plaintext block, the \( y_i \) are the four binary digits of the ciphertext block, the \( k_{ij} \) are the binary coefficients, and arithmetic is mod 2. The key size is just \( n^2 \), in this case 16 bits. The danger with this kind of formulation is that it may be vulnerable to cryptanalysis by an attacker that is aware of the structure of the algorithm. In this example, what we have is essentially the Hill cipher discussed in Chapter 2, applied to binary data rather than characters. As we saw in Chapter 2, a simple linear system such as this is quite vulnerable.

**The Feistel Cipher**

Feistel proposed [FEIS73] that we can approximate the ideal block cipher by utilizing the concept of a product cipher, which is the execution of two or more simple ciphers in sequence in such a way that the final result or product is cryptographically stronger than any of the component ciphers. The essence of the approach is to develop a block
cipher with a key length of $k$ bits and a block length of $n$ bits, allowing a total of $2^k$ possible transformations, rather than the $2^n!$ transformations available with the ideal block cipher.

In particular, Feistel proposed the use of a cipher that alternates substitutions and permutations, where these terms are defined as follows:

- **Substitution:** Each plaintext element or group of elements is uniquely replaced by a corresponding ciphertext element or group of elements.
- **Permutation:** A sequence of plaintext elements is replaced by a permutation of that sequence. That is, no elements are added or deleted or replaced in the sequence, rather the order in which the elements appear in the sequence is changed.

In fact, Feistel’s is a practical application of a proposal by Claude Shannon to develop a product cipher that alternates *confusion* and *diffusion* functions [SHAN49].3 We look next at these concepts of diffusion and confusion and then present the Feistel cipher. But first, it is worth commenting on this remarkable fact: The Feistel cipher structure, which dates back over a quarter century and which, in turn, is based on Shannon’s proposal of 1945, is the structure used by many significant symmetric block ciphers currently in use.

**Diffusion and Confusion** The terms *diffusion* and *confusion* were introduced by Claude Shannon to capture the two basic building blocks for any cryptographic system [SHAN49]. Shannon’s concern was to thwart cryptanalysis based on statistical analysis. The reasoning is as follows. Assume the attacker has some knowledge of the statistical characteristics of the plaintext. For example, in a human-readable message in some language, the frequency distribution of the various letters may be known. Or there may be words or phrases likely to appear in the message (probable words). If these statistics are in any way reflected in the ciphertext, the cryptanalyst may be able to deduce the encryption key, part of the key, or at least a set of keys likely to contain the exact key. In what Shannon refers to as a strongly ideal cipher, all statistics of the ciphertext are independent of the particular key used. The arbitrary substitution cipher that we discussed previously (Figure 3.2) is such a cipher, but as we have seen, it is impractical.4

Other than recourse to ideal systems, Shannon suggests two methods for frustrating statistical cryptanalysis: diffusion and confusion. In *diffusion*, the statistical structure of the plaintext is dissipated into long-range statistics of the ciphertext. This is achieved by having each plaintext digit affect the value of many ciphertext digits; generally, this is equivalent to having each ciphertext digit be affected by

---

3 The paper is available at this book’s Web site. Shannon’s 1949 paper appeared originally as a classified report in 1945. Shannon enjoys an amazing and unique position in the history of computer and information science. He not only developed the seminal ideas of modern cryptography but is also responsible for inventing the discipline of information theory. Based on his work in information theory, he developed a formula for the capacity of a data communications channel, which is still used today. In addition, he founded another discipline, the application of Boolean algebra to the study of digital circuits; this last he managed to toss off as a master’s thesis.

4 Appendix F expands on Shannon’s concepts concerning measures of secrecy and the security of cryptographic algorithms.
many plaintext digits. An example of diffusion is to encrypt a message $M = m_1, m_2, m_3, \ldots$ of characters with an averaging operation:

$$y_n = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{k} m_{n+i} \right) \mod 26$$

adding $k$ successive letters to get a ciphertext letter $y_n$. One can show that the statistical structure of the plaintext has been dissipated. Thus, the letter frequencies in the ciphertext will be more nearly equal than in the plaintext; the digram frequencies will also be more nearly equal, and so on. In a binary block cipher, diffusion can be achieved by repeatedly performing some permutation on the data followed by applying a function to that permutation; the effect is that bits from different positions in the original plaintext contribute to a single bit of ciphertext.\(^5\)

Every block cipher involves a transformation of a block of plaintext into a block of ciphertext, where the transformation depends on the key. The mechanism of diffusion seeks to make the statistical relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext as complex as possible in order to thwart attempts to deduce the key. On the other hand, **confusion** seeks to make the relationship between the statistics of the ciphertext and the value of the encryption key as complex as possible, again to thwart attempts to discover the key. Thus, even if the attacker can get some handle on the statistics of the ciphertext, the way in which the key was used to produce that ciphertext is so complex as to make it difficult to deduce the key. This is achieved by the use of a complex substitution algorithm. In contrast, a simple linear substitution function would add little confusion.

As [ROBS95b] points out, so successful are diffusion and confusion in capturing the essence of the desired attributes of a block cipher that they have become the cornerstone of modern block cipher design.

**Feistel Cipher Structure** The left-hand side of Figure 3.3 depicts the structure proposed by Feistel. The inputs to the encryption algorithm are a plaintext block of length $2w$ bits and a key $K$. The plaintext block is divided into two halves, $L_0$ and $R_0$. The two halves of the data pass through $n$ rounds of processing and then combine to produce the ciphertext block. Each round $i$ has as inputs $L_{i-1}$ and $R_{i-1}$ derived from the previous round, as well as a subkey $K_i$ derived from the overall $K$. In general, the subkeys $K_i$ are different from $K$ and from each other. In Figure 3.3, 16 rounds are used, although any number of rounds could be implemented.

All rounds have the same structure. A **substitution** is performed on the left half of the data. This is done by applying a round function $F$ to the right half of the data and then taking the exclusive-OR of the output of that function and the left half of the data. The round function has the same general structure for each round but is parameterized by the round subkey $K_i$. Another way to express this is to say that $F$ is a function of right-half block of $w$ bits and a subkey of $y$ bits, which produces an output value of length $w$ bits: $F(RE_i, K_{i+1})$. Following this substitution, a

\(^5\)Some books on cryptography equate permutation with diffusion. This is incorrect. Permutation, *by itself*, does not change the statistics of the plaintext at the level of individual letters or permuted blocks. For example, in DES, the permutation swaps two 32-bit blocks, so statistics of strings of 32 bits or less are preserved.
permutation is performed that consists of the interchange of the two halves of the data.\(^6\) This structure is a particular form of the substitution-permutation network (SPN) proposed by Shannon.

\(^6\)The final round is followed by an interchange that undoes the interchange that is part of the final round. One could simply leave both interchanges out of the diagram, at the sacrifice of some consistency of presentation. In any case, the effective lack of a swap in the final round is done to simplify the implementation of the decryption process, as we shall see.
The exact realization of a Feistel network depends on the choice of the following parameters and design features:

- **Block size**: Larger block sizes mean greater security (all other things being equal) but reduced encryption/decryption speed for a given algorithm. The greater security is achieved by greater diffusion. Traditionally, a block size of 64 bits has been considered a reasonable tradeoff and was nearly universal in block cipher design. However, the new AES uses a 128-bit block size.

- **Key size**: Larger key size means greater security but may decrease encryption/decryption speed. The greater security is achieved by greater resistance to brute-force attacks and greater confusion. Key sizes of 64 bits or less are now widely considered to be inadequate, and 128 bits has become a common size.

- **Number of rounds**: The essence of the Feistel cipher is that a single round offers inadequate security but that multiple rounds offer increasing security. A typical size is 16 rounds.

- **Subkey generation algorithm**: Greater complexity in this algorithm should lead to greater difficulty of cryptanalysis.

- **Round function F**: Again, greater complexity generally means greater resistance to cryptanalysis.

There are two other considerations in the design of a Feistel cipher:

- **Fast software encryption/decryption**: In many cases, encryption is embedded in applications or utility functions in such a way as to preclude a hardware implementation. Accordingly, the speed of execution of the algorithm becomes a concern.

- **Ease of analysis**: Although we would like to make our algorithm as difficult as possible to cryptanalyze, there is great benefit in making the algorithm easy to analyze. That is, if the algorithm can be concisely and clearly explained, it is easier to analyze that algorithm for cryptanalytic vulnerabilities and therefore develop a higher level of assurance as to its strength. DES, for example, does not have an easily analyzed functionality.

**Feistel Decryption Algorithm** The process of decryption with a Feistel cipher is essentially the same as the encryption process. The rule is as follows: Use the ciphertext as input to the algorithm, but use the subkeys in reverse order. That is, use $K_n$ in the first round, $K_{n-1}$ in the second round, and so on, until $K_1$ is used in the last round. This is a nice feature, because it means we need not implement two different algorithms; one for encryption and one for decryption.

To see that the same algorithm with a reversed key order produces the correct result, Figure 3.3 shows the encryption process going down the left-hand side and the decryption process going up the right-hand side for a 16-round algorithm. For clarity, we use the notation $LE_i$ and $RE_i$ for data traveling through the encryption algorithm and $LD_i$ and $RD_i$ for data traveling through the decryption algorithm. The diagram indicates that, at every round, the intermediate value of the decryption process is equal to the corresponding value of the encryption process with the two halves of the value swapped. To put this another way, let the output of the $i$th
encryption round be \( LE_i \| RE_i \) (\( LE_i \) concatenated with \( RE_i \)). Then the corresponding output of the \((16 - i)\)th decryption round is \( RE_i \| LE_i \) or, equivalently, \( LD_{16-i} \| RD_{16-i} \).

Let us walk through Figure 3.3 to demonstrate the validity of the preceding assertions. After the last iteration of the encryption process, the two halves of the output are swapped, so that the ciphertext is \( RE_{16} \| LE_{16} \). The output of that round is the ciphertext. Now take that ciphertext and use it as input to the same algorithm. The input to the first round is \( RE_{16} \| LE_{16} \), which is equal to the 32-bit swap of the output of the sixteenth round of the encryption process.

Now we would like to show that the output of the first round of the decryption process is equal to a 32-bit swap of the input to the sixteenth round of the encryption process. First, consider the encryption process. We see that

\[
LE_{16} = RE_{15}
\]

\[
RE_{16} = LE_{15} \oplus F(RE_{15}, K_{16})
\]

On the decryption side,

\[
LD_1 = RD_0 = LE_{16} = RE_{15}
\]

\[
RD_1 = LD_0 \oplus F(RD_0, K_{16}) = RE_{16} \oplus F(RE_{15}, K_{16}) = [LE_{15} \oplus F(RE_{15}, K_{16})] \oplus F(RE_{15}, K_{16})
\]

The XOR has the following properties:

\[
[A \oplus B] \oplus C = A \oplus [B \oplus C]
\]

\[
D \oplus D = 0
\]

\[
E \oplus 0 = E
\]

Thus, we have \( LD_1 = RE_{15} \) and \( RD_1 = LE_{15} \). Therefore, the output of the first round of the decryption process is \( RE_{15} \| LE_{15} \), which is the 32-bit swap of the input to the sixteenth round of the encryption. This correspondence holds all the way through the 16 iterations, as is easily shown. We can cast this process in general terms. For the \( i \)th iteration of the encryption algorithm,

\[
LE_i = RE_{i-1}
\]

\[
RE_i = LE_{i-1} \oplus F(RE_{i-1}, K_i)
\]

Rearranging terms:

\[
RE_{i-1} = LE_i
\]

\[
LE_{i-1} = RE_i \oplus F(RE_{i-1}, K_i) = RE_i \oplus F(LE_i, K_i)
\]

Thus, we have described the inputs to the \( i \)th iteration as a function of the outputs, and these equations confirm the assignments shown in the right-hand side of Figure 3.3.

Finally, we see that the output of the last round of the decryption process is \( RE_0 \| LE_0 \). A 32-bit swap recovers the original plaintext, demonstrating the validity of the Feistel decryption process.

Note that the derivation does not require that \( F \) be a reversible function. To see this, take a limiting case in which \( F \) produces a constant output (e.g., all ones) regardless of the values of its two arguments. The equations still hold.
To help clarify the preceding concepts, let us look at a specific example (Figure 3.4) and focus on the fifteenth round of encryption, corresponding to the second round of decryption. Suppose that the blocks at each stage are 32 bits (two 16-bit halves) and that the key size is 24 bits. Suppose that at the end of encryption round fourteen, the value of the intermediate block (in hexadecimal) is DE7F03A6. Then LE14 = DE7F and RE14 = 03A6. Also assume that the value of K15 is 12DE52. After round 15, we have LE15 = 03A6 and RE15 = F(03A6, 12DE52) ⊕ DE7F.

Now let’s look at the decryption. We assume that LD1 = RE15 and RD1 = LE15, as shown in Figure 3.3, and we want to demonstrate that LD2 = RE14 and RD2 = LE14. So, we start with LD1 = F(03A6, 12DE52) ⊕ DE7F and RD1 = 03A6. Then, from Figure 3.3, LD2 = 03A6 = RE14 and RD2 = F(03A6, 12DE52) ⊕ [F(03A6, 12DE52) ⊕ DE7F] = DE7F = LE14.

### 3.2 THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD

The most widely used encryption scheme is based on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) adopted in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards, now the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as Federal Information Processing Standard 46 (FIPS PUB 46). The algorithm itself is referred to as the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA). For DES, data are encrypted in 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key. The algorithm transforms 64-bit input in a series of steps into a 64-bit output. The same steps, with the same key, are used to reverse the encryption.

The DES enjoys widespread use. It has also been the subject of much controversy concerning how secure the DES is. To appreciate the nature of the controversy, let us quickly review the history of the DES.

---

7The terminology is a bit confusing. Until recently, the terms DES and DEA could be used interchangeably. However, the most recent edition of the DES document includes a specification of the DEA described here plus the triple DEA (TDEA) described in Chapter 6. Both DEA and TDEA are part of the Data Encryption Standard. Further, until the recent adoption of the official term TDEA, the triple DEA algorithm was typically referred to as triple DES and written as 3DES. For the sake of convenience, we will use the term 3DES.
In the late 1960s, IBM set up a research project in computer cryptography led by Horst Feistel. The project concluded in 1971 with the development of an algorithm with the designation LUCIFER [FEIS73], which was sold to Lloyd’s of London for use in a cash-dispensing system, also developed by IBM. LUCIFER is a Feistel block cipher that operates on blocks of 64 bits, using a key size of 128 bits. Because of the promising results produced by the LUCIFER project, IBM embarked on an effort to develop a marketable commercial encryption product that ideally could be implemented on a single chip. The effort was headed by Walter Tuchman and Carl Meyer, and it involved not only IBM researchers but also outside consultants and technical advice from the National Security Agency (NSA). The outcome of this effort was a refined version of LUCIFER that was more resistant to cryptanalysis but that had a reduced key size of 56 bits, in order to fit on a single chip.

In 1973, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) issued a request for proposals for a national cipher standard. IBM submitted the results of its Tuchman–Meyer project. This was by far the best algorithm proposed and was adopted in 1977 as the Data Encryption Standard.

Before its adoption as a standard, the proposed DES was subjected to intense criticism, which has not subsided to this day. Two areas drew the critics’ fire. First, the key length in IBM’s original LUCIFER algorithm was 128 bits, but that of the proposed system was only 56 bits, an enormous reduction in key size of 72 bits. Critics feared that this key length was too short to withstand brute-force attacks. The second area of concern was that the design criteria for the internal structure of DES, the S-boxes, were classified. Thus, users could not be sure that the internal structure of DES was free of any hidden weak points that would enable NSA to decipher messages without benefit of the key. Subsequent events, particularly the recent work on differential cryptanalysis, seem to indicate that DES has a very strong internal structure. Furthermore, according to IBM participants, the only changes that were made to the proposal were changes to the S-boxes, suggested by NSA, that removed vulnerabilities identified in the course of the evaluation process.

Whatever the merits of the case, DES has flourished and is widely used, especially in financial applications. In 1994, NIST reaffirmed DES for federal use for another five years; NIST recommended the use of DES for applications other than the protection of classified information. In 1999, NIST issued a new version of its standard (FIPS PUB 46-3) that indicated that DES should be used only for legacy systems and that triple DES (which in essence involves repeating the DES algorithm three times on the plaintext using two or three different keys to produce the ciphertext) be used. We study triple DES in Chapter 6. Because the underlying encryption and decryption algorithms are the same for DES and triple DES, it remains important to understand the DES cipher.

**DES Encryption**

The overall scheme for DES encryption is illustrated in Figure 3.5. As with any encryption scheme, there are two inputs to the encryption function: the plaintext to be encrypted and the key. In this case, the plaintext must be 64 bits in length and the key is 56 bits in length.\(^8\)

\(^8\)Actually, the function expects a 64-bit key as input. However, only 56 of these bits are ever used; the other 8 bits can be used as parity bits or simply set arbitrarily.
Looking at the left-hand side of the figure, we can see that the processing of the plaintext proceeds in three phases. First, the 64-bit plaintext passes through an initial permutation (IP) that rearranges the bits to produce the permuted input. This is followed by a phase consisting of sixteen rounds of the same function, which involves both permutation and substitution functions. The output of the last (sixteenth) round consists of 64 bits that are a function of the input plaintext and the key. The left and right halves of the output are swapped to produce the preoutput. Finally, the preoutput is passed through a permutation \([IP^{-1}]\) that is the inverse of the initial permutation function, to produce the 64-bit ciphertext. With the exception of the initial and final permutations, DES has the exact structure of a Feistel cipher, as shown in Figure 3.3.

The right-hand portion of Figure 3.5 shows the way in which the 56-bit key is used. Initially, the key is passed through a permutation function. Then, for each of the sixteen rounds, a subkey \((K_i)\) is produced by the combination of a left
circular shift and a permutation. The permutation function is the same for each round, but a different subkey is produced because of the repeated shifts of the key bits.

**Initial Permutation** The initial permutation and its inverse are defined by tables, as shown in Tables 3.2a and 3.2b, respectively. The tables are to be interpreted as follows. The input to a table consists of 64 bits numbered from 1 to 64. The 64 entries in the permutation table contain a permutation of the numbers from 1 to 64. Each

Table 3.2 Permutation Tables for DES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Initial Permutation (IP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) Inverse Initial Permutation (IP⁻¹)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(c) Expansion Permutation (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(d) Permutation Function (P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
entry in the permutation table indicates the position of a numbered input bit in the output, which also consists of 64 bits.

To see that these two permutation functions are indeed the inverse of each other, consider the following 64-bit input $M$:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
M_1 & M_2 & M_3 & M_4 & M_5 & M_6 & M_7 & M_8 \\
M_9 & M_{10} & M_{11} & M_{12} & M_{13} & M_{14} & M_{15} & M_{16} \\
M_{17} & M_{18} & M_{19} & M_{20} & M_{21} & M_{22} & M_{23} & M_{24} \\
M_{25} & M_{26} & M_{27} & M_{28} & M_{29} & M_{30} & M_{31} & M_{32} \\
M_{33} & M_{34} & M_{35} & M_{36} & M_{37} & M_{38} & M_{39} & M_{40} \\
M_{41} & M_{42} & M_{43} & M_{44} & M_{45} & M_{46} & M_{47} & M_{48} \\
M_{49} & M_{50} & M_{51} & M_{52} & M_{53} & M_{54} & M_{55} & M_{56} \\
M_{57} & M_{58} & M_{59} & M_{60} & M_{61} & M_{62} & M_{63} & M_{64} \\
\end{array}
\]

where $M_i$ is a binary digit. Then the permutation $X = \text{IP}(M)$ is as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
M_{58} & M_{50} & M_{42} & M_{44} & M_{26} & M_{18} & M_{10} & M_{2} \\
M_{60} & M_{52} & M_{44} & M_{36} & M_{28} & M_{20} & M_{12} & M_{4} \\
M_{62} & M_{54} & M_{46} & M_{38} & M_{50} & M_{22} & M_{14} & M_{6} \\
M_{64} & M_{56} & M_{48} & M_{40} & M_{52} & M_{24} & M_{16} & M_{8} \\
M_{57} & M_{49} & M_{41} & M_{33} & M_{25} & M_{17} & M_{9} & M_{1} \\
M_{59} & M_{51} & M_{43} & M_{35} & M_{27} & M_{19} & M_{11} & M_{3} \\
M_{61} & M_{53} & M_{45} & M_{37} & M_{29} & M_{21} & M_{13} & M_{5} \\
M_{63} & M_{55} & M_{47} & M_{39} & M_{31} & M_{23} & M_{15} & M_{7} \\
\end{array}
\]

If we then take the inverse permutation $Y = \text{IP}^{-1}(X) = \text{IP}^{-1}(\text{IP}(M))$, it can be seen that the original ordering of the bits is restored.

**Details of Single Round** Figure 3.6 shows the internal structure of a single round. Again, begin by focusing on the left-hand side of the diagram. The left and right halves of each 64-bit intermediate value are treated as separate 32-bit quantities, labeled L (left) and R (right). As in any classic Feistel cipher, the overall processing at each round can be summarized in the following formulas:

\[
L_i = R_{i-1} \\
R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus F(R_{i-1}, K_i)
\]

The round key $K_i$ is 48 bits. The $R$ input is 32 bits. This $R$ input is first expanded to 48 bits by using a table that defines a permutation plus an expansion that involves duplication of 16 of the $R$ bits (Table 3.2c). The resulting 48 bits are XORed with $K_i$. This 48-bit result passes through a substitution function that produces a 32-bit output, which is permuted as defined by Table 3.2d.

The role of the S-boxes in the function $F$ is illustrated in Figure 3.7. The substitution consists of a set of eight S-boxes, each of which accepts 6 bits as input and produces 4 bits as output. These transformations are defined in Table 3.3, which is
interpreted as follows: The first and last bits of the input to box $S_i$ form a 2-bit binary number to select one of four substitutions defined by the four rows in the table for $S_i$. The middle four bits select one of the sixteen columns. The decimal value in the cell selected by the row and column is then converted to its 4-bit representation to produce the output. For example, in $S_1$, for input 011001, the row is 01 (row 1) and the column is 1100 (column 12). The value in row 1, column 12 is 9, so the output is 1001.

Each row of an S-box defines a general reversible substitution. Figure 3.2 may be useful in understanding the mapping. The figure shows the substitution for row 0 of box $S_1$.

The operation of the S-boxes is worth further comment. Ignore for the moment the contribution of the key ($K_i$). If you examine the expansion table, you see that the 32 bits of input are split into groups of 4 bits and then become groups of 6 bits by taking the outer bits from the two adjacent groups. For example, if part of the input word is

... efgh ijk1 mnop ...

this becomes

... defghi hijklm lmnopq ...
The outer two bits of each group select one of four possible substitutions (one row of an S-box). Then a 4-bit output value is substituted for the particular 4-bit input (the middle four input bits). The 32-bit output from the eight S-boxes is then permuted, so that on the next round, the output from each S-box immediately affects as many others as possible.

**KEY GENERATION** Returning to Figures 3.5 and 3.6, we see that a 64-bit key is used as input to the algorithm. The bits of the key are numbered from 1 through 64; every eighth bit is ignored, as indicated by the lack of shading in Table 3.4a. The key is first subjected to a permutation governed by a table labeled Permuted Choice One (Table 3.4b). The resulting 56-bit key is then treated as two 28-bit quantities, labeled \( R_i \) and \( K_i \). At each round, \( C_{i-1} \) and \( D_{i-1} \) are separately subjected to a circular left shift or (rotation) of 1 or 2 bits, as governed by Table 3.4d. These shifted values serve as input to the next round. They also serve as input to the part labeled Permuted Choice Two (Table 3.4c), which produces a 48-bit output that serves as input to the function \( F(R_{i-1}, K_i) \).

**DES Decryption**

As with any Feistel cipher, decryption uses the same algorithm as encryption, except that the application of the subkeys is reversed.
### Table 3.3 Definition of DES S-Boxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S1</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S2</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S3</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S4</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| S5  | 2 | 12 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 10 | 11 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 15 | 13 | 0 | 14 | 9 |
|-----|----|---|---|---|---|----|----|---|---|---|---|----|----|---|---|---|---|
| 14  | 11 | 2 | 12 | 4 | 7 | 13 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 15 | 10 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 6 |   |
| 4   | 2 | 1 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 7 | 8 | 15 | 9 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 14 |   |
| 11  | 8 | 12 | 7 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 13 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 3 |   |

| S6  | 12 | 1 | 10 | 15 | 9 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 13 | 3 | 4 | 14 | 7 | 5 | 11 |
|-----|----|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|
| 10  | 15 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 12 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 13 | 14 | 0 | 11 | 3 | 8 |   |
| 9   | 14 | 15 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 12 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 13 | 11 | 6 |   |
| 4   | 3 | 2 | 12 | 9 | 5 | 15 | 10 | 11 | 14 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 13 |   |

| S7  | 4 | 11 | 2 | 14 | 15 | 0 | 8 | 13 | 3 | 12 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 1 |
|-----|----|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|
| 13  | 0 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 12 | 2 | 15 | 8 | 6 |   |
| 1   | 4 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 3 | 7 | 14 | 10 | 15 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 2 |   |
| 6   | 11 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 0 | 15 | 14 | 2 | 3 | 12 |   |

| S8  | 13 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 15 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 14 | 5 | 0 | 12 | 7 |
|-----|----|---|---|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|----|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|
| 1   | 15 | 13 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 11 | 0 | 14 | 9 | 2 |   |
| 7   | 11 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 10 | 13 | 15 | 3 | 5 | 8 |   |
| 2   | 1 | 14 | 7 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 15 | 12 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 11 |   |
We now work through an example and consider some of its implications. Although you are not expected to duplicate the example by hand, you will find it informative to study the hex patterns that occur from one step to the next.

For this example, the plaintext is a hexadecimal palindrome. The plaintext, key, and resulting ciphertext are as follows:

Plaintext: 02468aceeca86420
Key: 0f1571c947d9e859
Ciphertext: da02ce3a89ecac3b
Results

Table 3.5 shows the progression of the algorithm. The first row shows the 32-bit values of the left and right halves of data after the initial permutation. The next 16 rows show the results after each round. Also shown is the value of the 48-bit subkey generated for each round. Note that $L_i = R_{i-1}$. The final row shows the left- and right-hand values after the inverse initial permutation. These two values combined form the ciphertext.

The Avalanche Effect

A desirable property of any encryption algorithm is that a small change in either the plaintext or the key should produce a significant change in the ciphertext. In particular, a change in one bit of the plaintext or one bit of the key should produce a change in many bits of the ciphertext. This is referred to as the avalanche effect. If the change were small, this might provide a way to reduce the size of the plaintext or key space to be searched.

Using the example from Table 3.5, Table 3.6 shows the result when the fourth bit of the plaintext is changed, so that the plaintext is $12468aceecaa86420$. The second column of the table shows the intermediate 64-bit values at the end of each round for the two plaintexts. The third column shows the number of bits that differ between the two intermediate values. The table shows that, after just three rounds, 18 bits differ between the two blocks. On completion, the two ciphertexts differ in 32 bit positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>$K_i$</th>
<th>$L_i$</th>
<th>$R_i$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>5a005a00</td>
<td>3cf03c0f</td>
<td>3cf03c0f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1e030f03080d2930</td>
<td>3cf03c0f</td>
<td>bad22845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0a31293432242318</td>
<td>bad22845</td>
<td>99e9b723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>23072318201d0c1d</td>
<td>99e9b723</td>
<td>0bae3b9e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>05261d3824311a20</td>
<td>0bae3b9e</td>
<td>42415649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3325340136002c25</td>
<td>42415649</td>
<td>18b3fa41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>123a2d0d04262a1c</td>
<td>18b3fa41</td>
<td>9616fe23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>021f120b1c130611</td>
<td>9616fe23</td>
<td>67117cf2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1c10372a2832002b</td>
<td>67117cf2</td>
<td>c11bcf09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>04292a380c341f03</td>
<td>c11bcf09</td>
<td>887fbc6c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2703212607280403</td>
<td>887fbc6c</td>
<td>6007e8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2826390c31261504</td>
<td>6007e8b</td>
<td>f596506e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12071c241a0a0f08</td>
<td>f596506e</td>
<td>738538b8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>300935393c0d100b</td>
<td>738538b8</td>
<td>c6a62c4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>311e0923132118a2</td>
<td>c6a62c4e</td>
<td>56b0bd75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>283d3e0227072528</td>
<td>56b0bd75</td>
<td>75e8f8d8f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2921080b13143025</td>
<td>75e8f8d8f</td>
<td>25896490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP–1</td>
<td>da02ce3a</td>
<td>89eacac3b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: DES subkeys are shown as eight 6-bit values in hex format
Table 3.6  Avalanche Effect in DES: Change in Plaintext

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>( \delta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02468aceeca86420</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3cf030cfbad22845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>bad2284599e9b723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>99e9b7230bae3b9e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0bae3b9e42415649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4241564918b3fa1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18b3fa419616fe23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9616fe2367117cf2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>67117cf2c11bfc09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7 shows a similar test using the original plaintext of with two keys that differ in only the fourth bit position: the original key, 0f1571c947d9e859, and the altered key, 1f1571c947d9e859. Again, the results show that about half of the bits in the ciphertext differ and that the avalanche effect is pronounced after just a few rounds.

Table 3.7  Avalanche Effect in DES: Change in Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>( \delta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02468aceeca86420</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3cf030cfbad22845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>bad2284599e9b723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>99e9b7230bae3b9e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0bae3b9e42415649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4241564918b3fa1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18b3fa419616fe23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9616fe2367117cf2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>67117cf2c11bfc09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>( \delta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c11bfc09887fbc6c</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>887fbc6c600f7e8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>600f7e8bf596506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>f596506e738538b8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>738538b8c6a62c4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>c6a62c4e56b0bd75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>56b0bd757575e8fd8f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>75e8fd8f25896490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP⁻¹</td>
<td>da02ce3a89eacac3b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 / A DES EXAMPLE  87
Since its adoption as a federal standard, there have been lingering concerns about the level of security provided by DES. These concerns, by and large, fall into two areas: key size and the nature of the algorithm.

The Use of 56-Bit Keys

With a key length of 56 bits, there are $2^{56}$ possible keys, which is approximately $7.2 \times 10^{16}$ keys. Thus, on the face of it, a brute-force attack appears impractical. Assuming that, on average, half the key space has to be searched, a single machine performing one DES encryption per microsecond would take more than a thousand years (see Table 2.2) to break the cipher.

However, the assumption of one encryption per microsecond is overly conservative. As far back as 1977, Diffie and Hellman postulated that the technology existed to build a parallel machine with 1 million encryption devices, each of which could perform one encryption per microsecond [DIFF77]. This would bring the average search time down to about 10 hours. The authors estimated that the cost would be about $20 million in 1977 dollars.

DES finally and definitively proved insecure in July 1998, when the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) announced that it had broken a DES encryption using a special-purpose “DES cracker” machine that was built for less than $250,000. The attack took less than three days. The EFF has published a detailed description of the machine, enabling others to build their own cracker [EFF98]. And, of course, hardware prices will continue to drop as speeds increase, making DES virtually worthless.

It is important to note that there is more to a key-search attack than simply running through all possible keys. Unless known plaintext is provided, the analyst must be able to recognize plaintext as plaintext. If the message is just plain text in English, then the result pops out easily, although the task of recognizing English would have to be automated. If the text message has been compressed before encryption, then recognition is more difficult. And if the message is some more general type of data, such as a numerical file, and this has been compressed, the problem becomes even more difficult to automate. Thus, to supplement the brute-force approach, some degree of knowledge about the expected plaintext is needed, and some means of automatically distinguishing plaintext from garble is also needed. The EFF approach addresses this issue as well and introduces some automated techniques that would be effective in many contexts.

Fortunately, there are a number of alternatives to DES, the most important of which are AES and triple DES, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.

The Nature of the DES Algorithm

Another concern is the possibility that cryptanalysis is possible by exploiting the characteristics of the DES algorithm. The focus of concern has been on the eight substitution tables, or S-boxes, that are used in each iteration. Because the design criteria for these boxes, and indeed for the entire algorithm, were not made public, there is a suspicion that the boxes were constructed in such a way that cryptanalysis...
is possible for an opponent who knows the weaknesses in the S-boxes. This assertion
is tantalizing, and over the years a number of regularities and unexpected behaviors
of the S-boxes have been discovered. Despite this, no one has so far succeeded in
discovering the supposed fatal weaknesses in the S-boxes.  

Timing Attacks

We discuss timing attacks in more detail in Part Two, as they relate to public-key
algorithms. However, the issue may also be relevant for symmetric ciphers.
In essence, a timing attack is one in which information about the key or the plaintext
is obtained by observing how long it takes a given implementation to perform
decryptions on various ciphertexts. A timing attack exploits the fact that an encryp-
tion or decryption algorithm often takes slightly different amounts of time on
different inputs. [HEVI99] reports on an approach that yields the Hamming weight
(number of bits equal to one) of the secret key. This is a long way from knowing the
actual key, but it is an intriguing first step. The authors conclude that DES appears
to be fairly resistant to a successful timing attack but suggest some avenues to
explore. Although this is an interesting line of attack, it so far appears unlikely that
this technique will ever be successful against DES or more powerful symmetric
ciphers such as triple DES and AES.

3.5 DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS

For most of its life, the prime concern with DES has been its vulnerability
to brute-force attack because of its relatively short (56 bits) key length. However,
there has also been interest in finding cryptanalytic attacks on DES. With
the increasing popularity of block ciphers with longer key lengths, including
triple DES, brute-force attacks have become increasingly impractical. Thus,
there has been increased emphasis on cryptanalytic attacks on DES and other
symmetric block ciphers. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the two
most powerful and promising approaches: differential cryptanalysis and linear
cryptanalysis.

Differential Cryptanalysis

One of the most significant advances in cryptanalysis in recent years is differential
cryptanalysis. In this section, we discuss the technique and its applicability to DES.

**HISTORY** Differential cryptanalysis was not reported in the open literature until
1990. The first published effort appears to have been the cryptanalysis of a block
cipher called FEAL by Murphy [MURP90]. This was followed by a number of
papers by Biham and Shamir, who demonstrated this form of attack on a variety of
encryption algorithms and hash functions; their results are summarized in
[BIHA93].

---

9 At least, no one has publicly acknowledged such a discovery.
The most publicized results for this approach have been those that have
application to DES. Differential cryptanalysis is the first published attack that is
capable of breaking DES in less than $2^{55}$ encryptions. The scheme, as reported in
[BIHA93], can successfully cryptanalyze DES with an effort on the order of $2^{47}$
encryptions, requiring $2^{47}$ chosen plaintexts. Although $2^{47}$ is certainly significantly
less than $2^{55}$, the need for the adversary to find $2^{47}$ chosen plaintexts makes this
attack of only theoretical interest.

Although differential cryptanalysis is a powerful tool, it does not do very well
against DES. The reason, according to a member of the IBM team that designed
DES [COPP94], is that differential cryptanalysis was known to the team as early as
1974. The need to strengthen DES against attacks using differential cryptanalysis
played a large part in the design of the S-boxes and the permutation $P$. As evidence
of the impact of these changes, consider these comparable results reported in
[BIHA93]. Differential cryptanalysis of an eight-round LUCIFER algorithm
requires only 256 chosen plaintexts, whereas an attack on an eight-round version of
DES requires $2^{14}$ chosen plaintexts.

**Differential Cryptanalysis Attack**

The differential cryptanalysis attack is complex; [BIHA93] provides a complete description. The rationale behind differential
cryptanalysis is to observe the behavior of pairs of text blocks evolving along each
round of the cipher, instead of observing the evolution of a single text block. Here, we
provide a brief overview so that you can get the flavor of the attack.

We begin with a change in notation for DES. Consider the original plaintext
block $m$ to consist of two halves $m_0$, $m_1$. Each round of DES maps the right-hand
input into the left-hand output and sets the right-hand output to be a function of the
left-hand input and the subkey for this round. So, at each round, only one new 32-bit
block is created. If we label each new block $m_i (2 \leq i \leq 17)$, then the intermediate
message halves are related as follows:

$$m_{i+1} = m_{i-1} \oplus f(m_i, K_i), \quad i = 1, 2, \ldots, 16$$

In differential cryptanalysis, we start with two messages, $m$ and $m'$, with a
known XOR difference $\Delta m = m \oplus m'$, and consider the difference between the
intermediate message halves: $\Delta m_i = m_i \oplus m'_i$. Then we have

$$\Delta m_{i+1} = m_{i+1} \oplus m'_{i+1}$$
$$= [m_{i-1} \oplus f(m_i, K_i)] \oplus [m'_{i-1} \oplus f(m'_i, K_i)]$$
$$= \Delta m_{i-1} \oplus [f(m_i, K_i) \oplus f(m'_i, K_i)]$$

Now, suppose that many pairs of inputs to $f$ with the same difference yield the
same output difference if the same subkey is used. To put this more precisely, let us
say that $X$ may cause $Y$ with probability $p$, if for a fraction $p$ of the pairs in which the
input XOR is $X$, the output XOR equals $Y$. We want to suppose that there are a
number of values of $X$ that have high probability of causing a particular output
difference. Therefore, if we know $\Delta m_{i-1}$ and $\Delta m_i$ with high probability, then we
know $\Delta m_{i+1}$ with high probability. Furthermore, if a number of such differences are
determined, it is feasible to determine the subkey used in the function $f$.

The overall strategy of differential cryptanalysis is based on these considerations
for a single round. The procedure is to begin with two plaintext messages $m$ and $m'$
with a given difference and trace through a probable pattern of differences after each round to yield a probable difference for the ciphertext. Actually, there are two probable patterns of differences for the two 32-bit halves: $\Delta m_{17}$ $\parallel$ $\Delta m_{16}$. Next, we submit $m$ and $m'$ for encryption to determine the actual difference under the unknown key and compare the result to the probable difference. If there is a match,

$$E(K, m) \oplus E(K, m') = (\Delta m_{17} \parallel \Delta m_{16})$$

then we suspect that all the probable patterns at all the intermediate rounds are correct. With that assumption, we can make some deductions about the key bits. This procedure must be repeated many times to determine all the key bits.

Figure 3.8, based on a figure in [BIHA93], illustrates the propagation of differences through three rounds of DES. The probabilities shown on the right refer to the probability that a given set of intermediate differences will appear as a function

Figure 3.8  Differential Propagation through Three Rounds of DES (numbers in hexadecimal)
of the input differences. Overall, after three rounds, the probability that the output
difference is as shown is equal to \(0.25 \times 1 \times 0.25 = 0.0625\).

### Linear Cryptanalysis

A more recent development is linear cryptanalysis, described in [MATS93]. This attack
is based on finding linear approximations to describe the transformations performed in
DES. This method can find a DES key given \(2^{13}\) known plaintexts, as compared to \(2^{47}\)
chosen plaintexts for differential cryptanalysis. Although this is a minor improvement,
because it may be easier to acquire known plaintext rather than chosen plaintext, it still
leaves linear cryptanalysis infeasible as an attack on DES. So far, little work has been
done by other groups to validate the linear cryptanalytic approach.

We now give a brief summary of the principle on which linear cryptanalysis is
based. For a cipher with \(n\)-bit plaintext and ciphertext blocks and an \(m\)-bit key, let
the plaintext block be labeled \(P[1], \ldots, P[n]\), the cipher text block \(C[1], \ldots, C[n]\),
and the key \(K[1], \ldots, K[m]\). Then define

\[
A[i, j, \ldots, k] = A[i] \oplus A[j] \oplus \cdots \oplus A[k]
\]

The objective of linear cryptanalysis is to find an effective linear equation of
the form:

\[
P[\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_a] \oplus C[\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_b] = K[\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_c]
\]

(where \(x = 0\) or \(1\); \(1 \leq a; b \leq n; c \leq m\); and where the \(\alpha, \beta, \text{and } \gamma\) terms represent
fixed, unique bit locations) that holds with probability \(p \neq 0.5\). The further \(p\) is from
0.5, the more effective the equation. Once a proposed relation is determined, the pro-
cedure is to compute the results of the left-hand side of the preceding equation for a
large number of plaintext–ciphertext pairs. If the result is 0 more than half the time,
assume \(K[\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_c] = 0\). If it is 1 most of the time, assume \(K[\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_c] = 1\).
This gives us a linear equation on the key bits. Try to get more such relations so that we
can solve for the key bits. Because we are dealing with linear equations, the problem
can be approached one round of the cipher at a time, with the results combined.

### 3.6 BLOCK CIPHER DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Although much progress has been made in designing block ciphers that are crypto-
graphically strong, the basic principles have not changed all that much since the
work of Feistel and the DES design team in the early 1970s. It is useful to begin this
discussion by looking at the published design criteria used in the DES effort. Then
we look at three critical aspects of block cipher design: the number of rounds, design
of the function \(F\), and key scheduling.

#### DES Design Criteria

The criteria used in the design of DES, as reported in [COPP94], focused on the
design of the S-boxes and on the P function that takes the output of the S-boxes
(Figure 3.7). The criteria for the S-boxes are as follows.
1. No output bit of any S-box should be too close a linear function of the input bits. Specifically, if we select any output bit and any subset of the six input bits, the fraction of inputs for which this output bit equals the XOR of these input bits should not be close to 0 or 1, but rather should be near 1/2.

2. Each row of an S-box (determined by a fixed value of the leftmost and rightmost input bits) should include all 16 possible output bit combinations.

3. If two inputs to an S-box differ in exactly one bit, the outputs must differ in at least two bits.

4. If two inputs to an S-box differ in the two middle bits exactly, the outputs must differ in at least two bits.

5. If two inputs to an S-box differ in their first two bits and are identical in their last two bits, the two outputs must not be the same.

6. For any nonzero 6-bit difference between inputs, no more than eight of the 32 pairs of inputs exhibiting that difference may result in the same output difference.

7. This is a criterion similar to the previous one, but for the case of three S-boxes.

Coppersmith pointed out that the first criterion in the preceding list was needed because the S-boxes are the only nonlinear part of DES. If the S-boxes were linear (i.e., each output bit is a linear combination of the input bits), the entire algorithm would be linear and easily broken. We have seen this phenomenon with the Hill cipher, which is linear. The remaining criteria were primarily aimed at thwarting differential cryptanalysis and at providing good confusion properties.

The criteria for the permutation P are as follows.

1. The four output bits from each S-box at round \(i\) are distributed so that two of them affect (provide input for) “middle bits” of round \((i + 1)\) and the other two affect end bits. The two middle bits of input to an S-box are not shared with adjacent S-boxes. The end bits are the two left-hand bits and the two right-hand bits, which are shared with adjacent S-boxes.

2. The four output bits from each S-box affect six different S-boxes on the next round, and no two affect the same S-box.

3. For two S-boxes \(j, k\), if an output bit from \(S_j\) affects a middle bit of \(S_k\) on the next round, then an output bit from \(S_k\) cannot affect a middle bit of \(S_j\). This implies that, for \(j = k\), an output bit from \(S_j\) must not affect a middle bit of \(S_j\).

These criteria are intended to increase the diffusion of the algorithm.

**Number of Rounds**

The cryptographic strength of a Feistel cipher derives from three aspects of the design: the number of rounds, the function \(F\), and the key schedule algorithm. Let us look first at the choice of the number of rounds.
The greater the number of rounds, the more difficult it is to perform cryptanalysis, even for a relatively weak F. In general, the criterion should be that the number of rounds is chosen so that known cryptanalytic efforts require greater effort than a simple brute-force key search attack. This criterion was certainly used in the design of DES. Schneier [SCHN96] observes that for 16-round DES, a differential cryptanalysis attack is slightly less efficient than brute force: The differential cryptanalysis attack requires $2^{55.1}$ operations, whereas brute force requires $2^{55}$. If DES had 15 or fewer rounds, differential cryptanalysis would require less effort than a brute-force key search.

This criterion is attractive, because it makes it easy to judge the strength of an algorithm and to compare different algorithms. In the absence of a cryptanalytic breakthrough, the strength of any algorithm that satisfies the criterion can be judged solely on key length.

**Design of Function F**

The heart of a Feistel block cipher is the function F. As we have seen, in DES, this function relies on the use of S-boxes. This is also the case for many other symmetric block ciphers. However, we can make some general comments about the criteria for designing F. After that, we look specifically at S-box design.

**DESIGN CRITERIA FOR F**

The function F provides the element of confusion in a Feistel cipher. Thus, it must be difficult to “unscramble” the substitution performed by F. One obvious criterion is that F be nonlinear, as we discussed previously. The more nonlinear F, the more difficult any type of cryptanalysis will be. There are several measures of nonlinearity, which are beyond the scope of this book. In rough terms, the more difficult it is to approximate F by a set of linear equations, the more nonlinear F is.

Several other criteria should be considered in designing F. We would like the algorithm to have good avalanche properties. Recall that, in general, this means that a change in one bit of the input should produce a change in many bits of the output. A more stringent version of this is the **strict avalanche criterion (SAC)** [WEBS86], which states that any output bit $j$ of an S-box should change with probability 1/2 when any single input bit $i$ is inverted for all $i, j$. Although SAC is expressed in terms of S-boxes, a similar criterion could be applied to F as a whole. This is important when considering designs that do not include S-boxes.

Another criterion proposed in [WEBS86] is the **bit independence criterion (BIC)**, which states that output bits $j$ and $k$ should change independently when any single input bit $i$ is inverted for all $i, j$, and $k$. The SAC and BIC criteria appear to strengthen the effectiveness of the confusion function.

**S-Box Design**

One of the most intense areas of research in the field of symmetric block ciphers is that of S-box design. The papers are almost too numerous to

---

10Recall that differential cryptanalysis of DES requires $2^{57}$ chosen plaintext. If all you have to work with is known plaintext, then you must sort through a large quantity of known plaintext–ciphertext pairs looking for the useful ones. This brings the level of effort up to $2^{55.1}$. 
count.11 Here we mention some general principles. In essence, we would like any change to the input vector to an S-box to result in random-looking changes to the output. The relationship should be nonlinear and difficult to approximate with linear functions.

One obvious characteristic of the S-box is its size. An \( n \times m \) S-box has \( n \) input bits and \( m \) output bits. DES has \( 6 \times 4 \) S-boxes. The encryption algorithm Blowfish, has \( 8 \times 32 \) S-boxes. Larger S-boxes, by and large, are more resistant to differential and linear cryptanalysis [SCHN96]. On the other hand, the larger the dimension \( n \), the (exponentially) larger the lookup table. Thus, for practical reasons, a limit of \( n \) equal to about 8 to 10 is usually imposed. Another practical consideration is that the larger the S-box, the more difficult it is to design it properly.

S-boxes are typically organized in a different manner than used in DES. An \( n \times m \) S-box typically consists of \( 2^n \) rows of \( m \) bits each. The \( n \) bits of input select one of the rows of the S-box, and the \( m \) bits in that row are the output. For example, in an \( 8 \times 32 \) S-box, if the input is \( 00001001 \), the output consists of the 32 bits in row 9 (the first row is labeled row 0).

Mister and Adams [MIST96] propose a number of criteria for S-box design. Among these are that the S-box should satisfy both SAC and BIC. They also suggest that all linear combinations of S-box columns should be bent. Bent functions are a special class of Boolean functions that are highly nonlinear according to certain mathematical criteria [ADAM90]. There has been increasing interest in designing and analyzing S-boxes using bent functions.

A related criterion for S-boxes is proposed and analyzed in [HEYS95]. The authors define the guaranteed avalanche (GA) criterion as follows: An S-box satisfies GA of order \( \gamma \) if, for a 1-bit input change, at least \( \gamma \) output bits change. The authors conclude that a GA in the range of order 2 to order 5 provides strong diffusion characteristics for the overall encryption algorithm.

For larger S-boxes, such as \( 8 \times 32 \), the question arises as to the best method of selecting the S-box entries in order to meet the type of criteria we have been discussing. Nyberg, who has written a lot about the theory and practice of S-box design, suggests the following approaches (quoted in [ROBS95b]):

- **Random**: Use some pseudorandom number generation or some table of random digits to generate the entries in the S-boxes. This may lead to boxes with undesirable characteristics for small sizes (e.g., \( 6 \times 4 \)) but should be acceptable for large S-boxes (e.g., \( 8 \times 32 \)).

- **Random with testing**: Choose S-box entries randomly, then test the results against various criteria, and throw away those that do not pass.

- **Human-made**: This is a more or less manual approach with only simple mathematics to support it. It is apparently the technique used in the DES design. This approach is difficult to carry through for large S-boxes.

- **Math-made**: Generate S-boxes according to mathematical principles. By using mathematical construction, S-boxes can be constructed that offer proven security against linear and differential cryptanalysis, together with good diffusion.

---

11 A good summary of S-box design studies through early 1996 can be found in [SCHN96].
A variation on the first technique is to use S-boxes that are both random and key dependent. An example of this approach is Blowfish, which starts with S-boxes filled with pseudorandom digits and then alters the contents using the key. A tremendous advantage of key-dependent S-boxes is that, because they are not fixed, it is impossible to analyze the S-boxes ahead of time to look for weaknesses.

Key Schedule Algorithm

A final area of block cipher design, and one that has received less attention than S-box design, is the key schedule algorithm. With any Feistel block cipher, the key is used to generate one subkey for each round. In general, we would like to select subkeys to maximize the difficulty of deducing individual subkeys and the difficulty of working back to the main key. No general principles for this have yet been promulgated.

Hall suggests [ADAM94] that, at minimum, the key schedule should guarantee key/ciphertext Strict Avalanche Criterion and Bit Independence Criterion.

3.7 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

There is a wealth of information on symmetric encryption. Some of the more worthwhile references are listed here. An essential reference work is [SCHN96]. This remarkable work contains descriptions of virtually every cryptographic algorithm and protocol published up to the time of the writing of the book. The author pulls together results from journals, conference proceedings, government publications, and standards documents and organizes these into a comprehensive and comprehensible survey. Another worthwhile and detailed survey is [MENE97]. A rigorous mathematical treatment is [STIN06].

The foregoing references provide coverage of public-key as well as symmetric encryption. Perhaps the most detailed description of DES is [SIMO95]; the book also contains an extensive discussion of differential and linear cryptanalysis of DES. [BARK91] provides a readable and interesting analysis of the structure of DES and of potential cryptanalytic approaches to DES. [EFF98] details the most effective brute-force attack on DES. [COPP94] looks at the inherent strength of DES and its ability to stand up to cryptanalysis. The reader may also find the following document useful: “The DES Algorithm Illustrated” by J. Orlin Grabbe, which is available at this book’s Web site. An excellent description of linear and differential cryptanalysis is in [HEYS02].

3.8 / KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>avalanche effect</th>
<th>diffusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>block cipher</td>
<td>Feistel cipher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confusion</td>
<td>irreversible mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Encryption Standard (DES)</td>
<td>key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differential cryptanalysis</td>
<td>linear cryptanalysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>permutation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>product cipher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reversible mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>round function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>subkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>substitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

3.1 Why is it important to study the Feistel cipher?
3.2 What is the difference between a block cipher and a stream cipher?
3.3 Why is it not practical to use an arbitrary reversible substitution cipher of the kind shown in Table 3.1?
3.4 What is a product cipher?
3.5 What is the difference between diffusion and confusion?
3.6 Which parameters and design choices determine the actual algorithm of a Feistel cipher?
3.7 What is the purpose of the S-boxes in DES?
3.8 Explain the avalanche effect.
3.9 What is the difference between differential and linear cryptanalysis?

Problems

3.1 a. In Section 3.1, under the subsection on the motivation for the Feistel cipher structure, it was stated that, for a block of $n$ bits, the number of different reversible mappings for the ideal block cipher is $2^n!$. Justify.
   b. In that same discussion, it was stated that for the ideal block cipher, which allows all possible reversible mappings, the size of the key is $n \times 2^n$ bits. But, if there are $2^n!$
possible mappings, it should take \( \log_2 2^n! \) bits to discriminate among the different mappings, and so the key length should be \( \log_2 2^n! \). However, \( \log_2 2^n! < n \times 2^n \). Explain the discrepancy.

3.2 Consider a Feistel cipher composed of sixteen rounds with a block length of 128 bits and a key length of 128 bits. Suppose that, for a given \( k \), the key scheduling algorithm determines values for the first eight round keys, \( k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_8 \), and then sets \( k_9 = k_8, k_{10} = k_7, k_{11} = k_6, \ldots, k_{16} = k_1 \).

Suppose you have a ciphertext \( c \). Explain how, with access to an encryption oracle, you can decrypt \( c \) and determine \( k \) using just a single oracle query. This shows that such a cipher is vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack. (An encryption oracle can be thought of as a device that, when given a plaintext, returns the corresponding ciphertext. The internal details of the device are not known to you and you cannot break open the device. You can only gain information from the oracle by making queries to it and observing its responses.)

3.3 Consider a block encryption algorithm that encrypts blocks of length \( n \), and let \( N = 2^n \). Say we have \( t \) plaintext–ciphertext pairs \( P_i, C_i = E(K, P_i) \), where we assume that the key \( K \) selects one of the \( N! \) possible mappings. Imagine that we wish to find \( K \) by exhaustive search. We could generate key \( K' \) and test whether \( C_i = E(K', P_i) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq t \). If \( K' \) encrypts each \( P_i \) to its proper \( C_i \), then we have evidence that \( K = K' \). However, it may be the case that the mappings \( E(K, \cdot) \) and \( E(K', \cdot) \) exactly agree on the \( t \) plaintext–ciphertext pairs \( P_i, C_i \) and agree on no other pairs.

a. What is the probability that \( E(K, \cdot) \) and \( E(K', \cdot) \) are in fact distinct mappings?

b. What is the probability that \( E(K, \cdot) \) and \( E(K', \cdot) \) agree on another \( t' \) plaintext–ciphertext pairs where \( 0 \leq t' \leq N - t \)?

3.4 Let \( \pi \) be a permutation of the integers \( 0, 1, 2, \ldots, (2^n - 1) \), such that \( \pi(m) \) gives the permuted value of \( m \), \( 0 \leq m < 2^n \). Put another way, \( \pi \) maps the set of \( n \)-bit integers into itself and no two integers map into the same integer. DES is such a permutation for 64-bit integers. We say that \( \pi \) has a fixed point at \( m \) if \( \pi(m) = m \). That is, if \( \pi \) is an encryption mapping, then a fixed point corresponds to a message that encrypts to itself. We are interested in the probability that \( \pi \) has no fixed points. Show the somewhat unexpected result that over 60% of mappings will have at least one fixed point.

3.5 Consider the substitution defined by row 1 of S-box S1 in Table 3.3. Show a block diagram similar to Figure 3.2 that corresponds to this substitution.

3.6 Compute the bits number 1, 16, 33, and 48 at the output of the first round of the DES decryption, assuming that the ciphertext block is composed of all ones and the external key is composed of all ones.

3.7 Suppose the DES F function mapped every 32-bit input \( R \), regardless of the value of the input \( K \), to

- 32-bit string of ones
- bitwise complement of \( R \)

*Hint:* Use the following properties of the XOR operation:

1. What function would DES then compute?
2. What would the decryption look like?

\[
(A \oplus B) \oplus C = A \oplus (B \oplus C)
\]

\[
A \oplus A = 0
\]

\[
A \oplus 0 = A
\]

\[
A \oplus 1 = \text{bitwise complement of } A
\]

where

- \( A, B, C \) are \( n \)-bit strings of bits
- \( 0 \) is an \( n \)-bit string of zeros
- \( 1 \) is an \( n \)-bit string of one
This problem provides a numerical example of encryption using a one-round version of DES. We start with the same bit pattern for the key $K$ and the plaintext, namely:

**Hexadecimal notation:** \[0 \ 1 \ 2 \ 3 \ 4 \ 5 \ 6 \ 7 \ 8 \ 9 \ A \ B \ C \ D \ E \ F\]
**Binary notation:**
\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccc}
0000 & 0001 & 0010 & 0011 & 0100 & 0101 & 0110 & 0111 \\
1000 & 1001 & 1010 & 1011 & 1100 & 1101 & 1110 & 1111
\end{array}
\]

a. Derive $K_1$, the first-round subkey.

b. Derive $L_0, R_0$.

c. Expand $R_0$ to get $E[R_0]$, where $E[\cdot]$ is the expansion function of Table 3.2.

d. Calculate $A = E[R_0] \oplus K_1$.

e. Group the 48-bit result of (d) into sets of 6 bits and evaluate the corresponding S-box substitutions.

f. Concatenate the results of (e) to get a 32-bit result, $B$.

g. Apply the permutation to get $P(B)$.

h. Calculate $R_1 = P(B) \oplus L_0$.

i. Write down the ciphertext.

3.9 Show that DES decryption is, in fact, the inverse of DES encryption.

3.10 The 32-bit swap after the sixteenth iteration of the DES algorithm is needed to make the encryption process invertible by simply running the ciphertext back through the algorithm with the key order reversed. This was demonstrated in Problem 3.7. However, it still may not be entirely clear why the 32-bit swap is needed. To demonstrate why, solve the following exercises. First, some notation:

\[A \parallel B\]  = the concatenation of the bit strings $A$ and $B$

\[T_i(R \parallel L)\]  = the transformation defined by the $i$th iteration of the encryption algorithm for $1 \leq i \leq 16$

\[TD_i(R \parallel L)\]  = the transformation defined by the $i$th iteration of the encryption algorithm for $1 \leq i \leq 16$

\[T_{17}(R \parallel L)\]  = $L \parallel R$, where this transformation occurs after the sixteenth iteration of the encryption algorithm

a. Show that the composition $TD_1(IP(IP^{-1}(T_{17}(T_{16}(L_{15} \parallel R_{15}))))))$ is equivalent to the transformation that interchanges the 32-bit halves, $L_{15}$ and $R_{15}$. That is, show that

\[TD_1(IP(IP^{-1}(T_{17}(T_{16}(L_{15} \parallel R_{15})))))) = R_{15} \parallel L_{15}\]

b. Now suppose that we did away with the final 32-bit swap in the encryption algorithm. Then we would want the following equality to hold:

\[TD_1(IP(IP^{-1}(T_{16}(L_{15} \parallel R_{15})))) = L_{15} \parallel R_{15}\]

Does it?

3.11 Compare the initial permutation table (Table 3.2a) with the permuted choice one table (Table 3.4b). Are the structures similar? If so, describe the similarities. What conclusions can you draw from this analysis?

3.12 When using the DES algorithm for decryption, the 16 keys ($K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_{16}$) are used in reverse order. Therefore, the right-hand side of Figure 3.5 is not valid for decryption. Design a key-generation scheme with the appropriate shift schedule (analogous to Table 3.4d) for the decryption process.

3.13 a. Let $X'$ be the bitwise complement of $X$. Prove that if the complement of the plaintext block is taken and the complement of an encryption key is taken, then the result of DES encryption with these values is the complement of the original ciphertext. That is,
If \( Y = E(K, X) \)
Then \( Y' = E(K', X') \)

\textit{Hint:} Begin by showing that for any two bit strings of equal length, \( A \) and \( B \), 
\( (A \oplus B)' = A' \oplus B \).

b. It has been said that a brute-force attack on DES requires searching a key space of \( 2^{56} \) keys. Does the result of part (a) change that?

3.14 Show that in DES the first 24 bits of each subkey come from the same subset of 28 bits of the initial key and that the second 24 bits of each subkey come from a disjoint subset of 28 bits of the initial key.

3.15 For any block cipher, the fact that it is a nonlinear function is crucial to its security. To see this, suppose that we have a linear block cipher \( EL \) that encrypts 128-bit blocks of plaintext into 128-bit blocks of ciphertext. Let \( EL(k, m) \) denote the encryption of a 128-bit message \( m \) under a key \( k \) (the actual bit length of \( k \) is irrelevant). Thus, 
\[ EL(k, [m_1 \oplus m_2]) = EL(k, m_1) \oplus EL(k, m_2) \text{ for all 128-bit patterns } m_1, m_2 \]

Describe how, with 128 chosen ciphertexts, an adversary can decrypt any ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key \( k \). (A “chosen ciphertext” means that an adversary has the ability to choose a ciphertext and then obtain its decryption. Here, you have 128 plaintext/ciphertext pairs to work with and you have the ability to chose the value of the ciphertexts.)

\textit{Note:} The following problems refer to simplified DES, described in Appendix G.

3.16 Refer to Figure G.2, which depicts key generation for S-DES.
   a. How important is the initial \( P_{10} \) permutation function?
   b. How important are the two \( LS-1 \) shift functions?

3.17 The equations for the variables \( q \) and \( r \) for S-DES are defined in the section on S-DES analysis. Provide the equations for \( s \) and \( t \).

3.18 Using S-DES, decrypt the string (10100010) using the key (0111111101) by hand. Show intermediate results after each function (\( IP, F_k, SW, F_k, IP^{-1} \)). Then decode the first 4 bits of the plaintext string to a letter and the second 4 bits to another letter where we encode A through P in base 2 (i.e., A = 0000, B = 0001,..., P = 1111). \textit{Hint:} As a midway check, after the application of \( SW \), the string should be (00010011).

\textbf{Programming Problems}

3.19 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt using a general substitution block cipher.

3.20 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt using S-DES. Test data: use plaintext, ciphertext, and key of Problem 3.18.
CHAPTER 4

BASIC CONCEPTS IN NUMBER THEORY AND FINITE FIELDS

4.1 Divisibility and The Division Algorithm
4.2 The Euclidean Algorithm
4.3 Modular Arithmetic
4.4 Groups, Rings, and Fields
4.5 Finite Fields of the Form GF(p)
4.6 Polynomial Arithmetic
4.7 Finite Fields of the Form GF(2^n)
4.8 Recommended Reading and Web Site
4.9 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 4A The Meaning of Mod
The next morning at daybreak, Star flew indoors, seemingly keen for a lesson. I said, “Tap eight.” She did a brilliant exhibition, first tapping it in 4, 4, then giving me a hasty glance and doing it in 2, 2, 2, 2, before coming for her nut.

It is astonishing that Star learned to count up to 8 with no difficulty, and of her own accord discovered that each number could be given with various different divisions, this leaving no doubt that she was consciously thinking each number. In fact, she did mental arithmetic, although unable, like humans, to name the numbers. But she learned to recognize their spoken names almost immediately and was able to remember the sounds of the names. Star is unique as a wild bird, who of her own free will pursued the science of numbers with keen interest and astonishing intelligence.

—Living with Birds, Len Howard

**KEY POINTS**

- Modular arithmetic is a kind of integer arithmetic that reduces all numbers to one of a fixed set \([0, \ldots, n - 1]\) for some number \(n\). Any integer outside this range is reduced to one in this range by taking the remainder after division by \(n\).
- The greatest common divisor of two integers is the largest positive integer that exactly divides both integers.
- A field is a set of elements on which two arithmetic operations (addition and multiplication) have been defined and which has the properties of ordinary arithmetic, such as closure, associativity, commutativity, distributivity, and having both additive and multiplicative inverses.
- Finite fields are important in several areas of cryptography. A finite field is simply a field with a finite number of elements. It can be shown that the order of a finite field (number of elements in the field) must be a power of a prime \(p^n\), where \(n\) is a positive integer.
- Finite fields of order \(p\) can be defined using arithmetic mod \(p\).
- Finite fields of order \(p^n\), for \(n > 1\), can be defined using arithmetic over polynomials.

Finite fields have become increasingly important in cryptography. A number of cryptographic algorithms rely heavily on properties of finite fields, notably the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and elliptic curve cryptography. Other examples include the message authentication code CMAC and the authenticated encryption scheme GMC.

This chapter provides the reader with sufficient background on the concepts of finite fields to be able to understand the design of AES and other cryptographic algorithms that use finite fields. The first three sections introduce basic concepts
from number theory that are needed in the remainder of the chapter; these include divisibility, the Euclidean algorithm, and modular arithmetic. Next comes a brief overview of the concepts of group, ring, and field. This section is somewhat abstract; the reader may prefer to quickly skim this section on a first reading. We are then ready to discuss finite fields of the form $\text{GF}(p)$, where $p$ is a prime number. Next, we need some additional background, this time in polynomial arithmetic. The chapter concludes with a discussion of finite fields of the form $\text{GF}(2^n)$, where $n$ is a positive integer.

The concepts and techniques of number theory are quite abstract, and it is often difficult to grasp them intuitively without examples. Accordingly, this chapter and Chapter 8 include a number of examples, each of which is highlighted in a shaded box.

### 4.1 DIVISIBILITY AND THE DIVISION ALGORITHM

**Divisibility**

We say that a nonzero $b$ divides $a$ if $a = mb$ for some $m$, where $a$, $b$, and $m$ are integers. That is, $b$ divides $a$ if there is no remainder on division. The notation $b|a$ is commonly used to mean $b$ divides $a$. Also, if $b|a$, we say that $b$ is a divisor of $a$.

The positive divisors of 24 are 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, and 24.  
13|182; $-5|30; 17|289; -3|33; 17|0$

Subsequently, we will need some simple properties of divisibility for integers, which are as follows:

- If $a|1$, then $a = \pm 1$.
- If $a|b$ and $b|a$, then $a = \pm b$.
- Any $b \neq 0$ divides 0.
- If $a|b$ and $b|c$, then $a|c$:

$11|66$ and $66|198 = 11|198$

- If $b|g$ and $b|h$, then $b|(mg + nh)$ for arbitrary integers $m$ and $n$.

To see this last point, note that

- If $b|g$, then $g$ is of the form $g = b \times g_1$ for some integer $g_1$.
- If $b|h$, then $h$ is of the form $h = b \times h_1$ for some integer $h_1$.

So

$$mg + nh = mbg_1 + nbh_1 = b \times (mg_1 + nh_1)$$
and therefore $b$ divides $mg + nh$.

$$b = 7; g = 14; h = 63; m = 3; n = 2$$
$7|14$ and $7|63$.
To show $7|(3 \times 14 + 2 \times 63)$,
we have $(3 \times 14 + 2 \times 63) = 7(3 \times 2 + 2 \times 9)$,
and it is obvious that $7|(7(3 \times 2 + 2 \times 9))$.

### The Division Algorithm

Given any positive integer $n$ and any nonnegative integer $a$, if we divide $a$ by $n$, we get an integer quotient $q$ and an integer remainder $r$ that obey the following relationship:

$$a = qn + r \quad \text{with} \quad 0 \leq r < n; \quad q = \lfloor a/n \rfloor \quad (4.1)$$

where $\lfloor x \rfloor$ is the largest integer less than or equal to $x$. Equation (4.1) is referred to as the division algorithm.\

Figure 4.1a demonstrates that, given $a$ and positive $n$, it is always possible to find $q$ and $r$ that satisfy the preceding relationship. Represent the integers on the number line; $a$ will fall somewhere on that line (positive $a$ is shown, a similar demonstration can be made for negative $a$). Starting at 0, proceed to $n$, $2n$, up to $qn$, such that $qn \leq a$ and $(q + 1)n > a$. The distance from $qn$ to $a$ is $r$, and we have found the unique values of $q$ and $r$. The remainder $r$ is often referred to as a residue.

![Figure 4.1](image_url)

**Figure 4.1** The Relationship $a = qn + r; 0 \leq r < n$

---

1Equation 4.1 expresses a theorem rather than an algorithm, but by tradition, this is referred to as the division algorithm.
One of the basic techniques of number theory is the Euclidean algorithm, which is a simple procedure for determining the greatest common divisor of two positive integers. First, we need a simple definition: Two integers are relatively prime if their only common positive integer factor is 1.

Greatest Common Divisor

Recall that nonzero \( b \) is defined to be a divisor of \( a \) if \( a = mb \) for some \( m \), where \( a, b \), and \( m \) are integers. We will use the notation \( \gcd(a, b) \) to mean the greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \). The greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \) is the largest integer that divides both \( a \) and \( b \). We also define \( \gcd(0, 0) = 0 \).

More formally, the positive integer \( c \) is said to be the greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \) if

1. \( c \) is a divisor of \( a \) and of \( b \).
2. Any divisor of \( a \) and \( b \) is a divisor of \( c \).

An equivalent definition is the following:

\[
\gcd(a, b) = \max\{k, \text{ such that } k|a \text{ and } k|b\}
\]

Because we require that the greatest common divisor be positive, \( \gcd(a, b) = \gcd(a, -b) = \gcd(-a, b) = \gcd(-a, -b) \). In general, \( \gcd(a, b) = \gcd(|a|, |b|) \).

\[
\gcd(60, 24) = \gcd(60, -24) = 12
\]

Also, because all nonzero integers divide 0, we have \( \gcd(a, 0) = |a| \).

We stated that two integers \( a \) and \( b \) are relatively prime if their only common positive integer factor is 1. This is equivalent to saying that \( a \) and \( b \) are relatively prime if \( \gcd(a, b) = 1 \).

8 and 15 are relatively prime because the positive divisors of 8 are 1, 2, 4, and 8, and the positive divisors of 15 are 1, 3, 5, and 15. So 1 is the only integer on both lists.

Finding the Greatest Common Divisor

We now describe an algorithm credited to Euclid for easily finding the greatest common divisor of two integers. This algorithm has significance subsequently in this chapter. Suppose we have integers \( a, b \) such that \( d = \gcd(a, b) \). Because
gcd(|a|, |b|) = gcd(a, b), there is no harm in assuming \( a \geq b > 0 \). Now dividing \( a \) by \( b \) and applying the division algorithm, we can state:

\[
a = q_1 b + r_1 \quad 0 \leq r_1 < b
\]

(4.2)

If it happens that \( r_1 = 0 \), then \( b \mid a \) and \( d = \gcd(a, b) = b \). But if \( r_1 \neq 0 \), we can state that \( d \mid r_1 \). This is due to the basic properties of divisibility: the relations \( d \mid a \) and \( d \mid b \) together imply that \( d \mid (a - q_1 b) \), which is the same as \( d \mid r_1 \). Before proceeding with the Euclidean algorithm, we need to answer the question: What is the \( d \)? We know that \( d \mid a \) and \( d \mid b \). Now take any arbitrary integer \( c \) that divides both \( a \) and \( b \). Therefore, \( d \mid c \). Because \( d \) divides both \( a \) and \( b \), we must have \( c \leq d \), which is the greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \). Therefore \( d = \gcd(b, r_1) \).

Let us now return to Equation (4.2) and assume that \( r_1 \neq 0 \). Because \( b > r_1 \), we can divide \( b \) by \( r_1 \) and apply the division algorithm to obtain:

\[
b = q_2 r_1 + r_2 \quad 0 \leq r_2 < r_1
\]

As before, if \( r_2 = 0 \), then \( d = r_1 \) and if \( r_2 \neq 0 \), then \( d = \gcd(r_1, r_2) \). The division process continues until some zero remainder appears, say, at the \((n + 1)\)th stage where \( r_{n-1} \) is divided by \( r_n \). The result is the following system of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
a &= q_1 b + r_1 & 0 < r_1 < b \\
b &= q_2 r_1 + r_2 & 0 < r_2 < r_1 \\
r_1 &= q_3 r_2 + r_3 & 0 < r_3 < r_2 \\
\vdots & & \vdots \\
r_{n-2} &= q_n r_{n-1} + r_n & 0 < r_n < r_{n-1} \\
r_{n-1} &= q_{n+1} r_n + 0 \\
\end{align*}
\]

(4.3)

At each iteration, we have \( d = \gcd(r_i, r_{i+1}) \) until finally \( d = \gcd(r_n, 0) = r_n \). Thus, we can find the greatest common divisor of two integers by repetitive application of the division algorithm. This scheme is known as the Euclidean algorithm.

We have essentially argued from the top down that the final result is the \( \gcd(a, b) \). We can also argue from the bottom up. The first step is to show that \( r_n \) divides \( a \) and \( b \). It follows from the last division in Equation (4.3) that \( r_n \) divides \( r_{n-1} \). The next to last division shows that \( r_n \) divides \( r_{n-2} \) because it divides both terms on the right. Successively, one sees that \( r_n \) divides all \( r_i \)'s and finally \( a \) and \( b \). It remains to show that \( r_n \) is the largest divisor that divides \( a \) and \( b \). If we take any arbitrary integer \( c \) that divides \( a \) and \( b \), it must also divide \( r_1 \), as explained previously. We can follow the sequence of equations in Equation (4.3) down and show that \( c \) must divide all \( r_i \)'s. Therefore \( c \) must divide \( r_n \), so that \( r_n = \gcd(a, b) \).
Let us now look at an example with relatively large numbers to see the power of this algorithm:

To find $d = \gcd(a, b) = \gcd(1160718174, 316258250)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dividend</th>
<th>Divisor</th>
<th>Quotient</th>
<th>Remainder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a = 1160718174$</td>
<td>$b = 316258250$</td>
<td>$q_1 = 3$</td>
<td>$r_1 = 211943424$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b = 316258250$</td>
<td>$r_1 = 211943424$</td>
<td>$q_2 = 1$</td>
<td>$r_2 = 104314826$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_1 = 211943424$</td>
<td>$r_2 = 104314826$</td>
<td>$q_3 = 2$</td>
<td>$r_3 = 3313772$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_2 = 104314826$</td>
<td>$r_3 = 3313772$</td>
<td>$q_4 = 31$</td>
<td>$r_4 = 1587894$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_3 = 3313772$</td>
<td>$r_4 = 1587894$</td>
<td>$q_5 = 2$</td>
<td>$r_5 = 137984$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_4 = 1587894$</td>
<td>$r_5 = 137984$</td>
<td>$q_6 = 11$</td>
<td>$r_6 = 70070$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_5 = 137984$</td>
<td>$r_6 = 70070$</td>
<td>$q_7 = 1$</td>
<td>$r_7 = 67914$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_6 = 70070$</td>
<td>$r_7 = 67914$</td>
<td>$q_8 = 1$</td>
<td>$r_8 = 2156$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_7 = 67914$</td>
<td>$r_8 = 2156$</td>
<td>$q_9 = 31$</td>
<td>$r_9 = 1078$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_8 = 2156$</td>
<td>$r_9 = 1078$</td>
<td>$q_{10} = 2$</td>
<td>$r_{10} = 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, $d = \gcd(1160718174, 316258250) = 1078$

In this example, we begin by dividing 1160718174 by 316258250, which gives 3 with a remainder of 211943424. Next we take 316258250 and divide it by 211943424. The process continues until we get a remainder of 0, yielding a result of 1078.

It will be helpful in what follows to recast the above computation in tabular form. For every step of the iteration, we have $r_{i-1} = q_i r_{i-2} + r_i$, where $r_{i-2}$ is the dividend, $r_{i-1}$ is the divisor, $q_i$ is the quotient, and $r_i$ is the remainder. Table 4.1 summarizes the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dividend</th>
<th>Divisor</th>
<th>Quotient</th>
<th>Remainder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a = 1160718174$</td>
<td>$b = 316258250$</td>
<td>$q_1 = 3$</td>
<td>$r_1 = 211943424$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b = 316258250$</td>
<td>$r_1 = 211943424$</td>
<td>$q_2 = 1$</td>
<td>$r_2 = 104314826$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_1 = 211943424$</td>
<td>$r_2 = 104314826$</td>
<td>$q_3 = 2$</td>
<td>$r_3 = 3313772$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_2 = 104314826$</td>
<td>$r_3 = 3313772$</td>
<td>$q_4 = 31$</td>
<td>$r_4 = 1587894$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_3 = 3313772$</td>
<td>$r_4 = 1587894$</td>
<td>$q_5 = 2$</td>
<td>$r_5 = 137984$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_4 = 1587894$</td>
<td>$r_5 = 137984$</td>
<td>$q_6 = 11$</td>
<td>$r_6 = 70070$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_5 = 137984$</td>
<td>$r_6 = 70070$</td>
<td>$q_7 = 1$</td>
<td>$r_7 = 67914$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_6 = 70070$</td>
<td>$r_7 = 67914$</td>
<td>$q_8 = 1$</td>
<td>$r_8 = 2156$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_7 = 67914$</td>
<td>$r_8 = 2156$</td>
<td>$q_9 = 31$</td>
<td>$r_9 = 1078$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_8 = 2156$</td>
<td>$r_9 = 1078$</td>
<td>$q_{10} = 2$</td>
<td>$r_{10} = 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 MODULAR ARITHMETIC

The Modulus

If \( a \) is an integer and \( n \) is a positive integer, we define \( a \mod n \) to be the remainder when \( a \) is divided by \( n \). The integer \( n \) is called the modulus. Thus, for any integer \( a \), we can rewrite Equation (4.1) as follows:

\[
a = qn + r \quad 0 \leq r < n; \quad q = \lfloor a/n \rfloor
\]

\[
a = \lfloor a/n \rfloor \times n + (a \mod n)
\]

\[
11 \mod 7 = 4; \quad -11 \mod 7 = 3
\]

Two integers \( a \) and \( b \) are said to be congruent modulo \( n \), if \( (a \mod n) = (b \mod n) \). This is written as \( a \equiv b \pmod n \).\(^2\)

\[
73 \equiv 4 \pmod{23}; \quad 21 \equiv -9 \pmod{10}
\]

Note that if \( a \equiv 0 \pmod n \), then \( n|a \).

Properties of Congruences

Congruences have the following properties:

1. \( a \equiv b \pmod n \) if \( n|(a - b) \).
2. \( a \equiv b \pmod n \) implies \( b \equiv a \pmod n \).
3. \( a \equiv b \pmod n \) and \( b \equiv c \pmod n \) imply \( a \equiv c \pmod n \).

To demonstrate the first point, if \( n|(a - b) \), then \( (a - b) = kn \) for some \( k \). So we can write \( a = b + kn \). Therefore, \( (a \mod n) = (\text{remainder when } b + kn \text{ is divided by } n) = (\text{remainder when } b \text{ is divided by } n) = (b \mod n) \).

\[
\begin{align*}
23 &= 8 \pmod{5} \quad \text{because} \quad 23 - 8 = 15 = 5 \times 3 \\
-11 &= 5 \pmod{8} \quad \text{because} \quad -11 - 5 = -16 = 8 \times (-2) \\
81 &= 0 \pmod{27} \quad \text{because} \quad 81 - 0 = 81 = 27 \times 3
\end{align*}
\]

The remaining points are as easily proved.

Modular Arithmetic Operations

Note that, by definition (Figure 4.1), the \( (\pmod n) \) operator maps all integers into the set of integers \([0, 1, \ldots, (n - 1)]\). This suggests the question: Can we perform arithmetic

\(^2\)We have just used the operator \( \mod \) in two different ways: first as a binary operator that produces a remainder, as in the expression \( a \mod b \); second as a congruence relation that shows the equivalence of two integers, as in the expression \( a \equiv b \pmod n \). See Appendix 4A for a discussion.
operations within the confines of this set? It turns out that we can; this technique is known as **modular arithmetic**.

Modular arithmetic exhibits the following properties:

1. \[ [(a \mod n) + (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a + b) \mod n \]
2. \[ [(a \mod n) - (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a - b) \mod n \]
3. \[ [(a \mod n) \times (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a \times b) \mod n \]

We demonstrate the first property. Define \( a = r_a + jn \) for some integer \( j \) and \( b = r_b + kn \) for some integer \( k \). Then

\[
(a + b) \mod n = (r_a + r_b + (k + j)n) \mod n = (r_a + r_b) \mod n = [(a \mod n) + (b \mod n)] \mod n
\]

The remaining properties are proven as easily. Here are examples of the three properties:

\[
\begin{align*}
11 \mod 8 &= 3; 15 \mod 8 = 7 \\
[(11 \mod 8) + (15 \mod 8)] \mod 8 &= 10 \mod 8 = 2 \\
(11 + 15) \mod 8 &= 26 \mod 8 = 2 \\
[(11 \mod 8) - (15 \mod 8)] \mod 8 &= -4 \mod 8 = 4 \\
(11 - 15) \mod 8 &= -4 \mod 8 = 4 \\
[(11 \mod 8) \times (15 \mod 8)] \mod 8 &= 21 \mod 8 = 5 \\
(11 \times 15) \mod 8 &= 165 \mod 8 = 5
\end{align*}
\]

Exponentiation is performed by repeated multiplication, as in ordinary arithmetic. (We have more to say about exponentiation in Chapter 8.)

To find \( 11^7 \mod 13 \), we can proceed as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
11^2 &= 121 = 4 \pmod{13} \\
11^4 &= (11^2)^2 = 4^2 = 3 \pmod{13} \\
11^7 &= 11 \times 4 \times 3 = 132 = 2 \pmod{13}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, the rules for ordinary arithmetic involving addition, subtraction, and multiplication carry over into modular arithmetic.

Table 4.2 provides an illustration of modular addition and multiplication modulo 8. Looking at addition, the results are straightforward, and there is a regular pattern to the matrix. Both matrices are symmetric about the main diagonal in conformance to the commutative property of addition and multiplication. As in ordinary addition, there is an additive inverse, or negative, to each integer in modular arithmetic. In this case, the negative of an integer \( x \) is the integer \( y \) such that
mod 8 = 0. To find the additive inverse of an integer in the left-hand column, scan across the corresponding row of the matrix to find the value 0; the integer at the top of that column is the additive inverse; thus, \((2 + 6) \mod 8 = 0\). Similarly, the entries in the multiplication table are straightforward. In ordinary arithmetic, there is a multiplicative inverse, or reciprocal, to each integer. In modular arithmetic mod 8, the multiplicative inverse of \(x\) is the integer \(y\) such that \((x \times y) \mod 8 = 1 \mod 8\). Now, to find the multiplicative inverse of an integer from the multiplication table, scan across the matrix in the row for that integer to find the value 1; the integer at the top of that column is the multiplicative inverse; thus, \((3 \times 3) \mod 8 = 1\). Note that not all integers mod 8 have a multiplicative inverse; more about that later.

### Properties of Modular Arithmetic

Define the set \(\mathbb{Z}_n\) as the set of nonnegative integers less than \(n\):

\[
\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, \ldots, (n - 1)\}
\]

This is referred to as the set of residues, or residue classes \((\mod n)\). To be more precise, each integer in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\) represents a residue class. We can label the residue classes \((\mod n)\) as \([0]\), \([1]\), \([2]\), \ldots, \([n - 1]\), where

\[
[r] = \{a: a \text{ is an integer, } a = r \mod n\}\]
The residue classes (mod 4) are

\[ [0] = \{ \ldots, -16, -12, -8, -4, 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, \ldots \} \]
\[ [1] = \{ \ldots, -15, -11, -7, -3, 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, \ldots \} \]
\[ [2] = \{ \ldots, -14, -10, -6, -2, 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, \ldots \} \]
\[ [3] = \{ \ldots, -13, -9, -5, -1, 3, 7, 11, 15, 19, \ldots \} \]

Of all the integers in a residue class, the smallest nonnegative integer is the one used to represent the residue class. Finding the smallest nonnegative integer to which \( k \) is congruent modulo \( n \) is called \textbf{reducing \( k \) modulo \( n \)}.

If we perform modular arithmetic within \( \mathbb{Z}_n \), the properties shown in Table 4.3 hold for integers in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \). We show in the next section that this implies that \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) is a commutative ring with a multiplicative identity element.

There is one peculiarity of modular arithmetic that sets it apart from ordinary arithmetic. First, observe that (as in ordinary arithmetic) we can write the following:

\[
\text{if } (a + b) = (a + c) \pmod{n} \text{ then } b = c \pmod{n} \tag{4.4}
\]

\[
(5 + 23) = (5 + 7) \pmod{8}; \quad 23 = 7 \pmod{8}
\]

Equation (4.4) is consistent with the existence of an additive inverse. Adding the additive inverse of \( a \) to both sides of Equation (4.4), we have

\[
((-a) + a + b) = ((-a) + a + c) \pmod{n}
\]

\[
b = c \pmod{n}
\]

However, the following statement is true only with the attached condition:

\[
\text{if } (a \times b) = (a \times c) \pmod{n} \text{ then } b = c \pmod{n} \quad \text{if } a \text{ is relatively prime to } n \tag{4.5}
\]

Recall that two integers are \textbf{relatively prime} if their only common positive integer factor is 1. Similar to the case of Equation (4.4), we can say that Equation (4.5) is

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Property} & \text{Expression} \\
\hline
\text{Commutative Laws} & (w + x) \pmod{n} = (x + w) \pmod{n} \\
& (w \times x) \pmod{n} = (x \times w) \pmod{n} \\
\hline
\text{Associative Laws} & [(w + x) + y] \pmod{n} = [w + (x + y)] \pmod{n} \\
& [(w \times x) \times y] \pmod{n} = [w \times (x \times y)] \pmod{n} \\
\hline
\text{Distributive Law} & [w \times (x + y)] \pmod{n} = [(w \times x) + (w \times y)] \pmod{n} \\
\hline
\text{Identities} & (0 + w) \pmod{n} = w \pmod{n} \\
& (1 \times w) \pmod{n} = w \pmod{n} \\
\hline
\text{Additive Inverse (} - w \text{)} & \text{For each } w \in \mathbb{Z}_n, \text{ there exists a } a \text{ such that } w + z = 0 \pmod{n} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]
consistent with the existence of a multiplicative inverse. Applying the multiplicative inverse of $a$ to both sides of Equation (4.5), we have

$$((a^{-1})ab) = ((a^{-1})ac) \pmod{n}$$

$$b = c \pmod{n}$$

To see this, consider an example in which the condition of Equation (4.5) does not hold. The integers 6 and 8 are not relatively prime, since they have the common factor 2. We have the following:

$$6 \times 3 = 18 \equiv 2 \pmod{8}$$
$$6 \times 7 = 42 \equiv 2 \pmod{8}$$

Yet $3 \neq 7 \pmod{8}$.

The reason for this strange result is that for any general modulus $n$, a multiplier $a$ that is applied in turn to the integers 0 through $(n - 1)$ will fail to produce a complete set of residues if $a$ and $n$ have any factors in common.

With $a = 6$ and $n = 8$,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Z_8$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiply by 6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residues</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because we do not have a complete set of residues when multiplying by 6, more than one integer in $Z_8$ maps into the same residue. Specifically, $6 \times 0 \pmod{8} = 6 \times 4 \pmod{8}; 6 \times 1 \pmod{8} = 6 \times 5 \pmod{8};$ and so on. Because this is a many-to-one mapping, there is not a unique inverse to the multiply operation.

However, if we take $a = 5$ and $n = 8$, whose only common factor is 1,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Z_8$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiply by 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residues</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The line of residues contains all the integers in $Z_8$, in a different order.

In general, an integer has a multiplicative inverse in $Z_n$ if that integer is relatively prime to $n$. Table 4.2c shows that the integers 1, 3, 5, and 7 have a multiplicative inverse in $Z_8$; but 2, 4, and 6 do not.

**Euclidean Algorithm Revisited**

The Euclidean algorithm can be based on the following theorem: For any nonnegative integer $a$ and any positive integer $b$,

$$\text{gcd}(a, b) = \text{gcd}(b, a \mod b)$$

(4.6)
To see that Equation (4.6) works, let \( d = \gcd(a, b) \). Then, by the definition of \( \gcd \), \( d | a \) and \( d | b \). For any positive integer \( b \), we can express \( a \) as
\[
a = kb + r = r \pmod{b}
\]
with \( k, r \) integers. Therefore, \((a \pmod{b}) = a - kb\) for some integer \( k \). But because \( d | b \), it also divides \( kb \). We also have \( d | a \). Therefore, \( d | (a \pmod{b}) \). This shows that \( d \) is a common divisor of \( b \) and \((a \pmod{b})\). Conversely, if \( d \) is a common divisor of \( b \) and \((a \pmod{b})\), then \( d | kb \) and thus \( d | [kb + (a \pmod{b})] \), which is equivalent to \( d | a \). Thus, the set of common divisors of \( a \) and \( b \) is equal to the set of common divisors of \( b \) and \((a \pmod{b})\). Therefore, the \( \gcd \) of one pair is the same as the \( \gcd \) of the other pair, proving the theorem.

Equation (4.6) can be used repetitively to determine the greatest common divisor.

\[
\gcd(55, 22) = \gcd(22, 55 \mod 22) = \gcd(22, 11) = 11
\]

This is the same scheme shown in Equation (4.3), which can be rewritten in the following way.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Euclidean Algorithm} & \\
\hline
\text{Calculate} & \text{Which satisfies} \\
\hline
r_1 = a \pmod{b} & a = q_1b + r_1 \\
r_2 = b \pmod{r_1} & b = q_2r_1 + r_2 \\
r_3 = r_1 \pmod{r_2} & r_1 = q_3r_2 + r_3 \\
\vdots & \vdots \\
r_n = r_{n-2} \pmod{r_{n-1}} & r_{n-2} = q_{n-2}r_{n-1} + r_n \\
r_{n+1} = r_{n-1} \pmod{r_n} & r_{n-1} = q_{n+1}r_n + 0 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

We can define the Euclidean algorithm concisely as the following recursive function.

\[
\text{Euclid}(a, b) \\
\text{if} \ (b=0) \ \text{then return} \ a; \\
\text{else return} \ \text{Euclid}(b, a \pmod{b});
\]

The Extended Euclidean Algorithm

We now proceed to look at an extension to the Euclidean algorithm that will be important for later computations in the area of finite fields and in encryption algorithms, such as RSA. For given integers \( a \) and \( b \), the extended Euclidean algorithm not only calculate the greatest common divisor \( d \) but also two additional integers \( x \) and \( y \) that satisfy the following equation.

\[
gcd(18, 12) = \gcd(12, 6) = \gcd(6, 0) = 6 \\
gcd(11, 10) = \gcd(10, 1) = \gcd(1, 0) = 1
\]
It should be clear that \( x \) and \( y \) will have opposite signs. Before examining the algorithm, let us look at some of the values of \( x \) and \( y \) when \( a = 42 \) and \( b = 30 \). Note that \( \gcd(42, 30) = 6 \). Here is a partial table of values\(^3\) for \( 42x + 30y \).

\[
\begin{array}{c|ccccccc}
  \text{ } & x & -3 & -2 & -1 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
\hline
  -2 & -186 & -144 & -102 & -60 & -18 & 24 & 66 \\
  -1 & -156 & -114 & -72 & -30 & 12 & 54 & 96 \\
  0 & -126 & -84 & -42 & 0 & 42 & 84 & 126 \\
  1 & -96 & -54 & -12 & 30 & 72 & 114 & 156 \\
  2 & -66 & -24 & 18 & 60 & 102 & 144 & 186 \\
  3 & -36 & 6 & 48 & 90 & 132 & 174 & 216 \\
\end{array}
\]

Observer that all of the entries are divisible by 6. This is not surprising, because both 42 and 30 are divisible by 6, so every number of the form \( 42x + 30y = 6(7x + 5y) \) is a multiple of 6. Note also that \( \gcd(42, 30) = 6 \) appears in the table. In general, it can be shown that for given integers \( a \) and \( b \), the smallest positive value of \( ax + by \) is equal to \( \gcd(a, b) \).

Now let us show how to extend the Euclidean algorithm to determine \((x, y, d)\) given \( a \) and \( b \). We again go through the sequence of divisions indicated in Equation (4.3), and we assume that at each step \( i \) we can find integers \( x_i \) and \( y_i \) that satisfy \( r_i = ax_i + by_i \). We end up with the following sequence.

\[
\begin{align*}
  a &= q_1b + r_1 & r_1 &= ax_1 + by_1 \\
  b &= q_2r_1 + r_2 & r_2 &= ax_2 + by_2 \\
  r_1 &= q_3r_2 + r_3 & r_3 &= ax_3 + by_3 \\
  & \quad \vdots & & \vdots \\
  & \quad \vdots & & \vdots \\
  & \quad \vdots & & \vdots \\
  r_{n-2} &= q_nr_{n-1} + r_n & r_n &= ax_n + by_n \\
  r_{n-1} &= q_{n+1}r_n + 0 
\end{align*}
\]

Now, observe that we can rearrange terms to write

\[
(4.8) \quad r_i = r_{i-2} - r_{i-1}q_i
\]

Also, in rows \( i - 1 \) and \( i - 2 \), we find the values

\[
\begin{align*}
  r_{i-2} &= ax_{i-2} + by_{i-2} \quad \text{and} \quad r_{i-1} = ax_{i-1} + by_{i-1} 
\end{align*}
\]

Substituting into Equation (4.8), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
  r_i &= (ax_{i-2} + by_{i-2}) - (ax_{i-1} + by_{i-1})q_i \\
  &= a(x_{i-2} - q_ix_{i-1}) + b(y_{i-2} - q_iy_{i-1})
\end{align*}
\]

\(^3\)This example is taken from [SILV06].
But we have already assumed that \( r_i = ax_i + by_i \). Therefore,

\[
x_i = x_{i-2} - q_ix_{i-1} \quad \text{and} \quad y_i = y_{i-2} - q_iy_{i-1}
\]

We now summarize the calculations:

We need to make several additional comments here. In each row, we calculate a new remainder \( r_i \) based on the remainders of the previous two rows, namely \( r_{i-1} \) and \( r_{i-2} \). To start the algorithm, we need values for \( r_0 \) and \( r_1 \), which are just \( a \) and \( b \). It is then straightforward to determine the required values for \( x_{-1}, y_{-1}, x_0, \) and \( y_0 \).

We know from the original Euclidean algorithm that the process ends with a remainder of zero and that the greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \) is \( d = \gcd(a, b) = r_n \). But we also have determined that \( d = r_n = ax_n + by_n \).

As an example, let us use \( a = 1759 \) and \( b = 550 \) and solve for \( 1759x + 550y = \gcd(1759, 550) \). The results are shown in Table 4.4. Thus, we have \( 1759 \times (-111) + 550 \times 355 = -195249 + 195250 = 1 \).

We know from the original Euclidean algorithm that the process ends with a remainder of zero and that the greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \) is \( d = \gcd(a, b) = r_n \). But we also have determined that \( d = r_n = ax_n + by_n \).

As an example, let us use \( a = 1759 \) and \( b = 550 \) and solve for \( 1759x + 550y = \gcd(1759, 550) \). The results are shown in Table 4.4. Thus, we have \( 1759 \times (-111) + 550 \times 355 = -195249 + 195250 = 1 \).
Groups, rings, and fields are the fundamental elements of a branch of mathematics known as abstract algebra, or modern algebra. In abstract algebra, we are concerned with sets on whose elements we can operate algebraically; that is, we can combine two elements of the set, perhaps in several ways, to obtain a third element of the set. These operations are subject to specific rules, which define the nature of the set. By convention, the notation for the two principal classes of operations on set elements is usually the same as the notation for addition and multiplication on ordinary numbers. However, it is important to note that, in abstract algebra, we are not limited to ordinary arithmetical operations. All this should become clear as we proceed.

Groups

A group \( G \), sometimes denoted by \( \{ G, \cdot \} \), is a set of elements with a binary operation denoted by \( \cdot \) that associates to each ordered pair \((a, b)\) of elements in \( G \) an element \( a \cdot b \) in \( G \), such that the following axioms are obeyed:

\[
\begin{align*}
(A1) \text{ Closure:} & \quad \text{If } a \text{ and } b \text{ belong to } G, \text{ then } a \cdot b \text{ is also in } G. \\
(A2) \text{ Associative:} & \quad a \cdot (b \cdot c) = (a \cdot b) \cdot c \text{ for all } a, b, c \text{ in } G. \\
(A3) \text{ Identity element:} & \quad \text{There is an element } e \text{ in } G \text{ such that } a \cdot e = e \cdot a = a \text{ for all } a \text{ in } G. \\
(A4) \text{ Inverse element:} & \quad \text{For each } a \text{ in } G, \text{ there is an element } a' \text{ in } G \text{ such that } a \cdot a' = a' \cdot a = e.
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( N_n \) denote a set of \( n \) distinct symbols that, for convenience, we represent as \( \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \). A permutation of \( n \) distinct symbols is a one-to-one mapping from \( N_n \) to \( N_n \). Define \( S_n \) to be the set of all permutations of \( n \) distinct symbols. Each element of \( S_n \) is represented by a permutation of the integers \( \pi \) in \( 1, 2, \ldots, n \). It is easy to demonstrate that \( S_n \) is a group:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{A1:} & \quad \text{If } (\pi, \rho \in S_n), \text{ then the composite mapping } \pi \cdot \rho \text{ is formed by permuting the elements of } \rho \text{ according to the permutation } \pi. \text{ For example, } [3, 2, 1] \cdot [1, 3, 2] = [2, 3, 1]. \text{ Clearly, } \pi \cdot \rho \in S_n. \\
\text{A2:} & \quad \text{The composition of mappings is also easily seen to be associative.} \\
\text{A3:} & \quad \text{The identity mapping is the permutation that does not alter the order of the } n \text{ elements. For } S_n, \text{ the identity element is } [1, 2, \ldots, n]. \\
\text{A4:} & \quad \text{For any } \pi \in S_n, \text{ the mapping that undoes the permutation defined by } \pi \text{ is the inverse element for } \pi. \text{ There will always be such an inverse. For example } [2, 3, 1] \cdot [3, 1, 2] = [1, 2, 3].
\end{align*}
\]

---

4 The operator \( \cdot \) is generic and can refer to addition, multiplication, or some other mathematical operation.
5 This is equivalent to the definition of permutation in Chapter 2, which stated that a permutation of a finite set of elements \( S \) is an ordered sequence of all the elements of \( S \), with each element appearing exactly once.
If a group has a finite number of elements, it is referred to as a **finite group**, and the **order** of the group is equal to the number of elements in the group. Otherwise, the group is an **infinite group**.

A group is said to be **abelian** if it satisfies the following additional condition:

\[(A5) \text{ Commutative:} \quad a \cdot b = b \cdot a \text{ for all } a, b \text{ in } G.\]

The set of integers (positive, negative, and 0) under addition is an abelian group. The set of nonzero real numbers under multiplication is an abelian group. The set \(S_n\) from the preceding example is a group but not an abelian group for \(n > 2\).

When the group operation is addition, the identity element is 0; the inverse element of \(a\) is \(-a\); and subtraction is defined with the following rule: \(a - b = a + (-b)\).

**Cyclic Group** We define exponentiation within a group as a repeated application of the group operator, so that \(a^3 = a \cdot a \cdot a\). Furthermore, we define \(a^0 = e\) as the identity element, and \(a^{-n} = (a')^n\), where \(a'\) is the inverse element of \(a\) within the group. A group \(G\) is **cyclic** if every element of \(G\) is a power \(a^k\) (\(k\) is an integer) of a fixed element \(a \in G\). The element \(a\) is said to **generate** the group \(G\) or to be a **generator** of \(G\). A cyclic group is always abelian and may be finite or infinite.

The additive group of integers is an infinite cyclic group generated by the element 1. In this case, powers are interpreted additively, so that \(n\) is the \(n\)th power of 1.

**Rings**

A **ring** \(R\), sometimes denoted by \(\{R, +, \times\}\), is a set of elements with two binary operations, called **addition** and **multiplication**,\(^6\) such that for all \(a, b, c\) in \(R\) the following axioms are obeyed.

\[(A1–A5) \text{ } R \text{ is an abelian group with respect to addition; that is, } R \text{ satisfies axioms A1 through A5. For the case of an additive group, we denote the identity element as 0 and the inverse of } a \text{ as } -a.\]

\[(M1) \text{ Closure under multiplication:} \quad \text{If } a \text{ and } b \text{ belong to } R, \text{ then } ab \text{ is also in } R.\]

\[(M2) \text{ Associativity of multiplication:} \quad a(bc) = (ab)c \text{ for all } a, b, c \text{ in } R.\]

\[(M3) \text{ Distributive laws:} \quad a(b + c) = ab + ac \text{ for all } a, b, c \text{ in } R.\]

\[(a + b)c = ac + bc \text{ for all } a, b, c \text{ in } R.\]

In essence, a ring is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction \([a - b = a + (-b)]\), and multiplication without leaving the set.

\(^6\)Generally, we do not use the multiplication symbol, \(\times\), but denote multiplication by the concatenation of two elements.
A ring is said to be **commutative** if it satisfies the following additional condition:

**M4** Commutativity of multiplication: $ab = ba$ for all $a, b$ in $R$.

Let $S$ be the set of even integers (positive, negative, and 0) under the usual operations of addition and multiplication. $S$ is a commutative ring. The set of all $n$-square matrices defined in the preceding example is not a commutative ring.

The set $\mathbb{Z}_n$ of integers $\{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\}$, together with the arithmetic operations modulo $n$, is a commutative ring (Table 4.3).

Next, we define an **integral domain**, which is a commutative ring that obeys the following axioms.

**M5** Multiplicative identity: There is an element 1 in $R$ such that $a1 = 1a = a$ for all $a$ in $R$.

**M6** No zero divisors: If $a, b$ in $R$ and $ab = 0$, then either $a = 0$ or $b = 0$.

Let $S$ be the set of integers, positive, negative, and 0, under the usual operations of addition and multiplication. $S$ is an integral domain.

**Fields**

A **field** $F$, sometimes denoted by $\{F, +, \times\}$, is a set of elements with two binary operations, called *addition* and *multiplication*, such that for all $a, b, c$ in $F$ the following axioms are obeyed.

**A1–M6** $F$ is an integral domain; that is, $F$ satisfies axioms A1 through A5 and M1 through M6.

**M7** Multiplicative inverse: For each $a$ in $F$, except 0, there is an element $a^{-1}$ in $F$ such that $aa^{-1} = (a^{-1})a = 1$.

In essence, a field is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division without leaving the set. Division is defined with the following rule: $a/b = a(b^{-1})$.

Familiar examples of fields are the rational numbers, the real numbers, and the complex numbers. Note that the set of all integers is not a field, because not every element of the set has a multiplicative inverse; in fact, only the elements 1 and $-1$ have multiplicative inverses in the integers.

Figure 4.2 summarizes the axioms that define groups, rings, and fields.
(A1) Closure under addition: If \( a \) and \( b \) belong to \( S \), then \( a + b \) is also in \( S \).

(A2) Associativity of addition: \( a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c \) for all \( a, b, c \) in \( S \).

(A3) Additive identity: There is an element \( 0 \) in \( R \) such that \( a + 0 = 0 + a = a \) for all \( a \) in \( S \).

(A4) Additive inverse: For each \( a \) in \( S \) there is an element \(-a\) in \( S \) such that \( a + (-a) = (-a) + a = 0 \).

(A5) Commutativity of addition: \( a + b = b + a \) for all \( a, b \) in \( S \).

(M1) Closure under multiplication: If \( a \) and \( b \) belong to \( S \), then \( ab \) is also in \( S \).

(M2) Associativity of multiplication: \( a(bc) = (ab)c \) for all \( a, b, c \) in \( S \).

(M3) Distributive laws: \( a(b + c) = ab + ac \) for all \( a, b, c \) in \( S \) and \( (a + b)c = ac + bc \) for all \( a, b, c \) in \( S \).

(M4) Commutativity of multiplication: \( ab = ba \) for all \( a, b \) in \( S \).

(M5) Multiplicative identity: There is an element \( 1 \) in \( S \) such that \( a1 = 1a = a \) for all \( a \) in \( S \).

(M6) No zero divisors: If \( a, b \) in \( S \) and \( ab = 0 \), then either \( a = 0 \) or \( b = 0 \).

(M7) Multiplicative inverse: If \( a \) belongs to \( S \) and \( a \neq 0 \), there is an element \( a^{-1} \) in \( S \) such that \( aa^{-1} = a^{-1}a = 1 \).

Figure 4.2 Groups, Ring, and Field
4.5 FINITE FIELDS OF THE FORM GF(p)

In Section 4.4, we defined a field as a set that obeys all of the axioms of Figure 4.2 and gave some examples of infinite fields. Infinite fields are not of particular interest in the context of cryptography. However, finite fields play a crucial role in many cryptographic algorithms. It can be shown that the order of a finite field (number of elements in the field) must be a power of a prime \( p^n \), where \( n \) is a positive integer. We discuss prime numbers in detail in Chapter 8. Here, we need only say that a prime number is an integer whose only positive integer factors are itself and 1. That is, the only positive integers that are divisors of \( p \) are \( p \) and 1.

The finite field of order \( p^n \) is generally written \( \text{GF}(p^n) \); \text{GF} stands for Galois field, in honor of the mathematician who first studied finite fields. Two special cases are of interest for our purposes. For \( n = 1 \), we have the finite field \( \text{GF}(p) \); this finite field has a different structure than that for finite fields with \( n > 1 \) and is studied in this section. In Section 4.7, we look at finite fields of the form \( \text{GF}(2^n) \).

Finite Fields of Order \( p \)

For a given prime, \( p \), we define the finite field of order \( p \), \( \text{GF}(p) \), as the set \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) of integers \{0, 1, \ldots, p - 1\} together with the arithmetic operations modulo \( p \).

Recall that we showed in Section 4.3 that the set \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) of integers \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\}, together with the arithmetic operations modulo \( n \), is a commutative ring (Table 4.3). We further observed that any integer in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) has a multiplicative inverse if and only if that integer is relatively prime to \( n \) [see discussion of Equation (4.5)]\footnote{As stated in the discussion of Equation (4.5), two integers are relatively prime if their only common positive integer factor is 1.} If \( n \) is prime, then all of the nonzero integers in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) are relatively prime to \( n \), and therefore there exists a multiplicative inverse for all of the nonzero integers in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \). Thus, for \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) we can add the following properties to those listed in Table 4.3:

| Multiplicative inverse \((w^{-1})\) | For each \( w \in \mathbb{Z}_p, w \neq 0 \), there exists a \( z \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) such that \( w \times z \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \) |

Because \( w \) is relatively prime to \( p \), if we multiply all the elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) by \( w \), the resulting residues are all of the elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) permuted. Thus, exactly one of the residues has the value 1. Therefore, there is some integer in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) that, when multiplied by \( w \), yields the residue 1. That integer is the multiplicative inverse of \( w \), designated \( w^{-1} \). Therefore, \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) is in fact a finite field. Furthermore, Equation (4.5) is consistent with the existence of a multiplicative inverse and can be rewritten without the condition:

\[
\text{if } (a \times b) \equiv (a \times c)(\text{mod } p) \text{ then } b \equiv c \pmod{p} \quad (4.9)
\]

Multiplying both sides of Equation (4.9) by the multiplicative inverse of \( a \), we have

\[
((a^{-1}) \times a \times b) \equiv ((a^{-1}) \times a \times c) \pmod{p} \]

\[
b \equiv c \pmod{p}
\]
The simplest finite field is $\text{GF}(2)$. Its arithmetic operations are easily summarized:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>+</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\times$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$w$</th>
<th>$-w$</th>
<th>$w^{-1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Addition | Multiplication | Inverses
---|---|---
In this case, addition is equivalent to the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation, and multiplication is equivalent to the logical AND operation.

Table 4.5 shows arithmetic operations in $\text{GF}(7)$. This is a field of order 7 using modular arithmetic modulo 7. As can be seen, it satisfies all of the properties required of a field (Figure 4.2). Compare this table with Table 4.2. In the latter case, we see that the set $\mathbb{Z}_8$, using modular arithmetic modulo 8, is not a field. Later in this chapter, we show how to define addition and multiplication operations on $\mathbb{Z}_8$ in such a way as to form a finite field.

Finding the Multiplicative Inverse in $\text{GF}(p)$

It is easy to find the multiplicative inverse of an element in $\text{GF}(p)$ for small values of $p$. You simply construct a multiplication table, such as shown in Table 4.5b, and the desired result can be read directly. However, for large values of $p$, this approach is not practical.

Table 4.5 **Arithmetic in $\text{GF}(7)$**

(a) Addition modulo 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>+</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Multiplication modulo 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\times$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Additive and multiplicative inverses modulo 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$w$</th>
<th>$-w$</th>
<th>$w^{-1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If \(a\) and \(b\) are relatively prime, then \(b\) has a multiplicative inverse modulo \(a\). That is, if \(\gcd(a, b) = 1\), then \(b\) has a multiplicative inverse modulo \(a\). That is, for positive integer \(b < a\), there exists a \(b^{-1} < a\) such that \(bb^{-1} = 1 \mod a\). If \(a\) is a prime number and \(b < a\), then clearly \(a\) and \(b\) are relatively prime and have a greatest common divisor of 1. We now show that we can easily compute \(b^{-1}\) using the extended Euclidean algorithm.

We repeat here Equation (4.7), which we showed can be solved with the extended Euclidean algorithm:

\[
ax + by = d = \gcd(a, b)
\]

Now, if \(\gcd(a, b) = 1\), then we have \(ax + by = 1\). Using the basic equalities of modular arithmetic, defined in Section 4.3, we can say

\[
[(ax \mod a) + (by \mod a)] \mod a = 1 \mod a
\]

\[
0 + (by \mod a) = 1
\]

But if \(by \mod a = 1\), then \(y = b^{-1}\). Thus, applying the extended Euclidean algorithm to Equation (4.7) yields the value of the multiplicative inverse of \(b\) if \(\gcd(a, b) = 1\). Consider the example that was shown in Table 4.4. Here we have \(a = 1759\), which is a prime number, and \(b = 550\). The solution of the equation \(1759x + 550y = d\) yields a value of \(y = 355\). Thus, \(b^{-1} = 355\). To verify, we calculate \(550 \times 355 \mod 1759 = 195250 \mod 1759 = 1\).

More generally, the extended Euclidean algorithm can be used to find a multiplicative inverse in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\) for any \(n\). If we apply the extended Euclidean algorithm to the equation \(nx + by = d\), and the algorithm yields \(d = 1\), then \(y = b^{-1}\) in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\).

Summary

In this section, we have shown how to construct a finite field of order \(p\), where \(p\) is prime. Specifically, we defined \(\text{GF}(p)\) with the following properties.

1. \(\text{GF}(p)\) consists of \(p\) elements.
2. The binary operations + and \(\times\) are defined over the set. The operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division can be performed without leaving the set. Each element of the set other than 0 has a multiplicative inverse.

We have shown that the elements of \(\text{GF}(p)\) are the integers \([0, 1, \ldots, p - 1]\) and that the arithmetic operations are addition and multiplication mod \(p\).

### 4.6 POLYNOMIAL ARITHMETIC

Before continuing our discussion of finite fields, we need to introduce the interesting subject of polynomial arithmetic. We are concerned with polynomials in a single variable \(x\), and we can distinguish three classes of polynomial arithmetic.

- Ordinary polynomial arithmetic, using the basic rules of algebra.
- Polynomial arithmetic in which the arithmetic on the coefficients is performed modulo \(p\); that is, the coefficients are in \(\text{GF}(p)\).
Polynomial arithmetic in which the coefficients are in GF(p), and the polynomials are defined modulo a polynomial \( m(x) \) whose highest power is some integer \( n \).

This section examines the first two classes, and the next section covers the last class.

**Ordinary Polynomial Arithmetic**

A polynomial of degree \( n \) (integer \( n \geq 0 \)) is an expression of the form

\[
f(x) = a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + \cdots + a_1 x + a_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{n} a_i x^i
\]

where the \( a_i \) are elements of some designated set of numbers \( S \), called the coefficient set, and \( a_n \neq 0 \). We say that such polynomials are defined over the coefficient set \( S \).

A zero-degree polynomial is called a **constant polynomial** and is simply an element of the set of coefficients. An \( n \)-th-degree polynomial is said to be a **monic polynomial** if \( a_n = 1 \).

In the context of abstract algebra, we are usually not interested in evaluating a polynomial for a particular value of \( x \) [e.g., \( f(7) \)]. To emphasize this point, the variable \( x \) is sometimes referred to as the indeterminate.

Polynomial arithmetic includes the operations of addition, subtraction, and multiplication. These operations are defined in a natural way as though the variable \( x \) was an element of \( S \). Division is similarly defined, but requires that \( S \) be a field. Examples of fields include the real numbers, rational numbers, and \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) for \( p \) prime. Note that the set of all integers is not a field and does not support polynomial division.

Addition and subtraction are performed by adding or subtracting corresponding coefficients. Thus, if

\[
f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} a_i x^i; \quad g(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m} b_i x^i; \quad n \geq m
\]

then addition is defined as

\[
f(x) + g(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m} (a_i + b_i) x^i + \sum_{i=m+1}^{n} a_i x^i
\]

and multiplication is defined as

\[
f(x) \times g(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n+m} c_i x^i
\]

where

\[
c_k = a_0 b_k + a_1 b_{k-1} + \cdots + a_{k-1} b_1 + a_k b_0
\]

In the last formula, we treat \( a_i \) as zero for \( i > n \) and \( b_i \) as zero for \( i > m \). Note that the degree of the product is equal to the sum of the degrees of the two polynomials.
Polynomial Arithmetic with Coefficients in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \)

Let us now consider polynomials in which the coefficients are elements of some field \( F \); we refer to this as a polynomial over the field \( F \). In that case, it is easy to show that the set of such polynomials is a ring, referred to as a polynomial ring. That is, if we consider each distinct polynomial to be an element of the set, then that set is a ring.\(^8\)

When polynomial arithmetic is performed on polynomials over a field, then division is possible. Note that this does not mean that exact division is possible. Let us clarify this distinction. Within a field, given two elements \( a \) and \( b \), the quotient \( a/b \) is also an element of the field. However, given a ring \( R \) that is not a field, in

\[ f(x) + g(x) = x^3 + 2x^2 - x + 3 \]
\[ f(x) - g(x) = x^3 + x + 1 \]
\[ f(x) \times g(x) = x^5 + 3x^2 - 2x + 2 \]

Figures 4.3a through 4.3c show the manual calculations. We comment on division subsequently.

\(^8\)In fact, the set of polynomials whose coefficients are elements of a commutative ring forms a polynomial ring, but that is of no interest in the present context.
Consider the division $5/3$ within a set $S$. If $S$ is the set of rational numbers, which is a field, then the result is simply expressed as $5/3$ and is an element of $S$. Now suppose that $S$ is the field $\mathbb{Z}_7$. In this case, we calculate (using Table 4.5c)

$$5/3 = (5 \times 3^{-1}) \mod 7 = (5 \times 5) \mod 7 = 4$$

which is an exact solution. Finally, suppose that $S$ is the set of integers, which is a ring but not a field. Then $5/3$ produces a quotient of 1 and a remainder of 2:

$$5/3 = 1 + 2/3$$

$$5 = 1 \times 3 + 2$$

Thus, division is not exact over the set of integers.

Now, if we attempt to perform polynomial division over a coefficient set that is not a field, we find that division is not always defined.

If the coefficient set is the integers, then $(5x^2)/(3x)$ does not have a solution, because it would require a coefficient with a value of $5/3$, which is not in the coefficient set. Suppose that we perform the same polynomial division over $\mathbb{Z}_7$. Then we have $(5x^2)/(3x) = 4x$, which is a valid polynomial over $\mathbb{Z}_7$.

However, as we demonstrate presently, even if the coefficient set is a field, polynomial division is not necessarily exact. In general, division will produce a quotient and a remainder. We can restate the division algorithm of Equation (4.1) for polynomials over a field as follows. Given polynomials $f(x)$ of degree $n$ and $g(x)$ of degree $(m)$, $(n \geq m)$, if we divide $f(x)$ by $g(x)$, we get a quotient $q(x)$ and a remainder $r(x)$ that obey the relationship

$$f(x) = q(x)g(x) + r(x)$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.10)

with polynomial degrees:

Degree $f(x) = n$
Degree $g(x) = m$
Degree $q(x) = n - m$
Degree $r(x) \leq m - 1$

With the understanding that remainders are allowed, we can say that polynomial division is possible if the coefficient set is a field.

In an analogy to integer arithmetic, we can write $f(x) \mod g(x)$ for the remainder $r(x)$ in Equation (4.10). That is, $r(x) = f(x) \mod g(x)$. If there is no remainder [i.e., $r(x) = 0$], then we can say $g(x)$ divides $f(x)$, written as $g(x) \mid f(x)$. Equivalently, we can say that $g(x)$ is a factor of $f(x)$ or $g(x)$ is a divisor of $f(x)$. 
For the preceding example \( f(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 2 \) and \( g(x) = x^2 - x + 1 \), \( f(x)/g(x) \) produces a quotient of \( q(x) = x + 2 \) and a remainder \( r(x) = x \), as shown in Figure 4.3d. This is easily verified by noting that
\[
q(x)g(x) + r(x) = (x + 2)(x^2 - x + 1) + x = (x^3 + x^2 - x + 2) + x = x^3 + x^2 + 2 = f(x)
\]

For our purposes, polynomials over \( \text{GF}(2) \) are of most interest. Recall from Section 4.5 that in \( \text{GF}(2) \), addition is equivalent to the XOR operation, and multiplication is equivalent to the logical AND operation. Further, addition and subtraction are equivalent \( \mod 2 \): \[1 + 1 = 1 - 1 = 0; 1 + 0 = 1 - 0 = 1; 0 + 1 = 0 - 1 = 1.\]

Figure 4.4 shows an example of polynomial arithmetic over \( \text{GF}(2) \). For \( f(x) = (x^2 + 1)(x^3 + x^2 + 1) \) and \( g(x) = (x^3 + x + 1) \), the figure shows \( f(x) \div g(x) \); \( f(x) - g(x) \); \( f(x) \times g(x) \); and \( f(x)/g(x) \). Note that \( g(x) | f(x) \).

A polynomial \( f(x) \) over a field \( F \) is called **irreducible** if and only if \( f(x) \) cannot be expressed as a product of two polynomials, both over \( F \), and both of degree lower than that of \( f(x) \). By analogy to integers, an irreducible polynomial is also called a **prime polynomial**.

The polynomial\(^9\) \( f(x) = x^4 + 1 \) over \( \text{GF}(2) \) is reducible, because \( x^4 + 1 = (x + 1)(x^3 + x^2 + x + 1) \).

Consider the polynomial \( f(x) = x^3 + x + 1 \). It is clear by inspection that \( x \) is not a factor of \( f(x) \). We easily show that \( x + 1 \) is not a factor of \( f(x) \):
\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{x^2 + x}{x + 1} &= \frac{x^3 + x^2}{x^3 + x^2} + \frac{x + 1}{x + 1} \\
&= \frac{x^2 + x}{x^2 + x} + 1
\end{align*}
\]
Thus, \( f(x) \) has no factors of degree 1. But it is clear by inspection that if \( f(x) \) is reducible, it must have one factor of degree 2 and one factor of degree 1. Therefore, \( f(x) \) is irreducible.

\(^9\)In the remainder of this chapter, unless otherwise noted, all examples are of polynomials over \( \text{GF}(2) \).
Finding the Greatest Common Divisor

We can extend the analogy between polynomial arithmetic over a field and integer arithmetic by defining the greatest common divisor as follows. The polynomial \( c(x) \) is said to be the greatest common divisor of \( a(x) \) and \( b(x) \) if the following are true.

1. \( c(x) \) divides both \( a(x) \) and \( b(x) \).
2. Any divisor of \( a(x) \) and \( b(x) \) is a divisor of \( c(x) \).

An equivalent definition is the following: \( \gcd[a(x), b(x)] \) is the polynomial of maximum degree that divides both \( a(x) \) and \( b(x) \).

We can adapt the Euclidean algorithm to compute the greatest common divisor of two polynomials. The equality in Equation (4.6) can be rewritten as the following theorem.
\[ \gcd[a(x), b(x)] = \gcd[b(x), a(x) \mod b(x)] \]  
\textit{Equation (4.11)}

Equation (4.11) can be used repetitively to determine the greatest common divisor. Compare the following scheme to the definition of the Euclidean algorithm for integers.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Calculate} & \text{Which satisfies} \\
\hline
r_1(x) = a(x) \mod b(x) & a(x) = q_1(x)b(x) + r_1(x) \\
\hline
r_2(x) = b(x) \mod r_1(x) & b(x) = q_2(x)r_1(x) + r_2(x) \\
\hline
r_3(x) = r_1(x) \mod r_2(x) & r_1(x) = q_3(x)r_2(x) + r_3(x) \\
\hline
\vdots & \vdots \\
\hline
r_n(x) = r_{n-2}(x) \mod r_{n-1}(x) & r_{n-2}(x) = q_{n-1}(x)r_{n-1}(x) + r_n(x) \\
\hline
r_{n+1}(x) = r_{n-1}(x) \mod r_n(x) = 0 & r_{n-1}(x) = q_n(x) + 0 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

At each iteration, we have \( d(x) = \gcd(r_{i+1}(x), r_{i}(x)) \) until finally \( d(x) = \gcd(r_{n}(x), 0) = r_n(x) \). Thus, we can find the greatest common divisor of two integers by repetitive application of the division algorithm. This is the Euclidean algorithm for polynomials. The algorithm assumes that the degree of \( a(x) \) is greater than the degree of \( b(x) \).

\[
\text{Find } \gcd[a(x), b(x)] \text{ for } a(x) = x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \text{ and } b(x) = x^4 + x^2 + x + 1. \text{ First, we divide } a(x) \text{ by } b(x):
\]

\[
\frac{x^2 + x}{x^4 + x^2 + x + 1} \div \frac{\frac{1}{x^6} + \frac{x^5}{x^4} + \frac{x^4}{x^3} + \frac{x^3}{x^2} + \frac{x^2}{x} + \frac{x}{1}}{1 + x + 1 + x^2 + x^2 + x + 1}
\]

This yields \( r_1(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1 \) and \( q_1(x) = x^2 + x \). Then, we divide \( b(x) \) by \( r_1(x) \).

\[
\frac{x + 1}{x^3 + x^2 + 1} \div \frac{\frac{x^4}{x^3} + \frac{x^3}{x^2} + x}{1 + x + 1 + x^2 + x^2 + 1}
\]

This yields \( r_2(x) = 0 \) and \( q_2(x) = x + 1 \). Therefore, \( \gcd[a(x), b(x)] = r_1(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1 \).
Summary

We began this section with a discussion of arithmetic with ordinary polynomials. In ordinary polynomial arithmetic, the variable is not evaluated; that is, we do not plug a value in for the variable of the polynomials. Instead, arithmetic operations are performed on polynomials (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) using the ordinary rules of algebra. Polynomial division is not allowed unless the coefficients are elements of a field.

Next, we discussed polynomial arithmetic in which the coefficients are elements of \( \text{GF}(p) \). In this case, polynomial addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are allowed. However, division is not exact; that is, in general division results in a quotient and a remainder.

Finally, we showed that the Euclidean algorithm can be extended to find the greatest common divisor of two polynomials whose coefficients are elements of a field.

All of the material in this section provides a foundation for the following section, in which polynomials are used to define finite fields of order \( p^n \).

4.7 FINITE FIELDS OF THE FORM GF(2^n)

Earlier in this chapter, we mentioned that the order of a finite field must be of the form \( p^n \), where \( p \) is a prime and \( n \) is a positive integer. In Section 4.5, we looked at the special case of finite fields with order \( p \). We found that, using modular arithmetic in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), all of the axioms for a field (Figure 4.2) are satisfied. For polynomials over \( p^n \), with \( n > 1 \), operations modulo \( p^n \) do not produce a field. In this section, we show what structure satisfies the axioms for a field in a set with \( p^n \) elements and concentrate on \( \text{GF}(2^n) \).

Motivation

Virtually all encryption algorithms, both symmetric and public key, involve arithmetic operations on integers. If one of the operations that is used in the algorithm is division, then we need to work in arithmetic defined over a field. For convenience and for implementation efficiency, we would also like to work with integers that fit exactly into a given number of bits with no wasted bit patterns. That is, we wish to work with integers in the range 0 through \( 2^n - 1 \), which fit into an \( n \)-bit word.

Suppose we wish to define a conventional encryption algorithm that operates on data 8 bits at a time, and we wish to perform division. With 8 bits, we can represent integers in the range 0 through 255. However, 256 is not a prime number, so that if arithmetic is performed in \( \mathbb{Z}_{256} \) (arithmetic modulo 256), this set of integers will not be a field. The closest prime number less than 256 is 251. Thus, the set \( \mathbb{Z}_{251} \), using arithmetic modulo 251, is a field. However, in this case the 8-bit patterns representing the integers 251 through 255 would not be used, resulting in inefficient use of storage.
As the preceding example points out, if all arithmetic operations are to be used and we wish to represent a full range of integers in \( n \) bits, then arithmetic modulo \( 2^n \) will not work. Equivalently, the set of integers modulo \( 2^n \) for \( n > 1 \), is not a field. Furthermore, even if the encryption algorithm uses only addition and multiplication, but not division, the use of the set \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^n} \) is questionable, as the following example illustrates.

Suppose we wish to use 3-bit blocks in our encryption algorithm and use only the operations of addition and multiplication. Then arithmetic modulo 8 is well defined, as shown in Table 4.2. However, note that in the multiplication table, the nonzero integers do not appear an equal number of times. For example, there are only four occurrences of 3, but twelve occurrences of 4. On the other hand, as was mentioned, there are finite fields of the form \( \text{GF}(2^n) \), so there is in particular a finite field of order \( 2^3 = 8 \). Arithmetic for this field is shown in Table 4.6. In this case, the number of occurrences of the nonzero integers is uniform for multiplication. To summarize,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integer</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occurrences in ( \mathbb{Z}_8 )</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occurrences in ( \text{GF}(2^3) )</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the moment, let us set aside the question of how the matrices of Table 4.6 were constructed and instead make some observations.

1. The addition and multiplication tables are symmetric about the main diagonal, in conformance to the commutative property of addition and multiplication. This property is also exhibited in Table 4.2, which uses mod 8 arithmetic.
2. All the nonzero elements defined by Table 4.6 have a multiplicative inverse, unlike the case with Table 4.2.
3. The scheme defined by Table 4.6 satisfies all the requirements for a finite field. Thus, we can refer to this scheme as \( \text{GF}(2^3) \).
4. For convenience, we show the 3-bit assignment used for each of the elements of \( \text{GF}(2^3) \).

Intuitively, it would seem that an algorithm that maps the integers unevenly onto themselves might be cryptographically weaker than one that provides a uniform mapping. Thus, the finite fields of the form \( \text{GF}(2^n) \) are attractive for cryptographic algorithms.

To summarize, we are looking for a set consisting of \( 2^n \) elements, together with a definition of addition and multiplication over the set that define a field. We can assign a unique integer in the range 0 through \( 2^n - 1 \) to each element of the set.
Keep in mind that we will not use modular arithmetic, as we have seen that this does not result in a field. Instead, we will show how polynomial arithmetic provides a means for constructing the desired field.

**Modular Polynomial Arithmetic**

Consider the set $S$ of all polynomials of degree $n - 1$ or less over the field $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Thus, each polynomial has the form

$$f(x) = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + a_{n-2}x^{n-2} + \cdots + a_1x + a_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_ix^i$$

where each $a_i$ takes on a value in the set $\{0, 1, \ldots, p - 1\}$. There are a total of $p^n$ different polynomials in $S$. 

### Table 4.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>000</th>
<th>001</th>
<th>010</th>
<th>011</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>101</th>
<th>110</th>
<th>111</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>+</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) **Addition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>000</th>
<th>001</th>
<th>010</th>
<th>011</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>101</th>
<th>110</th>
<th>111</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>×</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **Multiplication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>w</th>
<th>-w</th>
<th>w⁻¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **Additive and multiplicative inverses**
For $p = 3$ and $n = 2$, the $3^2 = 9$ polynomials in the set are:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
0 & x & 2x \\
1 & x + 1 & 2x + 1 \\
2 & x + 2 & 2x + 2 \\
\end{array}
\]

For $p = 2$ and $n = 3$, the $2^3 = 8$ polynomials in the set are:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
0 & x + 1 & x^2 + x \\
1 & x^2 & x^2 + x + 1 \\
x & x^2 + 1 \\
\end{array}
\]

With the appropriate definition of arithmetic operations, each such set $S$ is a finite field. The definition consists of the following elements.

1. Arithmetic follows the ordinary rules of polynomial arithmetic using the basic rules of algebra, with the following two refinements.
2. Arithmetic on the coefficients is performed modulo $p$. That is, we use the rules of arithmetic for the finite field $\mathbb{Z}_p$.
3. If multiplication results in a polynomial of degree greater than $n - 1$, then the polynomial is reduced modulo some irreducible polynomial $m(x)$ of degree $n$. That is, we divide by $m(x)$ and keep the remainder. For a polynomial $f(x)$, the remainder is expressed as $r(x) = f(x) \mod m(x)$.

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) uses arithmetic in the finite field $\text{GF}(2^8)$, with the irreducible polynomial $m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$. Consider the two polynomials $f(x) = x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1$ and $g(x) = x^7 + x + 1$. Then

\[
f(x) + g(x) = x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1 + x^7 + x + 1 \\
\quad = x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + x^2
\]

\[
f(x) \times g(x) = x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 \\
\quad + x^7 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x \\
\quad + x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1 \\
\quad = x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1
\]

\[
x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1/\frac{x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1}{x^{13} + x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^5} + x^4 + x^3 \\
\quad + x^{11} + x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + x^3
\]

Therefore, $f(x) \times g(x) \mod m(x) = x^7 + x^6 + 1$. 
As with ordinary modular arithmetic, we have the notion of a set of residues in modular polynomial arithmetic. The set of residues modulo \( m(x) \), an \( n \)th-degree polynomial, consists of \( p^n \) elements. Each of these elements is represented by one of the \( p^n \) polynomials of degree \( m < n \).

The residue class \([x + 1], (\text{mod } m(x))\), consists of all polynomials \( a(x) \) such that \( a(x) \equiv (x + 1) \pmod{m(x)} \). Equivalently, the residue class \([x + 1]\) consists of all polynomials \( a(x) \) that satisfy the equality \( a(x) \pmod{m(x)} = x + 1 \).

It can be shown that the set of all polynomials modulo an irreducible \( n \)th-degree polynomial \( m(x) \) satisfies the axioms in Figure 4.2, and thus forms a finite field. Furthermore, all finite fields of a given order are isomorphic; that is, any two finite-field structures of a given order have the same structure, but the representation or labels of the elements may be different.

To construct the finite field \( \text{GF}(2^3) \), we need to choose an irreducible polynomial of degree 3. There are only two such polynomials: \( (x^3 + x^2 + 1) \) and \( (x^3 + x + 1) \). Using the latter, Table 4.7 shows the addition and multiplication tables for \( \text{GF}(2^3) \). Note that this set of tables has the identical structure to those of Table 4.6. Thus, we have succeeded in finding a way to define a field of order \( 2^3 \).

We can now read additions and multiplications from the table easily. For example, consider binary \( 100 + 010 = 110 \). This is equivalent to \( x^2 + x \). Also consider \( 100 \times 010 = 011 \), which is equivalent to \( x^2 \times x = x^3 \) and reduces to \( x + 1 \).

Finding the Multiplicative Inverse

Just as the Euclidean algorithm can be adapted to find the greatest common divisor of two polynomials, the extended Euclidean algorithm can be adapted to find the multiplicative inverse of a polynomial. Specifically, the algorithm will find the multiplicative inverse of \( b(x) \) modulo \( a(x) \) if the degree of \( b(x) \) is less than the degree of \( a(x) \) and \( \gcd[a(x), b(x)] = 1 \). If \( a(x) \) is an irreducible polynomial, then it has no factor other than itself or 1, so that \( \gcd[a(x), b(x)] = 1 \). The algorithm can be characterized in the same way as we did for the extended Euclidean algorithm for integers. Given polynomials \( a(x) \) and \( b(x) \) with the degree of \( a(x) \) greater than the degree of \( b(x) \), we wish to solve the following equation for the values \( v(x), w(x), \) and \( d(x) \), where \( d(x) = \gcd[a(x), b(x)] \):

\[
a(x)v(x) + b(x)w(x) = d(x)
\]

If \( d(x) = 1 \), then \( w(x) \) is the multiplicative inverse of \( b(x) \) modulo \( a(x) \). The calculations are as follows.
### Table 4.7 Polynomial Arithmetic Modulo \((x^3 + x + 1)\)

#### (a) Addition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>000</th>
<th>001</th>
<th>010</th>
<th>011</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>101</th>
<th>110</th>
<th>111</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (b) Multiplication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>000</th>
<th>001</th>
<th>010</th>
<th>011</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>101</th>
<th>110</th>
<th>111</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x^2 + x)</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x + 1)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(x^2 + x + 1)</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(x^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>(x^2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Extended Euclidean Algorithm for Polynomials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculate</th>
<th>Which satisfies</th>
<th>Calculate</th>
<th>Which satisfies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( r_{n-1}(x) = a(x) )</td>
<td>( v_{-1}(x) = 1; w_{-1}(x) = 0 )</td>
<td>( v_n(x) = v_{n-2}(x) - q_n(x)v_{n-1}(x) )</td>
<td>( r_n(x) = a(x)v_n(x) + b(x)w_n(x) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_0(x) = b(x) )</td>
<td>( v_0(x) = 0; w_0(x) = 1 )</td>
<td>( w_{n-1}(x) = w_{n-2}(x) - q_n(x)w_{n-1}(x) )</td>
<td>( d(x) = \gcd(a(x), b(x)) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_1(x) = a(x) \mod b(x) )</td>
<td>( q_1(x) = \text{quotient of } a(x)/b(x) )</td>
<td>( v_1(x) = v_{-1}(x) - q_1(x)v_0(x) = 1 )</td>
<td>( v(x) = v_n(x); w(x) = w_n(x) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( q_2(x) = \text{quotient of } b(x)/r_1(x) )</td>
<td>( r_2(x) = b(x) \mod r_1(x) )</td>
<td>( w_1(x) = w_{-1}(x) - q_1(x)w_0(x) = -q_1(x) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_3(x) = r_1(x) \mod r_2(x) )</td>
<td>( q_3(x) = \text{quotient of } r_1(x)/r_2(x) )</td>
<td>( v_3(x) = v_1(x) - q_3(x)v_2(x) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_n(x) = r_{n-2}(x) \mod r_{n-1}(x) )</td>
<td>( q_n(x) = \text{quotient of } r_{n-2}(x)/r_{n-3}(x) )</td>
<td>( w_3(x) = w_1(x) - q_3(x)w_2(x) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( r_{n+1}(x) = r_{n-1}(x) \mod r_n(x) = 0 )</td>
<td>( q_{n+1}(x) = \text{quotient of } r_{n-1}(x)/r_{n-2}(x) )</td>
<td>( r_n(x) = b(x)w_n(x) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8 shows the calculation of the multiplicative inverse of \((x^7 + x + 1)\mod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)\). The result is that \((x^7 + x + 1)^{-1} = (x^7)\). That is, \((x^7 + x + 1)(x^7) \equiv 1 \mod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)\).

**Computational Considerations**

A polynomial \(f(x)\) in GF\((2^n)\)

\[
f(x) = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + a_{n-2}x^{n-2} + \cdots + a_1x + a_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i x^i
\]

can be uniquely represented by the sequence of its \(n\) binary coefficients \((a_{n-1}, a_{n-2}, \ldots, a_0)\). Thus, every polynomial in GF\((2^n)\) can be represented by an \(n\)-bit number.
Consider the two polynomials in GF(2^8) from our earlier example: 
\[ f(x) = x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1 \text{ and } g(x) = x^7 + x + 1. \]

\[
\begin{align*}
(x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1) + (x^7 + x + 1) &= x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + x^2 \\
(01010111) \oplus (10000011) &= (11010100) \\
[57] \oplus [83] &= [D4]
\end{align*}
\]

**(Multiplication)** There is no simple XOR operation that will accomplish multiplication in GF(2^n). However, a reasonably straightforward, easily implemented technique is available. We will discuss the technique with reference to GF(2^8) using 
\[ m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1, \]
which is the finite field used in AES. The technique readily generalizes to GF(2^n).

The technique is based on the observation that

\[ x^8 \mod m(x) = [m(x) - x^8] = (x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) \]

(4.12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initialization</th>
<th>( a(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1; v_{-1}(x) = 1; w_{-1}(x) = 0 )</th>
<th>( b(x) = x^7 + x + 1 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iteration 1</td>
<td>( q_1(x) = x; r_1(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1 )</td>
<td>( v_1(x) = 1; w_1(x) = x )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iteration 2</td>
<td>( q_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1; r_2(x) = x )</td>
<td>( v_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1; w_2(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iteration 3</td>
<td>( q_3(x) = x^3 + x^2 + x; r_3(x) = 1 )</td>
<td>( v_3(x) = x^6 + x^2 + x + 1; w_3(x) = x^7 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iteration 4</td>
<td>( q_4(x) = x; r_4(x) = 0 )</td>
<td>( v_4(x) = x^7 + x + 1; w_4(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>( d(x) = r_4(x) = \gcd(a(x), b(x)) = 1 )</td>
<td>( w(x) = w_3(x) = (x^7 + x + 1)^{-1} \mod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) = x^7 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ ^{10} \text{A basic refresher on number systems (decimal, binary, hexadecimal) can be found at the Computer} \]
\[ \text{Science Student Resource Site at WilliamStallings.com/StudentSupport.html. Here each of two groups} \]
\[ \text{of 4 bits in a byte is denoted by a single hexadecimal character, and the two characters are enclosed in} \]
\[ \text{brackets.} \]
A moment’s thought should convince you that Equation (4.12) is true; if you are not sure, divide it out. In general, in GF(2^n) with an nth-degree polynomial p(x), we have x^n mod p(x) = [p(x) - x^n].

Now, consider a polynomial in GF(2^8), which has the form \( f(x) = b_7x^7 + b_6x^6 + b_5x^5 + b_4x^4 + b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0 \). If we multiply by x, we have

\[
x \times f(x) = (b_7x^8 + b_6x^7 + b_5x^6 + b_4x^5 + b_3x^4 + b_2x^3 + b_1x^2 + b_0x) \mod m(x)
\]

(4.13)

If \( b_7 = 0 \), then the result is a polynomial of degree less than 8, which is already in reduced form, and no further computation is necessary. If \( b_7 = 1 \), then reduction modulo \( m(x) \) is achieved using Equation (4.12):

\[
x \times f(x) = (b_6x^7 + b_5x^6 + b_4x^5 + b_3x^4 + b_2x^3 + b_1x^2 + b_0x) + (x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)
\]

It follows that multiplication by \( x \) (i.e., 00000010) can be implemented as a 1-bit left shift followed by a conditional bitwise XOR with (00011011), which represents \( x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \). To summarize,

\[
x \times f(x) = \begin{cases} 
(b_6b_5b_4b_3b_2b_1b_0) & \text{if } b_7 = 0 \\
(b_6b_5b_4b_3b_2b_1b_0) \oplus (00011011) & \text{if } b_7 = 1
\end{cases}
\]

(4.14)

Multiplication by a higher power of \( x \) can be achieved by repeated application of Equation (4.14). By adding intermediate results, multiplication by any constant in GF(2^8) can be achieved.

In an earlier example, we showed that for \( f(x) = x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1 \), \( g(x) = x^7 + x + 1 \), and \( m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \), we have \( f(x) \times g(x) \mod m(x) = x^7 + x^6 + 1 \). Redoing this in binary arithmetic, we need to compute \((01010111) \times (10000011)\). First, we determine the results of multiplication by powers of \( x \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(01010111) \times (00000010) &= (10101110) \\
(01010111) \times (00000100) &= (01011100) \oplus (00011011) = (01000111) \\
(01010111) \times (00010000) &= (00011000) \oplus (00001110) = (00000111) \\
(01010111) \times (01000000) &= (00011100) \\
(01010111) \times (10000000) &= (00111000)
\end{align*}
\]

So,

\[
(01010111) \times (10000011) = (01010111) \times [(00000001) \oplus (00000010) \oplus (10000000)]
\]

\[
= (01010111) \oplus (10101110) \oplus (00111000) = (11000001)
\]

which is equivalent to \( x^7 + x^6 + 1 \).
Using a Generator

An equivalent technique for defining a finite field of the form GF($2^n$), using the same irreducible polynomial, is sometimes more convenient. To begin, we need two definitions: A **generator** $g$ of a finite field $F$ of order $q$ (contains $q$ elements) is an element whose first powers generate all the nonzero elements of $F$. That is, the elements of $F$ consist of $0, g^0, g^1, \ldots, g^{q-2}$. Consider a field $F$ defined by a polynomial $f(x)$. An element $b$ contained in $F$ is called a **root** of the polynomial if $f(b) = 0$. Finally, it can be shown that a root $g$ of an irreducible polynomial is a generator of the finite field defined on that polynomial.

Let us consider the finite field $GF(2^3)$, defined over the irreducible polynomial $x^3 + x + 1$, discussed previously. Thus, the generator $g$ must satisfy $f(g) = g^3 + g + 1 = 0$. Keep in mind, as discussed previously, that we need not find a numerical solution to this equality. Rather, we deal with polynomial arithmetic in which arithmetic on the coefficients is performed modulo 2. Therefore, the solution to the preceding equality is $g^3 = -g - 1 = g + 1$. We now show that $g$ in fact generates all the polynomials of degree less than 3. We have the following.

\[
\begin{align*}
g^4 &= g(g^3) = g(g + 1) = g^2 + g \\
g^5 &= g(g^4) = g(g^2 + g) = g^3 + g^2 = g^2 + g + 1 \\
g^6 &= g(g^5) = g(g^2 + g + 1) = g^3 + g^2 + g = g^2 + g + g + 1 = g^2 + 1 \\
g^7 &= g(g^6) = g(g^2 + 1) = g^3 + g = g + g + 1 = 1 = g^0
\end{align*}
\]

We see that the powers of $g$ generate all the nonzero polynomials in $GF(2^3)$. Also, it should be clear that $g^k = g^{k \mod 7}$ for any integer $k$. Table 4.9 shows the power representation, as well as the polynomial and binary representations.

*(Continued)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Representation</th>
<th>Polynomial Representation</th>
<th>Binary Representation</th>
<th>Decimal (Hex) Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^0$ ($= g^7$)</td>
<td>$g$</td>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^1$</td>
<td>$g^2$</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^2$</td>
<td>$g^3$</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^3$</td>
<td>$g^4$</td>
<td>011</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^4$</td>
<td>$g^5$</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^5$</td>
<td>$g^6$</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^6$</td>
<td>$g^7$</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This power representation makes multiplication easy. To multiply in the power notation, add exponents modulo 7. For example, \(g^4 + g^6 = g^{(10 \mod 7)} = g^3 = g + 1\). The same result is achieved using polynomial arithmetic: We have \(g^4 = g^2 + g\) and \(g^6 = g^2 + 1\). Then, \((g^2 + g) \times (g^2 + 1) = g^4 + g^3 + g^2 + 1\).

Next, we need to determine \((g^4 + g^3 + g^2 + 1) \mod (g^3 + g + 1)\) by division:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
  & g^3 & + & g & + & 1 & & & & & & \\
\hline
  g^4 & + & g^3 & + & g^2 & + & g & & & & & \\
\hline
  g^3 & + & g & + & 1 & & & & & & & \\
  g & + & 1 & & & & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

We get a result of \(g + 1\), which agrees with the result obtained using the power representation.

Table 4.10 shows the addition and multiplication tables for \(GF(2^3)\) using the power representation. Note that this yields the identical results to the polynomial representation (Table 4.7) with some of the rows and columns interchanged.

In general, for \(GF(2^n)\) with irreducible polynomial \(f(x)\), determine \(g^n = f(g) - g^n\). Then calculate all of the powers of \(g\) from \(g^{n+1}\) through \(g^{2^n - 2}\). The elements of the field correspond to the powers of \(g\) from \(g^0\) through \(g^{2^n - 2}\) plus the value 0. For multiplication of two elements in the field, use the equality \(g^k = g^{k \mod (2^n - 1)}\) for any integer \(k\).

**Summary**

In this section, we have shown how to construct a finite field of order \(2^n\). Specifically, we defined \(GF(2^n)\) with the following properties.

1. \(GF(2^n)\) consists of \(2^n\) elements.

2. The binary operations + and \(\times\) are defined over the set. The operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division can be performed without leaving the set. Each element of the set other than 0 has a multiplicative inverse.

We have shown that the elements of \(GF(2^n)\) can be defined as the set of all polynomials of degree \(n - 1\) or less with binary coefficients. Each such polynomial can be represented by a unique \(n\)-bit value. Arithmetic is defined as polynomial arithmetic modulo some irreducible polynomial of degree \(n\). We have also seen that an equivalent definition of a finite field \(GF(2^n)\) makes use of a generator and that arithmetic is defined using powers of the generator.
Table 4.10  \( \text{GF}(2^3) \) Arithmetic Using Generator for the Polynomial \((x^3 + x + 1)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>000</th>
<th>001</th>
<th>010</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>011</th>
<th>110</th>
<th>111</th>
<th>101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>+</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(G)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^3)</td>
<td>(g^4)</td>
<td>(g^5)</td>
<td>(g^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(G)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^3)</td>
<td>(g^4)</td>
<td>(g^5)</td>
<td>(g^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Addition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>000</th>
<th>001</th>
<th>010</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>011</th>
<th>110</th>
<th>111</th>
<th>101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(\times)</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(G)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^3)</td>
<td>(g^4)</td>
<td>(g^5)</td>
<td>(g^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(G)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g^3)</td>
<td>(g^4)</td>
<td>(g^5)</td>
<td>(g^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(g^2 + 1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(g^2)</td>
<td>(g + 1)</td>
<td>(g^2 + g)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Multiplication
4.8 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

[HERS75], still in print, is the classic treatment of abstract algebra; it is readable and rigorous. [DESK92] is another good resource. [KNUT98] provides good coverage of polynomial arithmetic.

One of the best treatments of the topics of this chapter is [BERL84], still in print. [GARR01] also has extensive coverage. A thorough and rigorous treatment of finite fields is [LIDL94]. Another solid treatment is [MURP00]. [HORO71] is a good overview of the topics of this chapter.


Recommended Web Site:

- **PascGalois Project**: Contains a clever set of examples and projects to aid in giving students a visual understanding of key concepts in abstract algebra.

4.9 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>abelian group</th>
<th>commutative</th>
<th>divisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>associative</td>
<td>commutative ring</td>
<td>Euclidean algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coefficient set</td>
<td>cyclic group</td>
<td>field</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4 / Basic Concepts in Number Theory and Finite Fields

Review Questions

4.1 Briefly define a group.
4.2 Briefly define a ring.
4.3 Briefly define a field.
4.4 What does it mean to say that \( b \) is a divisor of \( a \)?
4.5 What is the difference between modular arithmetic and ordinary arithmetic?
4.6 List three classes of polynomial arithmetic.

Problems

4.1 For the group \( S_n \) of all permutations of \( n \) distinct symbols,
   a. what is the number of elements in \( S_n \)?
   b. show that \( S_n \) is not abelian for \( n > 2 \).
4.2 Does the set of residue classes (mod3) form a group
   a. with respect to modular addition?
   b. with respect to modular multiplication?
4.3 Consider the set \( S = \{a, b\} \) with addition and multiplication defined by the following tables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>+</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>\times</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is \( S \) a ring? Justify your answer.
4.4 Reformulate Equation (4.1), removing the restriction that \( a \) is a nonnegative integer. That is, let \( a \) be any integer.
4.5 Draw a figure similar to Figure 4.1 for \( a < 0 \).
4.6 For each of the following equations, find an integer \( x \) that satisfies the equation.
   a. \( 5x \equiv 4 \) (mod 3)
   b. \( 7x \equiv 6 \) (mod 5)
   c. \( 9x \equiv 8 \) (mod 7)
4.7 In this text, we assume that the modulus is a positive integer. But the definition of the expression \( a \mod n \) also makes perfect sense if \( n \) is negative. Determine the following:
   a. \( 5 \mod 3 \)
   b. \( 5 \mod -3 \)
   c. \( -5 \mod 3 \)
   d. \( -5 \mod -3 \)
4.8 A modulus of 0 does not fit the definition but is defined by convention as follows: $a \mod 0 = a$. With this definition in mind, what does the following expression mean: $a = b \mod 0$?

4.9 In Section 4.3, we define the congruence relationship as follows: Two integers $a$ and $b$ are said to be congruent modulo $n$ if $(a \mod n) = (b \mod n)$. We then proved that $a = b \mod n$ if $n | (a - b)$. Some texts on number theory use this latter relationship as the definition of congruence: Two integers $a$ and $b$ are said to be congruent modulo $n$ if $n | (a - b)$. Using this latter definition as the starting point, prove that, if $(a \mod n) = (b \mod n)$, then $n$ divides $(a - b)$.

4.10 What is the smallest positive integer that has exactly $k$ divisors, for $1 \leq k \leq 6$?

4.11 Prove the following:
   a. $a = b \mod (n \mod n)$ implies $b = a \mod (n \mod n)$
   b. $a = b \mod (n \mod n)$ and $b = c \mod (n \mod n)$ imply $a = c \mod (n \mod n)$

4.12 Prove the following:
   a. $[(a \mod n) - (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a - b) \mod n$
   b. $[(a \mod n) \times (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a \times b) \mod n$

4.13 Find the multiplicative inverse of each nonzero element in $Z_n$.

4.14 Show that an integer $N$ is congruent modulo 9 to the sum of its decimal digits. For example, $475 = 4 + 7 + 5 = 16 = 1 + 6 = 7 \mod 9$. This is the basis for the familiar procedure of “casting out 9’s” when checking computations in arithmetic.

4.15 a. Determine $\text{gcd}(24140, 16762)$.
    b. Determine $\text{gcd}(4655, 12075)$.

4.16 The purpose of this problem is to set an upper bound on the number of iterations of the Euclidean algorithm.

   a. Suppose that $m = qn + r$ with $q > 0$ and $0 \leq r < n$. Show that $m/2 > r$.
   b. Let $A_i$ be the value of $A$ in the Euclidean algorithm after the $i$th iteration. Show that $A_{i+2} < A_i/2$

   c. Show that if $m, n,$ and $N$ are integers with $(1 \leq m, n, \leq 2^N)$, then the Euclidean algorithm takes at most $2N$ steps to find $\text{gcd}(m, n)$.

4.17 The Euclidean algorithm has been known for over 2000 years and has always been a favorite among number theorists. After these many years, there is now a potential competitor, invented by J. Stein in 1961. Stein’s algorithms is as follows. Determine $\text{gcd}(A, B)$ with $A, B \geq 1$.

   **STEP 1** Set $A_1 = A, B_1 = B, C_1 = 1$

   **STEP 2** $n$

   1. If $A_n = B_n$, stop. $\text{gcd}(A, B) = A_nC_n$
   2. If $A_n$ and $B_n$ are both even, set $A_{n+1} = A_n/2, B_{n+1} = B_n/2, C_{n+1} = 2C_n$
   3. If $A_n$ is even and $B_n$ is odd, set $A_{n+1} = A_n/2, B_{n+1} = B_n, C_{n+1} = C_n$
   4. If $A_n$ is odd and $B_n$ is even, set $A_{n+1} = A_n, B_{n+1} = B_n/2, C_{n+1} = C_n$
   5. If $A_n$ and $B_n$ are both odd, set $A_{n+1} = \lfloor A_n/B_n \rfloor, B_{n+1} = \min(B_n, A_n)$, $C_{n+1} = C_n$

Continue to step $n + 1$.

a. To get a feel for the two algorithms, compute $\text{gcd}(2152, 764)$ using both the Euclidean and Stein’s algorithm.

b. What is the apparent advantage of Stein’s algorithm over the Euclidean algorithm?

4.18 a. Show that if Stein’s algorithm does not stop before the $n$th step, then $C_{n+1} \times \text{gcd}(A_{n+1}, B_{n+1}) = C_n \times \text{gcd}(A_n, B_n)$

   b. Show that if the algorithm does not stop before step $(n - 1)$, then $A_{n+2}B_{n+2} \leq \frac{A_nB_n}{2}$
c. Show that if $1 \leq A, B \leq 2^N$, then Stein’s algorithm takes at most $4N$ steps to find $\text{gcd}(m, n)$. Thus, Stein’s algorithm works in roughly the same number of steps as the Euclidean algorithm.

d. Demonstrate that Stein’s algorithm does indeed return $\text{gcd}(A, B)$.

4.19 Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, find the multiplicative inverse of

a. $1234 \mod 4321$

b. $24140 \mod 40902$

c. $550 \mod 1769$

4.20 Develop a set of tables similar to Table 4.5 for $\text{GF}(5)$.

4.21 Demonstrate that the set of polynomials whose coefficients form a field is a ring.

4.22 Demonstrate whether each of these statements is true or false for polynomials over a field.

a. The product of monic polynomials is monic.

b. The product of polynomials of degrees $m$ and $n$ has degree $m + n$.

c. The sum of polynomials of degrees $m$ and $n$ has degree $\max[m, n]$.

4.23 For polynomial arithmetic with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_{10}$, perform the following calculations.

a. $(7x + 2) - (x^2 + 5)$

b. $(6x^2 + x + 3) \times (5x^2 + 2)$

4.24 Determine which of the following are reducible over $\text{GF}(2)$.

a. $x^3 + 1$

b. $x^3 + x^2 + 1$

c. $x^4 + 1$ (be careful)

4.25 Determine the gcd of the following pairs of polynomials.

a. $x^3 + x + 1$ and $x^2 + x + 1$ over $\text{GF}(2)$

b. $x^3 - x + 1$ and $x^2 + 1$ over $\text{GF}(3)$

c. $x^3 + x^4 + x^3 - x^2 - x + 1$ and $x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ over $\text{GF}(3)$

d. $x^5 + 88x^4 + 73x^3 + 83x^2 + 51x + 67$ and $x^3 + 97x^2 + 40x + 38$ over $\text{GF}(101)$

4.26 Develop a set of tables similar to Table 4.7 for $\text{GF}(4)$ with $m(x) = x^2 + x + 1$.

4.27 Determine the multiplicative inverse of $x^3 + x + 1$ in $\text{GF}(2^4)$ with $m(x) = x^4 + x + 1$.

4.28 Develop a table similar to Table 4.9 for $\text{GF}(2^4)$ with $m(x) = x^4 + x + 1$.

Programming Problems

4.29 Write a simple four-function calculator in $\text{GF}(2^4)$. You may use table lookups for the multiplicative inverses.

4.30 Write a simple four-function calculator in $\text{GF}(2^8)$. You should compute the multiplicative inverses on the fly.

**APPENDIX 4A  THE MEANING OF MOD**

The operator mod is used in this book and in the literature in two different ways: as a binary operator and as a congruence relation. This appendix explains the distinction and precisely defines the notation used in this book regarding parentheses. This notation is common but, unfortunately, not universal.
The Binary Operator mod

If \( a \) is an integer and \( n \) is a nonzero integer, we define \( a \mod n \) to be the remainder when \( a \) is divided by \( n \). The integer \( n \) is called the modulus, and the remainder is called the residue. Thus, for any integer \( a \), we can always write

\[
    a = \lfloor a/n \rfloor \times n + (a \mod n)
\]

Formally, we define the operator \( \mod \) as

\[
    a \mod n = a - \lfloor a/n \rfloor \times n \quad \text{for } n \neq 0
\]

As a binary operation, \( \mod \) takes two integer arguments and returns the remainder. For example, \( 7 \mod 3 = 1 \). The arguments may be integers, integer variables, or integer variable expressions. For example, all of the following are valid, with the obvious meanings:

- \( 7 \mod 3 \)
- \( 7 \mod m \)
- \( x \mod 3 \)
- \( x \mod m \)
- \( (x^2 + y + 1) \mod (2m + n) \)

where all of the variables are integers. In each case, the left-hand term is divided by the right-hand term, and the resulting value is the remainder. Note that if either the left- or right-hand argument is an expression, the expression is parenthesized. The operator \( \mod \) is not inside parentheses.

In fact, the \( \mod \) operation also works if the two arguments are arbitrary real numbers, not just integers. In this book, we are concerned only with the integer operation.

The Congruence Relation mod

As a congruence relation, \( \mod \) expresses that two arguments have the same remainder with respect to a given modulus. For example, \( 7 \equiv 4 \pmod{3} \) expresses the fact that both 7 and 4 have a remainder of 1 when divided by 3. The following two expressions are equivalent:

\[
    a \equiv b \pmod{m} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad a \mod m = b \mod m
\]

Another way of expressing it is to say that the expression \( a \equiv b \pmod{m} \) is the same as saying that \( a - b \) is an integral multiple of \( m \). Again, all the arguments may be integers, integer variables, or integer variable expressions. For example, all of the following are valid, with the obvious meanings:

- \( 7 \equiv 4 \pmod{3} \)
- \( x \equiv y \pmod{m} \)
- \( (x^2 + y + 1) \equiv (a + 1) \pmod{[m + n]} \)
where all of the variables are integers. Two conventions are used. The congruence sign is \( \equiv \). The modulus for the relation is defined by placing the mod operator followed by the modulus in parentheses.

The congruence relation is used to define **residue classes**. Those numbers that have the same remainder \( r \) when divided by \( m \) form a residue class \((\text{mod } m)\). There are \( m \) residue classes \((\text{mod } m)\). For a given remainder \( r \), the residue class to which it belongs consists of the numbers

\[
\{ r, r \pm m, r \pm 2m, \ldots \}
\]

According to our definition, the congruence

\[
a \equiv b \; (\text{mod } m)
\]

signifies that the numbers \( a \) and \( b \) differ by a multiple of \( m \). Consequently, the congruence can also be expressed in the terms that \( a \) and \( b \) belong to the same residue class \((\text{mod } m)\).
5.1 Finite Field Arithmetic

5.2 AES Structure
   General Structure
   Detailed Structure

5.3 AES Transformation Functions
   Substitute Bytes Transformation
   ShiftRows Transformation
   MixColumns Transformation
   AddRoundKey Transformation

5.4 AES Key Expansion
   Key Expansion Algorithm
   Rationale

5.5 An AES Example
   Results
   Avalanche Effect

5.6 AES Implementation
   Equivalent Inverse Cipher
   Implementation Aspects

5.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

5.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 5A Polynomials With Coefficients In GF(2^8)

Appendix 5B Simplified AES
“It seems very simple.”

“It is very simple. But if you don’t know what the key is it’s virtually indecipherable.”

—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell

### KEY POINTS

- AES is a block cipher intended to replace DES for commercial applications. It uses a 128-bit block size and a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits.
- AES does not use a Feistel structure. Instead, each full round consists of four separate functions: byte substitution, permutation, arithmetic operations over a finite field, and XOR with a key.

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001. AES is a symmetric block cipher that is intended to replace DES as the approved standard for a wide range of applications. Compared to public-key ciphers such as RSA, the structure of AES and most symmetric ciphers is quite complex and cannot be explained as easily as many other cryptographic algorithms. Accordingly, the reader may wish to begin with a simplified version of AES, which is described in Appendix 5B. This version allows the reader to perform encryption and decryption by hand and gain a good understanding of the working of the algorithm details. Classroom experience indicates that a study of this simplified version enhances understanding of AES.\(^1\) One possible approach is to read the chapter first, then carefully read Appendix 5B, and then re-read the main body of the chapter.

Appendix H looks at the evaluation criteria used by NIST to select from among the candidates for AES, plus the rationale for picking Rijndael, which was the winning candidate. This material is useful in understanding not just the AES design but the criteria by which to judge any symmetric encryption algorithm.

### 5.1 FINITE FIELD ARITHMETIC

In AES, all operations are performed on 8-bit bytes. In particular, the arithmetic operations of addition, multiplication, and division are performed over the finite field $GF(2^8)$. Section 4.7 discusses such operations in some detail. For the reader who has not studied Chapter 4, and as a quick review for those who have, this section summarizes the important concepts.

In essence, a field is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division without leaving the set. Division is defined with the following

\(^1\)However, you may safely skip Appendix 5B, at least on a first reading. If you get lost or bogged down in the details of AES, then you can go back and start with simplified AES.
rule: \( a/b = a(b^{-1}) \). An example of a finite field (one with a finite number of elements) is the set \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) consisting of all the integers \([0, 1, \ldots, p - 1]\), where \( p \) is a prime number and in which arithmetic is carried out modulo \( p \).

Virtually all encryption algorithms, both conventional and public-key, involve arithmetic operations on integers. If one of the operations used in the algorithm is division, then we need to work in arithmetic defined over a field; this is because division requires that each nonzero element have a multiplicative inverse. For convenience and for implementation efficiency, we would also like to work with integers that fit exactly into a given number of bits, with no wasted bit patterns. That is, we wish to work with integers in the range 0 through \( 2^n - 1 \), which fit into an \( n \)-bit word. Unfortunately, the set of such integers, \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^n} \), using modular arithmetic, is not a field. For example, the integer 2 has no multiplicative inverse in \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^n} \), that is, there is no integer \( b \), such that \( 2b \mod 2^n = 1 \).

There is a way of defining a finite field containing \( 2^n \) elements; such a field is referred to as \( \text{GF}(2^n) \). Consider the set, \( S \), of all polynomials of degree \( n - 1 \) or less with binary coefficients. Thus, each polynomial has the form

\[
f(x) = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + a_{n-2}x^{n-2} + \cdots + a_1x + a_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_ix^i
\]

where each \( a_i \) takes on the value 0 or 1. There are a total of \( 2^n \) different polynomials in \( S \). For \( n = 3 \), the \( 2^3 = 8 \) polynomials in the set are

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
0 & x & x^2 \\
1 & x + 1 & x^2 + x
\end{array}
\]

With the appropriate definition of arithmetic operations, each such set \( S \) is a finite field. The definition consists of the following elements.

1. Arithmetic follows the ordinary rules of polynomial arithmetic using the basic rules of algebra with the following two refinements.
2. Arithmetic on the coefficients is performed modulo 2. This is the same as the XOR operation.
3. If multiplication results in a polynomial of degree greater than \( n - 1 \), then the polynomial is reduced modulo some irreducible polynomial \( m(x) \) of degree \( n \). That is, we divide by \( m(x) \) and keep the remainder. For a polynomial \( f(x) \), the remainder is expressed as \( r(x) = f(x) \mod m(x) \). A polynomial \( m(x) \) is called irreducible if and only if \( m(x) \) cannot be expressed as a product of two polynomials, both of degree lower than that of \( m(x) \).

For example, to construct the finite field \( \text{GF}(2^3) \), we need to choose an irreducible polynomial of degree 3. There are only two such polynomials: \( (x^3 + x^2 + 1) \) and \( (x^3 + x + 1) \). Addition is equivalent to taking the XOR of like terms. Thus, \( (x + 1) + x = 1 \).

A polynomial in \( \text{GF}(2^n) \) can be uniquely represented by its \( n \) binary coefficients \( (a_{n-1}a_{n-2} \ldots a_0) \). Therefore, every polynomial in \( \text{GF}(2^n) \) can be represented by an \( n \)-bit number. Addition is performed by taking the bitwise XOR of the two \( n \)-bit elements. There is no simple XOR operation that will accomplish multiplication in
GF($2^n$). However, a reasonably straightforward, easily implemented, technique is available. In essence, it can be shown that multiplication of a number in GF($2^n$) by 2 consists of a left shift followed by a conditional XOR with a constant. Multiplication by larger numbers can be achieved by repeated application of this rule.

For example, AES uses arithmetic in the finite field GF($2^8$) with the irreducible polynomial $m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$. Consider two elements $A = (a_7a_6 \ldots a_1a_0)$ and $B = (b_7b_6 \ldots b_1b_0)$. The sum $A + B = (c_7c_6 \ldots c_1c_0)$, where $c_i = a_i \oplus b_i$. The multiplication $[02] \cdot A$ equals $(a_6 \ldots a_1a_0)$ if $a_7 = 0$ and equals $(a_6 \ldots a_1a_00) \oplus (00011011)$ if $a_7 = 1$.

To summarize, AES operates on 8-bit bytes. Addition of two bytes is defined as the bitwise XOR operation. Multiplication of two bytes is defined as multiplication in the finite field GF($2^8$), with the irreducible polynomial $m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$. The developers of Rijndael give as their motivation for selecting this one of the 30 possible irreducible polynomials of degree 8 that it is the first one on the list given in [LIDL94].

### 5.2 AES STRUCTURE

#### General Structure

Figure 5.1 shows the overall structure of the AES encryption process. The cipher takes a plaintext block size of 128 bits, or 16 bytes. The key length can be 16, 24, or 32 bytes (128, 192, or 256 bits). The algorithm is referred to as AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256, depending on the key length.

The input to the encryption and decryption algorithms is a single 128-bit block. In FIPS PUB 197, this block is depicted as a $4 \times 4$ square matrix of bytes. This block is copied into the State array, which is modified at each stage of encryption or decryption. After the final stage, State is copied to an output matrix. These operations are depicted in Figure 5.2a. Similarly, the key is depicted as a square matrix of bytes. This key is then expanded into an array of key schedule words. Figure 5.2b shows the expansion for the 128-bit key. Each word is four bytes, and the total key schedule is 44 words for the 128-bit key. Note that the ordering of bytes within a matrix is by column. So, for example, the first four bytes of a 128-bit plaintext input to the encryption cipher occupy the first column of the $\text{in}$ matrix, the second four bytes occupy the second column, and so on. Similarly, the first four bytes of the expanded key, which form a word, occupy the first column of the $w$ matrix.

The cipher consists of $N$ rounds, where the number of rounds depends on the key length: 10 rounds for a 16-byte key, 12 rounds for a 24-byte key, and 14 rounds for a 32-byte key (Table 5.1). The first $N - 1$ rounds consist of four distinct transformation functions: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey, which are described subsequently. The final round contains only three transformations, and there is a initial single transformation (AddRoundKey) before the first round,

---

2In the remainder of this discussion, references to GF($2^8$) refer to the finite field defined with this polynomial.
which can be considered Round 0. Each transformation takes one or more $4 \times 4$ matrices as input and produces a $4 \times 4$ matrix as output. Figure 5.1 shows that the output of each round is a $4 \times 4$ matrix, with the output of the final round being the ciphertext. Also, the key expansion function generates $N + 1$ round keys, each of which is a distinct $4 \times 4$ matrix. Each round key serves as one of the inputs to the AddRoundKey transformation in each round.
Figure 5.2  AES Data Structures
Table 5.1  AES Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Size (words/bytes/bits)</th>
<th>4/16/128</th>
<th>6/24/192</th>
<th>8/32/256</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plaintext Block Size (words/bytes/bits)</td>
<td>4/16/128</td>
<td>4/16/128</td>
<td>4/16/128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Rounds</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round Key Size (words/bytes/bits)</td>
<td>4/16/128</td>
<td>4/16/128</td>
<td>4/16/128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded Key Size (words/bytes)</td>
<td>44/176</td>
<td>52/208</td>
<td>60/240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed Structure

Figure 5.3 shows the AES cipher in more detail, indicating the sequence of transformations in each round and showing the corresponding decryption function. As was done in Chapter 3, we show encryption proceeding down the page and decryption proceeding up the page.

Before delving into details, we can make several comments about the overall AES structure.

1. One noteworthy feature of this structure is that it is not a Feistel structure. Recall that, in the classic Feistel structure, half of the data block is used to modify the other half of the data block and then the halves are swapped. AES instead processes the entire data block as a single matrix during each round using substitutions and permutation.

2. The key that is provided as input is expanded into an array of forty-four 32-bit words, \( w[i] \). Four distinct words (128 bits) serve as a round key for each round; these are indicated in Figure 5.3.

3. Four different stages are used, one of permutation and three of substitution:
   - **Substitute bytes**: Uses an S-box to perform a byte-by-byte substitution of the block
   - **ShiftRows**: A simple permutation
   - **MixColumns**: A substitution that makes use of arithmetic over \( GF(2^8) \)
   - **AddRoundKey**: A simple bitwise XOR of the current block with a portion of the expanded key

4. The structure is quite simple. For both encryption and decryption, the cipher begins with an AddRoundKey stage, followed by nine rounds that each includes all four stages, followed by a tenth round of three stages. Figure 5.4 depicts the structure of a full encryption round.

5. Only the AddRoundKey stage makes use of the key. For this reason, the cipher begins and ends with an AddRoundKey stage. Any other stage, applied at the beginning or end, is reversible without knowledge of the key and so would add no security.

6. The AddRoundKey stage is, in effect, a form of Vernam cipher and by itself would not be formidable. The other three stages together provide confusion, diffusion, and nonlinearity, but by themselves would provide no security because they do not use the key. We can view the cipher as alternating operations of XOR
encryption (AddRoundKey) of a block, followed by scrambling of the block (the other three stages), followed by XOR encryption, and so on. This scheme is both efficient and highly secure.

7. Each stage is easily reversible. For the Substitute Byte, ShiftRows, and MixColumns stages, an inverse function is used in the decryption algorithm. For the AddRoundKey stage, the inverse is achieved by XORing the same round key to the block, using the result that $A \oplus B \oplus B = A$.

8. As with most block ciphers, the decryption algorithm makes use of the expanded key in reverse order. However, the decryption algorithm is not
identical to the encryption algorithm. This is a consequence of the particular structure of AES.

9. Once it is established that all four stages are reversible, it is easy to verify that decryption does recover the plaintext. Figure 5.3 lays out encryption and decryption going in opposite vertical directions. At each horizontal point (e.g., the dashed line in the figure), State is the same for both encryption and decryption.

10. The final round of both encryption and decryption consists of only three stages. Again, this is a consequence of the particular structure of AES and is required to make the cipher reversible.

5.3 AES TRANSFORMATION FUNCTIONS

We now turn to a discussion of each of the four transformations used in AES. For each stage, we describe the forward (encryption) algorithm, the inverse (decryption) algorithm, and the rationale for the stage.
Substitute Bytes Transformation

**Forward and Inverse Transformations** The **forward substitute byte transformation**, called SubBytes, is a simple table lookup (Figure 5.5a). AES defines a $16 \times 16$ matrix of byte values, called an S-box (Table 5.2a), that contains a permutation of all possible 256 8-bit values. Each individual byte of State is mapped into a new byte in the following way: The leftmost 4 bits of the byte are used as a row value and the rightmost 4 bits are used as a column value. These row and column values serve as indexes into the S-box to select a unique 8-bit output value. For example, the hexadecimal value $\{95\}_{16}$ [95] references row 9, column 5.

![Figure 5.5 AES Byte-Level Operations](image)

---

3In FIPS PUB 197, a hexadecimal number is indicated by enclosing it in curly brackets. We use that convention in this chapter.
### 5.3 / AES TRANSFORMATION FUNCTIONS

#### Table 5.2 AES S-Boxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>63 7C 77 7B F2 6B 6F C5 30 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CA 82 C9 7D FA 59 47 F0 AD D4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>B7 FD 93 26 36 3F F7 CC 34 A5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>04 C7 23 C3 18 96 05 9A 07 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>09 83 2C 1A 1B 6E 5A A0 52 3B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>53 D1 00 ED 20 FC B1 5B 6A CB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>D0 EF AA FB 43 4D 33 85 45 F9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>51 A3 40 8F 92 9D 38 F5 BC B6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CD 0C 13 EC 5F 97 44 17 C4 A7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>60 81 4F DC 22 2A 90 88 46 EE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>E0 32 3A 0A 49 06 24 5C C2 D3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>E7 C8 37 6D 8D D5 4E A9 6C F4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>BA 78 25 2E 1C A6 B4 C6 E8 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>70 3E B5 66 48 03 F6 0E 61 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>E1 F8 98 11 69 D9 8E 94 9B 1E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>8C A1 89 0D BF E6 42 68 41 99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (a) S-box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>52 09 6A D5 30 36 A5 38 BF 40 A3 9E 81 F3 D7 FB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7C E3 39 82 9B 2F FF 87 34 8E 43 44 C4 DE E9 CB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>54 7B 94 32 A6 C2 23 3D EE 4C 95 0B 42 FA C3 4E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>08 2E A1 66 28 D9 24 B2 76 5B A2 49 6D 8B D1 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>72 F8 F6 64 86 68 16 D4 A4 5C CC 5D 65 B6 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6C 70 48 50 FD ED B9 DA 5E 15 46 57 A7 8D 9D 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>90 D8 AB 00 8C BC D3 0A F7 E4 58 05 B8 B3 45 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>D0 2C 1E 8F CA 3F 0F 02 C1 AF BD 03 01 13 8A 6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3A 91 11 41 4F 67 DC EA 97 F2 CF CE F0 B4 E6 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>96 AC 74 22 E7 AD 35 85 E2 F9 37 E8 1C 75 DF 6E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>47 F1 1A 71 1D 29 C5 89 6F B7 62 0E AA 18 BE 1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>FC 56 3E 4B C6 D2 79 20 9A DB C0 FE 78 CD 5A F4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1F DD A8 33 88 07 C7 31 B1 12 10 59 27 80 EC 5F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>60 51 7F A9 19 B5 4A 0D 2D E5 7A 9F 93 C9 9C EF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>A0 E0 3B 4D AE 2A F5 B0 C8 EB BB 3C 83 53 99 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>17 2B 04 7E BA 77 D6 26 E1 69 14 63 55 21 0C 7D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (b) Inverse S-box
of the S-box, which contains the value \{2A\}. Accordingly, the value \{95\} is mapped into the value \{2A\}.

Here is an example of the SubBytes transformation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EA</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5D</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5C</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>B0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F0</td>
<td>2D</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>C5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>87</th>
<th>F2</th>
<th>4D</th>
<th>97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>6E</td>
<td>4C</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>E7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8C</td>
<td>D8</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>A6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The S-box is constructed in the following fashion (Figure 5.6a).

(a) Calculation of byte at row \(y\), column \(x\) of S-box

(b) Calculation of byte at row \(y\), column \(x\) of IS-box

Figure 5.6 Construction of S-Box and IS-Box
1. Initialize the S-box with the byte values in ascending sequence row by row. The first row contains \([00], [01], [02], \ldots, [0F]\); the second row contains \([10], [11], \text{etc.};\) and so on. Thus, the value of the byte at row \(y\), column \(x\) is \([yx]\).

2. Map each byte in the S-box to its multiplicative inverse in the finite field \(GF(2^8)\); the value \([00]\) is mapped to itself.

3. Consider that each byte in the S-box consists of 8 bits labeled \((b_7, b_6, b_5, b_4, b_3, b_2, b_1, b_0)\). Apply the following transformation to each bit of each byte in the S-box:

\[
b_i' = b_i \oplus b_{(i+4) \text{ mod } 8} \oplus b_{(i+5) \text{ mod } 8} \oplus b_{(i+6) \text{ mod } 8} \oplus b_{(i+7) \text{ mod } 8} \oplus c_i \quad (5.1)
\]

where \(c_i\) is the \(i\)th bit of byte \(c\) with the value \([63]\); that is, \((01100011) = (01100011)\). The prime (') indicates that the variable is to be updated by the value on the right. The AES standard depicts this transformation in matrix form as follows.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 \\
  b_1 \\
  b_2 \\
  b_3 \\
  b_4 \\
  b_5 \\
  b_6 \\
  b_7 \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 \\
  b_1 \\
  b_2 \\
  b_3 \\
  b_4 \\
  b_5 \\
  b_6 \\
  b_7 \\
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (5.2)
\]

Equation (5.2) has to be interpreted carefully. In ordinary matrix multiplication, each element in the product matrix is the sum of products of the elements of one row and one column. In this case, each element in the product matrix is the bitwise XOR of products of elements of one row and one column. Furthermore, the final addition shown in Equation (5.2) is a bitwise XOR. Recall from Section 4.7 that the bitwise XOR is addition in \(GF(2^8)\).

As an example, consider the input value \([95]\). The multiplicative inverse in \(GF(2^8)\) is \([95]^{-1} = [8A]\), which is 10001010 in binary. Using Equation (5.2),

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

---

\(^4\)For a brief review of the rules of matrix and vector multiplication, refer to Appendix E.
The result is \{2A\}, which should appear in row \{09\} column \{05\} of the S-box. This is verified by checking Table 5.2a.

The **inverse substitute byte transformation**, called InvSubBytes, makes use of the inverse S-box shown in Table 5.2b. Note, for example, that the input \{2A\} produces the output \{95\}, and the input \{95\} to the S-box produces \{2A\}. The inverse S-box is constructed (Figure 5.6b) by applying the inverse of the transformation in Equation (5.1) followed by taking the multiplicative inverse in GF(2^8). The inverse transformation is

\[ b'_i = b_{(i+2) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+5) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+7) \bmod 8} \oplus d_i \]

where byte \(d = \{05\}, \text{or 00000101}\). We can depict this transformation as follows.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  b'_0 \\
  b'_1 \\
  b'_2 \\
  b'_3 \\
  b'_4 \\
  b'_5 \\
  b'_6 \\
  b'_7
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 \\
  b_1 \\
  b_2 \\
  b_3 \\
  b_4 \\
  b_5 \\
  b_6 \\
  b_7
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

To see that InvSubBytes is the inverse of SubBytes, label the matrices in SubBytes and InvSubBytes as \(X\) and \(B\), respectively, and the vector versions of constants \(c\) and \(d\) as \(C\) and \(D\), respectively. For some 8-bit vector \(B\), Equation (5.2) becomes \(B' = XB \oplus C\). We need to show that \(Y(XB \oplus C) \oplus D = B\). To multiply out, we must show \(YXB \oplus YC \oplus D = B\). This becomes

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 \\
  b_1 \\
  b_2 \\
  b_3 \\
  b_4 \\
  b_5 \\
  b_6 \\
  b_7
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
  1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  0
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
  1 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  0 \\
  1 \\
  1 \\
  0
\end{bmatrix}
\]
We have demonstrated that $Y X$ equals the identity matrix, and the $Y C = D$, so that $Y C \oplus D$ equals the null vector.

**Rationale** The S-box is designed to be resistant to known cryptanalytic attacks. Specifically, the Rijndael developers sought a design that has a low correlation between input bits and output bits and the property that the output is not a linear mathematical function of the input [DAEM01]. The nonlinearity is due to the use of the multiplicative inverse. In addition, the constant in Equation (5.1) was chosen so that the S-box has no fixed points $[S-box(a) = a]$ and no “opposite fixed points” $[S-box(a) = \overline{a}]$, where $\overline{a}$ is the bitwise complement of $a$.

Of course, the S-box must be invertible, that is, $IS-box[S-box(a)] = a$. However, the S-box does not self-inverse in the sense that it is not true that $S-box(a) = IS-box(a)$. For example, $S-box(\{95\}) = \{2A\}$, but $IS-box(\{95\}) = \{AD\}$.

### ShiftRows Transformation

**Forward and Inverse Transformations** The **forward shift row transformation**, called ShiftRows, is depicted in Figure 5.7a. The first row of State is not altered. For the second row, a 1-byte circular left shift is performed. For the third row, a 2-byte circular left shift is performed. For the fourth row, a 3-byte circular left shift is performed. The following is an example of ShiftRows.

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
b_0 \\
b_1 \\
b_2 \\
b_3 \\
b_4 \\
b_5 \\
b_6 \\
b_7 \\
\end{bmatrix}
=\begin{bmatrix}
b_0 \\
b_1 \\
b_2 \\
b_3 \\
b_4 \\
b_5 \\
b_6 \\
b_7 \\
\end{bmatrix}
$$

The **inverse shift row transformation**, called InvShiftRows, performs the circular shifts in the opposite direction for each of the last three rows, with a 1-byte circular right shift for the second row, and so on.

**Rationale** The shift row transformation is more substantial than it may first appear. This is because the State, as well as the cipher input and output, is treated as an array of four 4-byte columns. Thus, on encryption, the first 4 bytes of the plaintext are copied to the first column of State, and so on. Furthermore, as will be seen, the round key is applied to State column by column. Thus, a row shift moves an individual byte from one column to another, which is a linear...
distance of a multiple of 4 bytes. Also note that the transformation ensures that the 4 bytes of one column are spread out to four different columns. Figure 5.4 illustrates the effect.

### MixColumns Transformation

**FORWARD AND INVERSE TRANSFORMATIONS**  The **forward mix column transformation**, called MixColumns, operates on each column individually. Each byte of a column is mapped into a new value that is a function of all four bytes in that column. The transformation can be defined by the following matrix multiplication on *State* (Figure 5.7b):

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\
03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \\
\end{bmatrix} \times 
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\
s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\
s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3} \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} & s'_{0,2} & s'_{0,3} \\
s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1} & s'_{1,2} & s'_{1,3} \\
s'_{2,0} & s'_{2,1} & s'_{2,2} & s'_{2,3} \\
s'_{3,0} & s'_{3,1} & s'_{3,2} & s'_{3,3} \\
\end{bmatrix} \tag{5.3}
\]

Each element in the product matrix is the sum of products of elements of one row and one column. In this case, the individual additions and multiplications\(^5\) are performed

\(^5\)We follow the convention of FIPS PUB 197 and use the symbol • to indicate multiplication over the finite field GF(\(2^8\)) and ⊕ to indicate bitwise XOR, which corresponds to addition in GF(\(2^8\)).
in GF(2^8). The MixColumns transformation on a single column of State can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
    s'_0, j &= (2 \cdot s_{0, j}) \oplus (3 \cdot s_{1, j}) \oplus s_{2, j} \oplus s_{3, j} \\
    s'_1, j &= s_{0, j} \oplus (2 \cdot s_{1, j}) \oplus (3 \cdot s_{2, j}) \oplus s_{3, j} \\
    s'_2, j &= s_{0, j} \oplus s_{1, j} \oplus (2 \cdot s_{2, j}) \oplus (3 \cdot s_{3, j}) \\
    s'_3, j &= (3 \cdot s_{0, j}) \oplus s_{1, j} \oplus s_{2, j} \oplus (2 \cdot s_{3, j})
\end{align*}
\] (5.4)

The following is an example of MixColumns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>87</th>
<th>F2</th>
<th>4D</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>[</th>
<th>47</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>4C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6E</td>
<td>4C</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>\rightarrow</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>D4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>E7</td>
<td>4A</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>3A</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>8C</td>
<td>D8</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ED</td>
<td>A5</td>
<td>A6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us verify the first column of this example. Recall from Section 4.7 that, in GF(2^8), addition is the bitwise XOR operation and that multiplication can be performed according to the rule established in Equation (4.14). In particular, multiplication of a value by x (i.e., by [02]) can be implemented as a 1-bit left shift followed by a conditional bitwise XOR with (0001 1011) if the leftmost bit of the original value (prior to the shift) is 1. Thus, to verify the MixColumns transformation on the first column, we need to show that

\[
\begin{align*}
    (\{02\} \cdot [87]) &\oplus ([03] \cdot [6E]) \oplus [46] \oplus [A6] = [47] \\
    [87] &\oplus ([02] \cdot [6E]) \oplus ([03] \cdot [46]) \oplus [A6] = [37] \\
    ([03] \cdot [87]) &\oplus [6E] \oplus ([02] \cdot [46]) \oplus ([03] \cdot [A6]) = [94] \\
    ([03] \cdot [87]) &\oplus [6E] \oplus [46] \oplus ([02] \cdot [A6]) = [ED]
\end{align*}
\]

For the first equation, we have \([02] \cdot [87] = (0000 1110) \oplus (0001 1011) = (0001 0101)\) and \([03] \cdot [6E] = [6E] \oplus ([02] \cdot [6E]) = (0110 1110) \oplus (1101 1100) = (1011 0010).\) Then,

\[
\begin{align*}
    [02] \cdot [87] &= 0001 \ 0101 \\
    [03] \cdot [6E] &= 1011 \ 0010 \\
    [46] &= 0100 \ 0110 \\
    [A6] &= 1010 \ 0110 \\
    0100 \ 0111 &= [47]
\end{align*}
\]

The other equations can be similarly verified.

The inverse mix column transformation, called InvMixColumns, is defined by the following matrix multiplication:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\
    09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\
    0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\
    0B & 0D & 09 & 0E
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
    s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\
    s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\
    s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\
    s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3}
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
    s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} & s'_{0,2} & s'_{0,3} \\
    s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1} & s'_{1,2} & s'_{1,3} \\
    s'_{2,0} & s'_{2,1} & s'_{2,2} & s'_{2,3} \\
    s'_{3,0} & s'_{3,1} & s'_{3,2} & s'_{3,3}
\end{bmatrix}
\] (5.5)
It is not immediately clear that Equation (5.5) is the inverse of Equation (5.3). We need to show

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\
09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\
0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\
0B & 0D & 09 & 0E
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
01 & 02 & 02 & 03 \\
03 & 01 & 01 & 02
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\
s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\
s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3}
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\
s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\
s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

which is equivalent to showing

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\
09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\
0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\
0B & 0D & 09 & 0E
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
01 & 02 & 02 & 03 \\
03 & 01 & 01 & 02
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

That is, the inverse transformation matrix times the forward transformation matrix equals the identity matrix. To verify the first column of Equation (5.6), we need to show

\[
([0E] \cdot [02]) + [0B] + [0D] + ([09] \cdot [03]) = [01]
\]
\[
([09] \cdot [02]) + [0E] + [0B] + ([0D] \cdot [03]) = [00]
\]
\[
([0D] \cdot [02]) + [09] + [0E] + ([0B] \cdot [03]) = [00]
\]
\[
([0B] \cdot [02]) + [0D] + [09] + ([0E] \cdot [03]) = [00]
\]

For the first equation, we have \([0E] \cdot [02] = 00011100\) and \([09] \cdot [03] = [09] + ([09] \cdot [02]) = 00001001 + 00010010 = 00011011\). Then

\[
[0E] \cdot [02] = 00011100
\]
\[
[0B] = 00001011
\]
\[
[0D] = 00001101
\]
\[
[09] \cdot [03] = 00011011
\]
\[
00000001
\]

The other equations can be similarly verified.

The AES document describes another way of characterizing the MixColumns transformation, which is in terms of polynomial arithmetic. In the standard, MixColumns is defined by considering each column of State to be a four-term polynomial with coefficients in \(\text{GF}(2^8)\). Each column is multiplied modulo \((x^4 + 1)\) by the fixed polynomial \(a(x)\), given by

\[
a(x) = [03]x^3 + [01]x^2 + [01]x + [02]
\]

Appendix 5A demonstrates that multiplication of each column of State by \(a(x)\) can be written as the matrix multiplication of Equation (5.3). Similarly, it can be seen that the transformation in Equation (5.5) corresponds to treating
each column as a four-term polynomial and multiplying each column by $b(x)$, given by

$$b(x) = \{0B\}x^3 + \{0D\}x^2 + \{09\}x + \{0E\} \quad (5.8)$$

It readily can be shown that $b(x) = a^{-1}(x) \mod (x^4 + 1)$.

**RATIONALE** The coefficients of the matrix in Equation (5.3) are based on a linear code with maximal distance between code words, which ensures a good mixing among the bytes of each column. The mix column transformation combined with the shift row transformation ensures that after a few rounds all output bits depend on all input bits. See [DAEM99] for a discussion.

In addition, the choice of coefficients in MixColumns, which are all $\{01\}$, $\{02\}$, or $\{03\}$, was influenced by implementation considerations. As was discussed, multiplication by these coefficients involves at most a shift and an XOR. The coefficients in InvMixColumns are more formidable to implement. However, encryption was deemed more important than decryption for two reasons:

1. For the CFB and OFB cipher modes (Figures 6.5 and 6.6; described in Chapter 6), only encryption is used.
2. As with any block cipher, AES can be used to construct a message authentication code (Chapter 12), and for this, only encryption is used.

**AddRoundKey Transformation**

**FORWARD AND INVERSE TRANSFORMATIONS** In the **forward add round key transformation**, called AddRoundKey, the 128 bits of State are bitwise XORed with the 128 bits of the round key. As shown in Figure 5.5b, the operation is viewed as a columnwise operation between the 4 bytes of a State column and one word of the round key; it can also be viewed as a byte-level operation. The following is an example of AddRoundKey:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} 47 & 40 & A3 & 4C \\ 37 & D4 & 70 & 9F \\ 94 & E4 & 3A & 42 \\ ED & A5 & A6 & BC \end{array} \oplus \begin{array}{cccc} AC & 19 & 28 & 57 \\ 77 & FA & D1 & 5C \\ 66 & DC & 29 & 00 \\ F3 & 21 & 41 & 6A \end{array} = \begin{array}{cccc} EB & 59 & 8B & 1B \\ 40 & 2E & A1 & C3 \\ F2 & 38 & 13 & 42 \\ 1E & 84 & E7 & D6 \end{array}$$

The first matrix is State, and the second matrix is the round key.

The **inverse add round key transformation** is identical to the forward add round key transformation, because the XOR operation is its own inverse.

**RATIONALE** The add round key transformation is as simple as possible and affects every bit of State. The complexity of the round key expansion, plus the complexity of the other stages of AES, ensure security.

Figure 5.8 is another view of a single round of AES, emphasizing the mechanisms and inputs of each transformation.
Key Expansion Algorithm

The AES key expansion algorithm takes as input a four-word (16-byte) key and produces a linear array of 44 words (176 bytes). This is sufficient to provide a four-word round key for the initial AddRoundKey stage and each of the 10 rounds of the cipher. The pseudocode on the next page describes the expansion.

The key is copied into the first four words of the expanded key. The remainder of the expanded key is filled in four words at a time. Each added word \( w[i] \) depends on the immediately preceding word, \( w[i - 1] \), and the word four positions back, \( w[i - 4] \). In three out of four cases, a simple XOR is used. For a word whose position in the \( w \) array is a multiple of 4, a more complex function is used. Figure 5.9 illustrates the generation of the expanded key, using the symbol \( g \) to represent that complex function. The function \( g \) consists of the following subfunctions.

---

5.4 AES KEY EXPANSION

---

Figure 5.8 Inputs for Single AES Round

---

[Diagram of the AES key expansion process with subfunctions and matrices]
KeyExpansion (byte key[16], word w[44])
{
    word temp
    for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
        w[i] = (key[4*i], key[4*i+1],
                key[4*i+2],
                key[4*i+3]);

    for (i = 4; i < 44; i++)
    {
        temp = w[i - 1];
        if (i mod 4 = 0) temp = SubWord (RotWord (temp))
        \(\oplus\) Rcon[i/4];
        w[i] = w[i-4] \(\oplus\) temp
    }
}

Figure 5.9    AES Key Expansion
1. RotWord performs a one-byte circular left shift on a word. This means that an input word \([B_0, B_1, B_2, B_3]\) is transformed into \([B_1, B_2, B_3, B_0]\).

2. SubWord performs a byte substitution on each byte of its input word, using the S-box (Table 5.2a).

3. The result of steps 1 and 2 is XORed with a round constant, Rcon[j].

The round constant is a word in which the three rightmost bytes are always 0. Thus, the effect of an XOR of a word with Rcon is to only perform an XOR on the left-most byte of the word. The round constant is different for each round and is defined as Rcon[j] = (RC[j], 0, 0, 0), with RC[1] = 1, RC[j] = 2 \cdot RC[j-1] and with multiplication defined over the field GF(2^8). The values of RC[j] in hexadecimal are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>j</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC[j]</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, suppose that the round key for round 8 is

EA D2 73 21 B5 8D BA D2 31 2B F5 60 7F 8D 29 2F

Then the first 4 bytes (first column) of the round key for round 9 are calculated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i (decimal)</th>
<th>temp</th>
<th>After RotWord</th>
<th>After SubWord</th>
<th>Rcon (9)</th>
<th>After XOR with Rcon</th>
<th>w[i-4]</th>
<th>w[i] = temp \oplus w[i-4]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>7F8D292F</td>
<td>8D292F7F</td>
<td>5DA515D2</td>
<td>1B000000</td>
<td>46A515D2</td>
<td>EAD27321</td>
<td>AC7766F3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rationale

The Rijndael developers designed the expansion key algorithm to be resistant to known cryptanalytic attacks. The inclusion of a round-dependent round constant eliminates the symmetry, or similarity, between the ways in which round keys are generated in different rounds. The specific criteria that were used are [DAEM99]

- Knowledge of a part of the cipher key or round key does not enable calculation of many other round-key bits.
- An invertible transformation [i.e., knowledge of any \(N_k\) consecutive words of the expanded key enables regeneration the entire expanded key (\(N_k = key size in words\))].
- Speed on a wide range of processors.
- Usage of round constants to eliminate symmetries.
- Diffusion of cipher key differences into the round keys; that is, each key bit affects many round key bits.
- Enough nonlinearity to prohibit the full determination of round key differences from cipher key differences only.
- Simplicity of description.
5.5 / AN AES EXAMPLE

We now work through an example and consider some of its implications. Although you are not expected to duplicate the example by hand, you will find it informative to study the hex patterns that occur from one step to the next.

For this example, the plaintext is a hexadecimal palindrome. The plaintext, key, and resulting ciphertext are

Table 5.3 shows the expansion of the 16-byte key into 10 round keys. As previously explained, this process is performed word by word, with each four-byte word occupying one column of the word round-key matrix. The left-hand column shows the four round-key words generated for each round. The right-hand column shows the steps

### Results

Table 5.3 shows the expansion of the 16-byte key into 10 round keys. As previously explained, this process is performed word by word, with each four-byte word occupying one column of the word round-key matrix. The left-hand column shows the four round-key words generated for each round. The right-hand column shows the steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Words</th>
<th>Auxiliary Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>w0 = 0f 15 71 c9</td>
<td>RotWord (w3) = 7f 67 98 af = x1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w1 = 47 d9 e8 59</td>
<td>SubWord (x1) = d2 85 46 79 = y1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w2 = 0c b7 ad</td>
<td>Rcon (1) = 01 00 00 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w3 = af 7f 67 98</td>
<td>y1 ⊕ Rcon (1) = d3 85 46 79 = z1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| w4 = w0 ⊕ z1 = dc 90 37 b0 | RotWord (w7) = 81 15 a7 38 = x2 |
| w5 = w4 ⊕ w1 = 9b 49 df e9 | SubWord (x4) = 0c 59 5c 07 = y2 |
| w6 = w5 ⊕ w2 = 97 fe 72 3f | Rcon (2) = 02 00 00 00 |
| w7 = w6 ⊕ w3 = 38 81 15 a7 | y2 ⊕ Rcon (2) = 0e 59 5c 07 = z2 |

| w8 = w4 ⊕ z2 = d2 c9 6b b7 | RotWord (w11) = ff d3 c6 e6 = x3 |
| w9 = w8 ⊕ w5 = 49 80 b4 5e | SubWord (x2) = 16 66 b4 83 = y3 |
| w10 = w9 ⊕ w6 = de 7e c6 61 | Rcon (3) = 04 00 00 00 |
| w11 = w10 ⊕ w7 = e6 ff d3 c6 | y3 ⊕ Rcon (3) = 12 66 b4 8e = z3 |

| w12 = w8 ⊕ z3 = c0 af df 39 | RotWord (w15) = ae 7e c0 b1 = x4 |
| w13 = w12 ⊕ w9 = 89 2f 6b 67 | SubWord (x3) = e4 f3 ba c8 = y4 |
| w14 = w13 ⊕ w10 = 57 51 ad 06 | Rcon (4) = 08 00 00 00 |
| w15 = w14 ⊕ w11 = b1 ae 7e c0 | y4 ⊕ Rcon (4) = ec f3 ba c8 = 4 |

| Plaintext: 0123456789abcdefedcba9876543210 |
| Key: 0f1571c947d9e8590cb7add6af7f6798 |
| Ciphertext: ff0b844a0853bf7c6934ab4364148fb9 |

(Continued)
used to generate the auxiliary word used in key expansion. We begin, of course, with
the key itself serving as the round key for round 0.

Next, Table 5.4 shows the progression of State through the AES encryption
process. The first column shows the value of State at the start of a round. For the first
row, State is just the matrix arrangement of the plaintext. The second, third, and fourth
columns show the value of State for that round after the SubBytes, ShiftRows, and
MixColumns transformations, respectively. The fifth column shows the round key.
You can verify that these round keys equate with those shown in Table 5.3. The first
column shows the value of State resulting from the bitwise XOR of State after the
preceding MixColumns with the round key for the preceding round.

**Avalanche Effect**

If a small change in the key or plaintext were to produce a corresponding small
change in the ciphertext, this might be used to effectively reduce the size of the
Table 5.4  AES Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start of Round</th>
<th>After SubBytes</th>
<th>After ShiftRows</th>
<th>After MixColumns</th>
<th>Round Key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 89 fe 76</td>
<td>ab 8b 89 35</td>
<td>ab 8b 89 35</td>
<td>b9 94 57 75</td>
<td>0f 47 0c af</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 ab dc 54</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>15 d9 b7 7f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 cd ba 32</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>71 e8 ad 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 ef 98 10</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>c9 59 d6 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0e ce f2 d9</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>dc 9b 97 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 72 6b 2b</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>90 49 fe 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 25 17 55</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>37 df 72 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ae b6 4e 88</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>b0 e9 3f a7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 0f c0 4d</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>d2 49 de 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 c7 e8 d0</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>c9 80 7e ff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 ff e8 2a</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>6b b4 c6 d3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 3f ca 9c</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>b7 5e 61 c6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c 6b 05 f4</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>c0 89 57 b1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b 72 a2 6d</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>af 2f 51 ae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b4 34 31 12</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>df 6b ad 7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9a 9b 7f 94</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>39 67 06 c0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 48 5c 7d</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>2c a5 f2 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 dc da a9</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>5c 73 22 8c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 74 c7 bd</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>65 0e a3 dd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 7e 22 9c</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>36 38 9b 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f8 b4 0c 4c</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>eb 7d ed bd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 37 24 ff</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>72 ba cb 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ae a5 c1 ea</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>71 8c 83 cf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e8 21 97 bc</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>58 fd 0f 4c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 ba cb 04</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>67 37 24 ff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1e 06 d4 fa</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>ae a5 c1 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b2 20 bc 65</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>e8 21 97 bc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 6d e7 4e</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>72 ba cb 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0a 89 c1 85</td>
<td>05 40 7f f1</td>
<td>40 7f f1 05</td>
<td>e4 8e 16 51</td>
<td>1e 06 d4 fa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d9 f9 c5 e5</td>
<td>18 3f 0f fc</td>
<td>f0 fc 18 3f</td>
<td>47 20 9a 3f</td>
<td>b2 20 bc 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d8 f7 f7 fb</td>
<td>e4 4e 2f c4</td>
<td>c4 e4 4e 2f</td>
<td>c5 d6 f5 3b</td>
<td>00 6d e7 4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 7b 11 14</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b1 1a 44 17</td>
<td>db a1 f8 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>db a1 f8 77</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b1 1a 44 17</td>
<td>18 6d 8b ba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 6d 8b ba</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b1 1a 44 17</td>
<td>a8 30 08 4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a8 30 08 4e</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b1 1a 44 17</td>
<td>ff d5 d7 aa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ff d5 d7 aa</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b9 32 41 f5</td>
<td>b1 1a 44 17</td>
<td>(Continued)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
plaintext (or key) space to be searched. What is desired is the avalanche effect, in which a small change in plaintext or key produces a large change in the ciphertext.

Using the example from Table 5.4, Table 5.5 shows the result when the eighth bit of the plaintext is changed. The second column of the table shows the value of the State matrix at the end of each round for the two plaintexts. Note that after just one round, 20 bits of the State vector differ. After two rounds, close to half the bits differ. This magnitude of difference propagates through the remaining rounds. A bit difference in approximately half the positions in the most desirable outcome. Clearly, if almost all the bits are changed, this would be logically equivalent to almost none of the bits being changed. Put another way, if we select two plaintexts at random, we would expect the two plaintexts to differ in about half of the bit positions and the two ciphertexts to also differ in about half the positions.

Table 5.6 shows the change in State matrix values when the same plaintext is used and the two keys differ in the eighth bit. That is, for the second case, the key is 0e1571c947d9e8590cb7add6af7f6798. Again, one round produces a
### Table 5.5  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Number of Bits that Differ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7115262448dc747e5cdac7227da9bd9c ec093dfb7c45343d689017507d485e62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>f867aee8b437a5210c24c1974cffeabc 43efdb697244df808e8d9364ee0ae6f5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>721eb200ba06206cdb4d4bec704fa654e 7b28a5d6ed643287e006c099bb375302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0ad9d85689f9f777bc1c5f71185e5fb14 3bc2d8b6798d8ac4fe36ad891ac181a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>db18a4ffaf16d30d5f88b08777ba4eeaa 9fbb545202370280e5c4bb9e555ab4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>f91b4fbcf934cf9bf8f2f85812b084989 2026a11126b2199af7febf3f9b2d64de0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>cca104a13e678500ff59025f3babaa34 b56a0341b2290ba7dfdfbddcd8578205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ff0b844a0853bf7c6934ab43641f8fb9 612b89398d0600cde16227ce72433f0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.6  Avalanche Effect in AES: Change in Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Number of Bits that Differ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0123456789abcdefedcba9876543210 0123456789abcdefedcba9876543210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0b3634aece7225b6f26b174ed92b5588 0f3634aece7225b6f26b174ed92b5588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>657470750fc7ff3fc0e8e8ca4d02a9c c5a9a090ec7ff3fc1e8e8ca4d02a9c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5c7bb4a6b72349b05a2317ff46d1294 90905fa9563356d15f3760f3b8259985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7115262448dc747e5cdac7227da9bd9c 18ae7aa794b3b6629448d575c7cebf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>f867aee8b437a5210c24c1974cffeabc f81015ff93c98a876ae017cb49e7eec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>721eb200ba06206cdb4d4bec704fa654e 5955c91b4e769f3cb4a9476e89d5267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0ad9d85689f9f777bc1c5f71185e5fb14 dc60a24d137662181e45b8d3726b2920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>db18a4ffaf16d30d5f88b08777ba4eeaa fe8343b8f88bef66c4a7e977d005a30c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>f91b4fbcf934cf9bf8f2f85812b084989 da7dad581d725c5b72fa0f9d9d1366a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>cca104a13e678500ff59025f3babaa34 0cb4c66b4bdf912f4b511d72996345e0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ff0b844a0853bf7c6934ab4364148fb9 fc8923ee501a7d207ab67068683996b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
significant change, and the magnitude of change after all subsequent rounds is roughly half the bits. Thus, based on this example, AES exhibits a very strong avalanche effect.

Note that this avalanche effect is stronger than that for DES (Table 3.5), which requires three rounds to reach a point at which approximately half the bits are changed, both for a bit change in the plaintext and a bit change in the key.

5.6 AES IMPLEMENTATION

Equivalent Inverse Cipher
As was mentioned, the AES decryption cipher is not identical to the encryption cipher (Figure 5.3). That is, the sequence of transformations for decryption differs from that for encryption, although the form of the key schedules for encryption and decryption is the same. This has the disadvantage that two separate software or firmware modules are needed for applications that require both encryption and decryption. There is, however, an equivalent version of the decryption algorithm that has the same structure as the encryption algorithm. The equivalent version has the same sequence of transformations as the encryption algorithm (with transformations replaced by their inverses). To achieve this equivalence, a change in key schedule is needed.

Two separate changes are needed to bring the decryption structure in line with the encryption structure. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, an encryption round has the structure SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey. The standard decryption round has the structure InvShiftRows, InvSubBytes, AddRoundKey, InvMixColumns. Thus, the first two stages of the decryption round need to be interchanged, and the second two stages of the decryption round need to be interchanged.

**INTERCHANGING InvShiftRows AND InvSubBytes** InvShiftRows affects the sequence of bytes in State but does not alter byte contents and does not depend on byte contents to perform its transformation. InvSubBytes affects the contents of bytes in State but does not alter byte sequence and does not depend on byte sequence to perform its transformation. Thus, these two operations commute and can be interchanged. For a given State $S_i$,

$$\text{InvShiftRows} \left[ \text{InvSubBytes} \left( S_i \right) \right] = \text{InvSubBytes} \left[ \text{InvShiftRows} \left( S_i \right) \right]$$

**INTERCHANGING AddRoundKey AND InvMixColumns** The transformations AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns do not alter the sequence of bytes in State. If we view the key as a sequence of words, then both AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns operate on State one column at a time. These two operations are linear with respect to the column input. That is, for a given State $S_i$ and a given round key $w_j$,

$$\text{InvMixColumns} \left( S_i \oplus w_j \right) = \left[ \text{InvMixColumns} \left( S_i \right) \right] \oplus \left[ \text{InvMixColumns} \left( w_j \right) \right]$$
To see this, suppose that the first column of \textbf{State} \( S_i \) is the sequence \((y_0, y_1, y_2, y_3)\) and the first column of the round key \( w_j \) is \((k_0, k_1, k_2, k_3)\). Then we need to show

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\
09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\
0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\
0B & 0D & 09 & 0E
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
y_0 \oplus k_0 \\
y_1 \oplus k_1 \\
y_2 \oplus k_2 \\
y_3 \oplus k_3
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\
09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\
0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\
0B & 0D & 09 & 0E
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
y_0 \\
y_1 \\
y_2 \\
y_3
\end{bmatrix}
\oplus \begin{bmatrix}
k_0 \\
k_1 \\
k_2 \\
k_3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Let us demonstrate that for the first column entry. We need to show

\[
\left([0E] \cdot (y_0 \oplus k_0)\right) \oplus \left([0B] \cdot (y_1 \oplus k_1)\right) \oplus \left([0D] \cdot (y_2 \oplus k_2)\right) \oplus \left([09] \cdot (y_3 \oplus k_3)\right)
\]

This equation is valid by inspection. Thus, we can interchange AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns, provided that we first apply InvMixColumns to the round key. Note that we do not need to apply InvMixColumns to the round key for the input to the first AddRoundKey transformation (preceding the first round) nor to the last AddRoundKey transformation (in round 10). This is because these two AddRoundKey transformations are not interchanged with InvMixColumns to produce the equivalent decryption algorithm.

Figure 5.10 illustrates the equivalent decryption algorithm.

Implementation Aspects

The Rijndael proposal [DAEM99] provides some suggestions for efficient implementation on 8-bit processors, typical for current smart cards, and on 32-bit processors, typical for PCs.

\textbf{8-BIT PROCESSOR} AES can be implemented very efficiently on an 8-bit processor. AddRoundKey is a bytewise XOR operation. ShiftRows is a simple byte-shifting operation. SubBytes operates at the byte level and only requires a table of 256 bytes.

The transformation MixColumns requires matrix multiplication in the field \( \text{GF}(2^8) \), which means that all operations are carried out on bytes. MixColumns only requires multiplication by \( \{02\} \) and \( \{03\} \), which, as we have seen, involved simple shifts, conditional XORs, and XORs. This can be implemented in a more efficient way that eliminates the shifts and conditional XORs. Equation set (5.4) shows the equations for the MixColumns transformation on a single column. Using the identity \( \{03\} \cdot x = (\{02\} \cdot x) \oplus x \), we can rewrite Equation set (5.4) as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Tmp} &= s_{0,j} \oplus s_{1,j} \oplus s_{2,j} \oplus s_{3,j} \\
s'_{0,j} &= s_{0,j} \oplus \text{Tmp} \oplus [2 \cdot (s_{0,j} \oplus s_{1,j})] \\
s'_{1,j} &= s_{1,j} \oplus \text{Tmp} \oplus [2 \cdot (s_{1,j} \oplus s_{2,j})] \\
s'_{2,j} &= s_{2,j} \oplus \text{Tmp} \oplus [2 \cdot (s_{2,j} \oplus s_{3,j})] \\
s'_{3,j} &= s_{3,j} \oplus \text{Tmp} \oplus [2 \cdot (s_{3,j} \oplus s_{0,j})]
\end{align*}
\]

Equation set (5.9) is verified by expanding and eliminating terms.
The multiplication by \{02\} involves a shift and a conditional XOR. Such an implementation may be vulnerable to a timing attack of the sort described in Section 3.4. To counter this attack and to increase processing efficiency at the cost of some storage, the multiplication can be replaced by a table lookup. Define the 256-byte table \( X2 \), such that \( X2[i] = \{02\} \cdot i \). Then Equation set (5.9) can be rewritten as

\[
T_{\text{mp}} = s_{0,j} \oplus s_{1,j} \oplus s_{2,j} \oplus s_{3,j}
\]

\[
s'_{0,j} = s_{0,j} \oplus T_{\text{mp}} \oplus X2[s_{0,j} \oplus s_{1,j}]
\]

\[
s'_{1,c} = s_{1,j} \oplus T_{\text{mp}} \oplus X2[s_{1,j} \oplus s_{2,j}]
\]

\[
s'_{2,c} = s_{2,j} \oplus T_{\text{mp}} \oplus X2[s_{2,j} \oplus s_{3,j}]
\]

\[
s'_{3,j} = s_{3,j} \oplus T_{\text{mp}} \oplus X2[s_{3,j} \oplus s_{0,j}]
\]
32-Bit Processor

The implementation described in the preceding subsection uses only 8-bit operations. For a 32-bit processor, a more efficient implementation can be achieved if operations are defined on 32-bit words. To show this, we first define the four transformations of a round in algebraic form. Suppose we begin with a State matrix consisting of elements \( a_{i,j} \) and a round-key matrix consisting of elements \( k_{i,j} \). Then the transformations can be expressed as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SubBytes</th>
<th>( b_{i,j} = S[a_{i,j}] )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ShiftRows      | \[
\begin{bmatrix}
    c_{0,j} \\
    c_{1,j} \\
    c_{2,j} \\
    c_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
    b_{0,j} \\
    b_{1,j-1} \\
    b_{2,j-2} \\
    b_{3,j-3} \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] |
| MixColumns     | \[
\begin{bmatrix}
    d_{0,j} \\
    d_{1,j} \\
    d_{2,j} \\
    d_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
    02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
    01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
    01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\
    03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
    c_{0,j} \\
    c_{1,j} \\
    c_{2,j} \\
    c_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] |
| AddRoundKey    | \[
\begin{bmatrix}
    e_{0,j} \\
    e_{1,j} \\
    e_{2,j} \\
    e_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
    d_{0,j} \\
    d_{1,j} \\
    d_{2,j} \\
    d_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
    k_{0,j} \\
    k_{1,j} \\
    k_{2,j} \\
    k_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] |

In the ShiftRows equation, the column indices are taken mod 4. We can combine all of these expressions into a single equation:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    e_{0,j} \\
    e_{1,j} \\
    e_{2,j} \\
    e_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
    02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
    01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
    01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\
    03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
    S[a_{0,j}] \\
    S[a_{1,j-1}] \\
    S[a_{2,j-2}] \\
    S[a_{3,j-3}] \\
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
    k_{0,j} \\
    k_{1,j} \\
    k_{2,j} \\
    k_{3,j} \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
= \left( \begin{bmatrix}
    02 \\
    01 \\
    03 \\
\end{bmatrix} \cdot S[a_{0,j}] \right) + \left( \begin{bmatrix}
    03 \\
    02 \\
    01 \\
\end{bmatrix} \cdot S[a_{1,j-1}] \right) + \left( \begin{bmatrix}
    01 \\
    02 \\
    01 \\
\end{bmatrix} \cdot S[a_{2,j-2}] \right) + \left( \begin{bmatrix}
    01 \\
    01 \\
    03 \\
\end{bmatrix} \cdot S[a_{3,j-3}] \right)
\]

In the second equation, we are expressing the matrix multiplication as a linear combination of vectors. We define four 256-word (1024-byte) tables as follows.
Thus, each table takes as input a byte value and produces a column vector (a 32-bit word) that is a function of the S-box entry for that byte value. These tables can be calculated in advance.

We can define a round function operating on a column in the following fashion.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    s'_{0,j} \\
    s'_{1,j} \\
    s'_{2,j} \\
    s'_{3,j}
\end{bmatrix} = T_0[s_{0,j}] \oplus T_1[s_{1,j-1}] \oplus T_2[s_{2,j-2}] \oplus T_3[s_{3,j-3}] \oplus
\begin{bmatrix}
k_{0,j} \\
k_{1,j} \\
k_{2,j} \\
k_{3,j}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

As a result, an implementation based on the preceding equation requires only four table lookups and four XORs per column per round, plus 4 Kbytes to store the table. The developers of Rijndael believe that this compact, efficient implementation was probably one of the most important factors in the selection of Rijndael for AES.

### 5.7 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

The most thorough description of AES so far available is the book by the developers of AES, [DAEM02]. The authors also provide a brief description and design rationale in [DAEM01]. [LAND04] is a rigorous mathematical treatment of AES and its cryptanalysis.

Another worked-out example of AES operation, authored by instructors at Massey U., New Zealand is available at this book’s Web site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Recommended Web Sites:**

- **AES home page**: NIST’s page on AES. Contains the standard plus a number of other relevant documents.
- **The AES Lounge**: Contains a comprehensive bibliography of documents and papers on AES, with access to electronic copies.
5.8 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

| Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) | National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) | power analysis | Rijndael | S-box |

Review Questions

5.1 What was the original set of criteria used by NIST to evaluate candidate AES ciphers?
5.2 What was the final set of criteria used by NIST to evaluate candidate AES ciphers?
5.3 What is the difference between Rijndael and AES?
5.4 What is the purpose of the State array?
5.5 How is the S-box constructed?
5.6 Briefly describe SubBytes.
5.7 Briefly describe ShiftRows.
5.8 How many bytes in State are affected by ShiftRows?
5.9 Briefly describe MixColumns.
5.10 Briefly describe AddRoundKey.
5.11 Briefly describe the key expansion algorithm.
5.12 What is the difference between SubBytes and SubWord?
5.13 What is the difference between ShiftRows and RotWord?
5.14 What is the difference between the AES decryption algorithm and the equivalent inverse cipher?

Problems

5.1 In the discussion of MixColumns and InvMixColumns, it was stated that

\[ b(x) = a^{-1}(x) \mod (x^4 + 1) \]

where \( a(x) = \{03\}x^3 + \{01\}x^2 + \{01\}x + \{02\} \) and \( b(x) = \{0B\}x^3 + \{0D\}x^2 + \{09\}x + \{0E\} \). Show that this is true.
5.2 a. What is \( \{01\}^{-1} \) in GF(2^5)?
    b. Verify the entry for \( \{01\} \) in the S-box.
5.3 Show the first eight words of the key expansion for a 128-bit key of all zeros.
5.4 Given the plaintext \{000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F\} and the key \{01010101010101010101010101010101\}:
   a. Show the original contents of State, displayed as a 4 × 4 matrix.
   b. Show the value of State after initial AddRoundKey.
   c. Show the value of State after SubBytes.
   d. Show the value of State after ShiftRows.
   e. Show the value of State after MixColumns.
5.5 Verify Equation (5.11). That is, show that \( x^i \mod (x^4 + 1) = x^{i \mod 4} \).
5.6 Compare AES to DES. For each of the following elements of DES, indicate the comparable element in AES or explain why it is not needed in AES.
   a. XOR of subkey material with the input to the f function
   b. XOR of the f function output with the left half of the block
   c. f function
5.7 In the subsection on implementation aspects, it is mentioned that the use of tables helps thwart timing attacks. Suggest an alternative technique.

5.8 In the subsection on implementation aspects, a single algebraic equation is developed that describes the four stages of a typical round of the encryption algorithm. Provide the equivalent equation for the tenth round.

5.9 Compute the output of the MixColumns transformation for the following sequence of input bytes “67 89 AB CD”. Apply the InvMixColumns transformation to the obtained result to verify your calculations. Change the first byte of the input from ‘67’ to ‘77’, perform the MixColumns transformation again for the new input, and determine how many bits have changed in the output.

Note: You can perform all calculations by hand or write a program supporting these computations. If you choose to write a program, it should be written entirely by you; no use of libraries or public domain source code is allowed in this assignment.

5.10 Use the key 1010 0111 0011 1011 to encrypt the plaintext “ok” as expressed in ASCII as 0110 1111 0110 1011. The designers of S-AES got the ciphertext 0000 0111 0011 1000. Do you?

5.11 Show that the matrix given here, with entries in GF(2^4), is the inverse of the matrix used in the MixColumns step of S-AES.

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
    x^3 + 1 & x \\
    x & x^3 + 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

5.12 Carefully write up a complete decryption of the ciphertext 0000 0111 0011 1000 using the key 1010 0111 0011 1011 and the S-AES algorithm. You should get the plaintext we started with in Problem 5.10. Note that the inverse of the S-boxes can be done with a reverse table lookup. The inverse of the MixColumns step is given by the matrix in the previous problem.

5.13 Demonstrate that Equation (5.9) is equivalent to Equation (5.4).

Programming Problems

5.14 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt using S-AES. Test data: A binary plaintext of 0110 1111 0110 1011 encrypted with a binary key of 1010 0111 0011 1011 should give a binary ciphertext of 0000 0111 0011 1000. Decryption should work correspondingly.

5.15 Implement a differential cryptanalysis attack on 1-round S-AES.

APPENDIX 5A  POLYNOMIALS WITH COEFFICIENTS IN GF(2^8)

In Section 4.5, we discussed polynomial arithmetic in which the coefficients are in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) and the polynomials are defined modulo a polynomial \( M(x) \) whose highest power is some integer \( n \). In this case, addition and multiplication of coefficients occurred within the field \( \mathbb{Z}_p \); that is, addition and multiplication were performed modulo \( p \).

The AES document defines polynomial arithmetic for polynomials of degree 3 or less with coefficients in GF(2^8). The following rules apply.

1. Addition is performed by adding corresponding coefficients in GF(2^8). As was pointed out Section 4.5, if we treat the elements of GF(2^8) as 8-bit strings, then addition is equivalent to the XOR operation. So, if we have

\[
a(x) = a_3x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_1x + a_0
\]

\[
b(x) = b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0
\]

\[
a(x) + b(x) = (a_3 + b_3)x^3 + (a_2 + b_2)x^2 + (a_1 + b_1)x + (a_0 + b_0)
\]

The polynomial addition is equivalent to the XOR operation on the corresponding coefficients.

[Note: Additional rules and examples are provided in the appendix, but they are not included here for brevity.]
and
\[ b(x) = b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0 \]  

(5.11)

then
\[ a(x) + b(x) = (a_3 \oplus b_3)x^3 + (a_2 \oplus b_2)x^2 + (a_1 \oplus b_1)x + (a_0 \oplus b_0) \]

2. Multiplication is performed as in ordinary polynomial multiplication with two refinements:
   a. Coefficients are multiplied in \( \text{GF}(2^8) \).
   b. The resulting polynomial is reduced \( \text{mod} (x^4 + 1) \).

We need to keep straight which polynomial we are talking about. Recall from Section 4.6 that each element of \( \text{GF}(2^8) \) is a polynomial of degree 7 or less with binary coefficients, and multiplication is carried out modulo a polynomial of degree 8. Equivalently, each element of \( \text{GF}(2^8) \) can be viewed as an 8-bit byte whose bit values correspond to the binary coefficients of the corresponding polynomial. For the sets defined in this section, we are defining a polynomial ring in which each element of this ring is a polynomial of degree 3 or less with coefficients in \( \text{GF}(2^8) \), and multiplication is carried out modulo a polynomial of degree 4. Equivalently, each element of this ring can be viewed as a 4-byte word whose byte values are elements of \( \text{GF}(2^8) \) that correspond to the 8-bit coefficients of the corresponding polynomial.

We denote the modular product of \( a(x) \) and \( b(x) \) by \( a(x) \otimes b(x) \). To compute \( d(x) = a(x) \otimes b(x) \), the first step is to perform a multiplication without the modulo operation and to collect coefficients of like powers. Let us express this as \( c(x) = a(x) \times b(x) \). Then
\[ c(x) = c_6x^6 + c_5x^5 + c_4x^4 + c_3x^3 + c_2x^2 + c_1x + c_0 \]  

(5.12)

where
\[
\begin{align*}
c_0 & = a_0 \cdot b_0 & c_4 & = (a_3 \cdot b_1) \oplus (a_2 \cdot b_2) \oplus (a_1 \cdot b_3) \\
c_1 & = (a_1 \cdot b_0) \oplus (a_0 \cdot b_1) & c_5 & = (a_3 \cdot b_2) \oplus (a_2 \cdot b_3) \\
c_2 & = (a_2 \cdot b_0) \oplus (a_1 \cdot b_1) \oplus (a_0 \cdot b_2) & c_6 & = a_3 \cdot b_3 \\
c_3 & = (a_3 \cdot b_0) \oplus (a_2 \cdot b_1) \oplus (a_1 \cdot b_2) \oplus (a_0 \cdot b_3)
\end{align*}
\]

The final step is to perform the modulo operation
\[ d(x) = c(x) \mod (x^4 + 1) \]

That is, \( d(x) \) must satisfy the equation
\[ c(x) = [(x^4 + 1) \times q(x)] \oplus d(x) \]

such that the degree of \( d(x) \) is 3 or less.

A practical technique for performing multiplication over this polynomial ring is based on the observation that
\[ x^i \mod (x^4 + 1) = x^i \mod 4 \]  

(5.13)
If we now combine Equations (5.12) and (5.13), we end up with
\[ d(x) = c(x) \mod (x^4 + 1) \]
\[ = [c_6 x^6 + c_5 x^5 + c_4 x^4 + c_3 x^3 + c_2 x^2 + c_1 x + c_0] \mod (x^4 + 1) \]
\[ = c_3 x^3 + (c_2 + c_6)x^2 + (c_1 + c_5)x + (c_0 + c_4) \]

Expanding the \( c_i \) coefficients, we have the following equations for the coefficients of \( d(x) \).

\[ d_0 = (a_0 \cdot b_0) + (a_3 \cdot b_1) + (a_2 \cdot b_2) + (a_1 \cdot b_3) \]
\[ d_1 = (a_1 \cdot b_0) + (a_0 \cdot b_1) + (a_3 \cdot b_2) + (a_2 \cdot b_3) \]
\[ d_2 = (a_2 \cdot b_0) + (a_1 \cdot b_1) + (a_0 \cdot b_2) + (a_3 \cdot b_3) \]
\[ d_3 = (a_3 \cdot b_0) + (a_2 \cdot b_1) + (a_1 \cdot b_2) + (a_0 \cdot b_3) \]

This can be written in matrix form:
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  d_0 \\
  d_1 \\
  d_2 \\
  d_3
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
  a_0 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 \\
  a_1 & a_0 & a_3 & a_2 \\
  a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & a_3 \\
  a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 \\
  b_1 \\
  b_2 \\
  b_3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

(5.14)

**MixColumns Transformation**

In the discussion of MixColumns, it was stated that there were two equivalent ways of defining the transformation. The first is the matrix multiplication shown in Equation (5.3), which is repeated here:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
  01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
  01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\
  03 & 01 & 01 & 02
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\
  s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\
  s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\
  s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3}
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
  s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} & s'_{0,2} & s'_{0,3} \\
  s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1} & s'_{1,2} & s'_{1,3} \\
  s'_{2,0} & s'_{2,1} & s'_{2,2} & s'_{2,3} \\
  s'_{3,0} & s'_{3,1} & s'_{3,2} & s'_{3,3}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The second method is to treat each column of **State** as a four-term polynomial with coefficients in GF(2^8). Each column is multiplied modulo \((x^4 + 1)\) by the fixed polynomial \(a(x)\), given by

\[ a(x) = \{03\}x^3 + \{01\}x^2 + \{01\}x + \{02\} \]

From Equation (5.10), we have \(a_3 = \{03\}; a_2 = \{01\}; a_1 = \{01\}; \text{ and } a_0 = \{02\}. \) For the \( j \)th column of **State**, we have the polynomial \(\text{col}_j(x) = s_{3,j}x^3 + s_{2,j}x^2 + s_{1,j}x + s_{0,j} \). Substituting into Equation (5.14), we can express \( d(x) = a(x) \times \text{col}_j(x) \) as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  d_0 \\
  d_1 \\
  d_2 \\
  d_3
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
  a_0 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 \\
  a_1 & a_0 & a_3 & a_2 \\
  a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & a_3 \\
  a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  s_{0,j} \\
  s_{1,j} \\
  s_{2,j} \\
  s_{3,j}
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
  02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\
  01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\
  01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\
  03 & 01 & 01 & 02
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  s_{0,j} \\
  s_{1,j} \\
  s_{2,j} \\
  s_{3,j}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

which is equivalent to Equation (5.3).
Multiplication by x

Consider the multiplication of a polynomial in the ring by \( x \): \( c(x) = x \oplus b(x) \). We have

\[
c(x) = x \otimes b(x) = [x \times (b_3 x^3 + b_2 x^2 + b_1 x + b_0)] \mod (x^4 + 1)
= (b_3 x^4 + b_2 x^3 + b_1 x^2 + b_0 x) \mod (x^4 + 1)
= b_2 x^3 + b_1 x^2 + b_0 x + b_3
\]

Thus, multiplication by \( x \) corresponds to a 1-byte circular left shift of the 4 bytes in the word representing the polynomial. If we represent the polynomial as a 4-byte column vector, then we have

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
c_0 \\
c_1 \\
c_2 \\
c_3 \\
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
00 & 00 & 00 & 01 \\
01 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\
00 & 01 & 00 & 00 \\
00 & 00 & 01 & 00 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
b_0 \\
b_1 \\
b_2 \\
b_3 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

**APPENDIX 5B  SIMPLIFIED AES**

Simplified AES (S-AES) was developed by Professor Edward Schaefer of Santa Clara University and several of his students [MUSA03]. It is an educational rather than a secure encryption algorithm. It has similar properties and structure to AES with much smaller parameters. The reader might find it useful to work through an example by hand while following the discussion in this appendix. A good grasp of S-AES will make it easier for the student to appreciate the structure and workings of AES.

**Overview**

Figure 5.11 illustrates the overall structure of S-AES. The encryption algorithm takes a 16-bit block of plaintext as input and a 16-bit key and produces a 16-bit block of ciphertext as output. The S-AES decryption algorithm takes an 16-bit block of ciphertext and the same 16-bit key used to produce that ciphertext as input and produces the original 16-bit block of plaintext as output.

The encryption algorithm involves the use of four different functions, or transformations: add key \( (A_K) \), nibble substitution (NS), shift row (SR), and mix column (MC), whose operation is explained subsequently.

We can concisely express the encryption algorithm as a composition\(^6\) of functions:

\[
A_{K_2} \circ SR \circ NS \circ A_{K_1} \circ MC \circ SR \circ NS \circ A_{K_0}
\]

so that \( A_{K_0} \) is applied first.

The encryption algorithm is organized into three rounds. Round 0 is simply an add key round; round 1 is a full round of four functions; and round 2 contains only 3 functions. Each round includes the add key function, which makes use of 16 bits of key. The initial 16-bit key is expanded to 48 bits, so that each round uses a distinct 16-bit round key.

---

\(^6\) **Definition:** If \( f \) and \( g \) are two functions, then the function \( F \) with the equation \( y = F(x) = g[f(x)] \) is called the composition of \( f \) and \( g \) and is denoted as \( F = g \circ f \).
Each function operates on a 16-bit state, treated as a $2 \times 2$ matrix of nibbles, where one nibble equals 4 bits. The initial value of the State matrix is the 16-bit plaintext; State is modified by each subsequent function in the encryption process, producing after the last function the 16-bit ciphertext. As Figure 5.12a shows, the ordering of nibbles within the matrix is by column. So, for example, the first 8 bits of a 16-bit

![Diagram of S-AES Encryption and Decryption]

**Figure 5.11** S-AES Encryption and Decryption

![Diagram of Bit representation and Nibble representation]

(a) State matrix

![Diagram of Bit representation and Byte representation]

(b) Key

**Figure 5.12** S-AES Data Structures
plaintext input to the encryption cipher occupy the first column of the matrix, and the second 8 bits occupy the second column. The 16-bit key is similarly organized, but it is somewhat more convenient to view the key as two bytes rather than four nibbles (Figure 5.12b). The expanded key of 48 bits is treated as three round keys, whose bits are labeled as follows: $K_0 = k_0 \ldots k_{15}; K_1 = k_{16} \ldots k_{31};$ and $K_2 = k_{32} \ldots k_{47}$.

Figure 5.13 shows the essential elements of a full round of S-AES.

Decryption is also shown in Figure 5.11 and is essentially the reverse of encryption:

$$A_{K_0} \circ \text{INS} \circ \text{ISR} \circ \text{IMC} \circ A_{K_1} \circ \text{INS} \circ \text{ISR} \circ A_{K_2}$$

in which three of the functions have a corresponding inverse function: inverse nibble substitution (INS), inverse shift row (ISR), and inverse mix column (IMC).

**S-AES Encryption and Decryption**

We now look at the individual functions that are part of the encryption algorithm.

**ADD KEY** The add key function consists of the bitwise XOR of the 16-bit State matrix and the 16-bit round key. Figure 5.14 depicts this as a columnwise operation, but it can also be viewed as a nibble-wise or bitwise operation. The following is an example.

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
A & 4 \\
7 & 9 \\
\end{array} \oplus \begin{array}{c|c}
2 & 5 \\
D & 5 \\
\end{array} = \begin{array}{c|c}
8 & 1 \\
A & C \\
\end{array}$$

The inverse of the add key function is identical to the add key function, because the XOR operation is its own inverse.

**NIBBLE SUBSTITUTION** The nibble substitution function is a simple table lookup (Figure 5.14). AES defines a $4 \times 4$ matrix of nibble values, called an S-box (Table 5.7a), that contains a permutation of all possible 4-bit values. Each individual nibble of State is mapped into a new nibble in the following way: The leftmost 2 bits of the nibble are used as a row value, and the rightmost 2 bits are used as a column value. These row and column values serve as indexes into the S-box to select a unique 4-bit output value. For example, the hexadecimal value A references row 2, column 2 of the S-box, which contains the value 0. Accordingly, the value A is mapped into the value 0.

Here is an example of the nibble substitution transformation.

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
8 & 1 \\
A & C \\
\end{array} \rightarrow \begin{array}{c|c}
6 & 4 \\
0 & C \\
\end{array}$$

The inverse nibble substitution function makes use of the inverse S-box shown in Table 5.7b. Note, for example, that the input 0 produces the output A, and the input A to the S-box produces 0.

**SHIFT ROW** The shift row function performs a one-nibble circular shift of the second row of State the first row is not altered (Figure 5.14). The following is an example.

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
6 & 4 \\
0 & C \\
\end{array} \rightarrow \begin{array}{c|c}
6 & 4 \\
C & 0 \\
\end{array}$$
Figure 5.13  S-AES Encryption Round
The inverse shift row function is identical to the shift row function, because it shifts the second row back to its original position.

**Mix Column** The mix column function operates on each column individually. Each nibble of a column is mapped into a new value that is a function of both

---

**Table 5.7 S-AES S-Boxes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$i$</th>
<th>$j$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) S-Box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$i$</th>
<th>$j$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Inverse S-Box

*Note: Hexadecimal numbers in shaded boxes; binary numbers in unshaded boxes.*
nibbles in that column. The transformation can be defined by the following matrix multiplication on \textbf{State} (Figure 5.14):

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 4 \\
4 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} \\
s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Performing the matrix multiplication, we get

\[
\begin{align*}
S'_{0,0} &= S_{0,0} \oplus (4 \cdot S_{1,0}) \\
S'_{1,0} &= (4 \cdot S_{0,0}) \oplus S_{1,0} \\
S'_{0,1} &= S_{0,1} \oplus (4 \cdot S_{1,1}) \\
S'_{1,1} &= (4 \cdot S_{0,1}) \oplus S_{1,1}
\end{align*}
\]

Where arithmetic is performed in \(\text{GF}(2^4)\), and the symbol \(\cdot\) refers to multiplication in \(\text{GF}(2^4)\). Appendix I provides the addition and multiplication tables. The following is an example.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 4 \\
4 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
6 & 4 \\
0 & C
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
3 & 4 \\
7 & 3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The inverse mix column function is defined as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
9 & 2 \\
2 & 9
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} \\
s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We demonstrate that we have indeed defined the inverse in the following fashion.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
9 & 2 \\
2 & 9
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 4 \\
4 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 \\
0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} \\
s_{1,0} & s_{1,1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The preceding matrix multiplication makes use of the following results in \(\text{GF}(2^4)\): \(9 + (2 \cdot 4) = 9 + 8 = 1\) and \((9 \cdot 4) + 2 = 2 + 2 = 0\). These operations can be verified using the arithmetic tables in Appendix I or by polynomial arithmetic.

The mix column function is the most difficult to visualize. Accordingly, we provide an additional perspective on it in Appendix I.

\textbf{Key Expansion} For key expansion, the 16 bits of the initial key are grouped into a row of two 8-bit words. Figure 5.15 shows the expansion into six words, by the calculation of four new words from the initial two words. The algorithm is

\[
\begin{align*}
w_2 &= w_0 \oplus g(w_1) = w_0 \oplus \text{Rcon}(1) \oplus \text{SubNib} (\text{RotNib}(w_1)) \\
w_3 &= w_2 \oplus w_1 \\
w_4 &= w_2 \oplus g(w_3) = w_2 \oplus \text{Rcon}(2) \oplus \text{SubNib} (\text{RotNib}(w_3)) \\
w_5 &= w_4 \oplus w_3
\end{align*}
\]

\text{Rcon} is a round constant, defined as follows: \(\text{RC}[i] = x^{i+2}\), so that \(\text{RC}[1] = x^3 = 1000\) and \(\text{RC}[2] = x^4 \mod (x^4 + x + 1) = x + 1 = 0011\). \(\text{RC}[i]\) forms the leftmost nibble of a byte, with the rightmost nibble being all zeros. Thus, \(\text{Rcon}(1) = 10000000\) and \(\text{Rcon}(2) = 00110000\).

For example, suppose the key is 2D55 = 0010 1101 0101 0101 = \(w_0 w_1\). Then
The S-Box

The S-box is constructed as follows:

1. Initialize the S-box with the nibble values in ascending sequence row by row. The first row contains the hexadecimal values \(0, 1, 2, 3\); the second row contains \(4, 5, 6, 7\); and so on. Thus, the value of the nibble at row \(i\), column \(j\) is \(4i + j\).

\[
\begin{align*}
w_2 & = 00101101 \oplus 10000000 \oplus \text{SubNib}(01010101) \\
& = 00101101 \oplus 10000000 \oplus 00010001 = 10111100 \\
w_3 & = 10111100 \oplus 01010101 = 11101001 \\
w_4 & = 10111100 \oplus 00110000 \oplus \text{SubNib}(10011110) \\
& = 10111100 \oplus 00110000 \oplus 00101111 = 10100011 \\
w_5 & = 10100011 \oplus 11101001 = 01001010
\end{align*}
\]
2. Treat each nibble as an element of the finite field \((2^4)\) modulo \(x^4 + x + 1\). Each nibble \(a_0\) to \(a_3\) represents a polynomial of degree 3.

3. Map each byte in the S-box to its multiplicative inverse in the finite field \(GF(2^4)\) modulo \(x^4 + x + 1\); the value 0 is mapped to itself.

4. Consider that each byte in the S-box consists of 4 bits labeled \(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3\). Apply the following transformation to each bit of each byte in the S-box. The AES standard depicts this transformation in matrix form as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    b'_0 \\
    b'_1 \\
    b'_2 \\
    b'_3
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
    1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
    1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
    1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
    0 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
    b_0 \\
    b_1 \\
    b_2 \\
    b_3
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
    1 \\
    0 \\
    0 \\
    1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

5. The prime (') indicates that the variable is to be updated by the value on the right. Remember that addition and multiplication are being calculated modulo 2.

Table 5.7a shows the resulting S-box. This is a nonlinear, invertible matrix. The inverse S-box is shown in Table 5.7b.

**S-AES Structure**

We can now examine several aspects of interest concerning the structure of AES. First, note that the encryption and decryption algorithms begin and end with the add key function. Any other function, at the beginning or end, is easily reversible without knowledge of the key and so would add no security but just a processing overhead. Thus, there is a round 0 consisting of only the add key function.

The second point to note is that round 2 does not include the mix column function. The explanation for this in fact relates to a third observation, which is that although the decryption algorithm is the reverse of the encryption algorithm, as clearly seen in Figure 5.11, it does not follow the same sequence of functions. Thus,

Encryption: \(A_{K_2} \circ SR \circ NS \circ A_{K_1} \circ MC \circ SR \circ NS \circ A_{K_0}\)

Decryption: \(A_{K_0} \circ INS \circ ISR \circ IMC \circ A_{K_1} \circ INS \circ ISR \circ A_{K_2}\)

From an implementation point of view, it would be desirable to have the decryption function follow the same function sequence as encryption. This allows the decryption algorithm to be implemented in the same way as the encryption algorithm, creating opportunities for efficiency.

Note that if we were able to interchange the second and third functions, the fourth and fifth functions, and the sixth and seventh functions in the decryption sequence, we would have the same structure as the encryption algorithm. Let’s see if this is possible. First, consider the interchange of INS and ISR. Given a state \(N\) consisting of the nibbles \((N_0, N_1, N_2, N_3)\), the transformation \(INS(ISR(N))\) proceeds as

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
    N_0 \\
    N_1 \\
    N_2 \\
    N_3
\end{pmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{pmatrix}
    N_0 \\
    N_1 \\
    N_2 \\
    N_3
\end{pmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{pmatrix}
    IS[N_0] \\
    IS[N_1] \\
    IS[N_2] \\
    IS[N_3]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Where IS refers to the inverse S-Box. Reversing the operations, the transformation \(ISR(INS(N))\) proceeds as
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
N_0 & N_2 \\
N_1 & N_3
\end{pmatrix}
\rightarrow
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{IS}[N_0] & \text{IS}[N_2] \\
\text{IS}[N_1] & \text{IS}[N_3]
\end{pmatrix}
\rightarrow
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{IS}[N_0] & \text{IS}[N_2] \\
\text{IS}[N_3] & \text{IS}[N_1]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

which is the same result. Thus, \(\text{INS}(\text{ISR}(N)) = \text{ISR}(\text{INS}(N))\).

Now consider the operation of inverse mix column followed by add key
\(\text{IMC}(A_{K_1}(N))\) where the round key \(K_1\) consists of the nibbles \((k_{0,0}, k_{1,0}, k_{0,1}, k_{1,1})\).
Then
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
k_0,0 & k_0,1 \\
k_{1,0} & k_{1,1}
\end{pmatrix}
\oplus
\begin{pmatrix}
N_0 & N_2 \\
N_1 & N_3
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
k_0,0 \oplus N_0 & k_0,1 \oplus N_2 \\
k_{1,0} \oplus N_1 & k_{1,1} \oplus N_3
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
9(k_{0,0} \oplus N_0) + 2(K_{1,0} \oplus N_1) & 9(k_{0,1} \oplus N_2) + 2(K_{1,1} \oplus N_3) \\
2(k_{0,0} \oplus N_0) + 9(K_{1,0} \oplus N_1) & 2(k_{0,1} \oplus N_2) + 9(K_{1,1} \oplus N_3)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
9k_{0,0} + 2k_{1,0} + (9N_0 + 2N_1) & 9k_{0,1} + 2k_{1,1} + (9N_2 + 2N_3) \\
2k_{0,0} + 9k_{1,0} + (2N_0 + 9N_1) & 2k_{0,1} + 9k_{1,1} + (2N_2 + 9N_3)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

All of these steps make use of the properties of finite field arithmetic. The result
is that \(\text{IMC}(A_{K_1}(N)) = \text{IMC}(K_1) \oplus \text{IMC}(N)\). Now let us define the inverse round
key for round 1 to be \(\text{IMC}(K_1)\) and the inverse add key operation \(\text{IA}_{K_1}\) to be the
bitwise XOR of the inverse round key with the state vector. Then we have
\(\text{IMC}(A_{K_1}(N)) = \text{IA}_{K_1}(\text{IMC}(N))\). As a result, we can write the following:

**Encryption:** \(A_{K_2} \circ \text{SR} \circ \text{NS} \circ A_{K_1} \circ \text{MC} \circ \text{SR} \circ \text{NS} \circ A_{K_0}\)

**Decryption:** \(A_{K_0} \circ \text{INS} \circ \text{ISR} \circ \text{IMC} \circ A_{K_1} \circ \text{INS} \circ \text{ISR} \circ A_{K_2}\)

Both encryption and decryption now follow the same sequence. Note that this
derivation would not work as effectively if round 2 of the encryption algorithm
included the MC function. In that case, we would have

**Encryption:** \(A_{K_2} \circ \text{MC} \circ \text{SR} \circ \text{NS} \circ A_{K_1} \circ \text{MC} \circ \text{SR} \circ \text{NS} \circ A_{K_0}\)

**Decryption:** \(A_{K_0} \circ \text{INS} \circ \text{ISR} \circ \text{IMC} \circ A_{K_1} \circ \text{INS} \circ \text{ISR} \circ \text{IMC} \circ A_{K_2}\)

There is now no way to interchange pairs of operations in the decryption algo-
rithm so as to achieve the same structure as the encryption algorithm.
CHAPTER 6

BLOCK CIPHER OPERATION

6.1 Multiple Encryption and Triple DES
    - Double DES
    - Triple DES with Two Keys
    - Triple DES with Three Keys

6.2 Electronic Code Book

6.3 Cipher Block Chaining Mode

6.4 Cipher Feedback Mode

6.5 Output Feedback Mode

6.6 Counter Mode

6.7 XTS-AES Mode for Block-Oriented Storage Devices
    - Storage Encryption Requirements
    - Operation on a Single Block
    - Operation on a Sector

6.8 Recommended Web Site

6.9 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
Many savages at the present day regard their names as vital parts of themselves, and therefore take great pains to conceal their real names, lest these should give to evil-disposed persons a handle by which to injure their owners.

—*The Golden Bough*, Sir James George Frazer

### KEY POINTS

- **Multiple encryption** is a technique in which an encryption algorithm is used multiple times. In the first instance, plaintext is converted to ciphertext using the encryption algorithm. This ciphertext is then used as input and the algorithm is applied again. This process may be repeated through any number of stages.

- **Triple DES** makes use of three stages of the DES algorithm, using a total of two or three distinct keys.

- A mode of operation is a technique for enhancing the effect of a cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for an application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of data blocks or a data stream.

- Five modes of operation have been standardized by NIST for use with symmetric block ciphers such as DES and AES: electronic codebook mode, cipher block chaining mode, cipher feedback mode, output feedback mode, and counter mode.

- Another important mode, XTS-AES, has been standardized by the IEEE Security in Storage Working Group (P1619). The standard describes a method of encryption for data stored in sector-based devices where the threat model includes possible access to stored data by the adversary.

This chapter continues our discussion of symmetric ciphers. We begin with the topic of multiple encryption, looking in particular at the most widely used multiple-encryption scheme: triple DES.

The chapter next turns to the subject of block cipher modes of operation. We find that there are a number of different ways to apply a block cipher to plaintext, each with its own advantages and particular applications.

### 6.1 MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION AND TRIPLE DES

Given the potential vulnerability of DES to a brute-force attack, there has been considerable interest in finding an alternative. One approach is to design a completely new algorithm, of which AES is a prime example. Another alternative, which would preserve the existing investment in software and equipment, is to use multiple encryption with DES and multiple keys. We begin by examining the
simplest example of this second alternative. We then look at the widely accepted triple DES (3DES) approach.

**Double DES**

The simplest form of multiple encryption has two encryption stages and two keys (Figure 6.1a). Given a plaintext $P$ and two encryption keys $K_1$ and $K_2$, ciphertext $C$ is generated as

$$C = E(K_2, E(K_1, P))$$

Decryption requires that the keys be applied in reverse order:

$$P = D(K_1, D(K_2, C))$$

For DES, this scheme apparently involves a key length of $56 \times 2 = 112$ bits, resulting in a dramatic increase in cryptographic strength. But we need to examine the algorithm more closely.

![Multiple Encryption Diagram](image-url)

*Figure 6.1 Multiple Encryption*
Suppose it were true for DES, for all 56-bit key values, that given any two keys $K_1$ and $K_2$, it would be possible to find a key $K_3$ such that

$$E(K_2, E(K_1, P)) = E(K_3, P) \quad (6.1)$$

If this were the case, then double encryption, and indeed any number of stages of multiple encryption with DES, would be useless because the result would be equivalent to a single encryption with a single 56-bit key.

On the face of it, it does not appear that Equation (6.1) is likely to hold. Consider that encryption with DES is a mapping of 64-bit blocks to 64-bit blocks. In fact, the mapping can be viewed as a permutation. That is, if we consider all $2^{64}$ possible input blocks, DES encryption with a specific key will map each block into a unique 64-bit block. Otherwise, if, say, two given input blocks mapped to the same output block, then decryption to recover the original plaintext would be impossible. With $2^{64}$ possible inputs, how many different mappings are there that generate a permutation of the input blocks? The value is easily seen to be

$$(2^{64})! = 10^{34738000000000000000000} > (10^{10^20})$$

On the other hand, DES defines one mapping for each different key, for a total number of mappings:

$$2^{56} < 10^{17}$$

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if DES is used twice with different keys, it will produce one of the many mappings that are not defined by a single application of DES. Although there was much supporting evidence for this assumption, it was not until 1992 that the assumption was proven [CAMP92].

Thus, the use of double DES results in a mapping that is not equivalent to a single DES encryption. But there is a way to attack this scheme, one that does not depend on any particular property of DES but that will work against any block encryption cipher.

The algorithm, known as a meet-in-the-middle attack, was first described in [DIFF77]. It is based on the observation that, if we have

$$C = E(K_2, E(K_1, P))$$

then (see Figure 6.1a)

$$X = E(K_1, P) = D(K_2, C)$$

Given a known pair, $(P, C)$, the attack proceeds as follows. First, encrypt $P$ for all $2^{56}$ possible values of $K_1$. Store these results in a table and then sort the table by the values of $X$. Next, decrypt $C$ using all $2^{56}$ possible values of $K_2$. As each decryption is produced, check the result against the table for a match. If a match occurs, then test the two resulting keys against a new known plaintext–ciphertext pair. If the two keys produce the correct ciphertext, accept them as the correct keys.

For any given plaintext $P$, there are $2^{64}$ possible ciphertext values that could be produced by double DES. Double DES uses, in effect, a 112-bit key, so that
there are $2^{112}$ possible keys. Therefore, on average, for a given plaintext $P$, the number of different 112-bit keys that will produce a given ciphertext $C$ is $2^{112}/2^{64} = 2^{48}$. Thus, the foregoing procedure will produce about $2^{48}$ false alarms on the first $(P, C)$ pair. A similar argument indicates that with an additional 64 bits of known plaintext and ciphertext, the false alarm rate is reduced to $2^{48-64} = 2^{-16}$. Put another way, if the meet-in-the-middle attack is performed on two blocks of known plaintext–ciphertext, the probability that the correct keys are determined is $1 - 2^{-16}$. The result is that a known plaintext attack will succeed against double DES, which has a key size of 112 bits, with an effort on the order of $2^{56}$, which is not much more than the $2^{55}$ required for single DES.

**Triple DES with Two Keys**

An obvious counter to the meet-in-the-middle attack is to use three stages of encryption with three different keys. This raises the cost of the meet-in-the-middle attack to $2^{112}$, which is beyond what is practical now and far into the future. However, it has the drawback of requiring a key length of $56 \times 3 = 168$ bits, which may be somewhat unwieldy.

As an alternative, Tuchman proposed a triple encryption method that uses only two keys [TUCH79]. The function follows an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt (EDE) sequence (Figure 6.1b):

$$
C = E(K_1, D(K_2, E(K_1, P))) \\
P = D(K_1, E(K_2, D(K_1, C)))
$$

There is no cryptographic significance to the use of decryption for the second stage. Its only advantage is that it allows users of 3DES to decrypt data encrypted by users of the older single DES:

$$
C = E(K_1, D(K_1, E(K_1, P))) = E(K_1, P) \\
P = D(K_1, E(K_1, D(K_1, C))) = D(K_1, C)
$$

3DES with two keys is a relatively popular alternative to DES and has been adopted for use in the key management standards ANSI X9.17 and ISO 8732.\(^1\)

Currently, there are no practical cryptanalytic attacks on 3DES. Coppersmith [COPP94] notes that the cost of a brute-force key search on 3DES is on the order of $2^{112} \approx (5 \times 10^{33})$ and estimates that the cost of differential cryptanalysis suffers an exponential growth, compared to single DES, exceeding $10^{52}$.

It is worth looking at several proposed attacks on 3DES that, although not practical, give a flavor for the types of attacks that have been considered and that could form the basis for more successful future attacks.

The first serious proposal came from Merkle and Hellman [MERK81]. Their plan involves finding plaintext values that produce a first intermediate value of $A = 0$

---

\(^1\)American National Standard (ANS): Financial Institution Key Management (Wholesale). From its title, X9.17 appears to be a somewhat obscure standard. Yet a number of techniques specified in this standard have been adopted for use in other standards and applications, as we shall see throughout this book.
6.1 / MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION AND TRIPLE DES

(Figure 6.1b) and then using the meet-in-the-middle attack to determine the two keys. The level of effort is $2^{56}$, but the technique requires $2^{56}$ chosen plaintext–ciphertext pairs, which is a number unlikely to be provided by the holder of the keys.

A known-plaintext attack is outlined in [VANO90]. This method is an improvement over the chosen-plaintext approach but requires more effort. The attack is based on the observation that if we know $A$ and $C$ (Figure 6.1b), then the problem reduces to that of an attack on double DES. Of course, the attacker does not know $A$, even if $P$ and $C$ are known, as long as the two keys are unknown. However, the attacker can choose a potential value of $A$ and then try to find a known $(P, C)$ pair that produces $A$. The attack proceeds as follows.

1. Obtain $n$ $(P, C)$ pairs. This is the known plaintext. Place these in a table (Table 1) sorted on the values of $P$ (Figure 6.2b).

2. Pick an arbitrary value $a$ for $A$, and create a second table (Figure 6.2c) with entries defined in the following fashion. For each of the $2^{56}$ possible keys $K_1 = i$, calculate the plaintext value $P_i$ that produces $a$:

$$P_i = D(i, a)$$

For each $P_i$ that matches an entry in Table 1, create an entry in Table 2 consisting of the $K_1$ value and the value of $B$ that is produced for the $(P, C)$ pair from Table 1, assuming that value of $K_1$:

$$B = D(i, C)$$

At the end of this step, sort Table 2 on the values of $B$.

(a) Two-key triple encryption with candidate pair of keys

(b) Table of $n$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, sorted on $P$

(c) Table of intermediate values and candidate keys

Figure 6.2 Known-Plaintext Attack on Triple DES
3. We now have a number of candidate values of $K_1$ in Table 2 and are in a position to search for a value of $K_2$. For each of the $2^{56}$ possible keys $K_2 = j$, calculate the second intermediate value for our chosen value of $a$:

$$B_j = D(j, a)$$

At each step, look up $B_j$ in Table 2. If there is a match, then the corresponding key $i$ from Table 2 plus this value of $j$ are candidate values for the unknown keys $(K_1, K_2)$. Why? Because we have found a pair of keys $(i, j)$ that produce a known $(P, C)$ pair (Figure 6.2a).

4. Test each candidate pair of keys $(i, j)$ on a few other plaintext–ciphertext pairs. If a pair of keys produces the desired ciphertext, the task is complete. If no pair succeeds, repeat from step 1 with a new value of $a$.

For a given known $(P, C)$, the probability of selecting the unique value of $a$ that leads to success is $1/2^{64}$. Thus, given $n$ $(P, C)$ pairs, the probability of success for a single selected value of $a$ is $n/2^{64}$. A basic result from probability theory is that the expected number of draws required to draw one red ball out of a bin containing $n$ red balls and $N - n$ green balls is $(N + 1)/(n + 1)$ if the balls are not replaced. So the expected number of values of $a$ that must be tried is, for large $n$,

$$\frac{2^{64} + 1}{n + 1} \approx \frac{2^{64}}{n}$$

Thus, the expected running time of the attack is on the order of

$$(2^{56}) \frac{2^{64}}{n} = 2^{120 - \log_2 n}$$

**Triple DES with Three Keys**

Although the attacks just described appear impractical, anyone using two-key 3DES may feel some concern. Thus, many researchers now feel that three-key 3DES is the preferred alternative (e.g., [KALI96a]). Three-key 3DES has an effective key length of 168 bits and is defined as

$$C = E(K_3, D(K_2, E(K_1, P)))$$

Backward compatibility with DES is provided by putting $K_3 = K_2$ or $K_1 = K_2$.

A number of Internet-based applications have adopted three-key 3DES, including PGP and S/MIME, both discussed in Chapter 18.

### 6.2 ELECTRONIC CODE BOOK

A block cipher takes a fixed-length block of text of length $b$ bits and a key as input and produces a $b$-bit block of ciphertext. If the amount of plaintext to be encrypted is greater than $b$ bits, then the block cipher can still be used by breaking the plaintext
up into $b$-bit blocks. When multiple blocks of plaintext are encrypted using the same key, a number of security issues arise. To apply a block cipher in a variety of applications, five *modes of operation* have been defined by NIST (SP 800-38A). In essence, a mode of operation is a technique for enhancing the effect of a cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for an application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of data blocks or a data stream. The five modes are intended to cover a wide variety of applications of encryption for which a block cipher could be used. These modes are intended for use with any symmetric block cipher, including triple DES and AES. The modes are summarized in Table 6.1 and described in this and the following sections.

The simplest mode is the **electronic codebook (ECB)** mode, in which plaintext is handled one block at a time and each block of plaintext is encrypted using the same key (Figure 6.3). The term *codebook* is used because, for a given key, there is a unique ciphertext for every $b$-bit block of plaintext. Therefore, we can imagine a gigantic codebook in which there is an entry for every possible $b$-bit plaintext pattern showing its corresponding ciphertext.

For a message longer than $b$ bits, the procedure is simply to break the message into $b$-bit blocks, padding the last block if necessary. Decryption is performed one block at a time, always using the same key. In Figure 6.3, the plaintext (padded as necessary) consists of a sequence of $b$-bit blocks, $P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_N$; the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Typical Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Codebook (ECB)</td>
<td>Each block of 64 plaintext bits is encoded independently using the same key.</td>
<td>• Secure transmission of single values (e.g., an encryption key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)</td>
<td>The input to the encryption algorithm is the XOR of the next 64 bits of plaintext and the preceding 64 bits of ciphertext.</td>
<td>• General-purpose block-oriented transmission • Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cipher Feedback (CFB)</td>
<td>Input is processed $s$ bits at a time. Preceding ciphertext is used as input to the encryption algorithm to produce pseudorandom output, which is XORed with plaintext to produce next unit of ciphertext.</td>
<td>• General-purpose stream-oriented transmission • Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Feedback (OFB)</td>
<td>Similar to CFB, except that the input to the encryption algorithm is the preceding encryption output, and full blocks are used.</td>
<td>• Stream-oriented transmission over noisy channel (e.g., satellite communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter (CTR)</td>
<td>Each block of plaintext is XORed with an encrypted counter. The counter is incremented for each subsequent block.</td>
<td>• General-purpose block-oriented transmission • Useful for high-speed requirements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ECB method is ideal for a short amount of data, such as an encryption key. Thus, if you want to transmit a DES or AES key securely, ECB is the appropriate mode to use.

The most significant characteristic of ECB is that if the same b-bit block of plaintext appears more than once in the message, it always produces the same ciphertext.

For lengthy messages, the ECB mode may not be secure. If the message is highly structured, it may be possible for a cryptanalyst to exploit these regularities. For example, if it is known that the message always starts out with certain predefined fields, then the cryptanalyst may have a number of known plaintext–ciphertext pairs to work with. If the message has repetitive elements with a period of repetition a multiple of b bits, then these elements can be identified by the analyst. This may help in the analysis or may provide an opportunity for substituting or rearranging blocks.
To overcome the security deficiencies of ECB, we would like a technique in which the same plaintext block, if repeated, produces different ciphertext blocks. A simple way to satisfy this requirement is the **cipher block chaining (CBC)** mode (Figure 6.4). In this scheme, the input to the encryption algorithm is the XOR of the current plaintext block and the preceding ciphertext block; the same key is used for each block. In effect, we have chained together the processing of the sequence of plaintext blocks. The input to the encryption function for each plaintext block bears no fixed relationship to the plaintext block. Therefore, repeating patterns of $b$ bits are not exposed. As with the ECB mode, the CBC mode requires that the last block be padded to a full $b$ bits if it is a partial block.

For decryption, each cipher block is passed through the decryption algorithm. The result is XORed with the preceding ciphertext block to produce the plaintext block. To see that this works, we can write

$$C_j = E(K, [C_{j-1} \oplus P_j])$$

**Figure 6.4** Cipher Block Chaining (CFB) Mode
Then

\[ D(K, C_j) = D(K, E(K, [C_{j-1} \oplus P_j])) \]
\[ D(K, C_j) = C_{j-1} \oplus P_j \]
\[ C_{j-1} \oplus D(K, C_j) = C_{j-1} \oplus C_{j-1} \oplus P_j = P_j \]

To produce the first block of ciphertext, an initialization vector (IV) is XORed with the first block of plaintext. On decryption, the IV is XORed with the output of the decryption algorithm to recover the first block of plaintext. The IV is a data block that is that same size as the cipher block. We can define CBC mode as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBC</th>
<th>( C_1 = E(K, [P_1 \oplus IV]) )</th>
<th>( P_1 = D(K, C_1) \oplus IV )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( C_j = E(K, [P_j \oplus C_{j-1}]) ) for ( j = 2, \ldots, N )</td>
<td>( P_j = D(K, C_j) \oplus C_{j-1} ) for ( j = 2, \ldots, N )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The IV must be known to both the sender and receiver but be unpredictable by a third party. In particular, for any given plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to the plaintext in advance of the generation of the IV. For maximum security, the IV should be protected against unauthorized changes. This could be done by sending the IV using ECB encryption. One reason for protecting the IV is as follows: If an opponent is able to fool the receiver into using a different value for IV, then the opponent is able to invert selected bits in the first block of plaintext. To see this, consider

\[ C_1 = E(K, [IV \oplus P_1]) \]
\[ P_1 = IV \oplus D(K, C_1) \]

Now use the notation that \( X[i] \) denotes the \( i \)th bit of the \( b \)-bit quantity \( X \). Then

\[ P_1[i] = IV[i] \oplus D(K, C_1)[i] \]

Then, using the properties of XOR, we can state

\[ P_1[i]' = IV[i]' \oplus D(K, C_1)[i] \]

where the prime notation denotes bit complementation. This means that if an opponent can predictably change bits in IV, the corresponding bits of the received value of \( P_1 \) can be changed.

For other possible attacks based on prior knowledge of IV, see [VOYD83].

So long as it is unpredictable, the specific choice of IV is unimportant. Sp800-38a recommends two possible methods: The first method is to apply the encryption function, under the same key that is used for the encryption of the plaintext, to a nonce.\(^2\) The nonce must be a data block that is unique to each execution of the encryption operation. For example, the nonce may be a counter, a timestamp, or

\(^2\)NIST SP-800-90 (Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators) defines nonce as follows: A time-varying value that has at most a negligible chance of repeating, e.g., a random value that is generated anew for each use, a timestamp, a sequence number, or some combination of these.
a message number. The second method is to generate a random data block using a random number generator.

In conclusion, because of the chaining mechanism of CBC, it is an appropriate mode for encrypting messages of length greater than $b$ bits.

In addition to its use to achieve confidentiality, the CBC mode can be used for authentication. This use is described in Chapter 12.

### 6.4 CIPHER FEEDBACK MODE

For AES, DES, or any block cipher, encryption is performed on a block of $b$ bits. In the case of DES, $b = 64$ and in the case of AES, $b = 128$. However, it is possible to convert a block cipher into a stream cipher, using one of the three modes to be discussed in this and the next two sections: **cipher feedback** (CFB) mode, **output feedback** (OFB) mode, and **counter** (CTR) mode. A stream cipher eliminates the need to pad a message to be an integral number of blocks. It also can operate in real time. Thus, if a character stream is being transmitted, each character can be encrypted and transmitted immediately using a character-oriented stream cipher.

One desirable property of a stream cipher is that the ciphertext be of the same length as the plaintext. Thus, if 8-bit characters are being transmitted, each character should be encrypted to produce a ciphertext output of 8 bits. If more than 8 bits are produced, transmission capacity is wasted.

Figure 6.5 depicts the CFB scheme. In the figure, it is assumed that the unit of transmission is $s$ bits; a common value is $s = 8$. As with CBC, the units of plaintext are chained together, so that the ciphertext of any plaintext unit is a function of all the preceding plaintext. In this case, rather than blocks of $b$ bits, the plaintext is divided into **segments** of $s$ bits.

First, consider encryption. The input to the encryption function is a $b$-bit shift register that is initially set to some initialization vector (IV). The leftmost (most significant) $s$ bits of the output of the encryption function are XORed with the first segment of plaintext $P_1$ to produce the first unit of ciphertext $C_1$, which is then transmitted. In addition, the contents of the shift register are shifted left by $s$ bits, and $C_1$ is placed in the rightmost (least significant) $s$ bits of the shift register. This process continues until all plaintext units have been encrypted.

For decryption, the same scheme is used, except that the received ciphertext unit is XORed with the output of the encryption function to produce the plaintext unit. Note that it is the encryption function that is used, not the decryption function. This is easily explained. Let $\text{MSB}_s(X)$ be defined as the most significant $s$ bits of $X$. Then

\[
C_1 = P_1 \oplus \text{MSB}_s[E(K, \text{IV})]
\]

Therefore, by rearranging terms:

\[
P_1 = C_1 \oplus \text{MSB}_s[E(K, \text{IV})]
\]

The same reasoning holds for subsequent steps in the process.

We can define CFB mode as follows.
Although CFB can be viewed as a stream cipher, it does not conform to the typical construction of a stream cipher. In a typical stream cipher, the cipher takes as input some initial value and a key and generates a stream of bits, which is then XORed with the plaintext bits (see Figure 3.1). In the case of CFB, the stream of bits that is XORed with the plaintext also depends on the plaintext.
The output feedback (OFB) mode is similar in structure to that of CFB. As can be seen in Figure 6.6, it is the output of the encryption function that is fed back to the shift register in OFB, whereas in CFB, the ciphertext unit is fed back to the shift register. The other difference is that the OFB mode operates on full blocks of plaintext and ciphertext, not on an $s$-bit subset. Encryption can be expressed as

$$C_j = P_j \oplus E(K, [C_{j-i} \oplus P_{j-1}])$$

By rearranging terms, we can demonstrate that decryption works.

$$P_j = C_j \oplus E(K, [C_{j-1} \oplus P_{j-1}])$$
We can define OFB mode as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFB</th>
<th>( I_1 = \text{Nonce} )</th>
<th>( I_1 = \text{Nonce} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( I_j = O_{j-1} ) ( j = 2, \ldots, N )</td>
<td>( I_j = \text{LSB}<em>{b-1}(I</em>{j-1}) | C_{j-1} ) ( j = 2, \ldots, N )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( O_j = E(K, I_j) ) ( j = 1, \ldots, N )</td>
<td>( O_j = E(K, I_j) ) ( j = 1, \ldots, N )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( C_j = P_j \oplus O_j ) ( j = 1, \ldots, N - 1 )</td>
<td>( P_j = C_j \oplus O_j ) ( j = 1, \ldots, N - 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( C_N = P_N \oplus \text{MSB}_{u}(O_N) )</td>
<td>( P_N = C_N \oplus \text{MSB}_{u}(O_N) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let the size of a block be \( b \). If the last block of plaintext contains \( u \) bits (indicated by *), with \( u < b \), the most significant \( u \) bits of the last output block \( O_N \) are used for the XOR operation; the remaining \( b-u \) bits of the last output block are discarded.

As with CBC and CFB, the OFB mode requires an initialization vector. In the case of OFB, the IV must be a nonce; that is, the IV must be unique to each execution of the encryption operation. The reason for this is that the sequence of encryption output blocks, \( O_i \), depends only on the key and the IV and does not depend on the plaintext. Therefore, for a given key and IV, the stream of output bits used to XOR with the stream of plaintext bits is fixed. If two different messages had an identical block of plaintext in the identical position, then an attacker would be able to determine that portion of the stream.

One advantage of the OFB method is that bit errors in transmission do not propagate. For example, if a bit error occurs in \( C_1 \), only the recovered value of \( P_1 \) is affected; subsequent plaintext units are not corrupted. With CFB, \( C_1 \) also serves as input to the shift register and therefore causes additional corruption downstream.

The disadvantage of OFB is that it is more vulnerable to a message stream modification attack than is CFB. Consider that complementing a bit in the ciphertext complements the corresponding bit in the recovered plaintext. Thus, controlled changes to the recovered plaintext can be made. This may make it possible for an opponent, by making the necessary changes to the checksum portion of the message as well as to the data portion, to alter the ciphertext in such a way that it is not detected by an error-correcting code. For a further discussion, see [VOYD83].

OFB has the structure of a typical stream cipher, because the cipher generates a stream of bits as a function of an initial value and a key, and that stream of bits is XORed with the plaintext bits (see Figure 3.1). The generated stream that is XORed with the plaintext is itself independent of the plaintext; this is highlighted by dashed boxes in Figure 6.6. One distinction from the stream ciphers we discuss in Chapter 7 is that OFB encrypts plaintext a full block at a time, where typically a block is 64 or 128 bits. Many stream ciphers encrypt one byte at a time.

### 6.6 COUNTER MODE

Although interest in the **counter** (CTR) mode has increased recently with applications to ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) network security and IP sec (IP security), this mode was proposed early on (e.g., [DIFF79]).

Figure 6.7 depicts the CTR mode. A counter equal to the plaintext block size is used. The only requirement stated in SP 800-38A is that the counter value must be
different for each plaintext block that is encrypted. Typically, the counter is initialized to some value and then incremented by 1 for each subsequent block (modulo $2^b$, where $b$ is the block size). For encryption, the counter is encrypted and then XORed with the plaintext block to produce the ciphertext block; there is no chaining. For decryption, the same sequence of counter values is used, with each encrypted counter XORed with a ciphertext block to recover the corresponding plaintext block. Thus, the initial counter value must be made available for decryption. Given a sequence of counters $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_N$, we can define CTR mode as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTR</th>
<th>$C_j = P_j \oplus E(K, T_j)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, N-1$</th>
<th>$P_j = C_j \oplus E(K, T_j)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, N-1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C_N = P_N' \oplus \text{MSB}_u[E(K, T_N)]$</td>
<td>$P_N' = C_N \oplus \text{MSB}_u[E(K, T_N)]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the last plaintext block, which may be a partial block of \( u \) bits, the most significant \( u \) bits of the last output block are used for the XOR operation; the remaining \( b-u \) bits are discarded. Unlike the ECB, CBC, and CFB modes, we do not need to use padding because of the structure of the CTR mode.

As with the OFB mode, the initial counter value must be a nonce; that is, \( T_1 \) must be different for all of the messages encrypted using the same key. Further, all \( T_i \) values across all messages must be unique. If, contrary to this requirement, a counter value is used multiple times, then the confidentiality of all of the plaintext blocks corresponding to that counter value may be compromised. In particular, if any plaintext block that is encrypted using a given counter value is known, then the output of the encryption function can be determined easily from the associated ciphertext block. This output allows any other plaintext blocks that are encrypted using the same counter value to be easily recovered from their associated ciphertext blocks.

One way to ensure the uniqueness of counter values is to continue to increment the counter value by 1 across messages. That is, the first counter value of each message is one more than the last counter value of the preceding message. [LIPM00] lists the following advantages of CTR mode.

- **Hardware efficiency:** Unlike the three chaining modes, encryption (or decryption) in CTR mode can be done in parallel on multiple blocks of plaintext or ciphertext. For the chaining modes, the algorithm must complete the computation on one block before beginning on the next block. This limits the maximum throughput of the algorithm to the reciprocal of the time for one execution of block encryption or decryption. In CTR mode, the throughput is only limited by the amount of parallelism that is achieved.

- **Software efficiency:** Similarly, because of the opportunities for parallel execution in CTR mode, processors that support parallel features, such as aggressive pipelining, multiple instruction dispatch per clock cycle, a large number of registers, and SIMD instructions, can be effectively utilized.

- **Preprocessing:** The execution of the underlying encryption algorithm does not depend on input of the plaintext or ciphertext. Therefore, if sufficient memory is available and security is maintained, preprocessing can be used to prepare the output of the encryption boxes that feed into the XOR functions, as in Figure 6.7. When the plaintext or ciphertext input is presented, then the only computation is a series of XORs. Such a strategy greatly enhances throughput.

- **Random access:** The \( i \)th block of plaintext or ciphertext can be processed in random-access fashion. With the chaining modes, block \( C_i \) cannot be computed until the \( i-1 \) prior block are computed. There may be applications in which a ciphertext is stored and it is desired to decrypt just one block; for such applications, the random access feature is attractive.

- **Provable security:** It can be shown that CTR is at least as secure as the other modes discussed in this section.

- **Simplicity:** Unlike ECB and CBC modes, CTR mode requires only the implementation of the encryption algorithm and not the decryption algorithm. This matters most when the decryption algorithm differs substantially from the encryption algorithm, as it does for AES. In addition, the decryption key scheduling need not be implemented.
Note that, with the exception of ECB, all of the NIST-approved block cipher modes of operation involve feedback. This is clearly seen in Figure 6.8. To highlight the feedback mechanism, it is useful to think of the encryption function as taking input from a input register whose length equals the encryption block length and with output stored in an output register. The input register is updated one block at a time by the feedback mechanism. After each update, the encryption algorithm is executed, producing a result in the output register. Meanwhile, a block of plaintext is accessed. Note that both OFB and CTR produce output that is independent of both the plaintext and the ciphertext. Thus, they are natural candidates for stream ciphers that encrypt plaintext by XOR one full block at a time.

![Diagram](image)

(a) Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode  
(b) Cipher feedback (CFB) mode

(c) Output feedback (OFB) mode  
(d) Counter (CTR) mode

Figure 6.8 Feedback Characteristic of Modes of Operation
6.7 XTS-AES MODE FOR BLOCK-ORIENTED STORAGE DEVICES

NIST is currently in the process of approving an additional block cipher mode of operation, XTS-AES. This mode is also an IEEE standard, IEEE Std 1619-2007, which was developed by the IEEE Security in Storage Working Group (P1619). The standard describes a method of encryption for data stored in sector-based devices where the threat model includes possible access to stored data by the adversary.

The XTS-AES mode is based on the concept of a tweakable block cipher, introduced in [LISK02]. The form of this concept used in XTS-AES was first described in [ROGA04]. The standard has received widespread industry support.

Storage Encryption Requirements

The requirements for encrypting stored data, also referred to as “data at rest” differ somewhat from those for transmitted data. The P1619 standard was designed to have the following characteristics:

1. The ciphertext is freely available for an attacker. Among the circumstances that lead to this situation:
   a. A group of users has authorized access to a database. Some of the records in the database are encrypted so that only specific users can successfully read/write them. Other users can retrieve an encrypted record but are unable to read it without the key.
   b. An unauthorized user manages to gain access to encrypted records.
   c. A data disk or laptop is stolen, giving the adversary access to the encrypted data.

2. The data layout is not changed on the storage medium and in transit. The encrypted data must be the same size as the plaintext data.

3. Data are accessed in fixed sized blocks, independently from each other. That is, an authorized user may access one or more blocks in any order.

4. Encryption is performed in 16-byte blocks, independently from other blocks (except the last two plaintext blocks of a sector, if its size is not a multiple of 16 bytes).

5. There are no other metadata used, except the location of the data blocks within the whole data set.

6. The same plaintext is encrypted to different ciphertexts at different locations, but always to the same ciphertext when written to the same location again.

7. A standard conformant device can be constructed for decryption of data encrypted by another standard conformant device.

The P1619 group considered some of the existing modes of operation for use with stored data. For CTR mode, an adversary with write access to the encrypted media can flip any bit of the plaintext simply by flipping the corresponding ciphertext bit.

Next, consider requirement 6 and the use of CBC. To enforce the requirement that the same plaintext encrypt to different ciphertext in different locations, the IV could be derived from the sector number. Each sector contains multiple blocks. An adversary with read/write access to the encrypted disk can copy a ciphertext sector
from one position to another, and an application reading the sector off the new location will still get the same plaintext sector (except perhaps the first 128 bits). For example, this means that an adversary that is allowed to read a sector from the second position but not the first can find the content of the sector in the first position by manipulating the ciphertext. Another weakness is that an adversary can flip any bit of the plaintext by flipping the corresponding ciphertext bit of the previous block, with the side-effect of “randomizing” the previous block.

**Operation on a Single Block**

Figure 6.9 shows the encryption and decryption of a single block. The operation involves two instances of the AES algorithm with two keys. The following parameters are associated with the algorithm.
In essence, the parameter functions much like the counter in CTR mode. It assures that if the same plaintext block appears at two different positions within a data unit, it will encrypt to two different ciphertext blocks. The parameter functions much like a nonce at the data unit level. It assures that, if the same plaintext block appears at the same position in two different data units, it will encrypt to two different ciphertext blocks. More generally, it assures that the same plaintext data unit will encrypt to two different ciphertext data units for two different data unit positions.

The encryption and decryption of a single block can be described as

\[
\begin{align*}
T &= E(K_2, i) \otimes \alpha^j \\
PP &= P \oplus T \\
CC &= E(K_1, PP) \\
C &= CC \oplus T
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
T &= E(K_2, i) \otimes \alpha^j \\
CC &= C \oplus T \\
PP &= D(K_1, CC) \\
P &= PP \oplus T
\end{align*}
\]

To see that decryption recovers the plaintext, let us expand the last line of both encryption and decryption. For encryption, we have

\[
C = CC \oplus T = E(K_1, PP) \oplus T = E(K_1, P \oplus T) \oplus T
\]

and for decryption, we have

\[
P = PP \oplus T = D(K_1, CC) \oplus T = D(K_1, C \oplus T) \oplus T
\]

Now, we substitute for \(C\):

\[
\begin{align*}
P &= D(K_1, C \oplus T) \oplus T \\
&= D(K_1, [E(K_1, P \oplus T) \oplus T] \oplus T) \oplus T \\
&= D(K_1, E(K_1, P \oplus T)) \oplus T \\
&= (P \oplus T) \oplus T = P
\end{align*}
\]
Operation on a Sector

The plaintext of a sector or data unit is organized into blocks of 128 bits. Blocks are labeled $P_0, P_1, \ldots, P_m$. The last block may be null or may contain from 1 to 127 bits. In other words, the input to the XTS-AES algorithm consists of $m$ 128-bit blocks and possibly a final partial block.

For encryption and decryption, each block is treated independently and encrypted/decrypted as shown in Figure 6.9. The only exception occurs when the last block has less than 128 bits. In that case, the last two blocks are encrypted/decrypted using a ciphertext-stealing technique instead of padding. Figure 6.10 shows the scheme. $P_{m-1}$ is the last full plaintext block, and $P_m$ is the final plaintext block, which contains $s$ bits with $1 \leq s \leq 127$. $C_{m-1}$ is the last full ciphertext block, and $C_m$ is the final ciphertext block, which contains $s$ bits.
Let us label the block encryption and decryption algorithms of Figure 6.9 as:

Block encryption: XTS-AES-blockEnc\((K, P_j, i, j)\)
Block decryption: XTS-AES-blockDec\((K, C_j, i, j)\)

Then, if the final block is null, XTS-AES mode is defined as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XTS-AES mode with null final block</th>
<th>(C_j = \text{XTS-AES-blockEnc}(K, P_j, i, j)) (j = 0, \ldots, m - 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(P_j = \text{XTS-AES-blockEnc}(K, C_j, i, j)) (j = 0, \ldots, m - 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XTS-AES mode with final block containing (s) bits</th>
<th>(C_j = \text{XTS-AES-blockEnc}(K, P_j, i, j)) (j = 0, \ldots, m - 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(XX = \text{XTS-AES-blockEnc}(K, P_{m-1}, i, m - 1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(CP = \text{LSB}_{128-s}(XX))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(YY = P_m \parallel CP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(C_{m-1} = \text{XTS-AES-blockEnc}(K, YY, i, m))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(C_m = \text{MSB}_s(XX))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(P_j = \text{XTS-AES-blockDec}(K, C_j, i, j)) (j = 0, \ldots, m - 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(YY = \text{XTS-AES-blockDec}(K, C_{m-1}, i, m - 1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(CP = \text{LSB}_{128-s}(YY))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(XX = C_m \parallel CP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(P_{m-1} = \text{XTS-AES-blockDec}(K, XX, i, m))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(P_m = \text{MSB}_s(YY))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, XTS-AES mode, like CTR mode, is suitable for parallel operation. Because there is no chaining, multiple blocks can be encrypted or decrypted simultaneously. Unlike CTR mode, XTS-AES mode includes a nonce (the parameter \(i\)) as well as a counter (parameter \(j\)).

### 6.8 RECOMMENDED WEB SITE

**Recommended Web Site:**

- **Block cipher modes of operation:** NIST page with full information on NIST-approved modes of operation.

### 6.9 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

**Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block cipher modes of operation</th>
<th>counter mode (CTR)</th>
<th>output feedback mode (OFB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cipher block chaining mode (CBC)</td>
<td>electronic codebook mode (ECB)</td>
<td>Triple DES (3DES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cipher feedback mode (CFB)</td>
<td>meet-in-the-middle attack nonce</td>
<td>XTS-AES mode</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Review Questions

6.1 What is triple encryption?
6.2 What is a meet-in-the-middle attack?
6.3 How many keys are used in triple encryption?
6.4 Why is the middle portion of 3DES a decryption rather than an encryption?
6.5 Why do some block cipher modes of operation only use encryption while others use both encryption and decryption?

Problems

6.1 You want to build a hardware device to do block encryption in the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode using an algorithm stronger than DES. 3DES is a good candidate. Figure 6.11 shows two possibilities, both of which follow from the definition of CBC. Which of the two would you choose:
   a. For security?
   b. For performance?

6.2 Can you suggest a security improvement to either option in Figure 6.11, using only three DES chips and some number of XOR functions? Assume you are still limited to two keys.

Figure 6.11 Use of Triple DES in CBC Mode
6.3 The Merkle-Hellman attack on 3DES begins by assuming a value of $A = 0$ (Figure 6.1b). Then, for each of the $2^{56}$ possible values of $K_1$, the plaintext $P$ that produces $A = 0$ is determined. Describe the rest of the algorithm.

6.4 With the ECB mode, if there is an error in a block of the transmitted ciphertext, only the corresponding plaintext block is affected. However, in the CBC mode, this error propagates. For example, an error in the transmitted $C_1$ (Figure 6.4) obviously corrupts $P_1$ and $P_2$.

a. Are any blocks beyond $P_2$ affected?

b. Suppose that there is a bit error in the source version of $P_1$. Through how many ciphertext blocks is this error propagated? What is the effect at the receiver?

6.5 Is it possible to perform encryption operations in parallel on multiple blocks of plaintext in CBC mode? How about decryption?

6.6 CBC-Pad is a block cipher mode of operation used in the RC5 block cipher, but it could be used in any block cipher. CBC-Pad handles plaintext of any length. The ciphertext is longer than the plaintext by at most the size of a single block. Padding is used to assure that the plaintext input is a multiple of the block length. It is assumed that the original plaintext is an integer number of bytes. This plaintext is padded at the end by from 1 to $bb$ bytes, where $bb$ equals the block size in bytes. The pad bytes are all the same and set to a byte that represents the number of bytes of padding. For example, if there are 8 bytes of padding, each byte has the bit pattern 00001000. Why not allow zero bytes of padding? That is, if the original plaintext is an integer multiple of the block size, why not refrain from padding?

6.7 For the ECB, CBC, and CFB modes, the plaintext must be a sequence of one or more complete data blocks (or, for CFB mode, data segments). In other words, for these three modes, the total number of bits in the plaintext must be a positive multiple of the block (or segment) size. One common method of padding, if needed, consists of a 1 bit followed by as few zero bits, possibly none, as are necessary to complete the final block. It is considered good practice for the sender to pad every message, including messages in which the final message block is already complete. What is the motivation for including a padding block when padding is not needed?

6.8 If a bit error occurs in the transmission of a ciphertext character in 8-bit CFB mode, how far does the error propagate?

6.9 In discussing OFB, it was mentioned that if it was known that two different messages had an identical block of plaintext in the identical position, it is possible to recover the corresponding $O_i$ block. Show the calculation.

6.10 In discussing the CTR mode, it was mentioned that if any plaintext block that is encrypted using a given counter value is known, then the output of the encryption function can be determined easily from the associated ciphertext block. Show the calculation.

6.11 Padding may not always be appropriate. For example, one might wish to store the encrypted data in the same memory buffer that originally contained the plaintext. In that case, the ciphertext must be the same length as the original plaintext. A mode for that purpose is the ciphertext stealing (CTS) mode. Figure 6.12a shows an implementation of this mode.

a. Explain how it works.

b. Describe how to decrypt $C_{n-1}$ and $C_n$.

6.12 Figure 6.12b shows an alternative to CTS for producing ciphertext of equal length to the plaintext when the plaintext is not an integer multiple of the block size.

a. Explain the algorithm.

b. Explain why CTS is preferable to this approach illustrated in Figure 6.12b.
6.13 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt in cipher block chaining mode using one of the following ciphers: affine modulo 256, Hill modulo 256, S-DES, DES.
Test data for S-DES using a binary initialization vector of 1010 1010. A binary plaintext of 0000 0001 0010 0011 encrypted with a binary key of 01111 11101 should give a binary plaintext of 1111 0100 0000 1011. Decryption should work correspondingly.

6.14 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt in 4-bit cipher feedback mode using one of the following ciphers: additive modulo 256, affine modulo 256, S-DES; or
or
8-bit cipher feedback mode using one of the following ciphers: $2 \times 2$ Hill modulo 256. Test data for S-DES using a binary initialization vector of 1010 1011. A binary plaintext of 0001 0010 0011 0100 encrypted with a binary key of 01111 11101 should give a binary plaintext of 1110 0100 0000 1011. Decryption should work correspondingly.

6.15 Create software that can encrypt and decrypt in counter mode using one of the following ciphers: affine modulo 256, Hill modulo 256, S-DES.
Test data for S-DES using a counter starting at 0000 0000. A binary plaintext of 0000 0001 0000 0010 0000 0100 0010 encrypted with a binary key of 01111 11101 should give a binary plaintext of 0011 1000 0100 1111 0011 0010. Decryption should work correspondingly.

6.16 Implement a differential cryptanalysis attack on 3-round S-DES.

Figure 6.12  Block Cipher Modes for Plaintext not a Multiple of Block Size
7.1 Principles of Pseudorandom Number Generation

The Use of Random Numbers
TRNGs, PRNGs, and PRFs
PRNG Requirements
Algorithm Design

7.2 Pseudorandom Number Generators

Linear Congruential Generators
Blum Blum Shub Generator

7.3 Pseudorandom Number Generation Using a Block Cipher

PRNG Using Block Cipher Modes of Operation
ANSI X9.17 PRNG

7.4 Stream Ciphers

7.5 RC4

Initialization of S
Stream Generation
Strength of RC4

7.6 True Random Number Generators

Entropy Sources
Skew

7.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

7.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
The comparatively late rise of the theory of probability shows how hard it is to grasp, and the many paradoxes show clearly that we, as humans, lack a well grounded intuition in this matter.

In probability theory there is a great deal of art in setting up the model, in solving the problem, and in applying the results back to the real world actions that will follow.

—The Art of Probability, Richard Hamming

**KEY POINTS**

- A capability with application to a number of cryptographic functions is random or pseudorandom number generation. The principle requirement for this capability is that the generated number stream be unpredictable.
- A stream cipher is a symmetric encryption algorithm in which ciphertext output is produced bit-by-bit or byte-by-byte from a stream of plaintext input. The most widely used such cipher is RC4.

An important cryptographic function is cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generation. Pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) are used in a variety of cryptographic and security applications. We begin the chapter with a look at the basic principles of PRNGs and contrast these with true random number generators (TRNGs). Next, we look at some common PRNGs, including PRNGs based on the use of a symmetric block cipher.

The chapter then moves on to the topic of symmetric stream ciphers, which are based on the use of a PRNG. The chapter next examines the most important stream cipher, RC4. Finally, we examine TRNGs.

**7.1 PRINCIPLES OF PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATION**

Random numbers play an important role in the use of encryption for various network security applications. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the use of random numbers in cryptography and network security and then focus on the principles of pseudorandom number generation.

**The Use of Random Numbers**

A number of network security algorithms and protocols based on cryptography make use of random binary numbers. For example,

---

1A note on terminology. Some standards documents, notably NIST and ANSI, refer to a TRNG as a nondeterministic random number generator (NRNG) and a PRNG as a deterministic random number generator (DRNG).
Key distribution and reciprocal authentication schemes, such as those discussed in Chapters 14 and 15. In such schemes, two communicating parties cooperate by exchanging messages to distribute keys and/or authenticate each other. In many cases, nonces are used for handshaking to prevent replay attacks. The use of random numbers for the nonces frustrates an opponent’s efforts to determine or guess the nonce.

Session key generation. We will see a number of protocols in this book where a secret key for symmetric encryption is generated for use for a short period of time. This key is generally called a session key.

Generation of keys for the RSA public-key encryption algorithm (described in Chapter 9).

Generation of a bit stream for symmetric stream encryption (described in this chapter).

These applications give rise to two distinct and not necessarily compatible requirements for a sequence of random numbers: randomness and unpredictability.

RandomnessTraditionally, the concern in the generation of a sequence of allegedly random numbers has been that the sequence of numbers be random in some well-defined statistical sense. The following two criteria are used to validate that a sequence of numbers is random:

- **Uniform distribution:** The distribution of bits in the sequence should be uniform; that is, the frequency of occurrence of ones and zeros should be approximately equal.
- **Independence:** No one subsequence in the sequence can be inferred from the others.

Although there are well-defined tests for determining that a sequence of bits matches a particular distribution, such as the uniform distribution, there is no such test to “prove” independence. Rather, a number of tests can be applied to demonstrate if a sequence does not exhibit independence. The general strategy is to apply a number of such tests until the confidence that independence exists is sufficiently strong.

In the context of our discussion, the use of a sequence of numbers that appear statistically random often occurs in the design of algorithms related to cryptography. For example, a fundamental requirement of the RSA public-key encryption scheme discussed in Chapter 9 is the ability to generate prime numbers. In general, it is difficult to determine if a given large number \( N \) is prime. A brute-force approach would be to divide \( N \) by every odd integer less than \( \sqrt{N} \). If \( N \) is on the order, say, of \( 10^{150} \), which is a not uncommon occurrence in public-key cryptography, such a brute-force approach is beyond the reach of human analysts and their computers. However, a number of effective algorithms exist that test the primality of a number by using a sequence of randomly chosen integers as input to relatively simple computations. If the sequence is sufficiently long (but far, far less than \( \sqrt{10^{150}} \)), the primality of a number can be determined with near certainty. This type of approach, known as randomization, crops up frequently in the design of algorithms. In essence, if a problem is too hard or time-consuming to solve exactly, a simpler, shorter
approach based on randomization is used to provide an answer with any desired level of confidence.

**Unpredictability** In applications such as reciprocal authentication, session key generation, and stream ciphers, the requirement is not just that the sequence of numbers be statistically random but that the successive members of the sequence are unpredictable. With “true” random sequences, each number is statistically independent of other numbers in the sequence and therefore unpredictable. However, as is discussed shortly, true random numbers are seldom used; rather, sequences of numbers that appear to be random are generated by some algorithm. In this latter case, care must be taken that an opponent not be able to predict future elements of the sequence on the basis of earlier elements.

**TRNGs, PRNGs, and PRFs**

Cryptographic applications typically make use of algorithmic techniques for random number generation. These algorithms are deterministic and therefore produce sequences of numbers that are not statistically random. However, if the algorithm is good, the resulting sequences will pass many reasonable tests of randomness. Such numbers are referred to as pseudorandom numbers.

You may be somewhat uneasy about the concept of using numbers generated by a deterministic algorithm as if they were random numbers. Despite what might be called philosophical objections to such a practice, it generally works. As one expert on probability theory puts it [Hamm91]:

For practical purposes we are forced to accept the awkward concept of “relatively random” meaning that with regard to the proposed use we can see no reason why they will not perform as if they were random (as the theory usually requires). This is highly subjective and is not very palatable to purists, but it is what statisticians regularly appeal to when they take “a random sample”—they hope that any results they use will have approximately the same properties as a complete counting of the whole sample space that occurs in their theory.

Figure 7.1 contrasts a true random number generator (TRNG) with two forms of pseudorandom number generators. A TRNG takes as input a source that is effectively random; the source is often referred to as an entropy source. We discuss such sources in Section 7.6. In essence, the entropy source is drawn from the physical environment of the computer and could include things such as keystroke timing patterns, disk electrical activity, mouse movements, and instantaneous values of the system clock. The source, or combination of sources, serve as input to an algorithm that produces random binary output. The TRNG may simply involve conversion of an analog source to a binary output. The TRNG may involve additional processing to overcome any bias in the source; this is discussed in Section 7.6.

In contrast, a PRNG takes as input a fixed value, called the seed, and produces a sequence of output bits using a deterministic algorithm. Typically, as shown, there is some feedback path by which some of the results of the algorithm are fed back as
input as additional output bits are produced. The important thing to note is that the output bit stream is determined solely by the input value or values, so that an adversary who knows the algorithm and the seed can reproduce the entire bit stream.

Figure 7.1 shows two different forms of PRNGs, based on application.

- **Pseudorandom number generator**: An algorithm that is used to produce an open-ended sequence of bits is referred to as a PRNG. A common application for an open-ended sequence of bits is as input to a symmetric stream cipher, as discussed in Section 7.4. Also, see Figure 3.1a.

- **Pseudorandom function (PRF)**: A PRF is used to produce a pseudorandom string of bits of some fixed length. Examples are symmetric encryption keys and nonces. Typically, the PRF takes as input a seed plus some context-specific values, such as a user ID or an application ID. A number of examples of PRFs will be seen throughout this book, notably in Chapters 16 and 17.

Other than the number of bits produced, there is no difference between a PRNG and a PRF. The same algorithms can be used in both applications. Both require a seed and both must exhibit randomness and unpredictability. Further, a PRNG application may also employ context-specific input. In what follows, we make no distinction between these two applications.

**PRNG Requirements**

When a PRNG or PRF is used for a cryptographic application, then the basic requirement is that an adversary who does not know the seed is unable to determine the pseudorandom string. For example, if the pseudorandom bit stream is
used in a stream cipher, then knowledge of the pseudorandom bit stream would enable the adversary to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. Similarly, we wish to protect the output value of a PRF. In this latter case, consider the following scenario. A 128-bit seed, together with some context-specific values, are used to generate a 128-bit secret key that is subsequently used for symmetric encryption. Under normal circumstances, a 128-bit key is safe from a brute-force attack. However, if the PRF does not generate effectively random 128-bit output values, it may be possible for an adversary to narrow the possibilities and successfully use a brute force attack.

This general requirement for secrecy of the output of a PRNG or PRF leads to specific requirements in the areas of randomness, unpredictability, and the characteristics of the seed. We now look at these in turn.

**Randomness**

In terms of randomness, the requirement for a PRNG is that the generated bit stream appear random even though it is deterministic. There is no single test that can determine if a PRNG generates numbers that have the characteristic of randomness. The best that can be done is to apply a sequence of tests to the PRNG. If the PRNG exhibits randomness on the basis of multiple tests, then it can be assumed to satisfy the randomness requirement. NIST SP 800-22 (A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications) specifies that the tests should seek to establish the following three characteristics.

- **Uniformity:** At any point in the generation of a sequence of random or pseudorandom bits, the occurrence of a zero or one is equally likely, i.e., the probability of each is exactly $1/2$. The expected number of zeros (or ones) is $n/2$, where $n$ = the sequence length.

- **Scalability:** Any test applicable to a sequence can also be applied to subsequences extracted at random. If a sequence is random, then any such extracted subsequence should also be random. Hence, any extracted subsequence should pass any test for randomness.

- **Consistency:** The behavior of a generator must be consistent across starting values (seeds). It is inadequate to test a PRNG based on the output from a single seed or an TRNG on the basis of an output produced from a single physical output.

SP 800-22 lists 15 separate tests of randomness. An understanding of these tests requires a basic knowledge of statistical analysis, so we don’t attempt a technical description here. Instead, to give some flavor for the tests, we list three of the tests and the purpose of each test, as follows.

- **Frequency test:** This is the most basic test and must be included in any test suite. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of ones and zeros in a sequence is approximately the same as would be expected for a truly random sequence.

- **Runs test:** The focus of this test is the total number of runs in the sequence, where a run is an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits bounded before and after with a bit of the opposite value. The purpose of the runs test is to determine
whether the number of runs of ones and zeros of various lengths is as expected for a random sequence.

- **Maurer’s universal statistical test:** The focus of this test is the number of bits between matching patterns (a measure that is related to the length of a compressed sequence). The purpose of the test is to detect whether or not the sequence can be significantly compressed without loss of information. A significantly compressible sequence is considered to be non-random.

**Unpredictability** A stream of pseudorandom numbers should exhibit two forms of unpredictability:

- **Forward unpredictability:** If the seed is unknown, the next output bit in the sequence should be unpredictable in spite of any knowledge of previous bits in the sequence.

- **Backward unpredictability:** It should also not be feasible to determine the seed from knowledge of any generated values. No correlation between a seed and any value generated from that seed should be evident; each element of the sequence should appear to be the outcome of an independent random event whose probability is 1/2.

The same set of tests for randomness also provide a test of unpredictability. If the generated bit stream appears random, then it is not possible to predict some bit or bit sequence from knowledge of any previous bits. Similarly, if the bit sequence appears random, then there is no feasible way to deduce the seed based on the bit sequence. That is, a random sequence will have no correlation with a fixed value (the seed).

**Seed Requirements** For cryptographic applications, the seed that serves as input to the PRNG must be secure. Because the PRNG is a deterministic algorithm, if the adversary can deduce the seed, then the output can also be determined. Therefore, the seed must be unpredictable. In fact, the seed itself must be a random or pseudorandom number.

Typically, the seed is generated by a TRNG, as shown in Figure 7.2. This is the scheme recommended by SP800-90. The reader may wonder, if a TRNG is available, why it is necessary to use a PRNG. If the application is a stream cipher, then a TRNG is not practical. The sender would need to generate a keystream of bits as long as the plaintext and then transmit the keystream and the ciphertext securely to the receiver. If a PRNG is used, the sender need only find a way to deliver the stream cipher key, which is typically 54 or 128 bits, to the receiver in a secure fashion.

Even in the case of a PRF application, in which only a limited number of bits is generated, it is generally desirable to use a TRNG to provide the seed to the PRF and use the PRF output rather than use the TRNG directly. As is explained in a Section 7.6, a TRNG may produce a binary string with some bias. The PRF would have the effect of “randomizing” the output of the TRNG so as to eliminate that bias.

Finally, the mechanism used to generate true random numbers may not be able to generate bits at a rate sufficient to keep up with the application requiring the random bits.
Algorithm Design

Cryptographic PRNGs have been the subject of much research over the years, and a wide variety of algorithms have been developed. These fall roughly into two categories.

- **Purpose-built algorithms**: These are algorithms designed specifically and solely for the purpose of generating pseudorandom bit streams. Some of these algorithms are used for a variety of PRNG applications; several of these are described in the next section. Others are designed specifically for use in a stream cipher. The most important example of the latter is RC4, described in Section 7.5.

- **Algorithms based on existing cryptographic algorithms**: Cryptographic algorithms have the effect of randomizing input. Indeed, this is a requirement of such algorithms. For example, if a symmetric block cipher produced ciphertext that had certain regular patterns in it, it would aid in the process of cryptanalysis. Thus, cryptographic algorithms can serve as the core of PRNGs. Three broad categories of cryptographic algorithms are commonly used to create PRNGs:
  
  — **Symmetric block ciphers**: This approach is discussed in Section 7.3.
  
  — **Asymmetric ciphers**: The number theoretic concepts used for an asymmetric cipher can also be adapted for a PRNG; this approach is examined in Chapter 10.
  
  — **Hash functions and message authentication codes**: This approach is examined in Chapter 12.

Any of these approaches can yield a cryptographically strong PRNG. A purpose-built algorithm may be provided by an operating system for general use. For applications that already use certain cryptographic algorithms for encryption or authentication, it makes sense to reuse the same code for the PRNG. Thus, all of these approaches are in common use.
7.2 PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS

In this section, we look at two types of algorithms for PRNGs.

Linear Congruential Generators

A widely used technique for pseudorandom number generation is an algorithm first proposed by Lehmer [LEHM51], which is known as the linear congruential method. The algorithm is parameterized with four numbers, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
    m & \quad \text{the modulus} & m & > 0 \\
    a & \quad \text{the multiplier} & 0 & < a < m \\
    c & \quad \text{the increment} & 0 & \leq c < m \\
    X_0 & \quad \text{the starting value, or seed} & 0 & \leq X_0 < m
\end{align*}
\]

The sequence of random numbers \( \{X_n\} \) is obtained via the following iterative equation:

\[
X_{n+1} = (aX_n + c) \mod m
\]

If \( m, a, c, \) and \( X_0 \) are integers, then this technique will produce a sequence of integers with each integer in the range \( 0 \leq X_n < m \).

The selection of values for \( a, c, \) and \( m \) is critical in developing a good random number generator. For example, consider \( a = c = 1 \). The sequence produced is obviously not satisfactory. Now consider the values \( a = 7, \ c = 0, \ m = 32, \) and \( X_0 = 1 \). This generates the sequence \( \{7, 17, 23, 1, 7, \text{etc.}\} \), which is also clearly unsatisfactory. Of the 32 possible values, only four are used; thus, the sequence is said to have a period of 4. If, instead, we change the value of \( a \) to 5, then the sequence is \( \{5, 25, 29, 17, 21, 9, 13, 1, 5, \text{etc.}\} \), which increases the period to 8.

We would like \( m \) to be very large, so that there is the potential for producing a long series of distinct random numbers. A common criterion is that \( m \) be nearly equal to the maximum representable nonnegative integer for a given computer. Thus, a value of \( m \) near to or equal to \( 2^{31} \) is typically chosen.

[PARK88a] proposes three tests to be used in evaluating a random number generator:

\( T_1: \) The function should be a full-period generating function. That is, the function should generate all the numbers between 0 and \( m \) before repeating.
\( T_2: \) The generated sequence should appear random.
\( T_3: \) The function should implement efficiently with 32-bit arithmetic.

With appropriate values of \( a, c, \) and \( m \), these three tests can be passed. With respect to \( T_1 \), it can be shown that if \( m \) is prime and \( c = 0 \), then for certain values of \( a \) the period of the generating function is \( m - 1 \), with only the value 0 missing. For
32-bit arithmetic, a convenient prime value of \( m \) is \( 2^{31} - 1 \). Thus, the generating function becomes

\[
X_{n+1} = (aX_n) \mod (2^{31} - 1)
\]

Of the more than 2 billion possible choices for \( a \), only a handful of multipliers pass all three tests. One such value is \( a = 7^5 = 16807 \), which was originally selected for use in the IBM 360 family of computers [LEWI69]. This generator is widely used and has been subjected to a more thorough testing than any other PRNG. It is frequently recommended for statistical and simulation work (e.g., [JAIN91]).

The strength of the linear congruential algorithm is that if the multiplier and modulus are properly chosen, the resulting sequence of numbers will be statistically indistinguishable from a sequence drawn at random (but without replacement) from the set \( 1, 2, \ldots, m - 1 \). But there is nothing random at all about the algorithm, apart from the choice of the initial value \( X_0 \). Once that value is chosen, the remaining numbers in the sequence follow deterministically. This has implications for cryptanalysis.

If an opponent knows that the linear congruential algorithm is being used and if the parameters are known (e.g., \( a = 7^5, c = 0, m = 2^{31} - 1 \)), then once a single number is discovered, all subsequent numbers are known. Even if the opponent knows only that a linear congruential algorithm is being used, knowledge of a small part of the sequence is sufficient to determine the parameters of the algorithm. Suppose that the opponent is able to determine values for \( X_0, X_1, X_2, \) and \( X_3 \). Then

\[
X_1 = (aX_0 + c) \mod m \\
X_2 = (aX_1 + c) \mod m \\
X_3 = (aX_2 + c) \mod m
\]

These equations can be solved for \( a, c, \) and \( m \).

Thus, although it is nice to be able to use a good PRNG, it is desirable to make the actual sequence used nonreproducible, so that knowledge of part of the sequence on the part of an opponent is insufficient to determine future elements of the sequence. This goal can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, [BRIG79] suggests using an internal system clock to modify the random number stream. One way to use the clock would be to restart the sequence after every \( N \) numbers using the current clock value \( \mod m \) as the new seed. Another way would be simply to add the current clock value to each random number \( \mod m \).

**Blum Blum Shub Generator**

A popular approach to generating secure pseudorandom numbers is known as the Blum, Blum, Shub (BBS) generator, named for its developers [BLUM86]. It has perhaps the strongest public proof of its cryptographic strength of any purpose-built algorithm. The procedure is as follows. First, choose two large prime numbers, \( p \) and \( q \), that both have a remainder of 3 when divided by 4. That is,

\[
p = q = 3 \pmod{4}
\]
This notation, explained more fully in Chapter 4, simply means that \((p \mod 4) = (q \mod 4) = 3\). For example, the prime numbers 7 and 11 satisfy \(7 = 11 = 3 \mod 4\). Let \(n = p \times q\). Next, choose a random number \(s\), such that \(s\) is relatively prime to \(n\); this is equivalent to saying that neither \(p\) nor \(q\) is a factor of \(s\). Then the BBS generator produces a sequence of bits \(B_i\) according to the following algorithm:

\[
X_0 = s^2 \mod n \\
\text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } \infty \\
X_i = (X_{i-1})^2 \mod n \\
B_i = X_i \mod 2
\]

Thus, the least significant bit is taken at each iteration. Table 7.1 shows an example of BBS operation. Here, \(n = 192649 = 383 \times 503\), and the seed \(s = 101355\).

The BBS is referred to as a \textbf{cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator} (CSPRBG). A CSPRBG is defined as one that passes the \textit{next-bit test}, which, in turn, is defined as follows [MENE97]: A pseudorandom bit generator is said to pass the next-bit test if there is not a polynomial-time algorithm\(^2\) that, on input of the first \(k\) bits of an output sequence, can predict the \((k + 1)\)st bit with probability significantly greater than 1/2. In other words, given the first \(k\) bits of the sequence, there is not a practical algorithm that can even allow you to state that the next bit will be 1 (or 0) with probability greater than 1/2. For all practical purposes, the sequence is unpredictable. The security of BBS is based on the difficulty of factoring \(n\). That is, given \(n\), we need to determine its two prime factors \(p\) and \(q\).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\(i\) & \(X_i\) & \(B_i\) \\
\hline
0 & 20749 & \\
1 & 143135 & 1 \\
2 & 177671 & 1 \\
3 & 97048 & 0 \\
4 & 89992 & 0 \\
5 & 174051 & 1 \\
6 & 80649 & 1 \\
7 & 45663 & 1 \\
8 & 69442 & 0 \\
9 & 186894 & 0 \\
10 & 177046 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\(i\) & \(X_i\) & \(B_i\) \\
\hline
11 & 137922 & 0 \\
12 & 123175 & 1 \\
13 & 8630 & 0 \\
14 & 114386 & 0 \\
15 & 14863 & 1 \\
16 & 133015 & 1 \\
17 & 106065 & 1 \\
18 & 45870 & 0 \\
19 & 137171 & 1 \\
20 & 48060 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^2\)A polynomial-time algorithm of order \(k\) is one whose running time is bounded by a polynomial of order \(k\).
A popular approach to PRNG construction is to use a symmetric block cipher as the heart of the PRNG mechanism. For any block of plaintext, a symmetric block cipher produces an output block that is apparently random. That is, there are no patterns or regularities in the ciphertext that provide information that can be used to deduce the plaintext. Thus, a symmetric block cipher is a good candidate for building a pseudorandom number generator.

If an established, standardized block cipher is used, such as DES or AES, then the security characteristics of the PRNG can be established. Further, many applications already make use of DES or AES, so the inclusion of the block cipher as part of the PRNG algorithm is straightforward.

PRNG Using Block Cipher Modes of Operation

Two approaches that use a block cipher to build a PNRG have gained widespread acceptance: the CTR mode and the OFB mode. The CTR mode is recommended in SP 800-90, in the ANSI standard X9.82 (Random Number Generation), and in RFC 4086. The OFB mode is recommended in X9.82 and RFC 4086.

Figure 7.3 illustrates the two methods. In each case, the seed consists of two parts: the encryption key value and a value $V$ that will be updated after each block of pseudorandom numbers is generated. Thus, for AES-128, the seed consists of a 128-bit key and a 128-bit $V$ value. In the CTR case, the value of $V$ is incremented by 1 after each encryption. In the case of OFB, the value of $V$ is updated to equal the value of the preceding PRNG block. In both cases, pseudorandom bits are produced one block at a time (e.g., for AES, PRNG bits are generated 128 bits at a time).
The CTR algorithm for PRNG can be summarized as follows.

```plaintext
while (len (temp) < requested_number_of_bits) do
    V = (V + 1) mod 2^{128}.
    output_block = E(Key, V)
    temp = temp || output_block
```

The OFB algorithm can be summarized as follows.

```plaintext
while (len (temp) < requested_number_of_bits) do
    V = E(Key, V)
    temp = temp || V
```

To get some idea of the performance of these two PRNGs, consider the following short experiment. A random bit sequence of 256 bits was obtained from random.org, which uses three radios tuned between stations to pick up atmospheric noise. These 256 bits form the seed, allocated as

| Key: cfb0ef3108d49cc4562d5810b0a9af60 |
| V: 4c89af496176b728ed1e2ea8ba27f5a4 |

The total number of one bits in the 256-bit seed is 124, or a fraction of 0.48, which is reassuringly close to the ideal of 0.5.

For the OFB PRNG, Table 7.2 shows the first eight output blocks (1024 bits) with two rough measures of security. The second column shows the fraction of one bits in each 128-bit block. This corresponds to one of the NIST tests. The results indicate that the output is split roughly equally between zero and one bits. The third column shows the fraction of bits that match between adjacent blocks. If this number differs substantially from 0.5, that suggests a correlation between blocks, which could be a security weakness. The results suggest no correlation.
Table 7.3  Example Results for PRNG Using CTR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output Block</th>
<th>Fraction of One Bits</th>
<th>Fraction of Bits that Match with Preceding Block</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1786f4c7ff6e291dbdfdd90ec3453176</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60809669a3e092a01b463472fdcaae420</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d4e6e170b46b0573eef88ee39bff33d</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5f8fcfc5deca18ea246785d7fadcc76f8</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90e63ed27bb07868c763545bddd57ee28</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0125856ffddf4a17f747c7633695c52235</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f4be2d179b0f2548fd748c8fc7c81990</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1151fc48f90e4ebac658a3911515c3c66</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 shows the results using the same key and $V$ values for CTR mode. Again, the results are favorable.

**ANSI X9.17 PRNG**

One of the strongest (cryptographically speaking) PRNGs is specified in ANSI X9.17. A number of applications employ this technique, including financial security applications and PGP (the latter described in Chapter 18).

Figure 7.4 illustrates the algorithm, which makes use of triple DES for encryption. The ingredients are as follows.

- **Input:** Two pseudorandom inputs drive the generator. One is a 64-bit representation of the current date and time, which is updated on each number generation. The other is a 64-bit seed value; this is initialized to some arbitrary value and is updated during the generation process.
• **Keys:** The generator makes use of three triple DES encryption modules. All three make use of the same pair of 56-bit keys, which must be kept secret and are used only for pseudorandom number generation.

• **Output:** The output consists of a 64-bit pseudorandom number and a 64-bit seed value.

Let us define the following quantities.

- $DT_i$: Date/time value at the beginning of $i$th generation stage
- $V_i$: Seed value at the beginning of $i$th generation stage
- $R_i$: Pseudorandom number produced by the $i$th generation stage
- $K_1, K_2$: DES keys used for each stage

Then

\[
R_i = \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], [V_i \oplus \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], DT_i)])
\]

\[
V_{i+1} = \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], [R_i \oplus \text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], DT_i)])
\]

where $\text{EDE}([K_1, K_2], X)$ refers to the sequence encrypt-decrypt-encrypt using two-key triple DES to encrypt $X$.

Several factors contribute to the cryptographic strength of this method. The technique involves a 112-bit key and three EDE encryptions for a total of nine DES encryptions. The scheme is driven by two pseudorandom inputs, the date and time value, and a seed produced by the generator that is distinct from the pseudorandom number produced by the generator. Thus, the amount of material that must be compromised by an opponent is overwhelming. Even if a pseudorandom number $R_i$ were compromised, it would be impossible to deduce the $V_{i+1}$ from the $R_i$, because an additional EDE operation is used to produce the $V_{i+1}$.

### 7.4 STREAM CIPHERS

A typical stream cipher encrypts plaintext one byte at a time, although a stream cipher may be designed to operate on one bit at a time or on units larger than a byte at a time. Figure 7.5 is a representative diagram of stream cipher structure. In this structure, a key is input to a pseudorandom bit generator that produces a stream of 8-bit numbers that are apparently random. The output of the generator, called a **keystream**, is combined one byte at a time with the plaintext stream using the bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) operation. For example, if the next byte generated by the generator is 01101100 and the next plaintext byte is 11001100, then the resulting ciphertext byte is

\[
\begin{align*}
11001100 & \quad \text{plaintext} \\
\oplus 01101100 & \quad \text{key stream} \\
10100000 & \quad \text{ciphertext}
\end{align*}
\]
Decryption requires the use of the same pseudorandom sequence:

\[
\begin{align*}
10100000 & \text{ ciphertext} \\
\oplus 01101100 & \text{ key stream} \\
11001100 & \text{ plaintext}
\end{align*}
\]

The stream cipher is similar to the one-time pad discussed in Chapter 2. The difference is that a one-time pad uses a genuine random number stream, whereas a stream cipher uses a pseudorandom number stream.

[KUMA97] lists the following important design considerations for a stream cipher.

1. The encryption sequence should have a large period. A pseudorandom number generator uses a function that produces a deterministic stream of bits that eventually repeats. The longer the period of repeat the more difficult it will be to do cryptanalysis. This is essentially the same consideration that was discussed with reference to the Vigenère cipher, namely that the longer the keyword the more difficult the cryptanalysis.

2. The keystream should approximate the properties of a true random number stream as close as possible. For example, there should be an approximately equal number of 1s and 0s. If the keystream is treated as a stream of bytes, then all of the 256 possible byte values should appear approximately equally often. The more random-appearing the keystream is, the more randomized the ciphertext is, making cryptanalysis more difficult.

3. Note from Figure 7.5 that the output of the pseudorandom number generator is conditioned on the value of the input key. To guard against brute-force attacks, the key needs to be sufficiently long. The same considerations that apply to block ciphers are valid here. Thus, with current technology, a key length of at least 128 bits is desirable.
With a properly designed pseudorandom number generator, a stream cipher can be as secure as a block cipher of comparable key length. A potential advantage of a stream cipher is that stream ciphers that do not use block ciphers as a building block are typically faster and use far less code than do block ciphers. The example in this chapter, RC4, can be implemented in just a few lines of code. Table 7.4, using data from [RESC01], compares execution times of RC4 with three symmetric block ciphers. One advantage of a block cipher is that you can reuse keys. In contrast, if two plaintexts are encrypted with the same key using a stream cipher, then cryptanalysis is often quite simple [DAWS96]. If the two ciphertext streams are XORed together, the result is the XOR of the original plaintexts. If the plaintexts are text strings, credit card numbers, or other byte streams with known properties, then cryptanalysis may be successful.

For applications that require encryption/decryption of a stream of data, such as over a data communications channel or a browser/Web link, a stream cipher might be the better alternative. For applications that deal with blocks of data, such as file transfer, e-mail, and database, block ciphers may be more appropriate. However, either type of cipher can be used in virtually any application.

A stream cipher can be constructed with any cryptographically strong PRNG, such as the ones discussed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. In the next section, we look at a stream cipher that uses a PRNG designed specifically for the stream cipher.

### 7.5 RC4

RC4 is a stream cipher designed in 1987 by Ron Rivest for RSA Security. It is a variable key size stream cipher with byte-oriented operations. The algorithm is based on the use of a random permutation. Analysis shows that the period of the cipher is overwhelmingly likely to be greater than $10^{100}$ [ROBS95a]. Eight to sixteen machine operations are required per output byte, and the cipher can be expected to run very quickly in software. RC4 is used in the Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) standards that have been defined for communication between Web browsers and servers. It is also used in the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol and the newer WiFi Protected Access (WPA) protocol that are part of the IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN standard. RC4 was kept as a trade secret by RSA Security. In September 1994, the RC4 algorithm was anonymously posted on the Internet on the Cypherpunks anonymous remailers list.
The RC4 algorithm is remarkably simple and quite easy to explain. A variable-length key of from 1 to 256 bytes (8 to 2048 bits) is used to initialize a 256-byte state vector $S$, with elements $S[0], S[1], \ldots, S[255]$. At all times, $S$ contains a permutation of all 8-bit numbers from 0 through 255. For encryption and decryption, a byte $k$ (see Figure 7.5) is generated from $S$ by selecting one of the 255 entries in a systematic fashion. As each value of $k$ is generated, the entries in $S$ are once again permuted.

**Initialization of S**

To begin, the entries of $S$ are set equal to the values from 0 through 255 in ascending order; that is, $S[0] = 0, S[1] = 1, \ldots, S[255] = 255$. A temporary vector, $T$, is also created. If the length of the key $K$ is 256 bytes, then $T$ is transferred to $T$. Otherwise, for a key of length $keylen$ bytes, the first $keylen$ elements of $T$ are copied from $K$, and then $K$ is repeated as many times as necessary to fill out $T$. These preliminary operations can be summarized as

```c
/* Initialization */
for i = 0 to 255 do
    S[i] = i;
    T[i] = K[i mod keylen];
```

Next we use $T$ to produce the initial permutation of $S$. This involves starting with $S[0]$ and going through to $S[255]$, and for each $S[i]$, swapping $S[i]$ with another byte in $S$ according to a scheme dictated by $T[i]$:

```c
/* Initial Permutation of S */
j = 0;
for i = 0 to 255 do
    j = (j + S[i] + T[i]) mod 256;
    Swap (S[i], S[j]);
```

Because the only operation on $S$ is a swap, the only effect is a permutation. $S$ still contains all the numbers from 0 through 255.

**Stream Generation**

Once the $S$ vector is initialized, the input key is no longer used. Stream generation involves cycling through all the elements of $S[i]$, and for each $S[i]$, swapping $S[i]$ with another byte in $S$ according to a scheme dictated by the current configuration of $S$. After $S[255]$ is reached, the process continues, starting over again at $S[0]$:

```c
/* Stream Generation */
i, j = 0;
while (true)
    i = (i + 1) mod 256;
    j = (j + S[i]) mod 256;
```
\begin{verbatim}
Swap (S[i], S[j]);
t = (S[i] + S[j]) mod 256;
k = S[t];
\end{verbatim}

To encrypt, XOR the value \( k \) with the next byte of plaintext. To decrypt, XOR the value \( k \) with the next byte of ciphertext.

Figure 7.6 illustrates the RC4 logic.

**Strength of RC4**

A number of papers have been published analyzing methods of attacking RC4 (e.g., [KNUD98], [MIST98], [FLUH00], [MANT01]). None of these approaches is practical against RC4 with a reasonable key length, such as 128 bits. A more serious problem is reported in [FLUH01]. The authors demonstrate that the WEP protocol, intended to provide confidentiality on 802.11 wireless LAN networks, is vulnerable to a particular attack approach. In essence, the problem is not with RC4 itself but the way in which keys are generated for use as input to RC4. This particular problem does not appear to be relevant to other applications using RC4 and
can be remedied in WEP by changing the way in which keys are generated. This problem points out the difficulty in designing a secure system that involves both cryptographic functions and protocols that make use of them.

7.6 TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS

Entropy Sources

A true random number generator (TRNG) uses a nondeterministic source to produce randomness. Most operate by measuring unpredictable natural processes, such as pulse detectors of ionizing radiation events, gas discharge tubes, and leaky capacitors. Intel has developed a commercially available chip that samples thermal noise by amplifying the voltage measured across undriven resistors [JUN99]. LavaRnd is an open source project for creating truly random numbers using inexpensive cameras, open source code, and inexpensive hardware. The system uses a saturated CCD in a light-tight can as a chaotic source to produce the seed. Software processes the result into truly random numbers in a variety of formats.

RFC 4086 lists the following possible sources of randomness that, with care, easily can be used on a computer to generate true random sequences.

- **Sound/video input:** Many computers are built with inputs that digitize some real-world analog source, such as sound from a microphone or video input from a camera. The “input” from a sound digitizer with no source plugged in or from a camera with the lens cap on is essentially thermal noise. If the system has enough gain to detect anything, such input can provide reasonably high quality random bits.

- **Disk drives:** Disk drives have small random fluctuations in their rotational speed due to chaotic air turbulence [JAKO98]. The addition of low-level disk seek-time instrumentation produces a series of measurements that contain this randomness. Such data is usually highly correlated, so significant processing is needed. Nevertheless, experimentation a decade ago showed that, with such processing, even slow disk drives on the slower computers of that day could easily produce 100 bits a minute or more of excellent random data.

There is also an online service (random.org), which can deliver random sequences securely over the Internet.

Skew

A TRNG may produce an output that is biased in some way, such as having more ones than zeros or vice versa. Various methods of modifying a bit stream to reduce or eliminate the bias have been developed. These are referred to as deskewing algorithms. One approach to deskew is to pass the bit stream through a hash function, such as MD5 or SHA-1 (described in Chapter 11). The hash function produces an \( n \)-bit output from an input of arbitrary length. For deskewing, blocks of \( m \) input bits, with \( m \geq n \), can be passed through the hash function. RFC 4086 recommends collecting input from multiple hardware sources and then mixing these using a hash function to produce random output.
Operating systems typically provide a built-in mechanism for generating random numbers. For example, Linux uses four entropy sources: mouse and keyboard activity, disk I/O operations, and specific interrupts. Bits are generated from these four sources and combined in a pooled buffer. When random bits are needed, the appropriate number of bits are read from the buffer and passed through the SHA-1 hash function [GUTT06].

### 7.7 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

Perhaps the best treatment of PRNGs is found in [KNUT98]. An alternative to the standard linear congruential algorithm, known as the linear recurrence algorithm, is explained in some detail in [BRIG79]. [ZENG91] assesses various PRNG algorithms for use in generating variable-length keys for Vernam types of ciphers.

An excellent survey of PRNGs, with an extensive bibliography, is [RITT91]. [MENE97] also provides a good discussions of secure PRNGs. Another good treatment, with an emphasis on practical implementation issues, is RFC 4086 [EAST05]. This RFC also describes a number of deskewing techniques. [KELS98] is a good survey of secure PRNG techniques and cryptanalytic attacks on them. SP 800-90 [BARK07] provides a useful treatment of a variety of PRNGs recommended by NIST. SP 800-22 [RUKH08] defines and discusses the 15 statistical tests of randomness recommended by NIST.

[KUMA97] contains an excellent and lengthy discussion of stream cipher design principles. Another good treatment, quite mathematical, is [RUEP92]. [ROBS95a] is an interesting and worthwhile examination of many design issues related to stream ciphers.

---


**RUEP92**  Rueppel, T. “Stream Ciphers.” In [SIMM92].
Recommended Web Sites:

- **NIST Random Number Generation Technical Working Group**: Contains documents and tests developed by NIST that related to PRNGs for cryptographic applications. Also has useful set of links.
- **NIST Random Number Generation Cryptographic Toolkit**: Another useful NIST site with documents and links.
- **LavaRnd**: LavaRnd is an open source project that uses a chaotic source to generate truly random numbers. The site also has background information on random numbers in general.
- **Quantum Random Numbers**: You can access quantum random numbers on the fly here.
- **RandomNumber.org**: Another source of random numbers.
- **A Million Random Digits**: Compiled by the RAND Corporation.

### 7.8 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

#### Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>backward unpredictability</th>
<th>pseudorandom function (PRF)</th>
<th>stream cipher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blum, Blum, Shub generator</td>
<td>pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)</td>
<td>skew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deskewing</td>
<td>randomness</td>
<td>true random number generator (TRNG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entropy source</td>
<td>RC4</td>
<td>unpredictability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forward unpredictability</td>
<td>seed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keystream</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linear congruential generator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Review Questions

7.1 What is the difference between statistical randomness and unpredictability?
7.2 List important design considerations for a stream cipher.
7.3 Why is it not desirable to reuse a stream cipher key?
7.4 What primitive operations are used in RC4?
Problems

7.1 If we take the linear congruential algorithm with an additive component of 0,
\[ X_{n+1} = (aX_n) \mod m \]
Then it can be shown that if \( m \) is prime and if a given value of \( a \) produces the maximum period of \( m - 1 \), then \( a^k \) will also produce the maximum period, provided that \( k \) is less than \( m \) and that \( k \) and \( m - 1 \) are relatively prime. Demonstrate this by using \( X_0 = 1 \) and \( m = 31 \) and producing the sequences for \( a^k = 3, 3^2, 3^3, \) and \( 3^4 \).

7.2 a. What is the maximum period obtainable from the following generator?
\[ X_{n+1} = (aX_n) \mod 2^4 \]
b. What should be the value of \( a \)?
c. What restrictions are required on the seed?

7.3 You may wonder why the modulus \( m = 2^{31} - 1 \) was chosen for the linear congruential method instead of simply \( 2^{31} \), because this latter number can be represented with no additional bits and the mod operation should be easier to perform. In general, the modulus \( 2^k - 1 \) is preferable to \( 2^k \). Why is this so?

7.4 With the linear congruential algorithm, a choice of parameters that provides a full period does not necessarily provide a good randomization. For example, consider the following two generators:
\[ X_{n+1} = (6X_n) \mod 13 \]
\[ X_{n+1} = (7X_n) \mod 13 \]
Write out the two sequences to show that both are full period. Which one appears more random to you?

7.5 In any use of pseudorandom numbers, whether for encryption, simulation, or statistical design, it is dangerous to trust blindly the random number generator that happens to be available in your computer’s system library. [PARK88] found that many contemporary textbooks and programming packages make use of flawed algorithms for pseudorandom number generation. This exercise will enable you to test your system.

The test is based on a theorem attributed to Ernesto Cesaro (see [KNUT98] for a proof), which states the following: Given two randomly chosen integers, \( x \) and \( y \), the probability that \( \gcd(x, y) = 1 \) is \( 6/\pi^2 \). Use this theorem in a program to determine statistically the value of \( \pi \). The main program should call three subprograms: the random number generator from the system library to generate the random integers; a subprogram to calculate the greatest common divisor of two integers using Euclid’s Algorithm; and a subprogram that calculates square roots. If these latter two programs are not available, you will have to write them as well. The main program should loop through a large number of random numbers to give an estimate of the aforementioned probability. From this, it is a simple matter to solve for your estimate of \( \pi \).

If the result is close to 3.14, congratulations! If not, then the result is probably low, usually a value of around 2.7. Why would such an inferior result be obtained?

7.6 Suppose you have a true random bit generator where each bit in the generated stream has the same probability of being a 0 or 1 as any other bit in the stream and that the bits are not correlated; that is the bits are generated from identical independent distribution. However, the bit stream is biased. The probability of a 1 is \( 0.5 + \delta \) and the probability of a 0 is \( n \), where \( 0 < \delta < 0.5 \). A simple deskewing algorithm is as follows: Examine the bit stream as a sequence of non-overlapping pairs. Discard all 00 and 11 pairs. Replace each 01 pair with 0 and each 10 pair with 1.

a. What is the probability of occurrence of each pair in the original sequence?
b. What is the probability of occurrence of 0 and 1 in the modified sequence?
c. What is the expected number of input bits to produce \( x \) output bits?
d. Suppose that the algorithm uses overlapping successive bit pairs instead of nonoverlapping successive bit pairs. That is, the first output bit is based on input bits 1 and 2, the second output bit is based on input bits 2 and 3, and so on. What can you say about the output bit stream?

7.7 Another approach to deskewing is to consider the bit stream as a sequence of non-overlapping groups of \( n \) bits each and output the parity of each group. That is, if a group contains an odd number of ones, the output is 1; otherwise the output is 0.
   a. Express this operation in terms of a basic Boolean function.
   b. Assume, as in the preceding problem, that the probability of a 1 is 0.5 + \( \delta \). If each group consists of 2 bits, what is the probability of an output of 1?
   c. If each group consists of 4 bits, what is the probability of an output of 1?
   d. Generalize the result to find the probability of an output of 1 for input groups of \( n \) bits.

7.8 What RC4 key value will leave S unchanged during initialization? That is, after the initial permutation of S, the entries of S will be equal to the values from 0 through 255 in ascending order.

7.9 RC4 has a secret internal state which is a permutation of all the possible values of the vector S and the two indices \( i \) and \( j \).
   a. Using a straightforward scheme to store the internal state, how many bits are used?
   b. Suppose we think of it from the point of view of how much information is represented by the state. In that case, we need to determine how many different states there are, then take the log to base 2 to find out how many bits of information this represents. Using this approach, how many bits would be needed to represent the state?

7.10 Alice and Bob agree to communicate privately via email using a scheme based on RC4, but they want to avoid using a new secret key for each transmission. Alice and Bob privately agree on a 128-bit key \( k \). To encrypt a message \( m \), consisting of a string of bits, the following procedure is used.
   1. Choose a random 80-bit value \( v \)
   2. Generate the ciphertext \( c = \text{RC4}(v \| k) \oplus m \)
   3. Send the bit string \( (v \| c) \)
   a. Suppose Alice uses this procedure to send a message \( m \) to Bob. Describe how Bob can recover the message \( m \) from \( (v \| c) \) using \( k \).
   b. If an adversary observes several values \( (v_1 \| c_1), (v_2 \| c_2), \ldots \) transmitted between Alice and Bob, how can he/she determine when the same key stream has been used to encrypt two messages?
   c. Approximately how many messages can Alice expect to send before the same key stream will be used twice? Use the result from the birthday paradox described in Appendix 11A [Equation (11.7)].
   d. What does this imply about the lifetime of the key \( k \) (i.e., the number of messages that can be encrypted using \( k \)?)
This page intentionally left blank
8.1 Prime Numbers
8.2 Fermat’s and Euler’s Theorems
   Fermat’s Theorem
   Euler’s Totient Function
   Euler’s Theorem
8.3 Testing for Primality
   Miller-Rabin Algorithm
   A Deterministic Primality Algorithm
   Distribution of Primes
8.4 The Chinese Remainder Theorem
8.5 Discrete Logarithms
   The Powers of an Integer, Modulo $n$
   Logarithms for Modular Arithmetic
   Calculation of Discrete Logarithms
8.6 Recommended Reading and Web Site
8.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
The Devil said to Daniel Webster: “Set me a task I can’t carry out, and I’ll give you anything in the world you ask for.”

Daniel Webster: “Fair enough. Prove that for \( n > 2 \), the equation \( a^n + b^n = c^n \) has no non-trivial solution in the integers.”

They agreed on a three-day period for the labor, and the Devil disappeared.

At the end of three days, the Devil presented himself, haggard, jumpy, biting his lip. Daniel Webster said to him, “Well, how did you do at my task? Did you prove the theorem?”

“Eh? No ... no, I haven’t proved it.”

“Well, how did you do at my task? Did you prove the theorem?”

“Then I can have whatever I ask for? Money? The Presidency?”

“What? Oh, that—of course. But listen! If we could just prove the following two lemmas—”

—The Mathematical Magpie, Clifton Fadiman

---

**KEY POINTS**

- A prime number is an integer that can only be divided without remainder by positive and negative values of itself and 1. Prime numbers play a critical role both in number theory and in cryptography.
- Two theorems that play important roles in public-key cryptography are Fermat’s theorem and Euler’s theorem.
- An important requirement in a number of cryptographic algorithms is the ability to choose a large prime number. An area of ongoing research is the development of efficient algorithms for determining if a randomly chosen large integer is a prime number.
- Discrete logarithms are fundamental to a number of public-key algorithms. Discrete logarithms are analogous to ordinary logarithms but are defined using modular arithmetic.

---

A number of concepts from number theory are essential in the design of public-key cryptographic algorithms. This chapter provides an overview of the concepts referred to in other chapters. The reader familiar with these topics can safely skip this chapter. The reader should also review Sections 4.1 through 4.3 before proceeding with this chapter.

As with Chapter 4, this chapter includes a number of examples, each of which is highlighted in a shaded box.
8.1 PRIME NUMBERS

A central concern of number theory is the study of prime numbers. Indeed, whole books have been written on the subject (e.g., [CRAN01], [RIBE96]). In this section, we provide an overview relevant to the concerns of this book.

An integer $p > 1$ is a prime number if and only if its only divisors are $\pm 1$ and $\pm p$. Prime numbers play a critical role in number theory and in the techniques discussed in this chapter. Table 8.1 shows the primes less than 2000. Note the way the primes are distributed. In particular, note the number of primes in each range of 100 numbers.

Any integer $a > 1$ can be factored in a unique way as

$$a = p_1^{a_1} \times p_2^{a_2} \times \cdots \times p_t^{a_t}$$

where $p_1 < p_2 < \ldots < p_t$ are prime numbers and where each $a_i$ is a positive integer. This is known as the fundamental theorem of arithmetic; a proof can be found in any text on number theory.

$$
\begin{align*}
91 &= 7 \times 13 \\
3600 &= 2^4 \times 3^2 \times 5^2 \\
11011 &= 7 \times 11^2 \times 13
\end{align*}
$$

It is useful for what follows to express this another way. If $P$ is the set of all prime numbers, then any positive integer $a$ can be written uniquely in the following form:

$$a = \prod_{p \in P} p^{a_p} \quad \text{where each } a_p \geq 0$$

The right-hand side is the product over all possible prime numbers $p$; for any particular value of $a$, most of the exponents $a_p$ will be 0.

The value of any given positive integer can be specified by simply listing all the nonzero exponents in the foregoing formulation.

The integer 12 is represented by $\{a_2 = 2, a_3 = 1\}$.
The integer 18 is represented by $\{a_2 = 1, a_3 = 2\}$.
The integer 91 is represented by $\{a_7 = 1, a_{13} = 1\}$.

Multiplication of two numbers is equivalent to adding the corresponding exponents. Given $a = \prod_{p \in P} p^{a_p}$, $b = \prod_{p \in P} p^{b_p}$. Define $k = ab$. We know that the integer

---

1In this section, unless otherwise noted, we deal only with the nonnegative integers. The use of negative integers would introduce no essential differences.

2Recall from Chapter 4 that integer $a$ is said to be a divisor of integer $b$ if there is no remainder on division. Equivalently, we say that $a$ divides $b$. 
Table 8.1  Primes Under 2000

|   | 2   | 3   | 5   | 7   | 11  | 13  | 17  | 19  | 23  | 29  | 31  | 37  | 41  | 43  | 47  | 53  | 59  | 61  | 67  | 71  | 73  | 79  | 83  | 89  | 97  |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 2 | 101 | 211 | 307 | 401 | 503 | 601 | 701 | 809 | 907 | 1009| 1201| 1511| 1601| 1709| 1801| 1901|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 3 | 103 | 223 | 311 | 409 | 509 | 607 | 709 | 811 | 911 | 1013| 1213| 1423| 1523| 1607| 1721| 1811| 1907|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 5 | 107 | 227 | 313 | 419 | 521 | 613 | 719 | 821 | 919 | 1019| 1117| 1217| 1307| 1427| 1531| 1609| 1723| 1823| 1913|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 7 | 109 | 229 | 317 | 421 | 523 | 617 | 727 | 823 | 929 | 1021| 1123| 1223| 1319| 1429| 1543| 1613| 1733| 1831| 1931|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 11| 113 | 233 | 331 | 431 | 541 | 619 | 733 | 827 | 937 | 1031| 1129| 1229| 1321| 1433| 1549| 1619| 1741| 1847| 1933|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 13| 127 | 239 | 337 | 433 | 547 | 631 | 739 | 829 | 941 | 1033| 1151| 1231| 1327| 1439| 1553| 1621| 1747| 1861| 1949|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 17| 131 | 241 | 347 | 439 | 557 | 641 | 743 | 839 | 947 | 1039| 1153| 1237| 1361| 1447| 1559| 1627| 1753| 1867| 1951|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 19| 137 | 251 | 349 | 443 | 563 | 643 | 751 | 853 | 953 | 1049| 1163| 1249| 1367| 1451| 1567| 1637| 1759| 1871| 1973|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 23| 139 | 257 | 353 | 449 | 569 | 647 | 757 | 857 | 967 | 1051| 1171| 1259| 1373| 1453| 1571| 1657| 1777| 1873| 1979|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 29| 149 | 263 | 359 | 457 | 571 | 653 | 761 | 859 | 971 | 1061| 1181| 1277| 1381| 1459| 1579| 1663| 1783| 1877| 1987|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 31| 151 | 269 | 367 | 461 | 577 | 659 | 769 | 863 | 977 | 1063| 1187| 1279| 1399| 1471| 1583| 1667| 1787| 1879| 1993|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 37| 157 | 271 | 373 | 463 | 587 | 661 | 773 | 877 | 983 | 1069| 1193| 1283| 1481| 1597| 1669| 1789| 1889| 1997|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 41| 163 | 277 | 379 | 467 | 593 | 673 | 787 | 881 | 991 | 1087| 1289| 1483| 1693| 1899| 1999|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 43| 167 | 281 | 383 | 479 | 599 | 677 | 797 | 883 | 997 | 1091| 1291| 1487| 1697|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 47| 173 | 283 | 389 | 487 | 683 | 887 | 1093| 1297| 1489| 1699|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 53| 179 | 293 | 397 | 491 | 691 | 897 | 1097| 1493|   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |


$k$ can be expressed as the product of powers of primes: $k = \prod_{p \in P} p^{k_p}$. It follows that $k_p = a_p + b_p$ for all $p \in P$.

\[
k = 12 \times 18 = (2^2 \times 3) \times (2 \times 3^2) = 216 \\
k_2 = 2 + 1 = 3; 
k_3 = 1 + 2 = 3 \\
216 = 2^3 \times 3^3 = 8 \times 27
\]

What does it mean, in terms of the prime factors of $a$ and $b$, to say that $a$ divides $b$? Any integer of the form $p^n$ can be divided only by an integer that is of a lesser or equal power of the same prime number, $p^j$ with $j \leq n$. Thus, we can say the following.

Given

\[
a = \prod_{p \in P} p^{a_p}, 
\quad b = \prod_{p \in P} p^{b_p}
\]

If $a | b$, then $a_p \leq b_p$ for all $p$.

\[
a = 12; 
b = 36; 
12 = 2^2 \times 3; 
36 = 2^2 \times 3^2 \\
a_2 = 2 = b_2 \\
a_3 = 1 \leq 2 = b_3
\]

Thus, the inequality $a_p \leq b_p$ is satisfied for all prime numbers.

It is easy to determine the greatest common divisor\(^3\) of two positive integers if we express each integer as the product of primes.

\[
300 = 2^2 \times 3^1 \times 5^2 \\
18 = 2^1 \times 3^2 \\
\gcd(18, 300) = 2^1 \times 3^1 \times 5^0 = 6
\]

The following relationship always holds:

If $k = \gcd(a, b)$, then $k_p = \min(a_p, b_p)$ for all $p$.

Determining the prime factors of a large number is no easy task, so the preceding relationship does not directly lead to a practical method of calculating the greatest common divisor.

\(^3\)Recall from Chapter 4 that the greatest common divisor of integers $a$ and $b$, expressed $(\gcd a, b)$, is an integer $c$ that divides both $a$ and $b$ without remainder and that any divisor of $a$ and $b$ is a divisor of $c$. 

Two theorems that play important roles in public-key cryptography are Fermat’s theorem and Euler’s theorem.

### Fermat’s Theorem

Fermat’s theorem states the following: If \( p \) is prime and \( a \) is a positive integer not divisible by \( p \), then

\[
a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (8.2)

**Proof:** Consider the set of positive integers less than \( p \): \([1, 2, \ldots, p-1]\) and multiply each element by \( a \), modulo \( p \), to get the set \( X = \{a \mod{p}, 2a \mod{p}, \ldots, (p-1)a \mod{p}\} \). None of the elements of \( X \) is equal to zero because \( p \) does not divide \( a \). Furthermore, no two of the integers in \( X \) are equal. To see this, assume that \( ja = ka \pmod{p} \), where \( 1 \leq j < k \leq p - 1 \). Because \( a \) is relatively prime\(^5\) to \( p \), we can eliminate \( a \) from both sides of the equation [see Equation (4.3)] resulting in \( j = k \pmod{p} \). This last equality is impossible, because \( j \) and \( k \) are both positive integers less than \( p \). Therefore, we know that the \((p - 1)\) elements of \( X \) are all positive integers with no two elements equal. We can conclude the \( X \) consists of the set of integers \([1, 2, \ldots, p-1]\) in some order. Multiplying the numbers in both sets \((p \text{ and } X)\) and taking the result mod \( p \) yields

\[
a \times 2a \times \ldots \times (p-1)a = [(1 \times 2 \times \ldots \times (p-1)) \pmod{p}]
\]

\[
a^{p-1}(p-1)! = (p-1)! \pmod{p}
\]

We can cancel the \((p-1)!\) term because it is relatively prime to \( p \) [see Equation (4.5)]. This yields Equation (8.2), which completes the proof.

\[\begin{align*}
a &= 7, \quad p = 19 \\
7^2 &= 49 \equiv 11 \pmod{19} \\
7^4 &= 121 \equiv 7 \pmod{19} \\
7^8 &= 49 \equiv 11 \pmod{19} \\
7^{16} &= 121 \equiv 7 \pmod{19} \\
7^{p-1} &= 7^{18} = 7^{16} \times 7^2 = 7 \times 11 \equiv 1 \pmod{19}
\end{align*}\]

An alternative form of Fermat’s theorem is also useful: If \( p \) is prime and \( a \) is a positive integer, then

\[
a^p = a \pmod{p}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (8.3)

\(^4\)This is sometimes referred to as Fermat’s little theorem.

\(^5\)Recall from Chapter 4 that two numbers are relatively prime if they have no prime factors in common; that is, their only common divisor is 1. This is equivalent to saying that two numbers are relatively prime if their greatest common divisor is 1.
Note that the first form of the theorem [Equation (8.2)] requires that  be relatively prime to  , but this form does not.

\[ p = 5, \ a = 3 \quad \Rightarrow \quad a^p = 3^5 = 243 \equiv 3(\mod 5) = a(\mod p) \]

\[ p = 5, \ a = 10 \quad \Rightarrow \quad a^p = 10^5 = 100000 = 10(\mod 5) = 0(\mod 5) = a(\mod p) \]

**Euler’s Totient Function**

Before presenting Euler’s theorem, we need to introduce an important quantity in number theory, referred to as **Euler’s totient function**, written  , and defined as the number of positive integers less than  and relatively prime to . By convention,  .

To determine , we list all of the positive integers less than 35 that are relatively prime to it:

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18
19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34

There are 24 numbers on the list, so  .

Table 8.2 lists the first 30 values of . The value  is without meaning but is defined to have the value 1.

It should be clear that, for a prime number  ,

\[ \phi(p) = p - 1 \]

Now suppose that we have two prime numbers  and  with  . Then we can show that, for  ,

\[ \phi(n) = \phi(pq) = \phi(p) \times \phi(q) = (p - 1) \times (q - 1) \]

To see that  , consider that the set of positive integers less than  is the set \{1, \ldots, (pq - 1)\}. The integers in this set that are not relatively prime to  are the set \{p, 2p, \ldots, (q - 1)p\} and the set \{q, 2q, \ldots, (p - 1)q\}. Accordingly,

\[ \phi(n) = (pq - 1) - [(q - 1) + (p - 1)] \\
= pq - (p + q + 1) \\
= (p - 1) \times (q - 1) \\
= \phi(p) \times \phi(q) \]
Table 8.2  Some Values of Euler’s Totient Function $\phi(n)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$\phi(n)$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$\phi(n)$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$\phi(n)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \phi(21) = \phi(3) \times \phi(7) = (3 - 1) \times (7 - 1) = 2 \times 6 = 12 \]


where the 12 integers are \{1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20\}.

Euler’s Theorem

Euler’s theorem states that for every $a$ and $n$ that are relatively prime:

\[ a^{\phi(n)} = 1 \pmod{n} \]  

(8.4)

Proof: Equation (8.4) is true if $n$ is prime, because in that case, $\phi(n) = (n - 1)$ and Fermat’s theorem holds. However, it also holds for any integer $n$. Recall that $\phi(n)$ is the number of positive integers less than $n$ that are relatively prime to $n$. Consider the set of such integers, labeled as

\[ R = \{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{\phi(n)}\} \]

That is, each element $x_i$ of $R$ is a unique positive integer less than $n$ with $\gcd(x_i, n) = 1$. Now multiply each element by $a$, modulo $n$:

\[ S = \{(ax_1 \pmod{n}), (ax_2 \pmod{n}), \ldots, (ax_{\phi(n)} \pmod{n})\} \]

The set $S$ is a permutation of $R$, by the following line of reasoning:

1. Because $a$ is relatively prime to $n$ and $x_i$ is relatively prime to $n$, $ax_i$ must also be relatively prime to $n$. Thus, all the members of $S$ are integers that are less than $n$ and that are relatively prime to $n.$

---

6Recall from Chapter 2 that a permutation of a finite set of elements $S$ is an ordered sequence of all the elements of $S$, with each element appearing exactly once.
2. There are no duplicates in \( S \). Refer to Equation (4.5). If \( ax_i \mod n = ax_j \mod n \), then \( x_i = x_j \).

Therefore,

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{\phi(n)} (ax_i \mod n) = \prod_{i=1}^{\phi(n)} x_i
\]

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{\phi(n)} ax_i = \prod_{i=1}^{\phi(n)} x_i \pmod{n}
\]

\[
a^{\phi(n)} = \left( \prod_{i=1}^{\phi(n)} x_i \right) \pmod{n}
\]

which completes the proof. This is the same line of reasoning applied to the proof of Fermat’s theorem.

\[
\begin{align*}
& a = 3; n = 10; \phi(10) = 4 \quad a^{\phi(n)} = 3^4 = 81 = 1 \pmod{10} = 1 \pmod{n} \\
& a = 2; n = 11; \phi(11) = 10 \quad a^{\phi(n)} = 2^{10} = 1024 = 1 \pmod{11} = 1 \pmod{n}
\end{align*}
\]

As is the case for Fermat’s theorem, an alternative form of the theorem is also useful:

\[
a^{\phi(n)+1} = a \pmod{n}
\]

Again, similar to the case with Fermat’s theorem, the first form of Euler’s theorem [Equation (8.4)] requires that \( a \) be relatively prime to \( n \), but this form does not.

8.3 TESTING FOR PRIMALITY

For many cryptographic algorithms, it is necessary to select one or more very large prime numbers at random. Thus, we are faced with the task of determining whether a given large number is prime. There is no simple yet efficient means of accomplishing this task.

In this section, we present one attractive and popular algorithm. You may be surprised to learn that this algorithm yields a number that is not necessarily a prime. However, the algorithm can yield a number that is almost certainly a prime. This will be explained presently. We also make reference to a deterministic algorithm for finding primes. The section closes with a discussion concerning the distribution of primes.
Miller-Rabin Algorithm\textsuperscript{7}

The algorithm due to Miller and Rabin [MILL75, RABI80] is typically used to test a large number for primality. Before explaining the algorithm, we need some background. First, any positive odd integer can be expressed as

\[ n - 1 = 2^k q \quad \text{with } k > 0, q \text{ odd} \]

To see this, note that \( n - 1 \) is an even integer. Then, divide \( n - 1 \) by 2 until the result is an odd number \( q \), for a total of \( k \) divisions. If \( n \) is expressed as a binary number, then the result is achieved by shifting the number to the right until the rightmost digit is a 1, for a total of \( k \) shifts. We now develop two properties of prime numbers that we will need.

\textbf{Two Properties of Prime Numbers} The \textbf{first property} is stated as follows: If \( p \) is prime and \( a \) is a positive integer less than \( p \), then \( a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \) if and only if either \( a \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \) or \( a \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \). By the rules of modular arithmetic, if \( a \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \), then \( a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \). Conversely, if \( a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \), then \( (a \pmod{p})^2 = 1 \), which is true only for \( a \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \) or \( a \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \).

The \textbf{second property} is stated as follows: Let \( p \) be a prime number greater than 2. We can then write \( p - 1 = 2^k q \) with \( k > 0, q \text{ odd} \). Let \( a \) be any integer in the range \( 1 < a < p - 1 \). Then one of the two following conditions is true.

1. \( a^q \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \). That is, \( a^q \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \).
2. One of the numbers \( a^q, a^{2q}, a^{4q}, \ldots, a^{2^{k-1}q} \) is congruent to \(-1\) modulo \( p \). That is, there is some number \( j \) in the range \( 1 \leq j \leq k \) such that \( a^{2^{j-1}q} \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \) or equivalently, \( a^{2^{j-1}q} \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \).

\textbf{Proof:} Fermat’s theorem [Equation (8.2)] states that \( a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \) if \( n \) is prime. We have \( p - 1 = 2^k q \). Thus, we know that \( a^{p-1} \equiv a^{2kq} \pmod{p} \). Thus, if we look at the sequence of numbers

\[ a^q \pmod{p}, a^{2q} \pmod{p}, a^{4q} \pmod{p}, \ldots, a^{2^{k-1}q} \pmod{p}, a^{2kq} \pmod{p} \quad (8.6) \]

we know that the last number in the list has value 1. Further, each number in the list is the square of the previous number. Therefore, one of the following possibilities must be true.

1. The first number on the list, and therefore all subsequent numbers on the list, equals 1.
2. Some number on the list does not equal 1, but its square \( \pmod{p} \) does equal 1. By virtue of the first property of prime numbers defined above, we know that the only number that satisfies this condition is \( p - 1 \). So, in this case, the list contains an element equal to \( p - 1 \).

This completes the proof.

\textsuperscript{7}Also referred to in the literature as the Rabin-Miller algorithm, or the Rabin-Miller test, or the Miller-Rabin test.
Details of the Algorithm  These considerations lead to the conclusion that, if \( n \) is prime, then either the first element in the list of residues, or remainders, \( (a^q, a^{2q}, \ldots, a^{2^{k-1}q}, a^{2^kq}) \) modulo \( n \) equals 1; or some element in the list equals \( (n - 1) \); otherwise \( n \) is composite (i.e., not a prime). On the other hand, if the condition is met, that does not necessarily mean that \( n \) is prime. For example, if \( n = 2047 = 23 \times 89 \), then \( n - 1 = 2 \times 1023 \). We compute \( 2^{1023} \mod 2047 = 1 \), so that 2047 meets the condition but is not prime.

We can use the preceding property to devise a test for primality. The procedure TEST takes a candidate integer \( n \) as input and returns the result composite if \( n \) is definitely not a prime, and the result inconclusive if \( n \) may or may not be a prime.

\[
\text{TEST} \ (n)
\]

1. Find integers \( k, q \), with \( k > 0, q \) odd, so that \( (n - 1) = 2^kq \).
2. Select a random integer \( a, 1 < a < n - 1 \);
3. if \( a^q \mod n = 1 \) then return("inconclusive");
4. for \( j = 0 \) to \( k - 1 \) do
5. if \( a^{2^j q} \mod n = n - 1 \) then return("inconclusive");
6. return("composite");

Let us apply the test to the prime number \( n = 29 \). We have \( (n - 1) = 28 = 2^3(7) = 2^kq \). First, let us try \( a = 10 \). We compute \( 10^7 \mod 29 = 17 \), which is neither 1 nor 28, so we continue the test. The next calculation finds that \( (10^7)^2 \mod 29 = 28 \), and the test returns inconclusive (i.e., 29 may be prime). Let’s try again with \( a = 2 \). We have the following calculations: \( 2^7 \mod 29 = 12; 2^{14} \mod 29 = 28 \); and the test again returns inconclusive. If we perform the test for all integers \( a \) in the range 1 through 28, we get the same inconclusive result, which is compatible with \( n \) being a prime number.

Now let us apply the test to the composite number \( n = 13 \times 17 = 221 \). Then \( (n-1) = 220 = 2^2(55) = 2^kq \). Let us try \( a = 5 \). Then we have \( 5^{55} \mod 221 = 112 \), which is neither 1 nor \( 220(55)^2 \mod 221 = 168 \). Because we have used all values of \( j \) (i.e., \( j = 0 \) and \( j = 1 \)) in line 4 of the TEST algorithm, the test returns composite, indicating that 221 is definitely a composite number. But suppose we had selected \( a = 21 \). Then we have \( 21^{55} \mod 221 = 200; (21^{55})^2 \mod 221 = 220 \); and the test returns inconclusive, indicating that 221 may be prime. In fact, of the 218 integers from 2 through 219, four of these will return an inconclusive result, namely 21, 47, 174, and 200.

Repeated Use of the Miller-Rabin Algorithm  How can we use the Miller-Rabin algorithm to determine with a high degree of confidence whether or not an integer is prime? It can be shown [KNUT98] that given an odd number \( n \) that is not prime and a randomly chosen integer, \( a \) with \( 1 < a < n - 1 \), the probability that TEST will return inconclusive (i.e., fail to detect that \( n \) is not prime) is less than 1/4. Thus, if \( t \) different values of \( a \) are chosen, the probability that all of them will
pass TEST (return inconclusive) for \( n \) is less than \((1/4)^t\). For example, for \( t = 10 \), the probability that a nonprime number will pass all ten tests is less than \(10^{-6}\). Thus, for a sufficiently large value of \( t \), we can be confident that \( n \) is prime if Miller’s test always returns inconclusive.

This gives us a basis for determining whether an odd integer \( n \) is prime with a reasonable degree of confidence. The procedure is as follows: Repeatedly invoke TEST \((n)\) using randomly chosen values for \( a \). If, at any point, TEST returns composite, then \( n \) is determined to be nonprime. If TEST continues to return inconclusive for \( t \) tests, then for a sufficiently large value of \( t \), assume that \( n \) is prime.

A Deterministic Primality Algorithm

Prior to 2002, there was no known method of efficiently proving the primality of very large numbers. All of the algorithms in use, including the most popular (Miller-Rabin), produced a probabilistic result. In 2002, Agrawal, Kayal, and Saxena [AGRA02] developed a relatively simple deterministic algorithm that efficiently determines whether a given large number is a prime. The algorithm, known as the AKS algorithm, does not appear to be as efficient as the Miller-Rabin algorithm. Thus far, it has not supplanted this older, probabilistic technique [BORN03].

Distribution of Primes

It is worth noting how many numbers are likely to be rejected before a prime number is found using the Miller-Rabin test, or any other test for primality. A result from number theory, known as the prime number theorem, states that the primes near \( n \) are spaced on the average one every \((\ln n)\) integers. Thus, on average, one would have to test on the order of \( \ln(n) \) integers before a prime is found. Because all even integers can be immediately rejected, the correct figure is \(0.5\ln(n)\). For example, if a prime on the order of magnitude of \(2^{200}\) were sought, then about \(0.5\ln(2^{200}) = 69\) trials would be needed to find a prime. However, this figure is just an average. In some places along the number line, primes are closely packed, and in other places there are large gaps.

The two consecutive odd integers 1,000,000,000,061 and 1,000,000,000,063 are both prime. On the other hand, 1001! + 2, 1001! + 3, ..., 1001! + 1000, 1001! + 1001 is a sequence of 1000 consecutive composite integers.

8.4 THE CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM

One of the most useful results of number theory is the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT).\(^8\) In essence, the CRT says it is possible to reconstruct integers in a certain range from their residues modulo a set of pairwise relatively prime moduli.

---

\(^8\)The CRT is so called because it is believed to have been discovered by the Chinese mathematician Sun-Tsu in around 100 A.D.
The CRT can be stated in several ways. We present here a formulation that is most useful from the point of view of this text. An alternative formulation is explored in Problem 8.17. Let

\[ M = \prod_{i=1}^{k} m_i \]

where the \( m_i \) are pairwise relatively prime; that is, \( \gcd(m_i, m_j) = 1 \) for \( 1 \leq i, j \leq k \), and \( i \neq j \). We can represent any integer \( A \) in \( Z_M \) by a \( k \)-tuple whose elements are in \( Z_{m_i} \) using the following correspondence:

\[ A \leftrightarrow (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k) \quad (8.7) \]

where \( A \in Z_M \), \( a_i \in Z_{m_i} \), and \( a_i = A \mod m_i \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq k \). The CRT makes two assertions.

1. The mapping of Equation (8.7) is a one-to-one correspondence (called a bijection) between \( Z_M \) and the Cartesian product \( Z_{m_1} \times Z_{m_2} \times \cdots \times Z_{m_k} \). That is, for every integer \( A \) such that \( 0 \leq A \leq M \), there is a unique \( k \)-tuple \((a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k)\) with \( 0 \leq a_i < m_i \) that represents it, and for every such \( k \)-tuple \((a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k)\), there is a unique integer \( A \) in \( Z_M \).

2. Operations performed on the elements of \( Z_M \) can be equivalently performed on the corresponding \( k \)-tuples by performing the operation independently in each coordinate position in the appropriate system.

Let us demonstrate the first assertion. The transformation from \( A \) to \((a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k)\), is obviously unique; that is, each \( a_i \) is uniquely calculated as \( a_i = A \mod m_i \). Computing \( A \) from \((a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k)\) can be done as follows. Let \( M_i = M/m_i \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq k \). Note that \( M_i = m_1 \times m_2 \times \cdots \times m_{i-1} \times m_{i+1} \times \cdots \times m_k \), so that \( M_i \equiv 0 (\mod m_j) \) for all \( j \neq i \). Then let

\[ c_i = M_i \times \left(M_i^{-1} \mod m_i\right) \quad \text{for} \ 1 \leq i \leq k \quad (8.8) \]

By the definition of \( M_i \), it is relatively prime to \( m_i \) and therefore has a unique multiplicative inverse \( \mod m_i \). So Equation (8.8) is well defined and produces a unique value \( c_i \). We can now compute

\[ A \equiv \left( \sum_{i=1}^{k} a_i c_i \right) \mod M \quad (8.9) \]
To show that the value of $A$ produced by Equation (8.9) is correct, we must show that $a_i = A \mod m_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq k$. Note that $c_j = M_j = 0 \mod m_i$ if $j \neq i$, and that $c_i = 1 \mod m_i$. It follows that $a_i = A \mod m_i$.

The second assertion of the CRT, concerning arithmetic operations, follows from the rules for modular arithmetic. That is, the second assertion can be stated as follows: If

$$A \leftrightarrow (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k)$$
$$B \leftrightarrow (b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_k)$$

then

$$(A + B) \mod M \leftrightarrow ((a_1 + b_1) \mod m_1, \ldots, (a_k + b_k) \mod m_k)$$
$$(A - B) \mod M \leftrightarrow ((a_1 - b_1) \mod m_1, \ldots, (a_k - b_k) \mod m_k)$$
$$(A \times B) \mod M \leftrightarrow ((a_1 \times b_1) \mod m_1, \ldots, (a_k \times b_k) \mod m_k)$$

One of the useful features of the Chinese remainder theorem is that it provides a way to manipulate (potentially very large) numbers mod $M$ in terms of tuples of smaller numbers. This can be useful when $M$ is 150 digits or more. However, note that it is necessary to know beforehand the factorization of $M$.

---

To represent $973 \mod 1813$ as a pair of numbers mod 37 and 49, define

$$m_1 = 37$$
$$m_2 = 49$$
$$M = 1813$$
$$A = 973$$

We also have $M_1 = 49$ and $M_2 = 37$. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, we compute $M_1^{-1} = 34 \mod m_1$ and $M_2^{-1} = 4 \mod m_2$. (Note that we only need to compute each $M_i$ and each $M_i^{-1}$ once.) Taking residues modulo 37 and 49, our representation of 973 is $(11, 42)$, because $973 \mod 37 = 11$ and $973 \mod 49 = 42$.

Now suppose we want to add 678 to 973. What do we do to $(11, 42)$? First we compute $(678) \leftrightarrow (678 \mod 37, 678 \mod 49) = (12, 41)$. Then we add the tuples element-wise and reduce $(11 + 12 \mod 37, 42 + 41 \mod 49) = (23, 34)$. To verify that this has the correct effect, we compute

$$(23, 34) \leftrightarrow a_1 M_1 M_1^{-1} + a_2 M_2 M_2^{-1} \mod M$$
$$= [(23)(49)(34) + (34)(37)(4)] \mod 1813$$
$$= 43350 \mod 1813$$
$$= 1651$$

and check that it is equal to $(973 + 678) \mod 1813 = 1651$. Remember that in the above derivation, $M_i^{-1}$ is the multiplicative inverse of $M_1 \mod m_1$ modulo $M_2^{-1}$ is the multiplicative inverse of $M_2 \mod m_2$.

---

This example was provided by Professor Ken Calvert of Georgia Tech.
Discrete logarithms are fundamental to a number of public-key algorithms, including Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the digital signature algorithm (DSA). This section provides a brief overview of discrete logarithms. For the interested reader, more detailed developments of this topic can be found in [ORE67] and [LEVE90].

### The Powers of an Integer, Modulo \( n \)

Recall from Euler’s theorem [Equation (8.4)] that, for every \( a \) and \( n \) that are relatively prime,

\[
a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}
\]

where \( \phi(n) \), Euler’s totient function, is the number of positive integers less than \( n \) and relatively prime to \( n \). Now consider the more general expression:

\[
a^m \equiv 1 \pmod{n}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (8.10)

If \( a \) and \( n \) are relatively prime, then there is at least one integer \( m \) that satisfies Equation (8.10), namely, \( M = \phi(n) \). The least positive exponent \( m \) for which Equation (8.10) holds is referred to in several ways:

- The order of \( a \) (mod \( n \))
- The exponent to which \( a \) belongs (mod \( n \))
- The length of the period generated by \( a \)

To see this last point, consider the powers of 7, modulo 19:

\[
\begin{align*}
7^1 &= 7 \pmod{19} \\
7^2 &= 49 = 2 \times 19 + 11 \equiv 11 \pmod{19} \\
7^3 &= 343 = 18 \times 19 + 1 \equiv 1 \pmod{19} \\
7^4 &= 2401 = 126 \times 19 + 7 \equiv 7 \pmod{19} \\
7^5 &= 16807 = 884 \times 19 + 11 \equiv 11 \pmod{19}
\end{align*}
\]
Table 8.3 shows all the powers of \(a\), modulo 19 for all positive \(a < 19\). The length of the sequence for each base value is indicated by shading. Note the following:

1. All sequences end in 1. This is consistent with the reasoning of the preceding few paragraphs.

2. The length of a sequence divides \(\phi(19) = 18\). That is, an integral number of sequences occur in each row of the table.

3. Some of the sequences are of length 18. In this case, it is said that the base integer \(a\) generates (via powers) the set of nonzero integers modulo 19. Each such integer is called a primitive root of the modulus 19.

Table 8.3  Powers of Integers, Modulo 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(a^2)</th>
<th>(a^3)</th>
<th>(a^4)</th>
<th>(a^5)</th>
<th>(a^6)</th>
<th>(a^7)</th>
<th>(a^8)</th>
<th>(a^9)</th>
<th>(a^{10})</th>
<th>(a^{11})</th>
<th>(a^{12})</th>
<th>(a^{13})</th>
<th>(a^{14})</th>
<th>(a^{15})</th>
<th>(a^{16})</th>
<th>(a^{17})</th>
<th>(a^{18})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More generally, we can say that the highest possible exponent to which a number can belong \((\text{mod } n)\) is \(\phi(n)\). If a number is of this order, it is referred to as a **primitive root** of \(n\). The importance of this notion is that if \(a\) is a primitive root of \(n\), then its powers

\[ a, a^2, \ldots, a^{\phi(n)} \]

are distinct \((\text{mod } n)\) and are all relatively prime to \(n\). In particular, for a prime number \(p\), if \(a\) is a primitive root of \(p\), then

\[ a, a^2, \ldots, a^{p-1} \]

are distinct \((\text{mod } p)\). For the prime number 19, its primitive roots are 2, 3, 10, 13, 14, and 15.

Not all integers have primitive roots. In fact, the only integers with primitive roots are those of the form \(2, 4, p^a, \text{ and } 2p^a\), where \(p\) is any odd prime and \(a\) is a positive integer. The proof is not simple but can be found in many number theory books, including [ORE76].

### Logarithms for Modular Arithmetic

With ordinary positive real numbers, the logarithm function is the inverse of exponentiation. An analogous function exists for modular arithmetic.

Let us briefly review the properties of ordinary logarithms. The logarithm of a number is defined to be the power to which some positive base (except 1) must be raised in order to equal the number. That is, for base \(x\) and for a value \(y\),

\[ y = x^\log_x(y) \]

The properties of logarithms include

\[
\begin{align*}
\log_x(1) &= 0 \\
\log_x(x) &= 1 \\
\log_x(yz) &= \log_x(y) + \log_x(z) \quad (8.11) \\
\log_x(y^r) &= r \times \log_x(y) \quad (8.12)
\end{align*}
\]

Consider a primitive root \(a\) for some prime number \(p\) (the argument can be developed for nonprimes as well). Then we know that the powers of \(a\) from 1 through \((p - 1)\) produce each integer from 1 through \((p - 1)\) exactly once. We also know that any integer \(b\) satisfies

\[ b \equiv r \pmod{p} \quad \text{for some } r, \text{ where } 0 \leq r \leq (p - 1) \]

by the definition of modular arithmetic. It follows that for any integer \(b\) and a primitive root \(a\) of prime number \(p\), we can find a unique exponent \(i\) such that

\[ b \equiv a^i \pmod{p} \quad \text{where } 0 \leq i \leq (p - 1) \]
This exponent $i$ is referred to as the **discrete logarithm** of the number $b$ for the base $a \pmod p$. We denote this value as $d\log_{a,p}(b)$.\(^{10}\)

Note the following:

$$d\log_{a,p}(1) = 0 \quad \text{because} \quad a^0 \mod p = 1 \mod p = 1 \quad (8.13)$$

$$d\log_{a,p}(a) = 1 \quad \text{because} \quad a^1 \mod p = a \quad (8.14)$$

Here is an example using a nonprime modulus, $n = 9$. Here $\phi(n) = 6$ and $a = 2$ is a primitive root. We compute the various powers of $a$ and find

$$
2^0 = 1 \quad 2^4 = 7 \pmod 9 \\
2^1 = 2 \quad 2^5 = 5 \pmod 9 \\
2^2 = 4 \quad 2^6 = 1 \pmod 9 \\
2^3 = 8
$$

This gives us the following table of the numbers with given discrete logarithms (mod 9) for the root $a = 2$:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logarithm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To make it easy to obtain the discrete logarithms of a given number, we rearrange the table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logarithm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now consider

$$x = a^{d\log_{a,p}(x)} \pmod p \quad y = a^{d\log_{a,p}(y)} \pmod p$$

$$xy = a^{d\log_{a,p}(xy)} \pmod p$$

Using the rules of modular multiplication,

$$xy \mod p = [(x \mod p)(y \mod p)] \mod p$$

$$a^{d\log_{a,p}(xy)} \pmod p = \left[ \left( a^{d\log_{a,p}(x)} \mod p \right) \left( a^{d\log_{a,p}(y)} \mod p \right) \right] \mod p$$

$$= \left( a^{d\log_{a,p}(x) + d\log_{a,p}(y)} \right) \mod p$$

But now consider Euler’s theorem, which states that, for every $a$ and $n$ that are relatively prime,

$$a^{\phi(n)} = 1 \pmod n$$

---

\(^{10}\)Many texts refer to the discrete logarithm as the **index**. There is no generally agreed notation for this concept, much less an agreed name.
Any positive integer \( z \) can be expressed in the form \( z = q + k\phi(n) \), with \( 0 \leq q < \phi(n) \). Therefore, by Euler’s theorem,

\[
a^z = a^q \pmod n \quad \text{if} \quad z = q \pmod{\phi(n)}
\]

Applying this to the foregoing equality, we have

\[
d\log_{a,p}(xy) = \left[ d\log_{a,p}(x) + d\log_{a,p}(y) \right] \pmod{\phi(p)}
\]

and generalizing,

\[
d\log_{a,p}(y^r) = \left[ r \times d\log_{a,p}(y) \right] \pmod{\phi(p)}
\]

This demonstrates the analogy between true logarithms and discrete logarithms.

Keep in mind that unique discrete logarithms mod \( m \) to some base \( a \) exist only if \( a \) is a primitive root of \( m \).

Table 8.4, which is directly derived from Table 8.3, shows the sets of discrete logarithms that can be defined for modulus 19.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.4</th>
<th>Tables of Discrete Logarithms, Modulo 19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Discrete logarithms to the base 2, modulo 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{2,19}(a) )</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Discrete logarithms to the base 3, modulo 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{3,19}(a) )</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Discrete logarithms to the base 10, modulo 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{10,19}(a) )</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Discrete logarithms to the base 13, modulo 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{13,19}(a) )</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Discrete logarithms to the base 14, modulo 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{14,19}(a) )</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Discrete logarithms to the base 15, modulo 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{15,19}(a) )</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Calculation of Discrete Logarithms

Consider the equation

\[ y = g^x \mod p \]

Given \( g, x, \) and \( p \), it is a straightforward matter to calculate \( y \). At the worst, we must perform \( x \) repeated multiplications, and algorithms exist for achieving greater efficiency (see Chapter 9).

However, given \( y, g, \) and \( p \), it is, in general, very difficult to calculate \( x \) (take the discrete logarithm). The difficulty seems to be on the same order of magnitude as that of factoring primes required for RSA. At the time of this writing, the asymptotically fastest known algorithm for taking discrete logarithms modulo a prime number is on the order of [BETH91]:

\[ e^{((\ln p)^{1/3}(\ln(\ln p))^{2/3})} \]

which is not feasible for large primes.

8.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

There are many basic texts on the subject of number theory that provide far more detail than most readers of this book will desire. An elementary but nevertheless useful short introduction is [ORE67]. For the reader interested in a more in-depth treatment, two excellent textbooks on the subject are [KUMA98] and [ROSE05]. [LEVE90] is a readable and detailed account as well. All of these books include problems with solutions, enhancing their value for self-study.

For readers willing to commit the time, perhaps the best way to get a solid grasp of the fundamentals of number theory is to work their way through [BURN97], which consists solely of a series of exercises with solutions that lead the student step-by-step through the concepts of number theory; working through all of the exercises is equivalent to completing an undergraduate course in number theory.


Recommended Web Site:

- **The Prime Pages**: Prime number research, records, and resources.
8.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>bijection</th>
<th>Euler’s theorem</th>
<th>order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>composite number</td>
<td>Euler’s totient function</td>
<td>prime number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese remainder theorem</td>
<td>Fermat’s theorem</td>
<td>primitive root</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrete logarithm</td>
<td>index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

8.1 What is a prime number?
8.2 What is the meaning of the expression $a$ divides $b$?
8.3 What is Euler’s totient function?
8.4 The Miller-Rabin test can determine if a number is not prime but cannot determine if a number is prime. How can such an algorithm be used to test for primality?
8.5 What is a primitive root of a number?
8.6 What is the difference between an index and a discrete logarithm?

Problems

8.1 The purpose of this problem is to determine how many prime numbers there are. Suppose there are a total of $n$ prime numbers, and we list these in order: $p_1 = 2 < p_2 = 3 < p_3 = 5 < \ldots < p_n$.
   a. Define $\bar{X} = 1 + p_1 \cdot p_2 \ldots p_n$. That is, $\bar{X}$ is equal to one plus the product of all the primes. Can we find a prime number $P_m$ that divides $\bar{X}$?
   b. What can you say about $m$?
   c. Deduce that the total number of primes cannot be finite.
   d. Show that $P_{n+1} \leq 1 + p_1 \cdot p_2 \ldots p_n$.

8.2 The purpose of this problem is to demonstrate that the probability that two random numbers are relatively prime is about 0.6.
   a. Let $P = \Pr[\gcd(a, b) = 1]$. Show that $P = \Pr[\gcd(a, b) = d] = P/d^2$. *Hint:* Consider the quantity $\gcd\left(\frac{a}{d}, \frac{b}{d}\right)$.
   b. The sum of the result of part (a) over all possible values of $d$ is 1. That is $\sum_{d=1}^{\infty} \Pr[\gcd(a, b) = d] = 1$. Use this equality to determine the value of $P$. *Hint:* Use the identity $\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{i^2} = \frac{\pi^2}{6}$.

8.3 Why is $\gcd(n, n + 1) = 1$ for two consecutive integers $n$ and $n + 1$?

8.4 Using Fermat’s theorem, find $3^{201} \mod 11$.

8.5 Use Fermat’s theorem to find a number $a$ between 0 and 72 with $a$ congruent to 9794 modulo 75.

8.6 Use Fermat’s theorem to find a number $x$ between 0 and 28 with $x^{85}$ congruent to 6 modulo 29. (You should not need to use any brute-force searching.)

8.7 Use Euler’s theorem to find a number $a$ between 0 and 9 such that $a$ is congruent to $7^{1000}$ modulo 10. (*Note:* This is the same as the last digit of the decimal expansion of $7^{1000}$.)*
8.8 Use Euler’s theorem to find a number \( x \) between 0 and 28 with \( x^{35} \) congruent to 6 modulo 35. (You should not need to use any brute-force searching.)

8.9 Notice in Table 8.2 that \( \phi(n) \) is even for \( n > 2 \). This is true for all \( n > 2 \). Give a concise argument why this is so.

8.10 Prove the following: If \( p \) is prime, then \( \phi(p^j) = p^j - p^{j-1} \). Hint: What numbers have a factor in common with \( p^j \)?

8.11 It can be shown (see any book on number theory) that \( \phi(mn) = \phi(m)\phi(n) \). Using this property, the property developed in the preceding problem, and the property that \( \phi(p) = p - 1 \) for \( p \) prime, it is straightforward to determine the value of \( \phi(n) \) for any \( n \). Determine the following:
   a. \( \phi(41) \)  
   b. \( \phi(27) \)  
   c. \( \phi(231) \)  
   d. \( \phi(440) \)

8.12 It can also be shown that for arbitrary positive integer \( a \), \( \phi(a) \) is given by

\[
\phi(a) = \prod_{i=1}^{t} [p_i^{a_i-1}(p_i - 1)]
\]

where \( a \) is given by Equation (8.1), namely: \( a = P_1^{a_1} P_2^{a_2} \ldots P_t^{a_t} \). Demonstrate this result.

8.13 Consider the function: \( f(n) = \) number of elements in the set \( \{a : 0 \leq a < n \text{ and } \gcd(a, n) = 1\} \). What is this function?

8.14 Although ancient Chinese mathematicians did good work coming up with their remainder theorem, they did not always get it right. They had a test for primality. The test said that \( n \) is prime if and only if \( n \) divides \( (2^n - 2) \).
   a. Give an example that satisfies the condition using an odd prime.
   b. The condition is obviously true for \( n = 2 \). Prove that the condition is true if \( n \) is an odd prime (proving the \textbf{if} condition)
   c. Give an example of an odd \( n \) that is not prime and that does not satisfy the condition. You can do this with nonprime numbers up to a very large value. This misled the Chinese mathematicians into thinking that if the condition is true then \( n \) is prime.
   d. Unfortunately, the ancient Chinese never tried \( n = 341 \), which is nonprime \( (341 = 11 \times 31) \), yet 341 divides \( 2^{341} - 2 \) without remainder. Demonstrate that \( 2341 = 2 \pmod{341} \) (disproving the \textbf{only if} condition). Hint: It is not necessary to calculate \( 2^{341} \), play around with the congruences instead.

8.15 Show that, if \( n \) is an odd composite integer, then the Miller-Rabin test will return \textbf{inconclusive} for \( a = 1 \) and \( a = (n - 1) \).

8.16 If \( n \) is composite and passes the Miller-Rabin test for the base \( a \), then \( n \) is called a \textbf{strong pseudoprime to the base} \( a \). Show that 2047 is a strong pseudoprime to the base 2.

8.17 A common formulation of the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) is as follows: Let \( m_1, \ldots, m_k \) be integers that are pairwise relatively prime for \( 1 \leq i, j \leq k \), and \( i \neq j \). Define \( M \) to be the product of all the \( m_i \)'s. Let \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \) be integers. Then the set of congruences:

\[
x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \\
x \equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2} \\
\vdots \\
x \equiv a_k \pmod{m_k}
\]

has a unique solution modulo \( M \). Show that the theorem stated in this form is true.
8.18 The example used by Sun-Tsu to illustrate the CRT was
\[ x \equiv 2 \pmod{3}; x \equiv 3 \pmod{5}; x \equiv 2 \pmod{7} \]
Solve for \( x \).

8.19 Six professors begin courses on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, respectively, and announce their intentions of lecturing at intervals of 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, and 5 days, respectively. The regulations of the university forbid Sunday lectures (so that a Sunday lecture must be omitted). When first will all six professors find themselves compelled to omit a lecture? *Hint:* Use the CRT.

8.20 Find all primitive roots of 25.

8.21 Given 2 as a primitive root of 29, construct a table of discrete logarithms, and use it to solve the following congruences.
   a. \( 17x^2 \equiv 10 \pmod{29} \)
   b. \( x^2 - 4x - 16 \equiv 0 \pmod{29} \)
   c. \( x^2 \equiv 17 \pmod{29} \)

**Programming Problems**

8.22 Write a computer program that implements fast exponentiation (successive squaring) modulo \( n \).

8.23 Write a computer program that implements the Miller-Rabin algorithm for a user-specified \( n \). The program should allow the user two choices: (1) specify a possible witness \( a \) to test using the Witness procedure or (2) specify a number \( s \) of random witnesses for the Miller-Rabin test to check.
CHAPTER 9

PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND RSA

9.1 Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems
   - Public-Key Cryptosystems
   - Applications for Public-Key Cryptosystems
   - Requirements for Public-Key Cryptography
   - Public-Key Cryptanalysis

9.2 The RSA Algorithm
   - Description of the Algorithm
   - Computational Aspects
   - The Security of RSA

9.3 Recommended Reading and Web Site

9.4 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 9A Proof of the RSA Algorithm
Appendix 9B The Complexity of Algorithms
Every Egyptian received two names, which were known respectively as the true name and the good name, or the great name and the little name; and while the good or little name was made public, the true or great name appears to have been carefully concealed.

—The Golden Bough, Sir James George Frazer

### KEY POINTS

- Asymmetric encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using the different keys—one a public key and one a private key. It is also known as public-key encryption.
- Asymmetric encryption transforms plaintext into ciphertext using a one of two keys and an encryption algorithm. Using the paired key and a decryption algorithm, the plaintext is recovered from the ciphertext.
- Asymmetric encryption can be used for confidentiality, authentication, or both.
- The most widely used public-key cryptosystem is RSA. The difficulty of attacking RSA is based on the difficulty of finding the prime factors of a composite number.

The development of public-key cryptography is the greatest and perhaps the only true revolution in the entire history of cryptography. From its earliest beginnings to modern times, virtually all cryptographic systems have been based on the elementary tools of substitution and permutation. After millennia of working with algorithms that could be calculated by hand, a major advance in symmetric cryptography occurred with the development of the rotor encryption/decryption machine. The electromechanical rotor enabled the development of fiendishly complex cipher systems. With the availability of computers, even more complex systems were devised, the most prominent of which was the Lucifer effort at IBM that culminated in the Data Encryption Standard (DES). But both rotor machines and DES, although representing significant advances, still relied on the bread-and-butter tools of substitution and permutation.

Public-key cryptography provides a radical departure from all that has gone before. For one thing, public-key algorithms are based on mathematical functions rather than on substitution and permutation. More important, public-key cryptography is asymmetric, involving the use of two separate keys, in contrast to symmetric encryption, which uses only one key. The use of two keys has profound consequences in the areas of confidentiality, key distribution, and authentication, as we shall see.

Before proceeding, we should mention several common misconceptions concerning public-key encryption. One such misconception is that public-key encryption is more secure from cryptanalysis than is symmetric encryption. In fact, the security of any encryption scheme depends on the length of the key and the computational work...
involved in breaking a cipher. There is nothing in principle about either symmetric or public-key encryption that makes one superior to another from the point of view of resisting cryptanalysis.

A second misconception is that public-key encryption is a general-purpose technique that has made symmetric encryption obsolete. On the contrary, because of the computational overhead of current public-key encryption schemes, there seems no foreseeable likelihood that symmetric encryption will be abandoned. As one of the inventors of public-key encryption has put it [DIFF88], “the restriction of public-key cryptography to key management and signature applications is almost universally accepted.”

Finally, there is a feeling that key distribution is trivial when using public-key encryption, compared to the rather cumbersome handshaking involved with key distribution centers for symmetric encryption. In fact, some form of protocol is needed, generally involving a central agent, and the procedures involved are not simpler nor any more efficient than those required for symmetric encryption (e.g., see analysis in [NEED78]).

This chapter and the next provide an overview of public-key cryptography. First, we look at its conceptual framework. Interestingly, the concept for this technique was developed and published before it was shown to be practical to adopt it. Next, we examine the RSA algorithm, which is the most important encryption/decryption algorithm that has been shown to be feasible for public-key encryption. Other important public-key cryptographic algorithms are covered in Chapter 10.

Much of the theory of public-key cryptosystems is based on number theory. If one is prepared to accept the results given in this chapter, an understanding of number theory is not strictly necessary. However, to gain a full appreciation of public-key algorithms, some understanding of number theory is required. Chapter 8 provides the necessary background in number theory.

Table 9.1 defines some key terms.

### Table 9.1 Terminology Related to Asymmetric Encryption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Asymmetric Keys</strong></th>
<th>Two related keys, a public key and a private key, that are used to perform complementary operations, such as encryption and decryption or signature generation and signature verification.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Key Certificate</strong></td>
<td>A digital document issued and digitally signed by the private key of a Certification Authority that binds the name of a subscriber to a public key. The certificate indicates that the subscriber identified in the certificate has sole control and access to the corresponding private key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Key (Asymmetric) Cryptographic Algorithm</strong></td>
<td>A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that deriving the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)</strong></td>
<td>A set of policies, processes, server platforms, software and workstations used for the purpose of administering certificates and public-private key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, and revoke public key certificates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Glossary of Key Information Security Terms*, NIST IR 7298 [KISS06]
9.1 PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS

The concept of public-key cryptography evolved from an attempt to attack two of the most difficult problems associated with symmetric encryption. The first problem is that of key distribution, which is examined in some detail in Chapter 14.

As Chapter 14 discusses, key distribution under symmetric encryption requires either (1) that two communicants already share a key, which somehow has been distributed to them; or (2) the use of a key distribution center. Whitfield Diffie, one of the discoverers of public-key encryption (along with Martin Hellman, both at Stanford University at the time), reasoned that this second requirement negated the very essence of cryptography: the ability to maintain total secrecy over your own communication. As Diffie put it [DIFF88], “what good would it do after all to develop impenetrable cryptosystems, if their users were forced to share their keys with a KDC that could be compromised by either burglary or subpoena?”

The second problem that Diffie pondered, and one that was apparently unrelated to the first, was that of digital signatures. If the use of cryptography was to become widespread, not just in military situations but for commercial and private purposes, then electronic messages and documents would need the equivalent of signatures used in paper documents. That is, could a method be devised that would stipulate, to the satisfaction of all parties, that a digital message had been sent by a particular person? This is a somewhat broader requirement than that of authentication, and its characteristics and ramifications are explored in Chapter 13.

Diffie and Hellman achieved an astounding breakthrough in 1976 [DIFF76 a, b] by coming up with a method that addressed both problems and was radically different from all previous approaches to cryptography, going back over four millennia.\(^1\)

In the next subsection, we look at the overall framework for public-key cryptography. Then we examine the requirements for the encryption/decryption algorithm that is at the heart of the scheme.

Public-Key Cryptosystems

Asymmetric algorithms rely on one key for encryption and a different but related key for decryption. These algorithms have the following important characteristic.

- It is computationally infeasible to determine the decryption key given only knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm and the encryption key.

---

\(^1\)Diffie and Hellman first publicly introduced the concepts of public-key cryptography in 1976. Hellman credits Merkle with independently discovering the concept at that same time, although Merkle did not publish until 1978 [MERK78a]. In fact, the first unclassified document describing public-key distribution and public-key cryptography was a 1974 project proposal by Merkle (http://merkle.com/1974). However, this is not the true beginning. Admiral Bobby Inman, while director of the National Security Agency (NSA), claimed that public-key cryptography had been discovered at NSA in the mid-1960s [SIMM93]. The first documented introduction of these concepts came in 1970, from the Communications-Electronics Security Group, Britain’s counterpart to NSA, in a classified report by James Ellis [ELLI70]. Ellis referred to the technique as nonsecret encryption and describes the discovery in [ELLI99].
In addition, some algorithms, such as RSA, also exhibit the following characteristic.

- Either of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for decryption.

A **public-key encryption** scheme has six ingredients (Figure 9.1a; compare with Figure 2.1).

![Diagram of public-key encryption](image)
• **Plaintext:** This is the readable message or data that is fed into the algorithm as input.

• **Encryption algorithm:** The encryption algorithm performs various transformations on the plaintext.

• **Public and private keys:** This is a pair of keys that have been selected so that if one is used for encryption, the other is used for decryption. The exact transformations performed by the algorithm depend on the public or private key that is provided as input.

• **Ciphertext:** This is the scrambled message produced as output. It depends on the plaintext and the key. For a given message, two different keys will produce two different ciphertexts.

• **Decryption algorithm:** This algorithm accepts the ciphertext and the matching key and produces the original plaintext.

The essential steps are the following.

1. Each user generates a pair of keys to be used for the encryption and decryption of messages.

2. Each user places one of the two keys in a public register or other accessible file. This is the public key. The companion key is kept private. As Figure 9.1a suggests, each user maintains a collection of public keys obtained from others.

3. If Bob wishes to send a confidential message to Alice, Bob encrypts the message using Alice’s public key.

4. When Alice receives the message, she decrypts it using her private key. No other recipient can decrypt the message because only Alice knows Alice’s private key.

With this approach, all participants have access to public keys, and private keys are generated locally by each participant and therefore need never be distributed. As long as a user’s private key remains protected and secret, incoming communication is secure. At any time, a system can change its private key and publish the companion public key to replace its old public key.

Table 9.2 summarizes some of the important aspects of symmetric and public-key encryption. To discriminate between the two, we refer to the key used in symmetric encryption as a **secret key**. The two keys used for asymmetric encryption are referred to as the **public key** and the **private key**. Invariably, the private key is kept secret, but it is referred to as a private key rather than a secret key to avoid confusion with symmetric encryption.

Let us take a closer look at the essential elements of a public-key encryption scheme, using Figure 9.2 (compare with Figure 2.2). There is some source A that

---

2The following notation is used consistently throughout. A secret key is represented by $K_m$, where $m$ is some modifier; for example, $K_a$ is a secret key owned by user A. A public key is represented by $PU_a$, for user A, and the corresponding private key is $PR_a$. Encryption of plaintext $X$ can be performed with a secret key, a public key, or a private key, denoted by $E(K_a, X)$, $E(PU_a, X)$, and $E(PR_a, X)$, respectively. Similarly, decryption of ciphertext $C$ can be performed with a secret key, a public key, or a private key, denoted by $D(K_a, X)$, $D(PU_a, X)$, and $D(PR_a, X)$, respectively.
Table 9.2  Conventional and Public-Key Encryption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional Encryption</th>
<th>Public-Key Encryption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Needed to Work:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Needed to Work:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The same algorithm with the same key is used for encryption and decryption.</td>
<td>1. One algorithm is used for encryption and decryption with a pair of keys, one for encryption and one for decryption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The sender and receiver must share the algorithm and the key.</td>
<td>2. The sender and receiver must each have one of the matched pair of keys (not the same one).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Needed for Security:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Needed for Security:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The key must be kept secret.</td>
<td>1. One of the two keys must be kept secret.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It must be impossible or at least impractical to decipher a message if no other information is available.</td>
<td>2. It must be impossible or at least impractical to decipher a message if no other information is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Knowledge of the algorithm plus samples of ciphertext must be insufficient to determine the key.</td>
<td>3. Knowledge of the algorithm plus one of the keys plus samples of ciphertext must be insufficient to determine the other key.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

produces a message in plaintext, $X = [X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_M]$. The $M$ elements of $X$ are letters in some finite alphabet. The message is intended for destination B. B generates a related pair of keys: a public key, $PU_b$, and a private key, $PR_b$. $PR_b$ is known only to B, whereas $PU_b$ is publicly available and therefore accessible by A.

With the message $X$ and the encryption key $PU_b$ as input, A forms the ciphertext $Y = [Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_N]$:

$$Y = E(PU_b, X)$$

![Figure 9.2  Public-Key Cryptosystem: Secrecy](image-url)
The intended receiver, in possession of the matching private key, is able to invert the transformation:

\[ X = D(PR_b, Y) \]

An adversary, observing \( Y \) and having access to \( PU_b \), but not having access to \( PR_b \) or \( X \), must attempt to recover \( X \) and/or \( PR_b \). It is assumed that the adversary does have knowledge of the encryption (E) and decryption (D) algorithms. If the adversary is interested only in this particular message, then the focus of effort is to recover \( X \) by generating a plaintext estimate \( \hat{X} \). Often, however, the adversary is interested in being able to read future messages as well, in which case an attempt is made to recover \( PR_b \) by generating an estimate \( \hat{PR}_b \).

We mentioned earlier that either of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with the other being used for decryption. This enables a rather different cryptographic scheme to be implemented. Whereas the scheme illustrated in Figure 9.2 provides confidentiality, Figures 9.1b and 9.3 show the use of public-key encryption to provide authentication:

\[ Y = E(PR_a, X) \]
\[ X = D(PU_a, Y) \]

In this case, A prepares a message to B and encrypts it using A’s private key before transmitting it. B can decrypt the message using A’s public key. Because the message was encrypted using A’s private key, only A could have prepared the message. Therefore, the entire encrypted message serves as a digital signature. In addition, it is impossible to alter the message without access to A’s private key, so the message is authenticated both in terms of source and in terms of data integrity.

![Figure 9.3 Public-Key Cryptosystem: Authentication](image-url)
In the preceding scheme, the entire message is encrypted, which, although validating both author and contents, requires a great deal of storage. Each document must be kept in plaintext to be used for practical purposes. A copy also must be stored in ciphertext so that the origin and contents can be verified in case of a dispute. A more efficient way of achieving the same results is to encrypt a small block of bits that is a function of the document. Such a block, called an authenticator, must have the property that it is infeasible to change the document without changing the authenticator. If the authenticator is encrypted with the sender’s private key, it serves as a signature that verifies origin, content, and sequencing. Chapter 13 examines this technique in detail.

It is important to emphasize that the encryption process depicted in Figures 9.1b and 9.3 does not provide confidentiality. That is, the message being sent is safe from alteration but not from eavesdropping. This is obvious in the case of a signature based on a portion of the message, because the rest of the message is transmitted in the clear. Even in the case of complete encryption, as shown in Figure 9.3, there is no protection of confidentiality because any observer can decrypt the message by using the sender’s public key.

It is, however, possible to provide both the authentication function and confidentiality by a double use of the public-key scheme (Figure 9.4):

\[ Z = E(PU_b, E(PR_a, X)) \]
\[ X = D(PU_a, D(PR_b, Z)) \]

In this case, we begin as before by encrypting a message, using the sender’s private key. This provides the digital signature. Next, we encrypt again, using the receiver’s public key. The final ciphertext can be decrypted only by the intended receiver, who alone has the matching private key. Thus, confidentiality is provided. The

![Figure 9.4 Public-Key Cryptosystem: Authentication and Secrecy](image-url)
disadvantage of this approach is that the public-key algorithm, which is complex, must be exercised four times rather than two in each communication.

Applications for Public-Key Cryptosystems

Before proceeding, we need to clarify one aspect of public-key cryptosystems that is otherwise likely to lead to confusion. Public-key systems are characterized by the use of a cryptographic algorithm with two keys, one held private and one available publicly. Depending on the application, the sender uses either the sender’s private key or the receiver’s public key, or both, to perform some type of cryptographic function. In broad terms, we can classify the use of public-key cryptosystems into three categories

- **Encryption/decryption**: The sender encrypts a message with the recipient’s public key.
- **Digital signature**: The sender “signs” a message with its private key. Signing is achieved by a cryptographic algorithm applied to the message or to a small block of data that is a function of the message.
- **Key exchange**: Two sides cooperate to exchange a session key. Several different approaches are possible, involving the private key(s) of one or both parties.

Some algorithms are suitable for all three applications, whereas others can be used only for one or two of these applications. Table 9.3 indicates the applications supported by the algorithms discussed in this book.

Requirements for Public-Key Cryptography

The cryptosystem illustrated in Figures 9.2 through 9.4 depends on a cryptographic algorithm based on two related keys. Diffie and Hellman postulated this system without demonstrating that such algorithms exist. However, they did lay out the conditions that such algorithms must fulfill [DIFF76b].

1. It is computationally easy for a party B to generate a pair (public key $PU_b$, private key $PR_b$).
2. It is computationally easy for a sender A, knowing the public key and the message to be encrypted, $M$, to generate the corresponding ciphertext:

$$C = E(PU_b, M)$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Encryption/Decryption</th>
<th>Digital Signature</th>
<th>Key Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliptic Curve</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. It is computationally easy for the receiver B to decrypt the resulting ciphertext using the private key to recover the original message:

\[ M = D(PR_b, C) = D(PR_b, E(PUb, M)) \]

4. It is computationally infeasible for an adversary, knowing the public key, \( PU_b \), to determine the private key, \( PR_b \).

5. It is computationally infeasible for an adversary, knowing the public key, \( PU_b \), and a ciphertext, \( C \), to recover the original message, \( M \).

We can add a sixth requirement that, although useful, is not necessary for all public-key applications:

6. The two keys can be applied in either order:

\[ M = D(PUb, E(PR_b, M)) = D(PR_b, E(PUb, M)) \]

These are formidable requirements, as evidenced by the fact that only a few algorithms (RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, Diffie-Hellman, DSS) have received widespread acceptance in the several decades since the concept of public-key cryptography was proposed.

Before elaborating on why the requirements are so formidable, let us first recast them. The requirements boil down to the need for a trap-door one-way function. A one-way function is one that maps a domain into a range such that every function value has a unique inverse, with the condition that the calculation of the function is easy, whereas the calculation of the inverse is infeasible:

\[ Y = f(X) \quad \text{easy} \]
\[ X = f^{-1}(Y) \quad \text{infeasible} \]

Generally, \textit{easy} is defined to mean a problem that can be solved in polynomial time as a function of input length. Thus, if the length of the input is \( n \) bits, then the time to compute the function is proportional to \( n^a \), where \( a \) is a fixed constant. Such algorithms are said to belong to the class \( P \). The term \textit{infeasible} is a much fuzzier concept. In general, we can say a problem is infeasible if the effort to solve it grows faster than polynomial time as a function of input size. For example, if the length of the input is \( n \) bits and the time to compute the function is proportional to \( 2^n \), the problem is considered infeasible. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine if a particular algorithm exhibits this complexity. Furthermore, traditional notions of computational complexity focus on the worst-case or average-case complexity of an algorithm. These measures are inadequate for cryptography, which requires that it be infeasible to invert a function for virtually all inputs, not for the worst case or even average case. A brief introduction to some of these concepts is provided in Appendix 9B.

---

3Not to be confused with a one-way hash function, which takes an arbitrarily large data field as its argument and maps it to a fixed output. Such functions are used for authentication (see Chapter 11).
We now turn to the definition of a trap-door one-way function, which is easy to calculate in one direction and infeasible to calculate in the other direction unless certain additional information is known. With the additional information the inverse can be calculated in polynomial time. We can summarize as follows: A trap-door one-way function is a family of invertible functions \( f_k \), such that

\[
Y = f_k(X) \quad \text{easy, if } k \text{ and } X \text{ are known}
\]
\[
X = f_k^{-1}(Y) \quad \text{easy, if } k \text{ and } Y \text{ are known}
\]
\[
X = f_k^{-1}(Y) \quad \text{infeasible, if } Y \text{ is known but } k \text{ is not known}
\]

Thus, the development of a practical public-key scheme depends on discovery of a suitable trap-door one-way function.

Public-Key Cryptanalysis

As with symmetric encryption, a public-key encryption scheme is vulnerable to a brute-force attack. The countermeasure is the same: Use large keys. However, there is a tradeoff to be considered. Public-key systems depend on the use of some sort of invertible mathematical function. The complexity of calculating these functions may not scale linearly with the number of bits in the key but grow more rapidly than that. Thus, the key size must be large enough to make brute-force attack impractical but small enough for practical encryption and decryption. In practice, the key sizes that have been proposed do make brute-force attack impractical but result in encryption/decryption speeds that are too slow for general-purpose use. Instead, as was mentioned earlier, public-key encryption is currently confined to key management and signature applications.

Another form of attack is to find some way to compute the private key given the public key. To date, it has not been mathematically proven that this form of attack is infeasible for a particular public-key algorithm. Thus, any given algorithm, including the widely used RSA algorithm, is suspect. The history of cryptanalysis shows that a problem that seems insoluble from one perspective can be found to have a solution if looked at in an entirely different way.

Finally, there is a form of attack that is peculiar to public-key systems. This is, in essence, a probable-message attack. Suppose, for example, that a message were to be sent that consisted solely of a 56-bit DES key. An adversary could encrypt all possible 56-bit DES keys using the public key and could discover the encrypted key by matching the transmitted ciphertext. Thus, no matter how large the key size of the public-key scheme, the attack is reduced to a brute-force attack on a 56-bit key. This attack can be thwarted by appending some random bits to such simple messages.

9.2 THE RSA ALGORITHM

The pioneering paper by Diffie and Hellman [DIFF76b] introduced a new approach to cryptography and, in effect, challenged cryptologists to come up with a cryptographic algorithm that met the requirements for public-key systems. A number of
algorithms have been proposed for public-key cryptography. Some of these, though initially promising, turned out to be breakable.\footnote{4}

One of the first successful responses to the challenge was developed in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman at MIT and first published in 1978 [RIVE78].\footnote{5} The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme has since that time reigned supreme as the most widely accepted and implemented general-purpose approach to public-key encryption.

The \textbf{RSA} scheme is a block cipher in which the plaintext and ciphertext are integers between 0 and $n - 1$ for some $n$. A typical size for $n$ is 1024 bits, or 309 decimal digits. That is, $n$ is less than $2^{1024}$. We examine RSA in this section in some detail, beginning with an explanation of the algorithm. Then we examine some of the computational and cryptanalytical implications of RSA.

\section*{Description of the Algorithm}

RSA makes use of an expression with exponentials. Plaintext is encrypted in blocks, with each block having a binary value less than some number $n$. That is, the block size must be less than or equal to $\log_2(n) + 1$; in practice, the block size is $i$ bits, where $2^i < n \leq 2^{i+1}$. Encryption and decryption are of the following form, for some plaintext block $M$ and ciphertext block $C$.

\begin{align*}
C &= M^e \mod n \\
M &= C^d \mod n = (M^e)^d \mod n = M^{ed} \mod n
\end{align*}

Both sender and receiver must know the value of $n$. The sender knows the value of $e$, and only the receiver knows the value of $d$. Thus, this is a public-key encryption algorithm with a public key of $PU = \{e, n\}$ and a private key of $PR = \{d, n\}$. For this algorithm to be satisfactory for public-key encryption, the following requirements must be met.

1. It is possible to find values of $e, d, n$ such that $M^{ed} \mod n = M$ for all $M < n$.
2. It is relatively easy to calculate $M^e \mod n$ and $C^d \mod n$ for all values of $M < n$.
3. It is infeasible to determine $d$ given $e$ and $n$.

For now, we focus on the first requirement and consider the other questions later. We need to find a relationship of the form

\[ M^{ed} \mod n = M \]

The preceding relationship holds if $e$ and $d$ are multiplicative inverses modulo $\phi(n)$, where $\phi(n)$ is the Euler totient function. It is shown in Chapter 8 that for $p$, $q$ prime, $\phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. The relationship between $e$ and $d$ can be expressed as

\[ ed \mod \phi(n) = 1 \quad (9.1) \]

\footnote{4}{The most famous of the fallen contenders is the trapdoor knapsack proposed by Ralph Merkle. We describe this in Appendix J.}

\footnote{5}{Apparently, the first workable public-key system for encryption/decryption was put forward by Clifford Cocks of Britain’s CESG in 1973 [COCK73]; Cocks’ method is virtually identical to RSA.}
This is equivalent to saying

\[ ed = 1 \text{ mod } \phi(n) \]

\[ d = e^{-1} \text{ mod } \phi(n) \]

That is, \( e \) and \( d \) are multiplicative inverses mod \( \phi(n) \). Note that, according to the rules of modular arithmetic, this is true only if \( d \) (and therefore \( e \)) is relatively prime to \( \phi(n) \). Equivalently, \( \gcd(\phi(n), d) = 1 \). See Appendix 9A for a proof that Equation (9.1) satisfies the requirement for RSA.

We are now ready to state the RSA scheme. The ingredients are the following:

- \( p, q \), two prime numbers (private, chosen)
- \( n = pq \) (public, calculated)
- \( e \), with \( \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1; 1 < e < \phi(n) \) (public, chosen)
- \( d = e^{-1} \mod \phi(n) \) (private, calculated)

The private key consists of \( \{d, n\} \) and the public key consists of \( \{e, n\} \). Suppose that user A has published its public key and that user B wishes to send the message \( M \) to A. Then B calculates \( C = M^e \mod n \) and transmits \( C \). On receipt of this ciphertext, user A decrypts by calculating \( M = C^d \mod n \).

Figure 9.5 summarizes the RSA algorithm. It corresponds to Figure 9.1a: Alice generates a public/private key pair; Bob encrypts using Alice’s public key; and Alice decrypts using her private key. An example from [SING99] is shown in Figure 9.6. For this example, the keys were generated as follows.

1. Select two prime numbers, \( p = 17 \) and \( q = 11 \).
2. Calculate \( n = pq = 17 \times 11 = 187 \).
3. Calculate \( \phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = 16 \times 10 = 160 \).
4. Select \( e \) such that \( e \) is relatively prime to \( \phi(n) = 160 \) and less than \( \phi(n) \); we choose \( e = 7 \).
5. Determine \( d \) such that \( de = 1 \mod 160 \) and \( d < 160 \). The correct value is \( d = 23 \), because \( 23 \times 7 = 161 = (1 \times 160) + 1 \); \( d \) can be calculated using the extended Euclid’s algorithm (Chapter 4).

The resulting keys are public key \( PU = \{7, 187\} \) and private key \( PR = \{23, 187\} \). The example shows the use of these keys for a plaintext input of \( M = 88 \). For encryption, we need to calculate \( C = 88^7 \mod 187 \). Exploiting the properties of modular arithmetic, we can do this as follows.

\[
88^7 \mod 187 = [((88^4 \mod 187) \times (88^2 \mod 187) \times (88^1 \mod 187)) \mod 187]
\]

\[
88^1 \mod 187 = 88
\]

\[
88^2 \mod 187 = 7744 \mod 187 = 77
\]

\[
88^4 \mod 187 = 59,969,536 \mod 187 = 132
\]

\[
88^7 \mod 187 = (88 \times 77 \times 132) \mod 187 = 894,432 \mod 187 = 11
\]
For decryption, we calculate $M = 11^{23} \mod 187$:

$$11^{23} \mod 187 = [(11^{1 \mod 187}) \times (11^{2 \mod 187}) \times (11^{4 \mod 187})$$

$$\times (11^{8 \mod 187}) \times (11^{8 \mod 187})] \mod 187$$

$$11^1 \mod 187 = 11$$

$$11^2 \mod 187 = 121$$

$$11^4 \mod 187 = 14,641 \mod 187 = 55$$

$$11^8 \mod 187 = 214,358,881 \mod 187 = 33$$

$$11^{23} \mod 187 = (11 \times 121 \times 55 \times 33 \times 33) \mod 187 = 79,720,245 \mod 187 = 88$$
We now look at an example from [HEL79], which shows the use of RSA to process multiple blocks of data. In this simple example, the plaintext is an alphanumeric string. Each plaintext symbol is assigned a unique code of two decimal digits (e.g., a = 00, A = 26). A plaintext block consists of four decimal digits, or two alphanumeric characters. Figure 9.7a illustrates the sequence of events for the encryption of multiple blocks, and Figure 9.7b gives a specific example. The circled numbers indicate the order in which operations are performed.

---

(a) General approach

(b) Example

---

6The complete mapping of alphanumeric characters to decimal digits is at this book’s Website in the document RSAexample.pdf.
Computational Aspects

We now turn to the issue of the complexity of the computation required to use RSA. There are actually two issues to consider: encryption/decryption and key generation. Let us look first at the process of encryption and decryption and then consider key generation.

**Exponentiation in Modular Arithmetic** Both encryption and decryption in RSA involve raising an integer to an integer power, mod $n$. If the exponentiation is done over the integers and then reduced modulo $n$, the intermediate values would be gargantuan. Fortunately, as the preceding example shows, we can make use of a property of modular arithmetic:

\[
[(a \text{ mod } n) \times (b \text{ mod } n)] \text{ mod } n = (a \times b) \text{ mod } n
\]

Thus, we can reduce intermediate results modulo $n$. This makes the calculation practical.

Another consideration is the efficiency of exponentiation, because with RSA, we are dealing with potentially large exponents. To see how efficiency might be increased, consider that we wish to compute $x^{16}$. A straightforward approach requires 15 multiplications:

\[
x^{16} = x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x
\]

However, we can achieve the same final result with only four multiplications if we repeatedly take the square of each partial result, successively forming ($x^2$, $x^4$, $x^8$, $x^{16}$). As another example, suppose we wish to calculate $x^{11} \text{ mod } n$ for some integers $x$ and $n$. Observe that $x^{11} = x^{1+2+8} = (x)(x^2)(x^8)$. In this case, we compute $x \text{ mod } n$, $x^2 \text{ mod } n$, $x^4 \text{ mod } n$, and $x^8 \text{ mod } n$ and then calculate $[(x \text{ mod } n) \times (x^2 \text{ mod } n) \times (x^8 \text{ mod } n)] \text{ mod } n$.

More generally, suppose we wish to find the value $a^b$ with $a$ and $m$ positive integers. If we express $b$ as a binary number $b_k b_{k-1} \ldots b_0$, then we have

\[
b = \sum_{b_i \neq 0} 2^i
\]

Therefore,

\[
a^b = a^{\left(\sum_{b_i \neq 0} 2^i\right)} = \prod_{b_i \neq 0} a^{(2^i)}
\]

\[
a^b \text{ mod } n = \left[\prod_{b_i \neq 0} a^{(2^i)}\right] \text{ mod } n = \left(\prod_{b_i \neq 0} [a^{(2^i)} \text{ mod } n]\right) \text{ mod } n
\]

We can therefore develop the algorithm\(^7\) for computing $a^b \text{ mod } n$, shown in Figure 9.8. Table 9.4 shows an example of the execution of this algorithm. Note that the variable $c$ is not needed; it is included for explanatory purposes. The final value of $c$ is the value of the exponent.

\(^7\)The algorithm has a long history; this particular pseudocode expression is from [CORM04].
 oppressor algorith Using the Public Key To speed up the operation of the RSA algorithm using the public key, a specific choice of \( e \) is usually made. The most common choice is 65537 (\( 2^{16} + 1 \)); two other popular choices are 3 and 17. Each of these choices has only two 1 bits, so the number of multiplications required to perform exponentiation is minimized.

However, with a very small public key, such as \( e = 3 \), RSA becomes vulnerable to a simple attack. Suppose we have three different RSA users who all use the value \( e = 3 \) but have unique values of \( n \), namely \((n_1, n_2, n_3)\). If user A sends the same encrypted message \( M \) to all three users, then the three ciphertexts are \( C_1 = M^3 \mod n_1 \), \( C_2 = M^3 \mod n_2 \), and \( C_3 = M^3 \mod n_3 \). It is likely that \( n_1, n_2, \) and \( n_3 \) are pairwise relatively prime. Therefore, one can use the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) to compute \( M^3 \mod (n_1 n_2 n_3) \). By the rules of the RSA algorithm, \( M \) is less than each of the \( n_i \); therefore \( M^3 < n_1 n_2 n_3 \). Accordingly, the attacker need only compute the cube root of \( M^3 \). This attack can be countered by adding a unique pseudorandom bit string as padding to each instance of \( M \) to be encrypted. This approach is discussed subsequently.

The reader may have noted that the definition of the RSA algorithm (Figure 9.5) requires that during key generation the user selects a value of \( e \) that is relatively prime to \( \phi(n) \). Thus, if a value of \( e \) is selected first and the primes \( p \) and \( q \) are generated, it may turn out that \( \gcd(\phi(n), e) \neq 1 \). In that case, the user must reject the \( p, q \) values and generate a new \( p, q \) pair.

Table 9.4 Result of the Fast Modular Exponentiation Algorithm for \( a^b \mod n \), where \( a = 7 \), \( b = 560 = 1000110000 \), and \( n = 561 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( i )</th>
<th>( 9 )</th>
<th>( 8 )</th>
<th>( 7 )</th>
<th>( 6 )</th>
<th>( 5 )</th>
<th>( 4 )</th>
<th>( 3 )</th>
<th>( 2 )</th>
<th>( 1 )</th>
<th>( 0 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( b_i )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( c )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( f )</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The integer \( b \) is expressed as a binary number \( b_k b_{k-1} \ldots b_0 \).
**Efficient Operation Using the Private Key** We cannot similarly choose a small constant value of $d$ for efficient operation. A small value of $d$ is vulnerable to a brute-force attack and to other forms of cryptanalysis [WIEN90]. However, there is a way to speed up computation using the CRT. We wish to compute the value $M = C^d \mod n$. Let us define the following intermediate results:

$$V_p = C^d \mod p \quad V_q = C^d \mod q$$

Following the CRT using Equation (8.8), define the quantities

$$X_p = q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \quad X_q = p \times (p^{-1} \mod q)$$

The CRT then shows, using Equation (8.9), that

$$M = (V_p X_p + V_q X_q) \mod n$$

Furthermore, we can simplify the calculation of $V_p$ and $V_q$ using Fermat’s theorem, which states that $a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p$ if $p$ and $a$ are relatively prime. Some thought should convince you that the following are valid.

$$V_p = C^d \mod p = C^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p \quad V_q = C^d \mod q = C^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q$$

The quantities $d \mod (p-1)$ and $d \mod (q-1)$ can be precalculated. The end result is that the calculation is approximately four times as fast as evaluating $M = C^d \mod n$ directly [BONE02].

**Key Generation** Before the application of the public-key cryptosystem, each participant must generate a pair of keys. This involves the following tasks.

- Determining two prime numbers, $p$ and $q$.
- Selecting either $e$ or $d$ and calculating the other.

First, consider the selection of $p$ and $q$. Because the value of $n = pq$ will be known to any potential adversary, in order to prevent the discovery of $p$ and $q$ by exhaustive methods, these primes must be chosen from a sufficiently large set (i.e., $p$ and $q$ must be large numbers). On the other hand, the method used for finding large primes must be reasonably efficient.

At present, there are no useful techniques that yield arbitrarily large primes, so some other means of tackling the problem is needed. The procedure that is generally used is to pick at random an odd number of the desired order of magnitude and test whether that number is prime. If not, pick successive random numbers until one is found that tests prime.

A variety of tests for primality have been developed (e.g., see [KNUT98] for a description of a number of such tests). Almost invariably, the tests are probabilistic. That is, the test will merely determine that a given integer is *probably* prime. Despite this lack of certainty, these tests can be run in such a way as to make the probability as close to 1.0 as desired. As an example, one of the more efficient and popular algorithms, the Miller-Rabin algorithm, is described in Chapter 8. With this algorithm and most such algorithms, the procedure for testing whether a given integer $n$ is prime is to perform some calculation that involves $n$ and a randomly chosen integer $a$. If $n$ “fails” the test, then $n$ is not prime. If $n$ “passes” the test, then $n$ may be prime or nonprime. If $n$ passes many
such tests with many different randomly chosen values for \( a \), then we can have high confidence that \( n \) is, in fact, prime.

In summary, the procedure for picking a prime number is as follows.

1. Pick an odd integer \( n \) at random (e.g., using a pseudorandom number generator).
2. Pick an integer \( a < n \) at random.
3. Perform the probabilistic primality test, such as Miller-Rabin, with \( a \) as a parameter.
   - If \( n \) fails the test, reject the value \( n \) and go to step 1.
4. If \( n \) has passed a sufficient number of tests, accept \( n \); otherwise, go to step 2.

This is a somewhat tedious procedure. However, remember that this process is performed relatively infrequently: only when a new pair \( (PU, PR) \) is needed.

It is worth noting how many numbers are likely to be rejected before a prime number is found. A result from number theory, known as the prime number theorem, states that the primes near \( N \) are spaced on the average one every \( (\ln N) \) integers. Thus, on average, one would have to test on the order of \( \ln(N) \) integers before a prime is found. Actually, because all even integers can be immediately rejected, the correct figure is \( \ln(N)/2 \). For example, if a prime on the order of magnitude of \( 2^{200} \) were sought, then about \( \ln(2^{200})/2 = 70 \) trials would be needed to find a prime.

Having determined prime numbers \( p \) and \( q \), the process of key generation is completed by selecting a value of \( e \) and calculating \( d \) or, alternatively, selecting a value of \( d \) and calculating \( e \). Assuming the former, then we need to select an \( e \) such that \( \gcd(phi(n), e) = 1 \) and then calculate \( d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{phi(n)} \). Fortunately, there is a single algorithm that will, at the same time, calculate the greatest common divisor of two integers and, if the gcd is 1, determine the inverse of one of the integers modulo the other. The algorithm, referred to as the extended Euclid’s algorithm, is explained in Chapter 4. Thus, the procedure is to generate a series of random numbers, testing each against \( phi(n) \) until a number relatively prime to \( phi(n) \) is found. Again, we can ask the question: How many random numbers must we test to find a usable number, that is, a number relatively prime to \( phi(n) \)? It can be shown easily that the probability that two random numbers are relatively prime is about 0.6; thus, very few tests would be needed to find a suitable integer (see Problem 8.2).

The Security of RSA

Four possible approaches to attacking the RSA algorithm are

- **Brute force:** This involves trying all possible private keys.
- **Mathematical attacks:** There are several approaches, all equivalent in effort to factoring the product of two primes.
- **Timing attacks:** These depend on the running time of the decryption algorithm.
- **Chosen ciphertext attacks:** This type of attack exploits properties of the RSA algorithm.

The defense against the brute-force approach is the same for RSA as for other cryptosystems, namely, to use a large key space. Thus, the larger the number of bits in \( d \), the better. However, because the calculations involved, both in key generation
and in encryption/decryption, are complex, the larger the size of the key, the slower the system will run.

In this subsection, we provide an overview of mathematical and timing attacks.

**The Factoring Problem** We can identify three approaches to attacking RSA mathematically.

1. Factor $n$ into its two prime factors. This enables calculation of $\phi(n) = (p - 1) \times (q - 1)$, which in turn enables determination of $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$.
2. Determine $\phi(n)$ directly, without first determining $p$ and $q$. Again, this enables determination of $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$.
3. Determine $d$ directly, without first determining $\phi(n)$.

Most discussions of the cryptanalysis of RSA have focused on the task of factoring $n$ into its two prime factors. Determining $\phi(n)$ given $n$ is equivalent to factoring $n$ [RIBE96]. With presently known algorithms, determining $d$ given $e$ and $n$ appears to be at least as time-consuming as the factoring problem [KALI95]. Hence, we can use factoring performance as a benchmark against which to evaluate the security of RSA.

For a large $n$ with large prime factors, factoring is a hard problem, but it is not as hard as it used to be. A striking illustration of this is the following. In 1977, the three inventors of RSA dared *Scientific American* readers to decode a cipher they printed in Martin Gardner’s “Mathematical Games” column [GARD77]. They offered a $100 reward for the return of a plaintext sentence, an event they predicted might not occur for some 40 quadrillion years. In April of 1994, a group working over the Internet claimed the prize after only eight months of work [LEUT94]. This challenge used a public key size (length of $n$) of 129 decimal digits, or around 428 bits. In the meantime, just as they had done for DES, RSA Laboratories had issued challenges for the RSA cipher with key sizes of 100, 110, 120, and so on, digits. The latest challenge to be met is the RSA-200 challenge with a key length of 200 decimal digits, or about 663 bits. Table 9.5 shows the results to date. The level of effort is measured in MIPS-years: a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Decimal Digits</th>
<th>Approximate Number of Bits</th>
<th>Date Achieved</th>
<th>MIPS-Years</th>
<th>Algorithm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Quadratic sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>April 1992</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Quadratic sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>Quadratic sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>Quadratic sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>April 1996</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Generalized number field sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>February 1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Generalized number field sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>Generalized number field sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Lattice sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Lattice sieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Lattice sieve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
million-instructions-per-second processor running for one year, which is about $3 \times 10^{13}$ instructions executed. A 1 GHz Pentium is about a 250-MIPS machine.

A striking fact about Table 9.5 concerns the method used. Until the mid-1990s, factoring attacks were made using an approach known as the quadratic sieve. The attack on RSA-130 used a newer algorithm, the generalized number field sieve (GNFS), and was able to factor a larger number than RSA-129 at only 20% of the computing effort.

The threat to larger key sizes is twofold: the continuing increase in computing power and the continuing refinement of factoring algorithms. We have seen that the move to a different algorithm resulted in a tremendous speedup. We can expect further refinements in the GNFS, and the use of an even better algorithm is also a possibility. In fact, a related algorithm, the special number field sieve (SNFS), can factor numbers with a specialized form considerably faster than the generalized number field sieve. Figure 9.9 compares the performance of the two algorithms. It is reasonable to expect a breakthrough that would enable a general factoring performance in about the same time as SNFS, or even better [ODLY95]. Thus, we need to be careful in choosing a key size for RSA. For the near future, a key size in the range of 1024 to 2048 bits seems reasonable.

In addition to specifying the size of $n$, a number of other constraints have been suggested by researchers. To avoid values of $n$ that may be factored more easily, the algorithm’s inventors suggest the following constraints on $p$ and $q$.

1. $p$ and $q$ should differ in length by only a few digits. Thus, for a 1024-bit key (309 decimal digits), both $p$ and $q$ should be on the order of magnitude of $10^{75}$ to $10^{100}$.
2. Both $(p - 1)$ and $(q - 1)$ should contain a large prime factor.
3. $\gcd(p - 1, q - 1)$ should be small.

In addition, it has been demonstrated that if $e < n$ and $d < n^{1/4}$, then $d$ can be easily determined [WIEN90].

**Timing Attacks** If one needed yet another lesson about how difficult it is to assess the security of a cryptographic algorithm, the appearance of timing attacks provides a stunning one. Paul Kocher, a cryptographic consultant, demonstrated that a snooper can determine a private key by keeping track of how long a computer takes to decipher messages [KOCH96, KALI96b]. Timing attacks are applicable not just to RSA, but to other public-key cryptography systems. This attack is alarming for two reasons: It comes from a completely unexpected direction, and it is a ciphertext-only attack.

A timing attack is somewhat analogous to a burglar guessing the combination of a safe by observing how long it takes for someone to turn the dial from number to number. We can explain the attack using the modular exponentiation algorithm of Figure 9.8, but the attack can be adapted to work with any implementation that does not run in fixed time. In this algorithm, modular exponentiation is accomplished bit by bit, with one modular multiplication performed at each iteration and an additional modular multiplication performed for each 1 bit.

As Kocher points out in his paper, the attack is simplest to understand in an extreme case. Suppose the target system uses a modular multiplication function that is very fast in almost all cases but in a few cases takes much more time than an entire average modular exponentiation. The attack proceeds bit-by-bit starting with the
leftmost bit, \( b_k \). Suppose that the first \( j \) bits are known (to obtain the entire exponent, start with \( j = 0 \) and repeat the attack until the entire exponent is known). For a given ciphertext, the attacker can complete the first \( j \) iterations of the for loop. The operation of the subsequent step depends on the unknown exponent bit. If the bit is set, \( d \leftarrow (d \times a) \) mod \( n \) will be executed. For a few values of \( a \) and \( d \), the modular multiplication will be extremely slow, and the attacker knows which these are. Therefore, if the observed time to execute the decryption algorithm is always slow when this particular iteration is slow with a 1 bit, then this bit is assumed to be 1. If a number of observed execution times for the entire algorithm are fast, then this bit is assumed to be 0.

In practice, modular exponentiation implementations do not have such extreme timing variations, in which the execution time of a single iteration can exceed the mean execution time of the entire algorithm. Nevertheless, there is enough variation to make this attack practical. For details, see [KOCH96].

Figure 9.9  MIPS-years Needed to Factor

![Figure 9.9 MIPS-years Needed to Factor](image)
Although the timing attack is a serious threat, there are simple countermeasures that can be used, including the following.

- **Constant exponentiation time**: Ensure that all exponentiations take the same amount of time before returning a result. This is a simple fix but does degrade performance.
- **Random delay**: Better performance could be achieved by adding a random delay to the exponentiation algorithm to confuse the timing attack. Kocher points out that if defenders don’t add enough noise, attackers could still succeed by collecting additional measurements to compensate for the random delays.
- **Blinding**: Multiply the ciphertext by a random number before performing exponentiation. This process prevents the attacker from knowing what ciphertext bits are being processed inside the computer and therefore prevents the bit-by-bit analysis essential to the timing attack.

RSA Data Security incorporates a blinding feature into some of its products. The private-key operation $M = C^d \mod n$ is implemented as follows.

1. Generate a secret random number $r$ between 0 and $n - 1$.
2. Compute $C' = C(r^e) \mod n$, where $e$ is the public exponent.
3. Compute $M' = (C')^d \mod n$ with the ordinary RSA implementation.
4. Compute $M = M'r^{-1} \mod n$. In this equation, $r^{-1}$ is the multiplicative inverse of $r \mod n$; see Chapter 4 for a discussion of this concept. It can be demonstrated that this is the correct result by observing that $r^{ed} \mod n = r \mod n$.

RSA Data Security reports a 2 to 10% performance penalty for blinding.

**CHosen Ciphertext Attack and Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding** The basic RSA algorithm is vulnerable to a **chosen ciphertext attack** (CCA). CCA is defined as an attack in which the adversary chooses a number of ciphertexts and is then given the corresponding plaintexts, decrypted with the target’s private key. Thus, the adversary could select a plaintext, encrypt it with the target’s public key, and then be able to get the plaintext back by having it decrypted with the private key. Clearly, this provides the adversary with no new information. Instead, the adversary exploits properties of RSA and selects blocks of data that, when processed using the target’s private key, yield information needed for cryptanalysis.

A simple example of a CCA against RSA takes advantage of the following property of RSA:

$$E(\text{PU}, M_1) \times E(\text{PU}, M_2) = E(\text{PU}, [M_1 \times M_2]) \quad (9.2)$$

We can decrypt $C = M^e \mod n$ using a CCA as follows.

1. Compute $X = (C \times 2^e) \mod n$.
2. Submit $X$ as a chosen ciphertext and receive back $Y = X^d \mod n$.

But now note that

$$X = (C \mod n) \times (2^e \mod n)$$
$$= (M^e \mod n) \times (2^e \mod n)$$
$$= (2M)^e \mod n$$
Therefore, \( Y = (2M) \mod n \). From this, we can deduce \( M \). To overcome this simple attack, practical RSA-based cryptosystems randomly pad the plaintext prior to encryption. This randomizes the ciphertext so that Equation (9.2) no longer holds. However, more sophisticated CCAs are possible, and a simple padding with a random value has been shown to be insufficient to provide the desired security. To counter such attacks, RSA Security Inc., a leading RSA vendor and former holder of the RSA patent, recommends modifying the plaintext using a procedure known as **optimal asymmetric encryption padding** (OAEP). A full discussion of the threats and OAEP are beyond our scope; see [POIN02] for an introduction and [BELL94a] for a thorough analysis. Here, we simply summarize the OAEP procedure.

Figure 9.10 depicts OAEP encryption. As a first step, the message \( M \) to be encrypted is padded. A set of optional parameters, \( P \), is passed through a hash function, \( H \). The output is then padded with zeros to get the desired length in the overall data.

![Figure 9.10 Encryption Using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)](image)

**Figure 9.10** Encryption Using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)

---

8A hash function maps a variable-length data block or message into a fixed-length value called a hash code. Hash functions are discussed in depth in Chapter 11.
block (DB). Next, a random seed is generated and passed through another hash function, called the mask generating function (MGF). The resulting hash value is bit-by-bit XORed with DB to produce a maskedDB. The maskedDB is in turn passed through the MGF to form a hash that is XORed with the seed to produce the masked seed. The concatenation of the maskedseed and the maskedDB forms the encoded message EM. Note that the EM includes the padded message, masked by the seed, and the seed, masked by the maskedDB. The EM is then encrypted using RSA.

9.3 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

The recommended treatments of encryption listed in Chapter 3 cover public-key as well as symmetric encryption.

[DIFF88] describes in detail the several attempts to devise secure two-key cryptoalgorithms and the gradual evolution of a variety of protocols based on them. [CORM04] provides a concise but complete and readable summary of all of the algorithms relevant to the verification, computation, and cryptanalysis of RSA. [BONE99] discusses various cryptanalytic attacks on RSA. A more recent discussion is [SHAM03].


Recommended Web Site:

RSA Laboratories: Extensive collection of technical material on RSA and other topics in cryptography.

9.4 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)</th>
<th>private key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>digital signature</td>
<td>public key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key exchange</td>
<td>public-key cryptography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one-way function</td>
<td>public-key cryptosystems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimal asymmetric encryption</td>
<td>public-key encryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>padding (OAEP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>time complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>timing attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trap-door one-way function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Review Questions

9.1 What are the principal elements of a public-key cryptosystem?
9.2 What are the roles of the public and private key?
9.3 What are three broad categories of applications of public-key cryptosystems?
9.4 What requirements must a public key cryptosystems fulfill to be a secure algorithm?
9.5 What is a one-way function?
9.6 What is a trap-door one-way function?
9.7 Describe in general terms an efficient procedure for picking a prime number.

Problems

9.1 Prior to the discovery of any specific public-key schemes, such as RSA, an existence proof was developed whose purpose was to demonstrate that public-key encryption is possible in theory. Consider the functions $f_1(x_1) = z_1; f_2(x_2, y_2) = z_2; f_3(x_3, y_3) = z_3$, where all values are integers with $1 \leq x_i, y_i, z_i \leq N$. Function $f_1$ can be represented by a vector $M_1$ of length $N$, in which the $k$th entry is the value of $f_1(k)$. Similarly, $f_2$ and $f_3$ can be represented by $N \times N$ matrices $M_2$ and $M_3$. The intent is to represent the encryption/decryption process by table lookups for tables with very large values of $N$. Such tables would be impractically huge but could be constructed in principle. The scheme works as follows: Construct $M_1$ with a random permutation of all integers between 1 and $N$; that is, each integer appears exactly once in $M_1$. Construct $M_2$ so that each row contains a random permutation of the first $N$ integers. Finally, fill in $M_3$ to satisfy the following condition:

$$f_3(f_2(f_1(k), p), k) = p \quad \text{for all } k, p \text{ with } 1 \leq k, p \leq N$$

To summarize,
1. $M_1$ takes an input $k$ and produces an output $x$.
2. $M_2$ takes inputs $x$ and $p$ giving output $z$.
3. $M_3$ takes inputs $z$ and $k$ and produces $p$.

The three tables, once constructed, are made public.

a. It should be clear that it is possible to construct $M_3$ to satisfy the preceding condition. As an example, fill in $M_3$ for the following simple case:

$$M_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 5 \\ 4 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad M_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 5 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 1 \\ 4 & 2 & 5 & 1 & 3 \\ 1 & 3 & 2 & 4 & 5 \\ 3 & 1 & 4 & 2 & 5 \\ 2 & 5 & 3 & 4 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad M_3 = \begin{bmatrix} \text{fill in} \\ \text{fill in} \\ \text{fill in} \\ \text{fill in} \end{bmatrix}$$

Convention: The $i$th element of $M_1$ corresponds to $k = i$. The $i$th row of $M_2$ corresponds to $x = i$; the $j$th column of $M_2$ corresponds to $p = j$. The $i$th row of $M_3$ corresponds to $z = i$; the $j$th column of $M_3$ corresponds to $k = j$.

b. Describe the use of this set of tables to perform encryption and decryption between two users.

c. Argue that this is a secure scheme.

9.2 Perform encryption and decryption using the RSA algorithm, as in Figure 9.5, for the following:

a. $p = 3; q = 11, e = 7; M = 5$

b. $p = 5; q = 11, e = 3; M = 9$

c. $p = 7; q = 11, e = 17; M = 8$
d. \( p = 11; q = 13; e = 11; M = 7 \)
e. \( p = 17; q = 31; e = 7; M = 2 \)

**Hint:** Decryption is not as hard as you think; use some finesse.

9.3 In a public-key system using RSA, you intercept the ciphertext \( C = 10 \) sent to a user whose public key is \( e = 5, n = 35 \). What is the plaintext \( M \)?

9.4 In an RSA system, the public key of a given user is \( e = 31, n = 3599 \). What is the private key of this user? **Hint:** First use trial-and-error to determine \( p \) and \( q \); then use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find the multiplicative inverse of 31 modulo \( \phi(n) \).

9.5 In using the RSA algorithm, if a small number of repeated encodings give back the plaintext, what is the likely cause?

9.6 Suppose we have a set of blocks encoded with the RSA algorithm and we don’t have the private key. Assume \( n = pq, e \) is the public key. Suppose also someone tells us they know one of the plaintext blocks has a common factor with \( n \). Does this help us in any way?

9.7 In the RSA public-key encryption scheme, each user has a public key, \( e \), and a private key, \( d \). Suppose Bob leaks his private key. Rather than generating a new public and a new private key, is this safe?

9.8 Suppose Bob uses the RSA cryptosystem with a very large modulus \( n \) for which the factorization cannot be found in a reasonable amount of time. Suppose Alice sends a message to Bob by representing each alphabetic character as an integer between 0 and 25 \((A \rightarrow 0, \ldots, Z \rightarrow 25)\) and then encrypting each number separately using RSA with large \( e \) and large \( n \). Is this method secure? If not, describe the most efficient attack against this encryption method.

9.9 Using a spreadsheet (such as Excel) or a calculator, perform the operations described below. Document results of all intermediate modular multiplications. Determine a number of modular multiplications per each major transformation (such as encryption, decryption, primality testing, etc.).

a. Test all odd numbers in the range from 233 to 241 for primality using the Miller-Rabin test with base 2.

b. Encrypt the message block \( M = 2 \) using RSA with the following parameters: \( e = 23 \) and \( n = 233 \times 241 \).

c. Compute a private key \((d, p, q)\) corresponding to the given above public key \((e, n)\).

d. Perform the decryption of the obtained ciphertext
   1. without using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and
   2. using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.

9.10 Assume that you generate an authenticated and encrypted message by first applying the RSA transformation determined by your private key, and then enciphering the message using recipient’s public key (note that you do NOT use hash function before the first transformation). Will this scheme work correctly [i.e., give the possibility to reconstruct the original message at the recipient’s side, for all possible relations between the sender’s modulus \( n_S \) and the recipient’s modulus \( n_R \) \((n_S > n_R, n_S < n_R, \text{and } n_S = n_R)\)]? Explain your answer. In case your answer is “no,” how would you correct this scheme?

9.11 “I want to tell you, Holmes,” Dr. Watson’s voice was enthusiastic, “that your recent activities in network security have increased my interest in cryptography. And just yesterday I found a way to make one-time pad encryption practical.”

“Oh, really?” Holmes’ face lost its sleepy look.

“Yes, Holmes. The idea is quite simple. For a given one-way function \( F \), I generate a long pseudorandom sequence of elements by applying \( F \) to some standard sequence of arguments. The cryptanalyst is assumed to know \( F \) and the general nature of the sequence, which may be as simple as \( S, S + 1, S + 2, \ldots \), but not secret \( S \). And due to the one-way nature of \( F \), no one is able to extract \( S \) given \( F(S + i) \) for some \( i \), thus even if he somehow obtains a certain segment of the sequence, he will not be able to determine the rest.”
"I am afraid, Watson, that your proposal isn’t without flaws and at least it needs some additional conditions to be satisfied by F. Let’s consider, for instance, the RSA encryption function, that is F(M) = M^K mod N, K is secret. This function is believed to be one-way, but I wouldn’t recommend its use, for example, on the sequence M = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . . ."

“But why, Holmes?” Dr. Watson apparently didn’t understand. “Why do you think that the resulting sequence 2^K mod N, 3^K mod N, 4^K mod N, . . . is not appropriate for one-time pad encryption if K is kept secret?”

“Because it is—at least partially—predictable, dear Watson, even if K is kept secret. You have said that the cryptanalyst is assumed to know F and the general nature of the sequence. Now let’s assume that he will obtain somehow a short segment of the output sequence. In crypto circles this assumption is generally considered to be a viable one. And for this output sequence, knowledge of just the first two elements will allow him to predict quite a lot of the next elements of the sequence, even if not all of them, thus this sequence can’t be considered to be cryptographically strong. And with the knowledge of a longer segment he could predict even more of the next elements of the sequence. Look, knowing the general nature of the sequence and its first two elements 2^K mod N and 3^K mod N, you can easily compute its following elements.”

Show how this can be done.

9.12 Show how RSA can be represented by matrices M1, M2, and M3 of Problem 9.1.

9.13 Consider the following scheme:
1. Pick an odd number, E.
2. Pick two prime numbers, P and Q, where (P - 1)(Q - 1) - 1 is evenly divisible by E.
3. Multiply P and Q to get N.
4. Calculate D = \((P - 1)(Q - 1)(E - 1) + 1\) / E

Is this scheme equivalent to RSA? Show why or why not.

9.14 Consider the following scheme by which B encrypts a message for A.
1. A chooses two large primes P and Q that are also relatively prime to (P - 1) and (Q - 1).
2. A publishes N = PQ as its public key.
3. A calculates \(P'\) and \(Q'\) such that \(PP'\equiv 1 \mod (Q - 1)\) and \(QQ'\equiv 1 \mod (P - 1)\).
4. B encrypts message M as \(C = M^N \mod N\).
5. A finds M by solving \(M = C^{P'} \mod Q\) and \(M = C^{Q'} \mod P\).
   a. Explain how this scheme works.
   b. How does it differ from RSA?
   c. Is there any particular advantage to RSA compared to this scheme?
   d. Show how this scheme can be represented by matrices M1, M2, and M3 of Problem 9.1.

9.15 “This is a very interesting case, Watson,” Holmes said. “The young man loves a girl, and she loves him too. However, her father is a strange fellow who insists that his would-be son-in-law must design a simple and secure protocol for an appropriate public-key cryptosystem he could use in his company’s computer network. The young man came up with the following protocol for communication between two parties. For example, user A wishing to send message M to user B: (messages exchanged are in the format sender’s name, text, receiver’s name)"
   1. A sends B the following block: \((A, E(PU_b, [M, A]), B)\).
   2. B acknowledges receipt by sending to A the following block: \((B, E(PU_a, [M, B]), A)\).

"You can see that the protocol is really simple. But the girl’s father claims that the young man has not satisfied his call for a simple protocol, because the proposal contains a certain redundancy and can be further simplified to the following:"
   1. A sends B the block: \((A, E(PU_b, M), B)\).
   2. B acknowledges receipt by sending to A the block: \((B, E(PU_a, M), A)\).
“On the basis of that, the girl’s father refuses to allow his daughter to marry the young man, thus making them both unhappy. The young man was just here to ask me for help.”

“Hmm, I don’t see how you can help him.” Watson was visibly unhappy with the idea that the sympathetic young man has to lose his love.

“Well, I think I could help. You know, Watson, redundancy is sometimes good to ensure the security of protocol. Thus, the simplification the girl’s father has proposed could make the new protocol vulnerable to an attack the original protocol was able to resist,” mused Holmes. “Yes, it is so, Watson. Look, all an adversary needs is to be one of the users of the network and to be able to intercept messages exchanged between A and B. Being a user of the network, he has his own public encryption key and is able to send his own messages to A or to B and to receive theirs. With the help of the simplified protocol, he could then obtain message \( M \) user A has previously sent to B using the following procedure:

Complete the description.

9.16 Use the fast exponentiation algorithm of Figure 9.8 to determine \( 5^{596} \mod 1234 \). Show the steps involved in the computation.

9.17 Here is another realization of the fast exponentiation algorithm. Demonstrate that it is equivalent to the one in Figure 9.8.

1. \( f \leftarrow 1; T \leftarrow a; E \leftarrow b \)
2. if odd \( (e) \) then \( f \leftarrow f \times T \)
3. \( E \leftarrow \lfloor E/2 \rfloor \)
4. \( T \leftarrow T \times T \)
5. if \( E > 0 \) then goto 2
6. output \( f \)

9.18 The problem illustrates a simple application of the chosen ciphertext attack. Bob intercepts a ciphertext \( C \) intended for Alice and encrypted with Alice’s public key \( e \). Bob wants to obtain the original message \( M = C^d \mod n \). Bob chooses a random value \( r \) less than \( n \) and computes

\[
Z = r^e \mod n \\
X = ZC \mod n \\
t = r^{-1} \mod n
\]

Next, Bob gets Alice to authenticate (sign) \( X \) with her private key (as in Figure 9.3), thereby decrypting \( X \). Alice returns \( Y = X^d \mod n \). Show how Bob can use the information now available to him to determine \( M \).

9.19 Show the OAEP decoding operation used for decryption that corresponds to the encoding operation of Figure 9.10.

9.20 Improve on algorithm P1 in Appendix 9B.

a. Develop an algorithm that requires \( 2n \) multiplications and \( n + 1 \) additions. \( \text{Hint: } x^{i+1} = x^i \times x \).

b. Develop an algorithm that requires only \( n + 1 \) multiplications and \( n + 1 \) additions. \( \text{Hint: } P(x) = a_0 + x \times q(x) \), where \( q(x) \) is a polynomial of degree \( n - 1 \).

The remaining problems concern the knapsack public-key algorithm described in Appendix J.

9.21 What items are in the knapsack in Figure F.1?

9.22 Perform encryption and decryption using the knapsack algorithm for the following:

a. \( a^I = (1, 3, 5, 10); w = 7; m = 20; x = 1101 \)

b. \( a^I = (1, 3, 5, 11, 23, 46, 136, 263); w = 203; m = 491; x = 11101000 \)

c. \( a^I = (2, 3, 6, 12, 25); w = 46; m = 53; x = 11101 \)

d. \( a^I = (15, 92, 108, 279, 563, 1172, 2243, 4468); w = 2393; m = 9291; x = 10110001 \)

9.23 Why is it a requirement that \( m > \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i^I \)?
The basic elements of the RSA algorithm can be summarized as follows. Given two prime numbers $p$ and $q$, with $n = pq$ and a message block $M < n$, two integers $e$ and $d$ are chosen such that

$$M^{ed} \mod n = M$$

We state in Section 9.2 that the preceding relationship holds if $e$ and $d$ are multiplicative inverses modulo $\phi(n)$, where $\phi(n)$ is the Euler totient function. It is shown in Chapter 8 that for $p, q$ prime, $\phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. The relationship between $e$ and $d$ can be expressed as

$$ed \mod \phi(n) = 1$$

Another way to state this is that there is an integer $k$ such that $ed = k\phi(n) + 1$. Thus, we must show that

$$M^{k\phi(n)+1} \mod n = M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod n = M \quad (9.3)$$

Basic Results

Before proving Equation (9.3), we summarize some basic results. In Chapter 4, we showed that a property of modular arithmetic is

$$[(a \mod n) \times (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a \times b) \mod n$$

From this, it should be easy to see that if we have $x \mod n = 1$, then $x^2 \mod n = 1$ and, for any integer $y$, we have $x^y \mod n = 1$. Similarly, if we have $x \mod n = 0$ for any integer $y$, we have $x^y \mod n = 0$.

Another property of modular arithmetic is

$$[(a \mod n) - (b \mod n)] \mod n = (a - b) \mod n$$

The other result we need is Euler’s theorem, which was developed in Chapter 8. If integers $a$ and $n$ are relatively prime, then $a^{\phi(n)} \mod n = 1$.

Proof

First we show that $M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod p = M \mod p$. There are two cases to consider.

**Case 1:** $M$ and $p$ are not relatively prime; that is, $p$ divides $M$. In this case, $M \mod p = 0$ and therefore $M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod p = 0$. Thus, $M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod p = M \mod p$.

**Case 2:** If $M$ and $p$ are relatively prime, by Euler’s theorem, $M^{\phi(p)} \mod p = 1$. We proceed as

$$M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod p = [(M)^{M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1}}] \mod p$$

$$= [(M)(M^{(p-1)}{k(q-1)})] \mod p$$

$$= [(M)(M^{\phi(p)}{k(q-1)})] \mod p$$

$$= (M \mod p) \times [(M^{\phi(p)} \mod p)^{k(q-1)}]$$

$$= (M \mod p) \times (1)^{k(q-1)} \quad \text{(by Euler’s theorem)}$$

$$= M \mod p$$
We now observe that

\[ [M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} - M] \mod p = [M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod p] - [M \mod p] = 0 \]

Thus, \( p \) divides \([M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} - M]\). By the same reasoning, we can show that \( q \) divides \([M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} - M]\). Because \( p \) and \( q \) are distinct primes, there must exist an integer \( r \) that satisfies

\[ [M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} - M] = (pq)r = nr \]

Therefore, \( n \) divides \([M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} - M]\), and so \( M^{k\phi(n)+1} \mod n = M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod n = M \).
An example helps clarify the use of this notation. Suppose we wish to evaluate a general polynomial of the form

\[ P(x) = a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + \cdots + a_1 x + a_0 \]

The following simple-minded algorithm is from [POHL81].

\begin{verbatim}
algorithm P1;
n, i, j: integer; x, polyval: real;
a, S: array [0..100] of real;
begin
  read(x, n);
  for i := 0 upto n do
    begin
      S[i] := 1; read(a[i]);
      for j := 1 upto i do S[i] := x × S[i];
      S[i] := a[i] × S[i]
    end;
  polyval := 0;
  for i := 0 upto n do polyval := polyval + S[i];
  write ('value at', x, 'is', polyval)
end.
\end{verbatim}

In this algorithm, each subexpression is evaluated separately. Each S[i] requires \((i + 1)\) multiplications: \(i\) multiplications to compute \(S[i]\) and one to multiply by \(a[i]\). Computing all \(n\) terms requires

\[ \sum_{i=0}^{n} (i + 1) = \frac{(n + 2)(n + 1)}{2} \]

multiplications. There are also \((n + 1)\) additions, which we can ignore relative to the much larger number of multiplications. Thus, the time complexity of this algorithm is \(f(n) = (n + 2)(n + 1)/2\). We now show that \(f(n) = O(n^2)\). From the definition of Equation (9.4), we want to show that for \(a = 1\) and \(M = 4\) the relationship holds for \(g(n) = n^2\). We do this by induction on \(n\). The relationship holds for \(n = 4\) because \((4 + 2)(4 + 1)/2 = 15 < 4^2 = 16\). Now assume that it holds for all values of \(n\) up to \(k\) [i.e., \((k + 2)(k + 1)/2 < k^2\)]. Then, with \(n = k + 1\),

\[ \frac{(n + 2)(n + 1)}{2} = \frac{(k + 3)(k + 2)}{2} \]

\[ = \frac{(k + 2)(k + 1)}{2} + k + 2 \]

\[ \leq k^2 + k + 2 \]

\[ \leq k^2 + 2k + 1 = (k + 1)^2 = n^2 \]

Therefore, the result is true for \(n = k + 1\).
In general, the big-O notation makes use of the term that grows the fastest. For example,

1. \( O(ax^7 + 3x^3 + \sin(x)) = O(ax^7) = O(x^7) \)
2. \( O(e^n + an^{10}) = O(e^n) \)
3. \( O(n! + n^{50}) = O(n!) \)

There is much more to the big-O notation, with fascinating ramifications. For the interested reader, two of the best accounts are in [GRAH94] and [KNUT97].

An algorithm with an input of size \( n \) is said to be

- **Linear**: If the running time is \( O(n) \)
- **Polynomial**: If the running time is \( O(n^t) \) for some constant \( t \)
- **Exponential**: If the running time is \( O(\mathcal{P}(n)) \) for some constant \( t \) and polynomial \( h(n) \)

Generally, a problem that can be solved in polynomial time is considered feasible, whereas anything worse than polynomial time, especially exponential time, is considered infeasible. But you must be careful with these terms. First, if the size of the input is small enough, even very complex algorithms become feasible. Suppose, for example, that you have a system that can execute \( 10^{12} \) operations per unit time. Table 9.6 shows the size of input that can be handled in one time unit for algorithms of various complexities. For algorithms of exponential or factorial time, only very small inputs can be accommodated.

The second thing to be careful about is the way in which the input is characterized. For example, the complexity of cryptanalysis of an encryption algorithm can be characterized equally well in terms of the number of possible keys or the length of the key. For the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for example, the number of possible keys is \( 2^{128} \), and the length of the key is 128 bits. If we consider a single encryption to be a “step” and the number of possible keys to be \( N = 2^n \), then the time complexity of the algorithm is linear in terms of the number of keys \( O(N) \) but exponential in terms of the length of the key \( O(2^n) \).

**Table 9.6**  
**Level of Effort for Various Levels of Complexity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \log_2 n )</td>
<td>( 2^{10^{21}} = 10^{31} \times 10^{11} )</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n^2 )</td>
<td>( 10^6 )</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n^6 )</td>
<td>( 10^2 )</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( 2^n )</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n! )</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>( 10^{12} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 10

OTHER PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTO SYSTEMS

10.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
   The Algorithm
   Key Exchange Protocols
   Man-in-the-Middle Attack

10.2 Elgamal Cryptographic System

10.3 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic
   Abelian Groups
   Elliptic Curves over Real Numbers
   Elliptic Curves over $\mathbb{Z}_p$
   Elliptic Curves over $\text{GF}(2^m)$

10.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
   Analog of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
   Elliptic Curve Encryption/Decryption
   Security of Elliptic Curve Cryptography

10.5 Pseudorandom Number Generation Based on an Asymmetric Cipher
   PRNG Based on RSA
   PRNG Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

10.6 Recommended Reading and Web Site

10.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
Amongst the tribes of Central Australia every man, woman, and child has a secret or sacred name which is bestowed by the older men upon him or her soon after birth, and which is known to none but the fully initiated members of the group. This secret name is never mentioned except upon the most solemn occasions; to utter it in the hearing of men of another group would be a most serious breach of tribal custom. When mentioned at all, the name is spoken only in a whisper, and not until the most elaborate precautions have been taken that it shall be heard by no one but members of the group. The native thinks that a stranger knowing his secret name would have special power to work him ill by means of magic.

—The Golden Bough, Sir James George Frazer

**KEY POINTS**

- A simple public-key algorithm is Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This protocol enables two users to establish a secret key using a public-key scheme based on discrete logarithms. The protocol is secure only if the authenticity of the two participants can be established.
- Elliptic curve arithmetic can be used to develop a variety of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) schemes, including key exchange, encryption, and digital signature.
- For purposes of ECC, elliptic curve arithmetic involves the use of an elliptic curve equation defined over a finite field. The coefficients and variables in the equation are elements of a finite field. Schemes using $Z_p$ and $GF(2^m)$ have been developed.

This chapter begins with a description of one of the earliest and simplest PKCS: Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The chapter then looks at another important scheme, the ElGamal PKCS. Next, we look at the increasingly important PKCS known as elliptic curve cryptography. Finally, the use of public-key algorithms for pseudorandom number generation is examined.

### 10.1 DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE

The first published public-key algorithm appeared in the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman that defined public-key cryptography [DIFF76b] and is generally referred to as Diffie-Hellman key exchange.\(^1\) A number of commercial products employ this key exchange technique.

---

\(^{1}\)Williamson of Britain’s CESG published the identical scheme a few months earlier in a classified document [WILL76] and claims to have discovered it several years prior to that; see [ELLI99] for a discussion.
The purpose of the algorithm is to enable two users to securely exchange a key that can then be used for subsequent encryption of messages. The algorithm itself is limited to the exchange of secret values.

The Diffie-Hellman algorithm depends for its effectiveness on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. Briefly, we can define the discrete logarithm in the following way. Recall from Chapter 8 that a primitive root of a prime number $p$ as one whose powers modulo $p$ generate all the integers from 1 to $p - 1$. That is, if $a$ is a primitive root of the prime number $p$, then the numbers

$$a \mod p, a^2 \mod p, \ldots, a^{p-1} \mod p$$

are distinct and consist of the integers from 1 through $p - 1$ in some permutation.

For any integer $b$ and a primitive root $a$ of prime number $p$, we can find a unique exponent $i$ such that

$$b = a^i \mod p \quad \text{where } 0 \leq i \leq (p - 1)$$

The exponent $i$ is referred to as the **discrete logarithm** of $b$ for the base $a$, mod $p$. We express this value as $\text{dlog}_{a,p}(b)$. See Chapter 8 for an extended discussion of discrete logarithms.

### The Algorithm

Figure 10.1 summarizes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. For this scheme, there are two publicly known numbers: a prime number $q$ and an integer $\alpha$ that is a primitive root of $q$. Suppose the users A and B wish to exchange a key. User A selects a random integer $X_A < q$ and computes $Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q$. Similarly, user B independently selects a random integer $X_B < q$ and computes $Y_B = \alpha^{X_B} \mod q$.

Each side keeps the $X$ value private and makes the $Y$ value available publicly to the other side. User A computes the key as $K = (Y_B)^{X_A} \mod q$ and user B computes the key as $K = (Y_A)^{X_B} \mod q$. These two calculations produce identical results:

$$K = (Y_B)^{X_A} \mod q$$

$$= (\alpha^{X_B})^{X_A} \mod q$$

$$= (\alpha^{X_B X_A}) \mod q$$

$$= (\alpha^{X_B})^{X_A} \mod q$$

by the rules of modular arithmetic

$$= (\alpha^{X_A})^{X_B} \mod q$$

$$= (Y_A)^{X_B} \mod q$$

The result is that the two sides have exchanged a secret value. Furthermore, because $X_A$ and $X_B$ are private, an adversary only has the following ingredients to work with: $q$, $\alpha$, $Y_A$, and $Y_B$. Thus, the adversary is forced to take a discrete logarithm to determine the key. For example, to determine the private key of user B, an adversary must compute

$$X_B = \text{dlog}_{\alpha,q}(Y_B)$$

The adversary can then calculate the key $K$ in the same manner as user B calculates it.
The security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange lies in the fact that, while it is relatively easy to calculate exponentials modulo a prime, it is very difficult to calculate discrete logarithms. For large primes, the latter task is considered infeasible.

Here is an example. Key exchange is based on the use of the prime number $q = 353$ and a primitive root of 353, in this case $\alpha = 3$. A and B select secret keys $X_A = 97$ and $X_B = 233$, respectively. Each computes its public key:

- A computes $Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q = 3^{97} \mod 353 = 40$.
- B computes $Y_B = \alpha^{X_B} \mod q = 3^{233} \mod 353 = 248$.

After they exchange public keys, each can compute the common secret key:

- A computes $K = (Y_B)^{X_A} \mod q = 248^{97} \mod 353 = 160$.
- B computes $K = (Y_A)^{X_B} \mod q = 40^{233} \mod 353 = 160$.

We assume an attacker would have available the following information:

$q = 353; \alpha = 3; Y_A = 40; Y_B = 248$
In this simple example, it would be possible by brute force to determine the secret key 160. In particular, an attacker E can determine the common key by discovering a solution to the equation $3^a \mod 353 = 40$ or the equation $3^b \mod 353 = 248$. The brute-force approach is to calculate powers of 3 modulo 353, stopping when the result equals either 40 or 248. The desired answer is reached with the exponent value of 97, which provides $3^{97} \mod 353 = 40$.

With larger numbers, the problem becomes impractical.

**Key Exchange Protocols**

Figure 10.2 shows a simple protocol that makes use of the Diffie-Hellman calculation. Suppose that user A wishes to set up a connection with user B and use a secret key to encrypt messages on that connection. User A can generate a one-time private key $X_A$, calculate $Y_A$, and send that to user B. User B responds by generating a private value $X_B$, calculating $Y_B$, and sending $Y_B$ to user A. Both users can now calculate the key. The necessary public values $q$ and $\alpha$ would need to be known ahead of time. Alternatively, user A could pick values for $q$ and $\alpha$ and include those in the first message.

As an example of another use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, suppose that a group of users (e.g., all users on a LAN) each generate a long-lasting private value $X_i$ (for user $i$) and calculate a public value $Y_i$. These public values, together with global public values for $q$ and $\alpha$, are stored in some central directory. At any time, user $j$ can access user $i$’s public value, calculate a secret key, and use that to send an encrypted message to user A. If the central directory is trusted, then this form of communication provides both confidentiality and a degree of authentication. Because only $i$ and $j$ can determine the key, no other user can read the message (confidentiality). Recipient $i$ knows that only user $j$ could have created a message using this key (authentication). However, the technique does not protect against replay attacks.

![Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange](image-url)
Man-in-the-Middle Attack

The protocol depicted in Figure 10.2 is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to exchange keys, and Darth is the adversary. The attack proceeds as follows.

1. Darth prepares for the attack by generating two random private keys \( X_{D1} \) and \( X_{D2} \) and then computing the corresponding public keys \( Y_{D1} \) and \( Y_{D2} \).
2. Alice transmits \( Y_A \) to Bob.
3. Darth intercepts \( Y_A \) and transmits \( Y_{D1} \) to Bob. Darth also calculates \( K2 = (Y_A)^{X_{D2}} \mod q \).
4. Bob receives \( Y_{D1} \) and calculates \( K1 = (Y_{D1})^{X_B} \mod q \).
5. Bob transmits \( Y_B \) to Alice.
6. Darth intercepts \( Y_B \) and transmits \( Y_{D2} \) to Alice. Darth calculates \( K1 = (Y_B)^{X_{D1}} \mod q \).
7. Alice receives \( Y_{D2} \) and calculates \( K2 = (Y_{D2})^{X_A} \mod q \).

At this point, Bob and Alice think that they share a secret key, but instead Bob and Darth share secret key \( K1 \) and Alice and Darth share secret key \( K2 \). All future communication between Bob and Alice is compromised in the following way.

1. Alice sends an encrypted message \( M: E(K2, M) \).
2. Darth intercepts the encrypted message and decrypts it to recover \( M \).
3. Darth sends Bob \( E(K1, M) \) or \( E(K1, M') \), where \( M' \) is any message. In the first case, Darth simply wants to eavesdrop on the communication without altering it. In the second case, Darth wants to modify the message going to Bob.

The key exchange protocol is vulnerable to such an attack because it does not authenticate the participants. This vulnerability can be overcome with the use of digital signatures and public-key certificates; these topics are explored in Chapters 13 and 14.

10.2 ELGAMAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM

In 1984, T. Elgamal announced a public-key scheme based on discrete logarithms, closely related to the Diffie-Hellman technique [ELGA84, ELGA85]. The ElGamal\(^2\) cryptosystem is used in some form in a number of standards including the digital signature standard (DSS), which is covered in Chapter 13, and the S/MIME e-mail standard (Chapter 18).

\(^2\)For no apparent reason, everyone calls this the ElGamal system although Mr. Elgamal’s last name does not have a capital letter G.
As with Diffie-Hellman, the global elements of ElGamal are a prime number \( q \) and \( \alpha \), which is a primitive root of \( q \). User A generates a private/public key pair as follows:

1. Generate a random integer \( X_A \), such that \( 1 < X_A < q - 1 \).
2. Compute \( Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q \).
3. A’s private key is \( X_A \); A’s public key is \( \{q, \alpha, Y_A\} \).

Any user B that has access to A’s public key can encrypt a message as follows:

1. Represent the message as an integer in the range \( 0 \leq M \leq q - 1 \). Longer messages are sent as a sequence of blocks, with each block being an integer less than \( q \).
2. Choose a random integer \( k \) such that \( 1 \leq k \leq q - 1 \).
3. Compute a one-time key \( K = (Y_A)^k \mod q \).
4. Encrypt \( M \) as the pair of integers \( (C_1, C_2) \) where
   \[
   C_1 = \alpha^k \mod q; \quad C_2 = KM \mod q
   \]

User A recovers the plaintext as follows:

1. Recover the key by computing \( K = (C_1)^{X_A} \mod q \).
2. Compute \( M = (C_2K^{-1}) \mod q \).

These steps are summarized in Figure 10.3. It corresponds to Figure 9.1a: Alice generates a public/private key pair; Bob encrypts using Alice’s public key; and Alice decrypts using her private key.

Let us demonstrate why the ElGamal scheme works. First, we show how \( K \) is recovered by the decryption process:

\[
K = (Y_A)^k \mod q \\
K = (\alpha^{X_A} \mod q)^k \mod q \\
K = \alpha^{kX_A} \mod q \\
K = (C_1)^{X_A} \mod q
\]

\( K \) is defined during the encryption process

\( K \) is a substitute using \( Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q \)

by the rules of modular arithmetic

substitute using \( C_1 = \alpha^k \mod q \)

Next, using \( K \), we recover the plaintext as

\[
C_2 = KM \mod q \\
(C_2K^{-1}) \mod q = KMK^{-1} \mod q = M \mod q = M
\]

We can restate the ElGamal process as follows, using Figure 10.3.

1. Bob generates a random integer \( k \).
2. Bob generates a one-time key \( K \) using Alice’s public-key components \( Y_A, q, \) and \( k \).
3. Bob encrypts \( k \) using the public-key component \( \alpha \), yielding \( C_1 \). \( C_1 \) provides sufficient information for Alice to recover \( K \).
4. Bob encrypts the plaintext message \( M \) using \( K \).
5. Alice recovers \( K \) from \( C_1 \) using her private key.
6. Alice uses \( K^{-1} \) to recover the plaintext message from \( C_2 \).
Global Public Elements

\[ q \]  prime number
\[ \alpha \]  \( \alpha < q \) and \( \alpha \) a primitive root of \( q \)

Key Generation by Alice

Select private \( X_A \)  \( X_A < q - 1 \)
Calculate \( Y_A \)  \( Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q \)
Public key  \( PU = \{q, \alpha, Y_A\} \)
Private key  \( X_A \)

Encryption by Bob with Alice’s Public Key

Plaintext:  \( M < q \)
Select random integer \( k \)  \( k < q \)
Calculate \( K \)  \( K = (Y_A)^k \mod q \)
Calculate \( C_1 \)  \( C_1 = \alpha^k \mod q \)
Calculate \( C_2 \)  \( C_2 = KM \mod q \)
Ciphertext:  \( (C_1, C_2) \)

Decryption by Alice with Alice’s Private Key

Ciphertext:  \( (C_1, C_2) \)
Calculate \( K \)  \( K = (C_1)^{X_A} \mod q \)
Plaintext:  \( M = (C_2 K^{-1}) \mod q \)

Figure 10.3 The ElGamal Cryptosystem

Thus, \( K \) functions as a one-time key, used to encrypt and decrypt the message.

For example, let us start with the prime field \( GF(19) \); that is, \( q = 19 \). It has primitive roots \( \{2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15\} \), as shown in Table 8.3. We choose \( \alpha = 10 \).

Alice generates a key pair as follows:

1. Alice chooses \( X_A = 5 \).
2. Then \( Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q = \alpha^5 \mod 19 = 3 \) (see Table 8.3).
3. Alice’s private key is 5; Alice’s public key is \( \{q, \alpha, Y_A\} = \{19, 10, 3\} \).
Suppose Bob wants to send the message with the value $M = 17$. Then,

2. Then $K = (Y_A)^k \mod q = 3^6 \mod 19 = 729 \mod 19 = 7$.
3. So
   
   $C_1 = \alpha^k \mod q = \alpha^6 \mod 19 = 11$

   $C_2 = KM \mod q = 7 \times 17 \mod 19 = 119 \mod 19 = 5$

4. Bob sends the ciphertext $(11, 5)$.

For decryption:

1. Alice calculates $K = (C_1)^{X_A} \mod q = 11^5 \mod 19 = 161051 \mod 19 = 7$.
2. Then $K^{-1}$ in $\text{GF}(19)$ is $7^{-1} \mod 19 = 11$.
3. Finally, $M = (C_2K^{-1}) \mod q = 5 \times 11 \mod 19 = 55 \mod 19 = 17$.

If a message must be broken up into blocks and sent as a sequence of encrypted blocks, a unique value of $k$ should be used for each block. If $k$ is used for more than one block, knowledge of one block of the message enables the user to compute other blocks as follows. Let

\[
C_{1,1} = \alpha^k \mod q; C_{2,1} = KM_1 \mod q
\]

\[
C_{1,2} = \alpha^k \mod q; C_{2,2} = KM_2 \mod q
\]

Then,

\[
\frac{C_{2,1}}{C_{2,2}} = \frac{KM_1 \mod q}{KM_2 \mod q} = \frac{M_1 \mod q}{M_2 \mod q}
\]

If $M_1$ is known, then $M_2$ is easily computed as

\[
M_2 = (C_{2,1})^{-1} C_{2,2} M_1 \mod q
\]

The security of ElGamal is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. To recover A’s private key, an adversary would have to compute $X_A = \text{dlog}_{\alpha,q}(Y_A)$. Alternatively, to recover the one-time key $K$, an adversary would have to determine the random number $k$, and this would require computing the discrete logarithm $k = \text{dlog}_{\alpha,q}(C_1)$. [STIN06] points out that these calculations are regarded as infeasible if $p$ is at least 300 decimal digits and $q - 1$ has at least one “large” prime factor.

### 10.3 ELLIPTIC CURVE ARITHMETIC

Most of the products and standards that use public-key cryptography for encryption and digital signatures use RSA. As we have seen, the key length for secure RSA use has increased over recent years, and this has put a heavier processing load on applications using RSA. This burden has ramifications, especially for electronic commerce sites that conduct large numbers of secure transactions. A competing
system challenges RSA: elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). ECC is showing up in standardization efforts, including the IEEE P1363 Standard for Public-Key Cryptography.

The principal attraction of ECC, compared to RSA, is that it appears to offer equal security for a far smaller key size, thereby reducing processing overhead. On the other hand, although the theory of ECC has been around for some time, it is only recently that products have begun to appear and that there has been sustained cryptanalytic interest in probing for weaknesses. Accordingly, the confidence level in ECC is not yet as high as that in RSA.

ECC is fundamentally more difficult to explain than either RSA or Diffie-Hellman, and a full mathematical description is beyond the scope of this book. This section and the next give some background on elliptic curves and ECC. We begin with a brief review of the concept of abelian group. Next, we examine the concept of elliptic curves defined over the real numbers. This is followed by a look at elliptic curves defined over finite fields. Finally, we are able to examine elliptic curve ciphers.

The reader may wish to review the material on finite fields in Chapter 4 before proceeding.

Abelian Groups
Recall from Chapter 4 that an abelian group \( G \), sometimes denoted by \( \{G, \cdot\} \), is a set of elements with a binary operation, denoted by \( \cdot \), that associates to each ordered pair \((a, b)\) of elements in \( G \) an element \((a \cdot b)\) in \( G \), such that the following axioms are obeyed:\(^3\)

(A1) Closure: If \( a \) and \( b \) belong to \( G \), then \( a \cdot b \) is also in \( G \).

(A2) Associative: \( a \cdot (b \cdot c) = (a \cdot b) \cdot c \) for all \( a, b, c \) in \( G \).

(A3) Identity element: There is an element \( e \) in \( G \) such that \( a \cdot e = e \cdot a = a \) for all \( a \) in \( G \).

(A4) Inverse element: For each \( a \) in \( G \) there is an element \( a' \) in \( G \) such that \( a \cdot a' = a' \cdot a = e \).

(A5) Commutative: \( a \cdot b = b \cdot a \) for all \( a, b \) in \( G \).

A number of public-key ciphers are based on the use of an abelian group. For example, Diffie-Hellman key exchange involves multiplying pairs of nonzero integers modulo a prime number \( q \). Keys are generated by exponentiation over the group, with exponentiation defined as repeated multiplication. For example, \( a^k \mod q = (a \times a \times \ldots \times a) \mod q \). To attack Diffie-Hellman, the attacker must determine \( k \) given \( a \) and \( a^k \); this is the discrete logarithm problem.

\(^3\)The operator \( \cdot \) is generic and can refer to addition, multiplication, or some other mathematical operation.
For elliptic curve cryptography, an operation over elliptic curves, called addition, is used. Multiplication is defined by repeated addition. For example,

\[ a \times k = (a + a + \ldots + a) \]

\[ k \text{ times} \]

where the addition is performed over an elliptic curve. Cryptanalysis involves determining \( k \) given \( a \) and \( (a \times k) \).

An **elliptic curve** is defined by an equation in two variables with coefficients. For cryptography, the variables and coefficients are restricted to elements in a finite field, which results in the definition of a finite abelian group. Before looking at this, we first look at elliptic curves in which the variables and coefficients are real numbers. This case is perhaps easier to visualize.

**Elliptic Curves over Real Numbers**

Elliptic curves are not ellipses. They are so named because they are described by cubic equations, similar to those used for calculating the circumference of an ellipse. In general, cubic equations for elliptic curves take the following form, known as a **Weierstrass equation**:

\[ y^2 + axy + by = x^3 + cx^2 + dx + e \]

where \( a, b, c, d, e \) are real numbers and \( x \) and \( y \) take on values in the real numbers.\(^4\)

For our purpose, it is sufficient to limit ourselves to equations of the form

\[ y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \]

(10.1)

Such equations are said to be cubic, or of degree 3, because the highest exponent they contain is a 3. Also included in the definition of an elliptic curve is a single element denoted \( O \) and called the **point at infinity** or the **zero point**, which we discuss subsequently. To plot such a curve, we need to compute

\[ y = \sqrt{x^3 + ax + b} \]

For given values of \( a \) and \( b \), the plot consists of positive and negative values of \( y \) for each value of \( x \). Thus, each curve is symmetric about \( y = 0 \). Figure 10.4 shows two examples of elliptic curves. As you can see, the formula sometimes produces weird-looking curves.

Now, consider the set of points \( E(a, b) \) consisting of all of the points \((x, y)\) that satisfy Equation (10.1) together with the element \( O \). Using a different value of the pair \((a, b)\) results in a different set \( E(a, b) \). Using this terminology, the two curves in Figure 10.4 depict the sets \( E(-1, 0) \) and \( E(1, 1) \), respectively.

**Geometric Description of Addition** It can be shown that a group can be defined based on the set \( E(a, b) \) for specific values of \( a \) and \( b \) in Equation (10.1), provided the following condition is met:

\[ 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \]

(10.2)

\(^4\)Note that \( x \) and \( y \) are true variables, which take on values. This is in contrast to our discussion of polynomial rings and fields in Chapter 4, where \( x \) was treated as an indeterminate.
To define the group, we must define an operation, called addition and denoted by +, for the set \( E(a, b) \), where \( a \) and \( b \) satisfy Equation (10.2). In geometric terms, the rules for addition can be stated as follows: If three points on an elliptic curve lie on a straight line, their sum is \( O \). From this definition, we can define the rules of addition over an elliptic curve.

1. \( O \) serves as the additive identity. Thus \( O = -O \); for any point \( P \) on the elliptic curve, \( P + O = P \). In what follows, we assume \( P \neq O \) and \( Q \neq O \).
2. The negative of a point \( P \) is the point with the same \( x \) coordinate but the negative of the \( y \) coordinate; that is, if \( P = (x, y) \), then \( -P = (x, -y) \). Note that these two points can be joined by a vertical line. Note that \( P + (-P) = P - P = O \).
3. To add two points $P$ and $Q$ with different $x$ coordinates, draw a straight line between them and find the third point of intersection $R$. It is easily seen that there is a unique point $R$ that is the point of intersection (unless the line is tangent to the curve at either $P$ or $Q$, in which case we take $R = P$ or $R = Q$, respectively). To form a group structure, we need to define addition on these three points: $P + Q = -R$. That is, we define $P + Q$ to be the mirror image (with respect to the $x$ axis) of the third point of intersection. Figure 10.4 illustrates this construction.

4. The geometric interpretation of the preceding item also applies to two points, $P$ and $-P$, with the same $x$ coordinate. The points are joined by a vertical line, which can be viewed as also intersecting the curve at the infinity point. We therefore have $P + (-P) = O$, which is consistent with item (2).

5. To double a point $Q$, draw the tangent line and find the other point of intersection $S$. Then $Q + Q = 2Q = -S$.

With the preceding list of rules, it can be shown that the set $E(a, b)$ is an abelian group.

**Algebraic Description of Addition** In this subsection, we present some results that enable calculation of additions over elliptic curves. For two distinct points, $P = (x_P, y_P)$ and $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$, that are not negatives of each other, the slope of the line $l$ that joins them is $\Delta = (y_Q - y_P)/(x_Q - x_P)$. There is exactly one other point where $l$ intersects the elliptic curve, and that is the negative of the sum of $P$ and $Q$. After some algebraic manipulation, we can express the sum $R = P + Q$ as

\[
\begin{align*}
x_R &= \Delta^2 - x_P - x_Q \\
y_R &= -y_P + \Delta(x_P - x_R)
\end{align*}
\]  

(10.3)

We also need to be able to add a point to itself: $P + P = 2P = R$. When $y_P \neq 0$, the expressions are

\[
\begin{align*}
x_R &= \left(\frac{3x_P^2 + a}{2y_P}\right)^2 - 2x_P \\
y_R &= \left(\frac{3x_P^2 + a}{2y_P}\right)(x_P - x_R) - y_P
\end{align*}
\]  

(10.4)

**Elliptic Curves over $\mathbb{Z}_p$**

Elliptic curve cryptography makes use of elliptic curves in which the variables and coefficients are all restricted to elements of a finite field. Two families of elliptic curves are used in cryptographic applications: prime curves over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and binary curves over GF($2^m$). For a prime curve over $\mathbb{Z}_p$, we use a cubic equation in which the variables and coefficients all take on values in the set of integers from 0 through $p - 1$ and in which calculations are performed modulo $p$. For a binary curve defined

---

\[5\text{For derivations of these results, see [KOBL94] or other mathematical treatments of elliptic curves.}\]
over GF($2^m$), the variables and coefficients all take on values in GF($2^m$) and calculations are performed over GF($2^m$). [FERN99] points out that prime curves are best for software applications, because the extended bit-fiddling operations needed by binary curves are not required; and that binary curves are best for hardware applications, where it takes remarkably few logic gates to create a powerful, fast cryptosystem. We examine these two families in this section and the next.

There is no obvious geometric interpretation of elliptic curve arithmetic over finite fields. The algebraic interpretation used for elliptic curve arithmetic over real numbers does readily carry over, and this is the approach we take.

For elliptic curves over $\mathbb{Z}_p$, as with real numbers, we limit ourselves to equations of the form of Equation (10.1), but in this case with coefficients and variables limited to $\mathbb{Z}_p$:

$$y^2 \mod p = (x^3 + ax + b) \mod p \quad (10.5)$$

For example, Equation (10.5) is satisfied for $a = 1$, $b = 1$, $x = 9$, $y = 7$, $\alpha = 1$ $p = 23$:

$$7^2 \mod 23 = (9^3 + 9 + 1) \mod 23$$
$$49 \mod 23 = 739 \mod 23$$
$$3 = 3$$

Now consider the set $E_p(a, b)$ consisting of all pairs of integers $(x, y)$ that satisfy Equation (10.5), together with a point at infinity $O$. The coefficients $a$ and $b$ and the variables $x$ and $y$ are all elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

For example, let $p = 23$ and consider the elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$. In this case, $a = b = 1$. Note that this equation is the same as that of Figure 10.4b. The figure shows a continuous curve with all of the real points that satisfy the equation. For the set $E_{23}(1, 1)$, we are only interested in the nonnegative integers in the quadrant from $(0, 0)$ through $(p - 1, p - 1)$ that satisfy the equation mod $p$. Table 10.1 lists the points (other than $O$) that are part of $E_{23}(1, 1)$. Figure 10.5 plots the points of $E_{23}(1, 1)$; note that the points, with one exception, are symmetric about $y = 11.5$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.1 Points on the Elliptic Curve $E_{23}(1,1)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(0, 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(0, 22)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1, 7)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1, 16)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(3, 10)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(3, 13)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(4, 0)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(5, 4)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(5, 19)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It can be shown that a finite abelian group can be defined based on the set $E_p(a, b)$ provided that $(x^3 + ax + b) \mod p$ has no repeated factors. This is equivalent to the condition

$$\text{(10.6)}$$

Note that Equation (10.6) has the same form as Equation (10.2).

The rules for addition over $E_p(a, b)$, correspond to the algebraic technique described for elliptic curves defined over real numbers. For all points $P, Q \in E_p(a, b)$:

1. $P + O = P$.
2. If $P = (x_P, y_P)$, then $P + (x_P, -y_P) = O$. The point $(x_P, -y_P)$ is the negative of $P$, denoted as $-P$. For example, in $E_{23}(1, 1)$, for $P = (13, 7)$, we have $-P = (13, -7)$. But $-7 \mod 23 = 16$. Therefore, $-P = (13, 16)$, which is also in $E_{23}(1, 1)$.
3. If $P = (x_P, y_P)$ and $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$ with $P \neq -Q$, then $R = P + Q = (x_R, y_R)$ is determined by the following rules:

$$x_R = (\lambda^2 - x_P - x_Q) \mod p$$

$$y_R = (\lambda(x_P - x_R) - y_P) \mod p$$
where

\[
\lambda = \begin{cases} 
    \frac{y_Q - y_P}{x_Q - x_P} \mod p & \text{if } P \neq Q \\
    \frac{3x_P^2 + a}{2y_P} \mod p & \text{if } P = Q
\end{cases}
\]

4. Multiplication is defined as repeated addition; for example, \(4P = P + P + P + P\).

For example, let \(P = (3, 10)\) and \(Q = (9, 7)\) in \(E_{23}(1, 1)\). Then

\[
\lambda = \left( \frac{7 - 10}{9 - 3} \right) \mod 23 = \left( \frac{-3}{6} \right) \mod 23 = \left( \frac{-1}{2} \right) \mod 23 = 11
\]

\[
x_R = (11^2 - 3 - 9) \mod 23 = 109 \mod 23 = 17
\]

\[
y_R = (11(3 - 17) - 10) \mod 23 = -164 \mod 23 = 20
\]

So \(P + Q = (17, 20)\). To find \(2P\),

\[
\lambda = \left( \frac{3(3^2) + 1}{2 \times 10} \right) \mod 23 = \left( \frac{5}{20} \right) \mod 23 = \left( \frac{1}{4} \right) \mod 23 = 6
\]

The last step in the preceding equation involves taking the multiplicative inverse of 4 in \(Z_{23}\). This can be done using the extended Euclidean algorithm defined in Section 4.4. To confirm, note that \((6 \times 4) \mod 23 = 24 \mod 23 = 1\).

\[
x_R = (6^2 - 3 - 3) \mod 23 = 30 \mod 23 = 7
\]

\[
y_R = (6(3 - 7) - 10) \mod 23 = (-34) \mod 23 = 12
\]

and \(2P = (7, 12)\).

For determining the security of various elliptic curve ciphers, it is of some interest to know the number of points in a finite abelian group defined over an elliptic curve. In the case of the finite group \(E_p(a, b)\), the number of points \(N\) is bounded by

\[
p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p} \leq N \leq p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p}
\]

Note that the number of points in \(E_p(a, b)\) is approximately equal to the number of elements in \(Z_p\), namely \(p\) elements.

Elliptic Curves over GF(\(2^m\))

Recall from Chapter 4 that a finite field \(GF(2^m)\) consists of \(2^m\) elements, together with addition and multiplication operations that can be defined over polynomials. For elliptic curves over \(GF(2^m)\), we use a cubic equation in which the variables and coefficients all take on values in \(GF(2^m)\) for some number \(m\) and in which calculations are performed using the rules of arithmetic in \(GF(2^m)\).

It turns out that the form of cubic equation appropriate for cryptographic applications for elliptic curves is somewhat different for \(GF(2^m)\) than for \(Z_p\). The form is

\[
y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b
\]  

(10.7)
Table 10.2 Points on the Elliptic Curve $E_{24}(g^4, 1)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(0, 1)$</th>
<th>$(g^5, g^3)$</th>
<th>$(g^9, g^{13})$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(1, g^6)$</td>
<td>$(g^5, g^{11})$</td>
<td>$(g^{10}, g)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1, g^{13})$</td>
<td>$(g^6, g^8)$</td>
<td>$(g^{10}, g^8)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(g^3, g^8)$</td>
<td>$(g^6, g^{14})$</td>
<td>$(g^{12}, 0)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(g^3, g^{13})$</td>
<td>$(g^9, g^{10})$</td>
<td>$(g^{12}, g^{13})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where it is understood that the variables $x$ and $y$ and the coefficients $a$ and $b$ are elements of $GF(2^m)$ and that calculations are performed in $GF(2^m)$.

Now consider the set $E_{2m}(a, b)$ consisting of all pairs of integers $(x, y)$ that satisfy Equation (10.7), together with a point at infinity $O$.

For example, let us use the finite field $GF(2^4)$ with the irreducible polynomial $f(x) = x^4 + x + 1$. This yields a generator $g$ that satisfies $f(g) = 0$ with a value of $g^4 = g + 1$, or in binary, $g = 0010$. We can develop the powers of $g$ as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$g^0 = 0001$</th>
<th>$g^4 = 0011$</th>
<th>$g^8 = 0101$</th>
<th>$g^{12} = 1111$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$g^1 = 0010$</td>
<td>$g^5 = 0110$</td>
<td>$g^9 = 1010$</td>
<td>$g^{13} = 1101$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^2 = 0100$</td>
<td>$g^6 = 1100$</td>
<td>$g^{10} = 0111$</td>
<td>$g^{14} = 1001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g^3 = 1000$</td>
<td>$g^7 = 1011$</td>
<td>$g^{11} = 1110$</td>
<td>$g^{15} = 0001$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, $g^5 = (g^4)(g) = g^2 + g = 0110$.

Now consider the elliptic curve $y^2 + xy = x^3 + g^4x^2 + 1$. In this case, $a = g^4$ and $b = g^0 = 1$. One point that satisfies this equation is $(g^5, g^3)$:

$$(g^3)^2 + (g^5)(g^3) = (g^5)^3 + (g^4)(g^5)^2 + 1$$

$g^6 + g^8 = g^{15} + g^{14} + 1$
$1100 + 0101 = 0001 + 1001 + 0001$
$1001 = 1001$

Table 10.2 lists the points (other than $O$) that are part of $E_{2m}(g^4, 1)$. Figure 10.6 plots the points of $E_{2m}(g^4, 1)$.

It can be shown that a finite abelian group can be defined based on the set $E_{2m}(a, b)$, provided that $b \neq 0$. The rules for addition can be stated as follows. For all points $P, Q \in E_{2m}(a, b)$:

1. $P + O = P$.
2. If $P = (x_p, y_p)$, then $P + (x_p, x_p + y_p) = O$. The point $(x_p, x_p + y_p)$ is the negative of $P$, which is denoted as $-P$.
3. If $P = (x_p, y_p)$ and $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$ with $P \neq -Q$ and $P \neq Q$, then $R = P + Q = (x_R, y_R)$ is determined by the following rules:

$$x_R = \lambda^2 + \lambda + x_p + x_Q + a$$
$$y_R = \lambda(x_p + x_R) + x_R + y_P$$
where

\[ \lambda = \frac{y_Q + y_P}{x_Q + x_P} \]

4. If \( P = (x_P, y_P) \) then \( R = 2P = (x_R, y_R) \) is determined by the following rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_R &= \lambda^2 + \lambda + a \\
    y_R &= x_P^2 + (\lambda + 1)x_R
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[ \lambda = x_P + \frac{y_P}{x_P} \]

10.4 ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY

The addition operation in ECC is the counterpart of modular multiplication in RSA, and multiple addition is the counterpart of modular exponentiation. To form a cryptographic system using elliptic curves, we need to find a “hard problem” corresponding to factoring the product of two primes or taking the discrete logarithm.

Consider the equation \( Q = kP \) where \( Q, P \in E_p(a, b) \) and \( k < p \). It is relatively easy to calculate \( Q \) given \( k \) and \( P \), but it is relatively hard to determine \( k \) given \( Q \) and \( P \). This is called the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves.

We give an example taken from the Certicom Web site (www.certicom.com). Consider the group \( E_{23}(9,17) \). This is the group defined by the equation \( y^2 \mod 23 = (x^3 + 9x + 17) \mod 23 \). What is the discrete logarithm \( k \) of \( Q = (4, 5) \)?
to the base $P = (16, 5)$? The brute-force method is to compute multiples of $P$ until $Q$ is found. Thus,

$$P = (16, 5); 2P = (20, 20); 3P = (14, 14); 4P = (19, 20); 5P = (13, 10);$$
$$6P = (7, 3); 7P = (8, 7); 8P = (12, 17); 9P = (4, 5)$$

Because $9P = (4, 5) = Q$, the discrete logarithm $Q = (4, 5)$ to the base $P = (16, 5)$ is $k = 9$. In a real application, $k$ would be so large as to make the brute-force approach infeasible.

In the remainder of this section, we show two approaches to ECC that give the flavor of this technique.

**Analog of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange**

Key exchange using elliptic curves can be done in the following manner. First pick a large integer $q$, which is either a prime number or an integer of the form $2^m$, and elliptic curve parameters $a$ and $b$ for Equation (10.5) or Equation (10.7). This defines the elliptic group of points $E_q(a, b)$. Next, pick a base point $G = (x_1, y_1)$ in $E_p(a, b)$ whose order is a very large value $n$. The order $n$ of a point $G$ on an elliptic curve is the smallest positive integer $n$ such that $nG = 0$ and $G$ are parameters of the cryptosystem known to all participants.

A key exchange between users A and B can be accomplished as follows (Figure 10.7).

1. A selects an integer $n_A$ less than $n$. This is A’s private key. A then generates a public key $P_A = n_A \times G$; the public key is a point in $E_q(a, b)$.
2. B similarly selects a private key $n_B$ and computes a public key $P_B$.
3. A generates the secret key $k = n_A \times P_B$. B generates the secret key $k = n_B \times P_A$.

The two calculations in step 3 produce the same result because

$$n_A \times P_B = n_A \times (n_B \times G) = n_B \times (n_A \times G) = n_B \times P_A$$

To break this scheme, an attacker would need to be able to compute $k$ given $G$ and $kG$, which is assumed to be hard.

As an example, take $p = 211$; $E_p(0, -4)$, which is equivalent to the curve $y^2 = x^3 - 4$; and $G = (2, 2)$. One can calculate that $240G = O$. A’s private key is $n_A = 121$, so A’s public key is $P_A = 121(2, 2) = (115, 48)$. B’s private key is $n_B = 203$, so B’s public key is $203(2, 2) = (130, 203)$. The shared secret key is $121(130, 203) = 203(115, 48) = (161, 69)$.

Note that the secret key is a pair of numbers. If this key is to be used as a session key for conventional encryption, then a single number must be generated. We could simply use the $x$ coordinates or some simple function of the $x$ coordinate.

---

<sup>6</sup>Provided by Ed Schaefer of Santa Clara University.
Elliptic Curve Encryption/Decryption

Several approaches to encryption/decryption using elliptic curves have been analyzed in the literature. In this subsection, we look at perhaps the simplest. The first task in this system is to encode the plaintext message $m$ to be sent as an $x$–$y$ point $P_m$. It is the point $P_m$ that will be encrypted as a ciphertext and subsequently decrypted. Note that we cannot simply encode the message as the $x$ or $y$ coordinate of a point, because not all such coordinates are in $E_q(a, b)$; for example, see Table 10.1. Again, there are several approaches to this encoding, which we will not address here, but suffice it to say that there are relatively straightforward techniques that can be used.

As with the key exchange system, an encryption/decryption system requires a point $G$ and an elliptic group $E_q(a, b)$ as parameters. Each user $A$ selects a private key $n_A$ and generates a public key $P_A = n_A \times G$. 
To encrypt and send a message $P_m$ to B, A chooses a random positive integer $k$ and produces the ciphertext $C_m$ consisting of the pair of points:

$$C_m = \{kG, P_m + kP_B\}$$

Note that A has used B’s public key $P_B$. To decrypt the ciphertext, B multiplies the first point in the pair by B’s secret key and subtracts the result from the second point:

$$P_m + kP_B - n_B(kG) = P_m + k(n_BG) - n_B(kG) = P_m$$

A has masked the message $P_m$ by adding $kP_B$ to it. Nobody but A knows the value of $k$, so even though $P_B$ is a public key, nobody can remove the mask $kP_B$. However, A also includes a “clue,” which is enough to remove the mask if one knows the private key $n_B$. For an attacker to recover the message, the attacker would have to compute $k$ given $G$ and $kG$, which is assumed to be hard.

As an example of the encryption process (taken from [KOBL94]), take $p = 751; E_p(-1, 188)$, which is equivalent to the curve $y^2 = x^3 - x + 188$; and $G = (0, 376)$. Suppose that A wishes to send a message to B that is encoded in the elliptic point $P_m = (562, 201)$ and that A selects the random number $k = 386$. B’s public key is $P_B = (201, 5)$. We have $386(0, 376) = (676, 558)$, and $(562, 201) + 386(201, 5) = (385, 328)$. Thus, A sends the ciphertext $\{(676, 558), (385, 328)\}$.

### Security of Elliptic Curve Cryptography

The security of ECC depends on how difficult it is to determine $k$ given $kP$ and $P$. This is referred to as the elliptic curve logarithm problem. The fastest known technique for taking the elliptic curve logarithm is known as the Pollard rho method. Table 10.3 compares various algorithms by showing comparable key sizes in terms of computational effort for cryptanalysis. As can be seen, a considerably smaller key size can be used for ECC compared to RSA. Furthermore, for equal key lengths, the computational effort required for ECC and RSA is comparable [JURI97]. Thus, there is a computational advantage to using ECC with a shorter key length than a comparably secure RSA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symmetric Scheme (key size in bits)</th>
<th>ECC-Based Scheme (size of $n$ in bits)</th>
<th>RSA/DSA (modulus size in bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>2048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>3072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>7680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>15360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Certicom*
We noted in Chapter 7 that because a symmetric block cipher produces an apparently random output, it can serve as the basis of a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Similarly, an asymmetric encryption algorithm produces apparently random output and can be used to build a PRNG. Because asymmetric algorithms are typically much slower than symmetric algorithms, asymmetric algorithms are not used to generate open-ended PRNG bit streams. Rather, the asymmetric approach is useful for creating a pseudorandom function (PRF) for generating a short pseudorandom bit sequence.

In this section, we examine two PRNG designs based on pseudorandom functions.

**PRNG Based on RSA**

For a sufficient key length, the RSA algorithm is considered secure and is a good candidate to form the basis of a PRNG. Such a PRNG, known as the Micali-Schnorr PRNG [MICA91], is recommended in the ANSI standard X9.82 (*Random Number Generation*) and in the ISO standard 18031 (*Random Bit Generation*).

The PRNG is illustrated in Figure 10.8. As can be seen, this PRNG has much the same structure as the output feedback (OFB) mode used as a PRNG (see Figure 7.3b and the portion of Figure 6.6a enclosed with a dashed box). In this case, the encryption algorithm is RSA rather than a symmetric block cipher. Also, a portion of the output is fed back to the next iteration of the encryption algorithm and the remainder of the output is used as pseudorandom bits. The motivation for this separation of the output into two distinct parts is so that the pseudorandom bits from one stage do not provide input to the next stage. This separation should contribute to forward unpredictability.

![Figure 10.8](image-url)
We can define the PRNG as follows.

**Setup**  Select $p, q$ primes; $n = pq; \phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. Select $e$ such that $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$. These are the standard RSA setup selections (see Figure 9.5). In addition, let $N = \lceil \log_2 n \rceil + 1$ (the bitlength of $n$). Select $r, k$ such that $r + k = N$.

**Seed**  Select a random seed $x_0$ of bitlength $r$.

**Generate**  Generate a pseudorandom sequence of length $k \times m$ using the loop

\[
\text{for } i \text{ from } 1 \text{ to } m \text{ do}
\]\n
\[
y_i = x_{i-1}^e \mod n
\]

\[
x_i = r \text{ most significant bits of } y_i
\]

\[
z_i = k \text{ least significant bits of } y_i
\]

**Output**  The output sequence is $z_1 \parallel z_2 \parallel \ldots \parallel z_m$.

The parameters $n, r, e, k$ are selected to satisfy the following six requirements.

1. $n = pq$  $n$ is chosen as the product of two primes to have the cryptographic strength required of RSA.

2. $1 < e < \phi(n); \gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$  Ensures that the mapping $s \mapsto s^e \mod n$ is 1 to 1.

3. $r \geq v_2 \text{ strength}$  Ensures that the exponentiation requires a full modular reduction.

4. $r \geq 2 \text{ strength}$  Protects against a cryptographic attack.

5. $k, r$ are multiples of 8  An implementation convenience.

6. $k \geq 8; r + k = N$  All bits are used.

The variable *strength* in requirement 4 is defined in NIST SP 800-90 as follows:

A number associated with the amount of work (that is, the number of operations) required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system; a security strength is specified in bits and is a specific value from the set (112, 128, 192, 256) for this Recommendation. The amount of work needed is $2^{\text{strength}}$.

There is clearly a tradeoff between $r$ and $k$. Because RSA is computationally intensive compared to a block cipher, we would like to generate as many pseudorandom bits per iteration as possible and therefore would like a large value of $k$. However, for cryptographic strength, we would like $r$ to be as large as possible.

For example, if $e = 3$ and $N = 1024$, then we have the inequality $3r > 1024$, yielding a minimum required size for $r$ of 683 bits. For $r$ set to that size, $k = 341$ bits are generated for each exponentiation (each RSA encryption). In this case, each exponentiation requires only one modular squaring of a 683-bit number and one modular multiplication. That is, we need only calculate $(x_i \times (x_i^7 \mod n)) \mod n$. 


PRNG Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

In this subsection, we briefly summarize a technique developed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) known as dual elliptic curve PRNG (DEC PRNG). This technique is recommended in NIST SP 800-90, the ANSI standard X9.82, and the ISO standard 18031. There has been some controversy regarding both the security and efficiency of this algorithm compared to other alternatives (e.g., see [SCHO06], [BROW07]).

[SCHO06] summarizes the algorithm as follows: Let P and Q be two known points on a given elliptic curve. The seed of the DEC PRNG is a random integer \( s_0 \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \#E(\text{GF}(p)) - 1\} \), where \( \#E(\text{GF}(p)) \) denotes the number of points on the curve. Let \( x \) denote a function that gives the \( x \)-coordinate of a point of the curve. Let \( \text{lsb}_i(s) \) denote the \( i \) least significant bits of an integer \( s \). The DEC PRNG transforms the seed into the pseudorandom sequence of length \( 240k \), \( k > 0 \), as follows.

\[
\text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } k \text{ do} \\
\quad \text{Set } s_i \leftarrow x(s_{i-1} P) \\
\quad \text{Set } r_i \leftarrow \text{lsb}_{240}(x(s_i Q)) \\
\text{end for} \\
\text{Return } r_1, \ldots, r_k
\]

Given the security concerns expressed for this PRNG, the only motivation for its use would be that it is used in a system that already implements ECC but does not implement any other symmetric, asymmetric, or hash cryptographic algorithm that could be used to build a PRNG.

10.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

A quite readable treatment of elliptic curve cryptography is [ROSI99]; the emphasis is on software implementation. Another readable, but rigorous, book is [HANK04]. Two other good treatments, both of which contain some rather stiff mathematics, are [BLAK99] and [ENGE99]. There are also good but more concise descriptions in [KUMA98], [STIN06], and [KOBL94]. Two interesting survey treatments are [FERN99] and [JURI97].

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>abelian group</th>
<th>elliptic curve</th>
<th>Micali-Schnorr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>binary curve</td>
<td>elliptic curve arithmetic</td>
<td>prime curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cubic equation</td>
<td>elliptic curve cryptography</td>
<td>primitive root</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffie-Hellman key exchange</td>
<td>finite field</td>
<td>zero point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrete logarithm</td>
<td>man-the-middle attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

10.1 Briefly explain Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
10.2 What is an elliptic curve?
10.3 What is the zero point of an elliptic curve?
10.4 What is the sum of three points on an elliptic curve that lie on a straight line?

Problems

10.1 Users A and B use the Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique with a common prime $q = 71$ and a primitive root $\alpha = 7$.
   a. If user A has private key $X_A = 5$, what is A’s public key $Y_A$?
   b. If user B has private key $X_B = 12$, what is B’s public key $Y_B$?
   c. What is the shared secret key?
10.2 Consider a Diffie-Hellman scheme with a common prime $q = 11$ and a primitive root $\alpha = 2$.
   a. Show that 2 is a primitive root of 11.
   b. If user A has public key $Y_A = 9$, what is A’s private key $X_A$?
   c. If user B has public key $Y_B = 3$, what is the secret key $K$ shared with A?
10.3 In the Diffie-Hellman protocol, each participant selects a secret number $x$ and sends the other participant $\alpha^x \mod q$ for some public number $\alpha$. What would happen if the participants sent each other $x^\alpha \mod q$ for some public number $\alpha$ instead? Give at least one method Alice and Bob could use to agree on a key. Can Eve break your system without finding the secret numbers? Can Eve find the secret numbers?

10.4 This problem illustrates the point that the Diffie-Hellman protocol is not secure without the step where you take the modulus; i.e. the “Indiscrete Log Problem” is not a hard problem! You are Eve and have captured Alice and Bob and imprisoned them. You overhear the following dialog.

**Bob:** Oh, let’s not bother with the prime in the Diffie-Hellman protocol, it will make things easier.

**Alice:** Okay, but we still need a base $\alpha$ to raise things to. How about $g = 3$?

**Bob:** All right, then my result is 27.

**Alice:** And mine is 243.

What is Bob’s secret $X_B$ and Alice’s secret $X_A$? What is their secret combined key? (Don’t forget to show your work.)

10.5 Section 10.2 describes a man-in-the-middle attack on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in which the adversary generates two public–private key pairs for the attack. Could the same attack be accomplished with one pair? Explain.

10.6 Consider an ElGamal scheme with a common prime $q = 71$ and a primitive root $\alpha = 7$.

a. If B has public key $Y_B = 3$ and A chose the random integer $k = 2$, what is the ciphertext of $M = 30$?

b. If A now chooses a different value of $k$ so that the encoding of $M = 30$ is $C = (59, C_2)$, what is the integer $C_2$?

10.7 Rule (5) for doing arithmetic in elliptic curves over real numbers states that to double a point $Q_2$, draw the tangent line and find the other point of intersection $S$. Then $Q + Q = 2Q = -S$. If the tangent line is not vertical, there will be exactly one point of intersection. However, suppose the tangent line is vertical? In that case, what is the value $2Q$? What is the value $3Q$?

10.8 Demonstrate that the two elliptic curves of Figure 10.4 each satisfy the conditions for a group over the real numbers.

10.9 Is $(4, 7)$ a point on the elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 - 5x + 5$ over real numbers?

10.10 On the elliptic curve over the real numbers $y^2 = x^3 - 36x$, let $P = (-3.5, 9.5)$ and $Q = (-2.5, 8.5)$. Find $P + Q$ and $2P$.

10.11 Does the elliptic curve equation $y^2 = x^3 + 10x + 5$ define a group over $\mathbb{Z}_{17}$?

10.12 Consider the elliptic curve $E_{11}(1, 6)$; that is, the curve is defined by $y^2 = x^3 + x + 6$ with a modulus of $p = 11$. Determine all of the points in $E_{11}(1, 6)$. *Hint:* Start by calculating the right-hand side of the equation for all values of $x$.

10.13 What are the negatives of the following elliptic curve points over $\mathbb{Z}_{17}$? $P = (5, 8); Q = (3, 0); R = (0, 6)$.

10.14 For $E_{11}(1, 6)$, consider the point $G = (2, 7)$. Compute the multiples of $G$ from $2G$ through $13G$.

10.15 This problem performs elliptic curve encryption/decryption using the scheme outlined in Section 10.4. The cryptosystem parameters are $E_{11}(1, 6)$ and $G = (2, 7)$. B’s secret key is $n_B = 7$.

a. Find B’s public key $P_B$.

b. A wishes to encrypt the message $P_m = (10, 9)$ and chooses the random value $k = 3$. Determine the ciphertext $C_m$.

c. Show the calculation by which B recovers $P_m$ from $C_m$.
10.16  The following is a first attempt at an elliptic curve signature scheme. We have a global elliptic curve, prime $p$, and “generator” $G$. Alice picks a private signing key $X_A$ and forms the public verifying key $Y_A = X_A G$. To sign a message $M$:
  - Alice picks a value $k$.
  - Alice sends Bob $M, k$ and the signature $S = M - kX_A G$.
  - Bob verifies that $M = S + kY_A$.
  a. Show that this scheme works. That is, show that the verification process produces an equality if the signature is valid.
  b. Show that the scheme is unacceptable by describing a simple technique for forging a user’s signature on an arbitrary message.

10.17  Here is an improved version of the scheme given in the previous problem. As before, we have a global elliptic curve, prime $p$, and “generator” $G$. Alice picks a private signing key $X_A$ and forms the public verifying key $Y_A = X_A G$. To sign a message $M$:
  - Bob picks a value $k$.
  - Bob sends Alice $C_1 = kG$.
  - Alice sends Bob $M$ and the signature $S = M - X_A C_1$.
  - Bob verifies that $M = S + kY_A$.
  a. Show that this scheme works. That is, show that the verification process produces an equality if the signature is valid.
  b. Show that forging a message in this scheme is as hard as breaking (ElGamal) elliptic curve cryptography. (Or find an easier way to forge a message?)
  c. This scheme has an extra “pass” compared to other cryptosystems and signature schemes we have looked at. What are some drawbacks to this?
11.1 Applications of Cryptographic Hash Functions
   - Message Authentication
   - Digital Signatures
   - Other Applications

11.2 Two Simple Hash Functions

11.3 Requirements and Security
   - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Hash Functions
   - Brute-Force Attacks
   - Cryptanalysis

11.4 Hash Functions Based on Cipher Block Chaining

11.5 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
   - SHA-512 Logic
   - SHA-512 Round Function
   - Example

11.6 SHA-3

11.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

11.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 11A Mathematical Basis of the Birthday Attack
Each of the messages, like each one he had ever read of Stern’s commands, began with a number and ended with a number or row of numbers. No efforts on the part of Mungo or any of his experts had been able to break Stern’s code, nor was there any clue as to what the preliminary number and those ultimate numbers signified.

—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell

The Douglas Squirrel has a distinctive eating habit. It usually eats pine cones from the bottom end up. Partially eaten cones can indicate the presence of these squirrels if they have been attacked from the bottom first. If, instead, the cone has been eaten from the top end down, it is more likely to have been a crossbill finch that has been doing the dining.

—Squirrels: A Wildlife Handbook, Kim Long

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY POINTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>◆ A hash function maps a variable-length message into a fixed-length hash value, or message digest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Virtually all cryptographic hash functions involve the iterative use of a compression function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ The compression function used in secure hash algorithms falls into one of two categories: a function specifically designed for the hash function or an algorithm based on a symmetric block cipher. SHA and Whirlpool are examples of these two approaches, respectively.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A hash function $H$ accepts a variable-length block of data $M$ as input and produces a fixed-size hash value $h = H(M)$. A “good” hash function has the property that the results of applying the function to a large set of inputs will produce outputs that are evenly distributed and apparently random. In general terms, the principal object of a hash function is data integrity. A change to any bit or bits in $M$ results, with high probability, in a change to the hash code.

The kind of hash function needed for security applications is referred to as a cryptographic hash function. A cryptographic hash function is an algorithm for which it is computationally infeasible (because no attack is significantly more efficient than brute force) to find either (a) a data object that maps to a pre-specified hash result (the one-way property) or (b) two data objects that map to the same hash result (the collision-free property). Because of these characteristics, hash functions are often used to determine whether or not data has changed.

Figure 11.1 depicts the general operation of a cryptographic hash function. Typically, the input is padded out to an integer multiple of some fixed length (e.g., 1024 bits), and the padding includes the value of the length of the original message in bits. The length field is a security measure to increase the difficulty for an attacker to produce an alternative message with the same hash value.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the wide variety of applications for cryptographic hash functions. Next, we look at the security requirements for such functions. Then we look at the use of cipher block chaining to implement a cryptographic hash function. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the most important and widely used family of cryptographic hash functions, the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family.

Appendix N describes Whirlpool, another popular cryptographic hash function.
Figure 11.2  Simplified Examples of the Use of a Hash Function for Message Authentication

a. The message plus concatenated hash code is encrypted using symmetric encryption. Because only A and B share the secret key, the message must have come from A and has not been altered. The hash code provides the structure or redundancy required to achieve authentication. Because encryption is applied to the entire message plus hash code, confidentiality is also provided.

b. Only the hash code is encrypted, using symmetric encryption. This reduces the processing burden for those applications that do not require confidentiality.

c. It is possible to use a hash function but no encryption for message authentication. The technique assumes that the two communicating parties share a common secret value \( S \). A computes the hash value over the concatenation of \( M \) and \( S \) and
appends the resulting hash value to \( M \). Because \( B \) possesses \( S \), it can recompute the hash value to verify. Because the secret value itself is not sent, an opponent cannot modify an intercepted message and cannot generate a false message.

d. Confidentiality can be added to the approach of method (c) by encrypting the entire message plus the hash code.

When confidentiality is not required, method (b) has an advantage over methods (a) and (d), which encrypts the entire message, in that less computation is required. Nevertheless, there has been growing interest in techniques that avoid encryption (Figure 11.2c). Several reasons for this interest are pointed out in [TSUD92].

- Encryption software is relatively slow. Even though the amount of data to be encrypted per message is small, there may be a steady stream of messages into and out of a system.
- Encryption hardware costs are not negligible. Low-cost chip implementations of DES are available, but the cost adds up if all nodes in a network must have this capability.
- Encryption hardware is optimized toward large data sizes. For small blocks of data, a high proportion of the time is spent in initialization/invocation overhead.
- Encryption algorithms may be covered by patents, and there is a cost associated with licensing their use.

More commonly, message authentication is achieved using a message authentication code (MAC), also known as a keyed hash function. Typically, MACs are used between two parties that share a secret key to authenticate information exchanged between those parties. A MAC function takes as input a secret key and a data block and produces a hash value, referred to as the MAC. This can then be transmitted with or stored with the protected message. If the integrity of the message needs to be checked, the MAC function can be applied to the message and the result compared with the stored MAC value. An attacker who alters the message will be unable to alter the MAC value without knowledge of the secret key. Note that the verifying party also knows who the sending party is because no one else knows the secret key.

Note that the combination of hashing and encryption results in an overall function that is, in fact, a MAC (Figure 11.2b). That is, \( E(K, H(M)) \) is a function of a variable-length message \( M \) and a secret key \( K \), and it produces a fixed-size output that is secure against an opponent who does not know the secret key. In practice, specific MAC algorithms are designed that are generally more efficient than an encryption algorithm.

We discuss MACs in Chapter 12.

Digital Signatures

Another important application, which is similar to the message authentication application, is the digital signature. The operation of the digital signature is similar to that of the MAC. In the case of the digital signature, the hash value of a message is encrypted with a user’s private key. Anyone who knows the user’s public key can verify the integrity of the message that is associated with the digital signature. In this
case, an attacker who wishes to alter the message would need to know the user’s private key. As we shall see in Chapter 14, the implications of digital signatures go beyond just message authentication.

Figure 11.3 illustrates, in a simplified fashion, how a hash code is used to provide a digital signature.

a. The hash code is encrypted, using public-key encryption with the sender’s private key. As with Figure 11.2b, this provides authentication. It also provides a digital signature, because only the sender could have produced the encrypted hash code. In fact, this is the essence of the digital signature technique.

b. If confidentiality as well as a digital signature is desired, then the message plus the private-key-encrypted hash code can be encrypted using a symmetric secret key. This is a common technique.

Other Applications

Hash functions are commonly used to create a one-way password file. Chapter 20 explains a scheme in which a hash of a password is stored by an operating system rather than the password itself. Thus, the actual password is not retrievable by a hacker who gains access to the password file. In simple terms, when a user enters a password, the hash of that password is compared to the stored hash value for verification. This approach to password protection is used by most operating systems.

Hash functions can be used for intrusion detection and virus detection. Store $H(F)$ for each file on a system and secure the hash values (e.g., on a CD-R that is
kept secure). One can later determine if a file has been modified by recomputing H(F). An intruder would need to change F without changing H(F).

A cryptographic hash function can be used to construct a **pseudorandom function (PRF)** or a **pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)**. A common application for a hash-based PRF is for the generation of symmetric keys. We discuss this application in Chapter 12.

### 11.2 TWO SIMPLE HASH FUNCTIONS

To get some feel for the security considerations involved in cryptographic hash functions, we present two simple, insecure hash functions in this section. All hash functions operate using the following general principles. The input (message, file, etc.) is viewed as a sequence of n-bit blocks. The input is processed one block at a time in an iterative fashion to produce an n-bit hash function.

One of the simplest hash functions is the bit-by-bit exclusive-OR (XOR) of every block. This can be expressed as

\[ C_i = b_{i1} \oplus b_{i2} \oplus \ldots \oplus b_{im} \]

where

- \( C_i \) = ith bit of the hash code, \( 1 \leq i \leq n \)
- \( m \) = number of n-bit blocks in the input
- \( b_{ij} \) = ith bit in jth block
- \( \oplus \) = XOR operation

This operation produces a simple parity for each bit position and is known as a longitudinal redundancy check. It is reasonably effective for random data as a data integrity check. Each n-bit hash value is equally likely. Thus, the probability that a data error will result in an unchanged hash value is \( 2^{-n} \). With more predictably formatted data, the function is less effective. For example, in most normal text files, the high-order bit of each octet is always zero. So if a 128-bit hash value is used, instead of an effectiveness of \( 2^{-128} \) the hash function on this type of data has an effectiveness of \( 2^{-112} \).

A simple way to improve matters is to perform a one-bit circular shift, or rotation, on the hash value after each block is processed. The procedure can be summarized as follows.

1. Initially set the n-bit hash value to zero.
2. Process each successive n-bit block of data as follows:
   a. Rotate the current hash value to the left by one bit.
   b. XOR the block into the hash value.

This has the effect of “randomizing” the input more completely and overcoming any regularities that appear in the input. Figure 11.4 illustrates these two types of hash functions for 16-bit hash values.

Although the second procedure provides a good measure of data integrity, it is virtually useless for data security when an encrypted hash code is used with a plaintext...
message, as in Figures 11.2b and 11.3a. Given a message, it is an easy matter to produce a new message that yields that hash code: Simply prepare the desired alternate message and then append an \( n \)-bit block that forces the new message plus block to yield the desired hash code.

Although a simple XOR or rotated XOR (RXOR) is insufficient if only the hash code is encrypted, you may still feel that such a simple function could be useful when the message together with the hash code is encrypted (Figure 11.2a). But you must be careful. A technique originally proposed by the National Bureau of Standards used the simple XOR applied to 64-bit blocks of the message and then an encryption of the entire message that used the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. We can define the scheme as follows: Given a message \( M \) consisting of a sequence of 64-bit blocks \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_N \), define the hash code \( h = H(M) \) as the block-by-block XOR of all blocks and append the hash code as the final block:

\[
h = X_{N+1} = X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus \ldots \oplus X_N
\]
Next, encrypt the entire message plus hash code using CBC mode to produce the encrypted message $Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_{N+1}$. [JUEN85] points out several ways in which the ciphertext of this message can be manipulated in such a way that it is not detectable by the hash code. For example, by the definition of CBC (Figure 6.4), we have

$$X_1 = IV \oplus D(K, Y_1)$$
$$X_i = Y_{i-1} \oplus D(K, Y_i)$$
$$X_{N+1} = Y_N \oplus D(K, Y_{N+1})$$

But $X_{N+1}$ is the hash code:

$$X_{N+1} = X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus \ldots \oplus X_N$$
$$= IV \oplus D(K, Y_1) \oplus [Y_1 \oplus D(K, Y_2)] \oplus \ldots \oplus [Y_{N-1} \oplus D(K, Y_N)]$$

Because the terms in the preceding equation can be XORed in any order, it follows that the hash code would not change if the ciphertext blocks were permuted.

11.3 REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY

Before proceeding, we need to define two terms. For a hash value $h = H(x)$, we say that $x$ is the **preimage** of $h$. That is, $x$ is a data block whose hash function, using the function $H$, is $h$. Because $H$ is a many-to-one mapping, for any given hash value $h$, there will in general be multiple preimages. A **collision** occurs if we have $x \neq y$ and $H(x) = H(y)$. Because we are using hash functions for data integrity, collisions are clearly undesirable.

Let us consider how many preimages are there for a given hash value, which is a measure of the number of potential collisions for a given hash value. Suppose the length of the hash code is $n$ bits, and the function $H$ takes as input messages or data blocks of length $b$ bits with $b > n$. Then, the total number of possible messages is $2^b$ and the total number of possible hash values is $2^n$. On average, each hash value corresponds to $2^{b/n}$ preimages. If $H$ tends to uniformly distribute hash values then, in fact, each hash value will have close to $2^{b/n}$ preimages. If we now allow inputs of arbitrary length, not just a fixed length of some number of bits, then the number of preimages per hash value is arbitrarily large. However, the security risks in the use of a hash function are not as severe as they might appear from this analysis. To understand better the security implications of cryptographic hash functions, we need precisely define their security requirements.

Security Requirements for Cryptographic Hash Functions

Table 11.1 lists the generally accepted requirements for a cryptographic hash function. The first three properties are requirements for the practical application of a hash function.

The fourth property, **preimage resistant**, is the one-way property: it is easy to generate a code given a message, but virtually impossible to generate a message given a code. This property is important if the authentication technique involves the use of a secret value (Figure 11.2c). The secret value itself is not sent. However, if the
Table 11.1 Requirements for a Cryptographic Hash Function H

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable input size</td>
<td>H can be applied to a block of data of any size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed output size</td>
<td>H produces a fixed-length output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x, making both hardware and software implementations practical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preimage resistant (one-way property)</td>
<td>For any given hash value $h$, it is computationally infeasible to find $y$ such that $H(y) = h$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second preimage resistant (weak collision resistant)</td>
<td>For any given block $x$, it is computationally infeasible to find $y \neq x$ with $H(y) = H(x)$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collision resistant (strong collision resistant)</td>
<td>It is computationally infeasible to find any pair $(x, y)$ such that $H(x) = H(y)$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudorandomness</td>
<td>Output of H meets standard tests for pseudorandomness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

hash function is not one way, an attacker can easily discover the secret value: If the attacker can observe or intercept a transmission, the attacker obtains the message $M$, and the hash code $h = H(S \parallel M)$. The attacker then inverts the hash function to obtain $S \parallel M = H^{-1}(MD_M)$. Because the attacker now has both $M$ and $S_{AB} \parallel M$, it is a trivial matter to recover $S_{AB}$.

The fifth property, **second preimage resistant**, guarantees that it is impossible to find an alternative message with the same hash value as a given message. This prevents forgery when an encrypted hash code is used (Figure 11.2b and Figure 11.3a). If this property were not true, an attacker would be capable of the following sequence: First, observe or intercept a message plus its encrypted hash code; second, generate an unencrypted hash code from the message; third, generate an alternate message with the same hash code.

A hash function that satisfies the first five properties in Table 11.1 is referred to as a weak hash function. If the sixth property, **collision resistant**, is also satisfied, then it is referred to as a strong hash function. A strong hash function protects against an attack in which one party generates a message for another party to sign. For example, suppose Bob writes an IOU message, sends it to Alice, and she signs it. Bob finds two messages with the same hash, one of which requires Alice to pay a small amount and one that requires a large payment. Alice signs the first message, and Bob is then able to claim that the second message is authentic.

Figure 11.5 shows the relationships among the three resistant properties. A function that is collision resistant is also second preimage resistant, but the reverse is not necessarily true. A function can be collision resistant but not preimage resistant and vice versa. A function can be collision resistant but not second preimage resistant and vice versa. See [MENE97] for a discussion.

Table 11.2 shows the resistant properties required for various hash function applications.
The final requirement in Table 11.1, pseudorandomness, has not traditionally been listed as a requirement of cryptographic hash functions but is more or less implied. [JOHN05] points out that cryptographic hash functions are commonly used for key derivation and pseudorandom number generation, and that in message integrity applications, the three resistant properties depend on the output of the hash function appearing to be random. Thus, it makes sense to verify that in fact a given hash function produces pseudorandom output.

**Brute-Force Attacks**

As with encryption algorithms, there are two categories of attacks on hash functions: brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis. A brute-force attack does not depend on the specific algorithm but depends only on bit length. In the case of a hash function, a brute-force attack depends only on the bit length of the hash value. A cryptanalysis, in contrast, is an attack based on weaknesses in a particular cryptographic algorithm. We look first at brute-force attacks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11.2</th>
<th>Hash Function Resistance Properties Required for Various Data Integrity Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preimage Resistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hash + digital signature</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrusion detection and virus detection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hash + symmetric encryption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-way password file</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Resistance required if attacker is able to mount a chosen message attack
**Preimage and Second Preimage Attacks**

For a preimage or second preimage attack, an adversary wishes to find a value \( y \) such that \( H(y) \) is equal to a given hash value \( h \). The brute-force method is to pick values of \( y \) at random and try each value until a collision occurs. For an \( m \)-bit hash value, the level of effort is proportional to \( 2^m \). Specifically, the adversary would have to try, on average, \( 2^{m-1} \) values of \( y \) to find one that generates a given hash value \( h \). This result is derived in Appendix 11A [Equation (11.1)].

**Collision Resistant Attacks**

For a collision resistant attack, an adversary wishes to find two messages or data blocks, \( x \) and \( y \), that yield the same hash function: \( H(x) = H(y) \). This turns out to require considerably less effort than a preimage or second preimage attack. The effort required is explained by a mathematical result referred to as the birthday paradox. In essence, if we choose random variables from a uniform distribution in the range 0 through \( N - 1 \), then the probability that a repeated element is encountered exceeds 0.5 after \( \sqrt{N} \) choices have been made. Thus, for an \( m \)-bit hash value, if we pick data blocks at random, we can expect to find two data blocks with the same hash value within \( \sqrt{2^m} = 2^{m/2} \) attempts. The mathematical derivation of this result is found in Appendix 11A.

Yuval proposed the following strategy to exploit the birthday paradox in a collision resistant attack [YUVA79].

1. The source, \( A \), is prepared to sign a legitimate message \( x \) by appending the appropriate \( m \)-bit hash code and encrypting that hash code with \( A \)'s private key (Figure 11.3a).
2. The opponent generates \( 2^{m/2} \) variations \( x' \) of \( x \), all of which convey essentially the same meaning, and stores the messages and their hash values.
3. The opponent prepares a fraudulent message \( y \) for which \( A \)'s signature is desired.
4. The opponent generates minor variations \( y' \) of \( y \), all of which convey essentially the same meaning. For each \( y' \), the opponent computes \( H(y') \), checks for matches with any of the \( H(x') \) values, and continues until a match is found. That is, the process continues until a \( y' \) is generated with a hash value equal to the hash value of one of the \( x' \) values.
5. The opponent offers the valid variation to \( A \) for signature. This signature can then be attached to the fraudulent variation for transmission to the intended recipient. Because the two variations have the same hash code, they will produce the same signature; the opponent is assured of success even though the encryption key is not known.

Thus, if a 64-bit hash code is used, the level of effort required is only on the order of \( 2^{32} \) [see Appendix 11A, Equation (11.7)].

The generation of many variations that convey the same meaning is not difficult. For example, the opponent could insert a number of “space-space-backspace” character pairs between words throughout the document. Variations could then be generated by substituting “space-backspace-space” in selected instances. Alternatively, the
Dear Anthony,

{This letter is } to introduce {you to } {Mr. } Alfred {P.}

Barton, the {newly appointed } {chief }{senior } jewellery buyer for {our }{the }

Northern {European }{area }{division }. He {will take }{has taken } over {the }

responsibility for {all }{the whole of } our interests in {watches }{jewellery }{and watches }

in the {area }{region }. Please {afford }{give } him {every }{all the } help he {may need }{needs }

to {seek out }{find } the most {modern }{up to date } lines for the {top }{high }end of the

market. He is {empowered }{authorized } to receive on our behalf {samples }{specimens } of the

{latest }{newest }{watch }{jewellery }{and watch } products, {up }{subject } to a {limit }{maximum }

of ten thousand dollars. He will {carry }{hold } a signed copy of this {letter }{document }
as proof of identity. An order with his signature, which is {appended }{attached }

{authorizes }{allows } you to charge the cost to this company at the {above }{head office }

address. We {fully }{-- } expect that our {level }{volume } of orders will increase in

the {following }{next } year and {trust }{hope } that the new appointment will {be }{prove }

{advantageous }{an advantage } to both our companies.

Figure 11.6 A Letter in 2$^37$ Variation [DAVI89]

opponent could simply reword the message but retain the meaning. Figure 11.6 [DAVI89] provides an example.

To summarize, for a hash code of length $m$, the level of effort required, as we have seen, is proportional to the following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preimage resistant</td>
<td>$2^m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second preimage resistant</td>
<td>$2^m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collision resistant</td>
<td>$2^{m/2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If collision resistance is required (and this is desirable for a general-purpose secure hash code), then the value $2^{m/2}$ determines the strength of the hash code against brute-force attacks. Van Oorschot and Wiener \cite{VANO94} presented a design for a $10$ million collision search machine for MD5, which has a 128-bit hash length, that could find a collision in 24 days. Thus, a 128-bit code may be viewed as inadequate. The next step up, if a hash code is treated as a sequence of 32 bits, is a 160-bit hash length. With a hash length of 160 bits, the same search machine would require over four thousand years to find a collision. With today’s technology, the time would be much shorter, so that 160 bits now appears suspect.

Cryptanalysis

As with encryption algorithms, cryptanalytic attacks on hash functions seek to exploit some property of the algorithm to perform some attack other than an exhaustive search. The way to measure the resistance of a hash algorithm to cryptanalysis is to compare its strength to the effort required for a brute-force attack. That is, an ideal hash algorithm will require a cryptanalytic effort greater than or equal to the brute-force effort.

In recent years, there has been considerable effort, and some successes, in developing cryptanalytic attacks on hash functions. To understand these, we need to look at the overall structure of a typical secure hash function, indicated in Figure 11.7. This structure, referred to as an iterated hash function, was proposed by Merkle \cite{MERK79, MERK89} and is the structure of most hash functions in use today, including SHA, which is discussed later in this chapter. The hash function takes an input message and partitions it into $L$ fixed-sized blocks of $b$ bits each. If necessary, the final block is padded to $b$ bits. The final block also includes the value of the total length of the input to the hash function. The inclusion of the length makes the job of the opponent more difficult. Either the opponent must find two messages of equal length that hash to the same value or two messages of differing lengths that, together with their length values, hash to the same value.

The hash algorithm involves repeated use of a compression function, $f$, that takes two inputs (an $n$-bit input from the previous step, called the chaining variable, and a $b$-bit block) and produces an $n$-bit output. At the start of hashing, the chaining variable has an initial value that is specified as part of the algorithm. The final value

---

**Figure 11.7** General Structure of Secure Hash Code

- $IV$ = Initial value
- $CV_i$ = Chaining variable
- $Y_i$ = $i^{th}$ input block
- $f$ = Compression algorithm
- $L$ = Number of input blocks
- $n$ = Length of hash code
- $b$ = Length of input block
of the chaining variable is the hash value. Often, \( b > n \); hence the term \textit{compression}. The hash function can be summarized as

\[
\begin{align*}
CV_0 &= IV = \text{initial } n\text{-bit value} \\
CV_i &= f(CV_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}) \quad 1 \leq i \leq L \\
H(M) &= CV_L
\end{align*}
\]

where the input to the hash function is a message \( M \) consisting of the blocks \( Y_0, Y_1, \ldots, Y_{L-1} \).

The motivation for this iterative structure stems from the observation by Merkle [MERK89] and Damgard [DAMG89] that if the compression function is collision resistant, then so is the resultant iterated hash function.\(^1\) Therefore, the structure can be used to produce a secure hash function to operate on a message of any length. The problem of designing a secure hash function reduces to that of designing a collision-resistant compression function that operates on inputs of some fixed size.

Cryptanalysis of hash functions focuses on the internal structure of \( f \) and is based on attempts to find efficient techniques for producing collisions for a single execution of \( f \). Once that is done, the attack must take into account the fixed value of \( IV \). The attack on \( f \) depends on exploiting its internal structure. Typically, as with symmetric block ciphers, \( f \) consists of a series of rounds of processing, so that the attack involves analysis of the pattern of bit changes from round to round.

Keep in mind that for any hash function there must exist collisions, because we are mapping a message of length at least equal to twice the block size \( b \) (because we must append a length field) into a hash code of length \( n \), where \( b \geq n \). What is required is that it is computationally infeasible to find collisions.

The attacks that have been mounted on hash functions are rather complex and beyond our scope here. For the interested reader, [DOBB96] and [BELL97] are recommended.

\(^1\)The converse is not necessarily true.

### 11.4 HASH FUNCTIONS BASED ON CIPHER BLOCK CHAINING

A number of proposals have been made for hash functions based on using a cipher block chaining technique, but without using the secret key. One of the first such proposals was that of Rabin [RABI78]. Divide a message \( M \) into fixed-size blocks \( M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_N \) and use a symmetric encryption system such as DES to compute the hash code \( G \) as

\[
\begin{align*}
H_0 &= \text{initial value} \\
H_i &= E(M_i, H_{i-1}) \\
G &= H_N
\end{align*}
\]

This is similar to the CBC technique, but in this case, there is no secret key. As with any hash code, this scheme is subject to the birthday attack, and if the encryption algorithm is DES and only a 64-bit hash code is produced, then the system is vulnerable.
Furthermore, another version of the birthday attack can be used even if the opponent has access to only one message and its valid signature and cannot obtain multiple signings. Here is the scenario: We assume that the opponent intercepts a message with a signature in the form of an encrypted hash code and that the unencrypted hash code is \( m \) bits long.

1. Use the algorithm defined at the beginning of this subsection to calculate the unencrypted hash code \( G \).
2. Construct any desired message in the form \( Q_1, Q_2, \ldots, Q_{N-2} \).
3. Compute \( H_i = E(Q_i, H_{i-1}) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq (N - 2) \).
4. Generate \( 2^{m/2} \) random blocks; for each block \( X \), compute \( E(X, H_{N-2}) \). Generate an additional \( 2^{m/2} \) random blocks; for each block \( Y \), compute \( D(Y, G) \), where \( D \) is the decryption function corresponding to \( E \).
5. Based on the birthday paradox, with high probability there will be an \( X \) and \( Y \) such that \( E(X, H_{N-2}) = D(Y, G) \).
6. Form the message \( Q_1, Q_2, \ldots, Q_{N-2}, X, Y \). This message has the hash code \( G \) and therefore can be used with the intercepted encrypted signature.

This form of attack is known as a **meet-in-the-middle-attack**. A number of researchers have proposed refinements intended to strengthen the basic block chaining approach. For example, Davies and Price [DAVI89] describe the variation:

\[
H_i = E(M_i, H_{i-1}) \oplus H_{i-1}
\]

Another variation, proposed in [MEYE88], is

\[
H_i = E(H_{i-1}, M_i) \oplus M_i
\]

However, both of these schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to a variety of attacks [MIYA90]. More generally, it can be shown that some form of birthday attack will succeed against any hash scheme involving the use of cipher block chaining without a secret key, provided that either the resulting hash code is small enough (e.g., 64 bits or less) or that a larger hash code can be decomposed into independent subcodes [JUEN87].

Thus, attention has been directed at finding other approaches to hashing. Many of these have also been shown to have weaknesses [MITC92].

### 11.5 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)

In recent years, the most widely used hash function has been the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). Indeed, because virtually every other widely used hash function had been found to have substantial cryptanalytic weaknesses, SHA was more or less the last remaining standardized hash algorithm by 2005. SHA was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and published
as a federal information processing standard (FIPS 180) in 1993. When weaknesses were discovered in SHA, now known as SHA-0, a revised version was issued as FIPS 180-1 in 1995 and is referred to as SHA-1. The actual standards document is entitled “Secure Hash Standard.” SHA is based on the hash function MD4, and its design closely models MD4. SHA-1 is also specified in RFC 3174, which essentially duplicates the material in FIPS 180-1 but adds a C code implementation.

SHA-1 produces a hash value of 160 bits. In 2002, NIST produced a revised version of the standard, FIPS 180-2, that defined three new versions of SHA, with hash value lengths of 256, 384, and 512 bits, known as SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, respectively. Collectively, these hash algorithms are known as SHA-2. These new versions have the same underlying structure and use the same types of modular arithmetic and logical binary operations as SHA-1. A revised document was issued as FIP PUB 180-3 in 2008, which added a 224-bit version (Table 11.3). SHA-2 is also specified in RFC 4634, which essentially duplicates the material in FIPS 180-3 but adds a C code implementation.

In 2005, NIST announced the intention to phase out approval of SHA-1 and move to a reliance on SHA-2 by 2010. Shortly thereafter, a research team described an attack in which two separate messages could be found that deliver the same SHA-1 hash using $2^{69}$ operations, far fewer than the $2^{90}$ operations previously thought needed to find a collision with an SHA-1 hash [WANG05]. This result should hasten the transition to SHA-2.

In this section, we provide a description of SHA-512. The other versions are quite similar.

**SHA-512 Logic**

The algorithm takes as input a message with a maximum length of less than $2^{128}$ bits and produces as output a 512-bit message digest. The input is processed in 1024-bit blocks. Figure 11.8 depicts the overall processing of a message to produce a digest. This follows the general structure depicted in Figure 11.7. The processing consists of the following steps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11.3 Comparison of SHA Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA-1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Message Digest Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Message Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Block Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Word Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Steps</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All sizes are measured in bits.*
Step 1 Append padding bits. The message is padded so that its length is congruent to 896 modulo 1024 \([\text{length} = 896 \text{(mod 1024)})\]. Padding is always added, even if the message is already of the desired length. Thus, the number of padding bits is in the range of 1 to 1024. The padding consists of a single 1 bit followed by the necessary number of 0 bits.

Step 2 Append length. A block of 128 bits is appended to the message. This block is treated as an unsigned 128-bit integer (most significant byte first) and contains the length of the original message (before the padding).

The outcome of the first two steps yields a message that is an integer multiple of 1024 bits in length. In Figure 11.8, the expanded message is represented as the sequence of 1024-bit blocks \(M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_N\), so that the total length of the expanded message is \(N \times 1024\) bits.

Step 3 Initialize hash buffer. A 512-bit buffer is used to hold intermediate and final results of the hash function. The buffer can be represented as eight 64-bit registers \((a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h)\). These registers are initialized to the following 64-bit integers (hexadecimal values):

\[
\begin{align*}
a &= 6A09E667F3BCC908 & e &= 510E527FADE682D1 \\
b &= BB67AE8584CAA73B & f &= 9B05688C2B3E6C1F \\
c &= 3C6EF372FE94F82B & g &= 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B \\
d &= A54FF53A5F1D36F1 & h &= 5BE0CD19137E2179
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 11.8 Message Digest Generation Using SHA-512
These values are stored in **big-endian** format, which is the most significant byte of a word in the low-address (leftmost) byte position. These words were obtained by taking the first sixty-four bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the first eight prime numbers.

**Step 4 Process message in 1024-bit (128-word) blocks.** The heart of the algorithm is a module that consists of 80 rounds; this module is labeled F in Figure 11.8. The logic is illustrated in Figure 11.9.

Each round takes as input the 512-bit buffer value, abcdefgh, and updates the contents of the buffer. At input to the first round, the buffer has the value of the intermediate hash value, $H_{i-1}$. Each round $t$ makes use of a 64-bit value $W_t$, derived from the current 1024-bit block being processed ($M_t$). These values are derived using a message schedule described subsequently. Each round also makes use of an additive constant $K_t$, where $0 \leq t \leq 79$ indicates one of the 80 rounds. These words represent the first 64 bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 80 prime numbers. The constants provide a “randomized” set of 64-bit patterns, which should eliminate any regularities in the input data. Table 11.4 shows these constants in hexadecimal format (from left to right).

The output of the eightieth round is added to the input to the first round ($H_{i-1}$) to produce $H_i$. The addition is done independently for each of the eight

![Figure 11.9 SHA-512 Processing of a Single 1024-Bit Block](image-url)
words in the buffer with each of the corresponding words in \( H_{i-1} \), using addition modulo \( 2^{64} \).

**Step 5 Output.** After all \( N \) 1024-bit blocks have been processed, the output from the \( N \)th stage is the 512-bit message digest.

We can summarize the behavior of SHA-512 as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
H_0 & = IV \\
H_i & = \text{SUM}_{64}(H_{i-1}, \text{abcdefgh}_i) \\
MD & = H_N
\end{align*}
\]

where

- \( IV \) = initial value of the abcdefgh buffer, defined in step 3
- \( \text{abcdefgh}_i \) = the output of the last round of processing of the \( i \)th message block
- \( N \) = the number of blocks in the message (including padding and length fields)
- \( \text{SUM}_{64} \) = addition modulo \( 2^{64} \) performed separately on each word of the pair of inputs
- \( MD \) = final message digest value

**SHA-512 Round Function**

Let us look in more detail at the logic in each of the 80 steps of the processing of one 512-bit block (Figure 11.10). Each round is defined by the following set of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
T_1 & = h + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + \left( \sum_{i=1}^{512} e \right) + W_t + K_t \\
T_2 & = \left( \sum_{i=0}^{512} a \right) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c) \\
h & = g \\
g & = f \\
f & = e \\
e & = d + T_1 \\
d & = c \\
c & = b \\
b & = a \\
a & = T_1 + T_2
\end{align*}
\]

where

- \( t \) = step number; \( 0 \leq t \leq 79 \\
\text{Ch}(e, f, g) = (e \text{ AND } f) \oplus (\text{NOT } e \text{ AND } g) \\
\text{the conditional function: If } e \text{ then } f \text{ else } g
11.5 / SECURE HASH ALGORITHM (SHA)  347

Table 11.4 SHA-512 Constants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHA-512 Constants</th>
<th>SHA-512 Constants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>428a2f98d728ae22</td>
<td>7137449123ef65cd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3956c25bf348b538</td>
<td>59f111f1b605d019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d807a98a3030242</td>
<td>12835b0145706fbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72be5d74f27b896f</td>
<td>80deb1f3eb1696b1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e49b69c19ef14ad2</td>
<td>e9b5dba58189dbbc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2de92c6f592b0275</td>
<td>3956c25bf348b538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>983e5152ee66dfab</td>
<td>59f111f1b605d019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c6e00bf33da88fc2</td>
<td>12835b0145706fbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27b70a8546d22ff</td>
<td>428a2f98d728ae22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>650a73548baf63de</td>
<td>7137449123ef65cd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a2be8a14c10364</td>
<td>06ca6351e003826f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d192e819d6ef5218</td>
<td>142929670a0e6e70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19aad1c66b9d2d0c8</td>
<td>3f0eb9a46ebc6f26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>391c0cb3c5c95a63</td>
<td>4ed8a4a43e3148ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>748f82e65efb2fc</td>
<td>78a5636f43172f60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90beaffa23631e28</td>
<td>a4506cebde82bde9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca273ee6a26619c</td>
<td>d186b8c721c0c207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06f067aa72176fba</td>
<td>0a637dc5a2c898a6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28dbf77f253047d84</td>
<td>0f3935d8ac5a15c9bebc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44c5d4becb3e4cb</td>
<td>797f299cf67e52a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Maj}(a, b, c) = (a \text{ AND } b) \oplus (a \text{ AND } c) \oplus (b \text{ AND } c)
\]

the function is true only of the majority (two or three) of the arguments are true

\[
\left( \sum_{0}^{512} a \right) = \text{ROTR}^{28}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{34}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{39}(a)
\]

\[
\left( \sum_{1}^{512} e \right) = \text{ROTR}^{14}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{18}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{41}(e)
\]

\[
\text{ROTR}^{n}(x) = \text{circular right shift (rotation)} \text{ of the 64-bit argument } x \text{ by } n \text{ bits}
\]

\[
W_t = \text{a 64-bit word derived from the current 512-bit input block}
\]

\[
K_t = \text{a 64-bit additive constant}
\]

\[
+ = \text{addition modulo } 2^{64}
\]

Two observations can be made about the round function.

1. Six of the eight words of the output of the round function involve simply permutation \((b, c, d, f, g, h)\) by means of rotation. This is indicated by shading in Figure 11.10.

2. Only two of the output words \((a, e)\) are generated by substitution. Word \(e\) is a function of input variables \((d, e, f, g, h)\), as well as the round word \(W_t\) and the constant \(K_t\). Word \(a\) is a function of all of the input variables except \(d\), as well as the round word \(W_t\) and the constant \(K_t\).
It remains to indicate how the 64-bit word values $W_t$ are derived from the 1024-bit message. Figure 11.11 illustrates the mapping. The first 16 values of $W_t$ are taken directly from the 16 words of the current block. The remaining values are defined as

$$W_t = \sigma_1^{512}(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0^{512}(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}$$

where

$$\sigma_0^{512}(x) = \text{ROTR}^1(x) \oplus \text{ROTR}^8(x) \oplus \text{SHR}^7(x)$$

$$\sigma_1^{512}(x) = \text{ROTR}^{19}(x) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{61}(x) \oplus \text{SHR}^6(x)$$

$\text{ROTR}^n(x)$ = circular right shift (rotation) of the 64-bit argument $x$ by $n$ bits

$\text{SHR}^n(x)$ = left shift of the 64-bit argument $x$ by $n$ bits with padding by zeros on the right

$+ = \text{addition modulo } 2^{64}$
Thus, in the first 16 steps of processing, the value of $W_t$ is equal to the corresponding word in the message block. For the remaining 64 steps, the value of $W_t$ consists of the circular left shift by one bit of the XOR of four of the preceding values of $W_t$, with two of those values subjected to shift and rotate operations. This introduces a great deal of redundancy and interdependence into the message blocks that are compressed, which complicates the task of finding a different message block that maps to the same compression function output.

Figure 11.12 summarizes the SHA-512 logic.

The SHA-512 algorithm has the property that every bit of the hash code is a function of every bit of the input. The complex repetition of the basic function $F$ produces results that are well mixed; that is, it is unlikely that two messages chosen at random, even if they exhibit similar regularities, will have the same hash code. Unless there is some hidden weakness in SHA-512, which has not so far been published, the difficulty of coming up with two messages having the same message digest is on the order of $2^{256}$ operations, while the difficulty of finding a message with a given digest is on the order of $2^{512}$ operations.

**Example**

We include here an example based on one in FIPS 180. We wish to hash a one-block message consisting of three ASCII characters: “abc”, which is equivalent to the following 24-bit binary string:

01100001 01100010 01100011

Recall from step 1 of the SHA algorithm, that the message is padded to a length congruent to 896 modulo 1024. In this case of a single block, the padding consists of $896 - 24 = 872$ bits, consisting of a “1” bit followed by 871 “0” bits. Then a 128-bit length value is appended to the message, which contains the length of the original message (before the padding). The original length is 24 bits, or a hexadecimal value of 18. Putting this all together, the 1024-bit message block, in hexadecimal, is

6162638000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000

This block is assigned to the words $W_0, \ldots, W_{15}$ of the message schedule, which appears as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
W_0 &= 6162638000000000 \\
W_1 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_2 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_3 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_4 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_5 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_6 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_7 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_8 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_9 &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_{10} &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_{11} &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_{12} &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_{13} &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_{14} &= 0000000000000000 \\
W_{15} &= 0000000000000000 
\end{align*}
\]
As indicated in Figure 11.12, the eight 64-bit variables, \( a \) through \( h \), are initialized to values \( H_{0,0} \) through \( H_{0,7} \). The following table shows the initial values of these variables and their values after each of the first two rounds.

| \( a \) | \( 6a09e667f3bcc908 \) | \( f6afceb8bcfcdddf5 \) | \( 1320f8c9fb872cc0 \) |
| \( b \) | \( bb67ae8584caa73b \) | \( 6a09e667f3bcc908 \) | \( f6afceb8bcfcdddf5 \) |
| \( c \) | \( 3c6ef372fe94f82b \) | \( bb67ae8584caa73b \) | \( 6a09e667f3bcc908 \) |
| \( d \) | \( a54ff53a5f1d36f1 \) | \( 3c6ef372fe94f82b \) | \( bb67ae8584caa73b \) |
| \( e \) | \( 510e527faded682d1 \) | \( 58cb02347ab51f91 \) | \( c3d4e6bf48650ffa \) |
| \( f \) | \( 9b05688c2b3e6c1f \) | \( 510e527faded682d1 \) | \( 58cb02347ab51f91 \) |
| \( g \) | \( 1f83d9abfb41bd6b \) | \( 9b05688c2b3e6c1f \) | \( 510e527faded682d1 \) |
| \( h \) | \( 5be0cd19137e2179 \) | \( 1f83d9abfb41bd6b \) | \( 9b05688c2b3e6c1f \) |

Note that in each of the rounds, six of the variables are copied directly from variables from the preceding round.

The process continues through 80 rounds. The output of the final round is

73a54f399fa4b1b2 10d9c4c4295599f6 6d7806db8b148f77 654ef9abec389ca9 d0846aa79693ed7 9bb4d39778c07f9e 25c96a7768fb2aa3 ceb9fc3691ce8326

The hash value is then calculated as

\[
\begin{align*}
H_{1,0} &= 6a09e667f3bcc908 + 73a54f399fa4b1b2 = ddaf35a193617aba \\
H_{1,1} &= bb67ae8584caa73b + 10d9c4c4295599f6 = cc417349ae204131 \\
H_{1,2} &= 3c6ef372fe94f82b + d67806db8b148f77 = 12e6fa4e89a97ea2 \\
H_{1,3} &= a54ff53a5f1d36f1 + 654ef9abec389ca9 = 0a9eeee64b55d39a \\
H_{1,4} &= 510e527faded682d1 + d0846aa79693ed7 = 2192992a274fc1a8 \\
H_{1,5} &= 9b05688c2b3e6c1f + 9bb4d39778c07f9e = 36ba3c23a3f6ebbd \\
H_{1,6} &= 1f83d9abfb41bd6b + 25c96a7768fb2aa3 = 454d4423643ce80e \\
H_{1,7} &= 5be0cd19137e2179 + ceb9fc3691ce8326 = 2a9ac94fa54ca49f
\end{align*}
\]

The resulting 512-bit message digest is

ddaf35a193617aba cc417349ae204131 12e6fa4e89a97ea2 0a9eeee64b55d39a 2192992a274fc1a8 36ba3c23a3f6ebbd 454d4423643ce80e 2a9ac94fa54ca49f
The padded message consists blocks $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_N$. Each message block $M_i$ consists of 16 64-bit words $M_{i,0}, M_{i,1}, \ldots, M_{i,15}$. All addition is performed modulo $2^{64}$.

\[
\begin{align*}
H_{0,0} &= 6A09E667F3BCC908 & H_{0,4} &= 510E527FADE682D1 \\
H_{0,1} &= BB67AE8584CAA73B & H_{0,5} &= 9B05688C2B3E6C1F \\
H_{0,2} &= 3C6EF372FE94F82B & H_{0,6} &= 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B \\
H_{0,3} &= A54FF53A5F1D36F1 & H_{0,7} &= 5BE0CDI9137E2179
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } N\]

1. Prepare the message schedule $W$
   \[\text{for } t = 0 \text{ to } 15 \]
   \[W_t = M_{i,t}\]
   \[\text{for } t = 16 \text{ to } 79 \]
   \[W_t = \sigma_{1}^{512} (W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_{0}^{512} (W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}\]

2. Initialize the working variables
   \[a = H_{i-1,0} \quad e = H_{i-1,4}\]
   \[b = H_{i-1,1} \quad f = H_{i-1,5}\]
   \[c = H_{i-1,2} \quad g = H_{i-1,6}\]
   \[d = H_{i-1,3} \quad h = H_{i-1,7}\]

3. Perform the main hash computation
   \[\text{for } t = 0 \text{ to } 79\]
   \[T_1 = h + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + \left( \sum_{i=1}^{512} e \right) + W_t + K_t\]
   \[T_2 = \left( \sum_{i=0}^{512} a \right) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c)\]
   \[h = g\]
   \[g = f\]
   \[f = e\]
   \[e = d + T_1\]
   \[d = c\]
   \[c = b\]
   \[b = a\]
   \[a = T_1 + T_2\]

4. Compute the intermediate hash value
   \[H_{i,0} = a + H_{i-1,0} \quad H_{i,4} = a + H_{i-1,4}\]
   \[H_{i,1} = a + H_{i-1,1} \quad H_{i,5} = a + H_{i-1,5}\]
   \[H_{i,2} = a + H_{i-1,2} \quad H_{i,6} = a + H_{i-1,6}\]
   \[H_{i,3} = a + H_{i-1,3} \quad H_{i,7} = a + H_{i-1,7}\]

\[\text{return } \{H_{N,0} || H_{N,1} || H_{N,2} || H_{N,4} || H_{N,3} || H_{N,5} || H_{N,6} || H_{N,7}\}\]
Suppose now that we change the input message by one bit, from “abc” to “cbc”. Then, the 1024-bit message block is

```
6362638000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000018
```

And the resulting 512-bit message digest is

```
531668966ee79b70 0b8e593261101354 4273f7ef7b31f279 2a7ef68d53f93264
319c165ad96d9187 55e6a204c2607e27 6e05cdf993a64c85 ef9e1e125c0f925f
```

The number of bit positions that differ between the two hash values is 253, almost exactly half the bit positions, indicating that SHA-512 has a good avalanche effect.

### 11.6 SHA-3

As of this writing, SHA-1 has not yet been “broken.” That is, no one has demonstrated a technique for producing collisions in less than brute-force time. However, because SHA-1 is very similar in structure and in the basic mathematical operations used to MD5 and SHA-0, both of which have been broken, SHA-1 is considered insecure and has been phased out for SHA-2.

SHA-2, particularly the 512-bit version, would appear to provide unassailable security. However, SHA-2 shares the same structure and mathematical operations as its predecessors, and this is a cause for concern. Because it will take years to find a suitable replacement for SHA-2, should it become vulnerable, NIST decided to begin the process of developing a new hash standard.

Accordingly, NIST announced in 2007 a competition to produce the next generation NIST hash function, to be called SHA-3. NIST would like to have a new standard in place by the end of 2012, but emphasizes that this is not a fixed timeline and that the schedule could slip well beyond that date. The basic requirements that must be satisfied by any candidate for SHA-3 are the following.

1. It must be possible to replace SHA-2 with SHA-3 in any application by a simple drop-in substitution. Therefore, SHA-3 must support hash value lengths of 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits.

2. SHA-3 must preserve the online nature of SHA-2. That is, the algorithm must process comparatively small blocks (512 or 1024 bits) at a time instead of requiring that the entire message be buffered in memory before processing it.

Beyond these basic requirements, NIST has defined a set of evaluation criteria. These criteria are designed to reflect the requirements for the main applications supported by SHA-2, which include digital signatures, hashed message authentication
codes, key generation, and pseudorandom number generation. The evaluation criteria for the new hash function, in decreasing order of importance, are as follows.

- **Security**: The security strength of SHA-3 should be close to the theoretical maximum for the different required hash sizes and for both preimage resistance and collision resistance. SHA-3 algorithms must be designed to resist any potentially successful attack on SHA-2 functions. In practice, this probably means that SHA-3 must be fundamentally different than the SHA-1, SHA-2, and MD5 algorithms in either structure, mathematical functions, or both.

- **Cost**: SHA-3 should be both time and memory efficient over a range of hardware platforms.

- **Algorithm and implementation characteristics**: Consideration will be given to such characteristics as flexibility (e.g., tunable parameters for security/performance tradeoffs, opportunity for parallelization, and so on) and simplicity. The latter characteristic makes it easier to analyze the security properties of the algorithm.

### 11.7 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

[PREN99] is a good survey of cryptographic hash functions. [GILB03] examines the security of SHA-256 through SHA-512.

#### GILB03  

#### PREN99  

#### Recommended Web Sites:

- **NIST Secure Hashing Page**: SHA FIPS and related documents.
- **Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition**: NIST page on its competition for a new standardized hash algorithm, to be called SHA-3.

### 11.8 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

#### Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>big endian</th>
<th>birthday paradox</th>
<th>collision resistant</th>
<th>compression function</th>
<th>cryptographic hash function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>birthday attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
CHAPTER 11 / CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>hash code</th>
<th>MD4</th>
<th>SHA-224</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hash function</td>
<td>MD5</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hash value</td>
<td>message digest</td>
<td>SHA-384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keyed hash function</td>
<td>one-way hash function</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>little endian</td>
<td>preimage resistant</td>
<td>strong collision resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message authentication code (MAC)</td>
<td>second preimage resistant</td>
<td>weak collision resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

11.1 What characteristics are needed in a secure hash function?
11.2 What is the difference between weak and strong collision resistance?
11.3 What is the role of a compression function in a hash function?
11.4 What is the difference between little-endian and big-endian format?
11.5 What basic arithmetical and logical functions are used in SHA?

Problems

11.1 The high-speed transport protocol XTP (Xpress Transfer Protocol) uses a 32-bit checksum function defined as the concatenation of two 16-bit functions: XOR and RXOR, defined in Section 11.4 as “two simple hash functions” and illustrated in Figure 11.4.
   a. Will this checksum detect all errors caused by an odd number of error bits? Explain.
   b. Will this checksum detect all errors caused by an even number of error bits? If not, characterize the error patterns that will cause the checksum to fail.
   c. Comment on the effectiveness of this function for use as a hash function for authentication.

11.2 a. Consider the Davies and Price hash code scheme described in Section 11.4 and assume that DES is used as the encryption algorithm:

   \[ H_i = H_{i-1} \oplus E(M_i, H_{i-1}) \]

   Recall the complementarity property of DES (Problem 3.14): If \( Y = E(K, X) \), then \( Y' = E(K', X') \). Use this property to show how a message consisting of blocks \( M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_N \) can be altered without altering its hash code.
   b. Show that a similar attack will succeed against the scheme proposed in [MEYE88]:

   \[ H_i = M_i \oplus E(H_{i-1}, M_i) \]

11.3 a. Consider the following hash function. Messages are in the form of a sequence of numbers in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \), \( M = (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_l) \). The hash value \( h \) is calculated as \( \left( \sum_{i=1}^{l} a_i \right)^2 \) for some predefined value \( n \). Does this hash function satisfy any of the requirements for a hash function listed in Table 11.1? Explain your answer.

   b. Repeat part (a) for the hash function \( h = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{l} a_i^2 \right) \mod n \).

   c. Calculate the hash function of part (b) for \( M = (189, 632, 900, 722, 349) \) and \( n = 989 \).

11.4 It is possible to use a hash function to construct a block cipher with a structure similar to DES. Because a hash function is one way and a block cipher must be reversible (to decrypt), how is it possible?
Now consider the opposite problem: using an encryption algorithm to construct a one-way hash function. Consider using RSA with a known key. Then process a message consisting of a sequence of blocks as follows: Encrypt the first block, XOR the result with the second block and encrypt again, etc. Show that this scheme is not secure by solving the following problem. Given a two-block message \( B_1, B_2 \), and its hash

\[
\text{RSAH}(B_1, B_2) = \text{RSA}(\text{RSAH}(B_1) \oplus B_2)
\]

Given an arbitrary block \( C_1 \), choose \( C_2 \) so that

\[
\text{RSAH}(C_1, C_2) = \text{RSAH}(B_1, B_2)
\]

Thus, the hash function does not satisfy weak collision resistance.

Suppose \( H(m) \) is a collision-resistant hash function that maps a message of arbitrary bit length into an \( n \)-bit hash value. Is it true that, for all messages \( x, x' \) with \( x \neq x' \), we have \( H(x) \neq H(x') \)? Explain your answer.

In Figure 11.11, it is assumed that an array of 80 64-bit words is available to store the values of \( W_r \), so that they can be precomputed at the beginning of the processing of a block. Now assume that space is at a premium. As an alternative, consider the use of a 16-word circular buffer that is initially loaded with \( W_0 \) through \( W_{15} \). Design an algorithm that, for each step \( t \), computes the required input value \( W_r \).

For SHA-512, show the equations for the values of \( W_{16}, W_{17}, W_{18}, \) and \( W_{19} \).

State the value of the padding field in SHA-512 if the length of the message is

a. 1919 bits
b. 1920 bits
c. 1921 bits

State the value of the length field in SHA-512 if the length of the message is

a. 1919 bits
b. 1920 bits
c. 1921 bits

Suppose \( a_1a_2a_3a_4 \) are the 4 bytes in a 32-bit word. Each \( a_i \) can be viewed as an integer in the range 0 to 255, represented in binary. In a big-endian architecture, this word represents the integer

\[
a_12^{24} + a_22^{16} + a_32^8 + a_4
\]

In a little-endian architecture, this word represents the integer

\[
a_42^{24} + a_32^{16} + a_22^8 + a_1
\]

a. Some hash functions, such as MD5, assume a little-endian architecture. It is important that the message digest be independent of the underlying architecture. Therefore, to perform the modulo 2 adition operation of MD5 or RIPEMD-160 on a big-endian architecture, an adjustment must be made. Suppose \( X = x_1x_2x_3x_4 \) and \( Y = y_1y_2y_3y_4 \). Show how the MD5 adition operation \( (X + Y) \) would be carried out on a big-endian machine.
b. SHA assumes a big-endian architecture. Show how the operation \( (X + Y) \) for SHA would be carried out on a little-endian machine.

This problem introduces a hash function similar in spirit to SHA that operates on letters instead of binary data. It is called the toy tetragraph hash (tth).\(^2\) Given a message consisting of a sequence of letters, tth produces a hash value consisting of four letters. First, tth divides the message into blocks of 16 letters, ignoring spaces, punctuation, and capitalization. If the message length is not divisible by 16, it is padded out with nulls. A four-number running total is maintained that starts out with the value \((0, 0, 0, 0)\); this is input to the compression function for processing the first block. The compression function consists of two rounds.

**Round 1** Get the next block of text and arrange it as a row-wise 4 \( \times \) 4 block of text and covert it to numbers (\( A = 0, B = 1, \) etc.). For example, for the block

\[
\text{ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP}
\]

\( ^2 \) I thank William K. Mason, of the magazine staff of *The Cryptogram*, for providing this example.
Then, add each column mod 26 and add the result to the running total, mod 26. In this example, the running total is (24, 2, 6, 10).

**Round 2** Using the matrix from round 1, rotate the first row left by 1, second row left by 2, third row left by 3, and reverse the order of the fourth row.

In our example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, add each column mod 26 and add the result to the running total. The new running total is (5, 7, 9, 11). This running total is now the input into the first round of the compression function for the next block of text. After the final block is processed, convert the final running total to letters. For example, if the message is ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP, then the hash is FHJL.

a. Draw figures comparable to Figures 11.8 and 11.9 to depict the overall logic and the compression function logic.

b. Calculate the hash function for the 48-letter message “I leave twenty million dollars to my friendly cousin Bill.”

c. To demonstrate the weakness of this, find a 48-letter block that produces the same hash as that just derived. Hint: Use lots of A’s.

The remaining problems deal with the hash function Whirlpool, described in Appendix N.

11.13 Develop a table similar to Table 4.9 for GF(2^8) with \( m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1 \).

11.14 Show the E and \( E^{-1} \) mini-boxes in Table N.2 in the traditional S-box square matrix format, such as that of Table 5.4.

11.15 Verify that Figure N.5 is a valid implementation of the S-box shown in Table N.2a. Do this by showing the calculations involved for three input values: 00, 55, 1E.

11.16 Provide a Boolean expression that defines the S-box functionality of Figure N.5.

11.17 Whirlpool makes use of the construction \( H_i = E(H_{i-1}, M_i) \oplus H_{i-1} \oplus M_i \). Another construction that was shown by Preneel to be secure is \( H_i = E(H_{i-1}, M_i) \oplus M_i \). Now notice that the key schedule for Whirlpool resembles encryption of the cipher key under a pseudo-key defined by the round constants, so that the core of the hashing process could be formally viewed as two interacting encryption lines. Consider the encryption \( E(H_{i-1}, M_i) \). We could write the final round key for this block as \( K_{10} = E(RC, H_{i-1}) \). Now show that the two hash constructions are essentially equivalent because of the way that the key schedule is defined.
Related Problem

A general problem relating to hash functions is the following. Given a hash function $H$, with $n$ possible outputs and a specific value $H(x)$, if $H$ is applied to $k$ random inputs, what must be the value of $k$ so that the probability that at least one input $y$ satisfies $H(y) = H(x)$ is 0.5?

For a single value of $y$, the probability that $H(y) = H(x)$ is just $1/n$. Conversely, the probability that $H(y) \neq H(x)$ is $[1 - (1/n)]$. If we generate $k$ random values of $y$, then the probability that none of them match is just the product of the probabilities that each individual value does not match, or $[1 - (1/n)]^k$. Thus, the probability that there is at least one match is $1 - [1 - (1/n)]^k$.

The binomial theorem can be stated as

$$(1 - a)^k = 1 - ka + \frac{k(k - 1)}{2!}a^2 - \frac{k(k - 1)(k - 2)}{3!}a^3 \ldots$$

For very small values of $a$, this can be approximated as $(1 - ka)$. Thus, the probability of at least one match is approximated as $1 - [1 - (1/n)]^k \approx 1 - [1 - (k/n)] = k/n$. For a probability of 0.5, we have $k = n/2$.

In particular, for an $m$-bit hash code, the number of possible codes is $2^m$ and the value of $k$ that produces a probability of one-half is

$$k = 2^{(m-1)} \quad (11.1)$$

The Birthday Paradox

The birthday paradox is often presented in elementary probability courses to demonstrate that probability results are sometimes counterintuitive. The problem can be stated as follows. What is the minimum value of $k$ such that the probability is greater than 0.5 that at least two people in a group of $k$ people have the same birthday? Ignore February 29 and assume that each birthday is equally likely.

We can reason to the answer as follows. The probability that the birthdays of any two people are not alike is clearly 364/365 (since there is only one chance in 365 that one person’s birthday will coincide with another’s). The probability that a third person’s birthday will differ from the other two is 363/365; a fourth person’s, 362/365; and so on, until we reach the 24th person (342/365). We thus obtain a series of 23 fractions which must be multiplied together to reach the probability that all 24 birthdays are different. The product is a fraction that reduces to about 0.507, or slightly better than 1/2, for a coincidence among 23 people.

To derive this answer formally, let us define

$$P(n, k) = \text{Pr} \{ \text{at least one duplicate in } k \text{ items, with each item able to take on one of } n \text{ equally likely values between 1 and } n \}$$

Thus, we are looking for the smallest value of $k$ such that $P(365, k) \geq 0.5$. It is easier first to derive the probability that there are no duplicates, which we designate as $Q(365, k)$. If $k > 365$, then it is impossible for all values to be different. So we assume $k \leq 365$. Now consider the number of different ways, $N$, that we can have $k$
values with no duplicates. We may choose any of the 365 values for the first item, any of the remaining 364 numbers for the second item, and so on. Hence, the number of different ways is

\[ N = 365 \times 364 \times \ldots (365 - k + 1) = \frac{365!}{(365 - k)!} \]  \hspace{1cm} (11.2)

If we remove the restriction that there are no duplicates, then each item can be any of 365 values, and the total number of possibilities is \(365^k\). So the probability of no duplicates is simply the fraction of sets of values that have no duplicates out of all possible sets of values:

\[ Q(365, k) = \frac{365!/(365 - k)!}{(365)^k} = \frac{365!}{(365 - k)!(365)^k} \]

and

\[ P(365, k) = 1 - Q(365, k) = 1 - \frac{365!}{(365 - k)!(365)^k} \]  \hspace{1cm} (11.3)

This function is plotted in Figure 11.13. The probabilities may seem surprisingly large to anyone who has not considered the problem before. Many people would guess that to have a probability greater than 0.5 that there is at least one duplicate, the number of people in the group would have to be about 100. In fact, the number is 23, with \(P(365, 23) = 0.5073\). For \(k = 100\), the probability of at least one duplicate is 0.9999997.

![Figure 11.13 The Birthday Paradox](image-url)
Perhaps the reason that the result seems so surprising is that if you consider a particular person in a group, the probability that some other person in the group has the same birthday is small. But the probability that we are concerned with is the probability that any pair of people in the group has the same birthday. In a group of 23, there are \((23(23 - 1))/2 = 253\) different pairs of people. Hence the high probabilities.

**Useful Inequality**

Before developing a generalization of the birthday problem, we derive an inequality that will be needed:

\[
(1 - x) \leq e^{-x} \quad \text{for all } x \geq 0 \quad (11.4)
\]

Figure 11.14 illustrates the inequality. To see that the inequality holds, note that the lower line is the tangent to \(e^{-x}\) at \(x = 0\). The slope of that line is just the derivative of \(e^{-x}\) at \(x = 0\):

\[
f(x) = e^{-x}
\]

\[
f'(x) = \frac{d}{dx} e^{-x} = -e^{-x}
\]

\[
f'(0) = -1
\]

The tangent is a straight line of the form \(ax + b\) with \(a = -1\), and the tangent at \(x = 0\) must equal \(e^{-0} = 1\). Thus, the tangent is the function \((1 - x)\), confirming the inequality of Equation (11.4). Furthermore, note that for small \(x\), we have \((1 - x) \approx e^{-x}\).
The General Case of Duplications

The birthday problem can be generalized to the following problem. Given a random variable that is an integer with uniform distribution between 1 and \( n \) and a selection of \( k \) instances (\( k \leq n \)) of the random variable, what is the probability, \( P(n, k) \), that there is at least one duplicate? The birthday problem is just the special case with \( n = 365 \). By the same reasoning as before, we have the following generalization of Equation (11.3):

\[
P(n, k) = 1 - \frac{n!}{(n-k)!n^k}
\]  

(11.5)

We can rewrite this as

\[
P(n, k) = 1 - \frac{n \times (n-1) \times \cdots \times (n-k+1)}{n^k}
\]

\[
= 1 - \left[ \frac{n-1}{n} \times \frac{n-2}{n} \times \cdots \times \frac{n-k+1}{n} \right]
\]

\[
= 1 - \left[ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{n} \right) \times \left( 1 - \frac{2}{n} \right) \times \cdots \times \left( 1 - \frac{k-1}{n} \right) \right]
\]

Using the inequality of Equation (11.4),

\[
P(n, k) > 1 - \left[ (e^{-1/n}) \times (e^{-2/n}) \times \cdots \times (e^{-(k-1)/n}) \right]
\]

\[
= 1 - e^{-[(1/n)+(2/n)+\cdots+(k-1)/n]}
\]

\[
= 1 - e^{-k(k-1)/2n}
\]

Now let us pose the question: What value of \( k \) is required such that \( P(n, k) > 0.5 \)? To satisfy the requirement, we have

\[
1/2 = 1 - e^{-k(k-1)/2n}
\]

\[
2 = e^{k(k-1)/2n}
\]

\[
\ln 2 = \frac{k \times (k-1)}{2n}
\]

For large \( k \), we can replace \( k \times (k-1) \) by \( k^2 \), and we get

\[
k = \sqrt{2\ln 2/n} = 1.18\sqrt{n} \approx \sqrt{n}
\]  

(11.6)

As a reality check, for \( n = 365 \), we get \( k = 1.18 \times \sqrt{365} = 22.54 \), which is very close to the correct answer of 23.

We can now state the basis of the birthday attack in the following terms. Suppose we have a function \( H \), with \( 2^m \) possible outputs (i.e., an \( m \)-bit output). If \( H \) is applied to \( k \) random inputs, what must be the value of \( k \) so that there is the probability of at least one duplicate [i.e., \( H(x) = H(y) \) for some inputs \( x, y \)]? Using the approximation in Equation (11.6),

\[
k = \sqrt{2^m} = 2^{m/2}
\]  

(11.7)
Overlap between Two Sets

There is a problem related to the general case of duplications that is also of relevance for our discussions. The problem is this: Given an integer random variable with uniform distribution between 1 and \(n\) and two sets of \(k\) instances \((k \leq n)\) of the random variable, what is the probability, \(R(n, k)\), that the two sets are not disjoint; that is, what is the probability that there is at least one value found in both sets?

Let us call the two sets \(X\) and \(Y\), with elements \(\{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k\}\) and \(\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_k\}\), respectively. Given the value of \(x_1\), the probability that \(y_1 = x_1\) is just \(1/n\), and therefore the probability that \(y_1\) does not match \(x_1\) is \([1 - (1/n)]\). If we generate the \(k\) random values in \(Y\), the probability that none of these values is equal to \(x_1\) is \(1 - (1/n)^k\). Thus, the probability that there is at least one match to \(x_1\) is

\[
R(n, k) = Pr[\text{at least one match in } Y \text{ to } X] = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^k
\]

To proceed, let us make the assumption that all the elements of \(X\) are distinct. If \(n\) is large and if \(k\) is also large (e.g., on the order of \(\sqrt{n}\)), then this is a good approximation. In fact, there may be a few duplications, but most of the values will be distinct. With that assumption, we can make the following derivation:

\[
\begin{align*}
Pr[\text{no match in } Y \text{ to } x_1] &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^k \\
Pr[\text{no match in } Y \text{ to } X] &= \left(\left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^k\right)^k = \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^{k^2} \\
R(n, k) &= Pr[\text{at least one match in } Y \text{ to } X] = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^{k^2}
\end{align*}
\]

Using the inequality of Equation (11.4),

\[
R(n, k) > 1 - \left(e^{-1/n}\right)^{k^2}
\]

Let us pose the question: What value of \(k\) is required such that \(R(n, k) > 0.5\)? To satisfy the requirement, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
1/2 &= 1 - (e^{-k^2/n}) \\
2 &= e^{k^2/n} \\
\ln(2) &= \frac{k^2}{n} \\
k &= \sqrt{\ln(2)n} = 0.83\sqrt{n} \approx \sqrt{n} \quad (11.8)
\end{align*}
\]

We can state this in terms related to birthday attacks as follows. Suppose we have a function \(H\) with \(2^m\) possible outputs (i.e., an \(m\)-bit output). Apply \(H\) to \(k\) random inputs to produce the set \(X\) and again to \(k\) additional random inputs to produce the set \(Y\). What must be the value of \(k\) so that there is the probability of at least 0.5 that there is a match between the two sets (i.e., \(H(x) = H(y)\) for some inputs \(x \in X, y \in Y\))? Using the approximation in Equation (11.8):

\[
k = \sqrt{2^m} = 2^{m/2}
\]
CHAPTER 12

MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES

12.1 Message Authentication Requirements
12.2 Message Authentication Functions
   - Message Encryption
   - Message Authentication Code
12.3 Requirements for Message Authentication Codes
12.4 Security of MACs
   - Brute-Force Attacks
   - Cryptanalysis
12.5 MACs Based on Hash Functions: HMAC
   - HMAC Design Objectives
   - HMAC Algorithm
   - Security of HMAC
12.6 MACs Based on Block Ciphers: DAA and CMAC
   - Data Authentication Algorithm
   - Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)
12.7 Authenticated Encryption: CCM and GCM
   - Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
   - Galois/Counter Mode
12.8 Pseudorandom Number Generation Using Hash Functions and Macs
   - PRNG Based on Hash function
   - PRNG Based on MAC function
12.9 Recommended Reading and Web Site
12.10 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
At cats’ green on the Sunday he took the message from the inside of the pillar and added Peter Moran’s name to the two names already printed there in the “Brontosaur” code. The message now read: “Leviathan to Dragon: Martin Hillman, Trevor Allan, Peter Moran: observe and tail.” What was the good of it John hardly knew. He felt better, he felt that at last he had made an attack on Peter Moran instead of waiting passively and effecting no retaliation. Besides, what was the use of being in possession of the key to the codes if he never took advantage of it?

—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell

KEY POINTS

◆ Message authentication is a mechanism or service used to verify the integrity of a message. Message authentication assures that data received are exactly as sent by (i.e., contain no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay) and that the purported identity of the sender is valid.

◆ Symmetric encryption provides authentication among those who share the secret key.

◆ A message authentication code (MAC) is an algorithm that requires the use of a secret key. A MAC takes a variable-length message and a secret key as input and produces an authentication code. A recipient in possession of the secret key can generate an authentication code to verify the integrity of the message.

◆ One means of forming a MAC is to combine a cryptographic hash function in some fashion with a secret key.

◆ Another approach to constructing a MAC is to use a symmetric block cipher in such a way that it produces a fixed-length output for a variable-length input.

One of the most fascinating and complex areas of cryptography is that of message authentication and the related area of digital signatures. It would be impossible, in anything less than book length, to exhaust all the cryptographic functions and protocols that have been proposed or implemented for message authentication and digital signatures. Instead, the purpose of this chapter and the next is to provide a broad overview of the subject and to develop a systematic means of describing the various approaches.

This chapter begins with an introduction to the requirements for authentication and digital signature and the types of attacks to be countered. Then the basic approaches are surveyed. The remainder of the chapter deals with the fundamental approach to message authentication known as the message authentication code (MAC). Following an overview of this topic, the chapter looks at security considerations for MACs. This is followed by a discussion of specific MACs in two categories: those built from cryptographic hash functions and those built using a block cipher
mode of operation. Next, we look at a relatively recent approach known as authenticated encryption. Finally, we look at the use of cryptographic hash functions and MACs for pseudorandom number generation.

12.1 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENTS

In the context of communications across a network, the following attacks can be identified.

1. **Disclosure**: Release of message contents to any person or process not possessing the appropriate cryptographic key.

2. **Traffic analysis**: Discovery of the pattern of traffic between parties. In a connection-oriented application, the frequency and duration of connections could be determined. In either a connection-oriented or connectionless environment, the number and length of messages between parties could be determined.

3. **Masquerade**: Insertion of messages into the network from a fraudulent source. This includes the creation of messages by an opponent that are purported to come from an authorized entity. Also included are fraudulent acknowledgments of message receipt or nonreceipt by someone other than the message recipient.

4. **Content modification**: Changes to the contents of a message, including insertion, deletion, transposition, and modification.

5. **Sequence modification**: Any modification to a sequence of messages between parties, including insertion, deletion, and reordering.

6. **Timing modification**: Delay or replay of messages. In a connection-oriented application, an entire session or sequence of messages could be a replay of some previous valid session, or individual messages in the sequence could be delayed or replayed. In a connectionless application, an individual message (e.g., datagram) could be delayed or replayed.

7. **Source repudiation**: Denial of transmission of message by source.

8. **Destination repudiation**: Denial of receipt of message by destination.

Measures to deal with the first two attacks are in the realm of message confidentiality and are dealt with in Part One. Measures to deal with items (3) through (6) in the foregoing list are generally regarded as message authentication. Mechanisms for dealing specifically with item (7) come under the heading of digital signatures. Generally, a digital signature technique will also counter some or all of the attacks listed under items (3) through (6). Dealing with item (8) may require a combination of the use of digital signatures and a protocol designed to counter this attack.

In summary, message authentication is a procedure to verify that received messages come from the alleged source and have not been altered. Message authentication may also verify sequencing and timeliness. A digital signature is an authentication technique that also includes measures to counter repudiation by the source.
12.2 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION FUNCTIONS

Any message authentication or digital signature mechanism has two levels of functionality. At the lower level, there must be some sort of function that produces an authenticator: a value to be used to authenticate a message. This lower-level function is then used as a primitive in a higher-level authentication protocol that enables a receiver to verify the authenticity of a message.

This section is concerned with the types of functions that may be used to produce an authenticator. These may be grouped into three classes.

- **Hash function**: A function that maps a message of any length into a fixed-length hash value, which serves as the authenticator
- **Message encryption**: The ciphertext of the entire message serves as its authenticator
- **Message authentication code (MAC)**: A function of the message and a secret key that produces a fixed-length value that serves as the authenticator

Hash functions, and how they may serve for message authentication, are discussed in Chapter 11. The remainder of this section briefly examines the remaining two topics. The remainder of the chapter elaborates on the topic of MACs.

**Message Encryption**

Message encryption by itself can provide a measure of authentication. The analysis differs for symmetric and public-key encryption schemes.

**Symmetric Encryption** Consider the straightforward use of symmetric encryption (Figure 12.1a). A message $M$ transmitted from source A to destination B is encrypted using a secret key $K$ shared by A and B. If no other party knows the key, then confidentiality is provided: No other party can recover the plaintext of the message.

In addition, B is assured that the message was generated by A. Why? The message must have come from A, because A is the only other party that possesses $K$ and therefore the only other party with the information necessary to construct ciphertext that can be decrypted with $K$. Furthermore, if $M$ is recovered, B knows that none of the bits of $M$ have been altered, because an opponent that does not know $K$ would not know how to alter bits in the ciphertext to produce the desired changes in the plaintext.

So we may say that symmetric encryption provides authentication as well as confidentiality. However, this flat statement needs to be qualified. Consider exactly what is happening at B. Given a decryption function $D$ and a secret key $K$, the destination will accept any input $X$ and produce output $Y = D(K, X)$. If $X$ is the ciphertext of a legitimate message $M$ produced by the corresponding encryption function, then $Y$ is some plaintext message $M$. Otherwise, $Y$ will likely be a meaningless sequence of bits. There may need to be some automated means of determining at B whether $Y$ is legitimate plaintext and therefore must have come from A.
The implications of the line of reasoning in the preceding paragraph are profound from the point of view of authentication. Suppose the message $M$ can be any arbitrary bit pattern. In that case, there is no way to determine automatically, at the destination, whether an incoming message is the ciphertext of a legitimate message. This conclusion is incontrovertible: If $M$ can be any bit pattern, then regardless of the value of $X$, the value $Y = D(K, X)$ is some bit pattern and therefore must be accepted as authentic plaintext.

Thus, in general, we require that only a small subset of all possible bit patterns be considered legitimate plaintext. In that case, any spurious ciphertext is unlikely to produce legitimate plaintext. For example, suppose that only one bit pattern in $10^6$ is legitimate plaintext. Then the probability that any randomly chosen bit pattern, treated as ciphertext, will produce a legitimate plaintext message is only $10^{-6}$.

For a number of applications and encryption schemes, the desired conditions prevail as a matter of course. For example, suppose that we are transmitting English-language messages using a Caesar cipher with a shift of one ($K = 1$). A sends the following legitimate ciphertext:

\[ \text{nbsftfbupbutboeepftfbupbutboemjuumfmbnctfbujwz} \]
B decrypts to produce the following plaintext:

mareseatoatsanddoeseatoatsandlittlelambseativy

A simple frequency analysis confirms that this message has the profile of ordinary English. On the other hand, if an opponent generates the following random sequence of letters:

zuvrsoevgqlzwigmmdvnhpcxxiureosfbctqxsxq

this decrypts to

ytuqrdupwkyhflcumxbbbwhtqdnreabdaspw

which does not fit the profile of ordinary English.

It may be difficult to determine automatically if incoming ciphertext decrypts to intelligible plaintext. If the plaintext is, say, a binary object file or digitized X-rays, determination of properly formed and therefore authentic plaintext may be difficult. Thus, an opponent could achieve a certain level of disruption simply by issuing messages with random content purporting to come from a legitimate user.

One solution to this problem is to force the plaintext to have some structure that is easily recognized but that cannot be replicated without recourse to the encryption function. We could, for example, append an error-detecting code, also known as a frame check sequence (FCS) or checksum, to each message before encryption, as illustrated in Figure 12.2a. A prepares a plaintext message $M$ and then provides this as input to a function $F$ that produces an FCS. The FCS is appended to $M$ and the entire block is then encrypted. At the destination, B

![Diagram](source-a-source-b-error-control.png)

**Figure 12.2** Internal and External Error Control
deciphers the incoming block and treats the results as a message with an appended 
FCS. B applies the same function F to attempt to reproduce the FCS. If the 
calculated FCS is equal to the incoming FCS, then the message is considered authentic. It is 
unlikely that any random sequence of bits would exhibit the desired relationship.

Note that the order in which the FCS and encryption functions are performed 
is critical. The sequence illustrated in Figure 12.2a is referred to in [DIFF79] 
as **internal error control**, which the authors contrast with **external error control** 
(Figure 12.2b). With internal error control, authentication is provided because an 
opponent would have difficulty generating ciphertext that, when decrypted, would 
have valid error control bits. If instead the FCS is the outer code, an opponent can 
construct messages with valid error-control codes. Although the opponent cannot 
know what the decrypted plaintext will be, he or she can still hope to create confu-
sion and disrupt operations.

An error-control code is just one example; in fact, any sort of structuring 
added to the transmitted message serves to strengthen the authentication capability. 
Such structure is provided by the use of a communications architecture consisting of 
layered protocols. As an example, consider the structure of messages transmitted 
using the TCP/IP protocol architecture. Figure 12.3 shows the format of a TCP seg-
ment, illustrating the TCP header. Now suppose that each pair of hosts shared a 
unique secret key, so that all exchanges between a pair of hosts used the same key, 
regardless of application. Then we could simply encrypt all of the datagram except 
the IP header. Again, if an opponent substituted some arbitrary bit pattern for the 
encrypted TCP segment, the resulting plaintext would not include a meaningful 
header. In this case, the header includes not only a checksum (which covers the 
header) but also other useful information, such as the sequence number. Because 
successive TCP segments on a given connection are numbered sequentially, encryption 
assures that an opponent does not delay, misorder, or delete any segments.

**Public-Key Encryption** The straightforward use of public-key encryption 
(Figure 12.1b) provides confidentiality but not authentication. The source (A) uses 
the public key $PU_b$ of the destination (B) to encrypt $M$. Because only B has the
corresponding private key \( PR_b \), only B can decrypt the message. This scheme provides no authentication, because any opponent could also use B’s public key to encrypt a message and claim to be A.

To provide authentication, A uses its private key to encrypt the message, and B uses A’s public key to decrypt (Figure 12.1c). This provides authentication using the same type of reasoning as in the symmetric encryption case: The message must have come from A because A is the only party that possesses \( PR_a \) and therefore the only party with the information necessary to construct ciphertext that can be decrypted with \( PU_a \). Again, the same reasoning as before applies: There must be some internal structure to the plaintext so that the receiver can distinguish between well-formed plaintext and random bits.

Assuming there is such structure, then the scheme of Figure 12.1c does provide authentication. It also provides what is known as digital signature. \(^1\) Only A could have constructed the ciphertext because only A possesses \( PR_a \). Not even B, the recipient, could have constructed the ciphertext. Therefore, if B is in possession of the ciphertext, B has the means to prove that the message must have come from A. In effect, A has “signed” the message by using its private key to encrypt. Note that this scheme does not provide confidentiality. Anyone in possession of A’s public key can decrypt the ciphertext.

To provide both confidentiality and authentication, A can encrypt \( M \) first using its private key, which provides the digital signature, and then using B’s public key, which provides confidentiality (Figure 12.1d). The disadvantage of this approach is that the public-key algorithm, which is complex, must be exercised four times rather than two in each communication.

**Message Authentication Code**

An alternative authentication technique involves the use of a secret key to generate a small fixed-size block of data, known as a cryptographic checksum or MAC, that is appended to the message. This technique assumes that two communicating parties, say A and B, share a common secret key \( K \). When A has a message to send to B, it calculates the MAC as a function of the message and the key:

\[
MAC = MAC(K, M)
\]

where

- \( M \) = input message
- \( C \) = MAC function
- \( K \) = shared secret key
- \( MAC \) = message authentication code

The message plus MAC are transmitted to the intended recipient. The recipient performs the same calculation on the received message, using the same secret key, to

\(^1\)This is not the way in which digital signatures are constructed, as we shall see, but the principle is the same.
generate a new MAC. The received MAC is compared to the calculated MAC (Figure 12.4a). If we assume that only the receiver and the sender know the identity of the secret key, and if the received MAC matches the calculated MAC, then

1. The receiver is assured that the message has not been altered. If an attacker alters the message but does not alter the MAC, then the receiver’s calculation of the MAC will differ from the received MAC. Because the attacker is assumed not to know the secret key, the attacker cannot alter the MAC to correspond to the alterations in the message.

2. The receiver is assured that the message is from the alleged sender. Because no one else knows the secret key, no one else could prepare a message with a proper MAC.

3. If the message includes a sequence number (such as is used with HDLC, X.25, and TCP), then the receiver can be assured of the proper sequence because an attacker cannot successfully alter the sequence number.

A MAC function is similar to encryption. One difference is that the MAC algorithm need not be reversible, as it must be for decryption. In general, the MAC function is a many-to-one function. The domain of the function consists of messages of some arbitrary length, whereas the range consists of all possible MACs and all possible keys. If an $n$-bit MAC is used, then there are $2^n$ possible MACs, whereas
there are $N$ possible messages with $N \gg 2^n$. Furthermore, with a $k$-bit key, there are $2^k$ possible keys.

For example, suppose that we are using 100-bit messages and a 10-bit MAC. Then, there are a total of $2^{100}$ different messages but only $2^{10}$ different MACs. So, on average, each MAC value is generated by a total of $2^{100}/2^{10} = 2^{90}$ different messages. If a 5-bit key is used, then there are $2^5 = 32$ different mappings from the set of messages to the set of MAC values.

It turns out that, because of the mathematical properties of the authentication function, it is less vulnerable to being broken than encryption.

The process depicted in Figure 12.4a provides authentication but not confidentiality, because the message as a whole is transmitted in the clear. Confidentiality can be provided by performing message encryption either after (Figure 12.4b) or before (Figure 12.4c) the MAC algorithm. In both these cases, two separate keys are needed, each of which is shared by the sender and the receiver. In the first case, the MAC is calculated with the message as input and is then concatenated to the message. The entire block is then encrypted. In the second case, the message is encrypted first. Then the MAC is calculated using the resulting ciphertext and is concatenated to the ciphertext to form the transmitted block. Typically, it is preferable to tie the authentication directly to the plaintext, so the method of Figure 12.4b is used.

Because symmetric encryption will provide authentication and because it is widely used with readily available products, why not simply use this instead of a separate message authentication code? [DAVI89] suggests three situations in which a message authentication code is used.

1. There are a number of applications in which the same message is broadcast to a number of destinations. Examples are notification to users that the network is now unavailable or an alarm signal in a military control center. It is cheaper and more reliable to have only one destination responsible for monitoring authenticity. Thus, the message must be broadcast in plaintext with an associated message authentication code. The responsible system has the secret key and performs authentication. If a violation occurs, the other destination systems are alerted by a general alarm.

2. Another possible scenario is an exchange in which one side has a heavy load and cannot afford the time to decrypt all incoming messages. Authentication is carried out on a selective basis, messages being chosen at random for checking.

3. Authentication of a computer program in plaintext is an attractive service. The computer program can be executed without having to decrypt it every time, which would be wasteful of processor resources. However, if a message authentication code were attached to the program, it could be checked whenever assurance was required of the integrity of the program.

Three other rationales may be added.

4. For some applications, it may not be of concern to keep messages secret, but it is important to authenticate messages. An example is the Simple Network Management Protocol Version 3 (SNMPv3), which separates the functions of
confidentiality and authentication. For this application, it is usually important for a managed system to authenticate incoming SNMP messages, particularly if the message contains a command to change parameters at the managed system. On the other hand, it may not be necessary to conceal the SNMP traffic.

5. Separation of authentication and confidentiality functions affords architectural flexibility. For example, it may be desired to perform authentication at the application level but to provide confidentiality at a lower level, such as the transport layer.

6. A user may wish to prolong the period of protection beyond the time of reception and yet allow processing of message contents. With message encryption, the protection is lost when the message is decrypted, so the message is protected against fraudulent modifications only in transit but not within the target system.

Finally, note that the MAC does not provide a digital signature, because both sender and receiver share the same key.

12.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES

A MAC, also known as a cryptographic checksum, is generated by a function C of the form

\[ T = \text{MAC}(K, M) \]

where \( M \) is a variable-length message, \( K \) is a secret key shared only by sender and receiver, and \( \text{MAC}(K, M) \) is the fixed-length authenticator, sometimes called a tag. The tag is appended to the message at the source at a time when the message is assumed or known to be correct. The receiver authenticates that message by recomputing the tag.

When an entire message is encrypted for confidentiality, using either symmetric or asymmetric encryption, the security of the scheme generally depends on the bit length of the key. Barring some weakness in the algorithm, the opponent must resort to a brute-force attack using all possible keys. On average, such an attack will require \( 2^{(k-1)} \) attempts for a \( k \)-bit key. In particular, for a ciphertext-only attack, the opponent, given ciphertext \( C \), performs \( P_i = D(K_i, C) \) for all possible key values \( K_i \) until a \( P_i \) is produced that matches the form of acceptable plaintext.

In the case of a MAC, the considerations are entirely different. In general, the MAC function is a many-to-one function, due to the many-to-one nature of the function. Using brute-force methods, how would an opponent attempt to discover a key? If confidentiality is not employed, the opponent has access to plaintext messages and their associated MACs. Suppose \( k > n \); that is, suppose that the key size is greater than the MAC size. Then, given a known \( M_1 \) and \( T_1 \), with \( T_1 = \text{MAC}(K, M_1) \), the cryptanalyst can perform \( T_i = \text{MAC}(K_i, M_1) \) for all possible key values \( K_i \). At least one key is guaranteed to produce a match of \( T_i = T_1 \). Note that a total of \( 2^k \) tags will be produced, but there are only \( 2^n < 2^k \) different tag values. Thus, a number of keys will produce the correct tag and the opponent has no
way of knowing which is the correct key. On average, a total of \(2^k/2^n = 2^{(k-n)}\) keys will produce a match. Thus, the opponent must iterate the attack.

- **Round 1**
  
  Given: \(M_1, T_1 = MAC(K, M_1)\)
  
  Compute \(T_i = MAC(K_i, M_1)\) for all \(2^k\) keys
  
  Number of matches = \(2^{(k-n)}\)

- **Round 2**
  
  Given: \(M_2, T_2 = MAC(K, M_2)\)
  
  Compute \(T_i = MAC(K_i, M_2)\) for the \(2^{(k-n)}\) keys resulting from Round 1
  
  Number of matches = \(2^{(k-2\times n)}\)

And so on. On average, \(\alpha\) rounds will be needed if \(k = \alpha \times n\). For example, if an 80-bit key is used and the tag is 32 bits, then the first round will produce about \(2^{48}\) possible keys. The second round will narrow the possible keys to about \(2^{16}\) possibilities. The third round should produce only a single key, which must be the one used by the sender.

If the key length is less than or equal to the tag length, then it is likely that a first round will produce a single match. It is possible that more than one key will produce such a match, in which case the opponent would need to perform the same test on a new (message, tag) pair.

Thus, a brute-force attempt to discover the authentication key is no less effort and may be more effort than that required to discover a decryption key of the same length. However, other attacks that do not require the discovery of the key are possible.

Consider the following MAC algorithm. Let \(M = (X_1 \parallel X_2 \parallel \ldots \parallel X_m)\) be a message that is treated as a concatenation of 64-bit blocks \(X_i\). Then define

\[
\Delta(M) = X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_m
\]

\[
MAC(K, M) = E(K, \Delta(M))
\]

where \(\oplus\) is the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation and the encryption algorithm is DES in electronic codebook mode. Thus, the key length is 56 bits, and the tag length is 64 bits. If an opponent observes \(\{M \parallel MAC(K, M)\}\), a brute-force attempt to determine \(K\) will require at least \(2^{56}\) encryptions. But the opponent can attack the system by replacing \(X_1\) through \(X_{m-1}\) with any desired values \(Y_1\) through \(Y_{m-1}\) and replacing \(X_m\) with \(Y_m\), where \(Y_m\) is calculated as

\[
Y_m = Y_1 \oplus Y_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus Y_{m-1} \oplus \Delta(M)
\]

The opponent can now concatenate the new message, which consists of \(Y_1\) through \(Y_m\), using the original tag to form a message that will be accepted as authentic by the receiver. With this tactic, any message of length \(64 \times (m-1)\) bits can be fraudulently inserted.

Thus, in assessing the security of a MAC function, we need to consider the types of attacks that may be mounted against it. With that in mind, let us state the requirements for the function. Assume that an opponent knows the MAC function
but does not know $K$. Then the MAC function should satisfy the following requirements.

1. If an opponent observes $M$ and $\text{MAC}(K, M)$, it should be computationally infeasible for the opponent to construct a message $M'$ such that
   \[
   \text{MAC}(K, M') = \text{MAC}(K, M)
   \]

2. $\text{MAC}(K, M)$ should be uniformly distributed in the sense that for randomly chosen messages $M$ and $M'$, the probability that $\text{MAC}(K, M) = \text{MAC}(K, M')$ is $2^{-n}$, where $n$ is the number of bits in the tag.

3. Let $M'$ be equal to some known transformation on $M$. That is, $M' = f(M)$. For example, $f$ may involve inverting one or more specific bits. In that case,
   \[
   \Pr[\text{MAC}(K, M) = \text{MAC}(K, M')] = 2^{-n}
   \]

The first requirement speaks to the earlier example, in which an opponent is able to construct a new message to match a given tag, even though the opponent does not know and does not learn the key. The second requirement deals with the need to thwart a brute-force attack based on chosen plaintext. That is, if we assume that the opponent does not know $K$ but does have access to the MAC function and can present messages for MAC generation, then the opponent could try various messages until finding one that matches a given tag. If the MAC function exhibits uniform distribution, then a brute-force method would require, on average, $2^{(n-1)}$ attempts before finding a message that fits a given tag.

The final requirement dictates that the authentication algorithm should not be weaker with respect to certain parts or bits of the message than others. If this were not the case, then an opponent who had $M$ and $\text{MAC}(K, M)$ could attempt variations on $M$ at the known “weak spots” with a likelihood of early success at producing a new message that matched the old tags.

### 12.4 SECURITY OF MACS

Just as with encryption algorithms and hash functions, we can group attacks on MACs into two categories: brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis.

**Brute-Force Attacks**

A brute-force attack on a MAC is a more difficult undertaking than a brute-force attack on a hash function because it requires known message-tag pairs. Let us see why this is so. To attack a hash code, we can proceed in the following way. Given a fixed message $x$ with $n$-bit hash code $h = H(x)$, a brute-force method of finding a collision is to pick a random bit string $y$ and check if $H(y) = H(x)$. The attacker can do this repeatedly off line. Whether an off-line attack can be used on a MAC algorithm depends on the relative size of the key and the tag.

To proceed, we need to state the desired security property of a MAC algorithm, which can be expressed as follows.

- **Computation resistance**: Given one or more text-MAC pairs $[x_i, \text{MAC}(K, x_i)]$, it is computationally infeasible to compute any text-MAC pair $[x, \text{MAC}(K, x)]$ for any new input $x \neq x_i$. 

In other words, the attacker would like to come up with the valid MAC code for a given message \( x \). There are two lines of attack possible: attack the key space and attack the MAC value. We examine each of these in turn.

If an attacker can determine the MAC key, then it is possible to generate a valid MAC value for any input \( x \). Suppose the key size is \( k \) bits and that the attacker has one known text–tag pair. Then the attacker can compute the \( n \)-bit tag on the known text for all possible keys. At least one key is guaranteed to produce the correct tag, namely, the valid key that was initially used to produce the known text–tag pair. This phase of the attack takes a level of effort proportional to \( 2^k \) (that is, one operation for each of the \( 2^k \) possible key values). However, as was described earlier, because the MAC is a many-to-one mapping, there may be other keys that produce the correct value. Thus, if more than one key is found to produce the correct value, additional text–tag pairs must be tested. It can be shown that the level of effort drops off rapidly with each additional text–MAC pair and that the overall level of effort is roughly \( 2^k \) \cite{MENE97}.

An attacker can also work on the tag without attempting to recover the key. Here, the objective is to generate a valid tag for a given message or to find a message that matches a given tag. In either case, the level of effort is comparable to that for attacking the one-way or weak collision-resistant property of a hash code, or \( 2^n \). In the case of the MAC, the attack cannot be conducted off line without further input; the attacker will require chosen text–tag pairs or knowledge of the key.

To summarize, the level of effort for brute-force attack on a MAC algorithm can be expressed as \( \min(2^k, 2^n) \). The assessment of strength is similar to that for symmetric encryption algorithms. It would appear reasonable to require that the key length and tag length satisfy a relationship such as \( \min(k, n) \geq N \), where \( N \) is perhaps in the range of 128 bits.

**Cryptanalysis**

As with encryption algorithms and hash functions, cryptanalytic attacks on MAC algorithms seek to exploit some property of the algorithm to perform some attack other than an exhaustive search. The way to measure the resistance of a MAC algorithm to cryptanalysis is to compare its strength to the effort required for a brute-force attack. That is, an ideal MAC algorithm will require a cryptanalytic effort greater than or equal to the brute-force effort.

There is much more variety in the structure of MACs than in hash functions, so it is difficult to generalize about the cryptanalysis of MACs. Furthermore, far less work has been done on developing such attacks. A useful survey of some methods for specific MACs is \cite{PREN96}.

**12.5 MACs BASED ON HASH FUNCTIONS: HMAC**

Later in this chapter, we look at examples of a MAC based on the use of a symmetric block cipher. This has traditionally been the most common approach to constructing a MAC. In recent years, there has been increased interest in developing
a MAC derived from a cryptographic hash function. The motivations for this interest are

1. Cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA generally execute faster in software than symmetric block ciphers such as DES.

2. Library code for cryptographic hash functions is widely available.

With the development of AES and the more widespread availability of code for encryption algorithms, these considerations are less significant, but hash-based MACs continue to be widely used.

A hash function such as SHA was not designed for use as a MAC and cannot be used directly for that purpose, because it does not rely on a secret key. There have been a number of proposals for the incorporation of a secret key into an existing hash algorithm. The approach that has received the most support is HMAC [BELL96a, BELL96b]. HMAC has been issued as RFC 2104, has been chosen as the mandatory-to-implement MAC for IP security, and is used in other Internet protocols, such as SSL. HMAC has also been issued as a NIST standard (FIPS 198).

HMAC Design Objectives

RFC 2104 lists the following design objectives for HMAC.

- To use, without modifications, available hash functions. In particular, to use hash functions that perform well in software and for which code is freely and widely available.
- To allow for easy replaceability of the embedded hash function in case faster or more secure hash functions are found or required.
- To preserve the original performance of the hash function without incurring a significant degradation.
- To use and handle keys in a simple way.
- To have a well understood cryptographic analysis of the strength of the authentication mechanism based on reasonable assumptions about the embedded hash function.

The first two objectives are important to the acceptability of HMAC. HMAC treats the hash function as a “black box.” This has two benefits. First, an existing implementation of a hash function can be used as a module in implementing HMAC. In this way, the bulk of the HMAC code is prepackaged and ready to use without modification. Second, if it is ever desired to replace a given hash function in an HMAC implementation, all that is required is to remove the existing hash function module and drop in the new module. This could be done if a faster hash function were desired. More important, if the security of the embedded hash function were compromised, the security of HMAC could be retained simply by replacing the embedded hash function with a more secure one (e.g., replacing SHA-2 with SHA-3).

The last design objective in the preceding list is, in fact, the main advantage of HMAC over other proposed hash-based schemes. HMAC can be proven secure
provided that the embedded hash function has some reasonable cryptographic strengths. We return to this point later in this section, but first we examine the structure of HMAC.

HMAC Algorithm

Figure 12.5 illustrates the overall operation of HMAC. Define the following terms.

- $H$ = embedded hash function (e.g., MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160)
- $IV$ = initial value input to hash function
- $M$ = message input to HMAC (including the padding specified in the embedded hash function)
- $Y_i = i$ th block of $M$, $0 \leq i \leq (L - 1)$
- $L$ = number of blocks in $M$
- $b$ = number of bits in a block
- $n$ = length of hash code produced by embedded hash function
- $K$ = secret key; recommended length is $\geq n$; if key length is greater than $b$, the key is input to the hash function to produce an $n$-bit key

![Figure 12.5 HMAC Structure](image-url)
$K^+ = K$ padded with zeros on the left so that the result is $b$ bits in length

$\text{ipad} = 00110110$ (36 in hexadecimal) repeated $b/8$ times

$\text{opad} = 01011100$ (5C in hexadecimal) repeated $b/8$ times

Then HMAC can be expressed as

$$\text{HMAC}(K, M) = H[(K^+ \oplus \text{opad}) \| H[(K^+ \oplus \text{ipad}) \| M]]$$

We can describe the algorithm as follows.

1. Append zeros to the left end of $K$ to create a $b$-bit string $K^+$ (e.g., if $K$ is of length 160 bits and $b = 512$, then $K$ will be appended with 44 zeroes).
2. XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) $K^+$ with ipad to produce the $b$-bit block $S_r$.
3. Append $M$ to $S_r$.
4. Apply $H$ to the stream generated in step 3.
5. XOR $K^+$ with opad to produce the $b$-bit block $S_o$.
6. Append the hash result from step 4 to $S_o$.
7. Apply $H$ to the stream generated in step 6 and output the result.

Note that the XOR with ipad results in flipping one-half of the bits of $K$. Similarly, the XOR with opad results in flipping one-half of the bits of $K$, using a different set of bits. In effect, by passing $S_r$ and $S_o$ through the compression function of the hash algorithm, we have pseudorandomly generated two keys from $K$.

HMAC should execute in approximately the same time as the embedded hash function for long messages. HMAC adds three executions of the hash compression function (for $S_r, S_o$, and the block produced from the inner hash).

A more efficient implementation is possible, as shown in Figure 12.6. Two quantities are precomputed:

$$f(IV, (K^+ \oplus \text{ipad}))$$
$$f(IV, (K^+ \oplus \text{opad}))$$

where $f(cv, \text{block})$ is the compression function for the hash function, which takes as arguments a chaining variable of $n$ bits and a block of $b$ bits and produces a chaining variable of $n$ bits. These quantities only need to be computed initially and every time the key changes. In effect, the precomputed quantities substitute for the initial value ($IV$) in the hash function. With this implementation, only one additional instance of the compression function is added to the processing normally produced by the hash function. This more efficient implementation is especially worthwhile if most of the messages for which a MAC is computed are short.

Security of HMAC

The security of any MAC function based on an embedded hash function depends in some way on the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function. The appeal of HMAC is that its designers have been able to prove an exact relationship between the strength of the embedded hash function and the strength of HMAC.
The security of a MAC function is generally expressed in terms of the probability of successful forgery with a given amount of time spent by the forger and a given number of message–tag pairs created with the same key. In essence, it is proved in [BELL96a] that for a given level of effort (time, message–tag pairs) on messages generated by a legitimate user and seen by the attacker, the probability of successful attack on HMAC is equivalent to one of the following attacks on the embedded hash function.

1. The attacker is able to compute an output of the compression function even with an IV that is random, secret, and unknown to the attacker.
2. The attacker finds collisions in the hash function even when the IV is random and secret.

In the first attack, we can view the compression function as equivalent to the hash function applied to a message consisting of a single $b$-bit block. For this attack, the IV of the hash function is replaced by a secret, random value of $n$ bits. An attack on this hash function requires either a brute-force attack on the key, which is a level of effort on the order of $2^n$, or a birthday attack, which is a special case of the second attack, discussed next.

![Figure 12.6 Efficient Implementation of HMAC](image)
In the second attack, the attacker is looking for two messages $M$ and $M'$ that produce the same hash: $H(M) = H(M')$. This is the birthday attack discussed in Chapter 11. We have shown that this requires a level of effort of $2^{n/2}$ for a hash length of $n$. On this basis, the security of MD5 is called into question, because a level of effort of $2^{64}$ looks feasible with today’s technology. Does this mean that a 128-bit hash function such as MD5 is unsuitable for HMAC? The answer is no, because of the following argument. To attack MD5, the attacker can choose any set of messages and work on these off line on a dedicated computing facility to find a collision. Because the attacker knows the hash algorithm and the default $IV$, the attacker can generate the hash code for each of the messages that the attacker generates. However, when attacking HMAC, the attacker cannot generate message/code pairs off line because the attacker does not know $K$. Therefore, the attacker must observe a sequence of messages generated by HMAC under the same key and perform the attack on these known messages. For a hash code length of 128 bits, this requires $2^{64}$ observed blocks ($2^{72}$ bits) generated using the same key. On a 1-Gbps link, one would need to observe a continuous stream of messages with no change in key for about 150,000 years in order to succeed. Thus, if speed is a concern, it is fully acceptable to use MD5 rather than SHA-1 as the embedded hash function for HMAC.

## 12.6 MACs Based on Block Ciphers: DAA and CMAC

In this section, we look at two MACs that are based on the use of a block cipher mode of operation. We begin with an older algorithm, the Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA), which is now obsolete. Then we examine CMAC, which is designed to overcome the deficiencies of DAA.

### Data Authentication Algorithm

The **Data Authentication Algorithm** (DAA), based on DES, has been one of the most widely used MACs for a number of years. The algorithm is both a FIPS publication (FIPS PUB 113) and an ANSI standard (X9.17). However, as we discuss subsequently, security weaknesses in this algorithm have been discovered, and it is being replaced by newer and stronger algorithms.

The algorithm can be defined as using the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of operation of DES (Figure 6.4) with an initialization vector of zero. The data (e.g., message, record, file, or program) to be authenticated are grouped into contiguous 64-bit blocks: $D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_N$. If necessary, the final block is padded on the right with zeroes to form a full 64-bit block. Using the DES encryption algorithm $E$ and a secret key $K$, a data authentication code (DAC) is calculated as follows (Figure 12.7).

$$
\begin{align*}
O_1 & = E(K, D) \\
O_2 & = E(K, [D_2 \oplus O_1]) \\
O_3 & = E(K, [D_3 \oplus O_2]) \\
& \quad \vdots \\
& \quad \vdots \\
O_N & = E(K, [D_N \oplus O_{N-1}])
\end{align*}
$$
The DAC consists of either the entire block $O_N$ or the leftmost $M$ bits of the block, with $16 \leq M \leq 64$.

**Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)**

As was mentioned, DAA has been widely adopted in government and industry. [BELL00] demonstrated that this MAC is secure under a reasonable set of security criteria, with the following restriction. Only messages of one fixed length of $mn$ bits are processed, where $n$ is the cipher block size and $m$ is a fixed positive integer. As a simple example, notice that given the CBC MAC of a one-block message $X$, say $T = \text{MAC}(K, X)$, the adversary immediately knows the CBC MAC for the two-block message $X \parallel (X \oplus T)$ since this is once again $T$.

Black and Rogaway [BLAC00] demonstrated that this limitation could be overcome using three keys: one key of length $K$ to be used at each step of the cipher block chaining and two keys of length $n$, where $k$ is the key length and $n$ is the cipher block length. This proposed construction was refined by Iwata and Kurosawa so that the two $n$-bit keys could be derived from the encryption key, rather than being provided separately [IWAT03]. This refinement, adopted by NIST, is the **Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)** mode of operation for use with AES and triple DES. It is specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38B.

First, let us define the operation of CMAC when the message is an integer multiple $n$ of the cipher block length $b$. For AES, $b = 128$, and for triple DES, $b = 64$. The message is divided into $n$ blocks $(M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n)$. The algorithm makes use of a $k$-bit encryption key $K$ and an $n$-bit constant, $K_1$. For AES, the key size $k$ is 128, 192, or 256 bits; for triple DES, the key size is 112 or 168 bits. CMAC is calculated as follows (Figure 12.8).
where

\[ C_1 = E(K, M_1) \]
\[ C_2 = E(K, [M_2 \oplus C_1]) \]
\[ C_3 = E(K, [M_3 \oplus C_2]) \]
\[ \vdots \]
\[ C_n = E(K, [M_n \oplus C_{n-1} \oplus K_1]) \]

\[ T = \text{MSB}_{Tlen}(C_n) \]

where

\[ T \] = message authentication code, also referred to as the tag
\[ Tlen \] = bit length of \( T \)
\[ \text{MSB}_s(X) \] = the \( s \) leftmost bits of the bit string \( X \)

If the message is not an integer multiple of the cipher block length, then the final block is padded to the right (least significant bits) with a 1 and as many 0s as necessary so that the final block is also of length \( b \). The CMAC operation then proceeds as before, except that a different \( n \)-bit key \( K_2 \) is used instead of \( K_1 \).
The two $n$-bit keys are derived from the $k$-bit encryption key as follows.

\[
L = E(K, 0^n) \\
K_1 = L \cdot x \\
K_2 = L \cdot x^2 = (L \cdot x) \cdot x
\]

where multiplication ($\cdot$) is done in the finite field $GF(2^n)$ and $x$ and $x^2$ are first- and second-order polynomials that are elements of $GF(2^n)$. Thus, the binary representation of $x$ consists of $n - 2$ zeros followed by 10; the binary representation of $x^2$ consists of $n - 3$ zeros followed by 100. The finite field is defined with respect to an irreducible polynomial that is lexicographically first among all such polynomials with the minimum possible number of nonzero terms. For the two approved block sizes, the polynomials are $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ and $x^{128} + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$.

To generate $K_1$ and $K_2$, the block cipher is applied to the block that consists entirely of 0 bits. The first subkey is derived from the resulting ciphertext by a left shift of one bit and, conditionally, by XORing a constant that depends on the block size. The second subkey is derived in the same manner from the first subkey. This property of finite fields of the form $GF(2^n)$ was explained in the discussion of MixColumns in Chapter 5.

## 12.7 AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION: CCM AND GCM

Authenticated encryption (AE) is a term used to describe encryption systems that simultaneously protect confidentiality and authenticity (integrity) of communications. Many applications and protocols require both forms of security, but until recently the two services have been designed separately.

[BLAC05] discussed four common approaches to providing both confidentiality and encryption for a message $M$.

- **HtE: Hash-then-encrypt.** First compute the cryptographic hash function over $M$ as $h = H(M)$. Then encrypt the message plus hash function: $E(K, (M \| h))$.
- **MtE: MAC-then-encrypt.** Use two keys. First authenticate the plaintext by computing the MAC value as $T = MAC(K_1, M)$. Then encrypt the message plus tag: $E(K_2, (M \| T))$. This approach is taken by the SSL/TLS protocols (Chapter 16).
- **EtM: Encrypt-then-MAC.** Use two keys. First encrypt the message to yield the ciphertext $C = E(K_2, M)$. Then authenticate the ciphertext with $T = MAC(K_1, C)$ to yield the pair $(C, T)$. This approach is used in the IPsec protocol (Chapter 19).
- **E&M: Encrypt-and-MAC.** Use two keys. Encrypt the message to yield the ciphertext $C = E(K_2, M)$. Authenticate the plaintext with $T = MAC(K_1, M)$ to yield the pair $(C, T)$. These operations can be performed in either order. This approach is used by the SSH protocol (Chapter 16).

Both decryption and verification are straightforward for each approach. For HtE, MtE, and E&M, decrypt first, then verify. For EtM, verify first, then decrypt. There are security vulnerabilities with all of these approaches. The HtE approach is
used in the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol to protect WiFi networks. This approach had fundamental weaknesses and led to the replacement of the WEP protocol. [BLAC05] and [BEL00] point out that there security concerns in each of the three encryption/MAC approaches listed above. Nevertheless, with proper design, any of these approaches can provide a high level of security. This is the goal of the two approaches discussed in this section, both of which have been standardized by NIST.

Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code

The CCM mode of operation was standardized by NIST specifically to support the security requirements of IEEE 802.11 WiFi wireless local area networks (Chapter 17), but can be used in any networking application requiring authenticated encryption. CCM is a variation of the encrypt-and-MAC approach to authenticated encryption. It is defined in NIST SP 800-38C.

The key algorithmic ingredients of CCM are the AES encryption algorithm (Chapter 5), the CTR mode of operation (Chapter 6), and the CMAC authentication algorithm (Section 12.6). A single key $K$ is used for both encryption and MAC algorithms. The input to the CCM encryption process consists of three elements.

1. Data that will be both authenticated and encrypted. This is the plaintext message $P$ of data block.
2. Associated data $A$ that will be authenticated but not encrypted. An example is a protocol header that must be transmitted in the clear for proper protocol operation but which needs to be authenticated.
3. A nonce $N$ that is assigned to the payload and the associated data. This is a unique value that is different for every instance during the lifetime of a protocol association and is intended to prevent replay attacks and certain other types of attacks.

Figure 12.9 illustrates the operation of CCM. For authentication, the input includes the nonce, the associated data, and the plaintext. This input is formatted as a sequence of blocks $B_0$ through $B_r$. The first block contains the nonce plus some formatting bits that indicate the lengths of the $N$, $A$, and $P$ elements. This is followed by zero or more blocks that contain $A$, followed by zero or more blocks that contain $P$. The resulting sequence of blocks serves as input to the CMAC algorithm, which produces a MAC value with length $Tlen$, which is less than or equal to the block length (Figure 12.9a).

For encryption, a sequence of counters is generated that must be independent of the nonce. The authentication tag is encrypted in CTR mode using the single counter $C_{tr}$. The $Tlen$ most significant bits of the output are XORed with the tag to produce an encrypted tag. The remaining counters are used for the CTR mode encryption of the plaintext (Figure 6.7). The encrypted plaintext is concatenated with the encrypted tag to form the ciphertext output (Figure 12.9b).

SP 800-38C defines the authentication/encryption process as follows.

1. Apply the formatting function to $(N, A, P)$ to produce the blocks $B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_r$.
2. Set $Y_0 = E(K, B_0)$. 
3. For \( i = 1 \) to \( r \), do \( Y_i = E(K, (B_i \oplus Y_{i-1})) \).
4. Set \( T = \text{MSB}_{Tlen}(Y_r) \).
5. Apply the counter generation function to generate the counter blocks \( Ctr_0, Ctr_1, \ldots, Ctr_m \), where \( m = \lceil \text{Plen}/128 \rceil \).
6. For \( j = 0 \) to \( m \), do \( S_j = E(K, Ctr_j) \).
7. Set \( S = S_1 \parallel S_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel S_m \).
8. Return \( C = (P \oplus \text{MSB}_{\text{Plen}}(S)) \parallel (T \oplus \text{MSB}_{\text{Tlen}}(S_0)) \).
For decryption and verification, the recipient requires the following input: the ciphertext $C$, the nonce $N$, the associated data $A$, the key $K$, and the initial counter $C_{tr_0}$. The steps are as follows.

1. If $Clen \leq Tlen$, then return INVALID.
2. Apply the counter generation function to generate the counter blocks $C_{tr_0}, C_{tr_1}, \ldots, C_{tr_m}$, where $m = \lceil Clen/128 \rceil$.
3. For $j = 0$ to $m$, do $S_j = E(K, C_{tr_j})$.
4. Set $S = S_1 || S_2 || \ldots || S_m$.
5. Set $P = \text{MSB}_{Clen-Tlen}(C) \oplus \text{MSB}_{Clen-Tlen}(S)$.
6. Set $T = \text{LSB}_{Tlen}(C) \oplus \text{MSB}_{Tlen}(S_0)$.
7. Apply the formatting function to $(N, A, P)$ to produce the blocks $B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_r$.
8. Set $Y_0 = E(K, B_0)$.
9. For $i = 1$ to $r$, do $Y_i = E(K, (B_i \oplus Y_{i-1}))$.
10. If $T \neq \text{MSB}_{Tlen}(Y_r)$, then return INVALID, else return $P$.

CCM is a relatively complex algorithm. Note that it requires two complete passes through the plaintext, once to generate the MAC value, and once for encryption. Further, the details of the specification require a tradeoff between the length of the nonce and the length of the tag, which is an unnecessary restriction. Also note that the encryption key is used twice with the CTR encryption mode: once to generate the tag and once to encrypt the plaintext plus tag. Whether these complexities add to the security of the algorithm is not clear. In any case, two analyses of the algorithm ([JONS02] and [ROGA03]) conclude that CCM provides a high level of security.

**Galois/Counter Mode**

The GCM mode of operation, standardized by NIST in NIST SP 800-38D, is designed to be parallelizable so that it can provide high throughput with low cost and low latency. In essence, the message is encrypted in variant of CTR mode. The resulting ciphertext is multiplied with key material and message length information over GF($2^{128}$) to generate the authenticator tag. The standard also specifies a mode of operation that supplies the MAC only, known as GMAC.

The GCM mode makes use of two functions: GHASH, which is a keyed hash function, and GCTR, which is essentially the CTR mode with the counters determined by a simple increment by one operation.

GHASH$_{HF}(X)$ takes a input the hash key $H$ and a bit string $X$ such that $\text{len}(X) = 128m$ bits for some positive integer $m$ and produces a 128-bit MAC value. The function may be specified as follows (Figure 12.10a).

1. Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_{m-1}, X_m$ denote the unique sequence of blocks such that $X = X_1 || X_2 || \ldots || X_{m-1} || X_m$.
2. Let $Y_0$ be a block of 128 zeros, designated as $0^{128}$.
3. For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, let $Y_i = (Y_{i-1} \oplus X_i) \cdot H$, where $\cdot$ designates multiplication in GF($2^{128}$).
4. Return $Y_m$. 

The GHASH_H(X) function can be expressed as

\[(X_1 \cdot H^m) \oplus (X_2 \cdot H^{m-1}) \oplus \cdots \oplus (X_{m-1} \cdot H^2) \oplus (X_m \cdot H)\]

This formulation has desirable performance implications. If the same hash key is to be used to authenticate multiple messages, then the values \(H^2, H^3, \ldots\) can be precalculated one time for use with each message to be authenticated. Then, the blocks of the data to be authenticated \((X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m)\) can be processed in parallel, because the computations are independent of one another.

GCTR_K(ICB, X) takes a input a secret key K and a bit string X arbitrary length and returns a ciphertext Y of bit length len(X). The function may be specified as follows (Figure 12.10b).

1. If X is the empty string, then return the empty string as Y.
2. Let \(n = \left\lceil \frac{\text{len}(X)}{128} \right\rceil\). That is, n is the smallest integer greater than or equal to \(\text{len}(X)/128\).
3. Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_{n-1}, X_n$ denote the unique sequence of bit strings such that

$$X = X_1 \| X_2 \| \ldots \| X_{n-1} \| X_n;$$

$X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_{n-1}$ are complete 128-bit blocks.

4. Let $CB_1 = ICB$.

5. For, $i = 2$ to $n$ let $CB_i = \text{inc}_{32}(CB_{i-1})$, where the $\text{inc}_{32}(S)$ function increments the rightmost 32 bits of $S$ by 1 mod $2^{32}$, and the remaining bits are unchanged.

6. For $i = 1$ to $n - 1$, do $Y_i = X_i \oplus E(K, CB_i)$.

7. Let $Y'_n = X'_n \oplus \text{MSB}_{\text{len}(X'_n)}(E(K, CB_n))$.

8. Let $X = X_1 \| X_2 \| \ldots \| X_{n-1} \| Y'_n$


Note that the counter values can be quickly generated and that the encryption operations can be performed in parallel.

We can now define the overall authenticated encryption function (Figure 12.11). The input consists of a secret key $K$, an initialization vector $IV$, a plaintext $P$, and
additional authenticated data $A$. The notation $[x]_s$ means the $s$-bit binary representation of the nonnegative integer $x$. The steps are as follows.

1. Let $H = E(K, 0^{128})$.
2. Define a block, $J_0$, as
   
   If $\text{len}(IV) = 96$, then let $J_0 = IV \parallel 0^{31} \parallel 1$.
   
   If $\text{len}(IV) \neq 96$, then let $s = 128 \left\lceil \frac{\text{len}(IV)}{128} \right\rceil - \text{len}(IV)$, and let $J_0 = \text{GHASH}_H(IV \parallel 0^{s+64} \parallel [\text{len}(IV)]_{64})$.
3. Let $C = \text{GCTR}_K(\text{inc}_{32}(J_0), P)$.
4. Let $u = 128 \left\lceil \frac{\text{len}(C)}{128} \right\rceil - \text{len}(C)$ and let $v = 128 \left\lceil \frac{\text{len}(A)}{128} \right\rceil - \text{len}(A)$.
5. Define a block, $S$, as
   
   $S = \text{GHASH}_H(A \parallel 0^v \parallel C \parallel 0^u \parallel [\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64})$
6. Let $T = \text{MSB}_t(\text{GCTR}_K(J_0, S))$, where $t$ is the supported tag length.
7. Return $(C, T)$.

In step 1, the hash key is generated by encrypting a block of all zeros with the secret key $K$. In step 2, the pre-counter block ($J_0$) is generated from the $IV$. In particular, when the length of the $IV$ is 96 bits, then the padding string $0^{31} \parallel 1$ is appended to the $IV$ to form the pre-counter block. Otherwise, the $IV$ is padded with the minimum number of 0 bits, possibly none, so that the length of the resulting string is a multiple of 128 bits (the block size); this string in turn is appended with 64 additional 0 bits, followed by the 64-bit representation of the length of the $IV$, and the GHASH function is applied to the resulting string to form the pre-counter block.

Thus, GCM is based on the CTR mode of operation and adds a MAC that authenticates both the message and additional data that requires only authentication. The function that computes the hash uses only multiplication in a Galois field. This choice was made because the operation of multiplication is easy to perform within a Galois field and is easily implemented in hardware [MCGR05].

[MCGR04] examines the available block cipher modes of operation and shows that a CTR-based authenticated encryption approach is the most efficient mode of operation for high-speed packet networks. The paper further demonstrates that GCM meets a high level of security requirements.

---

12.8 PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATION USING HASH FUNCTIONS AND MACS

The essential elements of any pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) are a seed value and a deterministic algorithm for generating a stream of pseudorandom bits. If the algorithm is used as a pseudorandom function (PRF) to produce a required value, such as a session key, then the seed should only be known to the user of the PRF. If the algorithm is used to produce a stream encryption function, then the seed has the role of a secret key that must be known to the sender and the receiver.
We noted in Chapters 7 and 10 that, because an encryption algorithm produces an apparently random output, it can serve as the basis of a (PRNG). Similarly, a hash function or MAC produces apparently random output and can be used to build a PRNG. Both ISO standard 18031 (Random Bit Generation) and NIST SP 800-90 (Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators) define an approach for random number generation using a cryptographic hash function. SP 800-90 also defines a random number generator based on HMAC. We look at these two approaches in turn.

PRNG Based on Hash Function

Figure 12.12a shows the basic strategy for a hash-based PRNG specified in SP 800-90 and ISO 18031. The algorithm takes as input:

- \( V = \text{seed} \)
- \( seedlen \) = bit length of \( V \geq k + 64 \), where \( k \) is a desired security level expressed in bits
- \( n = \text{desired number of output bits} \)

(a) PRNG using cryptographic hash function

(b) PRNG using HMAC

Figure 12.12 Basic Structure of Hash-Based PRNGs (SP 800-90)
The algorithm uses the cryptographic hash function $H$ with an hash value output of $outlen$ bits. The basic operation of the algorithm is

$$m = \lceil n/outlen \rceil$$
$$data = V$$
$$W = \text{the null string}$$
$$\text{For } i = 1 \text{ to } m$$
$$w_i = H(data)$$
$$W = W || w_i$$
$$data = (data + 1) \mod 2^{seedlen}$$
$$\text{Return leftmost } n \text{ bits of } W$$

Thus, the pseudorandom bit stream is $w_1 || w_2 || \ldots || w_m$, with the final block truncated if required.

The SP 800-90 specification also provides for periodically updating $V$ to enhance security. The specification also indicates that there are no known or suspected weaknesses in the hash-based approach for a strong cryptographic hash algorithm, such as SHA-2.

**PRNG Based on MAC Function**

Although there are no known or suspected weaknesses in the use of a cryptographic hash function for a PRNG in the manner of Figure 12.12a, a higher degree of confidence can be achieved by using a MAC. Almost invariably, HMAC is used for constructing a MAC-based PRNG. This is because HMAC is a widely used standardized MAC function and is implemented in many protocols and applications. As SP 800-90 points out, the disadvantage of this approach compared to the hash-based approach is that the execution time is twice as long, because HMAC involves two executions of the underlying hash function for each output block. The advantage of the HMAC approach is that it provides a greater degree of confidence in its security, compared to a pure hash-based approach.

For the MAC-based approach, there are two inputs: a key $K$ and a seed $V$. In effect, the combination of $K$ and $V$ form the overall seed for the PRNG specified in SP 800-90. Figure 12.12b shows the basic structure of the PRNG mechanism, and the leftmost column of Figure 12.13 shows the logic. Note that the key remains the same for each block of output, and the data input for each block is equal to the tag output of the previous block. The SP 800-90 specification also provides for periodically updating $K$ and $V$ to enhance security.

It is instructive to compare the SP 800-90 recommendation with the use of HMAC for a PRNG in some applications, and this is shown in Figure 12.13. For the IEEE 802.11i wireless LAN security standard (Chapter 17), the data input consists of the seed concatenated with a counter. The counter is incremented for each block $w_i$ of output. This approach would seem to offer enhanced security compared to the SP 800-90 approach. Consider that for SP 800-90, the data input for output block $w_i$ is just the output $w_{i-1}$ of the previous execution of HMAC. Thus, an opponent who is able to observe the pseudorandom output knows both the input and output of
HMAC. Even so, with the assumption that HMAC is secure, knowledge of the input and output should not be sufficient to recover $K$ and hence not sufficient to predict future pseudorandom bits.

The approach taken by the Transport Layer Security protocol (Chapter 16) and the Wireless Transport Layer Security Protocol (Chapter 17) involves invoking HMAC twice for each block of output $w_i$. As with IEEE 802.11, this is done in such a way that the output does not yield direct information about the input. The double use of HMAC doubles the execution burden and would seem to be security overkill.

### 12.9 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

[JUEN85] and [JUEN87] provide a good background on message authentication with a focus on cryptographic MACs and hash functions. Overviews of HMAC can be found in [BELL96a] and [BELL96b].

---

**NIST SP 800-90**

$m = \lceil n/\text{outlen} \rceil$

$w_0 = V$

$W = \text{the null string}$

For $i = 1$ to $m$

$w_i = \text{MAC}(K, w_{i-1})$

$W = W \parallel w_i$

Return leftmost $n$ bits of $W$

---

**IEEE 802.11i**

$m = \lceil n/\text{outlen} \rceil$

$W = \text{the null string}$

For $i = 1$ to $m$

$w_i = \text{MAC}(K, (V \parallel i))$

$W = W \parallel w_i$

Return leftmost $n$ bits of $W$

---

**TLS/WTLS**

$m = \lceil n/\text{outlen} \rceil$

$A(0) = V$

$W = \text{the null string}$

For $i = 1$ to $m$

$A(i) = \text{MAC}(K, A(i-1))$

$w_i = \text{MAC}(K, (A(i) \parallel V))$

$W = W \parallel w_i$

Return leftmost $n$ bits of $W$

---

Figure 12.13 Three PRNGs Based on HMAC


Recommended Web Site:

- Block cipher modes of operation: NIST page with full information on CMAC, CCM, and GCM.

### 12.10 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

#### Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>authenticator</th>
<th>cryptographic checksum</th>
<th>message authentication code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)</td>
<td>cryptographic hash function</td>
<td>(MAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (CCM)</td>
<td>Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Review Questions

12.1 What types of attacks are addressed by message authentication?
12.2 What two levels of functionality comprise a message authentication or digital signature mechanism?
12.3 What are some approaches to producing message authentication?
12.4 When a combination of symmetric encryption and an error control code is used for message authentication, in what order must the two functions be performed?
12.5 What is a message authentication code?
12.6 What is the difference between a message authentication code and a one-way hash function?
12.7 In what ways can a hash value be secured so as to provide message authentication?
12.8 Is it necessary to recover the secret key in order to attack a MAC algorithm?
12.9 What changes in HMAC are required in order to replace one underlying hash function with another?

#### Problems

12.1 If F is an error-detection function, either internal or external use (Figure 12.2) will provide error-detection capability. If any bit of the transmitted message is altered, this will be reflected in a mismatch of the received FCS and the calculated FCS, whether the FCS function is performed inside or outside the encryption function. Some codes also provide an error-correction capability. Depending on the nature of the function,
if one or a small number of bits is altered in transit, the error-correction code contains sufficient redundant information to determine the errored bit or bits and correct them. Clearly, an error-correction code will provide error correction capability when used external to the encryption function. Will it also provide this capability if used internal to the encryption function?

12.2 The data authentication algorithm, described in Section 12.6, can be defined as using the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of operation of DES with an initialization vector of zero (Figure 12.7). Show that the same result can be produced using the cipher feedback mode.

12.3 At the beginning of Section 12.6, it was noted that given the CBC MAC of a one-block message \( X \), say \( T = \text{MAC}(K, X) \), the adversary immediately knows the CBC MAC for the two-block message \( X' \oplus T \) since this is once again \( T \). Justify this statement.

12.4 In this problem, we demonstrate that for CMAC, a variant that XORs the second key after applying the final encryption doesn’t work. Let us consider this for the case of the message being an integer multiple of the block size. Then, the variant can be expressed as \( \text{VMAC}(K, M) = \text{CBC}(K, M) \oplus K_1 \). Now suppose an adversary is able to ask for the MACs of three messages: the message \( 0 \) where \( n \) is the cipher block size; the message \( 1 \oplus 0^n \); and the message \( 1 \oplus 1^n \). As a result of these three queries, the adversary gets \( T_0 = \text{CBC}(K, 0) \oplus K_1; T_1 = \text{CBC}(K, 1) \oplus K_1 \) and \( T_2 = \text{CBC}(K, [\text{CBC}(K, 1)]) \oplus K_1 \). Show that the adversary can compute the correct MAC for the (unqueried) message \( 0 \oplus (T_0 \oplus T_1) \).

12.5 In the discussion of subkey generation in CMAC, it states that the block cipher is applied to the block that consists entirely of 0 bits. The first subkey is derived from the resulting string by a left shift of one bit and, conditionally, by XORing a constant that depends on the block size. The second subkey is derived in the same manner from the first subkey.
   a. What constants are needed for block sizes of 64 and 128 bits?
   b. Explain how the left shift and XOR accomplishes the desired result.

12.6 Section 12.6 listed three general approaches to authenticated encryption: MtE, EtM, and E&M.
   a. Which approach is used by CCM?
   b. Which approach is used by GCM?

12.7 Show that the \( \text{GHASH} \) function calculates
\[
(X_1 \cdot H^n) \oplus (X_2 \cdot H^{n-1}) \oplus \cdots \oplus (X_{m-1} \cdot H^2) \oplus (X_m \cdot H)
\]

12.8 Draw a figure similar to Figure 12.11 that shows authenticated decryption.

12.9 Alice wants to send a single bit of information (a yes or a no) to Bob by means of a word of length 2. Alice and Bob have four possible keys available to perform message authentication. The following matrix shows the 2-bit word sent for each message under each key:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   a. The preceding matrix is in a useful form for Alice. Construct a matrix with the same information that would be more useful for Bob.
   b. What is the probability that someone else can successfully impersonate Alice?
   c. What is the probability that someone can replace an intercepted message with another message successfully?
CHAPTER 13

DIGITAL SIGNATURES

13.1 Digital Signatures

  Properties
  Attacks and Forgeries
  Digital Signature Requirements
  Direct Digital Signature

13.2 ElGamal Digital Signature Scheme

13.3 Schnorr Digital Signature Scheme

13.4 Digital Signature Standard

  The DSS Approach
  The Digital Signature Algorithm

13.5 Recommended Reading and Web Site

13.6 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
To guard against the baneful influence exerted by strangers is therefore an elementary dictate of savage prudence. Hence before strangers are allowed to enter a district, or at least before they are permitted to mingle freely with the inhabitants, certain ceremonies are often performed by the natives of the country for the purpose of disarming the strangers of their magical powers, or of disinfecting, so to speak, the tainted atmosphere by which they are supposed to be surrounded.

—The Golden Bough, Sir James George Frazer

KEY POINTS

◆ A digital signature is an authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a message to attach a code that acts as a signature. Typically the signature is formed by taking the hash of the message and encrypting the message with the creator’s private key. The signature guarantees the source and integrity of the message.

◆ The digital signature standard (DSS) is an NIST standard that uses the secure hash algorithm (SHA).

The most important development from the work on public-key cryptography is the digital signature. The digital signature provides a set of security capabilities that would be difficult to implement in any other way.

Figure 13.1 is a generic model of the process of making and using digital signatures. Bob can sign a message using a digital signature generation algorithm. The inputs to the algorithm are the message and Bob’s private key. Any other user, say Alice, can verify the signature using a verification algorithm, whose inputs are the message, the signature, and Bob’s public key. In simplified terms, the essence of the digital signature mechanism is shown in Figure 13.2. This repeats the logic shown in Figure 11.3. A worked-out example, using RSA, is available at this book’s Web site.

We begin this chapter with an overview of digital signatures. Then, we introduce the Digital Signature Standard (DSS).

13.1 DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Properties

Message authentication protects two parties who exchange messages from any third party. However, it does not protect the two parties against each other. Several forms of dispute between the two are possible.
For example, suppose that John sends an authenticated message to Mary, using one of the schemes of Figure 12.1. Consider the following disputes that could arise.

1. Mary may forge a different message and claim that it came from John. Mary would simply have to create a message and append an authentication code using the key that John and Mary share.

2. John can deny sending the message. Because it is possible for Mary to forge a message, there is no way to prove that John did in fact send the message.

Both scenarios are of legitimate concern. Here is an example of the first scenario: An electronic funds transfer takes place, and the receiver increases the amount of funds transferred and claims that the larger amount had arrived from the sender.

An example of the second scenario is that an electronic mail message contains instructions to a stockbroker for a transaction that subsequently turns out badly. The sender pretends that the message was never sent.
In situations where there is not complete trust between sender and receiver, something more than authentication is needed. The most attractive solution to this problem is the digital signature. The digital signature must have the following properties:

- It must verify the author and the date and time of the signature.
- It must authenticate the contents at the time of the signature.
- It must be verifiable by third parties, to resolve disputes.

Thus, the digital signature function includes the authentication function.

Attacks and Forgeries

[GOLD88] lists the following types of attacks, in order of increasing severity. Here A denotes the user whose signature method is being attacked, and C denotes the attacker.
• **Key-only attack:** C only knows A’s public key.

• **Known message attack:** C is given access to a set of messages and their signatures.

• **Generic chosen message attack:** C chooses a list of messages before attempting to breaks A’s signature scheme, independent of A’s public key. C then obtains from A valid signatures for the chosen messages. The attack is generic, because it does not depend on A’s public key; the same attack is used against everyone.

• **Directed chosen message attack:** Similar to the generic attack, except that the list of messages to be signed is chosen after C knows A’s public key but before any signatures are seen.

• **Adaptive chosen message attack:** C is allowed to use A as an “oracle.” This means the A may request signatures of messages that depend on previously obtained message–signature pairs.

[GOLD88] then defines success at breaking a signature scheme as an outcome in which C can do any of the following with a non-negligible probability:

• **Total break:** C determines A’s private key.

• **Universal forgery:** C finds an efficient signing algorithm that provides an equivalent way of constructing signatures on arbitrary messages.

• **Selective forgery:** C forges a signature for a particular message chosen by C.

• **Existential forgery:** C forges a signature for at least one message. C has no control over the message. Consequently, this forgery may only be a minor nuisance to A.

**Digital Signature Requirements**

On the basis of the properties and attacks just discussed, we can formulate the following requirements for a digital signature.

• The signature must be a bit pattern that depends on the message being signed.

• The signature must use some information unique to the sender to prevent both forgery and denial.

• It must be relatively easy to produce the digital signature.

• It must be relatively easy to recognize and verify the digital signature.

• It must be computationally infeasible to forge a digital signature, either by constructing a new message for an existing digital signature or by constructing a fraudulent digital signature for a given message.

• It must be practical to retain a copy of the digital signature in storage.

A secure hash function, embedded in a scheme such as that of Figure 13.2, provides a basis for satisfying these requirements. However, care must be taken in the design of the details of the scheme.
Direct Digital Signature

The term direct digital signature refers to a digital signature scheme that involves only the communicating parties (source, destination). It is assumed that the destination knows the public key of the source.

Confidentiality can be provided by encrypting the entire message plus signature with a shared secret key (symmetric encryption). Note that it is important to perform the signature function first and then an outer confidentiality function. In case of dispute, some third party must view the message and its signature. If the signature is calculated on an encrypted message, then the third party also needs access to the decryption key to read the original message. However, if the signature is the inner operation, then the recipient can store the plaintext message and its signature for later use in dispute resolution.

The validity of the scheme just described depends on the security of the sender’s private key. If a sender later wishes to deny sending a particular message, the sender can claim that the private key was lost or stolen and that someone else forged his or her signature. Administrative controls relating to the security of private keys can be employed to thwart or at least weaken this ploy, but the threat is still there, at least to some degree. One example is to require every signed message to include a timestamp (date and time) and to require prompt reporting of compromised keys to a central authority.

Another threat is that some private key might actually be stolen from X at time T. The opponent can then send a message signed with X’s signature and stamped with a time before or equal to T.

The universally accepted technique for dealing with these threats is the use of a digital certificate and certificate authorities. We defer a discussion of this topic until Chapter 14, and focus in this chapter on digital signature algorithms.

13.2 ELGAMAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME

Before examining the NIST Digital Signature standard, it will be helpful to understand the ElGamal and Schnorr signature schemes. Recall from Chapter 10, that the ElGamal encryption scheme is designed to enable encryption by a user’s public key with decryption by the user’s private key. The ElGamal signature scheme involves the use of the private key for encryption and the public key for decryption [ELGA84, ELGA85].

Before proceeding, we need a result from number theory. Recall from Chapter 8 that for a prime number $q$, if $\alpha$ is a primitive root of $q$, then

$$\alpha, \alpha^2, \ldots, \alpha^{q-1}$$

are distinct $\pmod{q}$. It can be shown that, if $\alpha$ is a primitive root of $q$, then

1. For any integer $m$, $\alpha^m \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$ if and only if $m \equiv 0 \pmod{q-1}$.
2. For any integers $i, j$, $\alpha^i \equiv \alpha^j \pmod{q}$ if and only if $i \equiv j \pmod{q-1}$. 

As with ElGamal encryption, the global elements of **ElGamal digital signature** are a prime number \( q \) and \( \alpha \), which is a primitive root of \( q \). User A generates a private/public key pair as follows.

1. Generate a random integer \( X_A \), such that \( 1 < X_A < q - 1 \).
2. Compute \( Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q \).
3. A’s private key is \( X_A \); A’s public key is \( \{q, \alpha, Y_A\} \).

To sign a message \( M \), user A first computes the hash \( m = H(M) \), such that \( m \) is an integer in the range \( 0 \leq m \leq q - 1 \). A then forms a digital signature as follows.

1. Choose a random integer \( K \) such that \( 1 \leq K \leq q - 1 \) and \( \gcd(K, q - 1) = 1 \). That is, \( K \) is relatively prime to \( q - 1 \).
2. Compute \( S_1 = \alpha^K \mod q \). Note that this is the same as the computation of \( C_1 \) for ElGamal encryption.
3. Compute \( K^{-1} \mod (q - 1) \). That is, compute the inverse of \( K \) modulo \( q - 1 \).
4. Compute \( S_2 = K^{-1}(m - X_A S_1) \mod (q - 1) \).
5. The signature consists of the pair \( (S_1, S_2) \).

Any user B can verify the signature as follows.

1. Compute \( V_1 = \alpha^m \mod q \).
2. Compute \( V_2 = (Y_A)^{S_1}(S_1)^{S_2} \mod q \).

The signature is valid if \( V_1 = V_2 \). Let us demonstrate that this is so. Assume that the equality is true. Then we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha^m \mod q & = (Y_A)^{S_1}(S_1)^{S_2} \mod q & \text{assume } V_1 = V_2 \\
\alpha^m \mod q & = \alpha^{X_A S_1 \alpha^{KS_2}} \mod q & \text{substituting for } Y_A \text{ and } S_1 \\
\alpha^{m-X_A S_1} \mod q & = \alpha^{KS_2} \mod q & \text{rearranging terms} \\
m - X_A S_1 & = KS_2 \mod (q - 1) & \text{property of primitive roots} \\
m - X_A S_1 & = KK^{-1}(m - X_A S_1) \mod (q - 1) & \text{substituting for } S_2
\end{align*}
\]

For example, let us start with the prime field GF(19); that is, \( q = 19 \). It has primitive roots \( \{2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15\} \), as shown in Table 8.3. We choose \( \alpha = 10 \).

Alice generates a key pair as follows:

1. Alice chooses \( X_A = 16 \).
2. Then \( Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q = \alpha^{16} \mod 19 = 4 \).
3. Alice’s private key is 16; Alice’s public key is \( \{q, \alpha, Y_A\} = \{19, 10, 4\} \).

Suppose Alice wants to sign a message with hash value \( m = 14 \).

1. Alice chooses \( K = 5 \), which is relatively prime to \( q - 1 = 18 \).
2. \( S_1 = \alpha^K \mod q = 10^5 \mod 19 = 3 \) (see Table 8.3).
3. \( K^{-1} \mod (q - 1) = 5^{-1} \mod 18 = 11. \)
4. \( S_2 = K^{-1}(m - X_A S_1) \mod (q - 1) = 11(14 - (16)(3)) \mod 18 = -374 \mod 18 = 4. \)

Bob can verify the signature as follows.

1. \( V_1 = \alpha^m \mod q = 10^{14} \mod 19 = 16. \)
2. \( V_2 = (Y_A)^S_1(S_1)^S_2 \mod q = (4^3)(3^4) \mod 19 = 5184 \mod 19 = 16. \)

Thus, the signature is valid.

### 13.3 SCHNORR DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME

As with the ElGamal digital signature scheme, the Schnorr signature scheme is based on discrete logarithms [SCHN89, SCHN91]. The Schnorr scheme minimizes the message-dependent amount of computation required to generate a signature. The main work for signature generation does not depend on the message and can be done during the idle time of the processor. The message-dependent part of the signature generation requires multiplying a \(2n\)-bit integer with an \(n\)-bit integer.

The scheme is based on using a prime modulus \(p\), with \(p - 1\) having a prime factor \(q\) of appropriate size; that is, \(p - 1 \equiv (\mod q)\). Typically, we use \(p \approx 2^{1024}\) and \(q \approx 2^{160}\). Thus, \(p\) is a 1024-bit number, and \(q\) is a 160-bit number, which is also the length of the SHA-1 hash value.

The first part of this scheme is the generation of a private/public key pair, which consists of the following steps.

1. Choose primes \(p\) and \(q\), such that \(q\) is a prime factor of \(p - 1\).
2. Choose an integer \(a\), such that \(a^d \equiv 1 \mod p\). The values \(a, p,\) and \(q\) comprise a global public key that can be common to a group of users.
3. Choose a random integer \(s\) with \(0 < s < q\). This is the user’s private key.
4. Calculate \(v = a^{-s} \mod p\). This is the user’s public key.

A user with private key \(s\) and public key \(v\) generates a signature as follows.

1. Choose a random integer \(r\) with \(0 < r < q\) and compute \(x = a^r \mod p\). This computation is a preprocessing stage independent of the message \(M\) to be signed.
2. Concatenate the message with \(x\) and hash the result to compute the value \(e\):
   \[
e = H(M \parallel x)
   \]
3. Compute \(y = (r + se) \mod q\). The signature consists of the pair \((e, y)\).
Any other user can verify the signature as follows.

1. Compute $x' = a^v e \mod p$.
2. Verify that $e = H(M \parallel x')$.

To see that the verification works, observe that

$$x' = a^v e = a^v a^{-se} = a^{v-se} = e = x \mod p$$

Hence, $H(M \parallel x') = H(M \parallel x)$.

---

13.4 DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186, known as the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The DSS makes use of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) described in Chapter 12 and presents a new digital signature technique, the **Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)**. The DSS was originally proposed in 1991 and revised in 1993 in response to public feedback concerning the security of the scheme. There was a further minor revision in 1996. In 2000, an expanded version of the standard was issued as FIPS 186-2, subsequently updated to FIPS 186-3 in 2009. This latest version also incorporates digital signature algorithms based on RSA and on elliptic curve cryptography. In this section, we discuss the original DSS algorithm.

The **DSS Approach**

The DSS uses an algorithm that is designed to provide only the digital signature function. Unlike RSA, it cannot be used for encryption or key exchange. Nevertheless, it is a public-key technique.

Figure 13.3 contrasts the DSS approach for generating digital signatures to that used with RSA. In the RSA approach, the message to be signed is input to a hash function that produces a secure hash code of fixed length. This hash code is then encrypted using the sender’s private key to form the signature. Both the message and the signature are then transmitted. The recipient takes the message and produces a hash code. The recipient also decrypts the signature using the sender’s public key. If the calculated hash code matches the decrypted signature, the signature is accepted as valid. Because only the sender knows the private key, only the sender could have produced a valid signature.

The DSS approach also makes use of a hash function. The hash code is provided as input to a signature function along with a random number $k$ generated for this particular signature. The signature function also depends on the sender’s private key ($PR_a$) and a set of parameters known to a group of communicating principals. We can consider this set to constitute a global public key ($PU_G$).\(^1\) The result is a signature consisting of two components, labeled $s$ and $r$.

---

\(^1\)It is also possible to allow these additional parameters to vary with each user so that they are a part of a user’s public key. In practice, it is more likely that a global public key will be used that is separate from each user’s public key.
At the receiving end, the hash code of the incoming message is generated. This plus the signature is input to a verification function. The verification function also depends on the global public key as well as the sender’s public key \((PU_a)\), which is paired with the sender’s private key. The output of the verification function is a value that is equal to the signature component \(r\) if the signature is valid. The signature function is such that only the sender, with knowledge of the private key, could have produced the valid signature.

We turn now to the details of the algorithm.

The Digital Signature Algorithm

The DSA is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms (see Chapter 8) and is based on schemes originally presented by ElGamal [ELGA85] and Schnorr [SCHN91].

Figure 13.4 summarizes the algorithm. There are three parameters that are public and can be common to a group of users. A 160-bit prime number \(q\) is chosen. Next, a prime number \(p\) is selected with a length between 512 and 1024 bits such that \(q\) divides \((p - 1)\). Finally, \(g\) is chosen to be of the form \(h^{(p-1)/q}\mod p\), where \(h\) is an integer between 1 and \((p - 1)\) with the restriction that \(g\) must be greater than 1.\(^2\) Thus, the global public-key components of DSA have the same for as in the Schnorr signature scheme.

With these numbers in hand, each user selects a private key and generates a public key. The private key \(x\) must be a number from 1 to \((q - 1)\) and should be chosen randomly or pseudorandomly. The public key is calculated from the private key as \(y = g^x \mod p\). The calculation of \(y\) given \(x\) is relatively straightforward. However, given the public key \(y\), it is believed to be computationally infeasible to determine \(x\), which is the discrete logarithm of \(y\) to the base \(g, \mod p\) (see Chapter 8).

\(^2\)In number-theoretic terms, \(g\) is of order \(q \mod p\); see Chapter 8.
To create a signature, a user calculates two quantities, \( r \) and \( s \), that are functions of the public key components \((p, q, g)\), the user’s private key \(x\), the hash code of the message \(H(M)\), and an additional integer \(k\) that should be generated randomly or pseudorandomly and be unique for each signing.

At the receiving end, verification is performed using the formulas shown in Figure 13.4. The receiver generates a quantity that is a function of the public key components, the sender’s public key, and the hash code of the incoming message. If this quantity matches the component of the signature, then the signature is validated.

Figure 13.5 depicts the functions of signing and verifying.

The structure of the algorithm, as revealed in Figure 13.5, is quite interesting. Note that the test at the end is on the value \( r \), which does not depend on the message at all. Instead, \( r \) is a function of \( k \) and the three global public-key components. The multiplicative inverse of \( k \mod q \) is passed to a function that also has as inputs the message hash code and the user’s private key. The structure of this function is such that the receiver can recover \( r \) using the incoming message and signature, the public key of the user, and the global public key. It is certainly not obvious from Figure 13.4 or Figure 13.5 that such a scheme would work. A proof is provided in Appendix K.

Given the difficulty of taking discrete logarithms, it is infeasible for an opponent to recover \( k \) from \( r \) or to recover \( x \) from \( s \).

Another point worth noting is that the only computationally demanding task in signature generation is the exponential calculation \( g^k \mod p \). Because this value does not depend on the message to be signed, it can be computed ahead of time.
Indeed, a user could precalculate a number of values of \( r \) to be used to sign documents as needed. The only other somewhat demanding task is the determination of a multiplicative inverse, \( k^{-1} \). Again, a number of these values can be precalculated.

### 13.5 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

[AKL83] is the classic paper on digital signatures and is still highly relevant. A more recent, and excellent, survey is [MITC92].


**MITC92** Mitchell, C.; Piper, F.; and Wild, P. “Digital Signatures.” In [SIMM92a].

**Recommended Web Site:**

- **Digital Signatures**: NIST page with information on NIST-approved digital signature options.
13.6 KEY TERM, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

**Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>direct digital signature</th>
<th>digital signature standard (DSS)</th>
<th>Schnorr digital signature timestamp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>digital signature</td>
<td>ElGamal digital signature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>digital signature algorithm (DSA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Review Questions**

13.1 List two disputes that can arise in the context of message authentication.
13.2 What are the properties a digital signature should have?
13.3 What requirements should a digital signature scheme satisfy?
13.4 What is the difference between direct and arbitrated digital signature?
13.5 In what order should the signature function and the confidentiality function be applied to a message, and why?
13.6 What are some threats associated with a direct digital signature scheme?

**Problems**

13.1 Dr. Watson patiently waited until Sherlock Holmes finished. “Some interesting problem to solve, Holmes?” he asked when Holmes finally logged out.

“Oh, not exactly. I merely checked my e-mail and then made a couple of network experiments instead of my usual chemical ones. I have only one client now and I have already solved his problem. If I remember correctly, you once mentioned cryptology among your other hobbies, so it may interest you.”

“Well, I am only an amateur cryptologist, Holmes. But of course I am interested in the problem. What is it about?”

“My client is Mr. Hosgrave, director of a small but progressive bank. The bank is fully computerized and of course uses network communications extensively. The bank already uses RSA to protect its data and to digitally sign documents that are communicated. Now the bank wants to introduce some changes in its procedures; in particular, it needs to digitally sign some documents by two signatories.

1. The first signatory prepares the document, forms its signature, and passes the document to the second signatory.
2. The second signatory as a first step must verify that the document was really signed by the first signatory. She then incorporates her signature into the document’s signature so that the recipient, as well as any member of the public, may verify that the document was indeed signed by both signatories. In addition, only the second signatory has to be able to verify the document’s signature after the first step; that is, the recipient (or any member of the public) should be able to verify only the complete document with signatures of both signatories, but not the document in its intermediate form where only one signatory has signed it. Moreover, the bank would like to make use of its existing modules that support RSA-style digital signatures.”

“Hm, I understand how RSA can be used to digitally sign documents by one signatory, Holmes. I guess you have solved the problem of Mr. Hosgrave by appropriate generalization of RSA digital signatures.”
“Exactly, Watson,” nodded Sherlock Holmes. “Originally, the RSA digital signature was formed by encrypting the document by the signatory’s private decryption key ‘d’, and the signature could be verified by anyone through its decryption using publicly known encryption key ‘e’. One can verify that the signature \( S \) was formed by the person who knows \( d \), which is supposed to be the only signatory. Now the problem of Mr. Hosgrave can be solved in the same way by slight generalization of the process, that is ...

Finish the explanation.

13.2 DSA specifies that if the signature generation process results in a value of \( s = 0 \), a new value of \( k \) should be generated and the signature should be recalculated. Why?

13.3 What happens if a value used in creating a DSA signature is compromised?

13.4 The DSS document includes a recommended algorithm for testing a number for primality.

1. [Choose \( w \)] Let \( w \) be a random odd integer. Then \( (w - 1) \) is even and can be expressed in the form \( 2^m \) with \( m \) odd. That is, \( 2^a \) is the largest power of 2 that divides \( (w - 1) \).
2. [Generate \( b \)] Let \( b \) be a random integer in the range \( 1 < b < w \).
3. [Exponentiate] Set \( j = 0 \) and \( z = b^m \mod w \).
4. [Done?] If \( j = 0 \) and \( z = 1 \), or if \( z = w - 1 \), then \( w \) passes the test and may be prime; go to step 8.
5. [Terminate?] If \( j > 0 \) and \( z = 1 \), then \( w \) is not prime; terminate algorithm for this \( w \).
6. [Increase \( j \)] Set \( j = j + 1 \). If \( j < a \), set \( z = z^2 \mod w \) and go to step 4.
7. [Terminate] \( w \) is not prime; terminate algorithm for this \( w \).
8. [Test again?] If enough random values of \( b \) have been tested, then accept \( w \) as prime and terminate algorithm; otherwise, go to step 2.

a. Explain how the algorithm works.

b. Show that it is equivalent to the Miller-Rabin test described in Chapter 8.

13.5 With DSS, because the value of \( k \) is generated for each signature, even if the same message is signed twice on different occasions, the signatures will differ. This is not true of RSA signatures. What is the practical implication of this difference?

13.6 Consider the problem of creating domain parameters for DSA. Suppose we have already found primes \( p \) and \( q \) such that \( q|(p - 1) \). Now we need to find \( g \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) with \( g \) of order \( q \mod p \). Consider the following two algorithms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm 1</th>
<th>Algorithm 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>repeat</td>
<td>repeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>select ( g \in \mathbb{Z}_p )</td>
<td>select ( h \in \mathbb{Z}_p )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( h \leftarrow g^q \mod p )</td>
<td>( g \leftarrow h^{(p-1)/q} \mod p )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>until ( (h = 1 ) and ( g \neq 1) )</td>
<td>until ( (g \neq 1) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return ( g )</td>
<td>return ( g )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Prove that the value returned by Algorithm 1 has order \( q \).

b. Prove that the value returned by Algorithm 2 has order \( q \).

c. Suppose \( p = 40193 \) and \( q = 157 \). How many loop iterations do you expect Algorithm 1 to make before it finds a generator?

d. If \( p \) is 1024 bits and \( q \) is 160 bits, would you recommend using Algorithm 1 to find \( g \)? Explain.

e. Suppose \( p = 40193 \) and \( q = 157 \). What is the probability that Algorithm 2 computes a generator in its very first loop iteration? (If it is helpful, you may use the fact that \( \sum_{d|n} \varphi(d) = n \) when answering this question.)
13.7 It is tempting to try to develop a variation on Diffie-Hellman that could be used as a digital signature. Here is one that is simpler than DSA and that does not require a secret random number in addition to the private key.

**Public elements:**
- \( q \) prime number
- \( \alpha \) \( \alpha < q \) and \( \alpha \) is a primitive root of \( q \)

**Private key:** \( X \) \( X < q \)

**Public key:** \( Y = \alpha^X \mod q \)

To sign a message \( M \), compute \( h = H(M) \), which is the hash code of the message. We require that \( \gcd(h, q - 1) = 1 \). If not, append the hash to the message and calculate a new hash. Continue this process until a hash code is produced that is relatively prime to \( q - 1 \). Then calculate \( Z \) to satisfy \( Z \times h \equiv X \mod (q - 1) \). The signature of the message is \( \alpha^Z \). To verify the signature, a user verifies that \( Y = (\alpha^Z)^h = \alpha^X \mod q \).

a. Show that this scheme works. That is, show that the verification process produces an equality if the signature is valid.
b. Show that the scheme is unacceptable by describing a simple technique for forging a user’s signature on an arbitrary message.

13.8 An early proposal for a digital signature scheme using symmetric encryption is based on the following. To sign an \( n \)-bit message, the sender randomly generates in advance \( 2n \) 56-bit cryptographic keys:

\[
k_1, K_1, k_2, K_2, \ldots, kn, K_n
\]

which are kept private. The sender prepares in advance two sets of corresponding non-secret 64-bit validation parameters, which are made public:

\[
u_1, U_1, u_2, U_2, \ldots, un, U_n \text{ and } v_1, V_1, v_2, V_2, \ldots, vn, V_n
\]

where

\[
vi = E(ki, ui), Vi = E(ki, Ui)
\]

The message \( M \) is signed as follows. For the \( i \)th bit of the message, either \( ki \) or \( Ki \) is attached to the message, depending on whether the message bit is 0 or 1. For example, if the first three bits of the message are 011, then the first three keys of the signature are \( k1, K2, K3 \).

a. How does the receiver validate the message?
b. Is the technique secure?
c. How many times can the same set of secret keys be safely used for different messages?
d. What, if any, practical problems does this scheme present?
This page intentionally left blank
14.1 Symmetric Key Distribution Using Symmetric Encryption
   A Key Distribution Scenario
   Hierarchical Key Control
   Session Key Lifetime
   A Transparent Key Control Scheme
   Decentralized Key Control
   Controlling Key Usage

14.2 Symmetric Key Distribution Using Asymmetric Encryption
   Simple Secret Key Distribution
   Secret Key Distribution with Confidentiality and Authentication
   A Hybrid Scheme

14.3 Distribution Of Public Keys
   Public Announcement of Public Keys
   Publicly Available Directory
   Public-Key Authority
   Public-Key Certificates

14.4 X.509 Certificates
   Certificates
   X.509 Version 3

14.5 Public-Key Infrastructure
   PKIX Management Functions
   PKIX Management Protocols

14.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

14.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
No Singhalese, whether man or woman, would venture out of the house without a bunch of keys in his hand, for without such a talisman he would fear that some devil might take advantage of his weak state to slip into his body.

—The Golden Bough, Sir James George Frazer

John wrote the letters of the alphabet under the letters in its first lines and tried it against the message. Immediately he knew that once more he had broken the code. It was extraordinary the feeling of triumph he had. He felt on top of the world. For not only had he done it, had he broken the July code, but he now had the key to every future coded message, since instructions as to the source of the next one must of necessity appear in the current one at the end of each month.

—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY POINTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>◆ Key distribution is the function that delivers a key to two parties who wish to exchange secure encrypted data. Some sort of mechanism or protocol is needed to provide for the secure distribution of keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Key distribution often involves the use of master keys, which are infrequently used and are long lasting, and session keys, which are generated and distributed for temporary use between two parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Public-key encryption schemes are secure only if the authenticity of the public key is assured. A public-key certificate scheme provides the necessary security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ X.509 defines the format for public-key certificates. This format is widely used in a variety of applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ A public-key infrastructure (PKI) is defined as the set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Typically, PKI implementations make use of X.509 certificates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The topics of cryptographic key management and cryptographic key distribution are complex, involving cryptographic, protocol, and management considerations. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a feel for the issues involved and a broad survey of the various aspects of key management and distribution. For more information, the place to start is the three-volume NIST SP 800-57, followed by the recommended readings listed at the end of this chapter.
For symmetric encryption to work, the two parties to an exchange must share the same key, and that key must be protected from access by others. Furthermore, frequent key changes are usually desirable to limit the amount of data compromised if an attacker learns the key. Therefore, the strength of any cryptographic system rests with the key distribution technique, a term that refers to the means of delivering a key to two parties who wish to exchange data without allowing others to see the key. For two parties A and B, key distribution can be achieved in a number of ways, as follows:

1. A can select a key and physically deliver it to B.
2. A third party can select the key and physically deliver it to A and B.
3. If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one party can transmit the new key to the other, encrypted using the old key.
4. If A and B each has an encrypted connection to a third party C, C can deliver a key on the encrypted links to A and B.

Options 1 and 2 call for manual delivery of a key. For link encryption, this is a reasonable requirement, because each link encryption device is going to be exchanging data only with its partner on the other end of the link. However, for end-to-end encryption over a network, manual delivery is awkward. In a distributed system, any given host or terminal may need to engage in exchanges with many other hosts and terminals over time. Thus, each device needs a number of keys supplied dynamically. The problem is especially difficult in a wide-area distributed system.

The scale of the problem depends on the number of communicating pairs that must be supported. If end-to-end encryption is done at a network or IP level, then a key is needed for each pair of hosts on the network that wish to communicate. Thus, if there are \( N \) hosts, the number of required keys is \( \frac{N(N - 1)}{2} \). If encryption is done at the application level, then a key is needed for every pair of users or processes that require communication. Thus, a network may have hundreds of hosts but thousands of users and processes. Figure 14.1 illustrates the magnitude of the key distribution task for end-to-end encryption.\(^1\) A network using node-level encryption with 1000 nodes would conceivably need to distribute as many as half a million keys. If that same network supported 10,000 applications, then as many as 50 million keys may be required for application-level encryption.

Returning to our list, option 3 is a possibility for either link encryption or end-to-end encryption, but if an attacker ever succeeds in gaining access to one key, then all subsequent keys will be revealed. Furthermore, the initial distribution of potentially millions of keys still must be made.

\(\text{\footnotesize\(^1\)Note that this figure uses a log-log scale, so that a linear graph indicates exponential growth. A basic review of log scales is in the math refresher document at the Computer Science Student Resource Site at WilliamStallings.com/StudentSupport.html.}\)
For end-to-end encryption, some variation on option 4 has been widely adopted. In this scheme, a key distribution center is responsible for distributing keys to pairs of users (hosts, processes, applications) as needed. Each user must share a unique key with the key distribution center for purposes of key distribution.

The use of a key distribution center is based on the use of a hierarchy of keys. At a minimum, two levels of keys are used (Figure 14.2). Communication between end systems is encrypted using a temporary key, often referred to as a session key. Typically, the session key is used for the duration of a logical connection, such as a frame relay connection or transport connection, and then discarded. Each session key is obtained from the key distribution center over the same networking facilities used for end-user communication. Accordingly, session keys are transmitted in encrypted form, using a master key that is shared by the key distribution center and an end system or user.

For each end system or user, there is a unique master key that it shares with the key distribution center. Of course, these master keys must be distributed in some fashion. However, the scale of the problem is vastly reduced. If there are $N$ entities that wish to communicate in pairs, then, as was mentioned, as many as $[N(N - 1)]/2$ session keys are needed at any one time. However, only $N$ master keys are required, one for each entity. Thus, master keys can be distributed in some noncryptographic way, such as physical delivery.

Figure 14.1 Number of Keys Required to Support Arbitrary Connections between Endpoints
A Key Distribution Scenario

The key distribution concept can be deployed in a number of ways. A typical scenario is illustrated in Figure 14.3, which is based on a figure in [POPE79]. The scenario assumes that each user shares a unique master key with the key distribution center (KDC).

Figure 14.2 The Use of a Key Hierarchy

Figure 14.3 Key Distribution Scenario
Let us assume that user A wishes to establish a logical connection with B and requires a one-time session key to protect the data transmitted over the connection. A has a master key, $K_a$, known only to itself and the KDC; similarly, B shares the master key $K_b$ with the KDC. The following steps occur.

1. A issues a request to the KDC for a session key to protect a logical connection to B. The message includes the identity of A and B and a unique identifier, $N_1$, for this transaction, which we refer to as a nonce. The nonce may be a timestamp, a counter, or a random number; the minimum requirement is that it differs with each request. Also, to prevent masquerade, it should be difficult for an opponent to guess the nonce. Thus, a random number is a good choice for a nonce.

2. The KDC responds with a message encrypted using $K_a$. Thus, A is the only one who can successfully read the message, and A knows that it originated at the KDC. The message includes two items intended for A:
   - The one-time session key, $K_s$, to be used for the session
   - The original request message, including the nonce, to enable A to match this response with the appropriate request

   Thus, A can verify that its original request was not altered before reception by the KDC and, because of the nonce, that this is not a replay of some previous request.

   In addition, the message includes two items intended for B:
   - The one-time session key, $K_s$, to be used for the session
   - An identifier of A (e.g., its network address), $ID_A$

   These last two items are encrypted with $K_b$ (the master key that the KDC shares with B). They are to be sent to B to establish the connection and prove A's identity.

3. A stores the session key for use in the upcoming session and forwards to B the information that originated at the KDC for B, namely, $E(K_b,[K_s||ID_A])$. Because this information is encrypted with $K_b$, it is protected from eavesdropping. B now knows the session key ($K_s$), knows that the other party is A (from $ID_A$), and knows that the information originated at the KDC (because it is encrypted using $K_b$).

   At this point, a session key has been securely delivered to A and B, and they may begin their protected exchange. However, two additional steps are desirable:

4. Using the newly minted session key for encryption, B sends a nonce, $N_2$, to A.

5. Also, using $K_s$, A responds with $f(N_2)$, where f is a function that performs some transformation on $N_2$ (e.g., adding one).

   These steps assure B that the original message it received (step 3) was not a replay.

   Note that the actual key distribution involves only steps 1 through 3, but that steps 4 and 5, as well as step 3, perform an authentication function.
Hierarchical Key Control

It is not necessary to limit the key distribution function to a single KDC. Indeed, for very large networks, it may not be practical to do so. As an alternative, a hierarchy of KDCs can be established. For example, there can be local KDCs, each responsible for a small domain of the overall internetwork, such as a single LAN or a single building. For communication among entities within the same local domain, the local KDC is responsible for key distribution. If two entities in different domains desire a shared key, then the corresponding local KDCs can communicate through a global KDC. In this case, any one of the three KDCs involved can actually select the key. The hierarchical concept can be extended to three or even more layers, depending on the size of the user population and the geographic scope of the internetwork.

A hierarchical scheme minimizes the effort involved in master key distribution, because most master keys are those shared by a local KDC with its local entities. Furthermore, such a scheme limits the damage of a faulty or subverted KDC to its local area only.

Session Key Lifetime

The more frequently session keys are exchanged, the more secure they are, because the opponent has less ciphertext to work with for any given session key. On the other hand, the distribution of session keys delays the start of any exchange and places a burden on network capacity. A security manager must try to balance these competing considerations in determining the lifetime of a particular session key.

For connection-oriented protocols, one obvious choice is to use the same session key for the length of time that the connection is open, using a new session key for each new session. If a logical connection has a very long lifetime, then it would be prudent to change the session key periodically, perhaps every time the PDU (protocol data unit) sequence number cycles.

For a connectionless protocol, such as a transaction-oriented protocol, there is no explicit connection initiation or termination. Thus, it is not obvious how often one needs to change the session key. The most secure approach is to use a new session key for each exchange. However, this negates one of the principal benefits of connectionless protocols, which is minimum overhead and delay for each transaction. A better strategy is to use a given session key for a certain fixed period only or for a certain number of transactions.

A Transparent Key Control Scheme

The approach suggested in Figure 14.3 has many variations, one of which is described in this subsection. The scheme (Figure 14.4) is useful for providing end-to-end encryption at a network or transport level in a way that is transparent to the end users. The approach assumes that communication makes use of a connection-oriented end-to-end protocol, such as TCP. The noteworthy element of this approach is a session security module (SSM), which may consist of functionality at one protocol layer, that performs end-to-end encryption and obtains session keys on behalf of its host or terminal.
1. Host sends packet requesting connection.
2. Security service buffers packet; asks KDC for session key.
3. KDC distributes session key to both hosts.

Figure 14.4 Automatic Key Distribution for Connection-Oriented Protocol
The steps involved in establishing a connection are shown in Figure 14.4. When one host wishes to set up a connection to another host, it transmits a connection-request packet (step 1). The SSM saves that packet and applies to the KDC for permission to establish the connection (step 2). The communication between the SSM and the KDC is encrypted using a master key shared only by this SSM and the KDC. If the KDC approves the connection request, it generates the session key and delivers it to the two appropriate SSMs, using a unique permanent key for each SSM (step 3). The requesting SSM can now release the connection request packet, and a connection is set up between the two end systems (step 4). All user data exchanged between the two end systems are encrypted by their respective SSMs using the one-time session key.

The automated key distribution approach provides the flexibility and dynamic characteristics needed to allow a number of terminal users to access a number of hosts and for the hosts to exchange data with each other.

**Decentralized Key Control**

The use of a key distribution center imposes the requirement that the KDC be trusted and be protected from subversion. This requirement can be avoided if key distribution is fully decentralized. Although full decentralization is not practical for larger networks using symmetric encryption only, it may be useful within a local context.

A decentralized approach requires that each end system be able to communicate in a secure manner with all potential partner end systems for purposes of session key distribution. Thus, there may need to be as many as \(\left\lfloor n(n - 1)/2 \right\rfloor\) master keys for a configuration with \(n\) end systems.

A session key may be established with the following sequence of steps (Figure 14.5).

1. A issues a request to B for a session key and includes a nonce, \(N_1\).
2. B responds with a message that is encrypted using the shared master key. The response includes the session key selected by B, an identifier of B, the value \(f(N_1)\), and another nonce, \(N_2\).
3. Using the new session key, A returns \(f(N_2)\) to B.

![Figure 14.5 Decentralized Key Distribution](image-url)
Thus, although each node must maintain at most \((n - 1)\) master keys, as many session keys as required may be generated and used. Because the messages transferred using the master key are short, cryptanalysis is difficult. As before, session keys are used for only a limited time to protect them.

Controlling Key Usage

The concept of a key hierarchy and the use of automated key distribution techniques greatly reduce the number of keys that must be manually managed and distributed. It also may be desirable to impose some control on the way in which automatically distributed keys are used. For example, in addition to separating master keys from session keys, we may wish to define different types of session keys on the basis of use, such as

- Data-encrypting key, for general communication across a network
- PIN-encrypting key, for personal identification numbers (PINs) used in electronic funds transfer and point-of-sale applications
- File-encrypting key, for encrypting files stored in publicly accessible locations

To illustrate the value of separating keys by type, consider the risk that a master key is imported as a data-encrypting key into a device. Normally, the master key is physically secured within the cryptographic hardware of the key distribution center and of the end systems. Session keys encrypted with this master key are available to application programs, as are the data encrypted with such session keys. However, if a master key is treated as a session key, it may be possible for an unauthorized application to obtain plaintext of session keys encrypted with that master key.

Thus, it may be desirable to institute controls in systems that limit the ways in which keys are used, based on characteristics associated with those keys. One simple plan is to associate a tag with each key ([JONE82]; see also [DAVI89]). The proposed technique is for use with DES and makes use of the extra 8 bits in each 64-bit DES key. That is, the eight non-key bits ordinarily reserved for parity checking form the key tag. The bits have the following interpretation:

- One bit indicates whether the key is a session key or a master key.
- One bit indicates whether the key can be used for encryption.
- One bit indicates whether the key can be used for decryption.
- The remaining bits are spares for future use.

Because the tag is embedded in the key, it is encrypted along with the key when that key is distributed, thus providing protection. The drawbacks of this scheme are

1. The tag length is limited to 8 bits, limiting its flexibility and functionality.
2. Because the tag is not transmitted in clear form, it can be used only at the point of decryption, limiting the ways in which key use can be controlled.

A more flexible scheme, referred to as the control vector, is described in [MATY91a and b]. In this scheme, each session key has an associated control vector
consisting of a number of fields that specify the uses and restrictions for that session key. The length of the control vector may vary.

The control vector is cryptographically coupled with the key at the time of key generation at the KDC. The coupling and decoupling processes are illustrated in Figure 14.6. As a first step, the control vector is passed through a hash function that produces a value whose length is equal to the encryption key length. Hash functions are discussed in detail in Chapter 11. In essence, a hash function maps values from a larger range into a smaller range with a reasonably uniform spread. Thus, for example, if numbers in the range 1 to 100 are hashed into numbers in the range 1 to 10, approximately 10% of the source values should map into each of the target values.

The hash value is then XORed with the master key to produce an output that is used as the key input for encrypting the session key. Thus,

\[
\text{Hash value} = H = h(CV) \\
\text{Key input} = K_m \oplus H \\
\text{Ciphertext} = E([K_m \oplus H], K_s)
\]

where \(K_m\) is the master key and \(K_s\) is the session key. The session key is recovered in plaintext by the reverse operation:

\[
D([K_m \oplus H], E([K_m \oplus H], K_s))
\]
When a session key is delivered to a user from the KDC, it is accompanied by the control vector in clear form. The session key can be recovered only by using both the master key that the user shares with the KDC and the control vector. Thus, the linkage between the session key and its control vector is maintained.

Use of the control vector has two advantages over use of an 8-bit tag. First, there is no restriction on length of the control vector, which enables arbitrarily complex controls to be imposed on key use. Second, the control vector is available in clear form at all stages of operation. Thus, control of key use can be exercised in multiple locations.

14.2 SYMMETRIC KEY DISTRIBUTION USING ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

Because of the inefficiency of public key cryptosystems, they are almost never used for the direct encryption of sizable block of data, but are limited to relatively small blocks. One of the most important uses of a public-key cryptosystem is to encrypt secret keys for distribution. We see many specific examples of this in Part Five. Here, we discuss general principles and typical approaches.

Simple Secret Key Distribution

An extremely simple scheme was put forward by Merkle [MERK79], as illustrated in Figure 14.7. If A wishes to communicate with B, the following procedure is employed:

1. A generates a public/private key pair \( \{PU_a, PR_a\} \) and transmits a message to B consisting of \( PU_a \) and an identifier of A, \( ID_A \).
2. B generates a secret key, \( KS \), and transmits it to A, which is encrypted with A’s public key.
3. A computes \( D(PR_a, E(PU_a, KS)) \) to recover the secret key. Because only A can decrypt the message, only A and B will know the identity of \( KS \).
4. A discards \( PU_a \) and \( PR_a \) and B discards \( PU_a \).

A and B can now securely communicate using conventional encryption and the session key \( KS \). At the completion of the exchange, both A and B discard \( KS \).

Figure 14.7 Simple Use of Public-Key Encryption to Establish a Session Key
Despite its simplicity, this is an attractive protocol. No keys exist before the start of the communication and none exist after the completion of communication. Thus, the risk of compromise of the keys is minimal. At the same time, the communication is secure from eavesdropping.

The protocol depicted in Figure 14.7 is insecure against an adversary who can intercept messages and then either relay the intercepted message or substitute another message (see Figure 1.3c). Such an attack is known as a man-in-the-middle attack [RIVE84]. In this case, if an adversary, E, has control of the intervening communication channel, then E can compromise the communication in the following fashion without being detected.

1. A generates a public/private key pair \{PU_a, PR_a\} and transmits a message intended for B consisting of PU_a and an identifier of A, ID_A.
2. E intercepts the message, creates its own public/private key pair \{PU_e, PR_e\} and transmits PU_e||ID_A to B.
3. B generates a secret key, K_s, and transmits E(PU_e, K_s).
4. E intercepts the message and learns K_s by computing D(PR_e, E(PU_e, K_s)).
5. E transmits E(PU_a, K_s) to A.

The result is that both A and B know K_s and are unaware that K_s has also been revealed to E. A and B can now exchange messages using K_s. E no longer actively interferes with the communications channel but simply eavesdrops. Knowing K_s, E can decrypt all messages, and both A and B are unaware of the problem. Thus, this simple protocol is only useful in an environment where the only threat is eavesdropping.

**Secret Key Distribution with Confidentiality and Authentication**

Figure 14.8, based on an approach suggested in [NEED78], provides protection against both active and passive attacks. We begin at a point when it is assumed that A and B have exchanged public keys by one of the schemes described subsequently in this chapter. Then the following steps occur.

![Figure 14.8 Public-Key Distribution of Secret Keys](image-url)
1. A uses B’s public key to encrypt a message to B containing an identifier of 
   $A(ID_A)$ and a nonce ($N_1$), which is used to identify this transaction uniquely.
2. B sends a message to A encrypted with $PU_a$ and containing A’s nonce ($N_1$) as 
   well as a new nonce generated by B ($N_2$). Because only B could have 
   decrypted message (1), the presence of $N_1$ in message (2) assures A that the 
   correspondent is B.
3. A returns $N_2$, encrypted using B’s public key, to assure B that its correspondent 
   is A.
4. A selects a secret key $K_s$ and sends $M = E(PU_b, E(PR_a, K_s))$ to B. Encryption 
   of this message with B’s public key ensures that only B can read it; encryption 
   with A’s private key ensures that only A could have sent it.
5. B computes $D(PU_a, D(PR_b, M))$ to recover the secret key.

The result is that this scheme ensures both confidentiality and authentication 

in the exchange of a secret key.

A Hybrid Scheme

Yet another way to use public-key encryption to distribute secret keys is a hybrid 

approach in use on IBM mainframes [LE93]. This scheme retains the use of a key 

distribution center (KDC) that shares a secret master key with each user and 

distributes secret session keys encrypted with the master key. A public key scheme is 

used to distribute the master keys. The following rationale is provided for using this 

three-level approach:

- **Performance:** There are many applications, especially transaction-oriented 
  applications, in which the session keys change frequently. Distribution of ses-
  sion keys by public-key encryption could degrade overall system performance 
  because of the relatively high computational load of public-key encryption 
  and decryption. With a three-level hierarchy, public-key encryption is used 
  only occasionally to update the master key between a user and the KDC.

- **Backward compatibility:** The hybrid scheme is easily overlaid on an existing 
  KDC scheme with minimal disruption or software changes.

The addition of a public-key layer provides a secure, efficient means of distrib-

uting master keys. This is an advantage in a configuration in which a single KDC 

serves a widely distributed set of users.

14.3 DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC KEYS

Several techniques have been proposed for the distribution of public keys. Virtually 

all these proposals can be grouped into the following general schemes:

- Public announcement
- Publicly available directory
- Public-key authority
- Public-key certificates
Public Announcement of Public Keys

On the face of it, the point of public-key encryption is that the public key is public. Thus, if there is some broadly accepted public-key algorithm, such as RSA, any participant can send his or her public key to any other participant or broadcast the key to the community at large (Figure 14.9). For example, because of the growing popularity of PGP (pretty good privacy, discussed in Chapter 18), which makes use of RSA, many PGP users have adopted the practice of appending their public key to messages that they send to public forums, such as USENET newsgroups and Internet mailing lists.

Although this approach is convenient, it has a major weakness. Anyone can forge such a public announcement. That is, some user could pretend to be user A and send a public key to another participant or broadcast such a public key. Until such time as user A discovers the forgery and alerts other participants, the forger is able to read all encrypted messages intended for A and can use the forged keys for authentication (see Figure 9.3).

Publicly Available Directory

A greater degree of security can be achieved by maintaining a publicly available dynamic directory of public keys. Maintenance and distribution of the public directory would have to be the responsibility of some trusted entity or organization (Figure 14.10). Such a scheme would include the following elements:

1. The authority maintains a directory with a \{name, public key\} entry for each participant.
2. Each participant registers a public key with the directory authority. Registration would have to be in person or by some form of secure authenticated communication.
3. A participant may replace the existing key with a new one at any time, either because of the desire to replace a public key that has already been used for a large amount of data, or because the corresponding private key has been compromised in some way.
Participants could also access the directory electronically. For this purpose, secure, authenticated communication from the authority to the participant is mandatory.

This scheme is clearly more secure than individual public announcements but still has vulnerabilities. If an adversary succeeds in obtaining or computing the private key of the directory authority, the adversary could authoritatively pass out counterfeit public keys and subsequently impersonate any participant and eavesdrop on messages sent to any participant. Another way to achieve the same end is for the adversary to tamper with the records kept by the authority.

Public-Key Authority

Stronger security for public-key distribution can be achieved by providing tighter control over the distribution of public keys from the directory. A typical scenario is illustrated in Figure 14.11, which is based on a figure in [POPE79]. As before, the scenario assumes that a central authority maintains a dynamic directory of public keys of all participants. In addition, each participant reliably knows a public key for the authority, with only the authority knowing the corresponding private key. The following steps (matched by number to Figure 14.11) occur.

1. A sends a timestamped message to the public-key authority containing a request for the current public key of B.
2. The authority responds with a message that is encrypted using the authority’s private key, $PR_{auth}$. Thus, A is able to decrypt the message using the authority’s public key. Therefore, A is assured that the message originated with the authority. The message includes the following:
   - B’s public key, $PU_b$, which A can use to encrypt messages destined for B
   - The original request used to enable A to match this response with the corresponding earlier request and to verify that the original request was not altered before reception by the authority
• The original timestamp given so A can determine that this is not an old message from the authority containing a key other than B’s current public key.

3. A stores B’s public key and also uses it to encrypt a message to B containing an identifier of A (ID_A) and a nonce (N_1), which is used to identify this transaction uniquely.

4, 5. B retrieves A’s public key from the authority in the same manner as A retrieved B’s public key.

At this point, public keys have been securely delivered to A and B, and they may begin their protected exchange. However, two additional steps are desirable:

6. B sends a message to A encrypted with PU_a containing A’s nonce (N_1) as well as a new nonce generated by B (N_2). Because only B could have decrypted message (3), the presence of N_1 in message (6) assures A that the correspondent is B.

7. A returns N_2, which is encrypted using B’s public key, to assure B that its correspondent is A.

Thus, a total of seven messages are required. However, the initial four messages need be used only infrequently because both A and B can save the other’s public key for future use—a technique known as caching. Periodically, a user should request fresh copies of the public keys of its correspondents to ensure currency.

Public-Key Certificates

The scenario of Figure 14.11 is attractive, yet it has some drawbacks. The public-key authority could be somewhat of a bottleneck in the system, for a user must appeal to
the authority for a public key for every other user that it wishes to contact. As before, the directory of names and public keys maintained by the authority is vulnerable to tampering.

An alternative approach, first suggested by Kohnfelder [KOHN78], is to use certificates that can be used by participants to exchange keys without contacting a public-key authority, in a way that is as reliable as if the keys were obtained directly from a public-key authority. In essence, a certificate consists of a public key, an identifier of the key owner, and the whole block signed by a trusted third party. Typically, the third party is a certificate authority, such as a government agency or a financial institution, that is trusted by the user community. A user can present his or her public key to the authority in a secure manner and obtain a certificate. The user can then publish the certificate. Anyone needing this user’s public key can obtain the certificate and verify that it is valid by way of the attached trusted signature. A participant can also convey its key information to another by transmitting its certificate. Other participants can verify that the certificate was created by the authority. We can place the following requirements on this scheme:

1. Any participant can read a certificate to determine the name and public key of the certificate’s owner.
2. Any participant can verify that the certificate originated from the certificate authority and is not counterfeit.
3. Only the certificate authority can create and update certificates.

These requirements are satisfied by the original proposal in [KOHN78]. Denning [DENN83] added the following additional requirement:

4. Any participant can verify the currency of the certificate.

A certificate scheme is illustrated in Figure 14.12. Each participant applies to the certificate authority, supplying a public key and requesting a certificate.

Figure 14.12 Exchange of Public-Key Certificates
Application must be in person or by some form of secure authenticated communication. For participant A, the authority provides a certificate of the form

\[ C_A = E(PR_{auth}, [T||ID_A||PU_a]) \]

where \( PR_{auth} \) is the private key used by the authority and \( T \) is a timestamp. A may then pass this certificate on to any other participant, who reads and verifies the certificate as follows:

\[ D(PU_{auth}, C_A) = D(PU_{auth}, E(PR_{auth}, [T||ID_A||PU_a])) = (T||ID_A||PU_a) \]

The recipient uses the authority’s public key, \( PU_{auth} \), to decrypt the certificate. Because the certificate is readable only using the authority’s public key, this verifies that the certificate came from the certificate authority. The elements \( ID_A \) and \( PU_a \) provide the recipient with the name and public key of the certificate’s holder. The timestamp \( T \) validates the currency of the certificate. The timestamp counters the following scenario. A’s private key is learned by an adversary. A generates a new private/public key pair and applies to the certificate authority for a new certificate. Meanwhile, the adversary replays the old certificate to B. If B then encrypts messages using the compromised old public key, the adversary can read those messages.

In this context, the compromise of a private key is comparable to the loss of a credit card. The owner cancels the credit card number but is at risk until all possible communicants are aware that the old credit card is obsolete. Thus, the timestamp serves as something like an expiration date. If a certificate is sufficiently old, it is assumed to be expired.

One scheme has become universally accepted for formatting public-key certificates: the X.509 standard. X.509 certificates are used in most network security applications, including IP security, transport layer security (TLS), and S/MIME, all of which are discussed in Part Five. X.509 is examined in detail in the next section.

14.4 X.509 CERTIFICATES

ITU-T recommendation X.509 is part of the X.500 series of recommendations that define a directory service. The directory is, in effect, a server or distributed set of servers that maintains a database of information about users. The information includes a mapping from user name to network address, as well as other attributes and information about the users.

X.509 defines a framework for the provision of authentication services by the X.500 directory to its users. The directory may serve as a repository of public-key certificates of the type discussed in Section 14.3. Each certificate contains the public key of a user and is signed with the private key of a trusted certification authority. In addition, X.509 defines alternative authentication protocols based on the use of public-key certificates.

X.509 is an important standard because the certificate structure and authentication protocols defined in X.509 are used in a variety of contexts. For example, the
X.509 certificate format is used in S/MIME (Chapter 18), IP Security (Chapter 19), and SSL/TLS (Chapter 16).

X.509 was initially issued in 1988. The standard was subsequently revised to address some of the security concerns documented in [IANS90] and [MITC90]; a revised recommendation was issued in 1993. A third version was issued in 1995 and revised in 2000.

X.509 is based on the use of public-key cryptography and digital signatures. The standard does not dictate the use of a specific algorithm but recommends RSA. The digital signature scheme is assumed to require the use of a hash function. Again, the standard does not dictate a specific hash algorithm. The 1988 recommendation included the description of a recommended hash algorithm; this algorithm has since been shown to be insecure and was dropped from the 1993 recommendation. Figure 14.13 illustrates the generation of a public-key certificate.

Certificates

The heart of the X.509 scheme is the public-key certificate associated with each user. These user certificates are assumed to be created by some trusted certification authority (CA) and placed in the directory by the CA or by the user. The directory server itself is not responsible for the creation of public keys or for the certification function; it merely provides an easily accessible location for users to obtain certificates.

Figure 14.14a shows the general format of a certificate, which includes the following elements.

![Figure 14.13: Public-Key Certificate Use](image-url)
• **Version:** Differentiates among successive versions of the certificate format; the default is version 1. If the *issuer unique identifier* or *subject unique identifier* are present, the value must be version 2. If one or more extensions are present, the version must be version 3.

• **Serial number:** An integer value unique within the issuing CA that is unambiguously associated with this certificate.

• **Signature algorithm identifier:** The algorithm used to sign the certificate together with any associated parameters. Because this information is repeated in the signature field at the end of the certificate, this field has little, if any, utility.

• **Issuer name:** X.500 is the name of the CA that created and signed this certificate.

• **Period of validity:** Consists of two dates: the first and last on which the certificate is valid.

• **Subject name:** The name of the user to whom this certificate refers. That is, this certificate certifies the public key of the subject who holds the corresponding private key.

• **Subject’s public-key information:** The public key of the subject, plus an identifier of the algorithm for which this key is to be used, together with any associated parameters.

• **Issuer unique identifier:** An optional-bit string field used to identify uniquely the issuing CA in the event the X.500 name has been reused for different entities.
• **Subject unique identifier**: An optional-bit string field used to identify uniquely the subject in the event the X.500 name has been reused for different entities.

• **Extensions**: A set of one or more extension fields. Extensions were added in version 3 and are discussed later in this section.

• **Signature**: Covers all of the other fields of the certificate; it contains the hash code of the other fields encrypted with the CA's private key. This field includes the signature algorithm identifier.

The unique identifier fields were added in version 2 to handle the possible reuse of subject and/or issuer names over time. These fields are rarely used. The standard uses the following notation to define a certificate:

\[
CA \ll A \gg = CA \{V, SN, AI, CA, UCA, A, UA, Ap, T^A\}
\]

where

\[
Y \ll X \gg = \text{the certificate of user } X \text{ issued by certification authority } Y
\]

\[
Y \{I\} = \text{the signing of } I \text{ by } Y. \text{ It consists of } I \text{ with an encrypted hash code appended}
\]

\[
V = \text{version of the certificate}
\]

\[
SN = \text{serial number of the certificate}
\]

\[
AI = \text{identifier of the algorithm used to sign the certificate}
\]

\[
CA = \text{name of certificate authority}
\]

\[
UCA = \text{optional unique identifier of the CA}
\]

\[
A = \text{name of user } A
\]

\[
UA = \text{optional unique identifier of the user } A
\]

\[
Ap = \text{public key of user } A
\]

\[
T^A = \text{period of validity of the certificate}
\]

The CA signs the certificate with its private key. If the corresponding public key is known to a user, then that user can verify that a certificate signed by the CA is valid. This is the typical digital signature approach illustrated in Figure 13.2.

**OBTAINING A USER’S CERTIFICATE**  User certificates generated by a CA have the following characteristics:

• Any user with access to the public key of the CA can verify the user public key that was certified.

• No party other than the certification authority can modify the certificate without this being detected.

Because certificates are unforgeable, they can be placed in a directory without the need for the directory to make special efforts to protect them.

If all users subscribe to the same CA, then there is a common trust of that CA. All user certificates can be placed in the directory for access by all users. In addition, a user can transmit his or her certificate directly to other users. In either case, once B is in possession of A’s certificate, B has confidence that messages it encrypts with A’s public key will be secure from eavesdropping and that messages signed with A’s private key are unforgeable.
If there is a large community of users, it may not be practical for all users to subscribe to the same CA. Because it is the CA that signs certificates, each participating user must have a copy of the CA’s own public key to verify signatures. This public key must be provided to each user in an absolutely secure (with respect to integrity and authenticity) way so that the user has confidence in the associated certificates. Thus, with many users, it may be more practical for there to be a number of CAs, each of which securely provides its public key to some fraction of the users.

Now suppose that A has obtained a certificate from certification authority $X_1$ and B has obtained a certificate from CA $X_2$. If A does not securely know the public key of $X_2$, then B’s certificate, issued by $X_2$, is useless to A. A can read B’s certificate, but A cannot verify the signature. However, if the two CAs have securely exchanged their own public keys, the following procedure will enable A to obtain B’s public key.

**Step 1** A obtains from the directory the certificate of $X_2$ signed by $X_1$. Because A securely knows $X_1$’s public key, A can obtain $X_2$’s public key from its certificate and verify it by means of $X_1$’s signature on the certificate.

**Step 2** A then goes back to the directory and obtains the certificate of B signed by $X_2$. Because A now has a trusted copy of $X_2$’s public key, A can verify the signature and securely obtain B’s public key.

A has used a chain of certificates to obtain B’s public key. In the notation of X.509, this chain is expressed as

$$X_1 \ll X_2 \gg X_2 \ll B \gg$$

In the same fashion, B can obtain A’s public key with the reverse chain:

$$X_2 \ll X_1 \gg X_1 \ll A \gg$$

This scheme need not be limited to a chain of two certificates. An arbitrarily long path of CAs can be followed to produce a chain. A chain with $N$ elements would be expressed as

$$X_1 \ll X_2 \gg X_2 \ll X_3 \gg \ldots \ X_N \ll B \gg$$

In this case, each pair of CAs in the chain $(X_i, X_{i+1})$ must have created certificates for each other.

All these certificates of CAs by CAs need to appear in the directory, and the user needs to know how they are linked to follow a path to another user’s public-key certificate. X.509 suggests that CAs be arranged in a hierarchy so that navigation is straightforward.

Figure 14.15, taken from X.509, is an example of such a hierarchy. The connected circles indicate the hierarchical relationship among the CAs; the associated boxes indicate certificates maintained in the directory for each CA entry. The directory entry for each CA includes two types of certificates:

- **Forward certificates**: Certificates of X generated by other CAs
- **Reverse certificates**: Certificates generated by X that are the certificates of other CAs
In this example, user A can acquire the following certificates from the directory to establish a certification path to B:

\[
X \ll W \gg W \ll V \gg V \ll Y \gg Y \ll Z \gg Z \ll B \gg
\]

When A has obtained these certificates, it can unwrap the certification path in sequence to recover a trusted copy of B’s public key. Using this public key, A can send encrypted messages to B. If A wishes to receive encrypted messages back from B, or to sign messages sent to B, then B will require A’s public key, which can be obtained from the following certification path:

\[
Z \ll Y \gg Y \ll V \gg V \ll W \gg W \ll X \gg X \ll A \gg
\]

B can obtain this set of certificates from the directory, or A can provide them as part of its initial message to B.

**Revocation of Certificates** Recall from Figure 14.14 that each certificate includes a period of validity, much like a credit card. Typically, a new certificate is issued just before the expiration of the old one. In addition, it may be desirable on occasion to revoke a certificate before it expires, for one of the following reasons.
1. The user’s private key is assumed to be compromised.

2. The user is no longer certified by this CA. Reasons for this include that the subject’s name has changed, the certificate is superseded, or the certificate was not issued in conformance with the CA’s policies.

3. The CA’s certificate is assumed to be compromised.

Each CA must maintain a list consisting of all revoked but not expired certificates issued by that CA, including both those issued to users and to other CAs. These lists should also be posted on the directory.

Each certificate revocation list (CRL) posted to the directory is signed by the issuer and includes (Figure 14.14b) the issuer’s name, the date the list was created, the date the next CRL is scheduled to be issued, and an entry for each revoked certificate. Each entry consists of the serial number of a certificate and revocation date for that certificate. Because serial numbers are unique within a CA, the serial number is sufficient to identify the certificate.

When a user receives a certificate in a message, the user must determine whether the certificate has been revoked. The user could check the directory each time a certificate is received. To avoid the delays (and possible costs) associated with directory searches, it is likely that the user would maintain a local cache of certificates and lists of revoked certificates.

**X.509 Version 3**

The X.509 version 2 format does not convey all of the information that recent design and implementation experience has shown to be needed. [FORD95] lists the following requirements not satisfied by version 2.

1. The subject field is inadequate to convey the identity of a key owner to a public-key user. X.509 names may be relatively short and lacking in obvious identification details that may be needed by the user.

2. The subject field is also inadequate for many applications, which typically recognize entities by an Internet e-mail address, a URL, or some other Internet-related identification.

3. There is a need to indicate security policy information. This enables a security application or function, such as IPSec, to relate an X.509 certificate to a given policy.

4. There is a need to limit the damage that can result from a faulty or malicious CA by setting constraints on the applicability of a particular certificate.

5. It is important to be able to identify different keys used by the same owner at different times. This feature supports key lifecycle management: in particular, the ability to update key pairs for users and CAs on a regular basis or under exceptional circumstances.

Rather than continue to add fields to a fixed format, standards developers felt that a more flexible approach was needed. Thus, version 3 includes a number of optional extensions that may be added to the version 2 format. Each extension consists of an extension identifier, a criticality indicator, and an extension value. The criticality
indicator indicates whether an extension can be safely ignored. If the indicator has a value of TRUE and an implementation does not recognize the extension, it must treat the certificate as invalid.

The certificate extensions fall into three main categories: key and policy information, subject and issuer attributes, and certification path constraints.

**Key and Policy Information** These extensions convey additional information about the subject and issuer keys, plus indicators of certificate policy. A certificate policy is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. For example, a policy might be applicable to the authentication of electronic data interchange (EDI) transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range.

This area includes:

- **Authority key identifier**: Identifies the public key to be used to verify the signature on this certificate or CRL. Enables distinct keys of the same CA to be differentiated. One use of this field is to handle CA key pair updating.
- **Subject key identifier**: Identifies the public key being certified. Useful for subject key pair updating. Also, a subject may have multiple key pairs and, correspondingly, different certificates for different purposes (e.g., digital signature and encryption key agreement).
- **Key usage**: Indicates a restriction imposed as to the purposes for which, and the policies under which, the certified public key may be used. May indicate one or more of the following: digital signature, nonrepudiation, key encryption, data encryption, key agreement, CA signature verification on certificates, CA signature verification on CRLs.
- **Private-key usage period**: Indicates the period of use of the private key corresponding to the public key. Typically, the private key is used over a different period from the validity of the public key. For example, with digital signature keys, the usage period for the signing private key is typically shorter than that for the verifying public key.
- **Certificate policies**: Certificates may be used in environments where multiple policies apply. This extension lists policies that the certificate is recognized as supporting, together with optional qualifier information.
- **Policy mappings**: Used only in certificates for CAs issued by other CAs. Policy mappings allow an issuing CA to indicate that one or more of that issuer’s policies can be considered equivalent to another policy used in the subject CA’s domain.

**Certificate Subject and Issuer Attributes** These extensions support alternative names, in alternative formats, for a certificate subject or certificate issuer and can convey additional information about the certificate subject to increase a certificate user’s confidence that the certificate subject is a particular person or entity. For example, information such as postal address, position within a corporation, or picture image may be required.
The extension fields in this area include:

- **Subject alternative name**: Contains one or more alternative names, using any of a variety of forms. This field is important for supporting certain applications, such as electronic mail, EDI, and IPSec, which may employ their own name forms.
- **Issuer alternative name**: Contains one or more alternative names, using any of a variety of forms.
- **Subject directory attributes**: Conveys any desired X.500 directory attribute values for the subject of this certificate.

**CERTIFICATION PATH CONSTRAINTS** These extensions allow constraint specifications to be included in certificates issued for CAs by other CAs. The constraints may restrict the types of certificates that can be issued by the subject CA or that may occur subsequently in a certification chain.

The extension fields in this area include:

- **Basic constraints**: Indicates if the subject may act as a CA. If so, a certification path length constraint may be specified.
- **Name constraints**: Indicates a name space within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in a certification path must be located.
- **Policy constraints**: Specifies constraints that may require explicit certificate policy identification or inhibit policy mapping for the remainder of the certification path.

**14.5 PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE**

RFC 2822 (*Internet Security Glossary*) defines public-key infrastructure (PKI) as the set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography. The principal objective for developing a PKI is to enable secure, convenient, and efficient acquisition of public keys. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) working group has been the driving force behind setting up a formal (and generic) model based on X.509 that is suitable for deploying a certificate-based architecture on the Internet. This section describes the PKIX model.

Figure 14.16 shows the interrelationship among the key elements of the PKIX model. These elements are

- **End entity**: A generic term used to denote end users, devices (e.g., servers, routers), or any other entity that can be identified in the subject field of a public key certificate. End entities typically consume and/or support PKI-related services.
- **Certification authority (CA)**: The issuer of certificates and (usually) certificate revocation lists (CRLs). It may also support a variety of administrative functions, although these are often delegated to one or more Registration Authorities.
• **Registration authority (RA):** An optional component that can assume a number of administrative functions from the CA. The RA is often associated with the end entity registration process but can assist in a number of other areas as well.

• **CRL issuer:** An optional component that a CA can delegate to publish CRLs.

• **Repository:** A generic term used to denote any method for storing certificates and CRLs so that they can be retrieved by end entities.

**PKIX Management Functions**

PKIX identifies a number of management functions that potentially need to be supported by management protocols. These are indicated in Figure 14.16 and include the following:

• **Registration:** This is the process whereby a user first makes itself known to a CA (directly or through an RA), prior to that CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that user. Registration begins the process of enrolling in a PKI. Registration usually involves some offline or online procedure for mutual authentication. Typically, the end entity is issued one or more shared secret keys used for subsequent authentication.

• **Initialization:** Before a client system can operate securely, it is necessary to install key materials that have the appropriate relationship with keys stored
elsewhere in the infrastructure. For example, the client needs to be securely initialized with the public key and other assured information of the trusted CA(s), to be used in validating certificate paths.

- **Certification**: This is the process in which a CA issues a certificate for a user’s public key, returns that certificate to the user’s client system, and/or posts that certificate in a repository.

- **Key pair recovery**: Key pairs can be used to support digital signature creation and verification, encryption and decryption, or both. When a key pair is used for encryption/decryption, it is important to provide a mechanism to recover the necessary decryption keys when normal access to the keying material is no longer possible, otherwise it will not be possible to recover the encrypted data. Loss of access to the decryption key can result from forgotten passwords/PINs, corrupted disk drives, damage to hardware tokens, and so on. Key pair recovery allows end entities to restore their encryption/decryption key pair from an authorized key backup facility (typically, the CA that issued the end entity’s certificate).

- **Key pair update**: All key pairs need to be updated regularly (i.e., replaced with a new key pair) and new certificates issued. Update is required when the certificate lifetime expires and as a result of certificate revocation.

- **Revocation request**: An authorized person advises a CA of an abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. Reasons for revocation include private-key compromise, change in affiliation, and name change.

- **Cross certification**: Two CAs exchange information used in establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a certificate issued by one CA to another CA that contains a CA signature key used for issuing certificates.

### PKIX Management Protocols

The PKIX working group has defined two alternative management protocols between PKIX entities that support the management functions listed in the preceding subsection. RFC 2510 defines the certificate management protocols (CMP). Within CMP, each of the management functions is explicitly identified by specific protocol exchanges. CMP is designed to be a flexible protocol able to accommodate a variety of technical, operational, and business models.

RFC 2797 defines certificate management messages over CMS (CMC), where CMS refers to RFC 2630, cryptographic message syntax. CMC is built on earlier work and is intended to leverage existing implementations. Although all of the PKIX functions are supported, the functions do not all map into specific protocol exchanges.

### 14.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

An exhaustive and essential resource on the topics of this chapter is the three-volume NIST SP800-57 [BARK07b, BARK07c, BARK08]. [FUMY93] is a good survey of key management principles. Another interesting survey, which looks at many key management techniques, is [HEGL06].

[PERL99] reviews various trust models that can be used in a PKI. [GUTM02] highlights difficulties in PKI use and recommends approaches for an effective PKI.
Recommended Web Sites:

- **Public-Key Infrastructure Working Group**: IETF group developing standards based on X.509v3.
- **Verisign**: A leading commercial vendor of X.509-related products; white papers and other worthwhile material at this site.
- **NIST PKI Program**: Good source of information.

### 14.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

#### Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>end-to-end encryption</th>
<th>man-the-middle attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>key distribution</td>
<td>master key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key distribution center (KDC)</td>
<td>nonce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key management</td>
<td>public-key certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public-key directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X.509 certificate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Review Questions

14.1 List ways in which secret keys can be distributed to two communicating parties.
14.2 What is the difference between a session key and a master key?
14.3 What is a nonce?
14.4 What is a key distribution center?
14.5 What are two different uses of public-key cryptography related to key distribution?
14.6 List four general categories of schemes for the distribution of public keys.
14.7 What are the essential ingredients of a public-key directory?
14.8 What is a public-key certificate?
14.9 What are the requirements for the use of a public-key certificate scheme?
14.10 What is the purpose of the X.509 standard?
14.11 What is a chain of certificates?
14.12 How is an X.509 certificate revoked?

Problems
14.1 One local area network vendor provides a key distribution facility, as illustrated in Figure 14.17.
   a. Describe the scheme.
   b. Compare this scheme to that of Figure 14.3. What are the pros and cons?
14.2 “We are under great pressure, Holmes.” Detective Lestrade looked nervous. “We have learned that copies of sensitive government documents are stored in computers of one foreign embassy here in London. Normally these documents exist in electronic form only on a selected few government computers that satisfy the most stringent security requirements. However, sometimes they must be sent through the network connecting all government computers. But all messages in this network are encrypted using a top-secret encryption algorithm certified by our best crypto experts. Even the NSA and the KGB are unable to break it. And now these documents have appeared in hands of diplomats of a small, otherwise insignificant, country. And we have no idea how it could happen.”
   “But you do have some suspicion who did it, do you?” asked Holmes.
   “Yes, we did some routine investigation. There is a man who has legal access to one of the government computers and has frequent contacts with diplomats from the embassy. But the computer he has access to is not one of the trusted ones where these documents are normally stored. He is the suspect, but we have no idea how he could obtain copies of the documents. Even if he could obtain a copy of an encrypted document, he couldn’t decrypt it.”

Figure 14.17 Figure for Problem 14.1
“Hmm, please describe the communication protocol used on the network.”
Holmes opened his eyes, thus proving that he had followed Lestrade’s talk with an
attention that contrasted with his sleepy look.

“Well, the protocol is as follows. Each node N of the network has been assigned
a unique secret key $K_n$. This key is used to secure communication between the node
and a trusted server. That is, all the keys are stored also on the server. User A, wishing
to send a secret message $M$ to user B, initiates the following protocol:

1. A generates a random number $R$ and sends to the server his name $A$, destination
   $B$, and $E(K_a, R)$.
2. Server responds by sending $E(K_b, R)$ to A.
3. A sends $E(R, M)$ together with $E(K_a, R)$ to B.
4. B knows $K_b$, thus decrypts $E(K_b, R)$, to get $R$ and will subsequently use $R$ to
decrypt $E(R, M)$ to get $M$.

You see that a random key is generated every time a message has to be sent. I admit
the man could intercept messages sent between the top-secret trusted nodes, but I see
no way he could decrypt them.”

“Well, I think you have your man, Lestrade. The protocol isn’t secure because
the server doesn’t authenticate users who send him a request. Apparently designers
of the protocol have believed that sending $E(K_a, R)$ implicitly authenticates user $X$ as
the sender, as only $X$ (and the server) knows $K_a$. But you know that $E(K_a, R)$ can be
intercepted and later replayed. Once you understand where the hole is, you will be
able to obtain enough evidence by monitoring the man’s use of the computer he has
access to. Most likely he works as follows. After intercepting $E(K_a, R)$ and $E(R, M)$
(see steps 1 and 3 of the protocol), the man, let’s denote him as $Z$, will continue by
pretending to be $A$ and ...

Finish the sentence for Holmes.

14.3 The 1988 version of X.509 lists properties that RSA keys must satisfy to be secure
given current knowledge about the difficulty of factoring large numbers. The discus-
sion concludes with a constraint on the public exponent and the modulus $n$:

$$e > \log_2(n)$$

Although the constraint is correct, the reason given for requiring it is incorrect. What
is wrong with the reason given and what is the correct reason?

14.4 Find at least one intermediate certification authority’s certificate and one trusted root
certification authority’s certificate on your computer (e.g. in the browser). Print
screenshots of both the general and details tab for each certificate.

14.5 NIST defines the term cryptoperiod as the time span during which a specific key is
authorized for use or in which the keys for a given system or application may remain
in effect. One document on key management uses the following time diagram for a
shared secret key.

![Diagram of Originator Usage Period, Recipient Usage Period, and Cryptoperiod]
Explain the overlap by giving an example application in which the originator’s usage period for the shared secret key begins before the recipient’s usage period and also ends before the recipients usage period.

14.6 Consider the following protocol, designed to let $A$ and $B$ decide on a fresh, shared session key $K'_{AB}$. We assume that they already share a long-term key $K_{AB}$.

1. $A \rightarrow B : A, N_A$.
2. $B \rightarrow A : E(K_{AB}, [N_A, K'_{AB}])$
3. $A \rightarrow B : E(K'_{AB}, N_A)$

a. We first try to understand the protocol designer’s reasoning:
   —Why would $A$ and $B$ believe after the protocol ran that they share $K'_{AB}$ with the other party?
   —Why would they believe that this shared key is fresh?
   In both cases, you should explain both the reasons of both $A$ and $B$, so your answer should complete the sentences
   $A$ believes that she shares $K'_{AB}$ with $B$ since...
   $B$ believes that he shares $K'_{AB}$ with $A$ since...
   $A$ believes that $K'_{AB}$ is fresh since...
   $B$ believes that $K'_{AB}$ is fresh since...

b. Assume now that $A$ starts a run of this protocol with $B$. However, the connection is intercepted by the adversary $C$. Show how $C$ can start a new run of the protocol using reflection, causing $A$ to believe that she has agreed on a fresh key with $B$ (in spite of the fact that she has only been communicating with $C$). Thus, in particular, the belief in (a) is false.

c. Propose a modification of the protocol that prevents this attack.

14.7 What are the core components of a PKI? Briefly describe each component.

14.8 Explain the problems with key management and how it affects symmetric cryptography.

*Note:* The remaining problems deal with the a cryptographic product developed by IBM, which is briefly described in a document at this book’s Web site (IBMCrypto.pdf). Try these problems after reviewing the document.

14.9 What is the effect of adding the instruction EMKi?

$$EMK_i : X \rightarrow E(KMH_i, X) \quad i = 0, 1$$

14.10 Suppose $N$ different systems use the IBM Cryptographic Subsystem with host master keys $KMH[i](i = 1, 2, \ldots, N)$. Devise a method for communicating between systems without requiring the system to either share a common host master key or to divulge their individual host master keys. *Hint:* each system needs three variants of its host master key.

14.11 The principal objective of the IBM Cryptographic Subsystem is to protect transmissions between a terminal and the processing system. Devise a procedure, perhaps adding instructions, which will allow the processor to generate a session key $KS$ and distribute it to Terminal $i$ and Terminal $j$ without having to store a key-equivalent variable in the host.
CHAPTER 15

USER AUTHENTICATION

15.1 Remote User-Authentication Principles
   Mutual Authentication
   One-Way Authentication

15.2 Remote User-Authentication Using Symmetric Encryption
   Mutual Authentication
   One-Way Authentication

15.3 Kerberos
   Motivation
   Kerberos Version 4
   Kerberos Version 5

15.4 Remote User Authentication Using Asymmetric Encryption
   Mutual Authentication
   One-Way Authentication

15.5 Federated Identity Management
   Identity Management
   Identity Federation

15.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

15.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 15A Kerberos Encryption Techniques
We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs.

—The Art of War, Sun Tzu

**KEY POINTS**

- Mutual authentication protocols enable communicating parties to satisfy themselves mutually about each other’s identity and to exchange session keys.
- Kerberos is an authentication service designed for use in a distributed environment.
- Kerberos provides a trusted third-party authentication service that enables clients and servers to establish authenticated communication.
- Identity management is a centralized, automated approach to provide enterprise-wide access to resources by employees and other authorized individuals.
- Identity federation is, in essence, an extension of identity management to multiple security domains.

This chapter examines some of the authentication functions that have been developed to support network-based use authentication. The chapter begins with an introduction to some of the concepts and key considerations for user authentication over a network or the Internet. The next section examines user-authentication protocols that rely on symmetric encryption. This is followed by a section on one of the earliest and also one of the most widely used authentication services: Kerberos. Next, the chapter looks at user-authentication protocols that rely on asymmetric encryption. This is followed by a discussion of the X.509 user-authentication protocol. Finally, the concept of federated identity is introduced.

**15.1 REMOTE USER-AUTHENTICATION PRINCIPLES**

In most computer security contexts, user authentication is the fundamental building block and the primary line of defense. User authentication is the basis for most types of access control and for user accountability. RFC 2828 defines user authentication as shown on the following page.

For example, user Alice Toklas could have the user identifier ABTOKLAS. This information needs to be stored on any server or computer system that Alice wishes to use and could be known to system administrators and other users. A typical item of authentication information associated with this user ID is a password, which is kept secret (known only to Alice and to the system). If no one is able to
obtain or guess Alice’s password, then the combination of Alice’s user ID and password enables administrators to set up Alice’s access permissions and audit her activity. Because Alice’s ID is not secret, system users can send her e-mail, but because her password is secret, no one can pretend to be Alice.

In essence, identification is the means by which a user provides a claimed identity to the system; user authentication is the means of establishing the validity of the claim. Note that user authentication is distinct from message authentication. As defined in Chapter 12, message authentication is a procedure that allows communicating parties to verify that the contents of a received message have not been altered and that the source is authentic. This chapter is concerned solely with user authentication.

There are four general means of authenticating a user’s identity, which can be used alone or in combination:

- **Something the individual knows**: Examples include a password, a personal identification number (PIN), or answers to a prearranged set of questions.
- **Something the individual possesses**: Examples include cryptographic keys, electronic keycards, smart cards, and physical keys. This type of authenticator is referred to as a *token*.
- **Something the individual is (static biometrics)**: Examples include recognition by fingerprint, retina, and face.
- **Something the individual does (dynamic biometrics)**: Examples include recognition by voice pattern, handwriting characteristics, and typing rhythm.

All of these methods, properly implemented and used, can provide secure user authentication. However, each method has problems. An adversary may be able to guess or steal a password. Similarly, an adversary may be able to forge or steal a token. A user may forget a password or lose a token. Furthermore, there is a significant administrative overhead for managing password and token information on systems and securing such information on systems. With respect to biometric authenticators, there are a variety of problems, including dealing with false positives and false negatives, user acceptance, cost, and convenience. For network-based user authentication, the most important methods involve cryptographic keys and something the individual knows, such as a password.
Mutual Authentication

An important application area is that of mutual authentication protocols. Such protocols enable communicating parties to satisfy themselves mutually about each other’s identity and to exchange session keys. This topic was examined in Chapter 14. There, the focus was key distribution. We return to this topic here to consider the wider implications of authentication.

Central to the problem of authenticated key exchange are two issues: confidentiality and timeliness. To prevent masquerade and to prevent compromise of session keys, essential identification and session-key information must be communicated in encrypted form. This requires the prior existence of secret or public keys that can be used for this purpose. The second issue, timeliness, is important because of the threat of message replays. Such replays, at worst, could allow an opponent to compromise a session key or successfully impersonate another party. At minimum, a successful replay can disrupt operations by presenting parties with messages that appear genuine but are not.

[GONG93] lists the following examples of replay attacks:

- **Simple replay:** The opponent simply copies a message and replays it later.
- **Repetition that can be logged:** An opponent can replay a timestamped message within the valid time window.
- **Repetition that cannot be detected:** This situation could arise because the original message could have been suppressed and thus did not arrive at its destination; only the replay message arrives.
- **Backward replay without modification:** This is a replay back to the message sender. This attack is possible if symmetric encryption is used and the sender cannot easily recognize the difference between messages sent and messages received on the basis of content.

One approach to coping with replay attacks is to attach a sequence number to each message used in an authentication exchange. A new message is accepted only if its sequence number is in the proper order. The difficulty with this approach is that it requires each party to keep track of the last sequence number for each claimant it has dealt with. Because of this overhead, sequence numbers are generally not used for authentication and key exchange. Instead, one of the following two general approaches is used:

- **Timestamps:** Party A accepts a message as fresh only if the message contains a timestamp that, in A’s judgment, is close enough to A’s knowledge of current time. This approach requires that clocks among the various participants be synchronized.
- **Challenge/response:** Party A, expecting a fresh message from B, first sends B a nonce (challenge) and requires that the subsequent message (response) received from B contain the correct nonce value.

It can be argued (e.g., [LAM92a]) that the timestamp approach should not be used for connection-oriented applications because of the inherent difficulties with this technique. First, some sort of protocol is needed to maintain synchronization among the various processor clocks. This protocol must be both fault tolerant, to
cope with network errors, and secure, to cope with hostile attacks. Second, the opportunity for a successful attack will arise if there is a temporary loss of synchronization resulting from a fault in the clock mechanism of one of the parties. Finally, because of the variable and unpredictable nature of network delays, distributed clocks cannot be expected to maintain precise synchronization. Therefore, any timestamp-based procedure must allow for a window of time sufficiently large to accommodate network delays yet sufficiently small to minimize the opportunity for attack.

On the other hand, the challenge-response approach is unsuitable for a connectionless type of application, because it requires the overhead of a handshake before any connectionless transmission, effectively negating the chief characteristic of a connectionless transaction. For such applications, reliance on some sort of secure time server and a consistent attempt by each party to keep its clocks in synchronization may be the best approach (e.g., [LAM92b]).

One-Way Authentication

One application for which encryption is growing in popularity is electronic mail (e-mail). The very nature of electronic mail, and its chief benefit, is that it is not necessary for the sender and receiver to be online at the same time. Instead, the e-mail message is forwarded to the receiver’s electronic mailbox, where it is buffered until the receiver is available to read it.

The “envelope” or header of the e-mail message must be in the clear, so that the message can be handled by the store-and-forward e-mail protocol, such as the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) or X.400. However, it is often desirable that the mail-handling protocol not require access to the plaintext form of the message, because that would require trusting the mail-handling mechanism. Accordingly, the e-mail message should be encrypted such that the mail-handling system is not in possession of the decryption key.

A second requirement is that of authentication. Typically, the recipient wants some assurance that the message is from the alleged sender.

15.2 REMOTE USER-AUTHENTICATION USING SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

Mutual Authentication

As was discussed in Chapter 14, a two-level hierarchy of symmetric encryption keys can be used to provide confidentiality for communication in a distributed environment. In general, this strategy involves the use of a trusted key distribution center (KDC). Each party in the network shares a secret key, known as a master key, with the KDC. The KDC is responsible for generating keys to be used for a short time over a connection between two parties, known as session keys, and for distributing those keys using the master keys to protect the distribution. This approach is quite common. As an example, we look at the Kerberos system in Section 15.3. The discussion in this subsection is relevant to an understanding of the Kerberos mechanisms.

Figure 14.3 illustrates a proposal initially put forth by Needham and Schroeder [NEED78] for secret key distribution using a KDC that, as was
mentioned in Chapter 14, includes authentication features. The protocol can be summarized as follows.\(^1\)

1. A → KDC: \(ID_A \| ID_B \| N_1\)
2. KDC → A: \(E(K_{a}, [K_{s} \| ID_B \| N_1 \| E(K_{b}, [K_{s} \| ID_A])]\))
3. A → B: \(E(K_{b}, [K_{s} \| ID_A])\)
4. B → A: \(E(K_{s}, N_2)\)
5. A → B: \(E(K_{s}, f(N_2))\)

Secret keys \(K_{a}\) and \(K_{b}\) are shared between A and the KDC and B and the KDC, respectively. The purpose of the protocol is to distribute securely a session key \(K_{s}\) to A and B. A securely acquires a new session key in step 2. The message in step 3 can be decrypted, and hence understood, only by B. Step 4 reflects B’s knowledge of \(K_{s}\), and step 5 assures B of A’s knowledge of \(K_{s}\) and assures B that this is a fresh message because of the use of the nonce \(N_2\). Recall from our discussion in Chapter 14 that the purpose of steps 4 and 5 is to prevent a certain type of replay attack. In particular, if an opponent is able to capture the message in step 3 and replay it, this might in some fashion disrupt operations at B.

Despite the handshake of steps 4 and 5, the protocol is still vulnerable to a form of replay attack. Suppose that an opponent, X, has been able to compromise an old session key. Admittedly, this is a much more unlikely occurrence than that an opponent has simply observed and recorded step 3. Nevertheless, it is a potential security risk. X can impersonate A and trick B into using the old key by simply replaying step 3. Unless B remembers indefinitely all previous session keys used with A, B will be unable to determine that this is a replay. If X can intercept the handshake message in step 4, then it can impersonate A’s response in step 5. From this point on, X can send bogus messages to B that appear to B to come from A using an authenticated session key.

Denning [DENN81, DENN82] proposes to overcome this weakness by a modification to the Needham/Schroeder protocol that includes the addition of a timestamp to steps 2 and 3. Her proposal assumes that the master keys, \(K_{a}\) and \(K_{b}\), are secure, and it consists of the following steps.

1. A → KDC: \(ID_A \| ID_B\)
2. KDC → A: \(E(K_{a}, [K_{s} \| ID_B \| T \| E(K_{b}, [K_{s} \| ID_A \| T])]\))
3. A → B: \(E(K_{b}, [K_{s} \| ID_A \| T])\)
4. B → A: \(E(K_{s}, N_1)\)
5. A → B: \(E(K_{s}, f(N_1))\)

\(T\) is a timestamp that assures A and B that the session key has only just been generated. Thus, both A and B know that the key distribution is a fresh exchange. A and B can verify timeliness by checking that

\[
|\text{Clock} - T| < \Delta t_1 + \Delta t_2
\]

where \(\Delta t_1\) is the estimated normal discrepancy between the KDC’s clock and the local clock (at A or B) and \(\Delta t_2\) is the expected network delay time. Each node can set its

\(^1\)The portion to the left of the colon indicates the sender and receiver; the portion to the right indicates the contents of the message; the symbol \(\|\) indicates concatenation.
clock against some standard reference source. Because the timestamp $T$ is encrypted using the secure master keys, an opponent, even with knowledge of an old session key, cannot succeed because a replay of step 3 will be detected by B as untimely.

A final point: Steps 4 and 5 were not included in the original presentation [DENN81] but were added later [DENN82]. These steps confirm the receipt of the session key at B.

The Denning protocol seems to provide an increased degree of security compared to the Needham/Schroeder protocol. However, a new concern is raised: namely, that this new scheme requires reliance on clocks that are synchronized throughout the network. [GONG92] points out a risk involved. The risk is based on the fact that the distributed clocks can become unsynchronized as a result of sabotage on or faults in the clocks or the synchronization mechanism. The problem occurs when a sender’s clock is ahead of the intended recipient’s clock. In this case, an opponent can intercept a message from the sender and replay it later when the timestamp in the message becomes current at the recipient’s site. This replay could cause unexpected results. Gong refers to such attacks as suppress-replay attacks.

One way to counter suppress-replay attacks is to enforce the requirement that parties regularly check their clocks against the KDC’s clock. The other alternative, which avoids the need for clock synchronization, is to rely on handshaking protocols using nonces. This latter alternative is not vulnerable to a suppress-replay attack, because the nonces the recipient will choose in the future are unpredictable to the sender. The Needham/Schroeder protocol relies on nonces only but, as we have seen, has other vulnerabilities.

In [KEHN92], an attempt is made to respond to the concerns about suppress-replay attacks and at the same time fix the problems in the Needham/Schroeder protocol. Subsequently, an inconsistency in this latter protocol was noted and an improved strategy was presented in [NEUM93a]. The protocol is

1. $A \rightarrow B$: $ID_A || N_a$
2. $B \rightarrow KDC$: $ID_B || N_b || E(K_b, [ID_A || N_a || T_b])$
3. $KDC \rightarrow A$: $E(K_a, [ID_B || N_a || K_s || T_b]) \| E(K_b, [ID_A || K_s || T_b]) \| N_b$
4. $A \rightarrow B$: $E(K_b, [ID_A || K_s || T_b]) \| E(K_s, N_b)$

Let us follow this exchange step by step.

1. $A$ initiates the authentication exchange by generating a nonce, $N_a$, and sending that plus its identifier to $B$ in plaintext. This nonce will be returned to $A$ in an encrypted message that includes the session key, assuring $A$ of its timeliness.
2. $B$ alerts the KDC that a session key is needed. Its message to the KDC includes its identifier and a nonce, $N_b$. This nonce will be returned to $B$ in an encrypted message that includes the session key, assuring $B$ of its timeliness. $B$’s message to

\footnote{Such things can and do happen. In recent years, flawed chips were used in a number of computers and other electronic systems to track the time and date. The chips had a tendency to skip forward one day. [NEUM90].}

\footnote{It really is hard to get these things right.}
the KDC also includes a block encrypted with the secret key shared by B and the KDC. This block is used to instruct the KDC to issue credentials to A; the block specifies the intended recipient of the credentials, a suggested expiration time for the credentials, and the nonce received from A.

3. The KDC passes on to A B’s nonce and a block encrypted with the secret key that B shares with the KDC. The block serves as a “ticket” that can be used by A for subsequent authentications, as will be seen. The KDC also sends to A a block encrypted with the secret key shared by A and the KDC. This block verifies that B has received A’s initial message ($ID_B$) and that this is a timely message and not a replay ($N'_a$), and it provides A with a session key ($K_s$) and the time limit on its use ($T_b$).

4. A transmits the ticket to B, together with the B’s nonce, the latter encrypted with the session key. The ticket provides B with the secret key that is used to decrypt $E(K_s, N_b)$ to recover the nonce. The fact that B’s nonce is encrypted with the session key authenticates that the message came from A and is not a replay.

This protocol provides an effective, secure means for A and B to establish a session with a secure session key. Furthermore, the protocol leaves A in possession of a key that can be used for subsequent authentication to B, avoiding the need to contact the authentication server repeatedly. Suppose that A and B establish a session using the aforementioned protocol and then conclude that session. Subsequently, but within the time limit established by the protocol, A desires a new session with B. The following protocol ensues:

1. $A \rightarrow B$: $E(K_b, [ID_A || K_s || T_b]) || N'_a$
2. $B \rightarrow A$: $N'_b || E(K_s, N'_a)$
3. $A \rightarrow B$: $E(K_s, N'_b)$

When B receives the message in step 1, it verifies that the ticket has not expired. The newly generated nonces $N'_a$ and $N'_b$ assure each party that there is no replay attack.

In all the foregoing, the time specified in $T_b$ is a time relative to B’s clock. Thus, this timestamp does not require synchronized clocks, because B checks only self-generated timestamps.

One-Way Authentication

Using symmetric encryption, the decentralized key distribution scenario illustrated in Figure 14.5 is impractical. This scheme requires the sender to issue a request to the intended recipient, awaited a response that includes a session key, and only then send the message.

With some refinement, the KDC strategy illustrated in Figure 14.3 is a candidate for encrypted electronic mail. Because we wish to avoid requiring that the recipient (B) be on line at the same time as the sender (A), steps 4 and 5 must be eliminated. For a message with content $M$, the sequence is as follows:

1. $A \rightarrow$ KDC: $ID_A || ID_B || N_1$
2. KDC $\rightarrow A$: $E(K_b, [K_s || ID_B || N_1 || E(K_b, [K_s || ID_A])])$
3. $A \rightarrow B$: $E(K_b, [K_s || ID_A]) || E(K_s, M)$
This approach guarantees that only the intended recipient of a message will be able to read it. It also provides a level of authentication that the sender is A. As specified, the protocol does not protect against replays. Some measure of defense could be provided by including a timestamp with the message. However, because of the potential delays in the e-mail process, such timestamps may have limited usefulness.

15.3 KERBEROS

Kerberos[^4] is an authentication service developed as part of Project Athena at MIT. The problem that Kerberos addresses is this: Assume an open distributed environment in which users at workstations wish to access services on servers distributed throughout the network. We would like for servers to be able to restrict access to authorized users and to be able to authenticate requests for service. In this environment, a workstation cannot be trusted to identify its users correctly to network services. In particular, the following three threats exist:

1. A user may gain access to a particular workstation and pretend to be another user operating from that workstation.
2. A user may alter the network address of a workstation so that the requests sent from the altered workstation appear to come from the impersonated workstation.
3. A user may eavesdrop on exchanges and use a replay attack to gain entrance to a server or to disrupt operations.

In any of these cases, an unauthorized user may be able to gain access to services and data that he or she is not authorized to access. Rather than building in elaborate authentication protocols at each server, Kerberos provides a centralized authentication server whose function is to authenticate users to servers and servers to users. Unlike most other authentication schemes described in this book, Kerberos relies exclusively on symmetric encryption, making no use of public-key encryption.

Two versions of Kerberos are in common use. Version 4 [MILL88, STEI88] implementations still exist. Version 5 [KOHL94] corrects some of the security deficiencies of version 4 and has been issued as a proposed Internet Standard (RFC 4120).[^5]

We begin this section with a brief discussion of the motivation for the Kerberos approach. Then, because of the complexity of Kerberos, it is best to start with a description of the authentication protocol used in version 4. This enables us to see the essence of the Kerberos strategy without considering some of the details required to handle subtle security threats. Finally, we examine version 5.

[^4]: In Greek mythology, a many headed dog, commonly three, perhaps with a serpent’s tail, the guardian of the entrance of Hades.” From Dictionary of Subjects and Symbols in Art, by James Hall, Harper & Row, 1979. Just as the Greek Kerberos has three heads, the modern Kerberos was intended to have three components to guard a network’s gate: authentication, accounting, and audit. The last two heads were never implemented.

[^5]: Versions 1 through 3 were internal development versions. Version 4 is the “original” Kerberos.
Motivation

If a set of users is provided with dedicated personal computers that have no network connections, then a user’s resources and files can be protected by physically securing each personal computer. When these users instead are served by a centralized time-sharing system, the time-sharing operating system must provide the security. The operating system can enforce access-control policies based on user identity and use the logon procedure to identify users.

Today, neither of these scenarios is typical. More common is a distributed architecture consisting of dedicated user workstations (clients) and distributed or centralized servers. In this environment, three approaches to security can be envisioned.

1. Rely on each individual client workstation to assure the identity of its user or users and rely on each server to enforce a security policy based on user identification (ID).
2. Require that client systems authenticate themselves to servers, but trust the client system concerning the identity of its user.
3. Require the user to prove his or her identity for each service invoked. Also require that servers prove their identity to clients.

In a small, closed environment in which all systems are owned and operated by a single organization, the first or perhaps the second strategy may suffice. But in a more open environment in which network connections to other machines are supported, the third approach is needed to protect user information and resources housed at the server. Kerberos supports this third approach. Kerberos assumes a distributed client/server architecture and employs one or more Kerberos servers to provide an authentication service.

The first published report on Kerberos [STEI88] listed the following requirements.

- **Secure**: A network eavesdropper should not be able to obtain the necessary information to impersonate a user. More generally, Kerberos should be strong enough that a potential opponent does not find it to be the weak link.
- **Reliable**: For all services that rely on Kerberos for access control, lack of availability of the Kerberos service means lack of availability of the supported services. Hence, Kerberos should be highly reliable and should employ a distributed server architecture with one system able to back up another.
- **Transparent**: Ideally, the user should not be aware that authentication is taking place beyond the requirement to enter a password.
- **Scalable**: The system should be capable of supporting large numbers of clients and servers. This suggests a modular, distributed architecture.

To support these requirements, the overall scheme of Kerberos is that of a trusted third-party authentication service that uses a protocol based on that proposed by Needham and Schroeder [NEED78], which was discussed in Section 15.2.

---

6However, even a closed environment faces the threat of attack by a disgruntled employee.
It is trusted in the sense that clients and servers trust Kerberos to mediate their mutual authentication. Assuming the Kerberos protocol is well designed, then the authentication service is secure if the Kerberos server itself is secure.\(^7\)

**Kerberos Version 4**

Version 4 of Kerberos makes use of DES, in a rather elaborate protocol, to provide the authentication service. Viewing the protocol as a whole, it is difficult to see the need for the many elements contained therein. Therefore, we adopt a strategy used by Bill Bryant of Project Athena [BRYA88] and build up to the full protocol by looking first at several hypothetical dialogues. Each successive dialogue adds additional complexity to counter security vulnerabilities revealed in the preceding dialogue.

After examining the protocol, we look at some other aspects of version 4.

**A Simple Authentication Dialogue** In an unprotected network environment, any client can apply to any server for service. The obvious security risk is that of impersonation. An opponent can pretend to be another client and obtain unauthorized privileges on server machines. To counter this threat, servers must be able to confirm the identities of clients who request service. Each server can be required to undertake this task for each client/server interaction, but in an open environment, this places a substantial burden on each server.

An alternative is to use an authentication server (AS) that knows the passwords of all users and stores these in a centralized database. In addition, the AS shares a unique secret key with each server. These keys have been distributed physically or in some other secure manner. Consider the following hypothetical dialogue:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad C \rightarrow AS: \quad ID_C \| P_C \| ID_V \\
(2) & \quad AS \rightarrow C: \quad Ticket \\
(3) & \quad C \rightarrow V: \quad ID_C \| Ticket \\
& \quad Ticket = E(K_v, [ID_C \| AD_C \| ID_V])
\end{align*}
\]

where

- **C** = client
- **AS** = authentication server
- **V** = server
- **ID_C** = identifier of user on C

---

\(^7\)Remember that the security of the Kerberos server should not automatically be assumed but must be guarded carefully (e.g., in a locked room). It is well to remember the fate of the Greek Kerberos, whom Hercules was ordered by Eurystheus to capture as his Twelfth Labor: "Hercules found the great dog on its chain and seized it by the throat. At once the three heads tried to attack, and Kerberos lashed about with its powerful tail. Hercules hung on grimly, and Kerberos relaxed into unconsciousness. Eurystheus may have been surprised to see Hercules alive—when he saw the three slavering heads and the huge dog they belonged to he was frightened out of his wits, and leapt back into the safety of his great bronze jar." From *The Hamlyn Concise Dictionary of Greek and Roman Mythology*, by Michael Stapleton, Hamlyn, 1982.
In this scenario, the user logs on to a workstation and requests access to server V. The client module C in the user’s workstation requests the user’s password and then sends a message to the AS that includes the user’s ID, the server’s ID, and the user’s password. The AS checks its database to see if the user has supplied the proper password for this user ID and whether this user is permitted access to server V. If both tests are passed, the AS accepts the user as authentic and must now convince the server that this user is authentic. To do so, the AS creates a ticket that contains the user’s ID and network address and the server’s ID. This ticket is encrypted using the secret key shared by the AS and this server. This ticket is then sent back to C. Because the ticket is encrypted, it cannot be altered by C or by an opponent.

With this ticket, C can now apply to V for service. C sends a message to V containing C’s ID and the ticket. V decrypts the ticket and verifies that the user ID in the ticket is the same as the unencrypted user ID in the message. If these two match, the server considers the user authenticated and grants the requested service.

Each of the ingredients of message (3) is significant. The ticket is encrypted to prevent alteration or forgery. The server’s ID (ID_V) is included in the ticket so that the server can verify that it has decrypted the ticket properly. ID_C is included in the ticket to indicate that this ticket has been issued on behalf of C. Finally, AD_C serves to counter the following threat. An opponent could capture the ticket transmitted in message (2), then use the name ID_C and transmit a message of form (3) from another workstation. The server would receive a valid ticket that matches the user ID and grant access to the user on that other workstation. To prevent this attack, the AS includes in the ticket the network address from which the original request came. Now the ticket is valid only if it is transmitted from the same workstation that initially requested the ticket.

A More Secure Authentication Dialogue  Although the foregoing scenario solves some of the problems of authentication in an open network environment, problems remain. Two in particular stand out. First, we would like to minimize the number of times that a user has to enter a password. Suppose each ticket can be used only once. If user C logs on to a workstation in the morning and wishes to check his or her mail at a mail server, C must supply a password to get a ticket for the mail server. If C wishes to check the mail several times during the day, each attempt requires reentering the password. We can improve matters by saying that tickets are reusable. For a single logon session, the workstation can store the mail server ticket after it is received and use it on behalf of the user for multiple accesses to the mail server.

However, under this scheme, it remains the case that a user would need a new ticket for every different service. If a user wished to access a print server, a mail server, a file server, and so on, the first instance of each access would require a new ticket and hence require the user to enter the password.
The second problem is that the earlier scenario involved a plaintext transmission of the password [message (1)]. An eavesdropper could capture the password and use any service accessible to the victim.

To solve these additional problems, we introduce a scheme for avoiding plaintext passwords and a new server, known as the ticket-granting server (TGS). The new (but still hypothetical) scenario is as follows.

**Once per user logon session:**

1. \( C \rightarrow AS: \ ID_C \| ID_{tgs} \)
2. \( AS \rightarrow C: \ E(K_c, Ticket_{tgs}) \)

**Once per type of service:**

3. \( C \rightarrow TGS: \ ID_C \| ID_V \| Ticket_{tgs} \)
4. \( TGS \rightarrow C: \ Ticket_V \)

**Once per service session:**

5. \( C \rightarrow V: \ ID_C \| Ticket_V \)

\[
Ticket_{tgs} = E(K_{tgs}, [ID_C \| AD_C \| ID_{tgs} \| TS_1 \| Lifetime_1])
\]

\[
Ticket_V = E(K_v, [ID_C \| AD_C \| ID_V \| TS_2 \| Lifetime_2])
\]

The new service, TGS, issues tickets to users who have been authenticated to AS. Thus, the user first requests a ticket-granting ticket (\( Ticket_{tgs} \)) from the AS. The client module in the user workstation saves this ticket. Each time the user requires access to a new service, the client applies to the TGS, using the ticket to authenticate itself. The TGS then grants a ticket for the particular service. The client saves each service-granting ticket and uses it to authenticate its user to a server each time a particular service is requested. Let us look at the details of this scheme:

1. The client requests a ticket-granting ticket on behalf of the user by sending its user’s ID to the AS, together with the TGS ID, indicating a request to use the TGS service.
2. The AS responds with a ticket that is encrypted with a key that is derived from the user’s password \( K_c \), which is already stored at the AS. When this response arrives at the client, the client prompts the user for his or her password, generates the key, and attempts to decrypt the incoming message. If the correct password is supplied, the ticket is successfully recovered.

Because only the correct user should know the password, only the correct user can recover the ticket. Thus, we have used the password to obtain credentials from Kerberos without having to transmit the password in plaintext. The ticket itself consists of the ID and network address of the user, and the ID of the TGS. This corresponds to the first scenario. The idea is that the client can use this ticket to request multiple service-granting tickets. So the ticket-granting ticket is to be reusable. However, we do not wish an opponent to be able to capture the ticket and use it. Consider the following scenario: An opponent captures the login ticket and waits until the user has logged off his or her workstation. Then the opponent either gains
access to that workstation or configures his workstation with the same network address as that of the victim. The opponent would be able to reuse the ticket to spoof the TGS. To counter this, the ticket includes a timestamp, indicating the date and time at which the ticket was issued, and a lifetime, indicating the length of time for which the ticket is valid (e.g., eight hours). Thus, the client now has a reusable ticket and need not bother the user for a password for each new service request. Finally, note that the ticket-granting ticket is encrypted with a secret key known only to the AS and the TGS. This prevents alteration of the ticket. The ticket is reencrypted with a key based on the user’s password. This assures that the ticket can be recovered only by the correct user, providing the authentication.

Now that the client has a ticket-granting ticket, access to any server can be obtained with steps 3 and 4.

3. The client requests a service-granting ticket on behalf of the user. For this purpose, the client transmits a message to the TGS containing the user’s ID, the ID of the desired service, and the ticket-granting ticket.

4. The TGS decrypts the incoming ticket using a key shared only by the AS and the TGS ($K_{tg}$) and verifies the success of the decryption by the presence of its ID. It checks to make sure that the lifetime has not expired. Then it compares the user ID and network address with the incoming information to authenticate the user. If the user is permitted access to the server $V$, the TGS issues a ticket to grant access to the requested service.

The service-granting ticket has the same structure as the ticket-granting ticket. Indeed, because the TGS is a server, we would expect that the same elements are needed to authenticate a client to the TGS and to authenticate a client to an application server. Again, the ticket contains a timestamp and lifetime. If the user wants access to the same service at a later time, the client can simply use the previously acquired service-granting ticket and need not bother the user for a password. Note that the ticket is encrypted with a secret key ($K_v$) known only to the TGS and the server, preventing alteration.

Finally, with a particular service-granting ticket, the client can gain access to the corresponding service with step 5.

5. The client requests access to a service on behalf of the user. For this purpose, the client transmits a message to the server containing the user’s ID and the service-granting ticket. The server authenticates by using the contents of the ticket.

This new scenario satisfies the two requirements of only one password query per user session and protection of the user password.

**The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue** Although the foregoing scenario enhances security compared to the first attempt, two additional problems remain. The heart of the first problem is the lifetime associated with the ticket-granting ticket. If this lifetime is very short (e.g., minutes), then the user will be repeatedly asked for a password. If the lifetime is long (e.g., hours), then an opponent has a greater opportunity for replay. An opponent could eavesdrop on the network and
capture a copy of the ticket-granting ticket and then wait for the legitimate user to log out. Then the opponent could forge the legitimate user’s network address and send the message of step (3) to the TGS. This would give the opponent unlimited access to the resources and files available to the legitimate user.

Similarly, if an opponent captures a service-granting ticket and uses it before it expires, the opponent has access to the corresponding service.

Thus, we arrive at an additional requirement. A network service (the TGS or an application service) must be able to prove that the person using a ticket is the same person to whom that ticket was issued.

The second problem is that there may be a requirement for servers to authenticate themselves to users. Without such authentication, an opponent could sabotage the configuration so that messages to a server were directed to another location. The false server would then be in a position to act as a real server and capture any information from the user and deny the true service to the user.

We examine these problems in turn and refer to Table 15.1, which shows the actual Kerberos protocol.

First, consider the problem of captured ticket-granting tickets and the need to determine that the ticket presenter is the same as the client for whom the ticket was issued. The threat is that an opponent will steal the ticket and use it before it expires. To get around this problem, let us have the AS provide both the client and the TGS with a secret piece of information in a secure manner. Then the client can prove its identity to the TGS by revealing the secret information—again in a secure manner. An efficient way of accomplishing this is to use an encryption key as the secure information; this is referred to as a session key in Kerberos.

Table 15.1  Summary of Kerberos Version 4 Message Exchanges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Message Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>C → AS  (ID_c \parallel ID_{tgs} \parallel TS_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AS → C  (E(K_c, [K_{c,tgs} \parallel ID_{tgs} \parallel TS_2 \parallel Lifetime_2 \parallel Ticket_{tgs}])  (Ticket_{tgs} = E(K_{tgs}, [K_c, ID_c \parallel AD_c \parallel ID_{tgs} \parallel TS_2 \parallel Lifetime_2]))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>C → TGS  (ID_v \parallel Ticket_{tgs} \parallel Authenticator_c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TGS → C  (E(K_{c,tgs}, [K_{c,v} \parallel ID_v \parallel TS_4 \parallel Ticket_v])) (Ticket_{tgs} = E(K_{tgs}, [K_c, ID_c \parallel AD_c \parallel ID_{tgs} \parallel TS_2 \parallel Lifetime_2])) (Ticket_v = E(K_v, [K_c, ID_c \parallel AD_c \parallel ID_v \parallel TS_4 \parallel Lifetime_4])) (Authenticator_c = E(K_{c,tgs}, [ID_c \parallel AD_c \parallel TS_3]))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>C → V  (Ticket_v \parallel Authenticator_c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>V → C  (E(K_{c,v}, [TS_5 + 1])) (for mutual authentication) (Ticket_v = E(K_v, [K_c, ID_c \parallel AD_c \parallel ID_v \parallel TS_4 \parallel Lifetime_4])) (Authenticator_c = E(K_{c,v}, [ID_c \parallel AD_c \parallel TS_3]))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Client/Server Authentication Exchange to obtain service
Table 15.1a shows the technique for distributing the session key. As before, the client sends a message to the AS requesting access to the TGS. The AS responds with a message, encrypted with a key derived from the user’s password \((K_c)\), that contains the ticket. The encrypted message also contains a copy of the session key, \(K_{c,TGS}\), where the subscripts indicate that this is a session key for C and TGS. Because this session key is inside the message encrypted with \(K_c\), only the user’s client can read it. The same session key is included in the ticket, which can be read only by the TGS. Thus, the session key has been securely delivered to both C and the TGS.

Note that several additional pieces of information have been added to this first phase of the dialogue. Message (1) includes a timestamp, so that the AS knows that the message is timely. Message (2) includes several elements of the ticket in a form accessible to C. This enables C to confirm that this ticket is for the TGS and to learn its expiration time.

Armed with the ticket and the session key, C is ready to approach the TGS. As before, C sends the TGS a message that includes the ticket plus the ID of the requested service (message (3) in Table 15.1b). In addition, C transmits an authenticator, which includes the ID and address of C’s user and a timestamp. Unlike the ticket, which is reusable, the authenticator is intended for use only once and has a very short lifetime. The TGS can decrypt the ticket with the key that it shares with the AS. This ticket indicates that user C has been provided with the session key \(K_{c,TGS}\). In effect, the ticket says, “Anyone who uses \(K_{c,TGS}\) must be C.” The TGS uses the session key to decrypt the authenticator. The TGS can then check the name and address from the authenticator with that of the ticket and with the network address of the incoming message. If all match, then the TGS is assured that the sender of the ticket is indeed the ticket’s real owner. In effect, the authenticator says, “At time \(TS_3\), I hereby use \(K_{c,TGS}\).” Note that the ticket does not prove anyone’s identity but is a way to distribute keys securely. It is the authenticator that proves the client’s identity. Because the authenticator can be used only once and has a short lifetime, the threat of an opponent stealing both the ticket and the authenticator for presentation later is countered.

The reply from the TGS in message (4) follows the form of message (2). The message is encrypted with the session key shared by the TGS and C and includes a session key to be shared between C and the server V, the ID of V, and the timestamp of the ticket. The ticket itself includes the same session key.

C now has a reusable service-granting ticket for V. When C presents this ticket, as shown in message (5), it also sends an authenticator. The server can decrypt the ticket, recover the session key, and decrypt the authenticator.

If mutual authentication is required, the server can reply as shown in message (6) of Table 15.1. The server returns the value of the timestamp from the authenticator, incremented by 1, and encrypted in the session key. C can decrypt this message to recover the incremented timestamp. Because the message was encrypted by the session key, C is assured that it could have been created only by V. The contents of the message assure C that this is not a replay of an old reply.

Finally, at the conclusion of this process, the client and server share a secret key. This key can be used to encrypt future messages between the two or to exchange a new random session key for that purpose.
Table 15.2 summarizes the justification for each of the elements in the Kerberos protocol, and Figure 15.1 provides a simplified overview of the action.

### Table 15.2 Rationale for the Elements of the Kerberos Version 4 Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Message (1)</strong></th>
<th>Client requests ticket-granting ticket.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$ID_C$</td>
<td>Tells AS identity of user from this client.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ID_{tgs}$</td>
<td>Tells AS that user requests access to TGS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$TS_1$</td>
<td>Allows AS to verify that client’s clock is synchronized with that of AS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Message (2)**

- AS returns ticket-granting ticket.
- $K_c$ Encryption is based on user’s password, enabling AS and client to verify password, and protecting contents of message (2).
- $K_{c,tgs}$ Copy of session key accessible to client created by AS to permit secure exchange between client and TGS without requiring them to share a permanent key.
- $ID_{tgs}$ Confirms that this ticket is for the TGS.
- $TS_2$ Informs client of time this ticket was issued.
- $Lifetime_2$ Informs client of the lifetime of this ticket.
- $Ticket_{tgs}$ Ticket to be used by client to access TGS.

#### (a) Authentication Service Exchange

**Message (3)**

- Client requests service-granting ticket.
- $ID_V$ Tells TGS that user requests access to server V.
- $Ticket_{tgs}$ Assures TGS that this user has been authenticated by AS.
- $Authenticator_c$ Generated by client to validate ticket.

**Message (4)**

- TGS returns service-granting ticket.
- $K_{c,tgs}$ Key shared only by C and TGS protects contents of message (4).
- $K_{c,v}$ Copy of session key accessible to client created by TGS to permit secure exchange between client and server without requiring them to share a permanent key.
- $ID_V$ Confirms that this ticket is for server V.
- $TS_4$ Informs client of time this ticket was issued.
- $Ticket_V$ Ticket to be used by client to access server V.
- $Ticket_{tgs}$ Reusable so that user does not have to reenter password.
- $K_{tgs}$ Ticket is encrypted with key known only to AS and TGS, to prevent tampering.
- $K_{c,tgs}$ Copy of session key accessible to TGS used to decrypt authenticator, thereby authenticating ticket.
- $ID_C$ Indicates the rightful owner of this ticket.
- $ADC$ Prevents use of ticket from workstation other than one that initially requested the ticket.
- $ID_{tgs}$ Assures server that it has decrypted ticket properly.
- $TS_2$ Informs TGS of time this ticket was issued.
- $Lifetime_2$ Prevents replay after ticket has expired.
- $Authenticator_c$ Assures TGS that the ticket presenter is the same as the client for whom the ticket was issued has very short lifetime to prevent replay.
Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$K_{c,tgs}$</td>
<td>Authenticator is encrypted with key known only to client and TGS, to prevent tampering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ID_C$</td>
<td>Must match ID in ticket to authenticate ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AD_C$</td>
<td>Must match address in ticket to authenticate ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$TS_3$</td>
<td>Informs TGS of time this authenticator was generated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Ticket-Granting Service Exchange

**Message (5)**
- Client requests service.
- $Ticket_V$ Assures server that this user has been authenticated by AS.
- $Authenticator_c$ Generated by client to validate ticket.

**Message (6)**
- Optional authentication of server to client.
  - $K_{c,v}$ Assures C that this message is from V.
  - $TS_5 + 1$ Assures C that this is not a replay of an old reply.
  - $Ticket_v$ Reusable so that client does not need to request a new ticket from TGS for each access to the same server.
  - $K_v$ Ticket is encrypted with key known only to TGS and server, to prevent tampering.
  - $K_{c,v}$ Copy of session key accessible to client; used to decrypt authenticator, thereby authenticating ticket.
  - $ID_C$ Indicates the rightful owner of this ticket.
  - $AD_C$ Prevents use of ticket from workstation other than one that initially requested the ticket.
  - $ID_V$ Assures server that it has decrypted ticket properly.
  - $TS_4$ Informs server of time this ticket was issued.
  - $Lifetime_4$ Prevents replay after ticket has expired.
  - $Authenticator_c$ Assures server that the ticket presenter is the same as the client for whom the ticket was issued; has very short lifetime to prevent replay.
  - $K_{c,v}$ Authenticator is encrypted with key known only to client and server, to prevent tampering.
  - $ID_C$ Must match ID in ticket to authenticate ticket.
  - $AD_C$ Must match address in ticket to authenticate ticket.
  - $TS_5$ Informs server of time this authenticator was generated.

(c) Client/Server Authentication Exchange

**KERBEROS REALMS AND MULTIPLE KERBEROS** A full-service Kerberos environment consisting of a Kerberos server, a number of clients, and a number of application servers requires the following:

1. The Kerberos server must have the user ID and hashed passwords of all participating users in its database. All users are registered with the Kerberos server.
2. The Kerberos server must share a secret key with each server. All servers are registered with the Kerberos server.
Such an environment is referred to as a **Kerberos realm**. The concept of **realm** can be explained as follows. A Kerberos realm is a set of managed nodes that share the same Kerberos database. The Kerberos database resides on the Kerberos master computer system, which should be kept in a physically secure room. A read-only copy of the Kerberos database might also reside on other Kerberos computer systems. However, all changes to the database must be made on the master computer system. Changing or accessing the contents of a Kerberos database requires the Kerberos master password. A related concept is that of a **Kerberos principal**, which is a service or user that is known to the Kerberos system. Each Kerberos principal is identified by its principal name. Principal names consist of three parts: a service or user name, an instance name, and a realm name.

Networks of clients and servers under different administrative organizations typically constitute different realms. That is, it generally is not practical or does not conform to administrative policy to have users and servers in one administrative domain registered with a Kerberos server elsewhere. However, users in one realm may need access to servers in other realms, and some servers

---

**Figure 15.1** Overview of Kerberos

1. User logs on to workstation and requests service on host.
2. AS verifies user's access right in database, creates ticket-granting ticket and session key. Results are encrypted using key derived from user's password.
3. Workstation prompts user for password and uses password to decrypt incoming message, then sends ticket and authenticator that contains user's name, network address, and time to TGS.
4. TGS decrypts ticket and authenticator, verifies request, then creates ticket for requested server.
5. Workstation sends ticket and authenticator to server.
6. Server verifies that ticket and authenticator match, then grants access to service. If mutual authentication is required, server returns an authenticator.
may be willing to provide service to users from other realms, provided that those users are authenticated.

Kerberos provides a mechanism for supporting such interrealm authentication. For two realms to support interrealm authentication, a third requirement is added:

3. The Kerberos server in each interoperating realm shares a secret key with the server in the other realm. The two Kerberos servers are registered with each other.

The scheme requires that the Kerberos server in one realm trust the Kerberos server in the other realm to authenticate its users. Furthermore, the participating servers in the second realm must also be willing to trust the Kerberos server in the first realm.

With these ground rules in place, we can describe the mechanism as follows (Figure 15.2): A user wishing service on a server in another realm needs a ticket for that server. The user’s client follows the usual procedures to gain access to the local TGS and then requests a ticket-granting ticket for a remote TGS (TGS in another realm). The client can then apply to the remote TGS for a service-granting ticket for the desired server in the realm of the remote TGS.

The details of the exchanges illustrated in Figure 15.2 are as follows (compare Table 15.1).

1. C → AS:  
   $\text{ID}_c \parallel \text{ID}_tgs \parallel TS_1$

2. AS → C:  
   $E(K_c, [\text{ID}_tgs \parallel \text{ID}_tgs \parallel TS_2 \parallel \text{Lifetime}_2 \parallel \text{Ticket}_tgs])$

3. C → TGS:  
   $\text{ID}_tgs \parallel \text{Ticket}_tgs \parallel \text{Authenticator}_c$

4. TGS → C:  
   $E(K_{c,tgs}, [\text{ID}_tgs \parallel \text{ID}_tgs \parallel TS_4 \parallel \text{Ticket}_tgs])$

5. C → TGS$_{rem}$:  
   $\text{ID}_vrem \parallel \text{Ticket}_tgs \parallel \text{Authenticator}_c$

6. TGS$_{rem}$ → C:  
   $E(K_{c,tgs}, [\text{ID}_vrem \parallel \text{ID}_vrem \parallel TS_6 \parallel \text{Ticket}_vrem])$

7. C → V$_{rem}$:  
   $\text{Ticket}_vrem \parallel \text{Authenticator}_c$

The ticket presented to the remote server ($V_{rem}$) indicates the realm in which the user was originally authenticated. The server chooses whether to honor the remote request.

One problem presented by the foregoing approach is that it does not scale well to many realms. If there are $N$ realms, then there must be $N(N - 1)/2$ secure key exchanges so that each Kerberos realm can interoperate with all other Kerberos realms.

Kerberos Version 5

Kerberos version 5 is specified in RFC 4120 and provides a number of improvements over version 4 [KOHL94]. To begin, we provide an overview of the changes from version 4 to version 5 and then look at the version 5 protocol.

Differences between Versions 4 and 5

Version 5 is intended to address the limitations of version 4 in two areas: environmental shortcomings and technical deficiencies. Let us briefly summarize the improvements in each area.8

---

8The following discussion follows the presentation in [KOHL94].
Kerberos version 4 was developed for use within the Project Athena environment and, accordingly, did not fully address the need to be of general purpose. This led to the following \textit{environmental shortcomings}.

1. \textbf{Encryption system dependence:} Version 4 requires the use of DES. Export restriction on DES as well as doubts about the strength of DES were thus of concern. In version 5, ciphertext is tagged with an encryption-type identifier so that any encryption technique may be used. Encryption keys are tagged with a type and a length, allowing the same key to be used in different
algorithms and allowing the specification of different variations on a given algorithm.

2. **Internet protocol dependence:** Version 4 requires the use of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Other address types, such as the ISO network address, are not accommodated. Version 5 network addresses are tagged with type and length, allowing any network address type to be used.

3. **Message byte ordering:** In version 4, the sender of a message employs a byte ordering of its own choosing and tags the message to indicate least significant byte in lowest address or most significant byte in lowest address. This technique works but does not follow established conventions. In version 5, all message structures are defined using Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) and Basic Encoding Rules (BER), which provide an unambiguous byte ordering.

4. **Ticket lifetime:** Lifetime values in version 4 are encoded in an 8-bit quantity in units of five minutes. Thus, the maximum lifetime that can be expressed is $2^8 \times 5 = 1280$ minutes (a little over 21 hours). This may be inadequate for some applications (e.g., a long-running simulation that requires valid Kerberos credentials throughout execution). In version 5, tickets include an explicit start time and end time, allowing tickets with arbitrary lifetimes.

5. **Authentication forwarding:** Version 4 does not allow credentials issued to one client to be forwarded to some other host and used by some other client. This capability would enable a client to access a server and have that server access another server on behalf of the client. For example, a client issues a request to a print server that then accesses the client’s file from a file server, using the client’s credentials for access. Version 5 provides this capability.

6. **Interrealm authentication:** In version 4, interoperability among $N$ realms requires on the order of $N^2$ Kerberos-to-Kerberos relationships, as described earlier. Version 5 supports a method that requires fewer relationships, as described shortly.

Apart from these environmental limitations, there are technical deficiencies in the version 4 protocol itself. Most of these deficiencies were documented in [BELL90], and version 5 attempts to address these. The deficiencies are the following.

1. **Double encryption:** Note in Table 15.1 [messages (2) and (4)] that tickets provided to clients are encrypted twice—one with the secret key of the target server and then again with a secret key known to the client. The second encryption is not necessary and is computationally wasteful.

2. **PCBC encryption:** Encryption in version 4 makes use of a nonstandard mode of DES known as **propagating cipher block chaining** (PCBC). It has been demonstrated that this mode is vulnerable to an attack involving the interchange of ciphertext blocks [KOHL89]. PCBC was intended to provide an integrity check as part of the encryption operation. Version 5 provides explicit integrity mechanisms, allowing the standard CBC mode to be used for encryption. In particular, a checksum or hash code is attached to the message prior to encryption using CBC.

---

9 This is described in Appendix 15A.
3. **Session keys**: Each ticket includes a session key that is used by the client to encrypt the authenticator sent to the service associated with that ticket. In addition, the session key may subsequently be used by the client and the server to protect messages passed during that session. However, because the same ticket may be used repeatedly to gain service from a particular server, there is the risk that an opponent will replay messages from an old session to the client or the server. In version 5, it is possible for a client and server to negotiate a subsession key, which is to be used only for that one connection. A new access by the client would result in the use of a new subsession key.

4. **Password attacks**: Both versions are vulnerable to a password attack. The message from the AS to the client includes material encrypted with a key based on the client’s password. An opponent can capture this message and attempt to decrypt it by trying various passwords. If the result of a test decryption is of the proper form, then the opponent has discovered the client’s password and may subsequently use it to gain authentication credentials from Kerberos. This is the same type of password attack described in Chapter 20, with the same kinds of countermeasures being applicable. Version 5 does provide a mechanism known as preauthentication, which should make password attacks more difficult, but it does not prevent them.

**THE VERSION 5 AUTHENTICATION DIALOGUE** Table 15.3 summarizes the basic version 5 dialogue. This is best explained by comparison with version 4 (Table 15.1).

### Table 15.3 Summary of Kerberos Version 5 Message Exchanges

| (1) C → AS | Options || IDc || Realmc || IDtgs || Times || Nonce1 |
| (2) AS → C | Realmc || IDc || Tickettgs || E(Kc, [Kc, tgs || Times || Nonce1 || Realmc || IDtgs]) |
|            | Tickettgs = E(Ktgs, [Flags || Ktgs || Realmc || IDc || ADC || Times]) |
|            | (a) Authentication Service Exchange to obtain ticket-granting ticket |

| (3) C → TGS | Options || IDc || Times || Nonce2 || Tickettgs || Authenticatorc |
| (4) TGS → C | Realmc || IDc || Ticketv || E(Kc, [Kc, v || Times || Nonce2 || Realmc || IDc]) |
|            | Tickettgs = E(Ktgs, [Flags || Kc, tgs || Realmc || IDc || ADc || Times]) |
|            | Ticketv = E(Kv, [Flags || Kc, v || Realmc || IDc || ADc || Times]) |
|            | Authenticatorv = E(Kc, [IDc || Realmc || TS1]) |
|            | (b) Ticket-Granting Service Exchange to obtain service-granting ticket |

| (5) C → V | Options || Ticketv || Authenticatorc |
| (6) V → C | EKc [TS2 || Subkey || Seq#] |
|            | Ticketv = E(Kv, [Flag || Kc, v || Realmc || IDc || ADc || Times]) |
|            | Authenticatorc = E(Kc, [IDc || Realmc || TS2 || Subkey || Seq#]) |
|            | (c) Client/Server Authentication Exchange to obtain service |

---

10Appendix 15A describes the mapping of passwords to encryption keys.
First, consider the **authentication service exchange**. Message (1) is a client request for a ticket-granting ticket. As before, it includes the ID of the user and the TGS. The following new elements are added:

- **Realm**: Indicates realm of user
- **Options**: Used to request that certain flags be set in the returned ticket
- **Times**: Used by the client to request the following time settings in the ticket:
  - *from*: the desired start time for the requested ticket
  - *till*: the requested expiration time for the requested ticket
  - *rtime*: requested renew-till time
- **Nonce**: A random value to be repeated in message (2) to assure that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an opponent

Message (2) returns a ticket-granting ticket, identifying information for the client, and a block encrypted using the encryption key based on the user’s password. This block includes the session key to be used between the client and the TGS, times specified in message (1), the nonce from message (1), and TGS identifying information. The ticket itself includes the session key, identifying information for the client, the requested time values, and flags that reflect the status of this ticket and the requested options. These flags introduce significant new functionality to version 5. For now, we defer a discussion of these flags and concentrate on the overall structure of the version 5 protocol.

Let us now compare the **ticket-granting service exchange** for versions 4 and 5. We see that message (3) for both versions includes an authenticator, a ticket, and the name of the requested service. In addition, version 5 includes requested times and options for the ticket and a nonce—all with functions similar to those of message (1). The authenticator itself is essentially the same as the one used in version 4.

Message (4) has the same structure as message (2). It returns a ticket plus information needed by the client, with the information encrypted using the session key now shared by the client and the TGS.

Finally, for the **client/server authentication exchange**, several new features appear in version 5. In message (5), the client may request as an option that mutual authentication is required. The authenticator includes several new fields:

- **Subkey**: The client’s choice for an encryption key to be used to protect this specific application session. If this field is omitted, the session key from the ticket \(K_{c,i}\) is used.
- **Sequence number**: An optional field that specifies the starting sequence number to be used by the server for messages sent to the client during this session. Messages may be sequence numbered to detect replays.

If mutual authentication is required, the server responds with message (6). This message includes the timestamp from the authenticator. Note that in version 4, the timestamp was incremented by one. This is not necessary in version 5, because the nature of the format of messages is such that it is not possible for an opponent to create message (6) without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. The subkey field, if present, overrides the subkey field, if present, in message (5).
The optional sequence number field specifies the starting sequence number to be used by the client.

**Ticket Flags** The flags field included in tickets in version 5 supports expanded functionality compared to that available in version 4. Table 15.4 summarizes the flags that may be included in a ticket.

The INITIAL flag indicates that this ticket was issued by the AS, not by the TGS. When a client requests a service-granting ticket from the TGS, it presents a ticket-granting ticket obtained from the AS. In version 4, this was the only way to obtain a service-granting ticket. Version 5 provides the additional capability that the client can get a service-granting ticket directly from the AS. The utility of this is as follows: A server, such as a password-changing server, may wish to know that the client’s password was recently tested.

The PRE-AUTHENT flag, if set, indicates that when the AS received the initial request [message (1)], it authenticated the client before issuing a ticket. The exact form of this preauthentication is left unspecified. As an example, the MIT implementation of version 5 has encrypted timestamp preauthentication, enabled by default. When a user wants to get a ticket, it has to send to the AS a preauthentication block containing a random confounder, a version number, and a timestamp all encrypted in the client’s password-based key. The AS decrypts the block and will not send a ticket-granting ticket back unless the timestamp in the preauthentication block is within the allowable time skew (time interval to account for clock drift and network delays). Another possibility is the use of a smart card that generates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL</td>
<td>This ticket was issued using the AS protocol and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE-AUTHENT</td>
<td>During initial authentication, the client was authenticated by the KDC before a ticket was issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW-AUTHENT</td>
<td>The protocol employed for initial authentication required the use of hardware expected to be possessed solely by the named client.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENEWABLE</td>
<td>Tells TGS that this ticket can be used to obtain a replacement ticket that expires at a later date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY-POSTDATE</td>
<td>Tells TGS that a postdated ticket may be issued based on this ticket-granting ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSTDATED</td>
<td>Indicates that this ticket has been postdated; the end server can check the authtime field to see when the original authentication occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>This ticket is invalid and must be validated by the KDC before use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROXiable</td>
<td>Tells TGS that a new service-granting ticket with a different network address may be issued based on the presented ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROXY</td>
<td>Indicates that this ticket is a proxy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORWARDABLE</td>
<td>Tells TGS that a new ticket-granting ticket with a different network address may be issued based on this ticket-granting ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORWARDED</td>
<td>Indicates that this ticket has either been forwarded or was issued based on authentication involving a forwarded ticket-granting ticket.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
continually changing passwords that are included in the preauthenticated messages. The passwords generated by the card can be based on a user’s password but be transformed by the card so that, in effect, arbitrary passwords are used. This prevents an attack based on easily guessed passwords. If a smart card or similar device was used, this is indicated by the HW-AUTHENT flag.

When a ticket has a long lifetime, there is the potential for it to be stolen and used by an opponent for a considerable period. If a short lifetime is used to lessen the threat, then overhead is involved in acquiring new tickets. In the case of a ticket-granting ticket, the client would either have to store the user’s secret key, which is clearly risky, or repeatedly ask the user for a password. A compromise scheme is the use of renewable tickets. A ticket with the RENEWABLE flag set includes two expiration times: one for this specific ticket and one that is the latest permissible value for an expiration time. A client can have the ticket renewed by presenting it to the TGS with a requested new expiration time. If the new time is within the limit of the latest permissible value, the TGS can issue a new ticket with a new session time and a later specific expiration time. The advantage of this mechanism is that the TGS may refuse to renew a ticket reported as stolen.

A client may request that the AS provide a ticket-granting ticket with the MAY-POSTDATE flag set. The client can then use this ticket to request a ticket that is flagged as POSTDATED and INVALID from the TGS. Subsequently, the client may submit the postdated ticket for validation. This scheme can be useful for running a long batch job on a server that requires a ticket periodically. The client can obtain a number of tickets for this session at once, with spread out time values. All but the first ticket are initially invalid. When the execution reaches a point in time when a new ticket is required, the client can get the appropriate ticket validated. With this approach, the client does not have to repeatedly use its ticket-granting ticket to obtain a service-granting ticket.

In version 5, it is possible for a server to act as a proxy on behalf of a client, in effect adopting the credentials and privileges of the client to request a service from another server. If a client wishes to use this mechanism, it requests a ticket-granting ticket with the PROXIABLE flag set. When this ticket is presented to the TGS, the TGS is permitted to issue a service-granting ticket with a different network address; this latter ticket will have its PROXY flag set. An application receiving such a ticket may accept it or require additional authentication to provide an audit trail.\textsuperscript{11}

The proxy concept is a limited case of the more powerful forwarding procedure. If a ticket is set with the FORWARDABLE flag, a TGS can issue to the requestor a ticket-granting ticket with a different network address and the FORWARDED flag set. This ticket then can be presented to a remote TGS. This capability allows a client to gain access to a server on another realm without requiring that each Kerberos maintain a secret key with Kerberos servers in every other realm. For example, realms could be structured hierarchically. Then a client could walk up the tree to a common node and then back down to reach a target realm. Each step of the walk would involve forwarding a ticket-granting ticket to the next TGS in the path.

\textsuperscript{11}For a discussion of some of the possible uses of the proxy capability, see [NEUM93b].
15.4 REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION USING ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

Mutual Authentication

In Chapter 14, we presented one approach to the use of public-key encryption for the purpose of session-key distribution (Figure 14.8). This protocol assumes that each of the two parties is in possession of the current public key of the other. It may not be practical to require this assumption.

A protocol using timestamps is provided in [DENN81]:

1. A → AS: \( ID_A \parallel ID_B \)
2. AS → A: \( E(PR_{as}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a \parallel T]) \parallel E(PR_{as}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b \parallel T]) \)
3. A → B: \( E(PR_{as}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a \parallel T]) \parallel E(PR_{as}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b \parallel T]) \parallel E(NU_b, E(PR_{as}, [K_s \parallel T])) \)

In this case, the central system is referred to as an authentication server (AS), because it is not actually responsible for secret-key distribution. Rather, the AS provides public-key certificates. The session key is chosen and encrypted by A; hence, there is no risk of exposure by the AS. The timestamps protect against replays of compromised keys.

This protocol is compact but, as before, requires the synchronization of clocks. Another approach, proposed by Woo and Lam [WOO92a], makes use of nonces. The protocol consists of the following steps.

1. A → KDC: \( ID_A \parallel ID_B \)
2. KDC → A: \( E(PR_{auth}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b]) \)
3. A → B: \( E(NU_b, [Na \parallel ID_A]) \)
4. B → KDC: \( ID_A \parallel ID_B \parallel E(NU_{auth}, Na) \)
5. KDC → B: \( E(PR_{auth}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a]) \parallel E(NU_b, E(PR_{auth}, [Na \parallel K_s \parallel ID_B])) \)
6. B → A: \( E(NU_a, E(PR_{auth}, [(Na \parallel K_s \parallel ID_B)] \parallel Nb)) \)
7. A → B: \( E(K_s, Nb) \)

In step 1, A informs the KDC of its intention to establish a secure connection with B. The KDC returns to A a copy of B’s public-key certificate (step 2). Using B’s public key, A informs B of its desire to communicate and sends a nonce \( Na \) (step 3). In step 4, B asks the KDC for A’s public-key certificate and requests a session key; B includes A’s nonce so that the KDC can stamp the session key with that nonce. The nonce is protected using the KDC’s public key. In step 5, the KDC returns to B a copy of A’s public-key certificate, plus the information \( [Na, K_s, ID_B] \). This information basically says that \( K_s \) is a secret key generated by the KDC on behalf of B and tied to \( Na \); the binding of \( K_s \) and \( Na \) will assure A that \( K_s \) is fresh. This triple is encrypted using the KDC’s private key to allow B to verify that the triple is in fact from the KDC. It is also encrypted using B’s public key so that no other entity may use the triple in an attempt to establish a fraudulent connection with A. In step 6, the triple \( [Na, K_s, ID_B] \), still encrypted with the KDC’s private key, is relayed to A, together with a nonce \( Nb \) generated by B. All the foregoing are encrypted using A’s public key. A retrieves the
session key $K_s$, uses it to encrypt $N_b$, and returns it to $B$. This last message assures $B$ of $A$’s knowledge of the session key.

This seems to be a secure protocol that takes into account the various attacks. However, the authors themselves spotted a flaw and submitted a revised version of the algorithm in [WOO92b]:

1. $A \rightarrow KDC$: $ID_A \parallel ID_B$
2. $KDC \rightarrow A$: $E(PR_{auth}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b])$
3. $A \rightarrow B$: $E( PU_b, [N_a \parallel ID_A])$
4. $B \rightarrow KDC$: $ID_A \parallel ID_B \parallel E( PU_{auth}, N_a)$
5. $KDC \rightarrow B$: $E(PR_{auth}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a]) \parallel E( PU_b, E(PR_{auth}, [N_a \parallel K_s \parallel ID_A \parallel ID_B] \parallel N_b))$
6. $B \rightarrow A$: $E( PU_a, E(PR_{auth}, [(N_a \parallel K_s \parallel ID_A \parallel ID_B] \parallel N_b)) )$
7. $A \rightarrow B$: $E( K_s, N_b )$

The identifier of $A$, $ID_A$, is added to the set of items encrypted with the KDC’s private key in steps 5 and 6. This binds the session key $K_s$ to the identities of the two parties that will be engaged in the session. This inclusion of $ID_A$ accounts for the fact that the nonce value $N_a$ is considered unique only among all nonces generated by $A$, not among all nonces generated by all parties. Thus, it is the pair \{ID$_A$, N$_a$\} that uniquely identifies the connection request of $A$.

In both this example and the protocols described earlier, protocols that appeared secure were revised after additional analysis. These examples highlight the difficulty of getting things right in the area of authentication.

One-Way Authentication

We have already presented public-key encryption approaches that are suited to electronic mail, including the straightforward encryption of the entire message for confidentiality (Figure 12.1b), authentication (Figure 12.1c), or both (Figure 12.1d). These approaches require that either the sender know the recipient’s public key (confidentiality), the recipient know the sender’s public key (authentication), or both (confidentiality plus authentication). In addition, the public-key algorithm must be applied once or twice to what may be a long message.

If confidentiality is the primary concern, then the following may be more efficient:

$$A \rightarrow B: \ E( PU_b, K_s ) \parallel E( K_s, M )$$

In this case, the message is encrypted with a one-time secret key. $A$ also encrypts this one-time key with $B$’s public key. Only $B$ will be able to use the corresponding private key to recover the one-time key and then use that key to decrypt the message. This scheme is more efficient than simply encrypting the entire message with $B$’s public key.

If authentication is the primary concern, then a digital signature may suffice, as was illustrated in Figure 13.2:

$$A \rightarrow B: \ M \parallel E(PR_a, H(M))$$
This method guarantees that A cannot later deny having sent the message. However, this technique is open to another kind of fraud. Bob composes a message to his boss Alice that contains an idea that will save the company money. He appends his digital signature and sends it into the e-mail system. Eventually, the message will get delivered to Alice’s mailbox. But suppose that Max has heard of Bob’s idea and gains access to the mail queue before delivery. He finds Bob’s message, strips off his signature, appends his, and requeues the message to be delivered to Alice. Max gets credit for Bob’s idea.

To counter such a scheme, both the message and signature can be encrypted with the recipient’s public key:

\[ A \rightarrow B: \ E(PU_b, [M \parallel E(PR_a, H(M))]) \]

The latter two schemes require that B know A’s public key and be convinced that it is timely. An effective way to provide this assurance is the digital certificate, described in Chapter 14. Now we have

\[ A \rightarrow B: \ M \parallel E(PR_a, H(M)) \parallel E(PR_{as}, [T \parallel ID_A \parallel PU_a]) \]

In addition to the message, A sends B the signature encrypted with A’s private key and A’s certificate encrypted with the private key of the authentication server. The recipient of the message first uses the certificate to obtain the sender’s public key and verify that it is authentic and then uses the public key to verify the message itself. If confidentiality is required, then the entire message can be encrypted with B’s public key. Alternatively, the entire message can be encrypted with a one-time secret key; the secret key is also transmitted, encrypted with B’s public key. This approach is explored in Chapter 18.

### 15.5 FEDERATED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT

**Federated identity management** is a relatively new concept dealing with the use of a common identity management scheme across multiple enterprises and numerous applications and supporting many thousands, even millions, of users. We begin our overview with a discussion of the concept of identity management and then examine federated identity management.

**Identity Management**

Identity management is a centralized, automated approach to provide enterprise-wide access to resources by employees and other authorized individuals. The focus of identity management is defining an identity for each user (human or process), associating attributes with the identity, and enforcing a means by which a user can verify identity. The central concept of an identity management system is the use of single sign-on (SSO). SSO enables a user to access all network resources after a single authentication.

[PELT07] lists the following as the principal elements of an identity management system.
• **Authentication**: Confirmation that a user corresponds to the user name provided.

• **Authorization**: Granting access to specific services and/or resources based on the authentication.

• **Accounting**: A process for logging access and authorization.

• **Provisioning**: The enrollment of users in the system.

• **Workflow automation**: Movement of data in a business process.

• **Delegated administration**: The use of role-based access control to grant permissions.

• **Password synchronization**: Creating a process for single sign-on (SSO) or reduced sign-on (RSO). Single sign-on enables a user to access all network resources after a single authentication. RSO may involve multiple sign-ons but requires less user effort than if each resource and service maintained its own authentication facility.

• **Self-service password reset**: Enables the user to modify his or her password.

• **Federation**: A process where authentication and permission will be passed on from one system to another—usually across multiple enterprises, thereby reducing the number of authentications needed by the user.

Note that Kerberos contains a number of the elements of an identity management system.

Figure 15.3 [LINN06] illustrates entities and data flows in a generic identity management architecture. A **principal** is an identity holder. Typically, this is a human

![Generic Identity Management Architecture](image-url)
user that seeks access to resources and services on the network. User devices, agent processes, and server systems may also function as principals. Principals authenticate themselves to an identity provider. The identity provider associates authentication information with a principal, as well as attributes and one or more identifiers.

Increasingly, digital identities incorporate attributes other than simply an identifier and authentication information (such as passwords and biometric information). An attribute service manages the creation and maintenance of such attributes. For example, a user needs to provide a shipping address each time an order is placed at a new Web merchant, and this information needs to be revised when the user moves. Identity management enables the user to provide this information once, so that it is maintained in a single place and released to data consumers in accordance with authorization and privacy policies. Users may create some of the attributes to be associated with their digital identity, such as an address. Administrators may also assign attributes to users, such as roles, access permissions, and employee information.

Data consumers are entities that obtain and employ data maintained and provided by identity and attribute providers, which are often used to support authorization decisions and to collect audit information. For example, a database server or file server is a data consumer that needs a client’s credentials so as to know what access to provide to that client.

**Identity Federation**

Identity federation is, in essence, an extension of identity management to multiple security domains. Such domains include autonomous internal business units, external business partners, and other third-party applications and services. The goal is to provide the sharing of digital identities so that a user can be authenticated a single time and then access applications and resources across multiple domains. Because these domains are relatively autonomous or independent, no centralized control is possible. Rather, the cooperating organizations must form a federation based on agreed standards and mutual levels of trust to securely share digital identities.

Federated identity management refers to the agreements, standards, and technologies that enable the portability of identities, identity attributes, and entitlements across multiple enterprises and numerous applications and supporting many thousands, even millions, of users. When multiple organizations implement interoperable federated identity schemes, an employee in one organization can use a single sign-on to access services across the federation with trust relationships associated with the identity. For example, an employee may log onto her corporate intranet and be authenticated to perform authorized functions and access authorized services on that intranet. The employee could then access their health benefits from an outside health-care provider without having to reauthenticate.

Beyond SSO, federated identity management provides other capabilities. One is a standardized means of representing attributes. Increasingly, digital identities incorporate attributes other than simply an identifier and authentication information (such as passwords and biometric information). Examples of attributes include account numbers, organizational roles, physical location, and file ownership. A user may have multiple identifiers; for example, each identifier may be associated with a unique role with its own access permissions.
Another key function of federated identity management is identity mapping. Different security domains may represent identities and attributes differently. Further, the amount of information associated with an individual in one domain may be more than is necessary in another domain. The federated identity management protocols map identities and attributes of a user in one domain to the requirements of another domain.

Figure 15.4 illustrates entities and data flows in a generic federated identity management architecture.

The identity provider acquires attribute information through dialogue and protocol exchanges with users and administrators. For example, a user needs to provide a shipping address each time an order is placed at a new Web merchant, and this information needs to be revised when the user moves. Identity management enables the user to provide this information once, so that it is maintained in a single place and released to data consumers in accordance with authorization and privacy policies.

Service providers are entities that obtain and employ data maintained and provided by identity providers, often to support authorization decisions and to collect audit information. For example, a database server or file server is a data consumer that needs a client’s credentials so as to know what access to provide to

---

Figure 15.4  Federated Identity Operation

- End user's browser or other application engages in an authentication dialogue with identity provider in the same domain. End user also provides attribute values associated with user's identity.
- Some attributes associated with an identity, such as allowable roles, may be provided by an administrator in the same domain.
- A service provider in a remote domain, which the user wishes to access, obtains identity information, authentication information, and associated attributes from the identity provider in the source domain.
- Service provider opens session with remote user and enforces access control restrictions based on user's identity and attributes.
that client. A service provider can be in the same domain as the user and the identity provider. The power of this approach is for federated identity management, in which the service provider is in a different domain (e.g., a vendor or supplier network).

**STANDARDS** Federated identity management uses a number of standards as the building blocks for secure identity exchange across different domains or heterogeneous systems. In essence, organizations issue some form of security tickets for their users that can be processed by cooperating partners. Identity federation standards are thus concerned with defining these tickets, in terms of content and format, providing protocols for exchanging tickets and performing a number of management tasks. These tasks include configuring systems to perform attribute transfers and identity mapping, and performing logging and auditing functions.

The principal underlying standard for federated identity is the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), which defines the exchange of security information between online business partners. SAML conveys authentication information in the form of assertions about subjects. Assertions are statements about the subject issued by an authoritative entity.

SAML is part of a broader collection of standards being issued by OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) for federated identity management. For example, WS-Federation enables browser-based federation; it relies on a security token service to broker trust of identities, attributes, and authentication between participating Web services.

The challenge with federated identity management is to integrate multiple technologies, standards, and services to provide a secure, user-friendly utility. The key, as in most areas of security and networking, is the reliance on a few mature standards widely accepted by industry. Federated identity management seems to have reached this level of maturity.

**EXAMPLES** To get some feel for the functionality of identity federation, we look at three scenarios, taken from [COMP06].

In the first scenario (Figure 15.5a), Workplace.com contracts with Health.com to provide employee health benefits. An employee uses a Web interface to sign on to Workplace.com and goes through an authentication procedure there. This enables the employee to access authorized services and resources at Workplace.com. When the employee clicks on a link to access health benefits, her browser is redirected to Health.com. At the same time, the Workplace.com software passes the user’s identifier to Health.com in a secure manner. The two organizations are part of a federation that cooperatively exchanges user identifiers. Health.com maintains user identities for every employee at Workplace.com and associates with each identity health-benefits information and access rights. In this example, the linkage between the two companies is based on account information and user participation is browser based.

Figure 15.5b shows a second type of browser-based scheme. PartsSupplier.com is a regular supplier of parts to Workplace.com. In this case, a role-based access-control (RBAC) scheme is used for access to information. An engineer of Workplace.com authenticates at the employee portal at Workplace.com and clicks on a link to access information at PartsSupplier.com. Because the user is authenticated in the role of an engineer, he is taken to the technical documentation and troubleshooting portion of PartsSupplier.com’s Web site without having to sign on.
Figure 15.5 Federated Identity Scenarios
Similarly, an employee in a purchasing role signs on at Workplace.com and is authorized, in that role, to place purchases at PartsSupplier.com without having to authenticate to PartsSupplier.com. For this scenario, PartsSupplier.com does not have identity information for individual employees at Workplace.com. Rather, the linkage between the two federated partners is in terms of roles.

The scenario illustrated in Figure 15.5c can be referred to as document based rather than browser based. In this third example, Workplace.com has a purchasing agreement with PinSupplies.com, and PinSupplies.com has a business relationship with E-Ship.com. An employee of Workplace.com signs on and is authenticated to make purchases. The employee goes to a procurement application that provides a list of Workplace.com’s suppliers and the parts that can be ordered. The user clicks on the PinSupplies button and is presented with a purchase order Web page (HTML page). The employee fills out the form and clicks the submit button. The procurement application generates an XML/SOAP document that it inserts into the envelope body of an XML-based message. The procurement application then inserts the user’s credentials in the envelope header of the message, together with Workplace.com’s organizational identity. The procurement application posts the message to the PinSupplies.com’s purchasing Web service. This service authenticates the incoming message and processes the request. The purchasing Web service then sends a SOAP message to its shipping partner to fulfill the order. The message includes a PinSupplies.com security token in the envelope header and the list of items to be shipped as well as the end user’s shipping information in the envelope body. The shipping Web service authenticates the request and processes the shipment order.

### 15.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

A painless way to get a grasp of Kerberos concepts is found in [BRYA88]. One of the best treatments of Kerberos is [KOHL94]. [TUNG99] describes Kerberos from a user’s point of view.

[SHIM05] provides a brief overview of federated identity management and examines one approach to standardization. [BHAT07] describes an integrated approach to federated identity management coupled with management of access control privileges.

---


15.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>authentication</th>
<th>Kerberos realm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>authentication server</td>
<td>mutual authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federated identity</td>
<td>nonce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management</td>
<td>one-way authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity management</td>
<td>propagating cipher block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerberos</td>
<td>chaining (PCBC) mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>realm</td>
<td>replay attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>suppress-replay attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ticket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ticket-granting server (TGS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>timestamp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

15.1 Give examples of replay attacks.
15.2 List three general approaches to dealing with replay attacks.
15.3 What is a suppress-replay attack?
15.4 What problem was Kerberos designed to address?
15.5 What are three threats associated with user authentication over a network or Internet?
15.6 List three approaches to secure user authentication in a distributed environment.
15.7 What four requirements were defined for Kerberos?
15.8 What entities constitute a full-service Kerberos environment?
15.9 In the context of Kerberos, what is a realm?
15.10 What are the principal differences between version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos?

Problems

15.1 In Section 15.4, we outlined the public-key scheme proposed in [WOO92a] for the distribution of secret keys. The revised version includes $ID_A$ in steps 5 and 6. What attack, specifically, is countered by this revision?

15.2 The protocol referred to in Problem 15.1 can be reduced from seven steps to five, having the following sequence:

1. $A \rightarrow B$:
2. $A \rightarrow KDC$:
3. KDC → B:
4. B → A:
5. A → B:

Show the message transmitted at each step. **Hint:** The final message in this protocol is the same as the final message in the original protocol.

15.3 Reference the suppress-replay attack described in Section 15.2 to answer the following.

a. Give an example of an attack when a party’s clock is ahead of that of the KDC.

b. Give an example of an attack when a party’s clock is ahead of that of another party.

15.4 There are three typical ways to use nonces as challenges. Suppose \( N_a \) is a nonce generated by A, A and B share key K, and \( f() \) is a function (such as an increment). The three usages are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usage 1</th>
<th>Usage 2</th>
<th>Usage 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) A → B: ( N_a )</td>
<td>(1) A → B: ( E(K, N_a) )</td>
<td>(1) A → B: ( E(K, N_a) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) B → A: ( E(K, N_a) )</td>
<td>(2) B → A: ( N_a )</td>
<td>(2) B → A: ( E(K, f(N_a)) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Describe situations for which each usage is appropriate.

15.5 Show that a random error in one block of ciphertext is propagated to all subsequent blocks of plaintext in PCBC mode (See Figure 15.7 in Appendix 15A).

15.6 Suppose that, in PCBC mode, blocks \( C_i \) and \( C_{i+1} \) are interchanged during transmission. Show that this affects only the decrypted blocks \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) but not subsequent blocks.

15.7 In addition to providing a standard for public-key certificate formats, X.509 specifies an authentication protocol. The original version of X.509 contains a security flaw. The essence of the protocol is as follows.

\[
X \{ Y \}
\]

\( rB \)

\( tA \)

\( tB \)

where \( t_A \) and \( t_B \) are timestamps, \( r_A \) and \( r_B \) are nonces and the notation \( X \{ Y \} \) indicates that the message Y is transmitted, encrypted, and signed by X.

The text of X.509 states that checking timestamps \( t_A \) and \( t_B \) is optional for three-way authentication. But consider the following example: Suppose A and B have used the preceding protocol on some previous occasion, and that opponent C has intercepted the preceding three messages. In addition, suppose that timestamps are not used and are all set to 0. Finally, suppose C wishes to impersonate A to B. C initially sends the first captured message to B:

\[
C \rightarrow B: \ A \{ 0, r_A, ID_B \}
\]

B responds, thinking it is talking to A but is actually talking to C:

\[
B \rightarrow C: \ B \{ 0, r_B, ID_A, r_A \}
\]

C meanwhile causes A to initiate authentication with C by some means. As a result, A sends C the following:

\[
A \rightarrow C: \ A \{ 0, r'_A, ID_C \}
\]

C responds to A using the same nonce provided to C by B:

\[
C \rightarrow A: \ C \{ 0, r'_B, ID_A, r'_A \}
\]

A responds with

\[
A \rightarrow C: \ A \{ r'_B \}
\]
This is exactly what C needs to convince B that it is talking to A, so C now repeats the incoming message back out to B.

\[ C \rightarrow B: \ A \{r'_B\} \]

So B will believe it is talking to A whereas it is actually talking to C. Suggest a simple solution to this problem that does not involve the use of timestamps.

15.8 Consider a one-way authentication technique based on asymmetric encryption:

\[ A \rightarrow B: \ ID_A \]
\[ B \rightarrow A: \ R_1 \]
\[ A \rightarrow B: \ E(PR_a, R_1) \]

a. Explain the protocol.
b. What type of attack is this protocol susceptible to?

15.9 Consider a one-way authentication technique based on asymmetric encryption:

\[ A \rightarrow B: \ ID_A \]
\[ B \rightarrow A: \ E(PU_a, R_2) \]
\[ A \rightarrow B: \ R_2 \]

a. Explain the protocol.
b. What type of attack is this protocol susceptible to?

15.10 In Kerberos, when Bob receives a Ticket from Alice, how does he know it is genuine?

15.11 In Kerberos, when Bob receives a Ticket from Alice, how does he know it came from Alice?

15.12 In Kerberos, when Alice receives a reply, how does she know it came from Bob (that it’s not a replay of an earlier message from Bob)?

15.13 In Kerberos, what does the Ticket contain that allows Alice and Bob to talk securely?

APPENDIX 15A KERBEROS ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES

Kerberos includes an encryption library that supports various encryption-related operations. These were included in the Kerberos version 5 specification and are common in commercial implementations. In February 2005, IETF issued RFCs 3961 and 3962, which expand the options of cryptographic techniques. In this appendix, we describe the original techniques.

Password-to-Key Transformation

In Kerberos, passwords are limited to the use of the characters that can be represented in a 7-bit ASCII format. This password, of arbitrary length, is converted into an encryption key that is stored in the Kerberos database. Figure 15.6 illustrates the procedure.

First, the character string, s, is packed into a bit string, b, such that the first character is stored in the first 7 bits, the second character in the second 7 bits, and so on. This can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
b[0] &= \text{bit 0 of } s[0] \\
\vdots \\
b[6] &= \text{bit 6 of } s[0] \\
b[7] &= \text{bit 0 of } s[1] \\
\vdots \\
b[7i + m] &= \text{bit } m \text{ of } s[i] \quad 0 \leq m \leq 6
\end{align*}
\]
Next, the bit string is compacted to 56 bits by aligning the bits in “fanfold” fashion and performing a bitwise XOR. For example, if the bit string is of length 59, then

\[
\begin{align*}
    b[55] &= b[55] \oplus b[56] \\
    b[54] &= b[54] \oplus b[57] \\
    b[53] &= b[53] \oplus b[58]
\end{align*}
\]

This creates a 56-bit DES key. To conform to the expected 64-bit key format, the string is treated as a sequence of eight 7-bit blocks and is mapped into eight 8-bit blocks to form an input key \( K_{pw} \).

Finally, the original password is encrypted using the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of DES with key \( K_{pw} \). The last 64-bit block returned from this process, known as the CBC checksum, is the output key associated with this password.

The entire algorithm can be viewed as a hash function that maps an arbitrary password into a 64-bit hash code.
Propagating Cipher Block Chaining Mode

Recall from Chapter 6 that, in the CBC mode of DES, the input to the DES algorithm at each stage consists of the XOR of the current plaintext block and the preceding ciphertext block with the same key used for each block (Figure 6.4). The advantage of this mode over the electronic codebook (ECB) mode, in which each plaintext block is independently encrypted, is this: With CBC, the same plaintext block produces different ciphertext blocks if repeated.

CBC has the property that if an error occurs in transmission of ciphertext block \( C_t \), then this error propagates to the recovered plaintext blocks \( P_t \) and \( P_{t+1} \).

Version 4 of Kerberos uses an extension to CBC called the propagating CBC (PCBC) mode [MEYE82]. This mode has the property that an error in one ciphertext block is propagated to all subsequent decrypted blocks of the message, rendering each block useless. Thus, data encryption and integrity are combined in one operation. (For an exception, see Problem 15.6).

PCBC is illustrated in Figure 15.7. In this scheme, the input to the encryption algorithm is the XOR of the current plaintext block, the preceding ciphertext block, and the preceding plaintext block:

\[
C_n = E(K, [C_{n-1} \oplus P_{n-1} \oplus P_n])
\]

![Figure 15.7 Propagating Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC) Mode](image-url)
On decryption, each ciphertext block is passed through the decryption algorithm. Then the output is XORed with the preceding ciphertext block and the preceding plaintext block. We can demonstrate that this scheme works, as follows.

\[
D(K, C_n) = D(K, E(K, [C_{n-1} \oplus P_{n-1} \oplus P_n]))
\]

\[
D(K, C_n) = C_{n-1} \oplus P_{n-1} \oplus P_n
\]

\[
C_{n-1} \oplus P_{n-1} \oplus D(K, C_n) = P_n
\]
CHAPTER 16

TRANSPORT-LEVEL SECURITY

16.1 Web Security Considerations

Web Security Threats
Web Traffic Security Approaches

16.2 Secure Socket Layer and Transport Layer Security

SSL Architecture
SSL Record Protocol
Change Cipher Spec Protocol
Alert Protocol
Handshake Protocol
Cryptographic Computations

16.3 Transport Layer Security

Version Number
Message Authentication Code
Pseudorandom Function
Alert Codes
Cipher Suites
Client Certificate Types
Certificate Verify and Finished Messages
Cryptographic Computations
Padding

16.4 HTTPS

Connection Initiation
Connection Closure

16.5 Secure Shell (SSH)

Transport Layer Protocol
User Authentication Protocol
Connection Protocol

16.6 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

16.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
CHAPTER 16 / TRANSPORT-LEVEL SECURITY

Use your mentality
Wake up to reality

—From the song, “I’ve Got You Under My Skin” by Cole Porter

KEY POINTS

◆ Secure Socket Layer (SSL) provides security services between TCP and applications that use TCP. The Internet standard version is called Transport Layer Service (TLS).
◆ SSL/TLS provides confidentiality using symmetric encryption and message integrity using a message authentication code.
◆ SSL/TLS includes protocol mechanisms to enable two TCP users to determine the security mechanisms and services they will use.
◆ HTTPS (HTTP over SSL) refers to the combination of HTTP and SSL to implement secure communication between a Web browser and a Web server.
◆ Secure Shell (SSH) provides secure remote logon and other secure client/server facilities.

Virtually all businesses, most government agencies, and many individuals now have Web sites. The number of individuals and companies with Internet access is expanding rapidly and all of these have graphical Web browsers. As a result, businesses are enthusiastic about setting up facilities on the Web for electronic commerce. But the reality is that the Internet and the Web are extremely vulnerable to compromises of various sorts. As businesses wake up to this reality, the demand for secure Web services grows.

The topic of Web security is a broad one and can easily fill a book. In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of the general requirements for Web security and then focus on three standardized schemes that are becoming increasingly important as part of Web commerce and that focus on security at the transport layer: SSL/TLS, HTTPS, and SSH.

16.1 WEB SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

The World Wide Web is fundamentally a client/server application running over the Internet and TCP/IP intranets. As such, the security tools and approaches discussed so far in this book are relevant to the issue of Web security. But, as pointed out in [GARF02], the Web presents new challenges not generally appreciated in the context of computer and network security.

◆ The Internet is two-way. Unlike traditional publishing environments—even electronic publishing systems involving teletext, voice response, or fax-back—the Web is vulnerable to attacks on the Web servers over the Internet.
• The Web is increasingly serving as a highly visible outlet for corporate and product information and as the platform for business transactions. Reputations can be damaged and money can be lost if the Web servers are subverted.

• Although Web browsers are very easy to use, Web servers are relatively easy to configure and manage, and Web content is increasingly easy to develop, the underlying software is extraordinarily complex. This complex software may hide many potential security flaws. The short history of the Web is filled with examples of new and upgraded systems, properly installed, that are vulnerable to a variety of security attacks.

• A Web server can be exploited as a launching pad into the corporation’s or agency’s entire computer complex. Once the Web server is subverted, an attacker may be able to gain access to data and systems not part of the Web itself but connected to the server at the local site.

• Casual and untrained (in security matters) users are common clients for Web-based services. Such users are not necessarily aware of the security risks that exist and do not have the tools or knowledge to take effective countermeasures.

Web Security Threats

Table 16.1 provides a summary of the types of security threats faced when using the Web. One way to group these threats is in terms of passive and active attacks. Passive attacks include eavesdropping on network traffic between browser and server and gaining access to information on a Web site that is supposed to be restricted. Active attacks include impersonating another user, altering messages in transit between client and server, and altering information on a Web site.

Another way to classify Web security threats is in terms of the location of the threat: Web server, Web browser, and network traffic between browser and server. Issues of server and browser security fall into the category of computer system security; Part Four of this book addresses the issue of system security in general but is also applicable to Web system security. Issues of traffic security fall into the category of network security and are addressed in this chapter.

Web Traffic Security Approaches

A number of approaches to providing Web security are possible. The various approaches that have been considered are similar in the services they provide and, to some extent, in the mechanisms that they use, but they differ with respect to their scope of applicability and their relative location within the TCP/IP protocol stack.

Figure 16.1 illustrates this difference. One way to provide Web security is to use IP security (IPsec) (Figure 16.1a). The advantage of using IPsec is that it is transparent to end users and applications and provides a general-purpose solution. Furthermore, IPsec includes a filtering capability so that only selected traffic need incur the overhead of IPsec processing.

Another relatively general-purpose solution is to implement security just above TCP (Figure 16.1b). The foremost example of this approach is the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) and the follow-on Internet standard known as Transport Layer Security (TLS). At this level, there are two implementation choices. For full generality, SSL (or TLS) could be provided as part of the underlying protocol suite and therefore be transparent to applications. Alternatively, SSL can be embedded in specific packages. For example, Netscape and Microsoft Explorer browsers come equipped with SSL, and most Web servers have implemented the protocol.

Application-specific security services are embedded within the particular application. Figure 16.1c shows examples of this architecture. The advantage of this approach is that the service can be tailored to the specific needs of a given application.

Table 16.1 A Comparison of Threats on the Web

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Countermeasures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integrity</strong></td>
<td>• Modification of user data</td>
<td>• Loss of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Trojan horse browser</td>
<td>• Compromise of machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Modification of memory</td>
<td>• Vulnerability to all other threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Modification of message traffic in transit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confidentiality</strong></td>
<td>• Eavesdropping on the net</td>
<td>• Loss of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Theft of info from server</td>
<td>• Loss of privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Theft of data from client</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Info about network configuration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Info about which client talks to server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denial of Service</strong></td>
<td>• Killing of user threads</td>
<td>• Disruptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Flooding machine with bogus requests</td>
<td>• Annoying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Filling up disk or memory</td>
<td>• Prevent user from getting work done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Isolating machine by DNS attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authentication</strong></td>
<td>• Impersonation of legitimate users</td>
<td>• Misrepresentation of user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Data forgery</td>
<td>• Belief that false information is valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16.1** Relative Location of Security Facilities in the TCP/IP Protocol Stack
Netscape originated SSL. Version 3 of the protocol was designed with public review and input from industry and was published as an Internet draft document. Subsequently, when a consensus was reached to submit the protocol for Internet standardization, the TLS working group was formed within IETF to develop a common standard. This first published version of TLS can be viewed as essentially an SSLv3.1 and is very close to and backward compatible with SSLv3.

This section is devoted to a discussion of SSLv3. In the next section, the principal differences between SSLv3 and TLS are described.

SSL Architecture

SSL is designed to make use of TCP to provide a reliable end-to-end secure service. SSL is not a single protocol but rather two layers of protocols, as illustrated in Figure 16.2.

The SSL Record Protocol provides basic security services to various higher-layer protocols. In particular, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which provides the transfer service for Web client/server interaction, can operate on top of SSL. Three higher-layer protocols are defined as part of SSL: the Handshake Protocol, The Change Cipher Spec Protocol, and the Alert Protocol. These SSL-specific protocols are used in the management of SSL exchanges and are examined later in this section.

Two important SSL concepts are the SSL session and the SSL connection, which are defined in the specification as follows.

- **Connection:** A connection is a transport (in the OSI layering model definition) that provides a suitable type of service. For SSL, such connections are peer-to-peer relationships. The connections are transient. Every connection is associated with one session.
- **Session:** An SSL session is an association between a client and a server. Sessions are created by the Handshake Protocol. Sessions define a set of cryptographic

![Figure 16.2 SSL Protocol Stack](image-url)
security parameters which can be shared among multiple connections. Sessions are used to avoid the expensive negotiation of new security parameters for each connection.

Between any pair of parties (applications such as HTTP on client and server), there may be multiple secure connections. In theory, there may also be multiple simultaneous sessions between parties, but this feature is not used in practice.

There are a number of states associated with each session. Once a session is established, there is a current operating state for both read and write (i.e., receive and send). In addition, during the Handshake Protocol, pending read and write states are created. Upon successful conclusion of the Handshake Protocol, the pending states become the current states.

A session state is defined by the following parameters.

- **Session identifier**: An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an active or resumable session state.
- **Peer certificate**: An X509.v3 certificate of the peer. This element of the state may be null.
- **Compression method**: The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption.
- **Cipher spec**: Specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm (such as null, AES, etc.) and a hash algorithm (such as MD5 or SHA-1) used for MAC calculation. It also defines cryptographic attributes such as the hash_size.
- **Master secret**: 48-byte secret shared between the client and server.
- **Is resumable**: A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new connections.

A connection state is defined by the following parameters.

- **Server and client random**: Byte sequences that are chosen by the server and client for each connection.
- **Server write MAC secret**: The secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the server.
- **Client write MAC secret**: The secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the client.
- **Server write key**: The secret encryption key for data encrypted by the server and decrypted by the client.
- **Client write key**: The symmetric encryption key for data encrypted by the client and decrypted by the server.
- **Initialization vectors**: When a block cipher in CBC mode is used, an initialization vector (IV) is maintained for each key. This field is first initialized by the SSL Handshake Protocol. Thereafter, the final ciphertext block from each record is preserved for use as the IV with the following record.
- **Sequence numbers**: Each party maintains separate sequence numbers for transmitted and received messages for each connection. When a party sends or receives a change cipher spec message, the appropriate sequence number is set to zero. Sequence numbers may not exceed $2^{64} - 1$. 


SSL Record Protocol

The SSL Record Protocol provides two services for SSL connections:

- **Confidentiality:** The Handshake Protocol defines a shared secret key that is used for conventional encryption of SSL payloads.
- **Message Integrity:** The Handshake Protocol also defines a shared secret key that is used to form a message authentication code (MAC).

Figure 16.3 indicates the overall operation of the SSL Record Protocol. The Record Protocol takes an application message to be transmitted, fragments the data into manageable blocks, optionally compresses the data, applies a MAC, encrypts, adds a header, and transmits the resulting unit in a TCP segment. Received data are decrypted, verified, decompressed, and reassembled before being delivered to higher-level users.

The first step is **fragmentation.** Each upper-layer message is fragmented into blocks of $2^{14}$ bytes (16384 bytes) or less. Next, **compression** is optionally applied. Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length by more than 1024 bytes. In SSLv3 (as well as the current version of TLS), no compression algorithm is specified, so the default compression algorithm is null.

The next step in processing is to compute a **message authentication code** over the compressed data. For this purpose, a shared secret key is used. The calculation is defined as

---

1. Of course, one hopes that compression shrinks rather than expands the data. However, for very short blocks, it is possible, because of formatting conventions, that the compression algorithm will actually provide output that is longer than the input.
hash(MAC_write_secret || pad_2 ||
      hash(MAC_write_secret || pad_1 || seq_num ||
      SSLCompressed.type || SSLCompressed.length ||
      SSLCompressed.fragment))

where

|| = concatenation
MAC_write_secret = shared secret key
hash = cryptographic hash algorithm; either MD5 or SHA-1
pad_1 = the byte 0x36 (0011 0110) repeated 48 times (384 bits) for MD5 and 40 times (320 bits) for SHA-1
pad_2 = the byte 0x5C (0101 1100) repeated 48 times for MD5 and 40 times for SHA-1
seq_num = the sequence number for this message
SSLCompressed.type = the higher-level protocol used to process this fragment
SSLCompressed.length = the length of the compressed fragment
SSLCompressed.fragment = the compressed fragment (if compression is not used, this is the plaintext fragment)

Note that this is very similar to the HMAC algorithm defined in Chapter 12. The difference is that the two pads are concatenated in SSLv3 and are XORed in HMAC. The SSLv3 MAC algorithm is based on the original Internet draft for HMAC, which used concatenation. The final version of HMAC (defined in RFC 2104) uses the XOR.

Next, the compressed message plus the MAC are encrypted using symmetric encryption. Encryption may not increase the content length by more than 1024 bytes, so that the total length may not exceed $2^{14} + 2048$. The following encryption algorithms are permitted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block Cipher</th>
<th></th>
<th>Stream Cipher</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>Key Size</td>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>Key Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>128, 256</td>
<td>RC4-40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>RC4-128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC2-40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES-40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortezza</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fortezza can be used in a smart card encryption scheme.

For stream encryption, the compressed message plus the MAC are encrypted. Note that the MAC is computed before encryption takes place and that the MAC is then encrypted along with the plaintext or compressed plaintext.

For block encryption, padding may be added after the MAC prior to encryption. The padding is in the form of a number of padding bytes followed by a one-byte
indication of the length of the padding. The total amount of padding is the smallest amount such that the total size of the data to be encrypted (plaintext plus MAC plus padding) is a multiple of the cipher’s block length. An example is a plaintext (or compressed text if compression is used) of 58 bytes, with a MAC of 20 bytes (using SHA-1), that is encrypted using a block length of 8 bytes (e.g., DES). With the padding-length byte, this yields a total of 79 bytes. To make the total an integer multiple of 8, one byte of padding is added.

The final step of SSL Record Protocol processing is to prepare a header consisting of the following fields:

- **Content Type (8 bits):** The higher-layer protocol used to process the enclosed fragment.
- **Major Version (8 bits):** Indicates major version of SSL in use. For SSLv3, the value is 3.
- **Minor Version (8 bits):** Indicates minor version in use. For SSLv3, the value is 0.
- **Compressed Length (16 bits):** The length in bytes of the plaintext fragment (or compressed fragment if compression is used). The maximum value is $2^{14} + 2048$.

The content types that have been defined are *change_cipher_spec*, *alert*, *handshake*, and *application_data*. The first three are the SSL-specific protocols, discussed next. Note that no distinction is made among the various applications (e.g., HTTP) that might use SSL; the content of the data created by such applications is opaque to SSL.

Figure 16.4 illustrates the SSL record format.

**Change Cipher Spec Protocol**

The Change Cipher Spec Protocol is one of the three SSL-specific protocols that use the SSL Record Protocol, and it is the simplest. This protocol consists of a single message (Figure 16.5a), which consists of a single byte with the value 1. The sole purpose of this message is to cause the pending state to be copied into the current state, which updates the cipher suite to be used on this connection.
The Alert Protocol is used to convey SSL-related alerts to the peer entity. As with other applications that use SSL, alert messages are compressed and encrypted, as specified by the current state.

Each message in this protocol consists of two bytes (Figure 16.5b). The first byte takes the value warning (1) or fatal (2) to convey the severity of the message. If the level is fatal, SSL immediately terminates the connection. Other connections on the same session may continue, but no new connections on this session may be established. The second byte contains a code that indicates the specific alert. First, we list those alerts that are always fatal (definitions from the SSL specification):

- **unexpected_message**: An inappropriate message was received.
- **bad_record_mac**: An incorrect MAC was received.
- **decompression_failure**: The decompression function received improper input (e.g., unable to decompress or decompress to greater than maximum allowable length).
- **handshake_failure**: Sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available.
- **illegal_parameter**: A field in a handshake message was out of range or inconsistent with other fields.

The remaining alerts are the following.

- **close_notify**: Notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection. Each party is required to send a close_notify alert before closing the write side of a connection.
- **no_certificate**: May be sent in response to a certificate request if no appropriate certificate is available.
- **bad_certificate**: A received certificate was corrupt (e.g., contained a signature that did not verify).
- **unsupported_certificate**: The type of the received certificate is not supported.
- **certificate_revoked**: A certificate has been revoked by its signer.
- **certificate_expired**: A certificate has expired.
Handshake Protocol

The most complex part of SSL is the Handshake Protocol. This protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption and MAC algorithm and cryptographic keys to be used to protect data sent in an SSL record. The Handshake Protocol is used before any application data is transmitted.

The Handshake Protocol consists of a series of messages exchanged by client and server. All of these have the format shown in Figure 16.5c. Each message has three fields:

- **Type (1 byte):** Indicates one of 10 messages. Table 16.2 lists the defined message types.
- **Length (3 bytes):** The length of the message in bytes.
- **Content (≥ 0 bytes):** The parameters associated with this message; these are listed in Table 16.2.

Figure 16.6 shows the initial exchange needed to establish a logical connection between client and server. The exchange can be viewed as having four phases.

**Phase 1. Establish Security Capabilities** This phase is used to initiate a logical connection and to establish the security capabilities that will be associated with it. The exchange is initiated by the client, which sends a client_hello message with the following parameters:

- **Version:** The highest SSL version understood by the client.
- **Random:** A client-generated random structure consisting of a 32-bit timestamp and 28 bytes generated by a secure random number generator. These values serve as nonces and are used during key exchange to prevent replay attacks.

Table 16.2  SSL Handshake Protocol Message Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message Type</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hello_request</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_hello</td>
<td>version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server_hello</td>
<td>version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certificate</td>
<td>chain of X.509v3 certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server_key_exchange</td>
<td>parameters, signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certificate_request</td>
<td>type, authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server_done</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certificate_verify</td>
<td>signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_key_exchange</td>
<td>parameters, signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finished</td>
<td>hash value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- **Session ID**: A variable-length session identifier. A nonzero value indicates that the client wishes to update the parameters of an existing connection or to create a new connection on this session. A zero value indicates that the client wishes to establish a new connection on a new session.

- **CipherSuite**: This is a list that contains the combinations of cryptographic algorithms supported by the client, in decreasing order of preference. Each element of the list (each cipher suite) defines both a key exchange algorithm and a CipherSpec; these are discussed subsequently.

---

**Figure 16.6** Handshake Protocol Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Server</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phase 1</strong> Establish security capabilities, including protocol version, session ID, cipher suite, compression method, and initial random numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phase 2</strong> Server may send certificate, key exchange, and request certificate. Server signals end of hello message phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phase 3</strong> Client sends certificate if requested. Client sends key exchange. Client may send certificate verification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phase 4</strong> Change cipher suite and finish handshake protocol.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Shaded transfers are optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.*
Compression Method: This is a list of the compression methods the client supports.

After sending the client_hello message, the client waits for the server_hello message, which contains the same parameters as the client_hello message. For the server_hello message, the following conventions apply. The Version field contains the lower of the versions suggested by the client and the highest supported by the server. The Random field is generated by the server and is independent of the client’s Random field. If the SessionID field of the client was nonzero, the same value is used by the server; otherwise the server’s SessionID field contains the value for a new session. The CipherSuite field contains the single cipher suite selected by the server from those proposed by the client. The Compression field contains the compression method selected by the server from those proposed by the client.

The first element of the CipherSuite parameter is the key exchange method (i.e., the means by which the cryptographic keys for conventional encryption and MAC are exchanged). The following key exchange methods are supported.

- **RSA**: The secret key is encrypted with the receiver’s RSA public key. A public-key certificate for the receiver’s key must be made available.
- **Fixed Diffie-Hellman**: This is a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in which the server’s certificate contains the Diffie-Hellman public parameters signed by the certificate authority (CA). That is, the public-key certificate contains the Diffie-Hellman public-key parameters. The client provides its Diffie-Hellman public-key parameters either in a certificate, if client authentication is required, or in a key exchange message. This method results in a fixed secret key between two peers based on the Diffie-Hellman calculation using the fixed public keys.
- **Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman**: This technique is used to create ephemeral (temporary, one-time) secret keys. In this case, the Diffie-Hellman public keys are exchanged, signed using the sender’s private RSA or DSS key. The receiver can use the corresponding public key to verify the signature. Certificates are used to authenticate the public keys. This would appear to be the most secure of the three Diffie-Hellman options, because it results in a temporary, authenticated key.
- **Anonymous Diffie-Hellman**: The base Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used with no authentication. That is, each side sends its public Diffie-Hellman parameters to the other with no authentication. This approach is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which the attacker conducts anonymous Diffie-Hellman with both parties.
- **Fortezza**: The technique defined for the Fortezza scheme.

Following the definition of a key exchange method is the CipherSpec, which includes the following fields.

- **CipherAlgorithm**: Any of the algorithms mentioned earlier: RC4, RC2, DES, 3DES, DES40, IDEA, or Fortezza
• **MACAlgorithm**: MD5 or SHA-1
• **CipherType**: Stream or Block
• **IsExportable**: True or False
• **HashSize**: 0, 16 (for MD5), or 20 (for SHA-1) bytes
• **Key Material**: A sequence of bytes that contain data used in generating the write keys
• **IV Size**: The size of the Initialization Value for Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption

**Phase 2. Server Authentication and Key Exchange** The server begins this phase by sending its certificate if it needs to be authenticated; the message contains one or a chain of X.509 certificates. The **certificate message** is required for any agreed-on key exchange method except anonymous Diffie-Hellman. Note that if fixed Diffie-Hellman is used, this certificate message functions as the server’s key exchange message because it contains the server’s public Diffie-Hellman parameters.

Next, a **server_key_exchange message** may be sent if it is required. It is not required in two instances: (1) The server has sent a certificate with fixed Diffie-Hellman parameters or (2) a RSA key exchange is to be used. The server_key_exchange message is needed for the following:

- **Anonymous Diffie-Hellman**: The message content consists of the two global Diffie-Hellman values (a prime number and a primitive root of that number) plus the server’s public Diffie-Hellman key (see Figure 10.1).
- **Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman**: The message content includes the three Diffie-Hellman parameters provided for anonymous Diffie-Hellman plus a signature of those parameters.
- **RSA key exchange (in which the server is using RSA but has a signature-only RSA key)**: Accordingly, the client cannot simply send a secret key encrypted with the server’s public key. Instead, the server must create a temporary RSA public/private key pair and use the server_key_exchange message to send the public key. The message content includes the two parameters of the temporary RSA public key (exponent and modulus; see Figure 9.5) plus a signature of those parameters.
- **Fortezza**

Some further details about the signatures are warranted. As usual, a signature is created by taking the hash of a message and encrypting it with the sender’s private key. In this case, the hash is defined as

\[
\text{hash(ClientHello.random || ServerHello.random || ServerParams)}
\]

So the hash covers not only the Diffie-Hellman or RSA parameters but also the two nonces from the initial hello messages. This ensures against replay attacks and misrepresentation. In the case of a DSS signature, the hash is performed using the
SHA-1 algorithm. In the case of an RSA signature, both an MD5 and an SHA-1 hash are calculated, and the concatenation of the two hashes (36 bytes) is encrypted with the server’s private key.

Next, a nonanonymous server (server not using anonymous Diffie-Hellman) can request a certificate from the client. The **certificate_request** message includes two parameters: **certificate_type** and **certificate_authorities**. The certificate type indicates the public-key algorithm and its use:

- RSA, signature only
- DSS, signature only
- RSA for fixed Diffie-Hellman; in this case the signature is used only for authentication, by sending a certificate signed with RSA
- DSS for fixed Diffie-Hellman; again, used only for authentication
- RSA for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
- DSS for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
- Fortezza

The second parameter in the **certificate_request** message is a list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities.

The final message in phase 2, and one that is always required, is the **server_done** message, which is sent by the server to indicate the end of the server hello and associated messages. After sending this message, the server will wait for a client response. This message has no parameters.

**Phase 3. Client Authentication and Key Exchange** Upon receipt of the **server_done** message, the client should verify that the server provided a valid certificate (if required) and check that the **server_hello** parameters are acceptable. If all is satisfactory, the client sends one or more messages back to the server.

If the server has requested a certificate, the client begins this phase by sending a **certificate** message. If no suitable certificate is available, the client sends a **no_certificate** alert instead.

Next is the **client_key_exchange** message, which must be sent in this phase. The content of the message depends on the type of key exchange, as follows.

- **RSA**: The client generates a 48-byte *pre-master secret* and encrypts with the public key from the server’s certificate or temporary RSA key from a **server_key_exchange** message. Its use to compute a *master secret* is explained later.
- **Ephemeral or Anonymous Diffie-Hellman**: The client’s public Diffie-Hellman parameters are sent.
- **Fixed Diffie-Hellman**: The client’s public Diffie-Hellman parameters were sent in a certificate message, so the content of this message is null.
- **Forteza**: The client’s Fortezza parameters are sent.

Finally, in this phase, the client may send a **certificate_verify** message to provide explicit verification of a client certificate. This message is only sent following any client certificate that has signing capability (i.e., all certificates except
those containing fixed Diffie-Hellman parameters). This message signs a hash code based on the preceding messages, defined as

\[ \text{CertificateVerify.signature.md5_hash} = \text{MD5(master_secret || pad_2 || MD5(handshake_messages || master_secret || pad_1))}; \]

\[ \text{CertificateVerify.signature.sha_hash} = \text{SHA(master_secret || pad_2 || SHA(handshake_messages || master_secret || pad_1))}; \]

where \( \text{pad}_1 \) and \( \text{pad}_2 \) are the values defined earlier for the MAC, \( \text{handshake_messages} \) refers to all Handshake Protocol messages sent or received starting at client_hello but not including this message, and \( \text{master_secret} \) is the calculated secret whose construction is explained later in this section. If the user’s private key is DSS, then it is used to encrypt the SHA-1 hash. If the user’s private key is RSA, it is used to encrypt the concatenation of the MD5 and SHA-1 hashes. In either case, the purpose is to verify the client’s ownership of the private key for the client certificate. Even if someone is misusing the client’s certificate, he or she would be unable to send this message.

**PHASE 4. FINISH** This phase completes the setting up of a secure connection. The client sends a change_cipher_spec message and copies the pending CipherSpec into the current CipherSpec. Note that this message is not considered part of the Handshake Protocol but is sent using the Change Cipher Spec Protocol. The client then immediately sends the finished message under the new algorithms, keys, and secrets. The finished message verifies that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful. The content of the finished message is the concatenation of two hash values:

\[ \text{MD5(master_secret || pad2 || MD5(handshake_messages || Sender || master_secret || pad1))}; \]

\[ \text{SHA(master_secret || pad2 || SHA(handshake_messages || Sender || master_secret || pad1))}; \]

where \( \text{Sender} \) is a code that identifies that the sender is the client and handshake_messages is all of the data from all handshake messages up to but not including this message.

In response to these two messages, the server sends its own change_cipher_spec message, transfers the pending to the current CipherSpec, and sends its finished message. At this point, the handshake is complete and the client and server may begin to exchange application-layer data.

**Cryptographic Computations**

Two further items are of interest: (1) the creation of a shared master secret by means of the key exchange and (2) the generation of cryptographic parameters from the master secret.
**Master Secret Creation** The shared master secret is a one-time 48-byte value (384 bits) generated for this session by means of secure key exchange. The creation is in two stages. First, a pre_master_secret is exchanged. Second, the master_secret is calculated by both parties. For pre_master_secret exchange, there are two possibilities.

- **RSA:** A 48-byte pre_master_secret is generated by the client, encrypted with the server’s public RSA key, and sent to the server. The server decrypts the ciphertext using its private key to recover the pre_master_secret.

- **Diffie-Hellman:** Both client and server generate a Diffie-Hellman public key. After these are exchanged, each side performs the Diffie-Hellman calculation to create the shared pre_master_secret.

Both sides now compute the master_secret as

\[
\text{master}_\text{secret} = \text{MD5}((\text{pre}_\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{SHA('A' \mid \text{pre}_\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{ClientHello.random} \mid \text{ServerHello.random})) \mid \text{MD5}((\text{pre}_\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{SHA('BB' \mid \text{pre}_\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{ClientHello.random} \mid \text{ServerHello.random})) \mid \text{MD5}((\text{pre}_\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{SHA('CCC' \mid \text{pre}_\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{ClientHello.random} \mid \text{ServerHello.random}))
\]

where ClientHello.random and ServerHello.random are the two nonce values exchanged in the initial hello messages.

**Generation of Cryptographic Parameters** CipherSpecs require a client write MAC secret, a server write MAC secret, a client write key, a server write key, a client write IV, and a server write IV, which are generated from the master secret in that order. These parameters are generated from the master secret by hashing the master secret into a sequence of secure bytes of sufficient length for all needed parameters.

The generation of the key material from the master secret uses the same format for generation of the master secret from the pre-master secret as

\[
\text{key}_\text{block} = \text{MD5}((\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{SHA('A' \mid \text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{ServerHello.random} \mid \text{ClientHello.random})) \mid \text{MD5}((\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{SHA('BB' \mid \text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{ServerHello.random} \mid \text{ClientHello.random})) \mid \text{MD5}((\text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{SHA('CCC' \mid \text{master}_\text{secret} \mid \text{ServerHello.random} \mid \text{ClientHello.random})}
\]

until enough output has been generated. The result of this algorithmic structure is a pseudorandom function. We can view the master_secret as the pseudorandom seed value to the function. The client and server random numbers can be viewed as salt values to complicate cryptanalysis (see Chapter 20 for a discussion of the use of salt values).
16.3 TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY

TLS is an IETF standardization initiative whose goal is to produce an Internet standard version of SSL. TLS is defined as a Proposed Internet Standard in RFC 5246. RFC 5246 is very similar to SSLv3. In this section, we highlight the differences.

Version Number

The TLS Record Format is the same as that of the SSL Record Format (Figure 16.4), and the fields in the header have the same meanings. The one difference is in version values. For the current version of TLS, the major version is 3 and the minor version is 3.

Message Authentication Code

There are two differences between the SSLv3 and TLS MAC schemes: the actual algorithm and the scope of the MAC calculation. TLS makes use of the HMAC algorithm defined in RFC 2104. Recall from Chapter 12 that HMAC is defined as

\[ \text{HMAC}_K(M) = H[(K^+ \oplus \text{opad}) \| H[(K^+ \oplus \text{ipad}) \| M]] \]

where

- \( H \) = embedded hash function (for TLS, either MD5 or SHA-1)
- \( M \) = message input to HMAC
- \( K^+ \) = secret key padded with zeros on the left so that the result is equal to the block length of the hash code (for MD5 and SHA-1, block length = 512 bits)
- \( \text{ipad} = 00110110 \) (36 in hexadecimal) repeated 64 times (512 bits)
- \( \text{opad} = 01011100 \) (5C in hexadecimal) repeated 64 times (512 bits)

SSLv3 uses the same algorithm, except that the padding bytes are concatenated with the secret key rather than being XORed with the secret key padded to the block length. The level of security should be about the same in both cases.

For TLS, the MAC calculation encompasses the fields indicated in the following expression:

\[
\text{MAC} \left( \text{MAC\_write\_secret}, \text{seq\_num} \| \text{TLSCompressed\_type} \| \text{TLSCompressed\_version} \| \text{TLSCompressed\_length} \| \text{TLSCompressed\_fragment} \right)
\]

The MAC calculation covers all of the fields covered by the SSLv3 calculation, plus the field \text{TLSCompressed\_version}, which is the version of the protocol being employed.
Pseudorandom Function

TLS makes use of a pseudorandom function referred to as PRF to expand secrets into blocks of data for purposes of key generation or validation. The objective is to make use of a relatively small shared secret value but to generate longer blocks of data in a way that is secure from the kinds of attacks made on hash functions and MACs. The PRF is based on the data expansion function (Figure 16.7) given as

\[
P_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret}, \text{seed}) = \text{HMAC}_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret}, A(1) \ || \ \text{seed}) \ || \\
\quad \text{HMAC}_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret}, A(2) \ || \ \text{seed}) \ || \\
\quad \text{HMAC}_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret}, A(3) \ || \ \text{seed}) \ || \ldots
\]

where \( A() \) is defined as

\[
A(0) = \text{seed} \\
A(i) = \text{HMAC}_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret}, A(i-1))
\]

Figure 16.7 TLS Function \( P_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret}, \text{seed}) \)
The data expansion function makes use of the HMAC algorithm with either MD5 or SHA-1 as the underlying hash function. As can be seen, \( P_{\text{hash}} \) can be iterated as many times as necessary to produce the required quantity of data. For example, if \( P_{\text{SHA-1}} \) was used to generate 64 bytes of data, it would have to be iterated four times, producing 80 bytes of data of which the last 16 would be discarded. In this case, \( P_{\text{MD5}} \) would also have to be iterated four times, producing exactly 64 bytes of data. Note that each iteration involves two executions of HMAC—each of which in turn involves two executions of the underlying hash algorithm.

To make PRF as secure as possible, it uses two hash algorithms in a way that should guarantee its security if either algorithm remains secure. PRF is defined as

\[
\text{PRF}(\text{secret}, \text{label}, \text{seed}) = P_{\text{hash}}(S1, \text{label} \parallel \text{seed})
\]

PRF takes as input a secret value, an identifying label, and a seed value and produces an output of arbitrary length.

**Alert Codes**

TLS supports all of the alert codes defined in SSLv3 with the exception of no_certificate. A number of additional codes are defined in TLS; of these, the following are always fatal.

- **record_overflow**: A TLS record was received with a payload (ciphertext) whose length exceeds \( 2^{14}+2048 \) bytes, or the ciphertext decrypted to a length of greater than \( 2^{14}+1024 \) bytes.
- **unknown_ca**: A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or could not be matched with a known, trusted CA.
- **access_denied**: A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with the negotiation.
- **decode_error**: A message could not be decoded, because either a field was out of its specified range or the length of the message was incorrect.
- **protocol_version**: The protocol version the client attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported.
- **insufficient_security**: Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client.
- **unsupported_extension**: Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension not in the corresponding client hello.
- **internal_error**: An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue.
- **decrypt_error**: A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a finished message.
The remaining alerts include the following.

- **userCanceled**: This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure.
- **noRenegotiation**: Sent by a client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these messages would normally result in renegotiation, but this alert indicates that the sender is not able to renegotiate. This message is always a warning.

**Cipher Suites**

There are several small differences between the cipher suites available under SSLv3 and under TLS:

- **Key Exchange**: TLS supports all of the key exchange techniques of SSLv3 with the exception of Fortezza.
- **Symmetric Encryption Algorithms**: TLS includes all of the symmetric encryption algorithms found in SSLv3, with the exception of Fortezza.

**Client Certificate Types**

TLS defines the following certificate types to be requested in a `certificate_request` message: `rsa_sign`, `dss_sign`, `rsa_fixed_dh`, and `dss_fixed_dh`. These are all defined in SSLv3. In addition, SSLv3 includes `rsa_ephemeral_dh`, `dss_ephemeral_dh`, and `fortezza_kea`. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman involves signing the Diffie-Hellman parameters with either RSA or DSS. For TLS, the `rsa_sign` and `dss_sign` types are used for that function; a separate signing type is not needed to sign Diffie-Hellman parameters. TLS does not include the Fortezza scheme.

**certificate_verify and Finished Messages**

In the TLS `certificate_verify` message, the MD5 and SHA-1 hashes are calculated only over `handshake_messages`. Recall that for SSLv3, the hash calculation also included the master secret and pads. These extra fields were felt to add no additional security.

As with the finished message in SSLv3, the finished message in TLS is a hash based on the shared `master_secret`, the previous handshake messages, and a label that identifies client or server. The calculation is somewhat different. For TLS, we have

\[
\text{PRF}(\text{master\_secret}, \text{finished\_label}, \text{MD5}(\text{handshake\_messages}) || \text{SHA-1}(\text{handshake\_messages}))
\]

where `finished_label` is the string “client finished” for the client and “server finished” for the server.
Cryptographic Computations

The \texttt{pre_master_secret} for TLS is calculated in the same way as in SSLv3. As in SSLv3, the \texttt{master_secret} in TLS is calculated as a hash function of the \texttt{pre_master_secret} and the two hello random numbers. The form of the TLS calculation is different from that of SSLv3 and is defined as

\[
\text{master_secret} = \text{PRF}(\text{pre_master_secret}, "master secret", \\
\quad \text{ClientHello.random} \parallel \text{ServerHello.random})
\]

The algorithm is performed until 48 bytes of pseudorandom output are produced. The calculation of the key block material (MAC secret keys, session encryption keys, and IVs) is defined as

\[
\text{key_block} = \text{PRF}(\text{master_secret}, "key expansion", \\
\quad \text{SecurityParameters.server_random} \parallel \text{SecurityParameters.client_random})
\]

until enough output has been generated. As with SSLv3, the \texttt{key_block} is a function of the \texttt{master_secret} and the client and server random numbers, but for TLS, the actual algorithm is different.

Padding

In SSL, the padding added prior to encryption of user data is the minimum amount required so that the total size of the data to be encrypted is a multiple of the cipher’s block length. In TLS, the padding can be any amount that results in a total that is a multiple of the cipher’s block length, up to a maximum of 255 bytes. For example, if the plaintext (or compressed text if compression is used) plus MAC plus padding.length byte is 79 bytes long, then the padding length (in bytes) can be 1, 9, 17, and so on, up to 249. A variable padding length may be used to frustrate attacks based on an analysis of the lengths of exchanged messages.

16.4 HTTPS

HTTPS (HTTP over SSL) refers to the combination of HTTP and SSL to implement secure communication between a Web browser and a Web server. The HTTPS capability is built into all modern Web browsers. Its use depends on the Web server supporting HTTPS communication. For example, search engines do not support HTTPS.

The principal difference seen by a user of a Web browser is that URL (uniform resource locator) addresses begin with \texttt{https://} rather than \texttt{http://}. A normal HTTP connection uses port 80. If HTTPS is specified, port 443 is used, which invokes SSL.
When HTTPS is used, the following elements of the communication are encrypted:

- URL of the requested document
- Contents of the document
- Contents of browser forms (filled in by browser user)
- Cookies sent from browser to server and from server to browser
- Contents of HTTP header

HTTPS is documented in RFC 2818, *HTTP Over TLS*. There is no fundamental change in using HTTP over either SSL or TLS, and both implementations are referred to as HTTPS.

**Connection Initiation**

For HTTPS, the agent acting as the HTTP client also acts as the TLS client. The client initiates a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then sends the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished, the client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data is to be sent as TLS application data. Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections, should be followed.

We need to be clear that there are three levels of awareness of a connection in HTTPS. At the HTTP level, an HTTP client requests a connection to an HTTP server by sending a connection request to the next lowest layer. Typically, the next lowest layer is TCP, but it also may be TLS/SSL. At the level of TLS, a session is established between a TLS client and a TLS server. This session can support one or more connections at any time. As we have seen, a TLS request to establish a connection begins with the establishment of a TCP connection between the TCP entity on the client side and the TCP entity on the server side.

**Connection Closure**

An HTTP client or server can indicate the closing of a connection by including the following line in an HTTP record: `Connection: close`. This indicates that the connection will be closed after this record is delivered.

The closure of an HTTPS connection requires that TLS close the connection with the peer TLS entity on the remote side, which will involve closing the underlying TCP connection. At the TLS level, the proper way to close a connection is for each side to use the TLS alert protocol to send a `close_notify` alert. TLS implementations must initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection. A TLS implementation may, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an “incomplete close”. Note that an implementation that does this may choose to reuse the session. This should only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has received all the message data that it cares about.

HTTP clients also must be able to cope with a situation in which the underlying TCP connection is terminated without a prior `close_notify` alert and without a `Connection: close` indicator. Such a situation could be due to a programming
error on the server or a communication error that causes the TCP connection to drop. However, the unannounced TCP closure could be evidence of some sort of attack. So the HTTPS client should issue some sort of security warning when this occurs.

16.5 SECURE SHELL (SSH)

Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure network communications designed to be relatively simple and inexpensive to implement. The initial version, SSH1 was focused on providing a secure remote logon facility to replace TELNET and other remote logon schemes that provided no security. SSH also provides a more general client/server capability and can be used for such network functions as file transfer and e-mail. A new version, SSH2, fixes a number of security flaws in the original scheme. SSH2 is documented as a proposed standard in IETF RFCs 4250 through 4256.

SSH client and server applications are widely available for most operating systems. It has become the method of choice for remote login and X tunneling and is rapidly becoming one of the most pervasive applications for encryption technology outside of embedded systems.

SSH is organized as three protocols that typically run on top of TCP (Figure 16.8):

- **Transport Layer Protocol**: Provides server authentication, data confidentiality, and data integrity with forward secrecy (i.e., if a key is compromised during one session, the knowledge does not affect the security of earlier sessions). The transport layer may optionally provide compression.
• **User Authentication Protocol**: Authenticates the user to the server.

• **Connection Protocol**: Multiplexes multiple logical communications channels over a single, underlying SSH connection.

**Transport Layer Protocol**

**Host Keys** Server authentication occurs at the transport layer, based on the server possessing a public/private key pair. A server may have multiple host keys using multiple different asymmetric encryption algorithms. Multiple hosts may share the same host key. In any case, the server host key is used during key exchange to authenticate the identity of the host. For this to be possible, the client must have a priori knowledge of the server’s public host key. RFC 4251 dictates two alternative trust models that can be used:

1. The client has a local database that associates each host name (as typed by the user) with the corresponding public host key. This method requires no centrally administered infrastructure and no third-party coordination. The downside is that the database of name-to-key associations may become burdensome to maintain.

2. The host name-to-key association is certified by a trusted certification authority (CA). The client only knows the CA root key and can verify the validity of all host keys certified by accepted CAs. This alternative eases the maintenance problem, since ideally, only a single CA key needs to be securely stored on the client. On the other hand, each host key must be appropriately certified by a central authority before authorization is possible.

**Packet Exchange** Figure 16.9 illustrates the sequence of events in the SSH Transport Layer Protocol. First, the client establishes a TCP connection to the server. This is done via the TCP protocol and is not part of the Transport Layer Protocol. Once the connection is established, the client and server exchange data, referred to as packets, in the data field of a TCP segment. Each packet is in the following format (Figure 16.10).

- **Packet length**: Length of the packet in bytes, not including the packet length and MAC fields.

- **Padding length**: Length of the random padding field.

- **Payload**: Useful contents of the packet. Prior to algorithm negotiation, this field is uncompressed. If compression is negotiated, then in subsequent packets, this field is compressed.

- **Random padding**: Once an encryption algorithm has been negotiated, this field is added. It contains random bytes of padding so that the total length of the packet (excluding the MAC field) is a multiple of the cipher block size, or 8 bytes for a stream cipher.

- **Message authentication code (MAC)**: If message authentication has been negotiated, this field contains the MAC value. The MAC value is computed over the entire packet plus a sequence number, excluding the MAC field. The sequence number is an implicit 32-bit packet sequence that is initialized to
zero for the first packet and incremented for every packet. The sequence number is not included in the packet sent over the TCP connection.

Once an encryption algorithm has been negotiated, the entire packet (excluding the MAC field) is encrypted after the MAC value is calculated.

The SSH Transport Layer packet exchange consists of a sequence of steps (Figure 16.9). The first step, the **identification string exchange**, begins with the client sending a packet with an identification string of the form:

```
SSH-protoversion-softwareversion SP comments CR LF
```

where SP, CR, and LF are space character, carriage return, and line feed, respectively. An example of a valid string is `SSH-2.0-billsSSH_3.6.3q3<CR><LF>`. The server responds with its own identification string. These strings are used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Next comes **algorithm negotiation**. Each side sends an `SSH_MSG_KEXINIT` containing lists of supported algorithms in the order of preference to the sender. There is one list for each type of cryptographic algorithm. The algorithms include key exchange, encryption, MAC algorithm, and compression algorithm. Table 16.3 shows the allowable options for encryption, MAC, and compression. For each category, the algorithm chosen is the first algorithm on the client’s list that is also supported by the server.
The next step is **key exchange**. The specification allows for alternative methods of key exchange, but at present, only two versions of Diffie-Hellman key exchange are specified. Both versions are defined in RFC 2409 and require only one packet in each direction. The following steps are involved in the exchange. In this, C is the client; S is the server; $p$ is a large safe prime; $g$ is a generator for a subgroup of GF($p$); $q$ is the order of the subgroup; $V_S$ is S’s identification string; $V_C$ is C’s identification string; $V_S$ is S’s public host key; $I_C$ is C’s SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message and $I_S$ is S’s SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message that have been exchanged before this part begins. The values of $p$, $g$, and $q$ are known to both client and server as a result of the algorithm selection negotiation. The hash function $\text{hash()}$ is also decided during algorithm negotiation.

1. C generates a random number $x (1 < x < q)$ and computes $e = g^x \mod p$. C sends $e$ to S.

2. S generates a random number $y (0 < y < q)$ and computes $f = g^y \mod p$. S receives $e$. It computes $K = e^y \mod p$, $H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K)$, and signature $s$ on $H$ with its private host key. S sends $(K_S || f || s)$ to C. The signing operation may involve a second hashing operation.
3. C verifies that \( K_S \) really is the host key for S (e.g., using certificates or a local database). C is also allowed to accept the key without verification; however, doing so will render the protocol insecure against active attacks (but may be desirable for practical reasons in the short term in many environments). C then computes \( K = f^x \mod p \), \( H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K) \), and verifies the signature \( s \) on \( H \).

As a result of these steps, the two sides now share a master key \( K \). In addition, the server has been authenticated to the client, because the server has used its private key to sign its half of the Diffie-Hellman exchange. Finally, the hash value \( H \) serves as a session identifier for this connection. Once computed, the session identifier is not changed, even if the key exchange is performed again for this connection to obtain fresh keys.

The **end of key exchange** is signaled by the exchange of `SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS` packets. At this point, both sides may start using the keys generated from \( K \), as discussed subsequently.
The final step is **service request**. The client sends an `SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST` packet to request either the User Authentication or the Connection Protocol. Subsequent to this, all data is exchanged as the payload of an SSH Transport Layer packet, protected by encryption and MAC.

**Key Generation** The keys used for encryption and MAC (and any needed IVs) are generated from the shared secret key $K$, the hash value from the key exchange $H$, and the session identifier, which is equal to $H$ unless there has been a subsequent key exchange after the initial key exchange. The values are computed as follows.

- Initial IV client to server: $\text{HASH}(K \ || \ H \ || \ "A" \ || \ \text{session}_id)$
- Initial IV server to client: $\text{HASH}(K \ || \ H \ || \ "B" \ || \ \text{session}_id)$
- Encryption key client to server: $\text{HASH}(K \ || \ H \ || \ "C" \ || \ \text{session}_id)$
- Encryption key server to client: $\text{HASH}(K \ || \ H \ || \ "D" \ || \ \text{session}_id)$
- Integrity key client to server: $\text{HASH}(K \ || \ H \ || \ "E" \ || \ \text{session}_id)$
- Integrity key server to client: $\text{HASH}(K \ || \ H \ || \ "F" \ || \ \text{session}_id)$

where $\text{HASH}()$ is the hash function determined during algorithm negotiation.

**User Authentication Protocol**

The User Authentication Protocol provides the means by which the client is authenticated to the server.

**Message Types and Formats** Three types of messages are always used in the User Authentication Protocol. Authentication requests from the client have the format:

- byte \text{SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST} (50)
- string user name
- string service name
- string method name
- ... method specific fields

where user name is the authorization identity the client is claiming, service name is the facility to which the client is requesting access (typically the SSH Connection Protocol), and method name is the authentication method being used in this request. The first byte has decimal value 50, which is interpreted as \text{SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST}.

If the server either (1) rejects the authentication request or (2) accepts the request but requires one or more additional authentication methods, the server sends a message with the format:

- byte \text{SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE} (51)
- name-list authentications that can continue
- boolean partial success

where the name-list is a list of methods that may productively continue the dialog. If the server accepts authentication, it sends a single byte message: \text{SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS} (52).
**MESSAGE EXCHANGE** The message exchange involves the following steps.

1. The client sends a `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST` with a requested method of none.
2. The server checks to determine if the user name is valid. If not, the server returns `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE` with the partial success value of false. If the user name is valid, the server proceeds to step 3.
3. The server returns `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE` with a list of one or more authentication methods to be used.
4. The client selects one of the acceptable authentication methods and sends a `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST` with that method name and the required method-specific fields. At this point, there may be a sequence of exchanges to perform the method.
5. If the authentication succeeds and more authentication methods are required, the server proceeds to step 3, using a partial success value of true. If the authentication fails, the server proceeds to step 3, using a partial success value of false.
6. When all required authentication methods succeed, the server sends a `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS` message, and the Authentication Protocol is over.

**AUTHENTICATION METHODS** The server may require one or more of the following authentication methods.

- **publickey:** The details of this method depend on the public-key algorithm chosen. In essence, the client sends a message to the server that contains the client’s public key, with the message signed by the client’s private key. When the server receives this message, it checks whether the supplied key is acceptable for authentication and, if so, it checks whether the signature is correct.

- **password:** The client sends a message containing a plaintext password, which is protected by encryption by the Transport Layer Protocol.

- **hostbased:** Authentication is performed on the client’s host rather than the client itself. Thus, a host that supports multiple clients would provide authentication for all its clients. This method works by having the client send a signature created with the private key of the client host. Thus, rather than directly verifying the user’s identity, the SSH server verifies the identity of the client host—and then believes the host when it says the user has already authenticated on the client side.

**Connection Protocol**

The SSH Connection Protocol runs on top of the SSH Transport Layer Protocol and assumes that a secure authentication connection is in use.\(^2\) That secure authentication

---

connection, referred to as a **tunnel**, is used by the Connection Protocol to multiplex a number of logical channels.

**Channel Mechanism** All types of communication using SSH, such as a terminal session, are supported using separate channels. Either side may open a channel. For each channel, each side associates a unique channel number, which need not be the same on both ends. Channels are flow controlled using a window mechanism. No data may be sent to a channel until a message is received to indicate that window space is available.

The life of a channel progresses through three stages: opening a channel, data transfer, and closing a channel.

When either side wishes to **open a new channel**, it allocates a local number for the channel and then sends a message of the form:

```plaintext
byte   SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string channel type
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
.... channel type specific data follows
```

where uint32 means unsigned 32-bit integer. The channel type identifies the application for this channel, as described subsequently. The sender channel is the local channel number. The initial window size specifies how many bytes of channel data can be sent to the sender of this message without adjusting the window. The maximum packet size specifies the maximum size of an individual data packet that can be sent to the sender. For example, one might want to use smaller packets for interactive connections to get better interactive response on slow links.

If the remote side is able to open the channel, it returns a **SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION** message, which includes the sender channel number, the recipient channel number, and window and packet size values for incoming traffic. Otherwise, the remote side returns a **SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE** message with a reason code indicating the reason for failure.

Once a channel is open, **data transfer** is performed using a **SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA** message, which includes the recipient channel number and a block of data. These messages, in both directions, may continue as long as the channel is open.

When either side wishes to **close a channel**, it sends a **SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE** message, which includes the recipient channel number.

Figure 16.11 provides an example of Connection Protocol Message Exchange.

**Channel Types** Four channel types are recognized in the SSH Connection Protocol specification.

- **session**: The remote execution of a program. The program may be a shell, an application such as file transfer or e-mail, a system command, or some built-in subsystem. Once a session channel is opened, subsequent requests are used to start the remote program.
• **x11**: This refers to the X Window System, a computer software system and network protocol that provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for networked computers. X allows applications to run on a network server but to be displayed on a desktop machine.

• **forwarded-tcpip**: This is remote port forwarding, as explained in the next subsection.

• **direct-tcpip**: This is local port forwarding, as explained in the next subsection.

**Port Forwarding**  One of the most useful features of SSH is port forwarding. In essence, port forwarding provides the ability to convert any insecure TCP connection into a secure SSH connection. This is also referred to as SSH tunneling. We need to know what a port is in this context. A **port** is an identifier of a user of TCP. So, any application that runs on top of TCP has a port number. Incoming TCP traffic is delivered to the appropriate application on the basis of the port number. An application may employ multiple port numbers. For example, for the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the server side generally listens on port 25, so an incoming SMTP request uses TCP and addresses the data to destination port 25. TCP recognizes that this is the SMTP server address and routes the data to the SMTP server application.
Figure 16.12 illustrates the basic concept behind port forwarding. We have a client application that is identified by port number $x$ and a server application identified by port number $y$. At some point, the client application invokes the local TCP entity and requests a connection to the remote server on port $y$. The local TCP entity negotiates a TCP connection with the remote TCP entity, such that the connection links local port $x$ to remote port $y$.

To secure this connection, SSH is configured so that the SSH Transport Layer Protocol establishes a TCP connection between the SSH client and server entities with TCP port numbers $a$ and $b$, respectively. A secure SSH tunnel is established over this TCP connection. Traffic from the client at port $x$ is redirected to the local

![Diagram of connection via TCP and SSH tunnel](image-url)
SSH entity and travels through the tunnel where the remote SSH entity delivers the data to the server application on port \( y \). Traffic in the other direction is similarly redirected.

SSH supports two types of port forwarding: local forwarding and remote forwarding. **Local forwarding** allows the client to set up a “hijacker” process. This will intercept selected application-level traffic and redirect it from an unsecured TCP connection to a secure SSH tunnel. SSH is configured to listen on selected ports. SSH grabs all traffic using a selected port and sends it through an SSH tunnel. On the other end, the SSH server sends the incoming traffic to the destination port dictated by the client application.

The following example should help clarify local forwarding. Suppose you have an e-mail client on your desktop and use it to get e-mail from your mail server via the Post Office Protocol (POP). The assigned port number for POP3 is port 110. We can secure this traffic in the following way:

1. The SSH client sets up a connection to the remote server.
2. Select an unused local port number, say 9999, and configure SSH to accept traffic from this port destined for port 110 on the server.
3. The SSH client informs the SSH server to create a connection to the destination, in this case mailserver port 110.
4. The client takes any bits sent to local port 9999 and sends them to the server inside the encrypted SSH session. The SSH server decrypts the incoming bits and sends the plaintext to port 110.
5. In the other direction, the SSH server takes any bits received on port 110 and sends them inside the SSH session back to the client, who decrypts and sends them to the process connected to port 9999.

With **remote forwarding**, the user’s SSH client acts on the server’s behalf. The client receives traffic with a given destination port number, places the traffic on the correct port and sends it to the destination the user chooses. A typical example of remote forwarding is the following. You wish to access a server at work from your home computer. Because the work server is behind a firewall, it will not accept an SSH request from your home computer. However, from work you can set up an SSH tunnel using remote forwarding. This involves the following steps.

1. From the work computer, set up an SSH connection to your home computer. The firewall will allow this, because it is a protected outgoing connection.
2. Configure the SSH server to listen on a local port, say 22, and to deliver data across the SSH connection addressed to remote port, say 2222.
3. You can now go to your home computer, and configure SSH to accept traffic on port 2222.
4. You now have an SSH tunnel that can be used for remote logon to the work server.
16.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

[RESC01] is a good detailed treatment of SSL and TLS. [BARR05] provides a thorough treatment of SSH. The original version (SSH-1) of SSH was introduced in [YLON96].


Recommended Web Sites:

- **Transport Layer Security Charter**: Latest RFCs and Internet drafts for TLS.
- **OpenSSL Project**: Project to develop open-source SSL and TLS software. Site includes documents and links.

16.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

**Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert protocol</th>
<th>HTTPS (HTTP over SSL)</th>
<th>Secure Socket Layer (SSL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change Cipher Spec protocol</td>
<td>Master Secret</td>
<td>Transport Layer Security (TLS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handshake protocol</td>
<td>Secure Shell (SSH)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Review Questions**

16.1 What are the advantages of each of the three approaches shown in Figure 16.1?
16.2 What protocols comprise SSL?
16.3 What is the difference between an SSL connection and an SSL session?
16.4 List and briefly define the parameters that define an SSL session state.
16.5 List and briefly define the parameters that define an SSL session connection.
16.6 What services are provided by the SSL Record Protocol?
16.7 What steps are involved in the SSL Record Protocol transmission?
16.8 What is the purpose of HTTPS?
16.9 For what applications is SSH useful?
16.10 List and briefly define the SSH protocols.
Problems

16.1 In SSL and TLS, why is there a separate Change Cipher Spec Protocol rather than including a change_cipher_spec message in the Handshake Protocol?

16.2 What purpose does the MAC serve during the change cipher spec SSL exchange?

16.3 Consider the following threats to Web security and describe how each is countered by a particular feature of SSL.
   a. Brute-Force Cryptanalytic Attack: An exhaustive search of the key space for a conventional encryption algorithm.
   b. Known Plaintext Dictionary Attack: Many messages will contain predictable plaintext, such as the HTTP GET command. An attacker constructs a dictionary containing every possible encryption of the known-plaintext message. When an encrypted message is intercepted, the attacker takes the portion containing the encrypted known plaintext and looks up the ciphertext in the dictionary. The ciphertext should match against an entry that was encrypted with the same secret key. If there are several matches, each of these can be tried against the full ciphertext to determine the right one. This attack is especially effective against small key sizes (e.g., 40-bit keys).
   c. Replay Attack: Earlier SSL handshake messages are replayed.
   d. Man-in-the-Middle Attack: An attacker interposes during key exchange, acting as the client to the server and as the server to the client.
   e. Password Sniffing: Passwords in HTTP or other application traffic are eavesdropped.
   f. IP Spoofing: Uses forged IP addresses to fool a host into accepting bogus data.
   g. IP Hijacking: An active, authenticated connection between two hosts is disrupted and the attacker takes the place of one of the hosts.
   h. SYN Flooding: An attacker sends TCP SYN messages to request a connection but does not respond to the final message to establish the connection fully. The attacked TCP module typically leaves the “half-open connection” around for a few minutes. Repeated SYN messages can clog the TCP module.

16.4 Based on what you have learned in this chapter, is it possible in SSL for the receiver to reorder SSL record blocks that arrive out of order? If so, explain how it can be done. If not, why not?

16.5 For SSH packets, what is the advantage, if any, of not including the MAC in the scope of the packet encryption?
17.1 **IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Overview**
- The Wi-Fi Alliance
- IEEE 802 Protocol Architecture
- IEEE 802.11 Network Components and Architectural Model
- IEEE 802.11 Services

17.2 **IEEE 802.11i Wireless LAN Security**
- IEEE 802.11i Services
- IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation
- Discovery Phase
- Authentication Phase
- Key Management Phase
- Protected Data Transfer Phase
- The IEEE 802.11i Pseudorandom Function

17.3 **Wireless Application Protocol Overview**
- Operational Overview
- Wireless Markup Language
- WAP Architecture
- Wireless Application Environment
- WAP Protocol Architecture

17.4 **Wireless Transport Layer Security**
- WTLS Sessions and Connections
- WTLS Protocol Architecture
- Cryptographic Algorithms

17.5 **WAP End-to-End Security**

17.6 **Recommended Reading and Web Sites**

17.7 **Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems**
Investigators have published numerous reports of birds taking turns vocalizing; the bird spoken to gave its full attention to the speaker and never vocalized at the same time, as if the two were holding a conversation.

Researchers and scholars who have studied the data on avian communication carefully write (a) the communication code of birds, such as crows, has not been broken by any means; (b) probably all birds have wider vocabularies than anyone realizes; and (c) greater complexity and depth are recognized in avian communication as research progresses.

—The Human Nature of Birds, Theodore Barber

KEY POINTS

- IEEE 802.11 is a standard for wireless LANs. Interoperable standards-compliant implementations are referred to as Wi-Fi.
- IEEE 802.11i specifies security standards for IEEE 802.11 LANs, including authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality, and key management. Interoperable implementations are also referred to as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA).
- The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is a standard to provide mobile users of wireless phones and other wireless terminals access to telephony and information services, including the Internet and the Web.
- WAP security is primarily provided by the Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS), which provides security services between the mobile device and the WAP gateway to the Internet.
- There are several approaches to WAP end-to-end security. One notable approach assumes that the mobile device implements TLS over TCP/IP and the wireless network supports transfer of IP packets.

This chapter looks at two important wireless network security schemes. First, we look at the IEEE 802.11i standard for wireless LAN security. This standard is part of IEEE 802.11, also referred to as Wi-Fi. We begin the discussion with an overview of IEEE 802.11, and we then look in some detail at IEEE 802.11i.

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to security standards for Web access from mobile wireless devices, such as cell phones. We begin this part of the chapter with an overview of the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), which is a set of standards for communication between mobile devices attached to a cellular network and a Web server. Then we examine the Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol, which provides security between the mobile device and a gateway that operates between the cellular network and the Internet. Finally, we cover end-to-end security services between WAP devices and Web servers.
17.1 IEEE 802.11 WIRELESS LAN OVERVIEW

IEEE 802 is a committee that has developed standards for a wide range of local area networks (LANs). In 1990, the IEEE 802 Committee formed a new working group, IEEE 802.11, with a charter to develop a protocol and transmission specifications for wireless LANs (WLANs). Since that time, the demand for WLANs at different frequencies and data rates has exploded. Keeping pace with this demand, the IEEE 802.11 working group has issued an ever-expanding list of standards. Table 17.1 briefly defines key terms used in the IEEE 802.11 standard.

The Wi-Fi Alliance

The first 802.11 standard to gain broad industry acceptance was 802.11b. Although 802.11b products are all based on the same standard, there is always a concern whether products from different vendors will successfully interoperate. To meet this concern, the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), an industry consortium, was formed in 1999. This organization, subsequently renamed the Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) Alliance, created a test suite to certify interoperability for 802.11b products. The term used for certified 802.11b products is Wi-Fi. Wi-Fi certification has been extended to 802.11g products. The Wi-Fi Alliance has also developed a certification process for 802.11a products, called Wi-Fi5. The Wi-Fi Alliance is concerned with a range of market areas for WLANs, including enterprise, home, and hot spots.

More recently, the Wi-Fi Alliance has developed certification procedures for IEEE 802.11 security standards, referred to as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). The most recent version of WPA, known as WPA2, incorporates all of the features of the IEEE 802.11i WLAN security specification.

| Access point (AP) | Any entity that has station functionality and provides access to the distribution system via the wireless medium for associated stations. |
| Basic service set (BSS) | A set of stations controlled by a single coordination function. |
| Coordination function | The logical function that determines when a station operating within a BSS is permitted to transmit and may be able to receive PDUs. |
| Distribution system (DS) | A system used to interconnect a set of BSSs and integrated LANs to create an ESS. |
| Extended service set (ESS) | A set of one or more interconnected BSSs and integrated LANs that appear as a single BSS to the LLC layer at any station associated with one of these BSSs. |
| MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) | The unit of data exchanged between two peer MAC entities using the services of the physical layer. |
| MAC service data unit (MSDU) | Information that is delivered as a unit between MAC users. |
| Station | Any device that contains an IEEE 802.11 conformant MAC and physical layer. |
IEEE 802 Protocol Architecture

Before proceeding, we need to briefly preview the IEEE 802 protocol architecture. IEEE 802.11 standards are defined within the structure of a layered set of protocols. This structure, used for all IEEE 802 standards, is illustrated in Figure 17.1.

**Physical Layer** The lowest layer of the IEEE 802 reference model is the **physical layer**, which includes such functions as encoding/decoding of signals and bit transmission/reception. In addition, the physical layer includes a specification of the transmission medium. In the case of IEEE 802.11, the physical layer also defines frequency bands and antenna characteristics.

**Medium Access Control** All LANs consist of collections of devices that share the network’s transmission capacity. Some means of controlling access to the transmission medium is needed to provide an orderly and efficient use of that capacity. This is the function of a **medium access control (MAC)** layer. The MAC layer receives data from a higher-layer protocol, typically the Logical Link Control (LLC) layer, in the form of a block of data known as the **MAC service data unit (MSDU)**. In general, the MAC layer performs the following functions:

- On transmission, assemble data into a frame, known as a **MAC protocol data unit (MPDU)** with address and error-detection fields.
- On reception, disassemble frame, and perform address recognition and error detection.
- Govern access to the LAN transmission medium.

**Figure 17.1 IEEE 802.11 Protocol Stack**
The exact format of the MPDU differs somewhat for the various MAC protocols in use. In general, all of the MPDUs have a format similar to that of Figure 17.2. The fields of this frame are as follows.

- **MAC Control**: This field contains any protocol control information needed for the functioning of the MAC protocol. For example, a priority level could be indicated here.
- **Destination MAC Address**: The destination physical address on the LAN for this MPDU.
- **Source MAC Address**: The source physical address on the LAN for this MPDU.
- **MAC Service Data Unit**: The data from the next higher layer.
- **CRC**: The cyclic redundancy check field; also known as the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) field. This is an error-detecting code, such as that which is used in other data-link control protocols. The CRC is calculated based on the bits in the entire MPDU. The sender calculates the CRC and adds it to the frame. The receiver performs the same calculation on the incoming MPDU and compares that calculation to the CRC field in that incoming MPDU. If the two values don’t match, then one or more bits have been altered in transit.

The fields preceding the MSDU field are referred to as the **MAC header**, and the field following the MSDU field is referred to as the **MAC trailer**. The header and trailer contain control information that accompany the data field and that are used by the MAC protocol.

**Logical Link Control**. In most data-link control protocols, the data-link protocol entity is responsible not only for detecting errors using the CRC, but for recovering from those errors by retransmitting damaged frames. In the LAN protocol architecture, these two functions are split between the MAC and LLC layers. The MAC layer is responsible for detecting errors and discarding any frames that contain errors. The LLC layer optionally keeps track of which frames have been successfully received and retransmits unsuccessful frames.

**IEEE 802.11 Network Components and Architectural Model**

Figure 17.3 illustrates the model developed by the 802.11 working group. The smallest building block of a wireless LAN is a **basic service set (BSS)**, which consists of wireless stations executing the same MAC protocol and competing for access to the same shared wireless medium. A BSS may be isolated, or it may connect to a backbone...
The **distribution system (DS)** through an **access point (AP)**. The AP functions as a bridge and a relay point. In a BSS, client stations do not communicate directly with one another. Rather, if one station in the BSS wants to communicate with another station in the same BSS, the MAC frame is first sent from the originating station to the AP and then from the AP to the destination station. Similarly, a MAC frame from a station in the BSS to a remote station is sent from the local station to the AP and then relayed by the AP over the DS on its way to the destination station. The BSS generally corresponds to what is referred to as a cell in the literature. The DS can be a switch, a wired network, or a wireless network.

When all the stations in the BSS are mobile stations that communicate directly with one another (not using an AP), the BSS is called an **independent BSS (IBSS)**. An IBSS is typically an ad hoc network. In an IBSS, the stations all communicate directly, and no AP is involved.

A simple configuration is shown in Figure 17.3, in which each station belongs to a single BSS; that is, each station is within wireless range only of other stations within the same BSS. It is also possible for two BSSs to overlap geographically, so that a single station could participate in more than one BSS. Furthermore, the association between a station and a BSS is dynamic. Stations may turn off, come within range, and go out of range.

An **extended service set (ESS)** consists of two or more basic service sets interconnected by a distribution system. The extended service set appears as a single logical LAN to the logical link control (LLC) level.
IEEE 802.11 Services

IEEE 802.11 defines nine services that need to be provided by the wireless LAN to achieve functionality equivalent to that which is inherent to wired LANs. Table 17.2 lists the services and indicates two ways of categorizing them.

1. The service provider can be either the station or the DS. Station services are implemented in every 802.11 station, including AP stations. Distribution services are provided between BSSs; these services may be implemented in an AP or in another special-purpose device attached to the distribution system.

2. Three of the services are used to control IEEE 802.11 LAN access and confidentiality. Six of the services are used to support delivery of MSDUs between stations. If the MSDU is too large to be transmitted in a single MPDU, it may be fragmented and transmitted in a series of MPDUs.

Following the IEEE 802.11 document, we next discuss the services in an order designed to clarify the operation of an IEEE 802.11 ESS network. **MSDU delivery**, which is the basic service, already has been mentioned. Services related to security are introduced in Section 17.2.

**DISTRIBUTION OF MESSAGES WITHIN A DS** The two services involved with the distribution of messages within a DS are distribution and integration. **Distribution** is the primary service used by stations to exchange MPDUs when the MPDUs must traverse the DS to get from a station in one BSS to a station in another BSS. For example, suppose a frame is to be sent from station 2 (STA 2) to station 7 (STA 7) in Figure 17.3. The frame is sent from STA 2 to AP 1, which is the AP for this BSS. The AP gives the frame to the DS, which has the job of directing the frame to the AP associated with STA 7 in the target BSS. AP 2 receives the frame and forwards it to STA 7. How the message is transported through the DS is beyond the scope of the IEEE 802.11 standard.

If the two stations that are communicating are within the same BSS, then the distribution service logically goes through the single AP of that BSS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 17.2</strong> IEEE 802.11 Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deauthentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disassociation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDU delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassociation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The integration service enables transfer of data between a station on an IEEE 802.11 LAN and a station on an integrated IEEE 802.x LAN. The term integrated refers to a wired LAN that is physically connected to the DS and whose stations may be logically connected to an IEEE 802.11 LAN via the integration service. The integration service takes care of any address translation and media conversion logic required for the exchange of data.

**ASSOCIATION-RELATED SERVICES** The primary purpose of the MAC layer is to transfer MSDUs between MAC entities; this purpose is fulfilled by the distribution service. For that service to function, it requires information about stations within the ESS that is provided by the association-related services. Before the distribution service can deliver data to or accept data from a station, that station must be associated. Before looking at the concept of association, we need to describe the concept of mobility. The standard defines three transition types, based on mobility:

- **No transition**: A station of this type is either stationary or moves only within the direct communication range of the communicating stations of a single BSS.
- **BSS transition**: This is defined as a station movement from one BSS to another BSS within the same ESS. In this case, delivery of data to the station requires that the addressing capability be able to recognize the new location of the station.
- **ESS transition**: This is defined as a station movement from a BSS in one ESS to a BSS within another ESS. This case is supported only in the sense that the station can move. Maintenance of upper-layer connections supported by 802.11 cannot be guaranteed. In fact, disruption of service is likely to occur.

To deliver a message within a DS, the distribution service needs to know where the destination station is located. Specifically, the DS needs to know the identity of the AP to which the message should be delivered in order for that message to reach the destination station. To meet this requirement, a station must maintain an association with the AP within its current BSS. Three services relate to this requirement:

- **Association**: Establishes an initial association between a station and an AP. Before a station can transmit or receive frames on a wireless LAN, its identity and address must be known. For this purpose, a station must establish an association with an AP within a particular BSS. The AP can then communicate this information to other APs within the ESS to facilitate routing and delivery of addressed frames.
- **Reassociation**: Enables an established association to be transferred from one AP to another, allowing a mobile station to move from one BSS to another.
- **Disassociation**: A notification from either a station or an AP that an existing association is terminated. A station should give this notification before leaving an ESS or shutting down. However, the MAC management facility protects itself against stations that disappear without notification.
17.2 IEEE 802.11i WIRELESS LAN SECURITY

There are two characteristics of a wired LAN that are not inherent in a wireless LAN.

1. In order to transmit over a wired LAN, a station must be physically connected to the LAN. On the other hand, with a wireless LAN, any station within radio range of the other devices on the LAN can transmit. In a sense, there is a form of authentication with a wired LAN in that it requires some positive and presumably observable action to connect a station to a wired LAN.

2. Similarly, in order to receive a transmission from a station that is part of a wired LAN, the receiving station also must be attached to the wired LAN. On the other hand, with a wireless LAN, any station within radio range can receive. Thus, a wired LAN provides a degree of privacy, limiting reception of data to stations connected to the LAN.

These differences between wired and wireless LANs suggest the increased need for robust security services and mechanisms for wireless LANs. The original 802.11 specification included a set of security features for privacy and authentication that were quite weak. For privacy, 802.11 defined the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm. The privacy portion of the 802.11 standard contained major weaknesses. Subsequent to the development of WEP, the 802.11i task group has developed a set of capabilities to address the WLAN security issues. In order to accelerate the introduction of strong security into WLANs, the Wi-Fi Alliance promulgated Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) as a Wi-Fi standard. WPA is a set of security mechanisms that eliminates most 802.11 security issues and was based on the current state of the 802.11i standard. The final form of the 802.11i standard is referred to as Robust Security Network (RSN). The Wi-Fi Alliance certifies vendors in compliance with the full 802.11i specification under the WPA2 program.

IEEE 802.11i Services

The 802.11i RSN security specification defines the following services.

- **Authentication**: A protocol is used to define an exchange between a user and an AS that provides mutual authentication and generates temporary keys to be used between the client and the AP over the wireless link.

- **Access control**: This function enforces the use of the authentication function, routes the messages properly, and facilitates key exchange. It can work with a variety of authentication protocols.

- **Privacy with message integrity**: MAC-level data (e.g., an LLC PDU) are encrypted along with a message integrity code that ensures that the data have not been altered.

Figure 17.4a indicates the security protocols used to support these services, while Figure 17.4b lists the cryptographic algorithms used for these services.

---

1In this context, we are discussing access control as a security function. This is a different function than media access control (MAC) as described in Section 17.1. Unfortunately, the literature and the standards use the term access control in both contexts.
IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation

The operation of an IEEE 802.11i RSN can be broken down into five distinct phases of operation. The exact nature of the phases will depend on the configuration and the end points of the communication. Possibilities include (see Figure 17.3):

1. Two wireless stations in the same BSS communicating via the access point (AP) for that BSS.
2. Two wireless stations (STAs) in the same ad hoc IBSS communicating directly with each other.
3. Two wireless stations in different BSSs communicating via their respective APs across a distribution system.
4. A wireless station communicating with an end station on a wired network via its AP and the distribution system.
IEEE 802.11i security is concerned only with secure communication between the STA and its AP. In case 1 in the preceding list, secure communication is assured if each STA establishes secure communications with the AP. Case 2 is similar, with the AP functionality residing in the STA. For case 3, security is not provided across the distribution system at the level of IEEE 802.11, but only within each BSS. End-to-end security (if required) must be provided at a higher layer. Similarly, in case 4, security is only provided between the STA and its AP.

With these considerations in mind, Figure 17.5 depicts the five phases of operation for an RSN and maps them to the network components involved. One new component is the authentication server (AS). The rectangles indicate the exchange of sequences of MPDUs. The five phases are defined as follows.

- **Discovery**: An AP uses messages called Beacons and Probe Responses to advertise its IEEE 802.11i security policy. The STA uses these to identify an AP for a WLAN with which it wishes to communicate. The STA associates with the AP, which it uses to select the cipher suite and authentication mechanism when the Beacons and Probe Responses present a choice.

- **Authentication**: During this phase, the STA and AS prove their identities to each other. The AP blocks non-authentication traffic between the STA and AS until the authentication transaction is successful. The AP does not participate in the authentication transaction other than forwarding traffic between the STA and AS.
• **Key generation and distribution**: The AP and the STA perform several operations that cause cryptographic keys to be generated and placed on the AP and the STA. Frames are exchanged between the AP and STA only.

• **Protected data transfer**: Frames are exchanged between the STA and the end station through the AP. As denoted by the shading and the encryption module icon, secure data transfer occurs between the STA and the AP only; security is not provided end-to-end.

• **Connection termination**: The AP and STA exchange frames. During this phase, the secure connection is torn down and the connection is restored to the original state.

**Discovery Phase**

We now look in more detail at the RSN phases of operation, beginning with the discovery phase, which is illustrated in the upper portion of Figure 17.6. The purpose of this phase is for an STA and an AP to recognize each other, agree on a set of security capabilities, and establish an association for future communication using those security capabilities.

**Security Capabilities** During this phase, the STA and AP decide on specific techniques in the following areas:

- Confidentiality and MPDU integrity protocols for protecting unicast traffic (traffic only between this STA and AP)
- Authentication method
- Cryptography key management approach

Confidentiality and integrity protocols for protecting multicast/broadcast traffic are dictated by the AP, since all STAs in a multicast group must use the same protocols and ciphers. The specification of a protocol, along with the chosen key length (if variable) is known as a *cipher suite*. The options for the confidentiality and integrity cipher suite are

- WEP, with either a 40-bit or 104-bit key, which allows backward compatibility with older IEEE 802.11 implementations
- TKIP
- CCMP
- Vendor-specific methods

The other negotiable suite is the authentication and key management (AKM) suite, which defines (1) the means by which the AP and STA perform mutual authentication and (2) the means for deriving a root key from which other keys may be generated. The possible AKM suites are

- IEEE 802.1X
- Pre-shared key (no explicit authentication takes place and mutual authentication is implied if the STA and AP share a unique secret key)
- Vendor-specific methods
**IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation: Capability Discovery, Authentication, and Association**

**MPDU Exchange** The discovery phase consists of three exchanges.

- **Network and security capability discovery:** During this exchange, STAs discover the existence of a network with which to communicate. The AP either periodically broadcasts its security capabilities (not shown in figure), indicated by RSN IE (Robust Security Network Information Element), in a specific channel through the Beacon frame; or responds to a station’s Probe Request through a Probe Response frame. A wireless station may discover available access points and corresponding security capabilities by either passively monitoring the Beacon frames or actively probing every channel.

- **Open system authentication:** The purpose of this frame sequence, which provides no security, is simply to maintain backward compatibility with the
IEEE 802.11 state machine, as implemented in existing IEEE 802.11 hardware. In essence, the two devices (STA and AP) simply exchange identifiers.

- **Association:** The purpose of this stage is to agree on a set of security capabilities to be used. The STA then sends an Association Request frame to the AP. In this frame, the STA specifies one set of matching capabilities (one authentication and key management suite, one pairwise cipher suite, and one group-key cipher suite) from among those advertised by the AP. If there is no match in capabilities between the AP and the STA, the AP refuses the Association Request. The STA blocks it too, in case it has associated with a rogue AP or someone is inserting frames illicitly on its channel. As shown in Figure 17.6, the IEEE 802.1X controlled ports are blocked, and no user traffic goes beyond the AP. The concept of blocked ports is explained subsequently.

**Authentication Phase**

As was mentioned, the authentication phase enables mutual authentication between an STA and an authentication server (AS) located in the DS. Authentication is designed to allow only authorized stations to use the network and to provide the STA with assurance that it is communicating with a legitimate network.

**IEEE 802.1X Access Control Approach** IEEE 802.11i makes use of another standard that was designed to provide access control functions for LANs. The standard is IEEE 802.1X, Port-Based Network Access Control. The authentication protocol that is used, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), is defined in the IEEE 802.1X standard. IEEE 802.1X uses the terms supplicant, authenticator, and authentication server (AS). In the context of an 802.11 WLAN, the first two terms correspond to the wireless station and the AP. The AS is typically a separate device on the wired side of the network (i.e., accessible over the DS) but could also reside directly on the authenticator.

Before a supplicant is authenticated by the AS using an authentication protocol, the authenticator only passes control or authentication messages between the supplicant and the AS; the 802.1X control channel is unblocked, but the 802.11 data channel is blocked. Once a supplicant is authenticated and keys are provided, the authenticator can forward data from the supplicant, subject to predefined access control limitations for the supplicant to the network. Under these circumstances, the data channel is unblocked.

As indicated in Figure 17.7, 802.1X uses the concepts of controlled and uncontrolled ports. Ports are logical entities defined within the authenticator and refer to physical network connections. For a WLAN, the authenticator (the AP) may have only two physical ports: one connecting to the DS and one for wireless communication within its BSS. Each logical port is mapped to one of these two physical ports. An uncontrolled port allows the exchange of PDUs between the supplicant and the other AS, regardless of the authentication state of the supplicant. A controlled port allows the exchange of PDUs between a supplicant and other systems on the LAN only if the current state of the supplicant authorizes such an exchange.

The 802.1X framework, with an upper-layer authentication protocol, fits nicely with a BSS architecture that includes a number of wireless stations and an AP.
However, for an IBSS, there is no AP. For an IBSS, 802.11i provides a more complex solution that, in essence, involves pairwise authentication between stations on the IBSS.

**MPDU Exchange** The lower part of Figure 17.6 shows the MPDU exchange dictated by IEEE 802.11 for the authentication phase. We can think of authentication phase as consisting of the following three phases.

- **Connect to AS**: The STA sends a request to its AP (the one with which it has an association) for connection to the AS. The AP acknowledges this request and sends an access request to the AS.
- **EAP exchange**: This exchange authenticates the STA and AS to each other. A number of alternative exchanges are possible, as explained subsequently.
- **Secure key delivery**: Once authentication is established, the AS generates a master session key (MSK), also known as the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) key and sends it to the STA. As explained subsequently, all the cryptographic keys needed by the STA for secure communication with its AP are generated from this MSK. IEEE 802.11i does not prescribe a method for secure delivery of the MSK but relies on EAP for this. Whatever method is used, it involves the transmission of an MPDU containing an encrypted MSK from the AS, via the AP, to the AS.

**EAP Exchange** As mentioned, there are a number of possible EAP exchanges that can be used during the authentication phase. Typically, the message flow
between STA and AP employs the EAP over LAN (EAPOL) protocol, and the message flow between the AP and AS uses the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) protocol, although other options are available for both STA-to-AP and AP-to-AS exchanges. [FRAN07] provides the following summary of the authentication exchange using EAPOL and RADIUS.

1. The EAP exchange begins with the AP issuing an EAP-Request/Identity frame to the STA.
2. The STA replies with an EAP-Response/Identity frame, which the AP receives over the uncontrolled port. The packet is then encapsulated in RADIUS over EAP and passed on to the RADIUS server as a RADIUS-Access-Request packet.
3. The AAA server replies with a RADIUS-Access-Challenge packet, which is passed on to the STA as an EAP-Request. This request is of the appropriate authentication type and contains relevant challenge information.
4. The STA formulates an EAP-Response message and sends it to the AS. The response is translated by the AP into a Radius-Access-Request with the response to the challenge as a data field. Steps 3 and 4 may be repeated multiple times, depending on the EAP method in use. For TLS tunneling methods, it is common for authentication to require 10 to 20 round trips.
5. The AAA server grants access with a Radius-Access-Accept packet. The AP issues an EAP-Success frame. (Some protocols require confirmation of the EAP success inside the TLS tunnel for authenticity validation.) The controlled port is authorized, and the user may begin to access the network.

Note from Figure 17.6 that the AP controlled port is still blocked to general user traffic. Although the authentication is successful, the ports remain blocked until the temporal keys are installed in the STA and AP, which occurs during the 4-Way Handshake.

Key Management Phase

During the key management phase, a variety of cryptographic keys are generated and distributed to STAs. There are two types of keys: pairwise keys used for communication between a pair of devices, typically between an STA and an AP, and group keys used for multicast communication. Figure 17.8, based on [FRAN07], shows the two key hierarchies, and Table 17.3 defines the individual keys.

**PAIRWISE KEYS** Pairwise keys are used for communication between a pair of devices, typically between an STA and an AP. These keys form a hierarchy beginning with a master key from which other keys are derived dynamically and used for a limited period of time.

At the top level of the hierarchy are two possibilities. A **pre-shared key (PSK)** is a secret key shared by the AP and a STA and installed in some fashion outside the scope of IEEE 802.11i. The other alternative is the **master session key (MSK)**, also known as the AAAK, which is generated using the IEEE 802.1X protocol during the authentication phase, as described previously. The actual method of key generation depends on the details of the authentication protocol used. In either
case (PSK or MSK), there is a unique key shared by the AP with each STA with which it communicates. All the other keys derived from this master key are also unique between an AP and an STA. Thus, each STA, at any time, has one set of keys, as depicted in the hierarchy of Figure 17.8a, while the AP has one set of such keys for each of its STAs.

The **pairwise master key (PMK)** is derived from the master key. If a PSK is used, then the PSK is used as the PMK; if a MSK is used, then the PMK is derived from the MSK by truncation (if necessary). By the end of the authentication phase, marked by the 802.1x EAP Success message (Figure 17.6), both the AP and the STA have a copy of their shared PMK.
### IEEE 802.11i Keys for Data Confidentiality and Integrity Protocols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description / Purpose</th>
<th>Size (bits)</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA Key</td>
<td>Authentication, Accounting, and Authorization Key</td>
<td>Used to derive the PMK. Used with the IEEE 802.1X authentication and key management approach. Same as MMSK.</td>
<td>≥ 256</td>
<td>Key generation key, root key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSK</td>
<td>Pre-shared Key</td>
<td>Becomes the PMK in pre-shared key environments.</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>Key generation key, root key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMK</td>
<td>Pairwise Master Key</td>
<td>Used with other inputs to derive the PTK.</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>Key generation key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMK</td>
<td>Group Master Key</td>
<td>Used with other inputs to derive the GTK.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Key generation key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTK</td>
<td>Pair-wise Transient Key</td>
<td>Derived from the PMK. Comprises the EAPOL-KCK, EAPOL-KEK, and TK (for TKIP) the MIC key.</td>
<td>512 (TKIP) 384 (CCMP)</td>
<td>Composite key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Temporal Key</td>
<td>Used with TKIP or CCMP to provide confidentiality and integrity protection for unicast user traffic.</td>
<td>256 (TKIP) 128 (CCMP)</td>
<td>Traffic key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTK</td>
<td>Group Temporal Key</td>
<td>Derived from the GMK. Used to provide confidentiality and integrity protection for multicast/broadcast user traffic.</td>
<td>256 (TKIP) 128 (CCMP) 40, 104 (WEP)</td>
<td>Traffic key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC Key</td>
<td>Message Integrity Code Key</td>
<td>Used by TKIP’s Michael MIC to provide integrity protection of messages.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Message integrity key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPOL-KCK</td>
<td>EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key</td>
<td>Used to provide integrity protection for key material distributed during the 4-Way Handshake.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Message integrity key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPOL-KEK</td>
<td>EAPOL-Key Encryption Key</td>
<td>Used to ensure the confidentiality of the GTK and other key material in the 4-Way Handshake.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Traffic key / key encryption key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEP Key</td>
<td>Wired Equivalent Privacy Key</td>
<td>Used with WEP.</td>
<td>40, 104</td>
<td>Traffic key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PMK is used to generate the **pairwise transient key (PTK)**, which in fact consists of three keys to be used for communication between an STA and AP after they have been mutually authenticated. To derive the PTK, the HMAC-SHA-1 function is applied to the PMK, the MAC addresses of the STA and AP, and nonces generated when needed. Using the STA and AP addresses in the generation of the PTK provides protection against session hijacking and impersonation; using nonces provides additional random keying material.
The three parts of the PTK are as follows.

- **EAP Over LAN (EAPOL) Key Confirmation Key (EAPOL-KCK):** Supports the integrity and data origin authenticity of STA-to-AP control frames during operational setup of an RSN. It also performs an access control function: proof-of-possession of the PMK. An entity that possesses the PMK is authorized to use the link.

- **EAPOL Key Encryption Key (EAPOL-KEK):** Protects the confidentiality of keys and other data during some RSN association procedures.

- **Temporal Key (TK):** Provides the actual protection for user traffic.

**Group Keys** Group keys are used for multicast communication in which one STA sends MPDU’s to multiple STAs. At the top level of the group key hierarchy is the **group master key (GMK).** The GMK is a key-generating key used with other inputs to derive the **group temporal key (GTK).** Unlike the PTK, which is generated using material from both AP and STA, the GTK is generated by the AP and transmitted to its associated STAs. Exactly how this GTK is generated is undefined. IEEE 802.11i, however, requires that its value is computationally indistinguishable from random. The GTK is distributed securely using the pairwise keys that are already established. The GTK is changed every time a device leaves the network.

**Pairwise Key Distribution** The upper part of Figure 17.9 shows the MPDU exchange for distributing pairwise keys. This exchange is known as the **4-way handshake.** The STA and SP use this handshake to confirm the existence of the PMK, verify the selection of the cipher suite, and derive a fresh PTK for the following data session. The four parts of the exchange are as follows.

- **AP → STA:** Message includes the MAC address of the AP and a nonce (Anonce)

- **STA → AP:** The STA generates its own nonce (Snonce) and uses both nonces and both MAC addresses, plus the PMK, to generate a PTK. The STA then sends a message containing its MAC address and Snonce, enabling the AP to generate the same PTK. This message includes a message integrity code (MIC)\(^2\) using HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA-1-128. The key used with the MIC is KCK.

- **AP → STA:** The AP is now able to generate the PTK. The AP then sends a message to the STA, containing the same information as in the first message, but this time including a MIC.

- **STA → AP:** This is merely an acknowledgment message, again protected by a MIC.

**Group Key Distribution** For group key distribution, the AP generates a GTK and distributes it to each STA in a multicast group. The two-message exchange with each STA consists of the following:

- **AP → STA:** This message includes the GTK, encrypted either with RC4 or with AES. The key used for encryption is KEK. A MIC value is appended.

---

\(^2\)While **MAC** is commonly used in cryptography to refer to a Message Authentication Code, the term **MIC** is used instead in connection with 802.11i because **MAC** has another standard meaning, Media Access Control, in networking.
IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation: Four-Way Handshake and Group Key Handshake

- **STA → AP**: The STA acknowledges receipt of the GTK. This message includes a MIC value.

**Protected Data Transfer Phase**

IEEE 802.11i defines two schemes for protecting data transmitted in 802.11 MPDUs: the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), and the Counter Mode-CBC MAC Protocol (CCMP).
TKIP TKIP is designed to require only software changes to devices that are implemented with the older wireless LAN security approach called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). TKIP provides two services:

- **Message integrity**: TKIP adds a message integrity code (MIC) to the 802.11 MAC frame after the data field. The MIC is generated by an algorithm, called Michael, that computes a 64-bit value using as input the source and destination MAC address values and the Data field, plus key material.

- **Data confidentiality**: Data confidentiality is provided by encrypting the MPDU plus MIC value using RC4.

The 256-bit TK (Figure 17.8) is employed as follows. Two 64-bit keys are used with the Michael message digest algorithm to produce a message integrity code. One key is used to protect STA-to-AP messages, and the other key is used to protect AP-to-STA messages. The remaining 128 bits are truncated to generate the RC4 key used to encrypt the transmitted data.

For additional protection, a monotonically increasing TKIP sequence counter (TSC) is assigned to each frame. The TSC serves two purposes. First, the TSC is included with each MPDU and is protected by the MIC to protect against replay attacks. Second, the TSC is combined with the session TK to produce a dynamic encryption key that changes with each transmitted MPDU, thus making cryptanalysis more difficult.

CCMP CCMP is intended for newer IEEE 802.11 devices that are equipped with the hardware to support this scheme. As with TKIP, CCMP provides two services:

- **Message integrity**: CCMP uses the cipher-block-chaining message authentication code (CBC-MAC), described in Chapter 12.

- **Data confidentiality**: CCMP uses the CTR block cipher mode of operation with AES for encryption. CTR is described in Chapter 6.

The same 128-bit AES key is used for both integrity and confidentiality. The scheme uses a 48-bit packet number to construct a nonce to prevent replay attacks.

The IEEE 802.11i Pseudorandom Function

At a number of places in the IEEE 802.11i scheme, a pseudorandom function (PRF) is used. For example, it is used to generate nonces, to expand pairwise keys, and to generate the GTK. Best security practice dictates that different pseudorandom number streams be used for these different purposes. However, for implementation efficiency, we would like to rely on a single pseudorandom number generator function.

The PRF is built on the use of HMAC-SHA-1 to generate a pseudorandom bit stream. Recall that HMAC-SHA-1 takes a message (block of data) and a key of length at least 160 bits and produces a 160-bit hash value. SHA-1 has the property that the change of a single bit of the input produces a new hash value with no apparent connection to the preceding hash value. This property is the basis for pseudorandom number generation.
The IEEE 802.11i PRF takes four parameters as input and produces the desired number of random bits. The function is of the form \( PRF(K, A, B, \text{Len}) \), where

- \( K \) = a secret key
- \( A \) = a text string specific to the application (e.g., nonce generation or pairwise key expansion)
- \( B \) = some data specific to each case
- \( \text{Len} \) = desired number of pseudorandom bits

For example, for the pairwise transient key for CCMP:

\[
\text{PTK} = \text{PRF}(\text{PMK}, \text{"Pairwise key expansion"}, \min(\text{AP-Addr, STA-Addr}) \| \max(\text{AP-Addr, STA-Addr}) \| \min(\text{Anonce, Snonce}) \| \max(\text{Anonce, Snonce}), 384)
\]

So, in this case, the parameters are

- \( K \) = PMK
- \( A \) = the text string "Pairwise key expansion"
- \( B \) = a sequence of bytes formed by concatenating the two MAC addresses and the two nonces
- \( \text{Len} = 384 \) bits

Similarly, a nonce is generated by

\[
\text{Nonce} = \text{PRF}(\text{Random Number, "Init Counter"}, \text{MAC} \| \text{Time}, 256)
\]

where \( \text{Time} \) is a measure of the network time known to the nonce generator.

The group temporal key is generated by

\[
\text{GTK} = \text{PRF}(\text{GMK, "Group key expansion"}, \text{MAC} \| \text{Gnonce}, 256)
\]

Figure 17.10 illustrates the function \( \text{PRF}(K, A, B, \text{Len}) \). The parameter \( K \) serves as the key input to HMAC. The message input consists of four items concatenated together: the parameter \( A \), a byte with value 0, the parameter \( B \), and a counter \( i \). The counter is initialized to 0. The HMAC algorithm is run once, producing a 160-bit hash value. If more bits are required, HMAC is run again with the same inputs, except that \( i \) is incremented each time until the necessary number of bits is generated. We can express the logic as

\[
\text{PRF}(K, A, B, \text{Len})
\]

\[
R \leftarrow \text{null string}
\]

\[
\text{for } i \leftarrow 0 \text{ to } ((\text{Len} + 159)/160 - 1) \text{ do}
\]

\[
R \leftarrow R \| \text{HMAC-SHA-1}(K, A \| 0 \| B \| i)
\]

\[
\text{Return } \text{Truncate-to-Len}(R, \text{Len})
\]
The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is a universal, open standard developed by the WAP Forum to provide mobile users of wireless phones and other wireless terminals such as pagers and personal digital assistants (PDAs) access to telephony and information services, including the Internet and the Web. WAP is designed to work with all wireless network technologies (e.g., GSM, CDMA, and TDMA). WAP is based on existing Internet standards, such as IP, XML, HTML, and HTTP, as much as possible. It also includes security facilities. At the time of this writing, the current release of the WAP specification is version 2.0.

Strongly affecting the use of mobile phones and terminals for data services are the significant limitations of the devices and the networks that connect them. The devices have limited processors, memory, and battery life. The user interface is also limited, and the displays small. The wireless networks are characterized by relatively low bandwidth, high latency, and unpredictable availability and stability compared to wired connections. Moreover, all of these features vary widely from terminal device to terminal device and from network to network. Finally, mobile, wireless users have different expectations and needs from other information systems users. For instance, mobile terminals must be extremely easy to use — much easier than workstations and personal computers. WAP is designed to deal with these challenges. The WAP specification includes:

- A programming model based on the WWW Programming Model
- A markup language, the Wireless Markup Language, adhering to XML
- A specification of a small browser suitable for a mobile, wireless terminal
- A lightweight communications protocol stack
- A framework for wireless telephony applications (WTAs)

\[ R = \text{HMAC-SHA-1}(K, A \parallel 0 \parallel B \parallel i) \]

Figure 17.10 IEEE 802.11i Pseudorandom Function
Operational Overview

The WAP Programming Model is based on three elements: the client, the gateway, and the original server (Figure 17.11). HTTP is used between the gateway and the original server to transfer content. The gateway acts as a proxy server for the wireless domain. Its processor(s) provide services that offload the limited capabilities of the hand-held, mobile, wireless terminals. For example, the gateway provides DNS services, converts between WAP protocol stack and the WWW stack (HTTP and TCP/IP), encodes information from the Web into a more compact form that minimizes wireless communication, and in the other direction, decodes the compacted form into standard Web communication conventions. The gateway also caches frequently requested information.

Figure 17.12 illustrates key components in a WAP environment. Using WAP, a mobile user can browse Web content on an ordinary Web server. The Web server provides content in the form of HTML-coded pages that are transmitted using the standard Web protocol stack (HTTP/TCP/IP). The HTML content must go through an HTML filter, which either may be colocated with the WAP proxy or in a separate physical module. The filter translates the HTML content into WML content. If the filter is separate from the proxy, HTTP/TCP/IP is used to deliver the WML to the proxy. The proxy converts the WML to a more compact form known as binary WML and delivers it to the mobile user over a wireless network using the WAP protocol stack.

If the Web server is capable of directly generating WML content, then the WML is delivered using HTTP/TCP/IP to the proxy, which converts the WML to binary WML and then delivers it to the mobile node using WAP protocols.

The WAP architecture is designed to cope with the two principal limitations of wireless Web access: the limitations of the mobile node (small screen size, limited input capability) and the low data rates of wireless digital networks. Even with the introduction of 3G wireless networks, which provide broadband data rates, the small hand-held mobile nodes continue to have limited input and display capabilities. Thus, WAP or a similar capability will be needed for the indefinite future.

Wireless Markup Language

WML was designed to describe content and format for presenting data on devices with limited bandwidth, limited screen size, and limited user input capability. It is designed to work with telephone keypads, styluses, and other input devices common to mobile, wireless communication. WML permits the scaling of displays for use on two-line screens found in some small devices, as well as the larger screens found on smart phones.

![Figure 17.11 The WAP Programming Model](image-url)
For an ordinary PC, a Web browser provides content in the form of Web pages coded with the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). To translate an HTML-coded Web page into WML with content and format suitable for wireless devices, much of the information, especially graphics and animation, must be stripped away. WML presents mainly text-based information that attempts to capture the essence of the Web page and that is organized for easy access for users of mobile devices.

Important features of WML include:

- **Text and image support:** Formatting and layout commands are provided for text and limited image capability.

- **Deck/card organizational metaphor:** WML documents are subdivided into small, well-defined units of user interaction called cards. Users navigate by moving back and forth between cards. A card specifies one or more units of interaction (a menu, a screen of text, or a text-entry field). A WML deck is similar to an HTML page in that it is identified by a Web address (URL) and is the unit of content transmission.
- **Support for navigation among cards and decks:** WML includes provisions for event handling, which is used for navigation or executing scripts.

In an HTML-based Web browser, a user navigates by clicking on links. At a WML-capable mobile device, a user interacts with cards, moving forward and back through the deck.

**WAP Architecture**

Figure 17.13, from the WAP architecture document, illustrates the overall stack architecture implemented in a WAP client. In essence, this is a five-layer model. Each layer provides a set of functions and/or services to other services and applications through a set of well-defined interfaces. Each of the layers of the architecture is accessible by the layers above, as well as by other services and applications. Many of the services in the stack may be provided by more than one protocol. For example, either HTTP or WSP may provide the Hypermedia Transfer service.

Common to all five layers are sets of services that are accessible by multiple layers. These common services fall into two categories: security services and service discovery.
SECURITY SERVICES The WAP specification includes mechanisms to provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation. The security services include the following.

- **Cryptographic libraries:** This application framework level library provides services for signing of data for integrity and non-repudiation purposes.
- **Authentication:** WAP provides various mechanisms for client and server authentication. At the Session Services layer, HTTP Client Authentication (RFC2617) may be used to authenticate clients to proxies and application servers. At the Transport Services layer, WTLS and TLS handshakes may be used to authenticate clients and servers.
- **Identity:** The WAP Identity Module (WIM) provides the functions that store and process information needed for user identification and authentication.
- **PKI:** The set of security services that enable the use and management of public-key cryptography and certificates.
- **Secure transport:** The Transport Services layer protocols are defined for secure transport over datagrams and connections. WTLS is defined for secure transport over datagrams and TLS is defined for secure transport over connections (i.e., TCP).
- **Secure bearer:** Some bearer networks provide bearer-level security. For example, IP networks (especially in the context of IPv6) provide bearer-level security with IPsec.

SERVICE DISCOVERY There is a collection of service discovery services that enable the WAP client and the Web server to determine capabilities and services. Examples of service discovery services include the following.

- **EFI:** The External Functionality Interface (EFI) allows applications to discover what external functions/services are available on the device.
- **Provisioning:** This service allows a device to be provisioned with the parameters necessary to access network services.
- **Navigation discovery:** This service allows a device to discover new network services (e.g., secure pull proxies) during the course of navigation such as when downloading resources from a hypermedia server. The WAP Transport-Level End-to-End Security specification, described in Section 17.5, defines one navigation discovery protocol.
- **Service lookup:** This service provides for the discovery of a service’s parameters through a directory lookup by name. One example of this is the Domain Name System (DNS).

Wireless Application Environment

The WAE specifies an application framework for wireless devices such as mobile telephones, pagers, and PDAs. In essence, the WAE consists of tools and formats
that are intended to ease the task of developing applications and devices supported
by WAP. The major elements of the WAE model (Figure 17.13) are

- **WAE user agents**: Software that executes in the user’s wireless device and that
  provides specific functionality (e.g., display content) to the end user.

- **Wireless telephony applications (WTA)**: A collection of telephony-specific
  extensions for call and feature control mechanisms that provide authors
  advanced mobile network services. Using WTA, applications developers can
  use the microbrowser to originate telephone calls and to respond to events
  from the telephone network.

- **Standard content encoding**: Defined to allow a WAE user agent (e.g., a
  browser) to conveniently navigate Web content. On the server side are content
  generators. These are applications (or services) on origin servers (e.g., CGI
  scripts) that produce standard content formats in response to requests from
  user agents in the mobile terminal. WAE does not specify any standard
  content generators but expects that there will be a variety available running
  on typical HTTP origin servers commonly used in WWW today.

- **Push**: A service to receive push transmissions from the server, i.e., transmis-
  sions that are not in response to a Web client request but are sent on the
  initiative of the server. This service is supported by the Push-OTA (Push Over
  The Air) session service.

- **Multimedia messaging**: Provides for the transfer and processing of multimedia
  messages, such as e-mail and instant messages, to WAP devices.

**WAP Protocol Architecture**

The WAP architecture illustrated in Figure 17.13 dictates a collection of services at
each level and provides interface specifications at the boundary between each pair
of layers. Because several of the services in the WAP stack can be provided using
different protocols based on the circumstances, there are more than one possible
stack configurations. Figure 17.14 depicts a common protocol stack configuration in
which a WAP client device connects to a Web server via a WAP gateway. This con-
figuration is common with devices that implement version 1 of the WAP specifica-
tion but is also used in version 2 devices (WAP2) if the bearer network does not
support TCP/IP.
In the remainder of this subsection, we provide an overview of the WAP protocols, with the exception of WTLS, which is treated in Section 17.4.

**Wireless Session Protocol.** WSP provides applications with an interface for two session services. The connection-oriented session service operates above WTP, and the connectionless session service operates above the unreliable transport protocol WDP. In essence, WSP is based on HTTP with some additions and modifications to optimize its use over wireless channels. The principal limitations addressed are low data rate and susceptibility to loss of connection due to poor coverage or cell overloading.

WSP is a transaction-oriented protocol based on the concept of a request and a reply. Each WSP protocol data unit (PDU) consists of a body, which may contain WML, WMLScript, or images; and a header, which contains information about the data in the body and about the transaction. WSP also defines a server push operation, in which the server sends unrequested content to a client device. This may be used for broadcast messages or for services, such as news headlines or stock quotes, that may be tailored to each client device.

**Wireless Transaction Protocol.** WTP manages transactions by conveying requests and responses between a user agent (such as a WAP browser) and an application server for such activities as browsing and e-commerce transactions. WTP provides a reliable transport service but dispenses with much of the overhead of TCP, resulting in a lightweight protocol that is suitable for implementation in “thin” clients (e.g., mobile nodes) and suitable for use over low-bandwidth wireless links. WTP includes the following features.

- Three classes of transaction service.
- Optional user-to-user reliability: WTP user triggers the confirmation of each received message.
- Optional out-of-band data on acknowledgments.
- PDU concatenation and delayed acknowledgment to reduce the number of messages sent.
- Asynchronous transactions.

WTP is transaction oriented rather than connection oriented. With WTP, there is no explicit connection setup or teardown but rather a reliable connectionless service. WTP provides three transaction classes that may be invoked by WSP or another higher layer protocol:

- **Class 0:** Unreliable invoke message with no result message
- **Class 1:** Reliable invoke message with no result message
- **Class 2:** Unreliable invoke message with one reliable result message

**Class 0** provides an unreliable datagram service, which can be used for an unreliable push operation. Data from a WTP user are encapsulated by WTP (the initiator, or client) in an invoke PDU and transmitted to the target WTP (the responder, or server) with no acknowledgment. The responder WTP delivers the data to the target WTP user.
**Class 1** provides a reliable datagram service, which can be used for a reliable push operation. Data from an initiator are encapsulated in an invoke PDU and transmitted to the responder. The responder delivers the data to the target WTP user and acknowledges receipt of the data by sending back an ACK PDU to the WTP entity on the initiator side, which confirms the transaction to the source WTP user. The responder WTP maintains state information for some time after the ACK has been sent to handle possible retransmission of the ACK if it gets lost and/or the initiator retransmits the invoke PDU.

**Class 2** provides a request/response transaction service and supports the execution of multiple transactions during one WSP session. Data from an initiator are encapsulated in an invoke PDU and transmitted to the responder, which delivers the data to the target WTP user. The target WTP user prepares response data, which are handed down to the local WTP entity. The responder WTP entity sends these data back in a result PDU. If there is a delay in generating the response data beyond a timer threshold, the responder may send an ACK PDU before sending the result PDU. This prevents the initiator from unnecessarily retransmitting the invoke message.

**Wireless Datagram Protocol** WDP is used to adapt a higher-layer WAP protocol to the communication mechanism (called the bearer) used between the mobile node and the WAP gateway. Adaptation may include partitioning data into segments of appropriate size for the bearer and interfacing with the bearer network. WDP hides details of the various bearer networks from the other layers of WAP. In some instances, WAP is implemented on top of IP.

---

**17.4 Wireless Transport Layer Security**

WTLS provides security services between the mobile device (client) and the WAP gateway. WTLS is based on the industry-standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol\(^3\), which is a refinement of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. TLS is the standard security protocol used between Web browsers and Web servers. WTLS is more efficient than TLS, requiring fewer message exchanges. To provide end-to-end security, WTLS is used between the client and the gateway, and TLS is used between the gateway and the target server (Figure 17.14). WAP systems translate between WTLS and TLS within the WAP gateway. Thus, the gateway is a point of vulnerability and must be given a high level of security from external attacks.

WTLS provides the following features.

- **Data integrity**: Uses message authentication to ensure that data sent between the client and the gateway are not modified.
- **Privacy**: Uses encryption to ensure that the data cannot be read by a third party.
- **Authentication**: Uses digital certificates to authenticate the two parties.
- **Denial-of-service protection**: Detects and rejects messages that are replayed or not successfully verified.

---

\(^3\)See Chapter 16 for a discussion of SSL/TLS. However, the discussion in this section is self-contained; you do not need to read a description of TLS first.
WTLS Sessions and Connections

Two important WTLS concepts are the secure session and the secure connection, which are defined in the specification as:

- **Secure connection**: A connection is a transport (in the OSI layering model definition) that provides a suitable type of service. For SSL, such connections are peer-to-peer relationships. The connections are transient. Every connection is associated with one session.

- **Secure session**: An SSL session is an association between a client and a server. Sessions are created by the Handshake Protocol. Sessions define a set of cryptographic security parameters, which can be shared among multiple connections. Sessions are used to avoid the expensive negotiation of new security parameters for each connection.

Between any pair of parties (applications such as HTTP on client and server), there may be multiple secure connections. In theory, there may also be multiple simultaneous sessions between parties, but this feature is not used in practice.

There are a number of states associated with each session. Once a session is established, there is a current operating state for both read and write (i.e., receive and send). In addition, during the Handshake Protocol, pending read and write states are created. Upon successful conclusion of the Handshake Protocol, the pending states become the current states.

A session state is defined by the following parameters:

- **Session identifier**: An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an active or resumable session state.
- **Protocol version**: WTLS protocol version number.
- **Peer certificate**: Certificate of the peer. This element of the state may be null.
- **Compression method**: The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption.
- **Cipher spec**: Specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm (such as null, RC5, DES, etc.) and a hash algorithm (such as MD5 or SHA-1) used for MAC calculation. It also defines cryptographic attributes such as the hash_size.
- **Master secret**: A 20-byte secret shared between the client and server.
- **Sequence number**: Which sequence numbering scheme (off, implicit, or explicit) is used in this secure connection.
- **Key refresh**: Defines how often some connection state values (encryption key, MAC secret, and IV) calculations are performed.
- **Is resumable**: A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new connections.

The connection state is the operating environment of the record protocol. It includes all parameters that are needed for the cryptographic operations (encryption/decryption and MAC calculation/verification). Each secure connection has a connection state, which is defined by the following parameters.
- **Connection end:** Whether this entity is considered a client or a server in this secure session.

- **Bulk cipher algorithm:** Includes the key size of this algorithm, how much of that key is secret, whether it is a block or stream cipher, and the block size of the cipher (if appropriate).

- **MAC algorithm:** Includes the size of the key used for MAC calculation and the size of the hash which is returned by the MAC algorithm.

- **Compression algorithm:** Includes all information the algorithm requires to do compression.

- **Master secret:** A 20-byte secret shared between the client and server.

- **Client random:** A 16-byte value provided by the client.

- **Server random:** A 16-byte value provided by the server.

- **Sequence number mode:** Which scheme is used to communicate sequence numbers in this secure connection.

- **Key refresh:** Defines how often some connection state parameters (encryption key, MAC secret, and IV) are updated. New keys are calculated at every \( n = 2^{key\_refresh} \) messages, that is, when the sequence number is 0, 2\(^n\), 3\(^n\), etc.

## WTLS Protocol Architecture

WTLS is not a single protocol but rather two layers of protocols, as illustrated in Figure 17.15. The WTLS Record Protocol provides basic security services to various higher-layer protocols. In particular, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which provides the transfer service for Web client/server interaction, can operate on top of WTLS. Three higher-layer protocols are defined as part of WTLS: the Handshake Protocol, The Change Cipher Spec Protocol, and the Alert Protocol. These WTLS-specific protocols are used in the management of WTLS exchanges and are examined subsequently in this section.

**WTLS RECORD PROTOCOL** The WTLS Record Protocol takes user data from the next higher layer (WTP, WTLS Handshake Protocol, WTLS Alert Protocol, and WTLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol) and encapsulates these data in a PDU. The following steps occur (Figure 17.16).
Step 1. The payload is compressed using a lossless compression algorithm.

Step 2. A message authentication code (MAC) is computed over the compressed data, using HMAC. One of several hash algorithms can be used with HMAC, including MD-5 and SHA-1. The length of the hash code is 0, 5, or 10 bytes. The MAC is added after the compressed data.

Step 3. The compressed message plus the MAC code are encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The allowable encryption algorithms are DES, triple DES, RC5, and IDEA.

Step 4. The Record Protocol prepends a header to the encrypted payload.

The Record Protocol header consists of the following fields (Figure 17.17).

- **Record type** (8 bits): Consisting of the subfields:
  - **Record length field indicator** (1 bit): Indicates whether a record length field is present.
  - **Sequence number field indicator** (1 bit): Indicates whether a sequence number field is present.
  - **Cipher spec indicator** (1 bit): If this bit is zero, it indicates that no compression, MAC protection, or encryption is used.
  - **Content type** (4 bits): The higher-layer protocol above the WTLS Record Protocol.

- **Sequence number** (16 bits): A sequence number associated with this record. This provides reliability over an unreliable transport service.

- **Record length** (16 bits): The length in bytes of the plaintext data (or compressed data if compression is used).

**Change Cipher Spec Protocol** Associated with the current transaction is a cipher spec, which specifies the encryption algorithm, the hash algorithm used as
part of HMAC, and cryptographic attributes, such as MAC code size. There are two states associated with each session. Once a session is established, there is a current operating state for both read and write (i.e., receive and send). In addition, during the Handshake Protocol, pending read and write states are created.

The Change Cipher Spec Protocol is one of the three WTLS-specific protocols that use the WTLS Record Protocol, and it is the simplest. This protocol consists of a single message, which consists of a single byte with the value 1. The sole purpose of this message is to cause the pending state to be copied into the current state, which updates the cipher suite to be used on this connection. Thus, when the Change Cipher Spec message arrives, the sender of the message sets the current write state to the pending state and the receiver sets the current read state to the pending state.

**Alert Protocol** The Alert Protocol is used to convey WTLS-related alerts to the peer entity. As with other applications that use WTLS, alert messages are compressed and encrypted, as specified by the current state.
Each message in this protocol consists of 2 bytes. The first byte takes the value warning(1), critical(2), or fatal(3) to convey the severity of the message. The second byte contains a code that indicates the specific alert. If the level is fatal, WTLS immediately terminates the connection. Other connections on the same session may continue, but no new connections on this session may be established. A critical alert message results in termination of the current secure connection. Other connections using the secure session may continue and the secure identifier may also be used for establishing new secure connections.

The connection is closed using the alert messages. Either party may initiate the exchange of the closing messages. If a closing message is received, then any data after this message is ignored. It is also required that the notified party verifies termination of the session by responding to the closing message.

Error handling in the WTLS is based on the alert messages. When an error is detected, the detecting party sends an alert message containing the occurred error. Further procedures depend on the level of the error that occurred.

Examples of fatal alerts:

- **session_close_notify**: notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages using this connection state or the secure session.
- **unexpected_message**: An inappropriate message was received.
- **bad_record_mac**: An incorrect MAC was received.
- **decompression_failure**: The decompression function received improper input (e.g., unable to decompress or decompress to greater than maximum allowable length).
- **handshake_failure**: Sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available.
- **illegal_parameter**: A field in a handshake message was out of range or inconsistent with other fields.

Examples of nonfatal alerts:

- **connection_close_notify**: Notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages using this connection state.
- **bad_certificate**: A received certificate was corrupt (e.g., contained a signature that did not verify).
- **unsupported_certificate**: The type of the received certificate is not supported.
- **certificate_revoked**: A certificate has been revoked by its signer.
- **certificate_expired**: A certificate has expired.
- **certificate_unknown**: Some other unspecified issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.

**Handshake Protocol** The most complex part of WTLS is the Handshake Protocol. This protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption and MAC algorithms and cryptographic keys to be
used to protect data sent in a WTLS record. The Handshake Protocol is used before any application data are transmitted. An important function of the Handshake Protocol is the generation of a pre-master secret, which in turn is used to generate a master secret. The master secret is then used to generate various cryptographic keys.

The Handshake Protocol consists of a series of messages exchanged by client and server. Figure 17.18 shows the initial exchange needed to establish a logical connection.

**Figure 17.18  WTLS Handshake Protocol Action**
connection between client and server. The exchange can be viewed as having four phases.

The **first phase** is used to initiate a logical connection and to establish the security capabilities that will be associated with it. The exchange is initiated by the client. The client sends a `client_hello` message that includes a session ID and a list of cryptographic and compression algorithms supported by the client (in decreasing order of preference for each algorithm type). After sending the `client_hello` message, the client waits for the `server_hello` message. This message indicates which cryptographic and compression algorithms will be used for the exchange.

The **second phase** is used for server authentication and key exchange. The server begins this phase by sending its public-key certificate if it needs to be authenticated. Next, a `server_key_exchange` message may be sent if it is required. This message is needed for certain public-key algorithms used for symmetric key exchange. Next, the server can request a public-key certificate from the client, using the `certificate_request` message. The final message in phase 2 (and one that is always required) is the `server_hello_done` message, which is sent by the server to indicate the end of the server hello and associated messages. After sending this message, the server will wait for a client response. This message has no parameters.

The **third phase** is used for client authentication and key exchange. Upon receipt of the `server_hello_done` message, the client should verify that the server provided a valid certificate if required and check that the `server_hello` parameters are acceptable. If all is satisfactory, the client sends one or more messages back to the server. If the server has requested a certificate, the client sends a `certificate` message. Next is the `client_key_exchange` message, which must be sent in this phase. The content of the message depends on the type of key exchange. Finally, in this phase, the client may send a `certificate_verify` message to provide explicit verification of a client certificate.

The **fourth phase** completes the setting up of a secure connection. The client sends a `change_cipher_spec` message and copies the pending CipherSpec into the current CipherSpec. Note that this message is not considered part of the Handshake Protocol but is sent using the Change Cipher Spec Protocol. The client then immediately sends the finished message under the new algorithms, keys, and secrets. The finished message verifies that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful. In response to these two messages, the server sends its own `change_cipher_spec` message, transfers the pending to the current CipherSpec, and sends its finished message. At this point, the handshakes is complete, and the client and server may begin to exchange application layer data.

**Cryptographic Algorithms**

**AUTHENTICATION** Authentication in the WTLS is carried out with certificates. Authentication can occur either between the client and the server or when the client only authenticates the server. The latter procedure can happen only if the server allows it to occur. The server can require the client to authenticate itself to the server.
However, the WTLS specification defines that authentication is an optional procedure. Currently, X.509v3, X9.68, and WTLS certificates are supported. The WTLS certificate is optimized for size, and consists of the following elements (compare with Figure 14.14).

- **Certificate_version**: Version of the certificate.
- **Signature_algorithm**: Algorithm used to sign the certificate.
- **Issuer**: Defines the party who has signed the certificate, usually some CA.
- **Valid_not_before**: The beginning of validity period of the certificate.
- **Valid_not_after**: The point of time after the certificate is no longer valid.
- **Subject**: Owner of the key, associated with the public key being certified.
- **Public_key_type**: Type (algorithm) of the public key.
- **Parameter_specifier**: Specifies parameter relevant for the public key.
- **Public key**: The public key being certified.
- **Signature**: Signed with the CA's private key.

**KEY EXCHANGE** The purpose of the WTLS protocol is for the client and server to generate a mutually shared pre-master key. This key is then used to generate as master key, as explained subsequently. A number of key exchange protocols are supported by WTLS. They can be grouped into those protocols that include a `server_key_exchange` message as part of the Handshake Protocol (Figure 17.18) and those that don’t.

The `server_key_exchange` message is sent by the server only when the server certificate message (if sent) does not contain enough data to allow the client to exchange a pre-master secret. The following three methods require the use of the `server_key_exchange` message.

- **DH_anon**: The conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is performed anonymously (without authentication). The negotiated key (Z) is used as the `pre_master_secret`.
- **ECDH_anon**: The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman computation is performed. The negotiated key (Z) is used as the `pre_master_secret`.
- **RSA_anon**: This is an RSA key exchange without authentication. The server sends its RSA public key. In this method, a 20-byte secret value is generated by the client, encrypted under the server’s public key, and sent to the server. The server uses its private key to decrypt the secret value. The `pre_master_secret` is the secret value appended with the server’s public key.

The server key exchange message is not sent for the following key exchange methods.

- **ECDH_ECDSA**: Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ECDSA-based certificates. The server sends a certificate that contains its ECDH public key. The server certificate is signed with ECDSA by a third party
trusted by the client. Depending whether the client is to be authenticated or not, it sends its certificate containing its ECDH public key signed with ECDSA by a third party trusted by the server or just its (temporary) ECDH public key. Each party calculates the pre-master secret based on one’s own private key and counterpart’s public key received as such or contained in a certificate.

- **RSA**: RSA key exchange with RSA-based certificates. The server sends a certificate that contains its RSA public key. The server certificate is signed with RSA by a third party trusted by the client. The client extracts the server’s public key from the received certificate, generates a secret value, encrypts it with the server’s public key, and sends it to the server. The pre-master secret is the secret value appended with the server’s public key. If the client is to be authenticated, it signs some data (messages sent during the handshake) with its RSA private key and sends its certificate and the signed data.

**Pseudorandom Function (PRF)** The PRF is used for a number of purposes in WTLS. The PRF takes as input a secret value, a seed, and an identifying label and produces an output of arbitrary length. In the TLS standard, two hash algorithms were used in order to make the PRF as secure as possible. In order to save resources, WTLS can be implemented using only one hash algorithm. Which hash algorithm is actually used is agreed on during the handshake as a part of the cipher spec.

The PRF is based on the data expansion function

\[
P_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret, seed}) = \text{HMAC}_\text{hash}(\text{secret, } A(1) \| \text{seed}) \| \text{HMAC}_\text{hash}(\text{secret, } A(2) \| \text{seed}) \| \text{HMAC}_\text{hash}(\text{secret, } A(3) \| \text{seed}) \| \ldots
\]

where \(\|\) indicates concatenation and \(A()\) is defined as

\[
A(0) = \text{seed} \\
A(i) = \text{HMAC}_\text{hash}(\text{secret, } A(i - 1))
\]

Then,

\[
\text{PRF}(\text{secret, label, seed}) = P_{\text{hash}}(\text{secret, label }\|\text{seed})
\]

**Master Key Generation** The shared master secret is a one-time 20-byte value (160 bits) generated for this session by means of secure key exchange. The creation is in two stages. First, a pre_master_secret is exchanged. Second, the master_secret is calculated by both parties, using the function
master_secret = PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret", ClientHello.random || ServerHello.random)

where ClientHello.random and ServerHello.random are the random numbers exchanged during the first phase of the handshake protocol.

The MAC and encryption keys are then derived from the master key. The MAC calculation uses the HMAC algorithm (Chapter 12) and encompasses the fields indicated in the expression

\[
\text{HMAC}_\text{hash} (\text{MAC}_\text{secret}, \text{seq_number} \| \text{WTLSCompressed}.\text{record_type} \| \text{WTLSCompressed}.\text{length} \| \text{WTLSCompressed}.\text{fragment})
\]

where WTLSCompressed.fragment refers to the (optionally) compressed plaintext data field.

Either MD5 or SHA-1 may be used for the HMAC hash function.

Encryption is applied to all of the WTLS record, except the header. The following encryption algorithms are permitted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Key Size (bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC5</td>
<td>40, 56, 64, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>40, 56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17.5 WAP END-TO-END SECURITY

The basic WAP transmission model involving a WAP client, a WAP gateway, and a Web server results in a security gap, as illustrated in Figure 17.19. This figure corresponds to the protocol architecture shown in Figure 17.14. The mobile device establishes a secure WTLS session with the WAP gateway. The WAP gateway, in turn,
establishes a secure SSL or TLS session with the Web server. Within the gateway, data are not encrypted during the translation process. The gateway is thus a point at which the data may be compromised.

There are a number of approaches to providing end-to-end security between the mobile client and the Web server. In the WAP version 2 (known as WAP2) architecture document, the WAP forum defines several protocol arrangements that allow for end-to-end security.

Version 1 of WAP assumed a simplified set of protocols over the wireless network and assumed that the wireless network did not support IP. WAP2 provides the option for the mobile device to implement full TCP/IP-based protocols and operate over an IP-capable wireless network. Figure 17.20 shows two ways in which this IP capability can be exploited to provide end-to-end security. In both approaches, the mobile client implements TCP/IP and HTTP.

The first approach (Figure 17.20a) is to make use of TLS between client and server. A secure TLS session is set up between the endpoints. The WAP gateway acts as a TCP-level gateway and splices together two TCP connections to carry the traffic between the endpoints. However, the TCP user data field (TLS records) remains encrypted as it passes through the gateway, so end-to-end security is maintained.
Another possible approach is shown in Figure 17.20b. Here we assume that the WAP gateway acts as a simple Internet router. In this case, end-to-end security can be provided at the IP level using IPsec (discussed in Chapter 19).

Yet another, somewhat more complicated, approach has been defined in more specific terms by the WAP forum in specification entitled “WAP Transport Layer End-to-End Security.” This approach is illustrated in Figure 17.21, which is based on a figure in [ASHL01]. In this scenario, the WAP client connects to its usual WAP gateway and attempts to send a request through the gateway to a secure domain. The secure content server determines the need for security that requires that the mobile client connect to its local WAP gateway rather than its default WAP gateway. The Web server responds to the initial client request with an HTTP redirect message that redirects the client to a WAP gateway that is part of the enterprise network. This message passes back through the default gateway, which validates the redirect and sends it to the client. The client caches the redirect information and establishes a secure session with the enterprise WAP gateway using WTLS. After the connection is terminated, the default gateway is reselected and used for subsequent communication to other Web servers. Note that this approach requires that the enterprise maintain a WAP gateway on the wireless network that the client is using.

Figure 17.22, from the WAP specification, illustrates the dialogue.

![Figure 17.21 WAP2 End-to-End Security Scheme](image-url)
The IEEE 802.11 and WiFi specifications are covered in more detail in [STAL07]. A good book-length treatment is [ROSH04]. [FRAN07] is an excellent, detailed treatment of IEEE 802.11i. [CHEN05] provides an overview of IEEE 802.11i.
CHAPTER 17 / WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

17.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

| 4-way handshake                          | media access control (MAC)                  | Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) |
| access point (AP)                        | MAC protocol data unit (MPDU)              | Wireless Datagram Protocol (WDP)    |
| Alert Protocol                           | MAC service data unit (MSDU)               | wireless LAN (WLAN)                |
| basic service set (BSS)                  | message integrity code (MIC)              | Wireless Markup Language (WML)      |
| Change Cipher Spec Protocol              | Michael                                     | Wireless Session Protocol (WSP)     |
| Counter Mode-CBC MAC Protocol (CCMP)     | pairwise keys                               | Wireless Transaction Protocol (WTP) |
| distribution system (DS)                 | pseudorandom function                      | Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) |
| extended service set (ESS)               | Robust Security Network (RSN)              | Wi-Fi                               |
| group keys                               | Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)     | Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)        |
| Handshake Protocol                       | Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)             | WTLS Record Protocol               |
| IEEE 802.1X                              | Wireless Application Environment (WAE)      |                                     |
| IEEE 802.11                              |                                          |                                     |
| IEEE 802.11i                             |                                          |                                     |
| independent BSS (IBSS)                   |                                          |                                     |
| logical link control (LLC)               |                                          |                                     |

Recommended Web Sites:

- **The IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Working Group**: Contains working group documents plus discussion archives.
- **Wi-Fi Alliance**: An industry group promoting the interoperability of 802.11 products with each other and with Ethernet.
- **Wireless LAN Association**: Gives an introduction to the technology, including a discussion of implementation considerations and case studies from users. Links to related sites.
- **Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Working Group**: IETF working group responsible for EAP and related issues. Site includes RFCs and Internet drafts.
- **Open Mobile Alliance**: Consolidation of the WAP Forum and the Open Mobile Architecture Initiative. Provides WAP technical specifications and industry links.

**Review Questions**

17.1 What is the basic building block of an 802.11 WLAN?
17.2 Define an extended service set.
17.3 List and briefly define IEEE 802.11 services.
17.4 Is a distribution system a wireless network?
17.5 How is the concept of an association related to that of mobility?
17.6 What security areas are addressed by IEEE 802.11i?
17.7 Briefly describe the four IEEE 802.11i phases of operation.
17.8 What is the difference between TKIP and CCMP?
17.9 What is the difference between an HTML filter and a WAP proxy?
17.10 What services are provided by WSP?
17.11 When would each of the three WTP transaction classes be used?
17.12 List and briefly define the security services provided by WTLS.
17.13 Briefly describe the four protocol elements of WTLS.
17.14 List and briefly define all of the keys used in WTLS.
17.15 Describe three alternative approaches to providing WAP end-to-end security.

Problems

17.1 In IEEE 802.11, open system authentication simply consists of two communications. An authentication is requested by the client, which contains the station ID (typically the MAC address). This is followed by an authentication response from the AP/router containing a success or failure message. An example of when a failure may occur is if the client’s MAC address is explicitly excluded in the AP/router configuration.
   a. What are the benefits of this authentication scheme?
   b. What are the security vulnerabilities of this authentication scheme?

17.2 Prior to the introduction of IEEE 802.11i, the security scheme for IEEE 802.11 was Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). WEP assumed all devices in the network share a secret key. The purpose of the authentication scenario is for the STA to prove that it possesses the secret key. Authentication proceeds as shown in Figure 17.23. The STA sends a message to the AP requesting authentication. The AP issues a challenge, which is a sequence of 128 random bytes sent as plaintext. The STA encrypts the challenge with the shared key and returns it to the AP. The AP decrypts the incoming value and compares it to the challenge that it sent. If there is a match, the AP confirms that authentication has succeeded.

![Figure 17.23 WEP Authentication](image-url)
a. What are the benefits of this authentication scheme?
b. This authentication scheme is incomplete. What is missing and why is this important? *Hint:* The addition of one or two messages would fix the problem.
c. What is a cryptographic weakness of this scheme?

17.3 For WEP, data integrity and data confidentiality are achieved using the RC4 stream encryption algorithm. The transmitter of an MPDU performs the following steps, referred to as encapsulation:

1. The transmitter selects an initial vector (IV) value.
2. The IV value is concatenated with the WEP key shared by transmitter and receiver to form the seed, or key input, to RC4.
3. A 32-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is computed over all the bits of the MAC data field and appended to the data field. The CRC is a common error-detection code used in data link control protocols. In this case, the CRC serves as an integrity check value (ICV).
4. The result of step 3 is encrypted using RC4 to form the ciphertext block.
5. The plaintext IV is prepended to the ciphertext block to form the encapsulated MPDU for transmission.
   a. Draw a block diagram that illustrates the encapsulation process.
   b. Describe the steps at the receiver end to recover the plaintext and perform the integrity check.
   c. Draw a block diagram that illustrates part b.

17.4 A potential weakness of the CRC as an integrity check is that it is a linear function. This means that you can predict which bits of the CRC are changed if a single bit of the message is changed. Furthermore, it is possible to determine which combination of bits could be flipped in the message so that the net result is no change in the CRC. Thus, there are a number of combinations of bit flippings of the plaintext message that leave the CRC unchanged, so message integrity is defeated. However, in WEP, if an attacker does not know the encryption key, the attacker does not have access to the plaintext, only to the ciphertext block. Does this mean that the ICV is protected from the bit flipping attack? Explain.

17.5 One potential weakness in WTLS is the use of CBC mode cipher encryption. The standard states that for CBC mode block ciphers, the IV (initialization vector) for each record is calculated in the following way: record\_IV = IV \oplus S, where IV is the original IV and S is obtained by concatenating the 2-byte sequence number of the record the needed number of times to obtain as many bytes as in IV. Thus, if the IV is 8 bytes long, the sequence number of the record is concatenated with itself four times. Now, in CBC mode, the first block of plaintext for a record with sequence number i would be encrypted as (Figure 6.4)

\[
C_i = E(K, [IV \oplus S \oplus P_{s,1}])
\]

where \(P_{s,1}\) is the first block of plaintext of a record with sequence number \(s\) and \(S\) is the concatenated version of \(s\). Consider a terminal application (such as telnet), where each keypress is sent as an individual record. Alice enters her password into this application, and Eve captures these encrypted records. Note that the sequence number is known to Eve, because this portion of the record is not encrypted (Figure 17.17). Now somehow Eve gets hold of Alice’s channel, perhaps through an echo feature in some application. This means that Eve can present unencrypted records to the channel and view the encrypted result. Suggest a brute-force method by which Eve can guess password letters in Alice’s password. *Hint:* Exploit these properties of exclusive-OR: \(x \oplus 1 = 1; x \oplus x = 1\).

17.6 An earlier version of WTLS supported a 40-bit XOR MAC and also supported RC4 stream encryption. The XOR MAC works by padding the message with zeros, dividing it into 5-byte blocks and XORing these blocks together. Show that this scheme does not provide message integrity protection.
18.1 Pretty Good Privacy
   Notation
   Operational Description
   Cryptographic Keys and Key Rings
   Public-Key Management

18.2 S/MIME
   RFC 5322
   Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
   S/MIME Functionality
   S/MIME Messages
   S/MIME Certificate Processing
   Enhanced Security Services

18.3 DomainKeys Identified Mail
   Internet Mail Architecture
   E-mail Threats
   DKIM Strategy
   DKIM Functional Flow

18.4 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

18.5 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 18A Radix-64 Conversion
Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to appear, the Board’s access to other sources of information filled much of this gap. The FBI provided documents taken from the files of the National Security Advisor and relevant NSC staff members, including messages from the PROF system between VADM Poindexter and LtCol North. The PROF messages were conversations by computer, written at the time events occurred and presumed by the writers to be protected from disclosure. In this sense, they provide a first-hand, contemporaneous account of events.

—The Tower Commission Report to President Reagan on the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987

**KEY POINTS**

- PGP is an open-source, freely available software package for e-mail security. It provides authentication through the use of digital signature, confidentiality through the use of symmetric block encryption, compression using the ZIP algorithm, and e-mail compatibility using the radix-64 encoding scheme.

- PGP incorporates tools for developing a public-key trust model and public-key certificate management.

- S/MIME is an Internet standard approach to e-mail security that incorporates the same functionality as PGP.

- DKIM is a specification used by e-mail providers for cryptographically signing e-mail messages on behalf of the source domain.

In virtually all distributed environments, electronic mail is the most heavily used network-based application. Users expect to be able to, and do, send e-mail to others who are connected directly or indirectly to the Internet, regardless of host operating system or communications suite. With the explosively growing reliance on e-mail, there grows a demand for authentication and confidentiality services. Two schemes stand out as approaches that enjoy widespread use: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and S/MIME. Both are examined in this chapter. The chapter closes with a discussion of DomainKeys Identified Mail.

**18.1 PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY**

PGP is a remarkable phenomenon. Largely the effort of a single person, Phil Zimmermann, PGP provides a confidentiality and authentication service that can be used for electronic mail and file storage applications. In essence, Zimmermann has done the following:
1. Selected the best available cryptographic algorithms as building blocks.

2. Integrated these algorithms into a general-purpose application that is independent of operating system and processor and that is based on a small set of easy-to-use commands.

3. Made the package and its documentation, including the source code, freely available via the Internet, bulletin boards, and commercial networks such as AOL (America On Line).

4. Entered into an agreement with a company (Viacrypt, now Network Associates) to provide a fully compatible, low-cost commercial version of PGP.

PGP has grown explosively and is now widely used. A number of reasons can be cited for this growth.

1. It is available free worldwide in versions that run on a variety of platforms, including Windows, UNIX, Macintosh, and many more. In addition, the commercial version satisfies users who want a product that comes with vendor support.

2. It is based on algorithms that have survived extensive public review and are considered extremely secure. Specifically, the package includes RSA, DSS, and Diffie-Hellman for public-key encryption; CAST-128, IDEA, and 3DES for symmetric encryption; and SHA-1 for hash coding.

3. It has a wide range of applicability, from corporations that wish to select and enforce a standardized scheme for encrypting files and messages to individuals who wish to communicate securely with others worldwide over the Internet and other networks.

4. It was not developed by, nor is it controlled by, any governmental or standards organization. For those with an instinctive distrust of “the establishment,” this makes PGP attractive.

5. PGP is now on an Internet standards track (RFC 3156; MIME Security with OpenPGP). Nevertheless, PGP still has an aura of an antiestablishment endeavor.

We begin with an overall look at the operation of PGP. Next, we examine how cryptographic keys are created and stored. Then, we address the vital issue of public-key management.

Notation

Most of the notation used in this chapter has been used before, but a few terms are new. It is perhaps best to summarize those at the beginning. The following symbols are used.

\[ K_s = \text{session key used in symmetric encryption scheme} \]
\[ PR_a = \text{private key of user A, used in public-key encryption scheme} \]
\[ PU_a = \text{public key of user A, used in public-key encryption scheme} \]
\[ EP = \text{public-key encryption} \]
\[ DP = \text{public-key decryption} \]
\[ EC = \text{symmetric encryption} \]
\[ DC = \text{symmetric decryption} \]
The PGP documentation often uses the term *secret key* to refer to a key paired with a public key in a public-key encryption scheme. As was mentioned earlier, this practice risks confusion with a secret key used for symmetric encryption. Hence, we use the term *private key* instead.

**Operational Description**

The actual operation of PGP, as opposed to the management of keys, consists of four services: authentication, confidentiality, compression, and e-mail compatibility (Table 18.1). We examine each of these in turn.

**AUTHENTICATION** Figure 18.1a illustrates the digital signature service provided by PGP. This is the digital signature scheme discussed in Chapter 13 and illustrated in Figure 13.2. The sequence is as follows.

1. The sender creates a message.
2. SHA-1 is used to generate a 160-bit hash code of the message.
3. The hash code is encrypted with RSA using the sender’s private key, and the result is prepended to the message.
4. The receiver uses RSA with the sender’s public key to decrypt and recover the hash code.
5. The receiver generates a new hash code for the message and compares it with the decrypted hash code. If the two match, the message is accepted as authentic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Algorithms Used</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Digital signature</td>
<td>DSS/SHA or RSA/SHA</td>
<td>A hash code of a message is created using SHA-1. This message digest is encrypted using DSS or RSA with the sender’s private key and included with the message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message encryption</td>
<td>CAST or IDEA or Three-key Triple DES with Diffie-Hellman or RSA</td>
<td>A message is encrypted using CAST-128 or IDEA or 3DES with a one-time session key generated by the sender. The session key is encrypted using Diffie-Hellman or RSA with the recipient’s public key and included with the message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compression</td>
<td>ZIP</td>
<td>A message may be compressed for storage or transmission using ZIP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail compatibility</td>
<td>Radix-64 conversion</td>
<td>To provide transparency for e-mail applications, an encrypted message may be converted to an ASCII string using radix-64 conversion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) is described in Appendix Q.
Figure 18.1  PGP Cryptographic Functions
The combination of SHA-1 and RSA provides an effective digital signature scheme. Because of the strength of RSA, the recipient is assured that only the possessor of the matching private key can generate the signature. Because of the strength of SHA-1, the recipient is assured that no one else could generate a new message that matches the hash code and, hence, the signature of the original message.

As an alternative, signatures can be generated using DSS/SHA-1.

Although signatures normally are found attached to the message or file that they sign, this is not always the case: Detached signatures are supported. A detached signature may be stored and transmitted separately from the message it signs. This is useful in several contexts. A user may wish to maintain a separate signature log of all messages sent or received. A detached signature of an executable program can detect subsequent virus infection. Finally, detached signatures can be used when more than one party must sign a document, such as a legal contract. Each person’s signature is independent and therefore is applied only to the document. Otherwise, signatures would have to be nested, with the second signer signing both the document and the first signature, and so on.

**CONFIDENTIALITY** Another basic service provided by PGP is confidentiality, which is provided by encrypting messages to be transmitted or to be stored locally as files. In both cases, the symmetric encryption algorithm CAST-128 may be used. Alternatively, IDEA or 3DES may be used. The 64-bit cipher feedback (CFB) mode is used.

As always, one must address the problem of key distribution. In PGP, each symmetric key is used only once. That is, a new key is generated as a random 128-bit number for each message. Thus, although this is referred to in the documentation as a session key, it is in reality a one-time key. Because it is to be used only once, the session key is bound to the message and transmitted with it. To protect the key, it is encrypted with the receiver’s public key. Figure 18.1b illustrates the sequence, which can be described as follows.

1. The sender generates a message and a random 128-bit number to be used as a session key for this message only.
2. The message is encrypted using CAST-128 (or IDEA or 3DES) with the session key.
3. The session key is encrypted with RSA using the recipient’s public key and is prepended to the message.
4. The receiver uses RSA with its private key to decrypt and recover the session key.
5. The session key is used to decrypt the message.

As an alternative to the use of RSA for key encryption, PGP provides an option referred to as **Diffie-Hellman.** As was explained in Chapter 10, Diffie-Hellman is a key exchange algorithm. In fact, PGP uses a variant of Diffie-Hellman that does provide encryption/decryption, known as ElGamal (Chapter 10).

Several observations may be made. First, to reduce encryption time, the combination of symmetric and public-key encryption is used in preference to simply using
RSA or ElGamal to encrypt the message directly: CAST-128 and the other symmetric algorithms are substantially faster than RSA or ElGamal. Second, the use of the public-key algorithm solves the session-key distribution problem, because only the recipient is able to recover the session key that is bound to the message. Note that we do not need a session-key exchange protocol of the type discussed in Chapter 14, because we are not beginning an ongoing session. Rather, each message is a one-time independent event with its own key. Furthermore, given the store-and-forward nature of electronic mail, the use of handshaking to assure that both sides have the same session key is not practical. Finally, the use of one-time symmetric keys strengthens what is already a strong symmetric encryption approach. Only a small amount of plaintext is encrypted with each key, and there is no relationship among the keys. Thus, to the extent that the public-key algorithm is secure, the entire scheme is secure. To this end, PGP provides the user with a range of key size options from 768 to 3072 bits (the DSS key for signatures is limited to 1024 bits).

**Confidentiality and Authentication** As Figure 18.1c illustrates, both services may be used for the same message. First, a signature is generated for the plaintext message and prepended to the message. Then the plaintext message plus signature is encrypted using CAST-128 (or IDEA or 3DES), and the session key is encrypted using RSA (or ElGamal). This sequence is preferable to the opposite: encrypting the message and then generating a signature for the encrypted message. It is generally more convenient to store a signature with a plaintext version of a message. Furthermore, for purposes of third-party verification, if the signature is performed first, a third party need not be concerned with the symmetric key when verifying the signature.

In summary, when both services are used, the sender first signs the message with its own private key, then encrypts the message with a session key, and finally encrypts the session key with the recipient’s public key.

**Compression** As a default, PGP compresses the message after applying the signature but before encryption. This has the benefit of saving space both for e-mail transmission and for file storage.

The placement of the compression algorithm, indicated by \( Z \) for compression and \( Z^{-1} \) for decompression in Figure 18.1, is critical.

1. The signature is generated before compression for two reasons:
   a. It is preferable to sign an uncompressed message so that one can store only the uncompressed message together with the signature for future verification. If one signed a compressed document, then it would be necessary either to store a compressed version of the message for later verification or to recompress the message when verification is required.
   b. Even if one were willing to generate dynamically a recompressed message for verification, PGP’s compression algorithm presents a difficulty. The algorithm is not deterministic; various implementations of the algorithm achieve different tradeoffs in running speed versus compression ratio and, as a result, produce different compressed forms. However, these different compression algorithms are interoperable because any version of the algorithm can correctly decompress the output of any other version. Applying the hash
function and signature after compression would constrain all PGP implementations to the same version of the compression algorithm.

2. Message encryption is applied after compression to strengthen cryptographic security. Because the compressed message has less redundancy than the original plaintext, cryptanalysis is more difficult.

The compression algorithm used is ZIP, which is described in Appendix O.

E-MAIL COMPATIBILITY When PGP is used, at least part of the block to be transmitted is encrypted. If only the signature service is used, then the message digest is encrypted (with the sender’s private key). If the confidentiality service is used, the message plus signature (if present) are encrypted (with a one-time symmetric key). Thus, part or all of the resulting block consists of a stream of arbitrary 8-bit octets. However, many electronic mail systems only permit the use of blocks consisting of ASCII text. To accommodate this restriction, PGP provides the service of converting the raw 8-bit binary stream to a stream of printable ASCII characters.

The scheme used for this purpose is radix-64 conversion. Each group of three octets of binary data is mapped into four ASCII characters. This format also appends a CRC to detect transmission errors. See Appendix 18A for a description.

The use of radix 64 expands a message by 33%. Fortunately, the session key and signature portions of the message are relatively compact, and the plaintext message has been compressed. In fact, the compression should be more than enough to compensate for the radix-64 expansion. For example, [HELD96] reports an average compression ratio of about 2.0 using ZIP. If we ignore the relatively small signature and key components, the typical overall effect of compression and expansion of a file of length $X$ would be $1.33 \times 0.5 \times X = 0.665 \times X$. Thus, there is still an overall compression of about one-third.

One noteworthy aspect of the radix-64 algorithm is that it blindly converts the input stream to radix-64 format regardless of content, even if the input happens to be ASCII text. Thus, if a message is signed but not encrypted and the conversion is applied to the entire block, the output will be unreadable to the casual observer, which provides a certain level of confidentiality. As an option, PGP can be configured to convert to radix-64 format only the signature portion of signed plaintext messages. This enables the human recipient to read the message without using PGP. PGP would still have to be used to verify the signature.

Figure 18.2 shows the relationship among the four services so far discussed. On transmission (if it is required), a signature is generated using a hash code of the uncompressed plaintext. Then the plaintext (plus signature if present) is compressed. Next, if confidentiality is required, the block (compressed plaintext or compressed signature plus plaintext) is encrypted and prepended with the public-key-encrypted symmetric encryption key. Finally, the entire block is converted to radix-64 format.

On reception, the incoming block is first converted back from radix-64 format to binary. Then, if the message is encrypted, the recipient recovers the session key and decrypts the message. The resulting block is then decompressed. If the message is signed, the recipient recovers the transmitted hash code and compares it to its own calculation of the hash code.
Figure 18.2 Transmission and Reception of PGP Messages
Cryptographic Keys and Key Rings

PGP makes use of four types of keys: one-time session symmetric keys, public keys, private keys, and passphrase-based symmetric keys (explained subsequently). Three separate requirements can be identified with respect to these keys.

1. A means of generating unpredictable session keys is needed.

2. We would like to allow a user to have multiple public-key/private-key pairs. One reason is that the user may wish to change his or her key pair from time to time. When this happens, any messages in the pipeline will be constructed with an obsolete key. Furthermore, recipients will know only the old public key until an update reaches them. In addition to the need to change keys over time, a user may wish to have multiple key pairs at a given time to interact with different groups of correspondents or simply to enhance security by limiting the amount of material encrypted with any one key. The upshot of all this is that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between users and their public keys. Thus, some means is needed for identifying particular keys.

3. Each PGP entity must maintain a file of its own public/private key pairs as well as a file of public keys of correspondents.

We examine each of these requirements in turn.

**SESSION KEY GENERATION** Each session key is associated with a single message and is used only for the purpose of encrypting and decrypting that message. Recall that message encryption/decryption is done with a symmetric encryption algorithm. CAST-128 and IDEA use 128-bit keys; 3DES uses a 168-bit key. For the following discussion, we assume CAST-128.

Random 128-bit numbers are generated using CAST-128 itself. The input to the random number generator consists of a 128-bit key and two 64-bit blocks that are treated as plaintext to be encrypted. Using cipher feedback mode, the CAST-128 encrypter produces two 64-bit cipher text blocks, which are concatenated to form the 128-bit session key. The algorithm that is used is based on the one specified in ANSI X12.17.

The “plaintext” input to the random number generator, consisting of two 64-bit blocks, is itself derived from a stream of 128-bit randomized numbers. These numbers are based on keystroke input from the user. Both the keystroke timing and the actual keys struck are used to generate the randomized stream. Thus, if the user hits arbitrary keys at his or her normal pace, a reasonably “random” input will be generated. This random input is also combined with previous session key output from CAST-128 to form the key input to the generator. The result, given the effective scrambling of CAST-128, is to produce a sequence of session keys that is effectively unpredictable.

Appendix P discusses PGP random number generation techniques in more detail.

**KEY IDENTIFIERS** As we have discussed, an encrypted message is accompanied by an encrypted form of the session key that was used for message encryption. The session key itself is encrypted with the recipient’s public key. Hence, only the
recipient will be able to recover the session key and therefore recover the message. If each user employed a single public/private key pair, then the recipient would automatically know which key to use to decrypt the session key: the recipient's unique private key. However, we have stated a requirement that any given user may have multiple public/private key pairs.

How, then, does the recipient know which of its public keys was used to encrypt the session key? One simple solution would be to transmit the public key with the message. The recipient could then verify that this is indeed one of its public keys, and proceed. This scheme would work, but it is unnecessarily wasteful of space. An RSA public key may be hundreds of decimal digits in length. Another solution would be to associate an identifier with each public key that is unique at least within one user. That is, the combination of user ID and key ID would be sufficient to identify a key uniquely. Then only the much shorter key ID would need to be transmitted. This solution, however, raises a management and overhead problem: Key IDs must be assigned and stored so that both sender and recipient could map from key ID to public key. This seems unnecessarily burdensome.

The solution adopted by PGP is to assign a key ID to each public key that is, with very high probability, unique within a user ID.\(^2\) The key ID associated with each public key consists of its least significant 64 bits. That is, the key ID of public key \(PU_a\) is \((PU_a \mod 2^{64})\). This is a sufficient length that the probability of duplicate key IDs is very small.

A key ID is also required for the PGP digital signature. Because a sender may use one of a number of private keys to encrypt the message digest, the recipient must know which public key is intended for use. Accordingly, the digital signature component of a message includes the 64-bit key ID of the required public key. When the message is received, the recipient verifies that the key ID is for a public key that it knows for that sender and then proceeds to verify the signature.

Now that the concept of key ID has been introduced, we can take a more detailed look at the format of a transmitted message, which is shown in Figure 18.3. A message consists of three components: the message component, a signature (optional), and a session key component (optional).

The **message component** includes the actual data to be stored or transmitted, as well as a filename and a timestamp that specifies the time of creation.

The **signature component** includes the following:

- **Timestamp:** The time at which the signature was made.
- **Message digest:** The 160-bit SHA-1 digest encrypted with the sender’s private signature key. The digest is calculated over the signature timestamp concatenated with the data portion of the message component. The inclusion of the signature timestamp in the digest insures against replay types of attacks. The exclusion of the filename and timestamp portions of the message component ensures that detached signatures are exactly the same as attached signatures.

\(^2\)We have seen this introduction of probabilistic concepts before, in Section 8.3, for determining whether a number is prime. It is often the case in designing algorithms that the use of probabilistic techniques results in a less time-consuming, a less complex solution, or both.
prefixed to the message. Detached signatures are calculated on a separate file that has none of the message component header fields.

- **Leading two octets of message digest:** Enables the recipient to determine if the correct public key was used to decrypt the message digest for authentication by comparing this plaintext copy of the first two octets with the first two octets of the decrypted digest. These octets also serve as a 16-bit frame check sequence for the message.

- **Key ID of sender's public key:** Identifies the public key that should be used to decrypt the message digest and, hence, identifies the private key that was used to encrypt the message digest.

The message component and optional signature component may be compressed using ZIP and may be encrypted using a session key.
The **session key component** includes the session key and the identifier of the recipient’s public key that was used by the sender to encrypt the session key.

The entire block is usually encoded with radix-64 encoding.

**Key Rings** We have seen how key IDs are critical to the operation of PGP and that two key IDs are included in any PGP message that provides both confidentiality and authentication. These keys need to be stored and organized in a systematic way for efficient and effective use by all parties. The scheme used in PGP is to provide a pair of data structures at each node, one to store the public/private key pairs owned by that node and one to store the public keys of other users known at this node. These data structures are referred to, respectively, as the private-key ring and the public-key ring.

Figure 18.4 shows the general structure of a **private-key ring**. We can view the ring as a table in which each row represents one of the public/private key pairs owned by this user. Each row contains the entries:

- **Timestamp**: The date/time when this key pair was generated.
- **Key ID**: The least significant 64 bits of the public key for this entry.
- **Public key**: The public-key portion of the pair.
- **Private key**: The private-key portion of the pair; this field is encrypted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private-Key Ring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timestamp</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public-Key Ring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timestamp</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = field used to index table

**Figure 18.4** General Structure of Private- and Public-Key Rings
• **User ID:** Typically, this will be the user’s e-mail address (e.g., stallings@acm.org). However, the user may choose to associate a different name with each pair (e.g., Stallings, WStallings, WilliamStallings, etc.) or to reuse the same User ID more than once.

The private-key ring can be indexed by either User ID or Key ID; later we will see the need for both means of indexing.

Although it is intended that the private-key ring be stored only on the machine of the user that created and owns the key pairs and that it be accessible only to that user, it makes sense to make the value of the private key as secure as possible. Accordingly, the private key itself is not stored in the key ring. Rather, this key is encrypted using CAST-128 (or IDEA or 3DES). The procedure is as follows:

1. The user selects a passphrase to be used for encrypting private keys.
2. When the system generates a new public/private key pair using RSA, it asks the user for the passphrase. Using SHA-1, a 160-bit hash code is generated from the passphrase, and the passphrase is discarded.
3. The system encrypts the private key using CAST-128 with the 128 bits of the hash code as the key. The hash code is then discarded, and the encrypted private key is stored in the private-key ring.

Subsequently, when a user accesses the private-key ring to retrieve a private key, he or she must supply the passphrase. PGP will retrieve the encrypted private key, generate the hash code of the passphrase, and decrypt the encrypted private key using CAST-128 with the hash code.

This is a very compact and effective scheme. As in any system based on passwords, the security of this system depends on the security of the password. To avoid the temptation to write it down, the user should use a passphrase that is not easily guessed but that is easily remembered.

Figure 18.4 also shows the general structure of a **public-key ring.** This data structure is used to store public keys of other users that are known to this user. For the moment, let us ignore some fields shown in the figure and describe the following fields.

- **Timestamp:** The date/time when this entry was generated.
- **Key ID:** The least significant 64 bits of the public key for this entry.
- **Public Key:** The public key for this entry.
- **User ID:** Identifies the owner of this key. Multiple user IDs may be associated with a single public key.

The public-key ring can be indexed by either User ID or Key ID; we will see the need for both means of indexing later.

We are now in a position to show how these key rings are used in message transmission and reception. For simplicity, we ignore compression and radix-64 conversion in the following discussion. First consider message transmission (Figure 18.5) and assume that the message is to be both signed and encrypted. The sending PGP entity performs the following steps.
1. Signing the message:
   a. PGP retrieves the sender’s private key from the private-key ring using `your_userid` as an index. If `your_userid` was not provided in the command, the first private key on the ring is retrieved.
   b. PGP prompts the user for the passphrase to recover the unencrypted private key.
   c. The signature component of the message is constructed.

2. Encrypting the message:
   a. PGP generates a session key and encrypts the message.
   b. PGP retrieves the recipient’s public key from the public-key ring using `her_userid` as an index.
   c. The session key component of the message is constructed.

The receiving PGP entity performs the following steps (Figure 18.6).

1. Decrypting the message:
   a. PGP retrieves the receiver’s private key from the private-key ring using the Key ID field in the session key component of the message as an index.
   b. PGP prompts the user for the passphrase to recover the unencrypted private key.
   c. PGP then recovers the session key and decrypts the message.
2. Authenticating the message:
   a. PGP retrieves the sender’s public key from the public-key ring using the Key
      ID field in the signature key component of the message as an index.
   b. PGP recovers the transmitted message digest.
   c. PGP computes the message digest for the received message and compares it
      to the transmitted message digest to authenticate.

Public-Key Management

As can be seen from the discussion so far, PGP contains a clever, efficient, interlocking
set of functions and formats to provide an effective confidentiality and authentication service. To complete the system, one final area needs to be addressed, that of public-key management. The PGP documentation captures the importance of this area:

This whole business of protecting public keys from tampering is the single most difficult problem in practical public key applications. It is the “Achilles heel” of public key cryptography, and a lot of software complexity is tied up in solving this one problem.
PGP provides a structure for solving this problem with several suggested options that may be used. Because PGP is intended for use in a variety of formal and informal environments, no rigid public-key management scheme is set up, such as we will see in our discussion of S/MIME later in this chapter.

**Approaches to Public-Key Management** The essence of the problem is this: User A must build up a public-key ring containing the public keys of other users to interoperate with them using PGP. Suppose that A’s key ring contains a public key attributed to B, but in fact the key is owned by C. This could happen, for example, if A got the key from a bulletin board system (BBS) that was used by B to post the public key but that has been compromised by C. The result is that two threats now exist. First, C can send messages to A and forge B’s signature so that A will accept the message as coming from B. Second, any encrypted message from A to B can be read by C.

A number of approaches are possible for minimizing the risk that a user’s public-key ring contains false public keys. Suppose that A wishes to obtain a reliable public key for B. The following are some approaches that could be used.

1. Physically get the key from B. B could store her public key \((PU_b)\) on a floppy disk and hand it to A. A could then load the key into his system from the floppy disk. This is a very secure method but has obvious practical limitations.

2. Verify a key by telephone. If A can recognize B on the phone, A could call B and ask her to dictate the key, in radix-64 format, over the phone. As a more practical alternative, B could transmit her key in an e-mail message to A. A could have PGP generate a 160-bit SHA-1 digest of the key and display it in hexadecimal format; this is referred to as the “fingerprint” of the key. A could then call B and ask her to dictate the fingerprint over the phone. If the two fingerprints match, the key is verified.

3. Obtain B’s public key from a mutual trusted individual D. For this purpose, the introducer, D, creates a signed certificate. The certificate includes B’s public key, the time of creation of the key, and a validity period for the key. D generates an SHA-1 digest of this certificate, encrypts it with her private key, and attaches the signature to the certificate. Because only D could have created the signature, no one else can create a false public key and pretend that it is signed by D. The signed certificate could be sent directly to A by B or D, or it could be posted on a bulletin board.

4. Obtain B’s public key from a trusted certifying authority. Again, a public-key certificate is created and signed by the authority. A could then access the authority, providing a user name and receiving a signed certificate.

For cases 3 and 4, A already would have to have a copy of the introducer’s public key and trust that this key is valid. Ultimately, it is up to A to assign a level of trust to anyone who is to act as an introducer.

**The Use of Trust** Although PGP does not include any specification for establishing certifying authorities or for establishing trust, it does provide a convenient means of using trust, associating trust with public keys, and exploiting trust information.
The basic structure is as follows. Each entry in the public-key ring is a public-key certificate, as described in the preceding subsection. Associated with each such entry is a **key legitimacy field** that indicates the extent to which PGP will trust that this is a valid public key for this user; the higher the level of trust, the stronger is the binding of this user ID to this key. This field is computed by PGP. Also associated with the entry are zero or more signatures that the key ring owner has collected that sign this certificate. In turn, each signature has associated with it a **signature trust field** that indicates the degree to which this PGP user trusts the signer to certify public keys. The key legitimacy field is derived from the collection of signature trust fields in the entry. Finally, each entry defines a public key associated with a particular owner, and an **owner trust field** is included that indicates the degree to which this public key is trusted to sign other public-key certificates; this level of trust is assigned by the user. We can think of the signature trust fields as cached copies of the owner trust field from another entry.

The three fields mentioned in the previous paragraph are each contained in a structure referred to as a trust flag byte. The content of this trust flag for each of these three uses is shown in Table 18.2. Suppose that we are dealing with the public-key ring of user A. We can describe the operation of the trust processing as follows.

1. When A inserts a new public key on the public-key ring, PGP must assign a value to the trust flag that is associated with the owner of this public key. If the owner is A, and therefore this public key also appears in the private-key ring, then a value of *ultimate trust* is automatically assigned to the trust field.

### Table 18.2 Contents of Trust Flag Byte

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Trust Assigned to Public-Key Owner (appears after key packet; user defined)</th>
<th>(b) Trust Assigned to Public Key/User ID Pair (appears after User ID packet; computed by PGP)</th>
<th>(c) Trust Assigned to Signature (appears after signature packet; cached copy of OWNERTRUST for this signator)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OWNERTRUST Field</td>
<td>KEYLEGIT Field</td>
<td>SIGTRUST Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— undefined trust</td>
<td>— unknown or undefined trust</td>
<td>— undefined trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— unknown user</td>
<td>— key ownership not trusted</td>
<td>— unknown user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— usually not trusted to sign other keys</td>
<td>— marginal trust in key ownership</td>
<td>— usually not trusted to sign other keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— usually trusted to sign other keys</td>
<td>— complete trust in key ownership</td>
<td>— usually trusted to sign other keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— always trusted to sign other keys</td>
<td></td>
<td>— always trusted to sign other keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— this key is present in secret key ring (ultimate trust)</td>
<td></td>
<td>— this key is present in secret key ring (ultimate trust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCKSTOP bit</td>
<td>WARNONLY bit</td>
<td>CONTIG bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— set if this key appears in secret key ring</td>
<td>— set if user wants only to be warned when key that is not fully validated is used for encryption</td>
<td>— set if signature leads up a contiguous trusted certification path back to the ultimately trusted key ring owner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Otherwise, PGP asks A for his assessment of the trust to be assigned to the owner of this key, and A must enter the desired level. The user can specify that this owner is unknown, untrusted, marginally trusted, or completely trusted.

2. When the new public key is entered, one or more signatures may be attached to it. More signatures may be added later. When a signature is inserted into the entry, PGP searches the public-key ring to see if the author of this signature is among the known public-key owners. If so, the OWNERTRUST value for this owner is assigned to the SIGTRUST field for this signature. If not, an unknown user value is assigned.

3. The value of the key legitimacy field is calculated on the basis of the signature trust fields present in this entry. If at least one signature has a signature trust value of ultimate, then the key legitimacy value is set to complete. Otherwise, PGP computes a weighted sum of the trust values. A weight of $1/X$ is given to signatures that are always trusted and $1/Y$ to signatures that are usually trusted, where $X$ and $Y$ are user-configurable parameters. When the total of weights of the introducers of a Key/UserID combination reaches 1, the binding is considered to be trustworthy, and the key legitimacy value is set to complete. Thus, in the absence of ultimate trust, at least $X$ signatures that are always trusted, $Y$ signatures that are usually trusted, or some combination is needed.

Periodically, PGP processes the public-key ring to achieve consistency. In essence, this is a top-down process. For each OWNERTRUST field, PGP scans the ring for all signatures authored by that owner and updates the SIGTRUST field to equal the OWNERTRUST field. This process starts with keys for which there is ultimate trust. Then all KEYLEGIT fields are computed on the basis of the attached signatures.

Figure 18.7 provides an example of the way in which signature trust and key legitimacy are related. The figure shows the structure of a public-key ring. The user has acquired a number of public keys—some directly from their owners and some from a third party such as a key server.

The node labeled “You” refers to the entry in the public-key ring corresponding to this user. This key is legitimate, and the OWNERTRUST value is ultimate trust. Each other node in the key ring has an OWNERTRUST value of undefined unless some other value is assigned by the user. In this example, this user has specified that it always trusts the following users to sign other keys: D, E, F, L. This user partially trusts users A and B to sign other keys.

So the shading, or lack thereof, of the nodes in Figure 18.7 indicates the level of trust assigned by this user. The tree structure indicates which keys have been signed by which other users. If a key is signed by a user whose key is also in this key ring, the arrow joins the signed key to the signatory. If the key is signed by a user whose key is not present in this key ring, the arrow joins the signed key to a question mark, indicating that the signatory is unknown to this user.

---

3Figure provided to the author by Phil Zimmermann.
CHAPTER 18 / ELECTRONIC MAIL SECURITY

Several points are illustrated in Figure 18.7.

1. Note that all keys whose owners are fully or partially trusted by this user have been signed by this user, with the exception of node L. Such a user signature is not always necessary, as the presence of node L indicates, but in practice, most users are likely to sign the keys for most owners that they trust. So, for example, even though E’s key is already signed by trusted introducer F, the user chose to sign E’s key directly.

2. We assume that two partially trusted signatures are sufficient to certify a key. Hence, the key for user H is deemed legitimate by PGP because it is signed by A and B, both of whom are partially trusted.

3. A key may be determined to be legitimate because it is signed by one fully trusted or two partially trusted signatories, but its user may not be trusted to sign other keys. For example, N’s key is legitimate because it is signed by E, whom this user trusts, but N is not trusted to sign other keys because this user has not assigned N that trust value. Therefore, although R’s key is signed by N, PGP does not consider R’s key legitimate. This situation makes perfect sense. If you wish to send a private message to some individual, it is not necessary that you trust that individual in any respect. It is only necessary that you are sure that you have the correct public key for that individual.

4. Figure 18.7 also shows an example of a detached “orphan” node S, with two unknown signatures. Such a key may have been acquired from a key server.
PGP cannot assume that this key is legitimate simply because it came from a reputable server. The user must declare the key legitimate by signing it or by telling PGP that it is willing to trust fully one of the key’s signatories.

A final point: Earlier it was mentioned that multiple user IDs may be associated with a single public key on the public-key ring. This could be because a person has changed names or has been introduced via signature under multiple names, indicating different e-mail addresses for the same person, for example. So we can think of a public key as the root of a tree. A public key has a number of user IDs associating with it, with a number of signatures below each user ID. The binding of a particular user ID to a key depends on the signatures associated with that user ID and that key, whereas the level of trust in this key (for use in signing other keys) is a function of all the dependent signatures.

**Revoking Public Keys**  A user may wish to revoke his or her current public key either because compromise is suspected or simply to avoid the use of the same key for an extended period. Note that a compromise would require that an opponent somehow had obtained a copy of your unencrypted private key or that the opponent had obtained both the private key from your private-key ring and your passphrase.

The convention for revoking a public key is for the owner to issue a key revocation certificate, signed by the owner. This certificate has the same form as a normal signature certificate but includes an indicator that the purpose of this certificate is to revoke the use of this public key. Note that the corresponding private key must be used to sign a certificate that revokes a public key. The owner should then attempt to disseminate this certificate as widely and as quickly as possible to enable potential correspondents to update their public-key rings.

Note that an opponent who has compromised the private key of an owner can also issue such a certificate. However, this would deny the opponent as well as the legitimate owner the use of the public key, and therefore, it seems a much less likely threat than the malicious use of a stolen private key.

### 18.2 S/MIME

Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) is a security enhancement to the MIME Internet e-mail format standard based on technology from RSA Data Security. Although both PGP and S/MIME are on an IETF standards track, it appears likely that S/MIME will emerge as the industry standard for commercial and organizational use, while PGP will remain the choice for personal e-mail security for many users. S/MIME is defined in a number of documents—most importantly RFCs 3370, 3850, 3851, and 3852.

To understand S/MIME, we need first to have a general understanding of the underlying e-mail format that it uses, namely MIME. But to understand the significance of MIME, we need to go back to the traditional e-mail format standard, RFC 822, which is still in common use. The most recent version of this format specification is RFC 5322 (*Internet Message Format*). Accordingly, this section first provides an introduction to these two earlier standards and then moves on to a discussion of S/MIME.
RFC 5322

RFC 5322 defines a format for text messages that are sent using electronic mail. It has been the standard for Internet-based text mail messages and remains in common use. In the RFC 5322 context, messages are viewed as having an envelope and contents. The envelope contains whatever information is needed to accomplish transmission and delivery. The contents compose the object to be delivered to the recipient. The RFC 5322 standard applies only to the contents. However, the content standard includes a set of header fields that may be used by the mail system to create the envelope, and the standard is intended to facilitate the acquisition of such information by programs.

The overall structure of a message that conforms to RFC 5322 is very simple. A message consists of some number of header lines (the header) followed by unrestricted text (the body). The header is separated from the body by a blank line. Put differently, a message is ASCII text, and all lines up to the first blank line are assumed to be header lines used by the user agent part of the mail system.

A header line usually consists of a keyword, followed by a colon, followed by the keyword’s arguments; the format allows a long line to be broken up into several lines. The most frequently used keywords are From, To, Subject, and Date. Here is an example message:

```
Date: October 8, 2009 2:15:49 PM EDT
From: "William Stallings" <ws@shore.net>
Subject: The Syntax in RFC 5322
To: Smith@Other-host.com
Cc: Jones@Yet-Another-Host.com

Hello. This section begins the actual message body, which is delimited from the message heading by a blank line.

Another field that is commonly found in RFC 5322 headers is Message-ID. This field contains a unique identifier associated with this message.

Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions

Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (MIME) is an extension to the RFC 5322 framework that is intended to address some of the problems and limitations of the use of Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), defined in RFC 821, or some other mail transfer protocol and RFC 5322 for electronic mail. [PARZ06] lists the following limitations of the SMTP/5322 scheme.

1. SMTP cannot transmit executable files or other binary objects. A number of schemes are in use for converting binary files into a text form that can be used by SMTP mail systems, including the popular UNIX UUencode/UUdecode scheme. However, none of these is a standard or even a de facto standard.

2. SMTP cannot transmit text data that includes national language characters, because these are represented by 8-bit codes with values of 128 decimal or higher, and SMTP is limited to 7-bit ASCII.
3. SMTP servers may reject mail message over a certain size.
4. SMTP gateways that translate between ASCII and the character code EBCDIC do not use a consistent set of mappings, resulting in translation problems.
5. SMTP gateways to X.400 electronic mail networks cannot handle nontextual data included in X.400 messages.
6. Some SMTP implementations do not adhere completely to the SMTP standards defined in RFC 821. Common problems include:
   • Deletion, addition, or reordering of carriage return and linefeed
   • Truncating or wrapping lines longer than 76 characters
   • Removal of trailing white space (tab and space characters)
   • Padding of lines in a message to the same length
   • Conversion of tab characters into multiple space characters

MIME is intended to resolve these problems in a manner that is compatible with existing RFC 5322 implementations. The specification is provided in RFCs 2045 through 2049.

**Overview** The MIME specification includes the following elements.

1. Five new message header fields are defined, which may be included in an RFC 5322 header. These fields provide information about the body of the message.
2. A number of content formats are defined, thus standardizing representations that support multimedia electronic mail.
3. Transfer encodings are defined that enable the conversion of any content format into a form that is protected from alteration by the mail system.

In this subsection, we introduce the five message header fields. The next two subsections deal with content formats and transfer encodings.

The five header fields defined in MIME are

- **MIME-Version**: Must have the parameter value 1.0. This field indicates that the message conforms to RFCs 2045 and 2046.
- **Content-Type**: Describes the data contained in the body with sufficient detail that the receiving user agent can pick an appropriate agent or mechanism to represent the data to the user or otherwise deal with the data in an appropriate manner.
- **Content-Transfer-Encoding**: Indicates the type of transformation that has been used to represent the body of the message in a way that is acceptable for mail transport.
- **Content-ID**: Used to identify MIME entities uniquely in multiple contexts.
- **Content-Description**: A text description of the object with the body; this is useful when the object is not readable (e.g., audio data).

Any or all of these fields may appear in a normal RFC 5322 header. A compliant implementation must support the MIME-Version, Content-Type, and Content-Transfer-Encoding fields; the Content-ID and Content-Description fields are optional and may be ignored by the recipient implementation.
**MIME Content Types** The bulk of the MIME specification is concerned with the definition of a variety of content types. This reflects the need to provide standardized ways of dealing with a wide variety of information representations in a multimedia environment.

Table 18.3 lists the content types specified in RFC 2046. There are seven different major types of content and a total of 15 subtypes. In general, a content type declares the general type of data, and the subtype specifies a particular format for that type of data.

For the **text type** of body, no special software is required to get the full meaning of the text aside from support of the indicated character set. The primary subtype is plain text, which is simply a string of ASCII characters or ISO 8859 characters. The enriched subtype allows greater formatting flexibility.

The **multipart type** indicates that the body contains multiple, independent parts. The Content-Type header field includes a parameter (called a boundary) that defines the delimiter between body parts. This boundary should not appear in any parts of the message. Each boundary starts on a new line and consists of two hyphens followed by the boundary value. The final boundary, which indicates the end of the last part, also has a suffix of two hyphens. Within each part, there may be an optional ordinary MIME header.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Plain</td>
<td>Unformatted text; may be ASCII or ISO 8859.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enriched</td>
<td>Provides greater format flexibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipart</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>The different parts are independent but are to be transmitted together. They should be presented to the receiver in the order that they appear in the mail message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>Differs from Mixed only in that no order is defined for delivering the parts to the receiver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>The different parts are alternative versions of the same information. They are ordered in increasing faithfulness to the original, and the recipient’s mail system should display the “best” version to the user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Digest</td>
<td>Similar to Mixed, but the default type/subtype of each part is message/rfc822.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message</td>
<td>rfc822</td>
<td>The body is itself an encapsulated message that conforms to RFC 822.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Used to allow fragmentation of large mail items, in a way that is transparent to the recipient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External-body</td>
<td>Contains a pointer to an object that exists elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>jpeg</td>
<td>The image is in JPEG format, JFIF encoding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gif</td>
<td>The image is in GIF format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>mpeg</td>
<td>MPEG format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>Single-channel 8-bit ISDN mu-law encoding at a sample rate of 8 kHz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>PostScript</td>
<td>Adobe Postscript format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>octet-stream</td>
<td>General binary data consisting of 8-bit bytes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here is a simple example of a multipart message containing two parts—both consisting of simple text (taken from RFC 2046).

```
From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@bellcore.com>
To: Ned Freed <ned@innosoft.com>
Subject: Sample message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="simple boundary"

This is the preamble. It is to be ignored, though it is a handy place for mail composers to include an explanatory note to non-MIME conformant readers.

This is implicitly typed plain ASCII text. It does NOT end with a linebreak.

This is explicitly typed plain ASCII text. It DOES end with a linebreak.

This is the epilogue. It is also to be ignored.

There are four subtypes of the multipart type, all of which have the same overall syntax. The **multipart/mixed** subtype is used when there are multiple independent body parts that need to be bundled in a particular order. For the **multipart/parallel** subtype, the order of the parts is not significant. If the recipient’s system is appropriate, the multiple parts can be presented in parallel. For example, a picture or text part could be accompanied by a voice commentary that is played while the picture or text is displayed.

For the **multipart/alternative** subtype, the various parts are different representations of the same information. The following is an example:

```
From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@bellcore.com>
To: Ned Freed <ned@innosoft.com>
Subject: Formatted text mail
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
    boundary=boundary42

    boundary42

    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

    ...plain text version of message goes here....
```
In this subtype, the body parts are ordered in terms of increasing preference. For this example, if the recipient system is capable of displaying the message in the text/enriched format, this is done; otherwise, the plain text format is used.

The **multipart/digest subtype** is used when each of the body parts is interpreted as an RFC 5322 message with headers. This subtype enables the construction of a message whose parts are individual messages. For example, the moderator of a group might collect e-mail messages from participants, bundle these messages, and send them out in one encapsulating MIME message.

The **message type** provides a number of important capabilities in MIME. The **message/rfc822 subtype** indicates that the body is an entire message, including header and body. Despite the name of this subtype, the encapsulated message may be not only a simple RFC 5322 message but also any MIME message.

The **message/partial subtype** enables fragmentation of a large message into a number of parts, which must be reassembled at the destination. For this subtype, three parameters are specified in the Content-Type: Message/Partial field: an id common to all fragments of the same message, a sequence number unique to each fragment, and the total number of fragments.

The **message/external-body subtype** indicates that the actual data to be conveyed in this message are not contained in the body. Instead, the body contains the information needed to access the data. As with the other message types, the message/external-body subtype has an outer header and an encapsulated message with its own header. The only necessary field in the outer header is the Content-Type field, which identifies this as a message/external-body subtype. The inner header is the message header for the encapsulated message. The Content-Type field in the outer header must include an access-type parameter, which indicates the method of access, such as FTP (file transfer protocol).

The **application type** refers to other kinds of data, typically either uninterpreted binary data or information to be processed by a mail-based application.

---

**MIME Transfer Encodings** The other major component of the MIME specification, in addition to content type specification, is a definition of transfer encodings for message bodies. The objective is to provide reliable delivery across the largest range of environments.

The MIME standard defines two methods of encoding data. The Content-Transfer-Encoding field can actually take on six values, as listed in Table 18.4. However, three of these values (7bit, 8bit, and binary) indicate that no encoding has been done but provide some information about the nature of the data. For SMTP transfer, it is safe to use the 7bit form. The 8bit and binary forms may be usable in other mail transport contexts. Another Content-Transfer-Encoding value is x-token,
which indicates that some other encoding scheme is used for which a name is to be supplied. This could be a vendor-specific or application-specific scheme. The two actual encoding schemes defined are quoted-printable and base64. Two schemes are defined to provide a choice between a transfer technique that is essentially human readable and one that is safe for all types of data in a way that is reasonably compact.

The quoted-printable transfer encoding is useful when the data consists largely of octets that correspond to printable ASCII characters. In essence, it represents nonsafe characters by the hexadecimal representation of their code and introduces reversible (soft) line breaks to limit message lines to 76 characters.

The base64 transfer encoding, also known as radix-64 encoding, is a common one for encoding arbitrary binary data in such a way as to be invulnerable to the processing by mail-transport programs. It is also used in PGP and is described in Appendix 18A.

Table 18.4 MIME Transfer Encodings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7bit</td>
<td>The data are all represented by short lines of ASCII characters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8bit</td>
<td>The lines are short, but there may be non-ASCII characters (octets with the high-order bit set).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>binary</td>
<td>Not only may non-ASCII characters be present, but the lines are not necessarily short enough for SMTP transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quoted-printable</td>
<td>Encodes the data in such a way that if the data being encoded are mostly ASCII text, the encoded form of the data remains largely recognizable by humans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>base64</td>
<td>Encodes data by mapping 6-bit blocks of input to 8-bit blocks of output, all of which are printable ASCII characters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x-token</td>
<td>A named nonstandard encoding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Multipart Example Figure 18.8, taken from RFC 2045, is the outline of a complex multipart message. The message has five parts to be displayed serially: two introductory plain text parts, an embedded multipart message, a richtext part, and a closing encapsulated text message in a non-ASCII character set. The embedded multipart message has two parts to be displayed in parallel: a picture and an audio fragment.

Canonical Form An important concept in MIME and S/MIME is that of canonical form. Canonical form is a format, appropriate to the content type, that is standardized for use between systems. This is in contrast to native form, which is a format that may be peculiar to a particular system. Table 18.5, from RFC 2049, should help clarify this matter.

S/MIME Functionality In terms of general functionality, S/MIME is very similar to PGP. Both offer the ability to sign and/or encrypt messages. In this subsection, we briefly summarize S/MIME capability. We then look in more detail at this capability by examining message formats and message preparation.
MIME-Version: 1.0
From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@bellcore.com>
To: Ned Freed <ned@innosoft.com>
Subject: A multipart example
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
    boundary=unique-boundary-1

This is the preamble area of a multipart message. Mail readers that understand multipart format should ignore this preamble. If you are reading this text, you might want to consider changing to a mail reader that understands how to properly display multipart messages.

--unique-boundary-1

...Some text appears here...
[Note that the preceding blank line means no header fields were given and this is text, with charset US ASCII. It could have been done with explicit typing as in the next part.]

--unique-boundary-1
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

This could have been part of the previous part, but illustrates explicit versus implicit typing of body parts.

--unique-boundary-1
Content-Type: multipart/parallel; boundary=unique-boundary-2

--unique-boundary-2
Content-Type: audio/basic
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

... base64-encoded 8000 Hz single-channel mu-law-format audio data goes here....

--unique-boundary-2
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

... base64-encoded image data goes here....

--unique-boundary-2--

--unique-boundary-1
Content-type: text/enriched
This is <bold><italic>richtext.</italic></bold> <smaller>as defined in RFC 1896</smaller>
Isn’t it <bigger><bigger>cool?</bigger></bigger>

--unique-boundary-1
Content-Type: message/rfc822
From: (mailbox in US-ASCII)
To: (address in US-ASCII)
Subject: (subject in US-ASCII)
Content-Type: Text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: Quoted-printable

... Additional text in ISO-8859-1 goes here ...

--unique-boundary-1--

Figure 18.8  Example MIME Message Structure
FUNCTIONS  S/MIME provides the following functions.

- **Enveloped data:** This consists of encrypted content of any type and encrypted-content encryption keys for one or more recipients.

- **Signed data:** A digital signature is formed by taking the message digest of the content to be signed and then encrypting that with the private key of the signer. The content plus signature are then encoded using base64 encoding. A signed data message can only be viewed by a recipient with S/MIME capability.

- **Clear-signed data:** As with signed data, a digital signature of the content is formed. However, in this case, only the digital signature is encoded using base64. As a result, recipients without S/MIME capability can view the message content, although they cannot verify the signature.

- **Signed and enveloped data:** Signed-only and encrypted-only entities may be nested, so that encrypted data may be signed and signed data or clear-signed data may be encrypted.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS  Table 18.6 summarizes the cryptographic algorithms used in S/MIME. S/MIME uses the following terminology taken from RFC 2119 (Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels) to specify the requirement level:

- **MUST:** The definition is an absolute requirement of the specification. An implementation must include this feature or function to be in conformance with the specification.

- **SHOULD:** There may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this feature or function, but it is recommended that an implementation include the feature or function.

S/MIME incorporates three public-key algorithms. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) described in Chapter 13 is the preferred algorithm for digital signature. S/MIME lists Diffie-Hellman as the preferred algorithm for encrypting session keys; in fact, S/MIME uses a variant of Diffie-Hellman that does provide
Table 18.6 Cryptographic Algorithms Used in S/MIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create a message digest to be used in forming a digital signature.</td>
<td>MUST support SHA-1. Receiver SHOULD support MD5 for backward compatibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encrypt message digest to form a digital signature.</td>
<td>Sending and receiving agents MUST support DSS. Sending agents SHOULD support RSA encryption. Receiving agents SHOULD support verification of RSA signatures with key sizes 512 bits to 1024 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encrypt session key for transmission with a message.</td>
<td>Sending and receiving agents MUST support Diffie-Hellman. Sending and receiving agents MUST support RSA encryption with key sizes 512 bits to 1024 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encrypt message for transmission with a one-time session key.</td>
<td>Sending and receiving agents MUST support encryption with tripleDES. Sending agents SHOULD support encryption with AES. Sending agents SHOULD support encryption with RC2/40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a message authentication code.</td>
<td>Receiving agents MUST support HMAC with SHA-1. Sending agents SHOULD support HMAC with SHA-1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For message encryption, three-key triple DES (tripleDES) is recommended, but compliant implementations must support 40-bit RC2. The latter is a weak encryption algorithm but allows compliance with U.S. export controls.

The S/MIME specification includes a discussion of the procedure for deciding which content encryption algorithm to use. In essence, a sending agent has two decisions to make. First, the sending agent must determine if the receiving agent is capable of decrypting using a given encryption algorithm. Second, if the receiving agent is only capable of accepting weakly encrypted content, the sending agent must decide if it is acceptable to send using weak encryption. To support this decision process, a sending agent may announce its decrypting capabilities in order of preference for any message that it sends out. A receiving agent may store that information for future use.

The following rules, in the following order, should be followed by a sending agent.

1. If the sending agent has a list of preferred decrypting capabilities from an intended recipient, it SHOULD choose the first (highest preference) capability on the list that it is capable of using.
2. If the sending agent has no such list of capabilities from an intended recipient but has received one or more messages from the recipient, then the outgoing message SHOULD use the same encryption algorithm as was used on the last signed and encrypted message received from that intended recipient.

3. If the sending agent has no knowledge about the decryption capabilities of the intended recipient and is willing to risk that the recipient may not be able to decrypt the message, then the sending agent SHOULD use triple DES.

4. If the sending agent has no knowledge about the decryption capabilities of the intended recipient and is not willing to risk that the recipient may not be able to decrypt the message, then the sending agent MUST use RC2/40.

If a message is to be sent to multiple recipients and a common encryption algorithm cannot be selected for all, then the sending agent will need to send two messages. However, in that case, it is important to note that the security of the message is made vulnerable by the transmission of one copy with lower security.

**S/MIME Messages**

S/MIME makes use of a number of new MIME content types, which are shown in Table 18.7. All of the new application types use the designation PKCS. This refers to a set of public-key cryptography specifications issued by RSA Laboratories and made available for the S/MIME effort.

We examine each of these in turn after first looking at the general procedures for S/MIME message preparation.

**Securing a MIME Entity** S/MIME secures a MIME entity with a signature, encryption, or both. A MIME entity may be an entire message (except for the RFC 5322 headers), or if the MIME content type is multipart, then a MIME entity is one or more of the subparts of the message. The MIME entity is prepared according to the normal rules for MIME message preparation. Then the MIME entity plus some security-related data, such as algorithm identifiers and certificates, are processed by S/MIME to produce what is known as a PKCS object. A PKCS object is then treated as message content and wrapped in MIME (provided with appropriate MIME headers). This process should become clear as we look at specific objects and provide examples.

In all cases, the message to be sent is converted to canonical form. In particular, for a given type and subtype, the appropriate canonical form is used for the message content. For a multipart message, the appropriate canonical form is used for each subpart.

The use of transfer encoding requires special attention. For most cases, the result of applying the security algorithm will be to produce an object that is partially or totally represented in arbitrary binary data. This will then be wrapped in an outer MIME message, and transfer encoding can be applied at that point, typically base64. However, in the case of a multipart signed message (described in more detail later), the message content in one of the subparts is unchanged by the security process. Unless that content is 7bit, it should be transfer encoded using base64 or quoted-printable so that there is no danger of altering the content to which the signature was applied.

We now look at each of the S/MIME content types.
### Table 18.7 S/MIME Content Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
<th>smime Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multipart</td>
<td>Signed</td>
<td></td>
<td>A clear-signed message in two parts: one is the message and the other is the signature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>pkcs7-mime</td>
<td>signedData</td>
<td>A signed S/MIME entity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>pkcs7-mime</td>
<td>envelopedData</td>
<td>An encrypted S/MIME entity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>pkcs7-mime</td>
<td>degenerate signedData</td>
<td>An entity containing only public-key certificates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>pkcs7-mime</td>
<td>CompressedData</td>
<td>A compressed S/MIME entity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>pkcs7-signature</td>
<td>signedData</td>
<td>The content type of the signature subpart of a multipart/signed message.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENVELOPED DATA** An application/pkcs7-mime subtype is used for one of four categories of S/MIME processing, each with a unique smime-type parameter. In all cases, the resulting entity (referred to as an object) is represented in a form known as Basic Encoding Rules (BER), which is defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.209. The BER format consists of arbitrary octet strings and is therefore binary data. Such an object should be transfer encoded with base64 in the outer MIME message. We first look at envelopedData.

The steps for preparing an envelopedData MIME entity are:

1. Generate a pseudorandom session key for a particular symmetric encryption algorithm (RC2/40 or triple DES).
2. For each recipient, encrypt the session key with the recipient’s public RSA key.
3. For each recipient, prepare a block known as RecipientInfo that contains an identifier of the recipient’s public-key certificate, an identifier of the algorithm used to encrypt the session key, and the encrypted session key.
4. Encrypt the message content with the session key.

The RecipientInfo blocks followed by the encrypted content constitute the envelopedData. This information is then encoded into base64. A sample message (excluding the RFC 5322 headers) is:

```plaintext
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m
rfvbnj756tbBghyHhHuujhjrh77n8HGHT9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT67n8HGHghyHhHuujhjrh4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6f8HGTrfvyHhHuujhjrh776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHuujpopsyF40GhIGfHfQbnj756YT64V
```

---

4This is an X.509 certificate, discussed later in this section.
To recover the encrypted message, the recipient first strips off the base64 encoding. Then the recipient’s private key is used to recover the session key. Finally, the message content is decrypted with the session key.

**SignedData** The signedData smime-type can be used with one or more signers. For clarity, we confine our description to the case of a single digital signature. The steps for preparing a signedData MIME entity are

1. Select a message digest algorithm (SHA or MD5).
2. Compute the message digest (hash function) of the content to be signed.
3. Encrypt the message digest with the signer’s private key.
4. Prepare a block known as SignerInfo that contains the signer’s public-key certificate, an identifier of the message digest algorithm, an identifier of the algorithm used to encrypt the message digest, and the encrypted message digest.

The signedData entity consists of a series of blocks, including a message digest algorithm identifier, the message being signed, and SignerInfo. The signedData entity may also include a set of public-key certificates sufficient to constitute a chain from a recognized root or top-level certification authority to the signer. This information is then encoded into base64. A sample message (excluding the RFC 5322 headers) is

Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data; name=smime.p7m
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m
567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4f8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj777n8HHGT9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6rfvbnj7566tbBghyHhHUujHhjhjH
H UujhJh4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6rfgvbnj76jH7756tbB9H7n8HHGghyHh6YT64V0GhIGfHfQbnj75

To recover the signed message and verify the signature, the recipient first strips off the base64 encoding. Then the signer’s public key is used to decrypt the message digest. The recipient independently computes the message digest and compares it to the decrypted message digest to verify the signature.

**Clear Signing** Clear signing is achieved using the multipart content type with a signed subtype. As was mentioned, this signing process does not involve transforming the message to be signed, so that the message is sent “in the clear.” Thus, recipients with MIME capability but not S/MIME capability are able to read the incoming message.

A multipart/signed message has two parts. The first part can be any MIME type but must be prepared so that it will not be altered during transfer from source to destination. This means that if the first part is not 7bit, then it needs to be encoded.
using base64 or quoted-printable. Then this part is processed in the same manner as
signedData, but in this case an object with signedData format is created that
has an empty message content field. This object is a detached signature. It is then
transfer encoded using base64 to become the second part of the multipart/signed
message. This second part has a MIME content type of application and a subtype of
pkcs7-signature. Here is a sample message:

Content-Type: multipart/signed;
    protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
    micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42

boundary42
Content-Type: text/plain

This is a clear-signed message.

boundary42
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s

ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VqfHyF467GhIGfHfYT6
4VqfHyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj
n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujfHyF4
7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756

boundary42

The protocol parameter indicates that this is a two-part clear-signed entity. The
micalg parameter indicates the type of message digest used. The receiver can
verify the signature by taking the message digest of the first part and comparing this
to the message digest recovered from the signature in the second part.

REGISTRATION REQUEST Typically, an application or user will apply to a certification
authority for a public-key certificate. The application/pkcs10 S/MIME entity is used to
transfer a certification request. The certification request includes certification
RequestInfo block, followed by an identifier of the public-key encryption
algorithm, followed by the signature of the certificationRequestInfo block
made using the sender’s private key. The certificationRequestInfo block
includes a name of the certificate subject (the entity whose public key is to be
certified) and a bit-string representation of the user’s public key.

CERTIFICATES-ONLY MESSAGE A message containing only certificates or a certificate
revocation list (CRL) can be sent in response to a registration request. The message
is an application/pkcs7-mime type/subtype with an smime-type parameter of
degenerate. The steps involved are the same as those for creating a signedData
message, except that there is no message content and the signerInfo field
is empty.
S/MIME Certificate Processing

S/MIME uses public-key certificates that conform to version 3 of X.509 (see Chapter 14). The key-management scheme used by S/MIME is in some ways a hybrid between a strict X.509 certification hierarchy and PGP’s web of trust. As with the PGP model, S/MIME managers and/or users must configure each client with a list of trusted keys and with certificate revocation lists. That is, the responsibility is local for maintaining the certificates needed to verify incoming signatures and to encrypt outgoing messages. On the other hand, the certificates are signed by certification authorities.

User Agent Role An S/MIME user has several key-management functions to perform.

- **Key generation**: The user of some related administrative utility (e.g., one associated with LAN management) MUST be capable of generating separate Diffie-Hellman and DSS key pairs and SHOULD be capable of generating RSA key pairs. Each key pair MUST be generated from a good source of non-deterministic random input and be protected in a secure fashion. A user agent SHOULD generate RSA key pairs with a length in the range of 768 to 1024 bits and MUST NOT generate a length of less than 512 bits.

- **Registration**: A user’s public key must be registered with a certification authority in order to receive an X.509 public-key certificate.

- **Certificate storage and retrieval**: A user requires access to a local list of certificates in order to verify incoming signatures and to encrypt outgoing messages. Such a list could be maintained by the user or by some local administrative entity on behalf of a number of users.

VeriSign Certificates There are several companies that provide certification authority (CA) services. For example, Nortel has designed an enterprise CA solution and can provide S/MIME support within an organization. There are a number of Internet-based CAs, including VeriSign, GTE, and the U.S. Postal Service. Of these, the most widely used is the VeriSign CA service, a brief description of which we now provide.

VeriSign provides a CA service that is intended to be compatible with S/MIME and a variety of other applications. VeriSign issues X.509 certificates with the product name VeriSign Digital ID. As of early 1998, over 35,000 commercial Web sites were using VeriSign Server Digital IDs, and over a million consumer Digital IDs had been issued to users of Netscape and Microsoft browsers.

The information contained in a Digital ID depends on the type of Digital ID and its use. At a minimum, each Digital ID contains

- Owner’s public key
- Owner’s name or alias
- Expiration date of the Digital ID
- Serial number of the Digital ID
- Name of the certification authority that issued the Digital ID
- Digital signature of the certification authority that issued the Digital ID
Digital IDs can also contain other user-supplied information, including

- Address
- E-mail address
- Basic registration information (country, zip code, age, and gender)

VeriSign provides three levels, or classes, of security for public-key certificates, as summarized in Table 18.8. A user requests a certificate online at VeriSign's Web site or other participating Web sites. Class 1 and Class 2 requests are processed on line, and in most cases take only a few seconds to approve. Briefly, the following procedures are used.

- For Class 1 Digital IDs, VeriSign confirms the user's e-mail address by sending a PIN and Digital ID pick-up information to the e-mail address provided in the application.
- For Class 2 Digital IDs, VeriSign verifies the information in the application through an automated comparison with a consumer database in addition to

Table 18.8 VeriSign Public-Key Certificate Classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary of Confirmation of Identity</strong></td>
<td>Automated unambiguous name and e-mail address search.</td>
<td>Same as Class 1, plus automated enrollment information check and automated address check.</td>
<td>Same as Class 1, plus personal presence and ID documents plus Class 2 automated ID check for individuals; business records (or filings) for organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IA Private Key Protection</strong></td>
<td>PCA: trustworthy hardware; CA: trustworthy software or trustworthy hardware.</td>
<td>PCA and CA: trustworthy hardware.</td>
<td>PCA and CA: trustworthy hardware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Certificate Applicant and Subscriber Private Key Protection</strong></td>
<td>Encryption software (PIN protected) recommended but not required.</td>
<td>Encryption software (PIN protected) required.</td>
<td>Encryption software (PIN protected) required; hardware token recommended but not required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applications Implemented or Contemplated by Users</strong></td>
<td>Web-browsing and certain e-mail usage.</td>
<td>Individual and intra- and inter-company e-mail, online subscriptions, password replacement, and software validation.</td>
<td>E-banking, corp. database access, personal banking, membership-based online services, content integrity services, e-commerce server, software validation; authentication of LRAAs; and strong encryption for certain servers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IA = Issuing Authority
CA = Certification Authority
PCA = VeriSign public primary certification authority
PIN = Personal Identification Number
LRAA = Local Registration Authority Administrator
performing all of the checking associated with a Class 1 Digital ID. Finally, confirmation is sent to the specified postal address alerting the user that a Digital ID has been issued in his or her name.

- For Class 3 Digital IDs, VeriSign requires a higher level of identity assurance. An individual must prove his or her identity by providing notarized credentials or applying in person.

Enhanced Security Services

As of this writing, three enhanced security services have been proposed in an Internet draft. The details of these may change, and additional services may be added. The three services are

- **Signed receipts**: A signed receipt may be requested in a SignedData object. Returning a signed receipt provides proof of delivery to the originator of a message and allows the originator to demonstrate to a third party that the recipient received the message. In essence, the recipient signs the entire original message plus the original (sender’s) signature and appends the new signature to form a new S/MIME message.

- **Security labels**: A security label may be included in the authenticated attributes of a SignedData object. A security label is a set of security information regarding the sensitivity of the content that is protected by S/MIME encapsulation. The labels may be used for access control, by indicating which users are permitted access to an object. Other uses include priority (secret, confidential, restricted, and so on) or role based, describing which kind of people can see the information (e.g., patient’s health-care team, medical billing agents, etc.).

- **Secure mailing lists**: When a user sends a message to multiple recipients, a certain amount of per-recipient processing is required, including the use of each recipient’s public key. The user can be relieved of this work by employing the services of an S/MIME Mail List Agent (MLA). An MLA can take a single incoming message, perform the recipient-specific encryption for each recipient, and forward the message. The originator of a message need only send the message to the MLA with encryption performed using the MLA’s public key.

**18.3 DOMAINKEYS IDENTIFIED MAIL**

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) is a specification for cryptographically signing e-mail messages, permitting a signing domain to claim responsibility for a message in the mail stream. Message recipients (or agents acting in their behalf) can verify the signature by querying the signer’s domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key and thereby can confirm that the message was attested to by a party in possession of the private key for the signing domain. DKIM is a proposed Internet Standard (RFC 4871: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures). DKIM has been widely adopted by a range of e-mail providers, including corporations, government agencies, gmail, yahoo, and many Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
This section provides an overview of DKIM. Before beginning our discussion of DKIM, we introduce the standard Internet mail architecture. Then we look at the threat that DKIM is intended to address, and finally provide an overview of DKIM operation.

Internet Mail Architecture

To understand the operation of DKIM, it is useful to have a basic grasp of the Internet mail architecture, which is currently defined in [CROC09]. This subsection provides an overview of the basic concepts.

At its most fundamental level, the Internet mail architecture consists of a user world in the form of Message User Agents (MUA), and the transfer world, in the form of the Message Handling Service (MHS), which is composed of Message Transfer Agents (MTA). The MHS accepts a message from one user and delivers it to one or more other users, creating a virtual MUA-to-MUA exchange environment. This architecture involves three types of interoperability. One is directly between users: messages must be formatted by the MUA on behalf of the message author so that the message can be displayed to the message recipient by the destination MUA. There are also interoperability requirements between the MUA and the MHS—first when a message is posted from an MUA to the MHS and later when it is delivered from the MHS to the destination MUA. Interoperability is required among the MTA components along the transfer path through the MHS.

Figure 18.9 illustrates the key components of the Internet mail architecture, which include the following.

- **Message User Agent (MUA):** Works on behalf of user actors and user applications. It is their representative within the e-mail service. Typically, this function is housed in the user’s computer and is referred to as a client e-mail program or a local network e-mail server. The author MUA formats a message and performs initial submission into the MHS via a MSA. The recipient MUA processes received mail for storage and/or display to the recipient user.

- **Mail Submission Agent (MSA):** Accepts the message submitted by an MUA and enforces the policies of the hosting domain and the requirements of Internet standards. This function may be located together with the MUA or as a separate functional model. In the latter case, the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is used between the MUA and the MSA.

- **Message Transfer Agent (MTA):** Relays mail for one application-level hop. It is like a packet switch or IP router in that its job is to make routing assessments and to move the message closer to the recipients. Relaying is performed by a sequence of MTAs until the message reaches a destination MDA. An MTA also adds trace information to the message header. SMTP is used between MTAs and between an MTA and an MSA or MDA.

- **Mail Delivery Agent (MDA):** Responsible for transferring the message from the MHS to the MS.

- **Message Store (MS):** An MUA can employ a long-term MS. An MS can be located on a remote server or on the same machine as the MUA. Typically, an MUA retrieves messages from a remote server using POP (Post Office Protocol) or IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol).
Two other concepts need to be defined. An administrative management domain (ADMD) is an Internet e-mail provider. Examples include a department that operates a local mail relay (MTA), an IT department that operates an enterprise mail relay, and an ISP that operates a public shared e-mail service. Each ADMD can have different operating policies and trust-based decision making. One obvious example is the distinction between mail that is exchanged within an organization and mail that is exchanged between independent organizations. The rules for handling the two types of traffic tend to be quite different.

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a directory lookup service that provides a mapping between the name of a host on the Internet and its numerical address.

E-mail Threats

RFC 4684 (*Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail*) describes the threats being addressed by DKIM in terms of the characteristics, capabilities, and location of potential attackers.

**Characteristics** RFC characterizes the range of attackers on a spectrum of three levels of threat.

1. At the low end are attackers who simply want to send e-mail that a recipient does not want to receive. The attacker can use one of a number of commercially available tools that allow the sender to falsify the origin address of messages. This makes it difficult for the receiver to filter spam on the basis of originating address or domain.
2. At the next level are professional senders of bulk spam mail. These attackers often operate as commercial enterprises and send messages on behalf of third parties. They employ more comprehensive tools for attack, including Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) and registered domains and networks of compromised computers (zombies) to send messages and (in some cases) to harvest addresses to which to send.

3. The most sophisticated and financially motivated senders of messages are those who stand to receive substantial financial benefit, such as from an e-mail-based fraud scheme. These attackers can be expected to employ all of the above mechanisms and additionally may attack the Internet infrastructure itself, including DNS cache-poisoning attacks and IP routing attacks.

**Capabilities** RFC 4686 lists the following as capabilities that an attacker might have.

1. Submit messages to MTAs and Message Submission Agents (MSAs) at multiple locations in the Internet.
2. Construct arbitrary Message Header fields, including those claiming to be mailing lists, resenders, and other mail agents.
3. Sign messages on behalf of domains under their control.
4. Generate substantial numbers of either unsigned or apparently signed messages that might be used to attempt a denial-of-service attack.
5. Resend messages that may have been previously signed by the domain.
6. Transmit messages using any envelope information desired.
7. Act as an authorized submitter for messages from a compromised computer.
8. Manipulation of IP routing. This could be used to submit messages from specific IP addresses or difficult-to-trace addresses, or to cause diversion of messages to a specific domain.
9. Limited influence over portions of DNS using mechanisms such as cache poisoning. This might be used to influence message routing or to falsify advertisements of DNS-based keys or signing practices.
10. Access to significant computing resources, for example, through the conscription of worm-infected “zombie” computers. This could allow the “bad actor” to perform various types of brute-force attacks.
11. Ability to eavesdrop on existing traffic, perhaps from a wireless network.

**Location** DKIM focuses primarily on attackers located outside of the administrative units of the claimed originator and the recipient. These administrative units frequently correspond to the protected portions of the network adjacent to the originator and recipient. It is in this area that the trust relationships required for authenticated message submission do not exist and do not scale adequately to be practical. Conversely, within these administrative units, there are other mechanisms (such as authenticated message submission) that are easier to deploy and more likely to be used than DKIM. External “bad actors” are usually attempting to exploit the “any-to-any” nature of e-mail that motivates most recipient MTAs to accept messages from anywhere for delivery to their local domain. They may generate messages without
signatures, with incorrect signatures, or with correct signatures from domains with little traceability. They may also pose as mailing lists, greeting cards, or other agents that legitimately send or resend messages on behalf of others.

**DKIM Strategy**

DKIM is designed to provide an e-mail authentication technique that is transparent to the end user. In essence, a user’s e-mail message is signed by a private key of the administrative domain from which the e-mail originates. The signature covers all of the content of the message and some of the RFC 5322 message headers. At the receiving end, the MDA can access the corresponding public key via a DNS and verify the signature, thus authenticating that the message comes from the claimed administrative domain. Thus, mail that originates from somewhere else but claims to come from a given domain will not pass the authentication test and can be rejected. This approach differs from that of S/MIME and PGP, which use the originator’s private key to sign the content of the message. The motivation for DKIM is based on the following reasoning.5

1. S/MIME depends on both the sending and receiving users employing S/MIME. For almost all users, the bulk of incoming mail does not use S/MIME, and the bulk of the mail the user wants to send is to recipients not using S/MIME.
2. S/MIME signs only the message content. Thus, RFC 5322 header information concerning origin can be compromised.
3. DKIM is not implemented in client programs (MUAs) and is therefore transparent to the user; the user need take no action.
4. DKIM applies to all mail from cooperating domains.
5. DKIM allows good senders to prove that they did send a particular message and to prevent forgers from masquerading as good senders.

Figure 18.10 is a simple example of the operation of DKIM. We begin with a message generated by a user and transmitted into the MHS to an MSA that is within the user’s administrative domain. An e-mail message is generated by an e-mail client program. The content of the message, plus selected RFC 5322 headers, is signed by the e-mail provider using the provider’s private key. The signer is associated with a domain, which could be a corporate local network, an ISP, or a public e-mail facility such as Gmail. The signed message then passes through the Internet via a sequence of MTAs. At the destination, the MDA retrieves the public key for the incoming signature and verifies the signature before passing the message on to the destination e-mail client. The default signing algorithm is RSA with SHA-256. RSA with SHA-1 also may be used.

**DKIM Functional Flow**

Figure 18.11 provides a more detailed look at the elements of DKIM operation. Basic message processing is divided between a signing Administrative Management Domain (ADMD) and a verifying ADMD. At its simplest, this is between the

---

5The reasoning is expressed in terms of the use of S/MIME. The same argument applies to PGP.
originating ADMD and the delivering ADMD, but it can involve other ADMDs in the handling path.

Signing is performed by an authorized module within the signing ADMD and uses private information from a Key Store. Within the originating ADMD, this might be performed by the MUA, MSA, or an MTA. Verifying is performed by an authorized module within the verifying ADMD. Within a delivering ADMD, verifying might be performed by an MTA, MDA, or MUA. The module verifies the signature or determines whether a particular signature was required. Verifying the signature uses public information from the Key Store. If the signature passes, reputation information is used to assess the signer and that information is passed to the message filtering system. If the signature fails or there is no signature using the author's domain, information about signing practices related to the author can be retrieved remotely and/or locally, and that information is passed to the message filtering system. For example, if the sender (e.g., gmail) uses DKIM but no DKIM signature is present, then the message may be considered fraudulent.

The signature is inserted into the RFC 5322 message as an additional header entry, starting with the keyword `Dkim-Signature`. You can view examples from your own incoming mail by using the View Long Headers (or similar wording) option for an incoming message. Here is an example:
Figure 18.11 DKIM Functional Flow

Dkim-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:date:message-id:subject :from:to:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=5mZvQDyCRuyLb1Y28K4zgS2MPOemFToDBgvbJ7G090s=; b=PcUvPSDygb4ya5Dyj1rbZGp/VyRiScuaz7TTGJ5qW5s1M+klzv6kcfYdGDHzEVJW+ZPetuPfELOVhELtw0zjScC0yPkEiblO6gILObm3DDRm3ys1/FVrbhV07A+/jh9AeiuIIw/5IFnRbSH6qPDVv/beDqAWQfA/wF705k=
Before a message is signed, a process known as canonicalization is performed on both the header and body of the RFC 5322 message. Canonicalization is necessary to deal with the possibility of minor changes in the message made en route, including character encoding, treatment of trailing white space in message lines, and the “folding” and “unfolding” of header lines. The intent of canonicalization is to make a minimal transformation of the message (for the purpose of signing; the message itself is not changed, so the canonicalization must be performed again by the verifier) that will give it its best chance of producing the same canonical value at the receiving end. DKIM defines two header canonicalization algorithms (“simple” and “relaxed”) and two for the body (with the same names). The simple algorithm tolerates almost no modification, while the relaxed tolerates common modifications.

The signature includes a number of fields. Each field begins with a tag consisting of a tag code followed by an equals sign and ends with a semicolon. The fields include the following:

- **v** = DKIM version.
- **a** = Algorithm used to generate the signature; must be either rsa-sha1 or rsa-sha256.
- **c** = Canonicalization method used on the header and the body.
- **d** = A domain name used as an identifier to refer to the identity of a responsible person or organization. In DKIM, this identifier is called the Signing Domain IDentifier (SDID). In our example, this field indicates that the sender is using a gmail address.
- **s** = In order that different keys may be used in different circumstances for the same signing domain (allowing expiration of old keys, separate departmental signing, or the like), DKIM defines a selector (a name associated with a key), which is used by the verifier to retrieve the proper key during signature verification.
- **h** = Signed Header fields. A colon-separated list of header field names that identify the header fields presented to the signing algorithm. Note that in our example above, the signature covers the domainkey-signature field. This refers to an older algorithm (since replaced by DKIM) that is still in use.
- **bh** = The hash of the canonicalized body part of the message. This provides additional information for diagnosing signature verification failures.
- **b** = The signature data in base64 format; this is the encrypted hash code.

### 18.4 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

[LEIB07] provides an overview of DKIM.

---

Recommended Web Sites:

- **PGP Home Page**: PGP Web site by PGP Corp., the leading PGP commercial vendor.
- **International PGP Home Page**: Designed to promote worldwide use of PGP. Contains documents and links of interest.
- **PGP Charter**: Latest RFCs and Internet drafts for Open Specification PGP.
- **S/MIME Charter**: Latest RFCs and Internet drafts for S/MIME.
- **DKIM**: Website hosted by Mutual Internet Practices Association, this site contains a wide range of documents and information related to DKIM.
- **DKIM Charter**: Latest RFCs and Internet drafts for DKIM.

### 18.5 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

**Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>detached signature</th>
<th>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)</th>
<th>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)</th>
<th>Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)</th>
<th>session key</th>
<th>S/MIME</th>
<th>trust</th>
<th>ZIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>electronic mail</td>
<td></td>
<td>radix 64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Review Questions**

18.1 What are the five principal services provided by PGP?
18.2 What is the utility of a detached signature?
18.3 Why does PGP generate a signature before applying compression?
18.4 What is R64 conversion?
18.5 Why is R64 conversion useful for an e-mail application?
18.6 How does PGP use the concept of trust?
18.7 What is RFC 5322?
18.8 What is MIME?
18.9 What is S/MIME?
18.10 What is DKIM?

**Problems**

18.1 PGP makes use of the cipher feedback (CFB) mode of CAST-128, whereas most symmetric encryption applications (other than key encryption) use the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. We have

\[
\text{CBC: } C_i = E(K, [C_{i-1} \oplus P_i]); \quad P_i = C_{i-1} \oplus D(K, C_i)
\]

\[
\text{CFB: } C_i = P_i \oplus E(K, C_{i-1}); \quad P_i = C_i \oplus E(K, C_{i-1})
\]
These two appear to provide equal security. Suggest a reason why PGP uses the CFB mode.

18.2 In the PGP scheme, what is the expected number of session keys generated before a previously created key is produced?

18.3 In PGP, what is the probability that a user with $N$ public keys will have at least one duplicate key ID?

18.4 The first 16 bits of the message digest in a PGP signature are translated in the clear. 
   a. To what extent does this compromise the security of the hash algorithm?
   b. To what extent does it in fact perform its intended function, namely, to help determine if the correct RSA key was used to decrypt the digest?

18.5 In Figure 18.4, each entry in the public-key ring contains an Owner Trust field that indicates the degree of trust associated with this public-key owner. Why is that not enough? That is, if this owner is trusted and this is supposed to be the owner’s public key, why is that trust not enough to permit PGP to use this public key?

18.6 What is the basic difference between X.509 and PGP in terms of key hierarchies and key trust?

18.7 Phil Zimmermann chose IDEA, three-key triple DES, and CAST-128 as symmetric encryption algorithms for PGP. Give reasons why each of the following symmetric encryption algorithms described in this book is suitable or unsuitable for PGP: DES, two-key triple DES, and AES.

18.8 Consider radix-64 conversion as a form of encryption. In this case, there is no key. But suppose that an opponent knew only that some form of substitution algorithm was being used to encrypt English text and did not guess that it was R64. How effective would this algorithm be against cryptanalysis?

18.9 Encode the text “plaintext” using the following techniques. Assume characters are stored in 8-bit ASCII with zero parity.
   a. Radix-64
   b. Quoted-printable

APPENDIX 18A RADIX-64 CONVERSION

Both PGP and S/MIME make use of an encoding technique referred to as radix-64 conversion. This technique maps arbitrary binary input into printable character output. The form of encoding has the following relevant characteristics:

1. The range of the function is a character set that is universally representable at all sites, not a specific binary encoding of that character set. Thus, the characters themselves can be encoded into whatever form is needed by a specific system. For example, the character “E” is represented in an ASCII-based system as hexadecimal 45 and in an EBCDIC-based system as hexadecimal C5.

2. The character set consists of 65 printable characters, one of which is used for padding. With $2^6 = 64$ available characters, each character can be used to represent 6 bits of input.

3. No control characters are included in the set. Thus, a message encoded in radix 64 can traverse mail-handling systems that scan the data stream for control characters.

4. The hyphen character “-” is not used. This character has significance in the RFC 5322 format and should therefore be avoided.
Table 18.9  Radix-64 Encoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6-bit Value</th>
<th>Character Encoding</th>
<th>6-bit Value</th>
<th>Character Encoding</th>
<th>6-bit Value</th>
<th>Character Encoding</th>
<th>6-bit Value</th>
<th>Character Encoding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>l</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>q</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>s</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18.9 shows the mapping of 6-bit input values to characters. The character set consists of the alphanumeric characters plus “+” and “/”. The “=” character is used as the padding character.

Figure 18.12 illustrates the simple mapping scheme. Binary input is processed in blocks of 3 octets (24 bits). Each set of 6 bits in the 24-bit block is mapped into a character. In the figure, the characters are shown encoded as 8-bit quantities. In this typical case, each 24-bit input is expanded to 32 bits of output.

For example, consider the 24-bit raw text sequence 00100011 01011100 10010001, which can be expressed in hexadecimal as 235C91. We arrange this input in blocks of 6 bits:

001000 110101 110010 010001

The extracted 6-bit decimal values are 8, 53, 50, and 17. Looking these up in Table 18.9 yields the radix-64 encoding as the following characters: I1yR. If these characters are stored in 8-bit ASCII format with parity bit set to zero, we have:

01001001 00110001 01111001 01010010
In hexadecimal, this is 49317952. To summarize:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input Data</th>
<th>Radix-64 Encoding of Input Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binary representation</td>
<td>00100011 01011100 10010001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hexadecimal representation</td>
<td>235C91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character representation</td>
<td>I1yR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCII code (8 bit, zero parity)</td>
<td>01001001 00110001 01111001 01010010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hexadecimal representation</td>
<td>49317952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 19

IP SECURITY

19.1 IP Security Overview
   - Applications of IPsec
   - Benefits of IPsec
   - Routing Applications
   - IPsec Documents
   - IPsec Services
   - Transport and Tunnel Modes

19.2 IP Security Policy
   - Security Associations
   - Security Association Database
   - Security Policy Database
   - IP Traffic Processing

19.3 Encapsulating Security Payload
   - ESP Format
   - Encryption and Authentication Algorithms
   - Padding
   - Anti-Replay Service
   - Transport and Tunnel Modes

19.4 Combining Security Associations
   - Authentication Plus Confidentiality
   - Basic Combinations of Security Associations

19.5 Internet Key Exchange
   - Key Determination Protocol
   - Header and Payload Formats

19.6 Cryptographic Suites

19.7 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

19.8 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death, together with the man to whom the secret was told.

—The Art of War, Sun Tzu

**KEY POINTS**

- IP security (IPsec) is a capability that can be added to either current version of the Internet Protocol (IPv4 or IPv6) by means of additional headers.
- IPsec encompasses three functional areas: authentication, confidentiality, and key management.
- Authentication makes use of the HMAC message authentication code. Authentication can be applied to the entire original IP packet (tunnel mode) or to all of the packet except for the IP header (transport mode).
- Confidentiality is provided by an encryption format known as encapsulating security payload. Both tunnel and transport modes can be accommodated.
- IKE defines a number of techniques for key management.

There are application-specific security mechanisms for a number of application areas, including electronic mail (S/MIME, PGP), client/server (Kerberos), Web access (Secure Sockets Layer), and others. However, users have security concerns that cut across protocol layers. For example, an enterprise can run a secure, private IP network by disallowing links to untrusted sites, encrypting packets that leave the premises, and authenticating packets that enter the premises. By implementing security at the IP level, an organization can ensure secure networking not only for applications that have security mechanisms but also for the many security-ignorant applications.

IP-level security encompasses three functional areas: authentication, confidentiality, and key management. The authentication mechanism assures that a received packet was, in fact, transmitted by the party identified as the source in the packet header. In addition, this mechanism assures that the packet has not been altered in transit. The confidentiality facility enables communicating nodes to encrypt messages to prevent eavesdropping by third parties. The key management facility is concerned with the secure exchange of keys.

We begin this chapter with an overview of IP security (IPsec) and an introduction to the IPsec architecture. We then look at each of the three functional areas in detail. Appendix L reviews Internet protocols.

### 19.1 IP SECURITY OVERVIEW

In 1994, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) issued a report titled “Security in the Internet Architecture” (RFC 1636). The report identified key areas for security mechanisms. Among these were the need to secure the network
infrastructure from unauthorized monitoring and control of network traffic and the need to secure end-user-to-end-user traffic using authentication and encryption mechanisms.

To provide security, the IAB included authentication and encryption as necessary security features in the next-generation IP, which has been issued as IPv6. Fortunately, these security capabilities were designed to be usable both with the current IPv4 and the future IPv6. This means that vendors can begin offering these features now, and many vendors now do have some IPsec capability in their products. The IPsec specification now exists as a set of Internet standards.

Applications of IPsec

IPsec provides the capability to secure communications across a LAN, across private and public WANs, and across the Internet. Examples of its use include:

- **Secure branch office connectivity over the Internet:** A company can build a secure virtual private network over the Internet or over a public WAN. This enables a business to rely heavily on the Internet and reduce its need for private networks, saving costs and network management overhead.

- **Secure remote access over the Internet:** An end user whose system is equipped with IP security protocols can make a local call to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) and gain secure access to a company network. This reduces the cost of toll charges for traveling employees and telecommuters.

- **Establishing extranet and intranet connectivity with partners:** IPsec can be used to secure communication with other organizations, ensuring authentication and confidentiality and providing a key exchange mechanism.

- **Enhancing electronic commerce security:** Even though some Web and electronic commerce applications have built-in security protocols, the use of IPsec enhances that security. IPsec guarantees that all traffic designated by the network administrator is both encrypted and authenticated, adding an additional layer of security to whatever is provided at the application layer.

The principal feature of IPsec that enables it to support these varied applications is that it can encrypt and/or authenticate *all* traffic at the IP level. Thus, all distributed applications (including remote logon, client/server, e-mail, file transfer, Web access, and so on) can be secured.

Figure 19.1 is a typical scenario of IPsec usage. An organization maintains LANs at dispersed locations. Nonsecure IP traffic is conducted on each LAN. For traffic offsite, through some sort of private or public WAN, IPsec protocols are used. These protocols operate in networking devices, such as a router or firewall, that connect each LAN to the outside world. The IPsec networking device will typically encrypt and compress all traffic going into the WAN and decrypt and decompress traffic coming from the WAN; these operations are transparent to workstations and servers on the LAN. Secure transmission is also possible with individual users who dial into the WAN. Such user workstations must implement the IPsec protocols to provide security.
Figure 19.1 An IP Security Scenario
Benefits of IPsec

Some of the benefits of IPsec:

- When IPsec is implemented in a firewall or router, it provides strong security that can be applied to all traffic crossing the perimeter. Traffic within a company or workgroup does not incur the overhead of security-related processing.
- IPsec in a firewall is resistant to bypass if all traffic from the outside must use IP and the firewall is the only means of entrance from the Internet into the organization.
- IPsec is below the transport layer (TCP, UDP) and so is transparent to applications. There is no need to change software on a user or server system when IPsec is implemented in the firewall or router. Even if IPsec is implemented in end systems, upper-layer software, including applications, is not affected.
- IPsec can be transparent to end users. There is no need to train users on security mechanisms, issue keying material on a per-user basis, or revoke keying material when users leave the organization.
- IPsec can provide security for individual users if needed. This is useful for offsite workers and for setting up a secure virtual subnetwork within an organization for sensitive applications.

Routing Applications

In addition to supporting end users and protecting premises systems and networks, IPsec can play a vital role in the routing architecture required for internetworking. [HUIT98] lists the following examples of the use of IPsec. IPsec can assure that

- A router advertisement (a new router advertises its presence) comes from an authorized router.
- A neighbor advertisement (a router seeks to establish or maintain a neighbor relationship with a router in another routing domain) comes from an authorized router.
- A redirect message comes from the router to which the initial IP packet was sent.
- A routing update is not forged.

Without such security measures, an opponent can disrupt communications or divert some traffic. Routing protocols such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) should be run on top of security associations between routers that are defined by IPsec.

IPsec Documents

IPsec encompasses three functional areas: authentication, confidentiality, and key management. The totality of the IPsec specification is scattered across dozens of RFCs and draft IETF documents, making this the most complex and difficult to grasp of all IETF specifications. The best way to grasp the scope of IPsec is to consult the
latest version of the IPsec document roadmap, which as of this writing is [FRAN09]. The documents can be categorized into the following groups.

- **Architecture**: Covers the general concepts, security requirements, definitions, and mechanisms defining IPsec technology. The current specification is RFC 4301, *Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol.*

- **Authentication Header (AH)**: AH is an extension header to provide message authentication. The current specification is RFC 4302, *IP Authentication Header.* Because message authentication is provided by ESP, the use of AH is deprecated. It is included in IPsecv3 for backward compatibility but should not be used in new applications. We do not discuss AH in this chapter.

- **Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)**: ESP consists of an encapsulating header and trailer used to provide encryption or combined encryption/authentication. The current specification is RFC 4303, *IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).*

- **Internet Key Exchange (IKE)**: This is a collection of documents describing the key management schemes for use with IPsec. The main specification is RFC 4306, *Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,* but there are a number of related RFCs.

- **Cryptographic algorithms**: This category encompasses a large set of documents that define and describe cryptographic algorithms for encryption, message authentication, pseudorandom functions (PRFs), and cryptographic key exchange.

- **Other**: There are a variety of other IPsec-related RFCs, including those dealing with security policy and management information base (MIB) content.

**IPsec Services**

IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keys required to provide the requested services. Two protocols are used to provide security: an authentication protocol designated by the header of the protocol, Authentication Header (AH); and a combined encryption/authentication protocol designated by the format of the packet for that protocol, Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). RFC 4301 lists the following services:

- Access control
- Connectionless integrity
- Data origin authentication
- Rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity)
- Confidentiality (encryption)
- Limited traffic flow confidentiality

**Transport and Tunnel Modes**

Both AH and ESP support two modes of use: transport and tunnel mode. The operation of these two modes is best understood in the context of a description of ESP, which is covered in Section 19.3. Here we provide a brief overview.
TRANSPORT MODE Transport mode provides protection primarily for upper-layer protocols. That is, transport mode protection extends to the payload of an IP packet. Examples include a TCP or UDP segment or an ICMP packet, all of which operate directly above IP in a host protocol stack. Typically, transport mode is used for end-to-end communication between two hosts (e.g., a client and a server, or two workstations). When a host runs AH or ESP over IPv4, the payload is the data that normally follow the IP header. For IPv6, the payload is the data that normally follow both the IP header and any IPv6 extensions headers that are present, with the possible exception of the destination options header, which may be included in the protection.

ESP in transport mode encrypts and optionally authenticates the IP payload but not the IP header. AH in transport mode authenticates the IP payload and selected portions of the IP header.

TUNNEL MODE Tunnel mode provides protection to the entire IP packet. To achieve this, after the AH or ESP fields are added to the IP packet, the entire packet plus security fields is treated as the payload of new outer IP packet with a new outer IP header. The entire original, inner, packet travels through a tunnel from one point of an IP network to another; no routers along the way are able to examine the inner IP header. Because the original packet is encapsulated, the new, larger packet may have totally different source and destination addresses, adding to the security. Tunnel mode is used when one or both ends of a security association (SA) are a security gateway, such as a firewall or router that implements IPsec. With tunnel mode, a number of hosts on networks behind firewalls may engage in secure communications without implementing IPsec. The unprotected packets generated by such hosts are tunneled through external networks by tunnel mode SAs set up by the IPsec software in the firewall or secure router at the boundary of the local network.

Here is an example of how tunnel mode IPsec operates. Host A on a network generates an IP packet with the destination address of host B on another network. This packet is routed from the originating host to a firewall or secure router at the boundary of A’s network. The firewall filters all outgoing packets to determine the need for IPsec processing. If this packet from A to B requires IPsec, the firewall performs IPsec processing and encapsulates the packet with an outer IP header. The source IP address of this outer IP packet is this firewall, and the destination address may be a firewall that forms the boundary to B’s local network. This packet is now routed to B’s firewall, with intermediate routers examining only the outer IP header. At B’s firewall, the outer IP header is stripped off, and the inner packet is delivered to B.

ESP in tunnel mode encrypts and optionally authenticates the entire inner IP packet, including the inner IP header. AH in tunnel mode authenticates the entire inner IP packet and selected portions of the outer IP header.

Table 19.1 summarizes transport and tunnel mode functionality.

---

1 In this chapter, the term IP packet refers to either an IPv4 datagram or an IPv6 packet.
Table 19.1 Tunnel Mode and Transport Mode Functionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transport Mode SA</th>
<th>Tunnel Mode SA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Authenticates IP payload and selected portions of IP header and IPv6 extension headers.</td>
<td>Authenticates entire inner IP packet (inner header plus IP payload) plus selected portions of outer IP header and outer IPv6 extension headers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Encrypts IP payload and any IPv6 extension headers following the ESP header.</td>
<td>Encrypts entire inner IP packet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19.2 IP SECURITY POLICY

Fundamental to the operation of IPsec is the concept of a security policy applied to each IP packet that transits from a source to a destination. IPsec policy is determined primarily by the interaction of two databases, the security association database (SAD) and the security policy database (SPD). This section provides an overview of these two databases and then summarizes their use during IPsec operation. Figure 19.2 illustrates the relevant relationships.

Security Associations

A key concept that appears in both the authentication and confidentiality mechanisms for IP is the security association (SA). An association is a one-way logical connection between a sender and a receiver that affords security services to the traffic carried on it. If a peer relationship is needed for two-way secure exchange, then two security associations are required. Security services are afforded to an SA for the use of AH or ESP, but not both.
A security association is uniquely identified by three parameters.

- **Security Parameters Index (SPI):** A bit string assigned to this SA and having local significance only. The SPI is carried in AH and ESP headers to enable the receiving system to select the SA under which a received packet will be processed.

- **IP Destination Address:** This is the address of the destination endpoint of the SA, which may be an end-user system or a network system such as a firewall or router.

- **Security Protocol Identifier:** This field from the outer IP header indicates whether the association is an AH or ESP security association.

Hence, in any IP packet, the security association is uniquely identified by the Destination Address in the IPv4 or IPv6 header and the SPI in the enclosed extension header (AH or ESP).

**Security Association Database**

In each IPsec implementation, there is a nominal Security Association Database that defines the parameters associated with each SA. A security association is normally defined by the following parameters in an SAD entry.

- **Security Parameter Index:** A 32-bit value selected by the receiving end of an SA to uniquely identify the SA. In an SAD entry for an outbound SA, the SPI is used to construct the packet’s AH or ESP header. In an SAD entry for an inbound SA, the SPI is used to map traffic to the appropriate SA.

- **Sequence Number Counter:** A 32-bit value used to generate the Sequence Number field in AH or ESP headers, described in Section 19.3 (required for all implementations).

- **Sequence Counter Overflow:** A flag indicating whether overflow of the Sequence Number Counter should generate an auditable event and prevent further transmission of packets on this SA (required for all implementations).

- **Anti-Replay Window:** Used to determine whether an inbound AH or ESP packet is a replay, described in Section 19.3 (required for all implementations).

- **AH Information:** Authentication algorithm, keys, key lifetimes, and related parameters being used with AH (required for AH implementations).

- **ESP Information:** Encryption and authentication algorithm, keys, initialization values, key lifetimes, and related parameters being used with ESP (required for ESP implementations).

- **Lifetime of this Security Association:** A time interval or byte count after which an SA must be replaced with a new SA (and new SPI) or terminated, plus an indication of which of these actions should occur (required for all implementations).

---

2Nominal in the sense that the functionality provided by a Security Association Database must be present in any IPsec implementation, but the way in which that functionality is provided is up to the implementer.
• **IPsec Protocol Mode:** Tunnel, transport, or wildcard.

• **Path MTU:** Any observed path maximum transmission unit (maximum size of a packet that can be transmitted without fragmentation) and aging variables (required for all implementations).

The key management mechanism that is used to distribute keys is coupled to the authentication and privacy mechanisms only by way of the Security Parameters Index (SPI). Hence, authentication and privacy have been specified independent of any specific key management mechanism.

IPsec provides the user with considerable flexibility in the way in which IPsec services are applied to IP traffic. As we will see later, SAs can be combined in a number of ways to yield the desired user configuration. Furthermore, IPsec provides a high degree of granularity in discriminating between traffic that is afforded IPsec protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec, as in the former case relating IP traffic to specific SAs.

### Security Policy Database

The means by which IP traffic is related to specific SAs (or no SA in the case of traffic allowed to bypass IPsec) is the nominal Security Policy Database (SPD). In its simplest form, an SPD contains entries, each of which defines a subset of IP traffic and points to an SA for that traffic. In more complex environments, there may be multiple entries that potentially relate to a single SA or multiple SAs associated with a single SPD entry. The reader is referred to the relevant IPsec documents for a full discussion.

Each SPD entry is defined by a set of IP and upper-layer protocol field values, called selectors. In effect, these selectors are used to filter outgoing traffic in order to map it into a particular SA. Outbound processing obeys the following general sequence for each IP packet.

1. Compare the values of the appropriate fields in the packet (the selector fields) against the SPD to find a matching SPD entry, which will point to zero or more SAs.
2. Determine the SA if any for this packet and its associated SPI.
3. Do the required IPsec processing (i.e., AH or ESP processing).

The following selectors determine an SPD entry:

• **Remote IP Address:** This may be a single IP address, an enumerated list or range of addresses, or a wildcard (mask) address. The latter two are required to support more than one destination system sharing the same SA (e.g., behind a firewall).

• **Local IP Address:** This may be a single IP address, an enumerated list or range of addresses, or a wildcard (mask) address. The latter two are required to support more than one source system sharing the same SA (e.g., behind a firewall).

• **Next Layer Protocol:** The IP protocol header (IPv4, IPv6, or IPv6 Extension) includes a field (Protocol for IPv4, Next Header for IPv6 or IPv6 Extension) that designates the protocol operating over IP. This is an individual protocol number, ANY, or for IPv6 only, OPAQUE. If AH or ESP is used, then this IP protocol header immediately precedes the AH or ESP header in the packet.
• **Name:** A user identifier from the operating system. This is not a field in the IP or upper-layer headers but is available if IPsec is running on the same operating system as the user.

• **Local and Remote Ports:** These may be individual TCP or UDP port values, an enumerated list of ports, or a wildcard port.

Table 19.2 provides an example of an SPD on a host system (as opposed to a network system such as a firewall or router). This table reflects the following configuration: A local network configuration consists of two networks. The basic corporate network configuration has the IP network number 1.2.3.0/24. The local configuration also includes a secure LAN, often known as a DMZ, that is identified as 1.2.4.0/24. The DMZ is protected from both the outside world and the rest of the corporate LAN by firewalls. The host in this example has the IP address 1.2.3.10, and it is authorized to connect to the server 1.2.4.10 in the DMZ.

The entries in the SPD should be self-explanatory. For example, UDP port 500 is the designated port for IKE. Any traffic from the local host to a remote host for purposes of an IKE exchange bypasses the IPsec processing.

### IP Traffic Processing

IPsec is executed on a packet-by-packet basis. When IPsec is implemented, each outbound IP packet is processed by the IPsec logic before transmission, and each inbound packet is processed by the IPsec logic after reception and before passing the packet contents on to the next higher layer (e.g., TCP or UDP). We look at the logic of these two situations in turn.

**OUTBOUND PACKETS** Figure 19.3 highlights the main elements of IPsec processing for outbound traffic. A block of data from a higher layer, such as TCP, is passed down to the IP layer and an IP packet is formed, consisting of an IP header and an IP body. Then the following steps occur:

1. IPsec searches the SPD for a match to this packet.
2. If no match is found, then the packet is discarded and an error message is generated.
3. If a match is found, further processing is determined by the first matching entry in the SPD. If the policy for this packet is DISCARD, then the packet is discarded. If the policy is BYPASS, then there is no further IPsec processing; the packet is forwarded to the network for transmission.

4. If the policy is PROTECT, then a search is made of the SAD for a matching entry. If no entry is found, then IKE is invoked to create an SA with the appropriate keys and an entry is made in the SA.

5. The matching entry in the SAD determines the processing for this packet. Either encryption, authentication, or both can be performed, and either transport or tunnel mode can be used. The packet is then forwarded to the network for transmission.

**Inbound Packets** Figure 19.4 highlights the main elements of IPsec processing for inbound traffic. An incoming IP packet triggers the IPsec processing. The following steps occur:

1. IPsec determines whether this is an unsecured IP packet or one that has ESP or AH headers/trailers, by examining the IP Protocol field (IPv4) or Next Header field (IPv6).
2. If the packet is unsecured, IPsec searches the SPD for a match to this packet. If the first matching entry has a policy of BYPASS, the IP header is processed and stripped off and the packet body is delivered to the next higher layer, such as TCP. If the first matching entry has a policy of PROTECT or DISCARD, or if there is no matching entry, the packet is discarded.

3. For a secured packet, IPsec searches the SAD. If no match is found, the packet is discarded. Otherwise, IPsec applies the appropriate ESP or AH processing. Then, the IP header is processed and stripped off and the packet body is delivered to the next higher layer, such as TCP.

**19.3 ENCAPSULATING SECURITY PAYLOAD**

ESP can be used to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial sequence integrity), and (limited) traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services provided depends on options selected at the time of Security Association (SA) establishment and on the location of the implementation in a network topology.

ESP can work with a variety of encryption and authentication algorithms, including authenticated encryption algorithms such as GCM.
ESP Format

Figure 19.5a shows the top-level format of an ESP packet. It contains the following fields.

- **Security Parameters Index (32 bits):** Identifies a security association.
- **Sequence Number (32 bits):** A monotonically increasing counter value; this provides an anti-replay function, as discussed for AH.
- **Payload Data (variable):** This is a transport-level segment (transport mode) or IP packet (tunnel mode) that is protected by encryption.
- **Padding (0 – 255 bytes):** The purpose of this field is discussed later.
- **Pad Length (8 bits):** Indicates the number of pad bytes immediately preceding this field.
- **Next Header (8 bits):** Identifies the type of data contained in the payload data field by identifying the first header in that payload (for example, an extension header in IPv6, or an upper-layer protocol such as TCP).

![ESP Packet Format Diagram](image-url)
• **Integrity Check Value (variable):** A variable-length field (must be an integral number of 32-bit words) that contains the Integrity Check Value computed over the ESP packet minus the Authentication Data field.

When any combined mode algorithm is employed, the algorithm itself is expected to return both decrypted plaintext and a pass/fail indication for the integrity check. For combined mode algorithms, the ICV that would normally appear at the end of the ESP packet (when integrity is selected) may be omitted. When the ICV is omitted and integrity is selected, it is the responsibility of the combined mode algorithm to encode within the Payload Data an ICV-equivalent means of verifying the integrity of the packet.

Two additional fields may be present in the payload (Figure 19.5b). An **initialization value (IV),** or nonce, is present if this is required by the encryption or authenticated encryption algorithm used for ESP. If tunnel mode is being used, then the IPsec implementation may add **traffic flow confidentiality (TFC) padding** after the Payload Data and before the Padding field, as explained subsequently.

**Encryption and Authentication Algorithms**

The Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and Next Header fields are encrypted by the ESP service. If the algorithm used to encrypt the payload requires cryptographic synchronization data, such as an initialization vector (IV), then these data may be carried explicitly at the beginning of the Payload Data field. If included, an IV is usually not encrypted, although it is often referred to as being part of the ciphertext.

The ICV field is optional. It is present only if the integrity service is selected and is provided by either a separate integrity algorithm or a combined mode algorithm that uses an ICV. The ICV is computed after the encryption is performed. This order of processing facilitates rapid detection and rejection of replayed or bogus packets by the receiver prior to decrypting the packet, hence potentially reducing the impact of denial of service (DoS) attacks. It also allows for the possibility of parallel processing of packets at the receiver, i.e., decryption can take place in parallel with integrity checking. Note that because the ICV is not protected by encryption, a keyed integrity algorithm must be employed to compute the ICV.

**Padding**

The Padding field serves several purposes:

• If an encryption algorithm requires the plaintext to be a multiple of some number of bytes (e.g., the multiple of a single block for a block cipher), the Padding field is used to expand the plaintext (consisting of the Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and Next Header fields) to the required length.

• The ESP format requires that the Pad Length and Next Header fields be right aligned within a 32-bit word. Equivalently, the ciphertext must be an integer multiple of 32 bits. The Padding field is used to assure this alignment.

• Additional padding may be added to provide partial traffic-flow confidentiality by concealing the actual length of the payload.
Anti-Replay Service

A replay attack is one in which an attacker obtains a copy of an authenticated packet and later transmits it to the intended destination. The receipt of duplicate, authenticated IP packets may disrupt service in some way or may have some other undesired consequence. The Sequence Number field is designed to thwart such attacks. First, we discuss sequence number generation by the sender, and then we look at how it is processed by the recipient.

When a new SA is established, the sender initializes a sequence number counter to 0. Each time that a packet is sent on this SA, the sender increments the counter and places the value in the Sequence Number field. Thus, the first value to be used is 1. If anti-replay is enabled (the default), the sender must not allow the sequence number to cycle past $2^{32} - 1$ back to zero. Otherwise, there would be multiple valid packets with the same sequence number. If the limit of $2^{32} - 1$ is reached, the sender should terminate this SA and negotiate a new SA with a new key.

Because IP is a connectionless, unreliable service, the protocol does not guarantee that packets will be delivered in order and does not guarantee that all packets will be delivered. Therefore, the IPsec authentication document dictates that the receiver should implement a window of size $W$, with a default of $W = 64$. The right edge of the window represents the highest sequence number, $N$, so far received for a valid packet. For any packet with a sequence number in the range from $N - W + 1$ to $N$ that has been correctly received (i.e., properly authenticated), the corresponding slot in the window is marked (Figure 19.6). Inbound processing proceeds as follows when a packet is received:

1. If the received packet falls within the window and is new, the MAC is checked. If the packet is authenticated, the corresponding slot in the window is marked.

2. If the received packet is to the right of the window and is new, the MAC is checked. If the packet is authenticated, the window is advanced so that this sequence number is the right edge of the window, and the corresponding slot in the window is marked.

3. If the received packet is to the left of the window or if authentication fails, the packet is discarded; this is an auditable event.

![Figure 19.6 Anti-replay Mechanism](image-url)
Transport and Tunnel Modes

Figure 19.7 shows two ways in which the IPsec ESP service can be used. In the upper part of the figure, encryption (and optionally authentication) is provided directly between two hosts. Figure 19.7b shows how tunnel mode operation can be used to set up a virtual private network. In this example, an organization has four private networks interconnected across the Internet. Hosts on the internal networks use the Internet for transport of data but do not interact with other Internet-based hosts. By terminating the tunnels at the security gateway to each internal network, the configuration allows the hosts to avoid implementing the security capability. The former technique is supported by a transport mode SA, while the latter technique uses a tunnel mode SA.

In this section, we look at the scope of ESP for the two modes. The considerations are somewhat different for IPv4 and IPv6. We use the packet formats of Figure 19.8a as a starting point.

**Transport Mode ESP** Transport mode ESP is used to encrypt and optionally authenticate the data carried by IP (e.g., a TCP segment), as shown in Figure 19.8b.

![Diagram](image-url)
For this mode using IPv4, the ESP header is inserted into the IP packet immediately prior to the transport-layer header (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP), and an ESP trailer (Padding, Pad Length, and Next Header fields) is placed after the IP packet. If authentication is selected, the ESP Authentication Data field is added after the ESP trailer. The entire transport-level segment plus the ESP trailer are encrypted. Authentication covers all of the ciphertext plus the ESP header.
In the context of IPv6, ESP is viewed as an end-to-end payload; that is, it is not examined or processed by intermediate routers. Therefore, the ESP header appears after the IPv6 base header and the hop-by-hop, routing, and fragment extension headers. The destination options extension header could appear before or after the ESP header, depending on the semantics desired. For IPv6, encryption covers the entire transport-level segment plus the ESP trailer plus the destination options extension header if it occurs after the ESP header. Again, authentication covers the ciphertext plus the ESP header.

Transport mode operation may be summarized as follows.

1. At the source, the block of data consisting of the ESP trailer plus the entire transport-layer segment is encrypted and the plaintext of this block is replaced with its ciphertext to form the IP packet for transmission. Authentication is added if this option is selected.

2. The packet is then routed to the destination. Each intermediate router needs to examine and process the IP header plus any plaintext IP extension headers but does not need to examine the ciphertext.

3. The destination node examines and processes the IP header plus any plaintext IP extension headers. Then, on the basis of the SPI in the ESP header, the destination node decrypts the remainder of the packet to recover the plaintext transport-layer segment.

Transport mode operation provides confidentiality for any application that uses it, thus avoiding the need to implement confidentiality in every individual application. One drawback to this mode is that it is possible to do traffic analysis on the transmitted packets.

**Tunnel Mode ESP** Tunnel mode ESP is used to encrypt an entire IP packet (Figure 19.8c). For this mode, the ESP header is prefixed to the packet and then the packet plus the ESP trailer is encrypted. This method can be used to counter traffic analysis.

Because the IP header contains the destination address and possibly source routing directives and hop-by-hop option information, it is not possible simply to transmit the encrypted IP packet prefixed by the ESP header. Intermediate routers would be unable to process such a packet. Therefore, it is necessary to encapsulate the entire block (ESP header plus ciphertext plus Authentication Data, if present) with a new IP header that will contain sufficient information for routing but not for traffic analysis.

Whereas the transport mode is suitable for protecting connections between hosts that support the ESP feature, the tunnel mode is useful in a configuration that includes a firewall or other sort of security gateway that protects a trusted network from external networks. In this latter case, encryption occurs only between an external host and the security gateway or between two security gateways. This relieves hosts on the internal network of the processing burden of encryption and simplifies the key distribution task by reducing the number of needed keys. Further, it thwarts traffic analysis based on ultimate destination.

Consider a case in which an external host wishes to communicate with a host on an internal network protected by a firewall, and in which ESP is implemented in
the external host and the firewalls. The following steps occur for transfer of a transport-layer segment from the external host to the internal host.

1. The source prepares an inner IP packet with a destination address of the target internal host. This packet is prefixed by an ESP header; then the packet and ESP trailer are encrypted and Authentication Data may be added. The resulting block is encapsulated with a new IP header (base header plus optional extensions such as routing and hop-by-hop options for IPv6) whose destination address is the firewall; this forms the outer IP packet.

2. The outer packet is routed to the destination firewall. Each intermediate router needs to examine and process the outer IP header plus any outer IP extension headers but does not need to examine the ciphertext.

3. The destination firewall examines and processes the outer IP header plus any outer IP extension headers. Then, on the basis of the SPI in the ESP header, the destination node decrypts the remainder of the packet to recover the plaintext inner IP packet. This packet is then transmitted in the internal network.

4. The inner packet is routed through zero or more routers in the internal network to the destination host.

Figure 19.9 shows the protocol architecture for the two modes.

19.4 COMBINING SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS

An individual SA can implement either the AH or ESP protocol but not both. Sometimes a particular traffic flow will call for the services provided by both AH and ESP. Further, a particular traffic flow may require IPsec services between hosts and, for that same flow, separate services between security gateways, such as firewalls. In all of these cases, multiple SAs must be employed for the same traffic flow to achieve the desired IPsec services. The term security association bundle refers to a sequence of SAs through which traffic must be processed to provide a desired set of IPsec services. The SAs in a bundle may terminate at different endpoints or at the same endpoints.

Security associations may be combined into bundles in two ways:

- **Transport adjacency:** Refers to applying more than one security protocol to the same IP packet without invoking tunneling. This approach to combining AH and ESP allows for only one level of combination; further nesting yields no added benefit since the processing is performed at one IPsec instance: the (ultimate) destination.

- **Iterated tunneling:** Refers to the application of multiple layers of security protocols effected through IP tunneling. This approach allows for multiple levels of nesting, since each tunnel can originate or terminate at a different IPsec site along the path.
The two approaches can be combined, for example, by having a transport SA between hosts travel part of the way through a tunnel SA between security gateways.

One interesting issue that arises when considering SA bundles is the order in which authentication and encryption may be applied between a given pair of endpoints and the ways of doing so. We examine that issue next. Then we look at combinations of SAs that involve at least one tunnel.
Authentication Plus Confidentiality

Encryption and authentication can be combined in order to transmit an IP packet that has both confidentiality and authentication between hosts. We look at several approaches.

**ESP with Authentication Option** This approach is illustrated in Figure 19.8. In this approach, the user first applies ESP to the data to be protected and then appends the authentication data field. There are actually two subcases:

- **Transport mode ESP:** Authentication and encryption apply to the IP payload delivered to the host, but the IP header is not protected.
- **Tunnel mode ESP:** Authentication applies to the entire IP packet delivered to the outer IP destination address (e.g., a firewall), and authentication is performed at that destination. The entire inner IP packet is protected by the privacy mechanism for delivery to the inner IP destination.

For both cases, authentication applies to the ciphertext rather than the plaintext.

**Transport Adjacency** Another way to apply authentication after encryption is to use two bundled transport SAs, with the inner being an ESP SA and the outer being an AH SA. In this case, ESP is used without its authentication option. Because the inner SA is a transport SA, encryption is applied to the IP payload. The resulting packet consists of an IP header (and possibly IPv6 header extensions) followed by an ESP. AH is then applied in transport mode, so that authentication covers the ESP plus the original IP header (and extensions) except for mutable fields. The advantage of this approach over simply using a single ESP SA with the ESP authentication option is that the authentication covers more fields, including the source and destination IP addresses. The disadvantage is the overhead of two SAs versus one SA.

**Transport-Tunnel Bundle** The use of authentication prior to encryption might be preferable for several reasons. First, because the authentication data are protected by encryption, it is impossible for anyone to intercept the message and alter the authentication data without detection. Second, it may be desirable to store the authentication information with the message at the destination for later reference. It is more convenient to do this if the authentication information applies to the unencrypted message; otherwise the message would have to be reencrypted to verify the authentication information.

One approach to applying authentication before encryption between two hosts is to use a bundle consisting of an inner AH transport SA and an outer ESP tunnel SA. In this case, authentication is applied to the IP payload plus the IP header (and extensions) except for mutable fields. The resulting IP packet is then processed in tunnel mode by ESP; the result is that the entire, authenticated inner packet is encrypted and a new outer IP header (and extensions) is added.

**Basic Combinations of Security Associations**

The IPsec Architecture document lists four examples of combinations of SAs that must be supported by compliant IPsec hosts (e.g., workstation, server) or security gateways (e.g. firewall, router). These are illustrated in Figure 19.10. The lower part
Figure 19.10  Basic Combinations of Security Associations

* = implements IPsec
of each case in the figure represents the physical connectivity of the elements; the upper part represents logical connectivity via one or more nested SAs. Each SA can be either AH or ESP. For host-to-host SAs, the mode may be either transport or tunnel; otherwise it must be tunnel mode.

**Case 1.** All security is provided between end systems that implement IPsec. For any two end systems to communicate via an SA, they must share the appropriate secret keys. Among the possible combinations are

- a. AH in transport mode
- b. ESP in transport mode
- c. ESP followed by AH in transport mode (an ESP SA inside an AH SA)
- d. Any one of a, b, or c inside an AH or ESP in tunnel mode

We have already discussed how these various combinations can be used to support authentication, encryption, authentication before encryption, and authentication after encryption.

**Case 2.** Security is provided only between gateways (routers, firewalls, etc.) and no hosts implement IPsec. This case illustrates simple virtual private network support. The security architecture document specifies that only a single tunnel SA is needed for this case. The tunnel could support AH, ESP, or ESP with the authentication option. Nested tunnels are not required, because the IPsec services apply to the entire inner packet.

**Case 3.** This builds on case 2 by adding end-to-end security. The same combinations discussed for cases 1 and 2 are allowed here. The gateway-to-gateway tunnel provides either authentication, confidentiality, or both for all traffic between end systems. When the gateway-to-gateway tunnel is ESP, it also provides a limited form of traffic confidentiality. Individual hosts can implement any additional IPsec services required for given applications or given users by means of end-to-end SAs.

**Case 4.** This provides support for a remote host that uses the Internet to reach an organization’s firewall and then to gain access to some server or workstation behind the firewall. Only tunnel mode is required between the remote host and the firewall. As in case 1, one or two SAs may be used between the remote host and the local host.

### 19.5 INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE

The key management portion of IPsec involves the determination and distribution of secret keys. A typical requirement is four keys for communication between two applications: transmit and receive pairs for both integrity and confidentiality. The IPsec Architecture document mandates support for two types of key management:

- **Manual:** A system administrator manually configures each system with its own keys and with the keys of other communicating systems. This is practical for small, relatively static environments.

- **Automated:** An automated system enables the on-demand creation of keys for SAs and facilitates the use of keys in a large distributed system with an evolving configuration.
The default automated key management protocol for IPsec is referred to as ISAKMP/Oakley and consists of the following elements:

- **Oakley Key Determination Protocol**: Oakley is a key exchange protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm but providing added security. Oakley is generic in that it does not dictate specific formats.

- **Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)**: ISAKMP provides a framework for Internet key management and provides the specific protocol support, including formats, for negotiation of security attributes.

ISAKMP by itself does not dictate a specific key exchange algorithm; rather, ISAKMP consists of a set of message types that enable the use of a variety of key exchange algorithms. Oakley is the specific key exchange algorithm mandated for use with the initial version of ISAKMP.

In IKEv2, the terms Oakley and ISAKMP are no longer used, and there are significant differences from the use of Oakley and ISAKMP in IKEv1. Nevertheless, the basic functionality is the same. In this section, we describe the IKEv2 specification.

**Key Determination Protocol**

IKE key determination is a refinement of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. Recall that Diffie-Hellman involves the following interaction between users A and B. There is prior agreement on two global parameters: \( q \), a large prime number; and \( a \), a primitive root of \( q \). A selects a random integer \( X_A \) as its private key and transmits to B its public key \( Y_A = a^{X_A} \mod q \). Similarly, B selects a random integer \( X_B \) as its private key and transmits to A its public key \( Y_B = a^{X_B} \mod q \). Each side can now compute the secret session key:

\[
K = (Y_B)^{X_A} \mod q = (Y_A)^{X_B} \mod q = a^{X_A X_B} \mod q
\]

The Diffie-Hellman algorithm has two attractive features:

- Secret keys are created only when needed. There is no need to store secret keys for a long period of time, exposing them to increased vulnerability.
- The exchange requires no pre-existing infrastructure other than an agreement on the global parameters.

However, there are a number of weaknesses to Diffie-Hellman, as pointed out in [HUIT98].

- It does not provide any information about the identities of the parties.
- It is subject to a man-in-the-middle attack, in which a third party C impersonates B while communicating with A and impersonates A while communicating with B. Both A and B end up negotiating a key with C, which can then listen to and pass on traffic. The man-in-the-middle attack proceeds as

1. B sends his public key \( Y_B \) in a message addressed to A (see Figure 10.2).
2. The enemy (E) intercepts this message. E saves B’s public key and sends a message to A that has B’s User ID but E’s public key \( Y_E \). This message is
sent in such a way that it appears as though it was sent from B’s host system.
A receives E’s message and stores E’s public key with B’s User ID. Similarly,
E sends a message to B with E’s public key, purporting to come from A.

3. B computes a secret key $K_1$ based on B’s private key and $Y_E$. A computes a
secret key $K_2$ based on A’s private key and $Y_E$. E computes $K_1$ using E’s
secret key $X_E$ and $Y_B$ and computers $K_2$ using $X_E$ and $Y_A$.

4. From now on, E is able to relay messages from A to B and from B to A,
appropriately changing their encipherment en route in such a way that
neither A nor B will know that they share their communication with E.

- It is computationally intensive. As a result, it is vulnerable to a clogging attack,
in which an opponent requests a high number of keys. The victim spends
considerable computing resources doing useless modular exponentiation
rather than real work.

IKE key determination is designed to retain the advantages of Diffie-
Hellman, while countering its weaknesses.

**Features of IKE Key Determination** The IKE key determination algorithm is
characterized by five important features:

1. It employs a mechanism known as cookies to thwart clogging attacks.
2. It enables the two parties to negotiate a group; this, in essence, specifies the global
parameters of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
3. It uses nonces to ensure against replay attacks.
4. It enables the exchange of Diffie-Hellman public key values.
5. It authenticates the Diffie-Hellman exchange to thwart man-in-the-middle
attacks.

We have already discussed Diffie-Hellman. Let us look at the remainder of
these elements in turn. First, consider the problem of clogging attacks. In this attack,
an opponent forges the source address of a legitimate user and sends a public Diffie-
Hellman key to the victim. The victim then performs a modular exponentiation to
compute the secret key. Repeated messages of this type can clog the victim’s system
with useless work. The cookie exchange requires that each side send a pseudorandom
number, the cookie, in the initial message, which the other side acknowledges.
This acknowledgment must be repeated in the first message of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. If the source address was forged, the opponent gets no answer. Thus,
an opponent can only force a user to generate acknowledgments and not to perform
the Diffie-Hellman calculation.

IKE mandates that cookie generation satisfy three basic requirements:

1. The cookie must depend on the specific parties. This prevents an attacker from
obtaining a cookie using a real IP address and UDP port and then using it to
swamp the victim with requests from randomly chosen IP addresses or ports.
2. It must not be possible for anyone other than the issuing entity to generate cook-
ies that will be accepted by that entity. This implies that the issuing entity will use
local secret information in the generation and subsequent verification of a
cookie. It must not be possible to deduce this secret information from any particular cookie. The point of this requirement is that the issuing entity need not save copies of its cookies, which are then more vulnerable to discovery, but can verify an incoming cookie acknowledgment when it needs to.

3. The cookie generation and verification methods must be fast to thwart attacks intended to sabotage processor resources.

The recommended method for creating the cookie is to perform a fast hash (e.g., MD5) over the IP Source and Destination addresses, the UDP Source and Destination ports, and a locally generated secret value.

IKE key determination supports the use of different groups for the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Each group includes the definition of the two global parameters and the identity of the algorithm. The current specification includes the following groups.

- Modular exponentiation with a 768-bit modulus
  \[ q = 2^{768} - 2^{704} - 1 + 2^{64} \times (\lfloor 2^{638} \times \pi \rfloor + 149686) \]
  \[ \alpha = 2 \]

- Modular exponentiation with a 1024-bit modulus
  \[ q = 2^{1024} - 2^{960} - 1 + 2^{64} \times (\lfloor 2^{894} \times \pi \rfloor + 129093) \]
  \[ \alpha = 2 \]

- Modular exponentiation with a 1536-bit modulus
  - Parameters to be determined

- Elliptic curve group over \( 2^{155} \)
  - Generator (hexadecimal): \( X = 7B, Y = 1C8 \)
  - Elliptic curve parameters (hexadecimal): \( A = 0, Y = 7338F \)

- Elliptic curve group over \( 2^{185} \)
  - Generator (hexadecimal): \( X = 18, Y = D \)
  - Elliptic curve parameters (hexadecimal): \( A = 0, Y = 1EE9 \)

The first three groups are the classic Diffie-Hellman algorithm using modular exponentiation. The last two groups use the elliptic curve analog to Diffie-Hellman, which was described in Chapter 10.

IKE key determination employs nonces to ensure against replay attacks. Each nonce is a locally generated pseudorandom number. Nonces appear in responses and are encrypted during certain portions of the exchange to secure their use.

Three different authentication methods can be used with IKE key determination:

- **Digital signatures**: The exchange is authenticated by signing a mutually obtainable hash; each party encrypts the hash with its private key. The hash is generated over important parameters, such as user IDs and nonces.

- **Public-key encryption**: The exchange is authenticated by encrypting parameters such as IDs and nonces with the sender’s private key.
• **Symmetric-key encryption**: A key derived by some out-of-band mechanism can be used to authenticate the exchange by symmetric encryption of exchange parameters.

**IKEv2 Exchanges** The IKEv2 protocol involves the exchange of messages in pairs. The first two pairs of exchanges are referred to as the initial exchanges (Figure 19.11a). In the first exchange, the two peers exchange information concerning cryptographic algorithms and other security parameters they are willing to use along with nonces and Diffie-Hellman (DH) values. The result of this exchange is to set up a special SA called the IKE SA (see Figure 19.2). This SA defines parameters for a secure channel between the peers over which subsequent message exchanges take place. Thus, all subsequent IKE message exchanges are protected by encryption and message authentication. In the second exchange, the two parties authenticate one another and set up a first IPsec SA to be placed in the SADB and used for protecting ordinary (i.e. non-IKE) communications between the peers. Thus, four messages are needed to establish the first SA for general use.

![IKEv2 Exchanges Diagram](image-url)

**Figure 19.11** IKEv2 Exchanges
The **CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange** can be used to establish further SAs for protecting traffic. The **informational exchange** is used to exchange management information, IKEv2 error messages, and other notifications.

**Header and Payload Formats**

IKE defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, and delete security associations. As part of SA establishment, IKE defines payloads for exchanging key generation and authentication data. These payload formats provide a consistent framework independent of the specific key exchange protocol, encryption algorithm, and authentication mechanism.

**IKE Header Format**

An IKE message consists of an IKE header followed by one or more payloads. All of this is carried in a transport protocol. The specification dictates that implementations must support the use of UDP for the transport protocol.

Figure 19.12a shows the header format for an IKE message. It consists of the following fields.

- **Initiator SPI (64 bits):** A value chosen by the initiator to identify a unique IKE security association (SA).
- **Responder SPI (64 bits):** A value chosen by the responder to identify a unique IKE SA.
- **Next Payload (8 bits):** Indicates the type of the first payload in the message; payloads are discussed in the next subsection.
- **Major Version (4 bits):** Indicates major version of IKE in use.
- **Minor Version (4 bits):** Indicates minor version in use.

The **CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange** can be used to establish further SAs for protecting traffic. The **informational exchange** is used to exchange management information, IKEv2 error messages, and other notifications.

### Header and Payload Formats

IKE defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, and delete security associations. As part of SA establishment, IKE defines payloads for exchanging key generation and authentication data. These payload formats provide a consistent framework independent of the specific key exchange protocol, encryption algorithm, and authentication mechanism.

**IKE Header Format**

An IKE message consists of an IKE header followed by one or more payloads. All of this is carried in a transport protocol. The specification dictates that implementations must support the use of UDP for the transport protocol.

Figure 19.12a shows the header format for an IKE message. It consists of the following fields.

- **Initiator SPI (64 bits):** A value chosen by the initiator to identify a unique IKE security association (SA).
- **Responder SPI (64 bits):** A value chosen by the responder to identify a unique IKE SA.
- **Next Payload (8 bits):** Indicates the type of the first payload in the message; payloads are discussed in the next subsection.
- **Major Version (4 bits):** Indicates major version of IKE in use.
- **Minor Version (4 bits):** Indicates minor version in use.

![IKE Formats](image-url)

**Figure 19.12 IKE Formats**
• **Exchange Type (8 bits):** Indicates the type of exchange; these are discussed later in this section.

• **Flags (8 bits):** Indicates specific options set for this IKE exchange. Three bits are defined so far. The initiator bit indicates whether this packet is sent by the SA initiator. The version bit indicates whether the transmitter is capable of using a higher major version number than the one currently indicated. The response bit indicates whether this is a response to a message containing the same message ID.

• **Message ID (32 bits):** Used to control retransmission of lost packets and matching of requests and responses.

• **Length (32 bits):** Length of total message (header plus all payloads) in octets.

**IKE Payload Types** All IKE payloads begin with the same generic payload header shown in Figure 19.12b. The Next Payload field has a value of 0 if this is the last payload in the message; otherwise its value is the type of the next payload. The Payload Length field indicates the length in octets of this payload, including the generic payload header.

The critical bit is 0 if the sender wants the recipient to skip this payload if it does not understand the payload type code in the Next Payload field of the previous payload. It is set to 1 if the sender wants the recipient to reject this entire message if it does not understand the payload type.

Table 19.3 summarizes the payload types defined for IKE and lists the fields, or parameters, that are part of each payload. The **SA payload** is used to begin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Association</td>
<td>Proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Exchange</td>
<td>DH Group #, Key Exchange Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>ID Type, ID Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>Cert Encoding, Certificate Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate Request</td>
<td>Cert Encoding, Certification Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>Auth Method, Authentication Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonce</td>
<td>Nonce Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notify</td>
<td>Protocol-ID, SPI Size, Notify Message Type, SPI, Notification Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delete</td>
<td>Protocol-ID, SPI Size, # of SPIs, SPI (one or more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vendor ID</td>
<td>Vendor ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Selector</td>
<td>Number of TSs, Traffic Selectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encrypted</td>
<td>IV, Encrypted IKE payloads, Padding, Pad Length, ICV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuration</td>
<td>CFG Type, Configuration Attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensible Authentication Protocol</td>
<td>EAP Message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the establishment of an SA. The payload has a complex, hierarchical structure. The payload may contain multiple proposals. Each proposal may contain multiple protocols. Each protocol may contain multiple transforms. And each transform may contain multiple attributes. These elements are formatted as substructures within the payload as follows.

- **Proposal**: This substructure includes a proposal number, a protocol ID (AH, ESP, or IKE), an indicator of the number of transforms, and then a transform substructure. If more than one protocol is to be included in a proposal, then there is a subsequent proposal substructure with the same proposal number.

- **Transform**: Different protocols support different transform types. The transforms are used primarily to define cryptographic algorithms to be used with a particular protocol.

- **Attribute**: Each transform may include attributes that modify or complete the specification of the transform. An example is key length.

The **Key Exchange payload** can be used for a variety of key exchange techniques, including Oakley, Diffie-Hellman, and the RSA-based key exchange used by PGP. The Key Exchange data field contains the data required to generate a session key and is dependent on the key exchange algorithm used.

The **Identification payload** is used to determine the identity of communicating peers and may be used for determining authenticity of information. Typically the ID Data field will contain an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

The **Certificate payload** transfers a public-key certificate. The Certificate Encoding field indicates the type of certificate or certificate-related information, which may include the following:

- PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate
- PGP certificate
- DNS signed key
- X.509 certificate—signature
- X.509 certificate—key exchange
- Kerberos tokens
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- Authority Revocation List (ARL)
- SPKI certificate

At any point in an IKE exchange, the sender may include a **Certificate Request payload** to request the certificate of the other communicating entity. The payload may list more than one certificate type that is acceptable and more than one certificate authority that is acceptable.

The **Authentication payload** contains data used for message authentication purposes. The authentication method types so far defined are RSA digital signature, shared-key message integrity code, and DSS digital signature.
The **Nonce** payload contains random data used to guarantee liveness during an exchange and to protect against replay attacks.

The **Notify** payload contains either error or status information associated with this SA or this SA negotiation. The following table lists the IKE notify messages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Messages</th>
<th>Status Messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsupported Critical</td>
<td>Initial Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payload</td>
<td>Set Window Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid IKE SPI</td>
<td>Additional TS Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Major Version</td>
<td>IPCOMP Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Syntax</td>
<td>NAT Detection Source IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Payload Type</td>
<td>NAT Detection Destination IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Message ID</td>
<td>Cookie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid SPI</td>
<td>Use Transport Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Proposal Chosen</td>
<td>HTTP Cert Lookup Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid KE Payload</td>
<td>Rekey SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentication Failed</td>
<td>ESP TFC Padding Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Pair Required</td>
<td>Non First Fragments Also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Additional SAS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Address Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed CP Required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Unacceptable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Selectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The **Delete** payload indicates one or more SAs that the sender has deleted from its database and that therefore are no longer valid.

The **Vendor ID** payload contains a vendor-defined constant. The constant is used by vendors to identify and recognize remote instances of their implementations. This mechanism allows a vendor to experiment with new features while maintaining backward compatibility.

The **Traffic Selector** payload allows peers to identify packet flows for processing by IPsec services.

The **Encrypted** payload contains other payloads in encrypted form. The encrypted payload format is similar to that of ESP. It may include an IV if the encryption algorithm requires it and an ICV if authentication is selected.

The **Configuration** payload is used to exchange configuration information between IKE peers.

The **Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)** payload allows IKE SAs to be authenticated using EAP, which was discussed in Chapter 17.
The IPsecv3 and IKEv3 protocols rely on a variety of types of cryptographic algorithms. As we have seen in this book, there are many cryptographic algorithms of each type, each with a variety of parameters, such as key size. To promote interoperability, two RFCs define recommended suites of cryptographic algorithms and parameters for various applications.

RFC 4308 defines two cryptographic suites for establishing virtual private networks. Suite VPN-A matches the commonly used corporate VPN security used in older IKEv1 implementations at the time of the issuance of IKEv2 in 2005. Suite VPN-B provides stronger security and is recommended for new VPNs that implement IPsecv3 and IKEv2.

Table 19.4a lists the algorithms and parameters for the two suites. There are several points to note about these two suites. Note that for symmetric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>VPN-A</th>
<th>VPN-B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESP encryption</td>
<td>3DES-CBC</td>
<td>AES-CBC (128-bit key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP integrity</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA1-96</td>
<td>AES-XCBC-MAC-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE encryption</td>
<td>3DES-CBC</td>
<td>AES-CBC (128-bit key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE PRF</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA1</td>
<td>AES-XCBC-PRF-128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE Integrity</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA1-96</td>
<td>AES-XCBC-MAC-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE DH group</td>
<td>1024-bit MODP</td>
<td>2048-bit MODP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Virtual private networks (RFC 4308)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>GCM-128</th>
<th>GCM-256</th>
<th>GMAC-128</th>
<th>GMAC-256</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESP encryption/Integrity</td>
<td>AES-GCM (128-bit key)</td>
<td>AES-GCM (256-bit key)</td>
<td>Null</td>
<td>Null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP integrity</td>
<td>Null</td>
<td>Null</td>
<td>AES-GMAC (128-bit key)</td>
<td>AES-GMAC (256-bit key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE encryption</td>
<td>AES-CBC (128-bit key)</td>
<td>AES-CBC (256-bit key)</td>
<td>AES-CBC (128-bit key)</td>
<td>AES-CBC (256-bit key)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE PRF</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-256</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-384</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-256</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE Integrity</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-256-128</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-384-128</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-256-128</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-384-128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE DH group</td>
<td>256-bit random ECP</td>
<td>384-bit random ECP</td>
<td>256-bit random ECP</td>
<td>384-bit random ECP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKE authentication</td>
<td>ECDSA-256</td>
<td>ECDSA-384</td>
<td>ECDSA-256</td>
<td>ECDSA-384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) NSA Suite B (RFC 4869)
cryptography, VPN-A relies on 3DES and HMAC, while VPN-B relies exclusively on AES. Three types of secret-key algorithms are used:

- **Encryption**: For encryption, the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode is used.
- **Message authentication**: For message authentication, VPN-A relies on HMAC with SHA-1 with the output truncated to 96 bits. VPN-B relies on a variant of CMAC with the output truncated to 96 bits.
- **Pseudorandom function**: IKEv2 generates pseudorandom bits by repeated use of the MAC used for message authentication.

RFC 4869 defines four optional cryptographic suites that are compatible with the United States National Security Agency’s Suite B specifications. In 2005, the NSA issued Suite B, which defined the algorithms and strengths needed to protect both sensitive but unclassified (SBU) and classified information for use in its Cryptographic Modernization program [LATT09]. The four suites defined in RFC 4869 provide choices for ESP and IKE. The four suites are differentiated by the choice of cryptographic algorithm strengths and a choice of whether ESP is to provide both confidentiality and integrity or integrity only. All of the suites offer greater protection than the two VPN suites defined in RFC 4308.

Table 19.4b lists the algorithms and parameters for the two suites. As with RFC 4308, three categories of secret key algorithms are listed:

- **Encryption**: For ESP, authenticated encryption is provided using the GCM mode with either 128-bit or 256-bit AES keys. For IKE encryption, CBC is used, as it was for the VPN suites.
- **Message authentication**: For ESP, if only authentication is required, then GMAC is used. As discussed in Chapter 12, GMAC is simply the authentication portion of GMC. For IKE, message authentication is provided using HMAC with one of the SHA-3 hash functions.
- **Pseudorandom function**: As with the VPN suites, IKEv2 in these suites generates pseudorandom bits by repeated use of the MAC used for message authentication.

For the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, the use of elliptic curve groups modulo a prime is specified. For authentication, elliptic curve digital signatures are listed. The original IKEv2 documents used RSA-based digital signatures. Equivalent or greater strength can be achieved using ECC with fewer key bits.

### 19.7 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

IPv6 and IPv4 are covered in more detail in [STAL07]. [CHEN98] provides a good discussion of an IPsec design. [FRAN05] is a more comprehensive treatment of IPsec. [PATE06] is a useful overview of IPsecv3 and IKEv2 with an emphasis on cryptographic aspects.
Recommended Web Sites:

- **NIST IPsec Project**: Contains papers, presentations, and reference implementations.
- **IPsec Maintenance and Extensions Charter**: Latest RFCs and internet drafts for IPsec.

### 19.8 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

#### Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>anti-replay service</th>
<th>Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</th>
<th>replay attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authentication Header (AH)</td>
<td>IP Security (IPsec)</td>
<td>security association (SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>transport mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>tunnel mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakley key determination protocol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Review Questions

19.1 Give examples of applications of IPsec.
19.2 What services are provided by IPsec?
19.3 What parameters identify an SA and what parameters characterize the nature of a particular SA?
19.4 What is the difference between transport mode and tunnel mode?
19.5 What is a replay attack?
19.6 Why does ESP include a padding field?
19.7 What are the basic approaches to bundling SAs?
19.8 What are the roles of the Oakley key determination protocol and ISAKMP in IPsec?
Problems

19.1 Describe and explain each of the entries in Table 19.2.
19.2 Draw a figure similar to Figure 19.8 for AH.
19.3 List the major security services provided by AH and ESP, respectively.
19.4 In discussing AH processing, it was mentioned that not all of the fields in an IP header are included in MAC calculation.
   a. For each of the fields in the IPv4 header, indicate whether the field is immutable, mutable but predictable, or mutable (zeroed prior to ICV calculation).
   b. Do the same for the IPv6 header.
   c. Do the same for the IPv6 extension headers.
   In each case, justify your decision for each field.
19.5 Suppose that the current replay window spans from 120 to 530.
   a. If the next incoming authenticated packet has sequence number 105, what will the receiver do with the packet, and what will be the parameters of the window after that?
   b. If instead the next incoming authenticated packet has sequence number 440, what will the receiver do with the packet, and what will be the parameters of the window after that?
   c. If instead the next incoming authenticated packet has sequence number 540, what will the receiver do with the packet, and what will be the parameters of the window after that?
19.6 When tunnel mode is used, a new outer IP header is constructed. For both IPv4 and IPv6, indicate the relationship of each outer IP header field and each extension header in the outer packet to the corresponding field or extension header of the inner IP packet. That is, indicate which outer values are derived from inner values and which are constructed independently of the inner values.
19.7 End-to-end authentication and encryption are desired between two hosts. Draw figures similar to Figure 19.8 that show each of the following.
   a. Transport adjacency with encryption applied before authentication.
   b. A transport SA bundled inside a tunnel SA with encryption applied before authentication.
   c. A transport SA bundled inside a tunnel SA with authentication applied before encryption.
19.8 The IPsec architecture document states that when two transport mode SAs are bundled to allow both AH and ESP protocols on the same end-to-end flow, only one ordering of security protocols seems appropriate: performing the ESP protocol before performing the AH protocol. Why is this approach recommended rather than authentication before encryption?
19.9 For the IKE key exchange, indicate which parameters in each message go in which ISAKMP payload types.
19.10 Where does IPsec reside in a protocol stack?
APPENDIX A

PROJECTS FOR TEACHING CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY

A.1 Sage Computer Algebra Projects
A.2 Hacking Project
A.3 Block Cipher Projects
A.4 Laboratory Exercises
A.5 Research Projects
A.6 Programming Projects
A.7 Practical Security Assessments
A.8 Writing Assignments
A.9 Reading/Report Assignments
Many instructors believe that research or implementation projects are crucial to the clear understanding of cryptography and network security. Without projects, it may be difficult for students to grasp some of the basic concepts and interactions among components. Projects reinforce the concepts introduced in the book, give the student a greater appreciation of how a cryptographic algorithm or protocol works, and can motivate students and give them confidence that they are capable of not only understanding but implementing the details of a security capability.

In this text, I have tried to present the concepts of cryptography and network security as clearly as possible and have provided numerous homework problems to reinforce those concepts. However, many instructors will wish to supplement this material with projects. This appendix provides some guidance in that regard and describes support material available in the Instructor’s Resource Center (IRC) for this book, accessible to instructors from Prentice Hall. The support material covers nine types of projects:

- Sage computer algebra projects
- Hacking project
- Block cipher projects
- Laboratory exercises
- Research projects
- Programming projects
- Practical security assessments
- Writing assignments
- Reading/report assignments

A.1 SAGE COMPUTER ALGEBRA PROJECTS

One of the most important new features for this edition is the use of Sage for cryptographic examples and homework assignments. Sage is an open-source, multiplatform, freeware package that implements a very powerful, flexible, and easily learned mathematics and computer algebra system. A computer algebra system (CAS) is software that can perform symbolic as well as numerical calculations. CASs have been used for teaching since their inception some decades ago, and there is now a considerable literature on their use. A CAS is a natural tool for extending the learning experience in a cryptography course.

Unlike competing systems such as Mathematica, Maple, and MATLAB, there are no licensing agreements or fees involved with Sage. Thus, Sage can be made available on computers and networks at school, and students can individually download the software to their own personal computers for use at home. Another advantage of using Sage is that students learn a powerful, flexible tool that can be used for virtually any mathematical application, not just cryptography. The Sage Web site (http://www.sagemath.org) provides considerable documentation on how
to install, set up, and use Sage on a variety of computers and how to use it online via the Web.

The use of Sage can make a significant difference to the teaching of the mathematics of cryptographic algorithms. Appendix B provides a large number of examples of the use of Sage covering many cryptographic concepts. Appendix C lists exercises in each of these topic areas to enable the student to gain hands-on experience with cryptographic algorithms. Copies of both appendices are available online so that students do not have to key in lines of code that are printed in the appendices.

The IRC contains solutions to all of the exercises in Appendix C.

Dan Shumow of Microsoft and the University of Washington developed all of the examples and assignments in Appendices B and C.

A.2 HACKING PROJECT

The aim of this project is to hack into a corporation’s network through a series of steps. The Corporation is named Extreme In Security Corporation. As the name indicates, the corporation has some security holes in it, and a clever hacker is able to access critical information by hacking into its network. The IRC includes what is needed to set up the Web site. The student’s goal is to capture the secret information about the price on the quote the corporation is placing next week to obtain a contract for a governmental project.

The student should start at the Web site and find his or her way into the network. At each step, if the student succeeds, there are indications as to how to proceed on to the next step as well as the grade until that point.

The project can be attempted in three ways:

1. Without seeking any sort of help
2. Using some provided hints
3. Using exact directions

The IRC includes the files needed for this project:

1. Web Security project
2. Web Hacking exercises (XSS and Script-attacks) covering client-side and server-side vulnerability exploitations respectively
3. Documentation for installation and use for the above
4. A PowerPoint file describing Web hacking. This file is crucial to understanding how to use the exercises since it clearly explains the operation using screen shots.

This project was designed and implemented by Professor Sreekanth Malladi of Dakota State University.

A.3 BLOCK CIPHER PROJECTS

This is a lab that explores the operation of the AES encryption algorithm by tracing its execution, computing one round by hand, and then exploring the various block cipher modes of use. The lab also covers DES. In both cases, an online Java applet is used (or can be downloaded) to execute AES or DES.
For both AES and DES, the lab is divided into three separate parts:

- **Block cipher internals:** This part involves encrypting plaintext and analyzing the intermediate results after each round. There is an online calculator for both AES and DES that provides the intermediate results and the final ciphertext.

- **Block cipher round:** This part involves calculating one round by hand and comparing the results to those produced by the calculator.

- **Block cipher modes of use:** Enables the student to compare the operation of CBC and CFB modes.

The IRC contains the `.html` and `.jar` files needed to set up these labs on your own Web site. Alternatively, the material is available from the Student Resources section of this book’s Web site. Click on the rotating globe.

Lawrie Brown of the Australian Defence Force Academy developed these projects.

### A.4 LABORATORY EXERCISES

Professor Sanjay Rao and Ruben Torres of Purdue University have prepared a set of laboratory exercises that are included in the IRC. These are implementation projects designed to be programmed on Linux but could be adapted for any Unix environment. These laboratory exercises provide realistic experience in implementing security functions and applications.

### A.5 RESEARCH PROJECTS

An effective way of reinforcing basic concepts from the course and for teaching students research skills is to assign a research project. Such a project could involve a literature search as well as an Internet search of vendor products, research lab activities, and standardization efforts. Projects could be assigned to teams or, for smaller projects, to individuals. In any case, it is best to require some sort of project proposal early in the term, giving the instructor time to evaluate the proposal for appropriate topic and appropriate level of effort. Student handouts for research projects should include

- A format for the proposal
- A format for the final report
- A schedule with intermediate and final deadlines
- A list of possible project topics

The students can select one of the topics listed in the IRC or devise their own comparable project. The IRC includes a suggested format for the proposal and final report as well as a list of fifteen possible research topics.
**A.6 PROGRAMMING PROJECTS**

The programming project is a useful pedagogical tool. There are several attractive features of stand-alone programming projects that are not part of an existing security facility:

1. The instructor can choose from a wide variety of cryptography and network security concepts to assign projects.
2. The projects can be programmed by the students on any available computer and in any appropriate language; they are platform and language independent.
3. The instructor need not download, install, and configure any particular infrastructure for stand-alone projects.

There is also flexibility in the size of projects. Larger projects give students more a sense of achievement, but students with less ability or fewer organizational skills can be left behind. Larger projects usually elicit more overall effort from the best students. Smaller projects can have a higher concepts-to-code ratio and, because more of them can be assigned, the opportunity exists to address a variety of different areas.

Again, as with research projects, the students should first submit a proposal. The student handout should include the same elements listed in the preceding section. The IRC includes a set of twelve possible programming projects.

The following individuals have supplied the research and programming projects suggested in the IRC: Henning Schulzrinne of Columbia University; Cetin Kaya Koç of Oregon State University; and David M. Balenson of Trusted Information Systems and George Washington University.

**A.7 PRACTICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS**

Examining the current infrastructure and practices of an existing organization is one of the best ways of developing skills in assessing its security posture. The IRC contains a list of such activities. Students, working either individually or in small groups, select a suitable small- to medium-sized organization. They then interview some key personnel in that organization in order to conduct a suitable selection of security risk assessment and review tasks as it relates to the organization’s IT infrastructure and practices. As a result, they can then recommend suitable changes, which can improve the organization’s IT security. These activities help students develop an appreciation of current security practices and the skills needed to review these and recommend changes.

Lawrie Brown of the Australian Defence Force Academy developed these projects.

**A.8 WRITING ASSIGNMENTS**

Writing assignments can have a powerful multiplier effect in the learning process in a technical discipline such as cryptography and network security. Adherents of the Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) movement (http://wac.colostate.edu/) report
substantial benefits of writing assignments in facilitating learning. Writing assignments lead to more detailed and complete thinking about a particular topic. In addition, writing assignments help to overcome the tendency of students to pursue a subject with a minimum of personal engagement, just learning facts and problem-solving techniques without obtaining a deep understanding of the subject matter.

The IRC contains a number of suggested writing assignments, organized by chapter. Instructors may ultimately find that this is an important part of their approach to teaching the material. I would greatly appreciate any feedback on this area and any suggestions for additional writing assignments.

### A.9 READING/REPORT ASSIGNMENTS

Another excellent way to reinforce concepts from the course and to give students research experience is to assign papers from the literature to be read and analyzed. The student is then asked to write a brief report on the assigned paper. The IRC includes a suggested list of papers, one or two per chapter, to be assigned. The IRC provides a PDF copy of each of the papers. The IRC also includes a suggested assignment wording.
APPENDIX B

SAGE EXAMPLES

By Dan Shumow
University of Washington

B.1 Linear Algebra and Matrix Functionality .................................................. 658
B.2 Chapter 2: Classical Encryption ................................................................. 659
B.3 Chapter 3: Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard ...................... 662
B.4 Chapter 4: Basic Concepts in Number Theory and Finite Fields ................. 666
B.5 Chapter 5: Advanced Encryption Standard .................................................. 673
B.6 Chapter 6: Pseudorandom Number Generation and Stream Ciphers .......... 678
B.7 Chapter 8: Number Theory .......................................................................... 680
B.8 Chapter 9: Public-Key Cryptography and RSA .......................................... 685
B.9 Chapter 10: Other Public-Key Cryptosystems ............................................. 688
B.10 Chapter 11: Cryptographic Hash Functions .............................................. 693
B.11 Chapter 13: Digital Signatures ................................................................. 695
This appendix contains a number of examples that illustrate cryptographic concepts, organized by the chapter in which those concepts were discussed. All the examples are in Sage. See Appendix C for how to get started using Sage and for a brief introduction to Sage syntax and operations. We begin with a brief introduction to some basic Sage matrix and linear algebra operations.

You should be able to follow the examples in this section as written. However, if you have difficulty interpreting the Sage code, please refer to Section C.2 in Appendix C.

B.1 LINEAR ALGEBRA AND MATRIX FUNCTIONALITY

Sage includes linear algebra and matrix functionality. The following shows some of the basic functionality applicable to cryptography.

In Sage you specify a matrix as a list of lists of numbers, passed to the \texttt{matrix} function. For example, passing a list of lists of integers as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: M = matrix([[1, 3], [7, 9]]); M
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
[1 3]
[7 9]
\end{verbatim}

Alternately, passing a list of lists of rationals as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: M = matrix([[1/2, 2/3, 3/4], [5, 7, 8]]); M
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
[1/2 2/3 3/4]
[5 7 8]
\end{verbatim}

You can specify that the input should be reduced by a modulus, using the \texttt{IntegerModRing} (functionality to be described later)

\begin{verbatim}
Sage: R = IntegerModRing(100)
sage: M = matrix(R, [[1],[102],[1003]]); M
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
[1]
[2]
[3]
\end{verbatim}

Or that the input should be considered in a finite field (also to be described later.)

\begin{verbatim}
sage: F = GF(2);
sage: M = matrix(F, [[1, 2, 0, 3]]); M
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
[1 0 0 1]
\end{verbatim}

\footnote{All of the Sage code in this appendix is available online at this book’s Web site in .sage files, so that you can load and execute the programs if you wish. See Preface for access information.}
Sage also supports multiplication, addition, and inversion of matrices as follows:

```
sage: M1 = matrix([[1, 2],[3,4]]);
sage: M2 = matrix([[1,-1],[1, 1]]);
sage: M1*M2
[3 1]
[7 1]
sage: M1 + M2
[2 1]
[4 5]
sage: M2^-1
[ 1/2 1/2]
[-1/2 1/2]
```

**Example 1:** Implement Sage encryption/decryption functions that take a key (as an integer in 0, 1, 2,..., 25), and a string. The function should only operate on the characters ‘a’, ‘b’,... ‘z’ (both upper and lower case), and it should leave any other characters unchanged.
Solution:

def CaesarEncrypt(k, plaintext):
   ciphertext = ""
   for j in xrange(len(plaintext)):
      p = plaintext[j]
      if is_alphabetic_char(p):
         x = (k + char_to_num(p)) % 26
         c = num_to_char(x)
      else:
         c = p
      ciphertext += c
   return ciphertext

def CaesarDecrypt(k, ciphertext):
   plaintext = ""
   for j in xrange(len(ciphertext)):
      c = ciphertext[j]
      if is_alphabetic_char(c):
         x = (char_to_num(c) - k) % 26
         p = num_to_char(x)
      else:
         p = c
      plaintext += p
   return plaintext

Example 2: Implement a function that performs a brute force attack on a ciphertext, it should print a list of the keys and associated decryptions. It should also take an optional parameter that takes a substring and only prints out potential plaintexts that contain that decryption.

Solution:

def BruteForceAttack(ciphertext, keyword=None):
   for k in xrange(26):
      plaintext = CaesarDecrypt(k, ciphertext)
      if (None==keyword) or (keyword in plaintext):
         print "key", k, "decryption", plaintext
   return
Example 3: Show the output of your encrypt function (Example 1) on the following (key, plaintext) pairs:

- k = 16 plaintext = “Get me a vanilla ice cream, make it a double.”
- k = 15 plaintext = “I don’t much care for Leonard Cohen.”
- k = 16 plaintext = “I like root beer floats.”

Solution:

```
sage: k = 6; plaintext = 'Get me a vanilla ice cream, make it a double.'
sage: CaesarEncrypt(k, plaintext)
'mkz sk g bgtorrg oik ixkgs, sgqk oz g juahrk.'
sage: k = 15; plaintext = 'I don’t much care for Leonard Cohen.'
sage: CaesarEncrypt(k, plaintext)
'x sdci bjrw rpgt udg atdcpgs rdwtc.'
sage: k = 16; plaintext = 'I like root beer floats.'
sage: CaesarEncrypt(k, plaintext)
'y byau heej ruuh vbegji.'
```

Example 4: Show the output of your decrypt function (Example 1) on the following (key, ciphertext) pairs:

- k = 12 ciphertext = ‘nduzs ftq buzq oazqe.’
- k = 3 ciphertext = “fdhvdu qhhgv wr orvh zhljkw.”
- k = 20 ciphertext = “ufgihxm uly numnys.”

Solution:

```
sage: k = 12; ciphertext = "nduzs ftq buzq oazqe."
sage: CaesarDecrypt(k, ciphertext)
'bring the pine cones.'
sage: k = 3; ciphertext = "fdhvdu qhhgv wr orvh zhljkw."
sage: CaesarDecrypt(k, ciphertext)
'caesar needs to lose weight.'
sage: k = 20; ciphertext = "ufgihxm uly numnys."
sage: CaesarDecrypt(k, ciphertext)
'almonds are tastey.'
```

Example 5: Show the output of your attack function (Example 2) on the following ciphertexts, if an optional keyword is specified, pass that to your attack function:

- ciphertext = ‘gryy guru g orb gb nzoebr fr puncry.’ keyword = ‘chapel’
- ciphertext = ‘wziv kyv jyfk nyve kyv tpdsrj tirj.’ keyword = ‘cymbal’
- ciphertext = ‘baeeq kwosjl osk s esf ozg cfwo lgg emuz.’ no keyword
Solution:

```
sage: ciphertext = 'gryy gurz gb tb gb nzoebfr puncry.'
sage: BruteForceAttack(ciphertext, 'chapel')
key 13 decryption tell them to go to ambrose chapel.

sage: ciphertext = 'wziv kyv jyfk nyve kyv tpdsrcj tirjy.'
sage: BruteForceAttack(ciphertext, 'cymbal')
key 17 decryption fire the shot when the cymbals crash.

sage: ciphertext = 'baeeq klwosjl osk s esf ozg cfwo lgg emuz.'
sage: BruteForceAttack(ciphertext)
key 0 decryption baeeq klwosjl osk s esf ozg cfwo lgg emuz.
key 1 decryption azddp jkvnrik nrj r dre nyf bevn kff dlty.
key 2 decryption zycco ijumqhj mqy q cgd mxr adum jee cksx.
key 3 decryption yxbbn hitlpgj lph p bpc lwd zct1 idd bjrw.
key 4 decryption xwaam ghskofh kog o aob kvr ybsk hcc aiqv.
key 5 decryption wzzl fgfrneg jnf n zna jub xarj gbb zhpu.
key 6 decryption vuyyk efqimdf ime m ynz ita wzqi faa ygot.
key 7 decryption utxxj dephlice hld l xly hsz vyph ezz xfn.
key 8 decryption tswit cdgkbd gkc k wkx gry uxog dyy wemr.
key 9 decryption srsvh bcnfjac fjb j vjw fgx twnf cxx vdlq.
key 10 decryption rquug abmeizb eia i uiv epw svme bbw uckp.
key 11 decryption gptftf zaldhya dhz h thu dov ruld avv tbjo.
key 12 decryption posse yzkcgxz cgy g sgt cnu qtkc zzu sain.
key 13 decryption onrdr xyjbfwy bfx f rfs bmt psjb ytt rzhl.
key 14 decryption mmqqc wxiaevx aew e qer als oria xss qygl.
key 15 decryption mlppb wvhzdwr zdv d pdg zkr nqhz wrr pxfr.
key 16 decryption lkoao uvgycrtv ycu c ocp yjq mpkg vqg owej.
key 17 decryption kjnnz tufxsu xbt b nbo xip lofx upp nvid.
key 18 decryption jimmy stewart was a man who knew too much.
key 19 decryption ihllx rsdvyqz vyr z lzm vgn jmdv smn ltbq.
key 20 decryption hkgkw qrcuypyr uyg y kyl ufmb ilcu rmm ksaq.
key 21 decryption gfjyv pgbtqox xp x jxk tel hkbq rll qjez.
key 22 decryption feiu opaswmp swo w lwj sdk gjas pkq iqtd.
key 23 decryption edhht nozrmo rvn v hvi rcc fizr ojz hpxc.
key 24 decryption dgcgs mjnyuln qmn u ghj qbi ehyq nii gowb.
key 25 decryption cbfr lmxptkm ptt t ftg pah dxgp mhh fnva.
```

B.3 CHAPTER 3: BLOCK CIPHERS AND THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD

Example 1: This example implements simplified DES, which is described in Appendix G.

```
P10_data = [3, 5, 2, 7, 4, 10, 1, 9, 8, 6];
P8_data = [6, 3, 7, 4, 8, 5, 10, 9];
LS1_data = [2, 3, 4, 5, 1];
LS2_data = [3, 4, 5, 1, 2];
IP_data = [2, 6, 3, 1, 4, 8, 5, 7];
IPinv_data = [4, 1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 8, 6];
EP_data = [4, 1, 2, 3, 2, 3, 4, 1];
P4_data = [2, 4, 3, 1];
SW_data = [5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4];

# SDES lookup tables
S0_data = [[1, 0, 3, 2],
           [3, 2, 1, 0],
           [0, 2, 1, 3],
           [3, 1, 3, 2]];
S1_data = [[0, 1, 2, 3],
           [2, 0, 1, 3],
           [3, 0, 1, 0],
           [2, 1, 0, 3]];

def ApplyPermutation(X, permutation):
    r"""
    This function takes a permutation list (list of bit positions.)
    And outputs a bit list with the bits taken from X.
    """
    # permute the list X
    l = len(permutation);
    return [X[permutation[j]-1] for j in xrange(l)];

def ApplySBox(X, SBox):
    r"""
    This function Applies the SDES SBox (by table look up
    """
    r = 2*X[0] + X[3];
    c = 2*X[1] + X[2];
    o = SBox[r][c];
    return [o & 2, o & 1];
# Each of these functions uses ApplyPermutation
# and a permutation list to perform an SDES
# Expansion/Permutation
#

def P10(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, P10_data);

def P8(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, P8_data);

def IP(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, IP_data);

def IPinv(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, IPinv_data);

def EP(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, EP_data);

def P4(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, P4_data);

def SW(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, SW_data);

def LS1(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, LS1_data);

def LS2(X):
    return ApplyPermutation(X, LS2_data);

# These two functions perform the SBox substitutions
#

def S0(X):
    return ApplySBox(X, S0_data);

def S1(X):
    return ApplySBox(X, S1_data);

def concatenate(left, right):
    r""
    Joins to bit lists together.
    """
    ret = [left[j] for j in xrange(len(left))];
    ret.extend(right);
    return ret;

def LeftHalfBits(block):
    r""
    Returns the left half bits from block.
    """
l = len(block);
return [block[j] for j in xrange(l/2)];

def RightHalfBits(block):
    r'''"
    Returns the right half bits from block.
    '''
    l = len(block);
    return [block[j] for j in xrange(l/2, l)];

def XorBlock(block1, block2):
    r'''"
    Xors two blocks together.
    '''
    l = len(block1);
    if (l != len(block2)):
        raise ValueError, "XorBlock arguments must be same length"
    return [(block1[j]+block2[j]) % 2 for j in xrange(l)];

def SDESKeySchedule(K):
    r'''"
    Expands an SDES Key (bit list) into the two round keys.
    '''
    temp_K = P10(K);
    left_temp_K = LeftHalfBits(temp_K);
    right_temp_K = RightHalfBits(temp_K);
    K1left = LS1(left_temp_K);
    K1right = LS1(right_temp_K);
    K1temp = concatenate(K1left, K1right);
    K1 = P8(K1temp);
    K2left = LS2(K1left);
    K2right = LS2(K1right);
    K2temp = concatenate(K2left, K2right);
    K2 = P8(K2temp);
    return (K1, K2);

def f_K(block, K):
    r'''"
    Performs the f_K function supplied block and K.
    '''
    left_block = LeftHalfBits(block);
    right_block = RightHalfBits(block);
temp_block1 = EP(right_block);
temp_block2 = XorBlock(temp_block1, K);
left_temp_block2 = LeftHalfBits(temp_block2);
right_temp_block2 = RightHalfBits(temp_block2);
S0_out = S0(left_temp_block2);
S1_out = S1(right_temp_block2);
temp_block3 = concatenate(S0_out, S1_out);
temp_block4 = P4(temp_block3)
temp_block5 = XorBlock(temp_block4, left_block);
output_block = concatenate(temp_block5, right_block)
return output_block;

def SDESEncrypt(plaintext_block, K):
    r""
    Performs a single SDES plaintext block encryption.
    (Given plaintext and key as bit lists.)
    ""
    
    (K1, K2) = SDESKeySchedule(K);
temp_block1 = IP(plaintext_block);
temp_block2 = f_K(temp_block1, K1);
temp_block3 = SW(temp_block2);
temp_block4 = f_K(temp_block3, K2);
output_block = IPinv(temp_block4);
return output_block;

B.4 CHAPTER 4: BASIC CONCEPTS IN NUMBER THEORY AND
FINITE FIELDS

Example 1: The Euclidean algorithm for the greatest common divisor

def EUCLID(a,b):
    r""
    The Euclidean algorithm for finding the gcd of a and b. This algorithm assumes that a > b => 0
    INPUT:
    
a - positive integer

    b - nonnegative integer less than a
OUTPUT:

\[ g \] - greatest common divisor of \( a \) and \( b \)

```python
if (b < 0) or (a <= b):
    raise ValueError, "Expected 0 < a < b"

(A, B) = (a, b);
while (True):
    if (0 == B):
        return A;
    R = A % B;
    A = B;
    B = R;
```

**Example 2:** The extended Euclidean algorithm for the greatest common divisor

```python
def EXTENDED_EUCLID(m, b):
    r"""
    The extended Euclidean algorithm to find \( \gcd(m, b) \).
    The input is expected to be such that \( 0 \leq b < m \).
    INPUT:
    m - positive integer
    b - nonnegative integer less than m
    OUTPUT:
    (g, b_inv) - g is the \( \gcd \) of m and b, b_inv is the multiplicative inverse of b mod m.
    """
    if (m < b) or (b < 0):
        raise ValueError, "Expected input (0 < b < m)"
    (A1, A2, A3) = (1, 0, m);
    (B1, B2, B3) = (0, 1, b);
    while (True):
        if (0 == B3):
            return (A3, None)
        if (1 == B3):
            return (B3, B2)
        Q = floor(A3/B3)
        (T1, T2, T3) = (A1-Q*B1, A2-Q*B2, A3-Q*B3)
```

Example 3: Euclidean algorithm to find gcd of polynomials (with coefficients in a field)

def POLYNOMIAL_EUCLID(A, B):
    r"""
    Euclidian algorithm for polynomial GCD:
    Given two polynomials over the same base field,
    Assuming degree(A) => degree(B) => 0.
    INPUT:
    A - polynomial over a field.
    B - polynomial over the same field as A, and 0 <=
      degree(B) <= degree(A).
    OUTPUT:
    G - greatest common divisor of A and B.
"""
    degA = A.degree();
    degB = B.degree();
    if ((degB < 0) or (degA < degB)):
        raise ValueError, "Expected 0 <= degree(B) <= de-
        gree(A)"
    while(True):
        if (0 == B):
            return A;
        R = A % B;
        A = B;
        B = R;

Example 4: Extended Euclidean algorithm for the gcd of two polynomials
(with coefficients in the same field)

def POLYNOMIAL_EXTENDED_EUCLID(m, b):
    r"""
    Extended Euclidian algorithm for polynomial GCD:
    Given two polynomials over the same base field,
    Assuming degree(m) => degree(b) => 0
    INPUT:
    m - polynomial over a field.
b - polynomial over the same field as A, and 0 <= 
   degree(B) <= degree(M).

OUTPUT:
   (g, b_inv) - the pair where:
   g - greatest common divisor of m and b.
   m_inv - is None if G is not of degree 0, 
   and otherwise it is the polynomial such 
   that b(X)*b_inv(X) = 1 mod m(X)

degm = m.degree();
degb = b.degree();
if(degb < 0) or (degm < degb):
    raise ValueError, "expected 0 <= degree(b) <= 
    degree(m)"

(A1, A2, A3) = (1, 0, m);
(B1, B2, B3) = (0, 1, b);

while (True):
    if (0 == B3):
        return (A3, None);
    if (0 == B3.degree()):
        return (B3/B3, B2/B3);
    Q = A3.quo_rem(B3)[0];
    (T1, T2, T3) = (A1 - Q*B1, A2 - Q*B2, A3 - Q*B3);
    (A1, A2, A3) = (B1, B2, B3);
    (B1, B2, B3) = (T1, T2, T3);

Example 5: Sage has built in functionality for the gcd function. The regular 
greatest common divisor function can simply be called as:

sage: gcd(15,100)
5

sage: gcd(90,65311)
1

You can also call it as a method on Integer objects:

sage: x = 10456890
sage: x.gcd(100)
10

The extended Euclidean algorithm for the greatest common divisor is also 
built into Sage. Calling xgcd(a,b) returns a tuple, the first element is the gcd,
the second and third elements are coefficients u,v such that \( \gcd(a,b) = u^*a + v^*b \). This can be called as:

```python
sage: xgcd(17, 31)
    (1, 11, -6)
sage: xgcd(10, 115)
    (5, -11, 1)
```

This can also be called as a method on Integer objects

```python
sage: x = 300
sage: x.xgcd(36)
    (12, 1, -8)
```

**Example 6:** Sage includes robust support for working with finite fields and performing finite field arithmetic. To initialize a finite field with prime order, use the `GF` command passing the order as the parameter.

```python
sage: F = GF(2)
sage: F
    Finite Field of size 2
sage: F = GF(37)
sage: F
    Finite Field of size 37
sage: p = 95131
sage: K = GF(p)
sage: K
    Finite Field of size 95131
```

To initialize a field with a prime power order use the `GF` command with the following syntax (to keep track of the primitive element of the extension field.)

```python
sage: F.<a> = GF(128)
sage: F
    Finite Field in a of size 2^7
```

To do arithmetic in finite fields use the following syntax:

```python
sage: K = GF(37)
sage: a = K(3)
sage: b = K(18)
sage: a - b
    22
sage: a + b
    21
sage: a * b
    17
sage: a/b
    31
```
sage: a^-1
25
sage: 1/a
25

To do arithmetic in a finite field with a prime power order, specify elements using the primitive element:

sage: F.<a> = GF(128)
sage: b = a^2 + 1
sage: c = a^5 + a^3 + 1
sage: b - c
a^5 + a^3 + a^2
sage: b + c
a^5 + a^3 + a^2
sage: b*c
a^3 + a^2 + a
sage: b/c
a^5 + a^3 + a^2 + a
sage: b^-1
a^5 + a^3 + a
sage: 1/b
a^5 + a^3 + a

Example 7: With Sage you can create rings of polynomials over finite fields and do arithmetic with them. To create polynomial rings over finite fields do the following:

sage: R.<x> = GF(2)[]
sage: R
Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Finite Field of size 2 (using NTL)
sage: R.<x> = GF(101)[]
sage: R
Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Finite Field in a of size 2^7

After initializing a polynomial ring, you can then just perform arithmetic as you would expect:

sage: R.<x> = GF(2)[]
sage: f = x^3 + x + 1
sage: g = x^5 + x
sage: f + g
x^5 + x^3 + 1
sage: f*g
x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + x
Division is accomplished by the \texttt{quo\_rem} function:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: g.quo_rem(f)
(x^2 + 1, x^2 + 1)
\end{verbatim}

You can also compute the greatest common divisor:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: f.gcd(g)
1
sage: g.gcd(g^2)
x^5 + x
sage: R.<x> = GF(17)[]
sage: f = 3*x^3 + 2*x^2 + x
sage: g = x^2 + 5
sage: f - g
3*x^3 + x^2 + x + 12
sage: f * g
3*x^5 + 2*x^4 + 16*x^3 + 10*x^2 + 5*x
sage: f.quo_rem(g)
(3*x + 2, 3*x + 7)
\end{verbatim}

And computing gcvs in this polynomial ring we see:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: f.gcd(g)
1
sage: f.gcd(x^2 + x)
x
\end{verbatim}

When creating a Sage finite field with a prime power order, Sage finds an irreducible polynomial for you. For example:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: F.<a> = GF(32)
a^5 + a^2 + 1
\end{verbatim}

However, there are many irreducible polynomials over \texttt{GF}(2) of degree 5, such as \(x^5 + x^3 + 1\). Suppose that you want to create your own extension of the binary field with degree 5, and an irreducible polynomial of your choice. Then you can do so as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: R.<x> = GF(2)[]
sage: F = GF(2).extension(x^5 + x^3 + 1, 'a')
sage: a = F.gen()
\end{verbatim}

You need to do this last step to inject the primitive element into the interpreter’s name space. This is done automatically when using the \texttt{GF} function to create an extension field, but not when you use the member function \texttt{extension} on a field object.
Example 1: Simplified AES.

# These structures are the underlying
# Galois Field and corresponding Vector Space
# of the field used in the SAES algorithm
# These structures allow us to easily compute with these fields.

#
F = GF(2);
L.<a> = GF(2^4);
V = L.vector_space();
VF8 = VectorSpace(F, 8);
#
# The MixColumns and its Inverse matrices are stored
# as 2x2 matrices with elements in GF(2^4) (as are state matrices.)
# The MixColumns operation (and its inverse) are performed by
# matrix multiplication.
#
MixColumns_matrix = Matrix(L, [[1,a^2],[a^2,1]]);
InverseMixColumns_matrix = MixColumns_matrix.inverse();
SBox_matrix = Matrix(L,
    [[       1 + a^3,           a^2,           a + a^3, 1 + a + a^3],
    [ 1 + a^2 + a^3,             1,               a^3,     1 + a^2],
    [       a + a^2,             0,                 a,       1 + a],
    [ a^2 + a^3, a + a^2 + a^3, 1 + a + a^2 + a^3, 1 + a + a^2] ]);
InverseSBox_matrix = Matrix(L,
    [[ a + a^3,   1 + a^2,       1 + a^3,       1 + a + a^3],
    [ 1, 1 + a + a^2, a^3, 1 + a + a^2 + a^3],
    [ a + a^2,             0,                 a,       1 + a],
    [ a^2 + a^3, a^2, 1 + a^2 + a^3, a + a^2 + a^3] ]));
RCON = [
    VF8([F(0), F(0), F(0), F(0), F(0), F(0), F(0), F(1)]),
    VF8([F(0), F(0), F(0), F(0), F(1), F(1), F(0), F(0)]));
def SAES_ToStateMatrix(block):
    r"""
    Converts a bit list into an SAES state matrix.
    """
    B = block;
    # form the plaintext block into a matrix of GF(2^n) elements
    S00 = L(V([B[0], B[1], B[2], B[3]]));
    S01 = L(V([B[4], B[5], B[6], B[7]]));
    S10 = L(V([B[8], B[9], B[10], B[11]]));
    S11 = L(V([B[12], B[13], B[14], B[15]]));
    state_matrix = Matrix(L, [[S00, S01], [S10, S11]]);
    return state_matrix;

def SAES_FromStateMatrix(State Matrix):
    r"""
    Converts an SAES State Matrix to a bit list.
    """
    output = [];
    # convert State Matrix back into bit list
    for r in xrange(2):
        for c in xrange(2):
            v = V(State Matrix[r,c]);
            for j in xrange(4):
                output.append(Integer(v[j]));
    return output;

def SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix, K):
    r"""
    Adds a round key to an SAES state matrix.
    """
    K_matrix = SAES_ToStateMatrix(K);
    next_state_matrix = K_matrix + state_matrix;
    return next_state_matrix;

def SAES_MixColumns(state_matrix):
    r"""
    Performs the Mix Columns operation.
    """
    next_state_matrix = MixColumns_matrix*state_matrix;
    return next_state_matrix;
def SAES_InverseMixColumns(state_matrix):
    r""
    Performs the Inverse Mix Columns operation.
    ""
    next_state_matrix = InverseMixColumns_matrix* state_matrix;
    return next_state_matrix;

def SAES_ShiftRow(state_matrix):
    r""
    Performs the Shift Row operation.
    ""
    M = state_matrix;
    next_state_matrix = Matrix(L, [
        [M[0,0], M[0,1]],
        [M[1,1], M[1,0]]
    ]);  
    return next_state_matrix;

def SAES_SBox(nibble):
    r""
    Performs the SAES SBox look up in the SBox matrix (lookup table.)
    ""
    v = nibble._vector_();
    c = Integer(v[0]) + 2*Integer(v[1]);
    r = Integer(v[2]) + 2*Integer(v[3]);
    return SBox_matrix[r,c];

def SAES_NibbleSubstitution(state_matrix):
    r""
    Performs the SAES SBox on each element of an SAES state matrix.
    ""
    M = state_matrix;
    next_state_matrix = Matrix(L, [
        [ SAES_SBox(M[0,0]), SAES_SBox(M[0,1])],
        [ SAES_SBox(M[1,0]), SAES_SBox(M[1,1]) ]
    ]);  
    return next_state_matrix;

def SAES_InvSBox(nibble):
    r""
    Performs the SAES Inverse SBox look up in the SBox matrix (lookup table.)
    ""
    v = nibble._vector_();
    c = Integer(v[0]) + 2*Integer(v[1]);
    r = Integer(v[2]) + 2*Integer(v[3]);
    return InverseSBox_matrix[r,c];
def SAES_InvNibbleSub(state_matrix):
    r""
    Performs the SAES Inverse SBox on each element of an
    SAES state matrix.
    ""
    M = state_matrix;
    next_state_matrix = Matrix(L,
        [ [ SAES_InvSBox(M[0,0]), SAES_InvSBox(M[0,1])],
          [ SAES_InvSBox(M[1,0]), SAES_InvSBox(M[1,1]) ] ];
    return next_state_matrix;

def RotNib(w):
    r""
    Splits an 8 bit list into two elements of GF(2^4)
    ""
    N_0 = L(V([w[j] for j in xrange(4)]));
    N_1 = L(V([w[j] for j in xrange(4,8)]));
    return (N_1, N_0);

def SAES_g(w, i):
    r""
    Performs the SAES g function on the 8 bit list w.
    ""
    (N0, N1) = RotNib(w);
    N0 = V(SAES_SBox(N0));
    N1 = V(SAES_SBox(N1));
    temp1 = VF8([ N0[0], N0[1], N0[2], N0[3],
                  N1[0], N1[1], N1[2], N1[3] ] );
    output = temp1 + RCON[i];
    return output;

def SAES_KeyExpansion(K):
    r""
    Expands an SAES key into two round keys.
    ""
    w0 = VF8([K[j] for j in xrange(8)]);
    w1 = VF8([K[j] for j in xrange(8,16)]);
    w2 = w0 + SAES_g(w1, 0);
    w3 = w1 + w2;
    w4 = w2 + SAES_g(w3, 1);
    w5 = w3 + w4;
    K0 = [w0[j] for j in xrange(8)];
    K0.extend([w1[j] for j in xrange(8)]);
    K1 = [w2[j] for j in xrange(8)];
    K1.extend([w3[j] for j in xrange(8)]);
K2 = [w4[j] for j in xrange(8)];
K2.extend([w4[j] for j in xrange(8)]);
return (K0, K1, K2);

# Encrypts one plaintext block with key K
#
def SAES_Encrypt(plaintext, K):
    r""
    Performs a SAES encryption on a single plaintext block.
    (Both block and key passed as bit lists.)
    """
    # get the key schedule
    (K0, K1, K2) = SAES_KeyExpansion(K);
    state_matrix0 = SAES_ToStateMatrix(plaintext);
    state_matrix1 = SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix0, K0);
    state_matrix2 = SAES_NibbleSubstitution(state_matrix1);
    state_matrix3 = SAES_ShiftRow(state_matrix2);
    state_matrix4 = SAES_MixColumns(state_matrix3);
    state_matrix5 = SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix4, K1);
    state_matrix6 = SAES_NibbleSubstitution(state_matrix5);
    state_matrix7 = SAES_ShiftRow(state_matrix6);
    state_matrix8 = SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix7, K2);
    output = SAES_FromStateMatrix(state_matrix8);
    return output;

# Decrypts one ciphertext block with key K
#
def SAES_Decrypt(ciphertext, K):
    r""
    Performs a single SAES decryption operation on a ciphertext block.
    (Both block and key passed as bit lists.)
    """
    # perform key expansion
    (K0, K1, K2) = SAES_KeyExpansion(K);
# form the ciphertext block into a matrix of GF(2^n) elements
state_matrix0 = SAES_ToStateMatrix(ciphertext);
state_matrix1 = SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix0, K2);
state_matrix2 = SAES_ShiftRow(state_matrix1);
state_matrix3 = SAES_InvNibbleSub(state_matrix2);
state_matrix4 = SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix3, K1);
state_matrix5 = SAES_InverseMixColumns(state_matrix4);
state_matrix6 = SAES_ShiftRow(state_matrix5);
state_matrix7 = SAES_InvNibbleSub(state_matrix6);
state_matrix8 = SAES_AddRoundKey(state_matrix7, K0);
output = SAES_FromStateMatrix(state_matrix8);
return output;

---

### B.6 CHAPTER 6: PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATION AND STREAM CIPHERS

**Example 1: Blum Blum Shub RNG**

```python
def BlumBlumShub_Initialize(bitlen, seed):
    """
    Initializes a Blum-Blum-Shub RNG State.
    A BBS-RNG State is a list with two elements:
    [N, X]
    N is a 2*bitlen modulus (product of two primes)
    X is the current state of the PRNG.
    INPUT:
    - bitlen - the bit length of each of the prime factors of n
    - seed - a large random integer to start out the prng
    OUTPUT:
    - state - a BBS-RNG internal state
    """

    # note that this is not the most cryptographically secure
```

---
# way to generate primes, because we do not know how the
# internal sage random_prime function works.

p = 3;
while (p < 2^(bitlen-1)) or (3 != (p % 4)):
    p = random_prime(2^bitlen);
q = 3;
while (q < 2^(bitlen-1)) or (3 != (q % 4)):
    q = random_prime(2^bitlen);
N = p*q;
X = (seed^2 % N)
state = [N, X]
return state;

def BlumBlumShub_Generate(num_bits, state):
    """Blum-Blum-Shum random number generation function.
    INPUT:
    num_bits - the number of bits (iterations) to
generate with this RNG.
    state - an internal state of the BBS-RNG (a
    list [N, X].)
    OUTPUT:
    random_bits - a num_bits length list of random
    bits.
    """
    random_bits = [];
    N = state[0]
    X = state[1]
    for j in xrange(num_bits):
        X = X^2 % N
        random_bits.append(X % 2)
    # update the internal state
    state[1] = X;
    return random_bits;

Example 2: Linear Congruential RNG

def LinearCongruential_Initialize(a, c, m, X0):
This functional initializes a linear congruential RNG state.

This state is a list of four integers: [a, c, m, X]
a, c, m are the parameters of the linear congruential instantiation X is the current state of the PRNG.

INPUT:
   a - The coefficient
   c - The offset
   m - The modulus
   X0 - The initial state

OUTPUT:
   state - The initial internal state of the RNG

return [a, c, m, X0]

def LinearCongruential_Generate(state):
   """
   Generates a single linear congruential RNG output and updates the state.
   INPUT:
   state - an internal RNG state.
   OUTPUT:
   X - a single output of the linear congruential RNG.
   """
   a = state[0]
c = state[1]
m = state[2]
X = state[3]
X_next = (a*X + c) % m
state[3] = X_next
return X_next

Example 1: Chinese Remainder Theorem.

def chinese_remainder_theorem(moduli, residues):
   """
Function that implements the Chinese Remainder Theorem.

**INPUT:**

- `moduli` - list or positive integers.
- `residues` - list of remainders such that remainder at position `j` results when divided by the corresponding modulus at position `j` in `moduli`.

**OUTPUT:**

- `x` - integer such that division by `moduli[j]` gives remainder `residue[j]`.

```python
if (len(moduli) != len(residues)):
    raise ValueError, "expected len(moduli) == len(residues)"

M = prod(moduli);
for j in xrange(len(moduli)):
    Mj = moduli[j]
    Mpr = M/Mj
    (Mj_Mpr_gcd, Mpr_inv, Mj_inv) = xgcd(Mpr, Mj)
    Mpr_inv = Mpr_inv
    if (Mj_Mpr_gcd != 1):
        raise ValueError, "Expected all moduli are coprime."
    x += residues[j]*Mpr*Mpr_inv;

return x;
```

**Example 2:** Miller Rabin Primality Test.

```python
r""
EXAMPLES:
sage: MILLER_RABIN_TEST(101)
False
sage: MILLER_RABIN_TEST(592701729979)
True
"""```
def MILLER_RABIN_TEST(n):
    r"""
    This function implements the Miller-Rabin Test. It either returns "inconclusive" or "composite."
    INPUT:
    n - positive integer to probabilistically determine the primality of.
    OUTPUT:
    If the function returns False, then the test was inconclusive.
    If the function returns True, then the test was conclusive and n is composite.
    """
    R = IntegerModRing(n); # object for integers mod n
    # (1) Find integers k, q w/ k > 0 and q odd so that
    # (n-1) == 2^k * q
    q = n-1
    k = 0
    while (1 == (q % 2)):
        k += 1
        q = q.quo_rem(2)[0] # q/2 but with result of type Integer
    # (2) select random a in 1 < a < n-1
    a = randint(1,n-1)
    a = R(a) # makes it so modular exponentiation is done fast
    # if a^q mod n == 1 then return inconclusive
    if (1 == a^q):
        return False
    # (3) for j = 0 to k-1 do: if a^(2^j * q) mod n = n-1 return inconclusive
    e = q
    for j in xrange(k):
        if (n-1) == (a^e):
            return False
        e = 2*e
    # (4) if you've made it here return composite.
Example 3: Modular Exponentiation (Square and Multiply).

def ModExp(x,e,N):
    r""
    Calculates x^e mod N using square and multiply.
    INPUT:
    x - an integer.
    e - a nonnegative integer.
    N - a positive integer modulus.
    OUTPUT:
    y - x^e mod N
    ""
    e_bits = e.bits()
    e_bitlen = len(e_bits)
    y = 1
    for j in xrange(e_bitlen):
        y = y^2 % N
        if (1 == e_bits[e_bitlen-1-j]):
            y = x*y % N
    return y

Example 4: Using built-in Sage functionality for CRT.

Sage has built in functions to perform the Chinese Remainder Theorem. There are several functions that produce a wide array of CRT functionality. The simplest function performs the CRT with two modulii. Specifically CRT (or the lowercase crt) when called as:

crt(a,b,m,n)

will return a number that is simultaneously congruent to a mod m and b mod n. All parameters are assumed to be Integers and the parameters m, n must be relatively prime. Some examples of this function are:

sage: CRT(8, 16, 17, 49)
-3120
sage: CRT(1,2,5,7)
16
sage: CRT(50,64,101,127)
-62166

If you want to perform the CRT with a list of residues and moduli, Sage includes the function CRT_list.
CRT_list(v, modulii)

requires that v and modulii be lists of Integers of the same length. Furthermore, the elements of modulii must be relatively prime. Then the output is an integer that reduces to v[i] mod modulii[i] (for i in range(len(v))). For example, the last call to CRT would have been

```
sage: CRT_list([50, 64], [101, 127])
1969
```

Note that this answer is different. However, you can check that both answers satisfy the requirements of the CRT. Here are examples with longer lists:

```
sage: CRT_list([8, 20, 13], [49, 101, 127])
608343
sage: CRT_list([10, 11, 12, 13, 14], [29, 31, 37, 41, 43])
36657170
```

The function CRT_basis can be used to precompute the values associated to the given set of modulii. If modulii is a list of relatively prime modulii, then CRT_basis(modulii) returns a list a. This list a is such that if x is a list of residues of the modulii, then the output of the CRT can be found by summing:

\[ a[0]*x[0] + a[1]*x[1] + \ldots + a[len(a)-1]*x[len(a)-1] \]

In the case of the modulii used in the last call to CRT_list this function returns as follows:

```
sage: CRT_basis([29, 31, 37, 41, 43])
[32354576, 20808689, 23774055, 17163708, 23184311]
```

The last CRT function that Sage provides is CRT_vectors. This function performs CRT_list on several different lists (with the same set of modulii) and returns a list of the simultaneous answers. It is efficient in that it uses CRT_basis and does not recompute those values for each list. For example:

```
sage: CRT_vectors([[1, 10], [2, 11], [3, 12], [4, 13], [5, 14]],
                [29, 31, 37, 41, 43])
[36657161, 36657170]
```

**Example 5:** Using built-in Sage functionality for Modular Exponentiation.

Sage can perform modular exponentiation using fast algorithms (like square and multiply) and without allowing the intermediate computations to become huge. This is done through IntegerModRing objects. Specifically, creating an IntegerModRing object indicates that arithmetic should be done with a modulus. Then you cast your integers in this ring to indicate that all arithmetic should be done with the modulus. Then for elements of this ring, exponentiation is done efficiently. For example:

```
sage: R = IntegerModRing(101)
```
Creating an IntegerModRing is similar to creating a FiniteField with GF(...) except that the modulus can be a general composite.

**Example 6:** Using built-in Sage functionality for Euler’s totient.

Sage has the Euler totient functionality built in. The function is called euler_phi because of the convention of using the Greek letter phi to represent this function. The operation of this function is simple. Just call euler_phi on an integer and it computes the totient function. This function factors the input, and hence requires exponential time.

```sage
euler_phi(101)
100

euler_phi(1024)
512

euler_phi(333)
216

euler_phi(125)
100

euler_phi(423)
276
```

**Example 1:** Using Sage we can simulate an RSA encryption and decryption.

```sage
# randomly select some prime numbers
p = random_prime(1000); p
191
```
sage: q = random_prime(1000); q
601
sage: # compute the modulus
sage: N = p*q
sage: R = IntegerModRing(N)
sage: phi_N = (p-1)*(q-1)
sage: # we can choose the encrypt key to be anything
sage: # relatively prime to phi_N
sage: e = 17
sage: gcd(d, phi_N)
1
sage: # the decrypt key is the multiplicative inverse
sage: # of d mod phi_N
sage: d = xgcd(d, phi_N)[1] % phi_N
sage: d
60353
sage: # Now we will encrypt/decrypt some random 7 digit numbers
sage: P = randint(1,127); P
97
sage: # encrypt
sage: C = R(P)^e; C
46685
sage: # decrypt
sage: R(C)^d
97

sage: P = randint(1,127); P
46
sage: # encrypt
sage: C = R(P)^e; C
75843
sage: # decrypt
sage: R(C)^d
46

sage: P = randint(1,127); P
3
sage: # encrypt
sage: C = R(P)^e; C
288
sage: # decrypt
sage: R(C)^d
3

Also, Sage can just as easily do much larger numbers:
sage: p = random_prime(1000000000); p
Example 2: In Sage, we can also see an example of RSA signing/verifying.

```python
sage: p = random_prime(10000); p
1601
sage: q = random_prime(10000); q
4073
sage: N = p*q
sage: R = IntegerModRing(N)
sage: phi_N = (p-1)*(q-1)
1
sage: e = 47
sage: gcd(e, phi_N)
1
sage: d = xgcd(e, phi_N)[1] % phi_N
sage: # Now by exponentiating with the private key
sage: # we are effectively signing the data
sage: # a few examples of this
sage: to_sign = randint(2,2^10); to_sign
650
sage: signed = R(to_sign)^d; signed
2910116
sage: signed == to_sign^e
True
sage: to_sign = randint(2,2^10); to_sign
362
sage: signed = R(to_sign)^d; signed
546132
sage: signed == to_sign^e
True
```
Example 1: Here is an example of Alice and Bob performing a Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange done in Sage:

```sage
sage: # Alice and Bob agree on the domain parameters:
sage: p = 619
sage: F = GF(p)
sage: g = F(2)
sage: # Alice picks a random value x in 1...618
sage: x = randint(1,618); x
571
sage: # Alice computes X = g^x and sends this to Bob
sage: X = g^571; X
591
sage: # Bob picks a random value y in 1...618
sage: y = randint(1,618);y
356
sage: # Bob computes Y = g^y and sends this to Alice
sage: Y = g^356; Y
199
sage: # Alice computes Y^x
sage: Y^x
563
sage: # Bob computes X^y
sage: X^y
563
sage: # Alice and Bob now share a secret value
```

Example 2: In reality to prevent what is known as small subgroup attacks, the prime $p$ is chosen so that $p - 2q + 1$ where $p$ is a prime as well.

```sage
sage: q = 761
sage: p = 2*q + 1
sage: is_prime(q)
True
```
\begin{verbatim}
Example 3: Sage has a significant amount of support for elliptic curves. This functionality can be very useful when learning, because it allows you to easily calculate things and get the big picture. Doing the examples by hand may cause you to get mired in the details. First you instantiate an elliptic curve, by specifying the field that it is over, and the coefficients of the defining Weierstrass equation. For this purpose, we write the Weierstrass equation as
\[
y^2 + a_1xy + a_3y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6
\]
Then the Sage function `EllipticCurve(R, [a1, a2, a3, a4, a6])` creates the elliptic curve over the ring R.

```python
sage: E = EllipticCurve(GF(17), [1,2,3,4,5])
sage: E
Elliptic Curve defined by y^2 + x*y + 3*y = x^3 + 2*x^2 + 4*x + 5 over Finite Field of size 17
sage: E = EllipticCurve(GF(29), [0,0,0,1,1])
sage: E
Elliptic Curve defined by y^2 = x^3 + x + 1 over Finite Field of size 29
```
Example 4: Koblitz curves. A Koblitz curve is an elliptic curve over a binary field defined by an equation of the form

\[ y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + 1 \]

where \( a = 0 \) or \( 1 \). FIPS 186-3 recommends a number of Koblitz curves for use with the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). Here we give an example of a curve of similar form to the Koblitz curves:

```python
sage: F.<theta> = GF(2^17)
sage: E = EllipticCurve(F,[1,0,0,theta,1])
sage: E
Elliptic Curve defined by y^2 + y = x^3 + theta* x^2 = 1
over Finite Field in theta of size 2^17
```

Example 5: Sage can even easily instantiate curves of cryptographic sizes, like K163, which is one of the FIPS 186-3 curves.

```python
sage: F.<theta> = GF(2^163)
sage: E = EllipticCurve(F, [1,0,0,1,1])
sage: E
Elliptic Curve defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + x^2 + 1
over Finite Field in theta of size 2^163
```

However, you should be careful that when instantiating a curve of cryptographic sizes, some of the functions on the curve object will not work because they require exponential time to run. While you can compute some things with these objects, it is best to leave your experimentation to the smaller sized curves.

You can calculate some values of the curve, such as the number of points:

```python
sage: E = EllipticCurve(GF(107), [0,0,0,2,17])
sage: E.order()
108
```

You can also determine the generators of a curve:

```python
sage: E = EllipticCurve(GF(101), [0,0,0,1,0])
sage: E.gens()
((7 : 42 : 1), (36 : 38 : 1))
```
Note that this output is printed \((x : y : z)\). This is a minor technical consideration because Sage stores points in what is known as “projective coordinates.” The precise meaning is not important, because for non-infinite points the value \(z\) will always be 1 and the first two values in a coordinate will be the \(x\) and \(y\) coordinates, exactly as you would expect. This representation is useful because it allows the point at infinity to be specified as a point with the \(z\) coordinate equal to 0:

\[
\text{sage: } E(0) \\
(0 : 1 : 0)
\]

This shows how you can recognize a point at infinity as well as specify it. If you want to get the \(x\) and \(y\) coordinates out of a point on the curve, you can do so as follows:

\[
\text{sage: } P = E().random_point(); P \\
(62 : 38 : 1) \\
\text{sage: } (x,y) = P.xy(); (x,y) \\
(62, 38)
\]

You can specify a point on the curve by casting an ordered pair to the curve as:

\[
\text{sage: } P = E((62, -38)); P \\
(62 : 63 : 1)
\]

Now that you can find the generators on a curve and specify points you can experiment with these points and do arithmetic as well. Continuing to use \(E\) as the curve instantiated in the previous example, we can set \(G1\) and \(G2\) to the generators:

\[
\text{sage: } (G1, G2) = E().gens() \\
\text{sage: } P = E().random_point(); P \\
(49 : 29 : 1)
\]

You can compute the sum of two points as in the following examples:

\[
\text{sage: } G1 + G2 + P \\
(69 : 96 : 1) \\
\text{sage: } G1 + P \\
(40 : 62 : 1) \\
\text{sage: } P + P + G2 \\
(84 : 25 : 1)
\]

You can compute the inverse of a point using the unary minus \((-)\) operator:

\[
\text{sage: } -P \\
(49 : 72 : 1) \\
\text{sage: } -G1 \\
(7 : 59 : 1)
\]

You can also compute repeated point addition (adding a point to itself many times) with the \(*\) operator:

\[
\text{sage: } 13*G1
\]
And for curves over small finite fields you can also compute the order (discrete log of the point at infinity with respect to that point).

Example 6: Using the Sage elliptic curve functionality to perform a simulated elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange.
However, in practice most curves that are used have a prime order:

```
sage: # Calculate the domain parameters
sage: F = GF(101)
sage: E = EllipticCurve(F, [0, 0, 0, 25, 7])
sage: G = E((97,34))
sage: q = E.order()
sage: # Alice computes a secret values x in 2...q-1
sage: x = randint(2,q-1)
sage: # Alice computes a public value X = x*G
sage: X = x*G
sage: # Bob computes a secret value y in 2...q-1
sage: y = randint(2,q-1)
sage: # Bob computes a public value Y = y*G
sage: Y = y*G
sage: # Alice computes the shared secret value
sage: x*Y
(23 : 15 : 1)
sage: # Bob computes the shared secret value
sage: y*X
(23 : 15 : 1)
```

**Example 1:** The following is an example of the MASH hash function in Sage. MASH is a function based on the use of modular arithmetic. It involves use of an RSA-like modulus M, whose bit length affects the security. M should be difficult to factor, and for M of unknown factorization, the security is based in part on the difficulty of extracting modular roots. M also determines the block size for processing messages. In essence, MASH is defined as:

\[ H_i = ((x_i \oplus H_{i-1})^2 \text{OR} H_{i-1}) \pmod{M} \]

where

- A = 0xFF00...00
- \( H_{i-1} \) = the largest prime less than M
- \( x_i \) = the \( i \)th digit of the base \( M \) expansion of input \( n \). That is, we express \( n \) as a number of base \( M \). Thus:

\[ n = x_0 + x_1 M + x_2 M^2 + \ldots \]

The following is an example of the MASH hash function in Sage

```python
# This function generates a mash modulus
# takes a bit length, and returns a Mash
# modulus l or l-1 bits long (if n is odd)
```
APPENDIX B / SAGE EXAMPLES

# returns p, q, and the product N
#
def generate_mash_modulus(l):
    m = l.quo_rem(2)[0]
    p = 1
    while (p < 2^(m-1)):
        p = random_prime(2^m)
    q = 1
    while (q < 2^(m-1)):
        q = random_prime(2^m)
    N = p*q
    return (N, p, q)

#
# Mash Hash
# the value n is the data to be hashed.
# the value N is the modulus
# Returns the hash value.
#
def MASH(n, N):
    H = previous_prime(N)
    q = n
    while (0 != q):
        (q, a) = q.quo_rem(N)
        H = ((H+a)^2 + H) % N
    return H

The output of these functions running:
sage: data = ZZ(randint(1,2^1000))
sage: (N, p, q) = generate_mash_modulus(20)
sage: MASH(data, N)
220874
sage: (N, p, q) = generate_mash_modulus(50)
sage: MASH(data, N)
455794413217080
sage: (N, p, q) = generate_mash_modulus(100)
sage: MASH(data, N)
268864504538508517754648285037
sage: data = ZZ(randint(1,2^1000))
sage: MASH(data, N)
236862581074736881919296071248
Example 1: Using Sage, we can perform a DSA sign and verify:

```sage
sage: # First we generate the domain parameters
sage: # Generate a 16 bit prime q
sage: q = 1;
sage: while (q < 2^15): q = random_prime(2^16)
   ....:
sage: q
   42697
sage: # Generate a 64 bit p, such that q divides (p-1)
sage: p = 1
sage: while (not is_prime(p)):
   ....: p = (2^48 + randint(1,2^46)*2)*q + 1
   ....:
sage: p
   12797003281321319017
sage: # Generate h and g
sage: h = randint(2,p-2)
sage: h
   5751574539220326847
sage: F = GF(p)
sage: g = F(h)^((p-1)/q)
sage: g
   9670562682258945855
sage: # Generate a user public / private key
sage: # private key
sage: x = randint(2,q-1)
sage: x
   20499
sage: # public key
sage: y = F(g)^x
sage: y
   7955052828197610751
sage: # Sign and verify a random value
sage: H = randint(2,p-1)
sage: # Signing
sage: # random blinding value
```

B.11 / DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Example 1: Using Sage, we can perform a DSA sign and verify:

```sage
sage: # First we generate the domain parameters
sage: # Generate a 16 bit prime q
sage: q = 1;
sage: while (q < 2^15): q = random_prime(2^16)
   ....:
sage: q
   42697
sage: # Generate a 64 bit p, such that q divides (p-1)
sage: p = 1
sage: while (not is_prime(p)):
   ....: p = (2^48 + randint(1,2^46)*2)*q + 1
   ....:
sage: p
   12797003281321319017
sage: # Generate h and g
sage: h = randint(2,p-2)
sage: h
   5751574539220326847
sage: F = GF(p)
sage: g = F(h)^((p-1)/q)
sage: g
   9670562682258945855
sage: # Generate a user public / private key
sage: # private key
sage: x = randint(2,q-1)
sage: x
   20499
sage: # public key
sage: y = F(g)^x
sage: y
   7955052828197610751
sage: # Sign and verify a random value
sage: H = randint(2,p-1)
sage: # Signing
sage: # random blinding value
```
sage: k = randint(2,q-1)
sage: r = F(g)^k % q
sage: r = F(g)^k
sage: r = r.lift() % q
sage: r
6805
sage: kinv = xgcd(k,q)[1] % q
sage: s = kinv*(H + x*r) % q
sage: s
26026
sage: # Verifying
sage: w = xgcd(s,q)[1]; w
12250
sage: u1 = H*w % q; u1
6694
sage: u2 = r*w % q; u2
16706
sage: v = F(g)^u1 * F(y)^u2
sage: v = v.lift() % q
sage: v
6805
sage: v == r
True

sage: # Sign and verify another random value
sage: H = randint(2,p-1)
sage: k = randint(2,q-1)
sage: r = F(g)^k
sage: r = r.lift() % q
sage: r
3284
sage: kinv = xgcd(k,q)[1] % q
sage: s = kinv*(H + x*r) % q
sage: s
2330
sage: # Verifying
sage: w = xgcd(s,q)[1]; w
4343
sage: u1 = H*w % q; u1
32191
sage: u2 = r*w % q; u2
1614
sage: v = F(g)^u1 * F(y)^u2
sage: v = v.lift() % q
sage: v
Example 2: The following functions implement DSA domain parameter generation, key generation, and DSA Signing:

```
# Generates a 16 bit q and 64 bit p, both prime
# such that q divides p-1
#
def DSA_generate_domain_parameters():
    g = 1
    while (1 == g):
        # first find a q
        q = 1
        while (q < 2^15): q = random_prime(2^16)
        # next find a p
        p = 1
        while (not is_prime(p)):
            p = (2^47 + randint(1,2^45)*2)*q + 1
        F = GF(p)
        h = randint(2,p-1)
        g = (F(h)^((p-1)/q)).lift()
    return (p, q, g)

# Generates a users private and public key
# given domain parameters p, q, and g
#
def DSA_generate_keypair(p, q, g):
    x = randint(2,q-1)
    F = GF(p)
    y = F(g)^x
    y = y.lift()
    return (x,y)
```

# Given domain parameters p, q and g
# as well as a secret key x
# and a hash value H
# this performs the DSA signing algorithm
#
def DSA_sign(p, q, g, x, H):
    k = randint(2,q-1)
    F = GF(p)
    r = F(g)^k
    r = r.lift() % q
    kinv = xgcd(k,q)[1] % q
    s = kinv*(H + x*r) % q
    return (r, s)
In matters of this kind everyone feels he is justified in writing and publishing the first thing that comes into his head when he picks up a pen, and thinks his own idea as axiomatic as the fact that two and two make four. If critics would go to the trouble of thinking about the subject for years on end and testing each conclusion against the actual history of war, as I have done, they would undoubtedly be more careful of what they wrote.

—On War Carl von Clausewitz

ABBREVIATIONS

ACM Association for Computing Machinery
IBM International Business Machines Corporation
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

REFERENCES


REFERENCES

ELGA84  Elgamal, T. A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms.” Proceedings, Crypto 84, 1984.


REFERENCES


MITC92 Mitchell, C.; Piper, F.; and Wild, P. “Digital Signatures.” in [SIMM92].


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
REFERENCES


RUEP92 Rueppel, T. “Stream Ciphers.” In [SIMM92].


REFERENCES


Abelian groups, 117, 309–310
Access control, 20–21
Access point (AP), IEEE 802.11, 526, 528
Active attacks, 15–19
Add key (AK) function, S-AES, 184–186
AddRoundKey transformation, AES, 150–151, 153–155, 165–166
Administrators, identity management, 474
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 67, 102, 132–133, 147–191
AddRoundKey transformation, 150–151, 153–155, 165–166
arithmetic operations for, 148–150
avalanche effect, 170–174
data structures, 152, 184
decryption (inverse), 153–155, 174–176, 183–188
8-bit processor implementation, 175–176
decryption, 153–155, 183–188
equivalent inverse cipher of, 174–175
finite fields of, 102, 132–133, 148–150
implementation, 174–178
interchanging decryption rounds for, 174–175
polynomial arithmetic with GF(2^8), 180–183
S-boxes, 156–161, 188–191
ShiftRows transformation, 150, 153–155, 161–162
simplified (S-AES), 183–191
State array of, 150, 155
time complexity of, 297–299
transformation functions, 155–166, 182
12-bit processor implementation, 177–178
AES, see Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
AKS (deterministic primality) algorithm, 254
Alert codes, 489, 494–495, 554–555
AES key expansion, 166–170
AKS (deterministic primality) algorithm, 254
big-O notation for, 297–299
Blowfish, 95–96
Brum Blum Shub (BBS) generator, 227–228
cryptographic, 2–3, 33, 357–560, 595–597
data authentication (DA), 380–381
data encryption (DEA), 88–89
data integrity, 8, 327–409
decryption, 33
DES key schedule, 96
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, 302–304
digital signature (DS), 403–406
division, 104–105
equation, 33
ESP, 629
Euclidian, 105–107, 112–115, 128–129
exponential, 299
Feistel decryption, 75–77
Hill, 47–49
HMAC, 377–378
linear congruential number generators, 226–227
linear, 299
Miller-Rabin, 252–254
polynomial, 299
principally random number generation (PRNG), 222, 225–228
RSA, 277–291, 296–297
S-AES key expansion, 188–189
S/MIME, 595–597
time complexity of, 297–299
WTLS, 557–560
American National Standard (ANS), 196
ANSI X9.17 PRNG, 231–232
Anti-replay service, ESP, 630
Asymmetric ciphers, 8, 243–299, 300–326, 422–424, 470–472
big-O notation, 297–299
Diffe-Hellman key exchange, 301–305, 318–319
ElGamal cryptographic system, 305–308
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), 308–320, 323
encryption, 8, 269–277, 422–424
number theory, 243–265
principally random number generation (PRNG), 321–323
public-key cryptography, 266–299, 300–326
symmetric key distribution, 422–424
time complexity of algorithms, 297–299
user authentication (remote) using, 470–472
Asymmetric keys, 268
active, 15–19
chosen ciphertext (CCA), 36, 285, 289–291
chosen plaintext, 36–37
cryptanalytic, 33, 35–38, 89–92, 277, 340–341, 375
denial of service, 16–17
DES, on, 89–92, 195–196
differential cryptanalysis, 90–92
digital signatures and, 398–399
hash function security and, 337–341
linear cryptanalysis, 92
masquerade, 16
mathematical, 285–287
meet-in-the-middle, 195–196, 305, 342
modification of messages, 16
passive, 15–17
password, 466
release of message contents, 16
replay, 16, 447–448, 450
RSA security and, 285–291
threats and, 15
timing, 89, 285, 287–289
traffic analysis, 16
Attribute service, 474
See also Message authentication codes (MAC)
data-origin, 20–21
federated identity management, 472–478
IEEE 802.11 phase, 531, 534–536
IKE key determination, 641–642
Internet Protocol (IP), 636
Kerberos, 452–469
key exchange client and server, SSL, 498–500
mutual, 447–451, 470–471
one-way, 448, 451–452, 471–472
peer entity, 20–21
pretty good privacy (PGP), 570–573, 579–580
protocols, 8
Authentication (Continued)
security services, 20–21
timestamp, 447–448, 579–580
user, 444–484
WTLS, 557–558
Authenticated encryption (AE), 383–389
approaches of, 383–384
cipher block chaining–message (CCM) authentication code, 384–386
counter (CTR) mode with, 384–389
Galois counter–message (GCM) authentication code, 386–389
Authentication server (AS), Kerberos, 454–455, 458, 460, 467
Autokey system, 51
Availability of service, 10–13, 22
Avalanche effect, 86–87, 170–174

B
Base-64 (radix-64) transfer encoding, 593
Basic service set (BSS), IEEE 802.11, 525–526
Big-O notation, 297–299
Bijection, defined, 255
Binary operator, 108
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode for, 341–342
collision resistant requirements for, 338–340
duplications and, 359–360
inequality of, 359
mathematical basis of, 356–361
overlap between two sets, 360–361
paradox, 338, 357–358
Bit independence criterion (BIC), 94
Bit-by-bit exclusive-OR (XOR) hash function, 333–335
Block ciphers, 35, 66–100, 192–217, 229–232, 380–383
ANSI X9.17 PRNG, 231–232
cipher block chaining–message (CCM) authentication code, 381–383
cipher feedback (CFB) mode, 203–204
cipher suites, TLS, 505
ANSI X9.17 PRNG, 231–232
cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC), 381–383
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, 201–203
cipher feedback (CFB) mode, 203–204
conversion to stream ciphers (modes), 203–209
counter (CTR) mode, 203, 206–209, 229–231
data authentication algorithm (DAA), 380–381
Data Encryption Standard (DES), 67–68, 77–96
electronic code book (ECB) mode, 198–200
Feistel, 68–77
message authentication codes (MAC) based on, 380–383
multiple DES encryption, 193–198
operation, 192–217
output feedback (OFB) mode, 203, 205–206, 229–230
pseudo-random number generation (PRNG) using, 229–232
Shannon diffusion/confusion concepts, 72–73,
stream ciphers and, 68–69, 203–209
substitution/permutation network (SPN), 72–75
XTS-AES mode for storage encryption, 210–214
Blowfish, 95–96
Blum Blum Shub (BBS) number generator, 227–228
birthday paradox, 338–340
Caesar cipher example of, 40–41
collision resistant, 338–340
collision resistant paradox, 338–340
collision resistant requirements for, 338–340
collision resistant requirements for, 338–340
message authentication code (MAC), 374–375
preimage, 338
RSA algorithms and, 258
C
Caesar cipher, 39–41
Canonical form, MIME and S/MIME, 593
Certificates, 268, 427–439, 498–500, 505–506, 600–603
authority (CA), 430–434, 437, 601
enhanced security services, 603
end entity, 437
key and policy information, 436
key distribution and, 427–439
path constraints, 437
public-key, 268, 427–429
public-key infrastructure (PKI), 437–439
registration authority (RA), 438
repository, 438
revocation lists (CRL), 434–435, 438, 600
S/MIME, 600–603
SSL messages for key exchange, 498–500
subject and issuer attributes, 436–437
TLS client types, 505–506
user, 432–434, 601
VeriSign, 601–603
X.509, 429–439
Certificates-only message, S/MIME, 600
Change Cipher Spec Protocol, 489, 493–494, 500, 553–554
Channels, SSH, 515–516
Chinese remainder theorem, 254–257
Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA), 36, 285, 289–291
Chosen plaintext attack, 36–37. See also Differential
Differential cryptanalysis
CIA triad, 10–11
Cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC), 381–383
Cipher block chaining–message (CCM) authentication code, 384–386
Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, 201–203, 334–335, 341–342, 465, 483–484
cipher block use of, 201–203
hash functions based on, 334–335, 341–342
propagating (PCBC), Kerberos, 465, 483–484
Cipher feedback (CFB) mode, 203–204
Cipher suites, TLS, 505
block, 35, 66–100, 192–217
Caesar, 39–41
equivalent inverse, AES, 174–176
Hill, 46–49
monoalphabetic, 41–44
Playfair, 44–46
polyalphabetic, 49–52
rail fence, 53–54
stream, 35, 68–69, 218–241
substitution techniques, 38–53
transposition techniques, 53–55
Vernam, 51–52
Vigenere, 49–51
Ciphertext, 32–33, 36–53, 271
asymmetric encryption, 271
brute-force attacks, 36–37
substitution techniques using, 38–53
symmetric encryption, 32–33, 36–53
Ciphertext-stealing technique, 213–214
Clear signing, S/MIME, 599–600
Client/server authentication, Kerberos, 457–460, 467
Coefficient set of integers (S), 123
Collision, hash functions, 335–336, 338–340
Commutative ring, 118
Compression, 340–341, 491, 573–574
hash function (f), 340–341
PGP, 573–574
SSL, 491
Computational resistance, MAC security, 374–375
Confidentiality, 10–12, 20–21, 571–573, 629, 636
connection and connectionless, 20
data, 10, 20–21
Internet Protocol (IP), 629, 636
pretty good privacy (PGP), 571–573
privacy and, 10
selective-field, 20
traffic flow (TFC), 20, 629
Confusion concept, 72–73
Congruent modulo (mod n), 108, 257–259
Connection, SSL, 489
Connection confidentiality and integrity, 20
Connection Protocol, SSH, 509, 514–518
Connectionless confidentiality and integrity, 20
Constant polynomial, 123
Cookie exchange, 640–641
Counter (CTR) mode, 203, 206–209, 229–231, 384–389
authenticated encryption (AE) using, 384–389
block to stream cipher conversion, 203, 206–209
cipher block chaining-message (CCM) authentication code, 384–386
Galois counter–message (GCM) authentication code, 386–389
pseudorandom number generation (PRNG), 229–231
Cryptanalysis, 33, 35–38, 89–92, 277, 340–341, 375
Data Encryption Standard (DES) and, 89–92
differential, 89–92
encryption and, 33, 35–38
hash functions, 340–341
linear, 92
message authentication code (MAC), 375
public-key, 277
Cryptographic algorithms, 2–3. See also Algorithms
Cryptographic checksum, 369–372. See also Message authentication code (MAC)
Cryptographic computations, 500–501, 506
Cryptographic systems, see Ciphers
Cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator (CSPRBG), 228
Cryptography, 32, 35, 266–299, 300–326
Cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC), 381–383
equivalent inverse cipher, 174–176
simplified AES (S-AES) inverse functions, 183–188
symmetric ciphers and, 32–33, 83–85, 153–155, 174–176, 183–188
Denial of service, 16–17
Deskeying algorithms, 237
Determinant, 46–47
Deterministic primality (AKS) algorithm, 254
Differential cryptanalysis, 89–92
Diffie–Hellman key exchange, 301–305, 318–319, 497, 501
algorithm, 302–304
anonymous, 497
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) analog of, 318–319
ephemeral, 497
fixed, 497
man-in-the-middle attack, 305
protocols, 304
SSL Handshake Protocol, 497, 501
Diffusion concept, 72–73
Digital signatures, 269, 273, 275, 331–332, 395–409
algorithm (DSA), 403–406
attacks and forgeries, 398–399
ElGamal scheme, 400–402
hash functions used for, 331–332
properties, 396–398
public-key cryptography and, 269, 273, 275
Schnorr scheme, 402–403
standard (DSS), 403–406
Digrams, 43
Direct digital signatures, 400
Discovery phase, IEEE 802.11, 531–534
Discrete logarithms, 257–262, 302
calculation of, 262
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, 302
modular arithmetic, 259–261
powers of modulo n (mod n), 257–259
Distribution system (DS), IEEE 802.11, 526–528
Divisibility, 103–104
Division algorithm, 104–105
Divisor, 103, 125
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), 603–610
e-mail threats, 605–607
functional flow, 607–610
Internet mail architecture, 604–605
Double DES, 194–196
Data Encryption Standard (DES), 83–85
encryption/decryption system for, 319–320
encryption and, 32–33
his-and-or, 32–33
preferred encryption and, 32–33
symmetric ciphers and, 32–33
tags, 32–33
Hash function of, 174–176
inverse of, 174–176
security of, 320
Encapsulating security payload (ESP), 627–634
anti-replay service, 630
format, 628–629
padding, 629
transport mode, 631–633
tunnel mode, 631–634
See also Asymmetric ciphers; Block ciphers; Stream ciphers; Symmetric ciphers
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 153–155, 183–188
algorithm, 33, 271
asymmetric, 8, 269–277, 422–424
brute-force attack, 36, 38, 40–41
ciphers, 39–52, 66–100
ciphertext, 32–33, 36, 38–53, 271
computationally secure, 37
cryptanalysis, 33, 35–38
cryptography, 32, 35
data Encryption Standard (DES), 67–68, 77–96
digital signature, 269, 273, 275
ElGamal, 305–308, 400–402
end-to-end, 413–415
key distribution, 413–422
plaintext, 32–33, 35, 38–55, 271
private key, 271–275
public key, 269–277
rotor machines, 55–57
secret key, 33–34, 271
simplified AES (S-AES), 183–188
steganography, 57–58
substitution cipher techniques, 38–53
symmetric, 8, 33–34, 66–100, 365–368, 413–422
transposition cipher techniques, 53–55
unconditionally secure, 37
XTS-AES for storage, 210–214
encryption/decryption system, ECC, 319–320
End entity, PKIX, 437
End-to-end encryption, 413–415, 560–563
Entropy source, TRNG, 221, 237
EnvelopedData, S/MIME, 598–599
Equivalent inverse cipher, 174–176
exponential algorithm, 299
exponentiation in modular arithmetic, RSA, 282–283
Extended basic service set (EBSS), IEEE 802.11, 526
External Functionality Interface (EFI), WAP, 547

F
F function, DES, 94–96
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), 6
Federated identity management, 472–478
Feistel cipher, 68–77
algorithm, 75–77
ideal, 70–77
Shannon diffusion/confusion concepts, 72–73
structure, 68–71
substitution/permutation network (SPN), 72–75
Fermat’s theorem, 248–249
Fields (F), 118–119
addition in, 136
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in, 102, 132–133, 149–150
extended Euclidean algorithm for, 133–137
generator (g) of, 138–140
modular polynomial arithmetic over, 131–140
modulo operations GF(p), 129–140
multiplication in, 136–137
multiplicative inverse, 121–122, 133–135
number theory and, 120–122, 129–140
polynomial arithmetic over, 126–127
prime p order GF(p), 120–122
root (b) of, 138
forgeries, digital signatures and, 398–399
Forzetta key exchange, 497–499, 501
Fragmentation, SSL, 491
Frame check sequence (FCS), 367–368
Frequency test, PRNG, 223

G
Galois counter–message (GCM) authentication code, 386–389
Generator (a), 117, 138–140
Greatest common divisor (gcd), 105–107, 109–107, 127–129
Group master key (PMK), IEEE 802.11, 538–539
Groups (G), 116–117, 119
Guaranteed avalanche (GA), 95

H
Handshake Protocol, 489, 495–500, 555–557
birthday attack, 338–342, 356–361
bit-by-bit exclusive–OR (XOR) method, 333–335
brute-force attacks, 337–340
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode for, 334–335, 341–342
collision properties, 335–336, 338–340
compression function (f), 340–341
cryptanalysis, 340–341
cryptographic, 328–329
digital signatures, 331–332
hash value (h), 328–329
keyed, 331
message authentication code (HMAC), 331, 375–380
cryptographic, 326–327
digest, 333–335
hash value (h), 326–327
keyed, 331
message authentication code (HMAC), 331, 375–380
secure hash algorithm (SHA), 342–353
security requirements, 335–341
Hill cipher, 46–49
HMAC, 331, 375–380
algorithm, 377–378
design objectives, 376–377
keyed hash function of, 331
security, 378–380
Host keys, SSH, 509
HTTPS, 486, 506–508
Identity federation, 474–478
Identity management, 472–474
IEEE 802.11 LAN, 523–528
association-related services, 528
message distribution, 527–528
network components, 525–526
protocol architecture, 524–525
IEEE 802.11i LAN, 529–543
authentication phase, 531, 534–536
cryptography, 531
characteristics of, 529
connection termination, 532
connection termination, 532
discovery phase, 531–534
key management phase, 532, 536–540
phases of operation, 530–532
protected data transfer phase, 532, 540–541
pseudorandom function (PRF), 541–543
Robust Security Network (RSN), 529–530
services, 529–530
Independent basic service set (IBSS), IEEE 802.11, 526
Indeterminate variable, 123
Information access threats, 27
Initial permutation (IP), 79–81
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 210
Integral domain, 118
Integrity, 10–13, 20, 22–23
Interchanging rounds in AES, 174–175
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 6
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 6
Internet Architecture Board (IAB), 6, 616–617
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 6
Internet key exchange (IKE), 638–646
cookies, 640–641
header and payload formats, 643–646
IKEv5 message exchange, 642–643
key determination protocol, 639–646
Internet protocol (IP), 487–488, 615–649
authentication plus confidentiality, 636
combining security associations (SA), 634–638
cryptographic suites, 647–648
encapsulating security payload (ESP), 627–634
Internet, 638–646
Internet key exchange (IKE), 638–646
security (IPsec), 616–621
documents, 619–620
packets, 625–627
policy, 622–625
routing, 619
transport mode, 620–622
tunnel mode, 620–622
Internet security, 8–9, 482–520, 567–650, 651–649
electronic mail, 567–650
Internet Protocol security (IPsec), 616–625
packets, 625–627
policy, 622–625
routing, 619
tunnel mode, 620–622
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), 639
Internet Society (ISOC), 6
Intrusion detection, hash functions for, 332–333
Inverse S–boxes (IS), AES, 157–158, 160–165
Irreducible polynomial, 126, 149–150
ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), 6, 15
Kerberos, 452–469, 481–484
authentication dialogues, 454–461, 466–468
authentication server (AS), 454–455, 458, 460, 467
client/server authentication, 457–460, 467
environmental shortcomings, 464–465
Inverse S–boxes (IS), AES, 157–158, 160–165
Irreducible polynomial, 126, 149–150
key distribution, 411–443, 532, 536–540, 576–587
asymmetric encryption used for, 422–424
center (KDC), 415–417, 424
certificates, 427–439
decentralized key control, 419–420
hierarchy, 415, 417, 537
IEEE 802.11i management phase, 532, 536–540
key identifiers, 576–579
key rings, 579–582
key usage control, 420–422
master key, 414–415
pretty good privacy (PGP), 576–587
private key, 579–580
public key, 424–429, 580–587
public–key infrastructure (PKI), 437–439
secret key, 422–424
session key, 417, 576–579
symmetric encryption used for, 413–422
symmetric, 413–422
transparent key control, 417–419
wireless network security, 536–540
X.509 certificates, 429–437
certificate messages for, 498–500
client authentication and, 499–500
Diffie–Hellman, 301–305, 318–319, 497, 558–559
Fortezza, 497–499
Internet (IKE) key determination protocol, 639–646
Internet, 638–646
RSA, 497, 558–559
server authentication and, 498–499
SSH Transport Layer Protocol, 511–512
SSL Handshake Protocol, 497–500
WTLS, 558–559
Key expansion algorithm, AES, 166–170, 188–189
Key generation, 83, 284–285, 513, 559–560, 576
DES, 83
PGP, 576
RSA, 284–285
SSH, 513
WTLS, 559–560
Key identifiers (key ID), PGP, 576–579
Key management, see Key distribution
Key rings, PGP, 579–582
Key schedule algorithm, DES, 96
Keyed hash function, see Message authentication code (MAC)
L
Linear algorithm, 299
Linear congruential number generators, 226–227
Linear cryptanalysis, 92
Logic link control (LLC) layer, IEEE 802, 525
M
MAC protocol data unit (MPDU), IEEE 802, 524–525, 527, 533–536
MAC service data unit (MSDU), IEEE 802, 524–525, 527
Masquerade attacks, 16
Master key, 414–415, 559–560
Master secret creation, 501, 506
Master session key (MSK), IEEE 802.11i, 536
Mathematical attacks, RSA, 285–287
Maurer’s universal statistical test, 224
Media access control (MAC) layer, IEEE 802, 524–525
Meet-in-the-middle attack, 195–196, 305, 342. See also Birthday attack
Message authentication, 329–331, 364–372
code (MAC), 369–372
cryptographic checksum method of, 369–372
data authentication algorithm (DAA), 380–381
data authentication code (DAC), 380–381
hash function based (HMAC), 331, 375–380
pseudorandom number generation (PRNG) based on, 391–392
### Key Identifiers, 576–579
- key rings, 579–582
- notation for, 569–570
- private key, 579–580
- public key, 580–587
- session key, 576–579
- trust, fields for, 583–587

### Prime Numbers, 245–254
- AKS (deterministic primality) algorithm, 254
- distribution of, 254
- Euler's theorem, 250–251
- Euler's totient function $f(n)$, 249–250
- Fermat's theorem, 248–249
- fundamental theorem of arithmetic, 245–247
- Miller-Rabin algorithm, 252–254
- properties of, 252
- testing for, 251–254

### Prime Polynomial, 126

### Principle, Identity Management and, 473–474

### Principle, Kerberos, 462

### Private Key, 268, 270–275, 284, 579–580
- digital signatures using, 273, 275
- encryption, 270–275
- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), 579–580
- public key and, 268
- ring, 579–580
- RSA efficiency using, 284

### Public Key, 268, 271–273, 283, 390–391, 580–587
- authority, 580–587
- asymmetric keys, 268
- big-O notation, 297–299
- cryptanalysis, 277
- cryptographic algorithm, 268
- digital signatures and, 269, 273, 275
- encryption, 269–277, 368–369
- infrastructure (PKI), 268
- key exchange, 275
- message confidentiality, 368–369
- misconceptions of, 267–268
- principles of, 269–277
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm, 277–291, 296–297
- time complexity of algorithms, 297–299
- trap-door one-way function, 276–277
- Public-key infrastructure (PKI), 437–439

### Quoted-printable Transfer Encoding, 593

### Radix-64 Conversion, 612–614

### Rail Fence Cipher, 43–54

### Random Numbers, 219–221
- Randomness criteria, PRNG, 220–221, 223–224
- RC4 stream cipher, PRNG, 234–237

### Rijndael, 148, 168, 175–178

### Rings ($R$), 117–119

- chosen ciphertext attacks, 285, 289–291
- computational aspects of, 282–285
- description of, 278–281
- exponentiation in modular arithmetic, 282–283
- key exchange, 497, 501, 558–559
- key generation, 284–285
- mathematical attacks, 285–287
- proof of, 296–297
- pseudorandom number generation (PRNG), 321–322
- security of, 285–291
- SSL Handshake Protocol, 497, 501
- timing attacks, 285, 287–289
- WTLS, 558–559

### Sage Projects and Examples, 651–698
INDEX

Security policy database (SPD), 622, 624–625
Security association database (SAD), 622–624
Security association (SA), IP , 622–624, 634–638
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), 476
Secure Shell (SSH), 486, 508–518
Secure hash algorithm (SHA), 342–353
secret key, 33–34, 271, 422–424
Schnorr digital signature scheme, 402–403
Schnorr digital signature scheme, 402–403
Secure/ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME), 588–593
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), 486, 494–495
architecture, 489–490
Change Cipher Spec Protocol, 489, 493–494, 500
cryptographic computations, 500–501
Handshake Protocol, 489, 495–500
Hyptertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), 489,
master secret, 501
message authentication code (MAC), 491–493
Record Protocol, 489, 491–493
session, 489–490
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME),
568, 587–603
certificate processing, 601–603
clear signing, 599–600
cryptographic algorithms, 595–597
functionality, 593–597
messages, 597–600
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME), 588–593
See also Attacks; Authentication; Cryptanalysis; Internet
security attacks, 8, 15–19
authentication, 8, 20–21
availability, 10–13, 22
challenges of, 13–14
CIA triad, 10–11
confidentiality, 10–12, 20–21
cryptographic algorithms and protocols, 8
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), 320
hash function requirements, 335–341
HMAC, 378–380
integrity, 10–13, 20, 22–23
mechanism, 8, 23–25
message authentication code (MAC), 374–375
models for, 25–27
network, 3, 8–9, 25–27
NIST definition of, 9–10
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) security architecture,
8, 14–25
services, 8, 19–22, 24–25
standards, 5–6
threats, 15, 27
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), 476
Security association (SA), IP , 622–624, 634–638
Security association database (SAD), 622–624
Security policy database (SPD), 622, 624–625
Seed, PRNG, 221–222, 224–225
Selective–field confidentiality and integrity, 20
Service request, SSH, 513
Service threats, 27
Session, SSL, 489–490
Session key, 417, 466, 576–579
Session security module (SSM), 417–419
Shannon diffusion/confusion concepts, 72–73
Shift row (SR) function, S-AES, 184–185, 187
ShiftRows transformation, AES, 150, 153–155, 161–162
SignedData, S/MIME, 599
Simplified Advanced Encryption Standard (S-AES), 183–191
add key (Ak) function, 184–186
decryption (inverse), 183–188
encryption, 183–188
decryption algorithm, 188–189
mix column (MC) function, 184–185, 187–188
nitble substitution (NS) function, 184–185, 187
S-box construction, 188–191
shift row (SR) function, 184–185, 187
structure of, 190–191
Single round, DES, 81–83
Single sign-on (SSO), 472–473
Skew, TRNG, 237–238
Special Publications (SP), 6
SSH, see Secure Shell (SSH)
SAML, see Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
State array, 150, 155
State vector (S) initialization, RC4, 235
Steganography, 57–58
Storage encryption, XTS-AES for, 210–214
block ciphers and, 68–69, 203–209
cipher feedback (CFB) mode, 203–204
conversion from block ciphers (modes), 203–209
counter (CTR) mode, 203, 206–209
keystream, 232–233
output feedback (OFB) mode, 203, 205–206
pseudorandom number generators (PRNG), 232–237
RC4, 234–237
Strict avalanche criterion (SAC), 94
SubBytes (substitute bytes) transformation, AES,
150, 153–161
Substitution cipher techniques, 38–53, 68–77
autokey system, 51
Caesar cipher, 39–41
determinant, 46–47
Feistel cipher, 68–77
Hill cipher, 46–49
monoalphabetic ciphers, 41–44
one-time pad, 52–53
permutation and, 41, 72
Playfair cipher, 44–46
polyalphabetic ciphers, 49–52
Substitution/permutation network (SPN), 72–75
Supress-replay attacks, 450
Symmetric ciphers, 8, 33–38, 66–240, 365–368, 413–422,
448–452
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 67, 102, 132–133,
147–191
block ciphers, 35, 66–100, 192–217, 229–232
cryptosystem model, 34–35
Data Encryption Standard (DES), 67–68, 77–96
encryption, 8, 33–38, 66–100, 365–368, 413–422, 448–452
key distribution using, 413–422
message authentication and confidentiality, 365–368
model for, 33–34
modular arithmetic for, 108–115, 131–137
number theory of, 101–146
plaintext, 33, 35
polynomial arithmetic for, 122–129, 131–134, 180–183
pseudorandom number generation (PRNG), 218–241
secret key for encryption, 33–34
substitution techniques, 68–77
user authentication (remote) using, 448–452
Symmetric key distribution, 413–422
asymmetric encryption used for, 422–424
decentralized key control, 419–420
decided to-end encryption, 413–415
key control hierarchy, 415, 417
key distribution center (KDC), 415–417, 424

INDEX

key usage control, 420–422
symmetric encryption used for, 413–422
transparent key control, 417–419

T
Tag, MAC authenticator, 372–374
Threats, 15, 27, 605–607. See also Attacks
Ticket flags, Kerberos, 468–469
Ticket, Kerberos, 455
Ticket-granting server (TGS), 456–461, 467
Time complexity of algorithms, 297–299
Timestamp authentication, 447–448, 577, 579–580
Timing attacks, 89, 285, 287–289
TLS, see Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Traffic analysis, 16
Traffic flow confidentiality (TFC), 20, 629
Traffic processing, IP, 625–627
Transformation functions, AES, 155–166, 182
AddRoundKey, 150–151, 153–155, 165–166
forward, 156–163, 165
inverse, 157–158, 160–165
MixColumns transformation, 150, 153–155, 162–165, 182
ShiftRows transformation, 150, 153–155, 161–162
SubBytes (substitute bytes) transformation, 150, 153–161
Transparent key control, 417–419
Transport Layer Protocol, SSH, 508–513
Transport Layer Security (TLS), 486, 488, 502–506
alert codes, 504–505
certificate types (client), 505–506
cipher suites, 505
cryptographic computations, 506
message authentication code (MAC), 502
padding, 506
pseudorandom function (PRF), 502–504
Transport-level security, 485–520
HTTPS, 486, 506–508
Secure Shell (SSH), 486, 508–518
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), 486, 488–501
Transport Layer Security (TLS), 486, 488, 502–506
Web considerations, 486–488
Transport mode, IP, 620–622, 631–636
Transposition cipher techniques, 53–55
Trap-door one-way function, 276–277
Triple data encryption algorithm (TDEA), 77
Triple data encryption standard (3DES), 77, 196–198
True random number generator (TRNG), 219, 221–222,
237–238
Trust, PGP fields, 583–587
Tunnel, SSH, 513–516
Tunnel mode, IP, 620–622, 631–636
12-bit processor, AES implementation of, 177–178

U
Uniform distribution of bits, 220
Unpredictability criteria, PRNG, 221, 224–225
User Authentication Protocol, SSH, 509, 513–514
User authentication, 444–484
asymmetric encryption used for, 470–472
federated identity management, 472–478
Kerberos, 452–469, 481–484
mutual, 447–451, 470–471
one-way, 448, 451–452, 471–472
principles of, 445–446
remote, 445–452, 470–472
replay attacks and, 447–448, 450
symmetric encryption used for, 448–452
User certificates, X.509, 432–434

V
VertiSign certificates, S/MIME, 601–603
Vernam cipher, 51–52
Version number, TLS, 502
Vigenère cipher, 49–51
Virus detection, hash functions for, 332–333

W
WAP, see Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)
Web resources, 4–5
Web security, 485–488, 506–507. See also Internet security
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), 522–523, 529
Wireless application environment (WAE), 547–548
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), 522, 543–550,
560–563
architecture, 546–547
dead-to-end security, 560–563
programming model, 544
protocol, 543–550
security discovery and services, 547
wireless application environment (WAE), 547–548
wireless markup language (WML), 544–546
wireless session protocol (WSP), 549
wireless transaction protocol (WTP), 549–550
Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), 523
Wireless markup language (WML), WAP, 544–546
Wireless network security, 521–566
IEEE 802.11 LAN, 523–528
IEEE 802.11i LAN, 529–543
Robust Security Network (RSN), 529–530
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), 522–523, 529
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), 529
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), 522, 543–550,
560–563
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS), 522, 550–560
Wireless session protocol (WSP), WAP, 549
Wireless transaction protocol (WTP), WAP, 549–550
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS), 522, 550–560
Alert Protocol, 554–555
authentication, 557–558
Change Cipher Spec Protocol, 553–554
cryptographic algorithms, 557–560
Handshake Protocol, 555–557
key exchange, 558–559
master key generation, 559–560
protocol architecture, 552–557
pseudorandom function (PRF), 559
Record Protocol, 552–555
sessions and connections, 551–552

X
X.509 ITU-T recommendation, 429–439
certificate authority (CA), 430–434, 437
certificates, 429–437
general public–key infrastructure (PKIX), 437–439
version 3 format, 435–437
X.800 ITU-T Recommendation, 15, 19–25
active and passive attacks, 15
security mechanism, 23–25
security services, 19–22
XTS-AES mode, 210–214
block-oriented storage devices using, 210–214
ciphertext–stealing technique, 213–214
sector (data unit) operation, 213–214
single-block operation, 211–212
storage encryption requirements, 210–211
This page intentionally left blank
PART 6: SYSTEM SECURITY

CHAPTER 20

INTRUDERS

20.1 Intruders

Intruder Behavior Patterns
Intrusion Techniques

20.2 Intrusion Detection

Audit Records
Statistical Anomaly Detection
Rule-Based Intrusion Detection
The Base-Rate Fallacy
Distributed Intrusion Detection
Honeypots
Intrusion Detection Exchange Format

20.3 Password Management

Password Protection
Password Selection Strategies

20.4 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

20.5 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems

Appendix 20A The Base-Rate Fallacy
They agreed that Graham should set the test for Charles Mabledene. It was nei-
ther more nor less than that Dragon should get Stern’s code. If he had the ‘in’ at
Utting which he claimed to have this should be possible, only loyalty to Moscow
Centre would prevent it. If he got the key to the code he would prove his loyalty
to London Central beyond a doubt.

—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell

KEY POINTS

◆ Unauthorized intrusion into a computer system or network is one of the
  most serious threats to computer security.
◆ Intrusion detection systems have been developed to provide early warning
  of an intrusion so that defensive action can be taken to prevent or mini-
mize damage.
◆ Intrusion detection involves detecting unusual patterns of activity or
  patterns of activity that are known to correlate with intrusions.
◆ One important element of intrusion prevention is password management,
  with the goal of preventing unauthorized users from having access to the
  passwords of others.

A significant security problem for networked systems is hostile, or at least
unwanted, trespass by users or software. User trespass can take the form of unau-
thorized logon to a machine or, in the case of an authorized user, acquisition of priv-
ileges or performance of actions beyond those that have been authorized. Software
trespass can take the form of a virus, worm, or Trojan horse.

All these attacks relate to network security because system entry can be
achieved by means of a network. However, these attacks are not confined to net-
work-based attacks. A user with access to a local terminal may attempt trespass
without using an intermediate network. A virus or Trojan horse may be introduced
into a system by means of an optical disc. Only the worm is a uniquely network phe-
nomenon. Thus, system trespass is an area in which the concerns of network security
and computer security overlap.

Because the focus of this book is network security, we do not attempt a com-
prehensive analysis of either the attacks or the security countermeasures related
to system trespass. Instead, in this Part we present a broad overview of these
concerns.

This chapter covers the subject of intruders. First, we examine the nature of
the attack and then look at strategies intended for prevention and, failing that,
detection. Next we examine the related topic of password management.
One of the two most publicized threats to security is the intruder (the other is viruses), often referred to as a hacker or cracker. In an important early study of intrusion, Anderson [ANDE80] identified three classes of intruders:

- **Masquerader**: An individual who is not authorized to use the computer and who penetrates a system’s access controls to exploit a legitimate user’s account
- **Misfeasor**: A legitimate user who accesses data, programs, or resources for which such access is not authorized, or who is authorized for such access but misuses his or her privileges
- **Clandestine user**: An individual who seizes supervisory control of the system and uses this control to evade auditing and access controls or to suppress audit collection

The masquerader is likely to be an outsider; the misfeasor generally is an insider; and the clandestine user can be either an outsider or an insider.

Intruder attacks range from the benign to the serious. At the benign end of the scale, there are many people who simply wish to explore internets and see what is out there. At the serious end are individuals who are attempting to read privileged data, perform unauthorized modifications to data, or disrupt the system. [GRAN04] lists the following examples of intrusion:

- Performing a remote root compromise of an e-mail server
- Defacing a Web server
- Guessing and cracking passwords
- Copying a database containing credit card numbers
- Viewing sensitive data, including payroll records and medical information, without authorization
- Running a packet sniffer on a workstation to capture usernames and passwords
- Using a permission error on an anonymous FTP server to distribute pirated software and music files
- Dialing into an unsecured modem and gaining internal network access
- Posing as an executive, calling the help desk, resetting the executive’s e-mail password, and learning the new password
- Using an unattended, logged-in workstation without permission

**Intruder Behavior Patterns**

The techniques and behavior patterns of intruders are constantly shifting, to exploit newly discovered weaknesses and to evade detection and countermeasures. Even so, intruders typically follow one of a number of recognizable behavior patterns, and these patterns typically differ from those of ordinary users. In the following, we look
at three broad examples of intruder behavior patterns, to give the reader some feel for the challenge facing the security administrator. Table 20.1, based on [RADC04], summarizes the behavior.

**HACKERS** Traditionally, those who hack into computers do so for the thrill of it or for status. The hacking community is a strong meritocracy in which status is determined by level of competence. Thus, attackers often look for targets of opportunity and then share the information with others. A typical example is a break-in at a large financial institution reported in [RADC04]. The intruder took advantage of the fact that the corporate network was running unprotected services, some of which were not even needed. In this case, the key to the break-in was the pcAnywhere application. The manufacturer, Symantec, advertises this program as a remote control solution that enables secure connection to remote devices. But the attacker had an easy time gaining access to pcAnywhere; the administrator used the same three-letter username and password for the program. In this case, there was no intrusion detection system on the 700-node corporate network. The intruder was only discovered when a vice president walked into her office and saw the cursor moving files around on her Windows workstation.

**Table 20.1 Some Examples of Intruder Patterns of Behavior**

**(a) Hacker**

1. Select the target using IP lookup tools such as NSLookup, Dig, and others.
2. Map network for accessible services using tools such as NMAP.
3. Identify potentially vulnerable services (in this case, pcAnywhere).
5. Install remote administration tool called DameWare.
6. Wait for administrator to log on and capture his password.
7. Use that password to access remainder of network.

**(b) Criminal Enterprise**

1. Act quickly and precisely to make their activities harder to detect.
2. Exploit perimeter through vulnerable ports.
3. Use Trojan horses (hidden software) to leave back doors for reentry.
4. Use sniffers to capture passwords.
5. Do not stick around until noticed.
6. Make few or no mistakes.

**(c) Internal Threat**

1. Create network accounts for themselves and their friends.
2. Access accounts and applications they wouldn’t normally use for their daily jobs.
3. E-mail former and prospective employers.
5. Visit Web sites that cater to disgruntled employees, such as f’dcompany.com.
6. Perform large downloads and file copying.
7. Access the network during off hours.
Benign intruders might be tolerable, although they do consume resources and may slow performance for legitimate users. However, there is no way in advance to know whether an intruder will be benign or malign. Consequently, even for systems with no particularly sensitive resources, there is a motivation to control this problem.

Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) are designed to counter this type of hacker threat. In addition to using such systems, organizations can consider restricting remote logons to specific IP addresses and/or use virtual private network technology.

One of the results of the growing awareness of the intruder problem has been the establishment of a number of computer emergency response teams (CERTs). These cooperative ventures collect information about system vulnerabilities and disseminate it to systems managers. Hackers also routinely read CERT reports. Thus, it is important for system administrators to quickly insert all software patches to discovered vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, given the complexity of many IT systems, and the rate at which patches are released, this is increasingly difficult to achieve without automated updating. Even then, there are problems caused by incompatibilities resulting from the updated software. Hence the need for multiple layers of defense in managing security threats to IT systems.

**Criminals** Organized groups of hackers have become a widespread and common threat to Internet-based systems. These groups can be in the employ of a corporation or government but often are loosely affiliated gangs of hackers. Typically, these gangs are young, often Eastern European, Russian, or southeast Asian hackers who do business on the Web [ANTE06]. They meet in underground forums with names like DarkMarket.org and theftservices.com to trade tips and data and coordinate attacks. A common target is a credit card file at an e-commerce server. Attackers attempt to gain root access. The card numbers are used by organized crime gangs to purchase expensive items and are then posted to carder sites, where others can access and use the account numbers; this obscures usage patterns and complicates investigation.

Whereas traditional hackers look for targets of opportunity, criminal hackers usually have specific targets, or at least classes of targets in mind. Once a site is penetrated, the attacker acts quickly, scooping up as much valuable information as possible and exiting.

IDSs and IPSs can also be used for these types of attackers, but may be less effective because of the quick in-and-out nature of the attack. For e-commerce sites, database encryption should be used for sensitive customer information, especially credit cards. For hosted e-commerce sites (provided by an outsider service), the e-commerce organization should make use of a dedicated server (not used to support multiple customers) and closely monitor the provider’s security services.

**Insider Attacks** Insider attacks are among the most difficult to detect and prevent. Employees already have access and knowledge about the structure and content of corporate databases. Insider attacks can be motivated by revenge or simply a feeling of entitlement. An example of the former is the case of Kenneth Patterson, fired from his position as data communications manager for American Eagle Outfitters. Patterson disabled the company’s ability to process credit card purchases during five days of the holiday season of 2002. As for a sense of entitlement, there have
always been many employees who felt entitled to take extra office supplies for home use, but this now extends to corporate data. An example is that of a vice president of sales for a stock analysis firm who quit to go to a competitor. Before she left, she copied the customer database to take with her. The offender reported feeling no animus toward her former employee; she simply wanted the data because it would be useful to her.

Although IDS and IPS facilities can be useful in countering insider attacks, other more direct approaches are of higher priority. Examples include the following:

- Enforce least privilege, only allowing access to the resources employees need to do their job.
- Set logs to see what users access and what commands they are entering.
- Protect sensitive resources with strong authentication.
- Upon termination, delete employee’s computer and network access.
- Upon termination, make a mirror image of employee’s hard drive before reissuing it. That evidence might be needed if your company information turns up at a competitor.

In this section, we look at the techniques used for intrusion. Then we examine ways to detect intrusion.

Intrusion Techniques

The objective of the intruder is to gain access to a system or to increase the range of privileges accessible on a system. Most initial attacks use system or software vulnerabilities that allow a user to execute code that opens a back door into the system. Alternatively, the intruder attempts to acquire information that should have been protected. In some cases, this information is in the form of a user password. With knowledge of some other user’s password, an intruder can log in to a system and exercise all the privileges accorded to the legitimate user.

Typically, a system must maintain a file that associates a password with each authorized user. If such a file is stored with no protection, then it is an easy matter to gain access to it and learn passwords. The password file can be protected in one of two ways:

- **One-way function:** The system stores only the value of a function based on the user’s password. When the user presents a password, the system transforms that password and compares it with the stored value. In practice, the system usually performs a one-way transformation (not reversible) in which the password is used to generate a key for the one-way function and in which a fixed-length output is produced.
- **Access control:** Access to the password file is limited to one or a very few accounts.

If one or both of these countermeasures are in place, some effort is needed for a potential intruder to learn passwords. On the basis of a survey of the literature and
interviews with a number of password crackers, [ALVA90] reports the following techniques for learning passwords:

1. Try default passwords used with standard accounts that are shipped with the system. Many administrators do not bother to change these defaults.
2. Exhaustively try all short passwords (those of one to three characters).
3. Try words in the system’s online dictionary or a list of likely passwords. Examples of the latter are readily available on hacker bulletin boards.
4. Collect information about users, such as their full names, the names of their spouse and children, pictures in their office, and books in their office that are related to hobbies.
5. Try users’ phone numbers, Social Security numbers, and room numbers.
6. Try all legitimate license plate numbers for this state.
7. Use a Trojan horse (described in Chapter 21) to bypass restrictions on access.
8. Tap the line between a remote user and the host system.

The first six methods are various ways of guessing a password. If an intruder has to verify the guess by attempting to log in, it is a tedious and easily countered means of attack. For example, a system can simply reject any login after three password attempts, thus requiring the intruder to reconnect to the host to try again. Under these circumstances, it is not practical to try more than a handful of passwords. However, the intruder is unlikely to try such crude methods. For example, if an intruder can gain access with a low level of privileges to an encrypted password file, then the strategy would be to capture that file and then use the encryption mechanism of that particular system at leisure until a valid password that provided greater privileges was discovered.

Guessing attacks are feasible, and indeed highly effective, when a large number of guesses can be attempted automatically and each guess verified, without the guessing process being detectable. Later in this chapter, we have much to say about thwarting guessing attacks.

The seventh method of attack listed earlier, the Trojan horse, can be particularly difficult to counter. An example of a program that bypasses access controls was cited in [ALVA90]. A low-privilege user produced a game program and invited the system operator to use it in his or her spare time. The program did indeed play a game, but in the background it also contained code to copy the password file, which was unencrypted but access protected, into the user’s file. Because the game was running under the operator’s high-privilege mode, it was able to gain access to the password file.

The eighth attack listed, line tapping, is a matter of physical security.

Other intrusion techniques do not require learning a password. Intruders can get access to a system by exploiting attacks such as buffer overflows on a program that runs with certain privileges. Privilege escalation can be done this way as well.

We turn now to a discussion of the two principal countermeasures: detection and prevention. Detection is concerned with learning of an attack, either before or after its success. Prevention is a challenging security goal and an uphill battle at all times. The difficulty stems from the fact that the defender must attempt to thwart all possible attacks, whereas the attacker is free to try to find the weakest link in the defense chain and attack at that point.
Inevitably, the best intrusion prevention system will fail. A system’s second line of defense is intrusion detection, and this has been the focus of much research in recent years. This interest is motivated by a number of considerations, including the following:

1. If an intrusion is detected quickly enough, the intruder can be identified and ejected from the system before any damage is done or any data are compromised. Even if the detection is not sufficiently timely to preempt the intruder, the sooner that the intrusion is detected, the less the amount of damage and the more quickly that recovery can be achieved.

2. An effective intrusion detection system can serve as a deterrent, so acting to prevent intrusions.

3. Intrusion detection enables the collection of information about intrusion techniques that can be used to strengthen the intrusion prevention facility.

Intrusion detection is based on the assumption that the behavior of the intruder differs from that of a legitimate user in ways that can be quantified. Of course, we cannot expect that there will be a crisp, exact distinction between an attack by an intruder and the normal use of resources by an authorized user. Rather, we must expect that there will be some overlap.

Figure 20.1 suggests, in very abstract terms, the nature of the task confronting the designer of an intrusion detection system. Although the typical behavior of an
Intruder differs from the typical behavior of an authorized user, there is an overlap in these behaviors. Thus, a loose interpretation of intruder behavior, which will catch more intruders, will also lead to a number of “false positives,” or authorized users identified as intruders. On the other hand, an attempt to limit false positives by a tight interpretation of intruder behavior will lead to an increase in false negatives, or intruders not identified as intruders. Thus, there is an element of compromise and art in the practice of intrusion detection.

In Anderson’s study [ANDE80], it was postulated that one could, with reasonable confidence, distinguish between a masquerader and a legitimate user. Patterns of legitimate user behavior can be established by observing past history, and significant deviation from such patterns can be detected. Anderson suggests that the task of detecting a misfeasor (legitimate user performing in an unauthorized fashion) is more difficult, in that the distinction between abnormal and normal behavior may be small. Anderson concluded that such violations would be undetectable solely through the search for anomalous behavior. However, misfeasor behavior might nevertheless be detectable by intelligent definition of the class of conditions that suggest unauthorized use. Finally, the detection of the clandestine user was felt to be beyond the scope of purely automated techniques. These observations, which were made in 1980, remain true today.

[PORR92] identifies the following approaches to intrusion detection:

1. **Statistical anomaly detection**: Involves the collection of data relating to the behavior of legitimate users over a period of time. Then statistical tests are applied to observed behavior to determine with a high level of confidence whether that behavior is not legitimate user behavior.
   a. Threshold detection: This approach involves defining thresholds, independent of user, for the frequency of occurrence of various events.
   b. Profile based: A profile of the activity of each user is developed and used to detect changes in the behavior of individual accounts.

2. **Rule-based detection**: Involves an attempt to define a set of rules that can be used to decide that a given behavior is that of an intruder.
   a. Anomaly detection: Rules are developed to detect deviation from previous usage patterns.
   b. Penetration identification: An expert system approach that searches for suspicious behavior.

In a nutshell, statistical approaches attempt to define normal, or expected, behavior, whereas rule-based approaches attempt to define proper behavior.

In terms of the types of attackers listed earlier, statistical anomaly detection is effective against masqueraders, who are unlikely to mimic the behavior patterns of the accounts they appropriate. On the other hand, such techniques may be unable to deal with misfeasors. For such attacks, rule-based approaches may be able to recognize events and sequences that, in context, reveal penetration. In practice, a system may exhibit a combination of both approaches to be effective against a broad range of attacks.
Audit Records

A fundamental tool for intrusion detection is the audit record. Some record of ongoing activity by users must be maintained as input to an intrusion detection system. Basically, two plans are used:

- **Native audit records**: Virtually all multiuser operating systems include accounting software that collects information on user activity. The advantage of using this information is that no additional collection software is needed. The disadvantage is that the native audit records may not contain the needed information or may not contain it in a convenient form.

- **Detection-specific audit records**: A collection facility can be implemented that generates audit records containing only that information required by the intrusion detection system. One advantage of such an approach is that it could be made vendor independent and ported to a variety of systems. The disadvantage is the extra overhead involved in having, in effect, two accounting packages running on a machine.

A good example of detection-specific audit records is one developed by Dorothy Denning [DENN87]. Each audit record contains the following fields:

- **Subject**: Initiators of actions. A subject is typically a terminal user but might also be a process acting on behalf of users or groups of users. All activity arises through commands issued by subjects. Subjects may be grouped into different access classes, and these classes may overlap.

- **Action**: Operation performed by the subject on or with an object; for example, login, read, perform I/O, execute.

- **Object**: Receptors of actions. Examples include files, programs, messages, records, terminals, printers, and user- or program-created structures. When a subject is the recipient of an action, such as electronic mail, then that subject is considered an object. Objects may be grouped by type. Object granularity may vary by object type and by environment. For example, database actions may be audited for the database as a whole or at the record level.

- **Exception-Condition**: Denotes which, if any, exception condition is raised on return.

- **Resource-Usage**: A list of quantitative elements in which each element gives the amount used of some resource (e.g., number of lines printed or displayed, number of records read or written, processor time, I/O units used, session elapsed time).

- **Time-Stamp**: Unique time-and-date stamp identifying when the action took place.

Most user operations are made up of a number of elementary actions. For example, a file copy involves the execution of the user command, which includes doing access validation and setting up the copy, plus the read from one file, plus the write to another file. Consider the command

```
COPY GAME.EXE TO <Library>GAME.EXE
```
issued by Smith to copy an executable file GAME from the current directory to the <Library> directory. The following audit records may be generated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Intent</th>
<th>Records</th>
<th>CPU (sec)</th>
<th>Time (sec)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>execute</td>
<td>&lt;Library&gt;COPY.EXE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00002</td>
<td>11058721678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>read</td>
<td>&lt;Smith&gt;GAME.EXE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11058721679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>execute</td>
<td>&lt;Library&gt;COPY.EXE</td>
<td>write-viol</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11058721680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the copy is aborted because Smith does not have write permission to <Library>.

The decomposition of a user operation into elementary actions has three advantages:

1. Because objects are the protectable entities in a system, the use of elementary actions enables an audit of all behavior affecting an object. Thus, the system can detect attempted subversions of access controls (by noting an abnormality in the number of exception conditions returned) and can detect successful subversions by noting an abnormality in the set of objects accessible to the subject.

2. Single-object, single-action audit records simplify the model and the implementation.

3. Because of the simple, uniform structure of the detection-specific audit records, it may be relatively easy to obtain this information or at least part of it by a straightforward mapping from existing native audit records to the detection-specific audit records.

Statistical Anomaly Detection

As was mentioned, statistical anomaly detection techniques fall into two broad categories: threshold detection and profile-based systems. Threshold detection involves counting the number of occurrences of a specific event type over an interval of time. If the count surpasses what is considered a reasonable number that one might expect to occur, then intrusion is assumed.

Threshold analysis, by itself, is a crude and ineffective detector of even moderately sophisticated attacks. Both the threshold and the time interval must be determined. Because of the variability across users, such thresholds are likely to generate either a lot of false positives or a lot of false negatives. However, simple threshold detectors may be useful in conjunction with more sophisticated techniques.

Profile-based anomaly detection focuses on characterizing the past behavior of individual users or related groups of users and then detecting significant deviations. A profile may consist of a set of parameters, so that deviation on just a single parameter may not be sufficient in itself to signal an alert.

The foundation of this approach is an analysis of audit records. The audit records provide input to the intrusion detection function in two ways. First, the designer must decide on a number of quantitative metrics that can be used to measure user behavior. An analysis of audit records over a period of time can be used to
determine the activity profile of the average user. Thus, the audit records serve to define typical behavior. Second, current audit records are the input used to detect intrusion. That is, the intrusion detection model analyzes incoming audit records to determine deviation from average behavior.

Examples of metrics that are useful for profile-based intrusion detection are the following:

- **Counter**: A nonnegative integer that may be incremented but not decremented until it is reset by management action. Typically, a count of certain event types is kept over a particular period of time. Examples include the number of logins by a single user during an hour, the number of times a given command is executed during a single user session, and the number of password failures during a minute.

- **Gauge**: A nonnegative integer that may be incremented or decremented. Typically, a gauge is used to measure the current value of some entity. Examples include the number of logical connections assigned to a user application and the number of outgoing messages queued for a user process.

- **Interval timer**: The length of time between two related events. An example is the length of time between successive logins to an account.

- **Resource utilization**: Quantity of resources consumed during a specified period. Examples include the number of pages printed during a user session and total time consumed by a program execution.

Given these general metrics, various tests can be performed to determine whether current activity fits within acceptable limits. [DENN87] lists the following approaches that may be taken:

- Mean and standard deviation
- Multivariate
- Markov process
- Time series
- Operational

The simplest statistical test is to measure the mean and standard deviation of a parameter over some historical period. This gives a reflection of the average behavior and its variability. The use of mean and standard deviation is applicable to a wide variety of counters, timers, and resource measures. But these measures, by themselves, are typically too crude for intrusion detection purposes.

A **multivariate** model is based on correlations between two or more variables. Intruder behavior may be characterized with greater confidence by considering such correlations (for example, processor time and resource usage, or login frequency and session elapsed time).

A **Markov process** model is used to establish transition probabilities among various states. As an example, this model might be used to look at transitions between certain commands.
A **time series** model focuses on time intervals, looking for sequences of events that happen too rapidly or too slowly. A variety of statistical tests can be applied to characterize abnormal timing.

Finally, an **operational model** is based on a judgment of what is considered abnormal, rather than an automated analysis of past audit records. Typically, fixed limits are defined and intrusion is suspected for an observation that is outside the limits. This type of approach works best where intruder behavior can be deduced from certain types of activities. For example, a large number of login attempts over a short period suggests an attempted intrusion.

As an example of the use of these various metrics and models, Table 20.2 shows various measures considered or tested for the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) intrusion detection system (IDES) [DENN87, JAVI91, LUNT88].

The main advantage of the use of statistical profiles is that a prior knowledge of security flaws is not required. The detector program learns what is “normal” behavior and then looks for deviations. The approach is not based on system-dependent characteristics and vulnerabilities. Thus, it should be readily portable among a variety of systems.

**Rule-Based Intrusion Detection**

Rule-based techniques detect intrusion by observing events in the system and applying a set of rules that lead to a decision regarding whether a given pattern of activity is or is not suspicious. In very general terms, we can characterize all approaches as focusing on either anomaly detection or penetration identification, although there is some overlap in these approaches.

**Rule-based anomaly detection** is similar in terms of its approach and strengths to statistical anomaly detection. With the rule-based approach, historical audit records are analyzed to identify usage patterns and to generate automatically rules that describe those patterns. Rules may represent past behavior patterns of users, programs, privileges, time slots, terminals, and so on. Current behavior is then observed, and each transaction is matched against the set of rules to determine if it conforms to any historically observed pattern of behavior.

As with statistical anomaly detection, rule-based anomaly detection does not require knowledge of security vulnerabilities within the system. Rather, the scheme is based on observing past behavior and, in effect, assuming that the future will be like the past. In order for this approach to be effective, a rather large database of rules will be needed. For example, a scheme described in [VACC89] contains anywhere from $10^4$ to $10^6$ rules.

**Rule-based penetration identification** takes a very different approach to intrusion detection. The key feature of such systems is the use of rules for identifying known penetrations or penetrations that would exploit known weaknesses. Rules can also be defined that identify suspicious behavior, even when the behavior is within the bounds of established patterns of usage. Typically, the rules used in these systems are specific to the machine and operating system. The most fruitful approach to developing such rules is to analyze attack tools and scripts collected on the Internet. These rules can be supplemented with rules generated by knowledgeable security personnel. In this latter case, the normal procedure is to interview
Table 20.2 Measures That May Be Used for Intrusion Detection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Type of Intrusion Detected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Login frequency by day and time</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Intruders may be likely to log in during off-hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of login at different locations</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Intruders may log in from a location that a particular user rarely or never uses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time since last login</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Break-in on a “dead” account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapsed time per session</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Significant deviations might indicate masquerader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity of output to location</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Excessive amounts of data transmitted to remote locations could signify leakage of sensitive data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session resource utilization</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Unusual processor or I/O levels could signal an intruder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password failures at login</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Attempted break-in by password guessing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failures to login from specified terminals</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Attempted break-in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Command or Program Execution Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Execution frequency</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>May detect intruders, who are likely to use different commands, or a successful penetration by a legitimate user, who has gained access to privileged commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program resource utilization</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>An abnormal value might suggest injection of a virus or Trojan horse, which performs side-effects that increase I/O or processor utilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution denials</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>May detect penetration attempt by individual user who seeks higher privileges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

File Access Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read, write, create, delete frequency</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Abnormalities for read and write access for individuals may signify masquerading or browsing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Records read, written</td>
<td>Mean and standard deviation</td>
<td>Abnormality could signify an attempt to obtain sensitive data by inference and aggregation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure count for read, write, create, delete</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>May detect users who persistently attempt to access unauthorized files.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

system administrators and security analysts to collect a suite of known penetration scenarios and key events that threaten the security of the target system.

A simple example of the type of rules that can be used is found in NIDX, an early system that used heuristic rules that can be used to assign degrees of suspicion to activities [BAUE88]. Example heuristics are the following:

1. Users should not read files in other users’ personal directories.
2. Users must not write other users’ files.
3. Users who log in after hours often access the same files they used earlier.
4. Users do not generally open disk devices directly but rely on higher-level operating system utilities.
5. Users should not be logged in more than once to the same system.
6. Users do not make copies of system programs.

The penetration identification scheme used in IDES is representative of the strategy followed. Audit records are examined as they are generated, and they are matched against the rule base. If a match is found, then the user’s suspicion rating is increased. If enough rules are matched, then the rating will pass a threshold that results in the reporting of an anomaly.

The IDES approach is based on an examination of audit records. A weakness of this plan is its lack of flexibility. For a given penetration scenario, there may be a number of alternative audit record sequences that could be produced, each varying from the others slightly or in subtle ways. It may be difficult to pin down all these variations in explicit rules. Another method is to develop a higher-level model independent of specific audit records. An example of this is a state transition model known as USTAT [ILGU93]. USTAT deals in general actions rather than the detailed specific actions recorded by the UNIX auditing mechanism. USTAT is implemented on a SunOS system that provides audit records on 239 events. Of these, only 28 are used by a preprocessor, which maps these onto 10 general actions (Table 20.3). Using just these actions and the parameters that are invoked with each action, a state transition diagram is developed that characterizes suspicious activity. Because a number of different auditable events map into a smaller number of actions, the rule-creation process is simpler. Furthermore, the state transition diagram model is easily modified to accommodate newly learned intrusion behaviors.

### Table 20.3 USTAT Actions versus SunOS Event Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USTAT Action</th>
<th>SunOS Event Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read</td>
<td>open_r, open_rc, open rtc, open_rwc, open_rwtc, open_rt, open_rw, open_rwt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write</td>
<td>truncate, ftruncate, creat, open rtc, open_rwc, open_rwtc, open rt, open rw, open rwt, open w, open wt, open wc, open wct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create</td>
<td>mkdir, creat, open rc, open rtc, open_rwc, open_rwtc, open_we, open wc, open wtc, mknod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delete</td>
<td>rmdir, unlink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute</td>
<td>exec, execve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit</td>
<td>exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modify_Owner</td>
<td>chown, fchown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modify_Perm</td>
<td>chmod, fchmod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rename</td>
<td>rename</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardlink</td>
<td>link</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Base-Rate Fallacy

To be of practical use, an intrusion detection system should detect a substantial percentage of intrusions while keeping the false alarm rate at an acceptable level. If only a modest percentage of actual intrusions are detected, the system provides a false sense of security. On the other hand, if the system frequently triggers an alert when there is no intrusion (a false alarm), then either system managers will begin to ignore the alarms, or much time will be wasted analyzing the false alarms.

Unfortunately, because of the nature of the probabilities involved, it is very difficult to meet the standard of high rate of detections with a low rate of false alarms. In general, if the actual numbers of intrusions is low compared to the number of legitimate uses of a system, then the false alarm rate will be high unless the test is extremely discriminating. A study of existing intrusion detection systems, reported in [AXEL00], indicated that current systems have not overcome the problem of the base-rate fallacy. See Appendix 20A for a brief background on the mathematics of this problem.

Distributed Intrusion Detection

Until recently, work on intrusion detection systems focused on single-system stand-alone facilities. The typical organization, however, needs to defend a distributed collection of hosts supported by a LAN or internetwork. Although it is possible to mount a defense by using stand-alone intrusion detection systems on each host, a more effective defense can be achieved by coordination and cooperation among intrusion detection systems across the network.

Porras points out the following major issues in the design of a distributed intrusion detection system [PORR92]:

- A distributed intrusion detection system may need to deal with different audit record formats. In a heterogeneous environment, different systems will employ different native audit collection systems and, if using intrusion detection, may employ different formats for security-related audit records.

- One or more nodes in the network will serve as collection and analysis points for the data from the systems on the network. Thus, either raw audit data or summary data must be transmitted across the network. Therefore, there is a requirement to assure the integrity and confidentiality of these data. Integrity is required to prevent an intruder from masking his or her activities by altering the transmitted audit information. Confidentiality is required because the transmitted audit information could be valuable.

- Either a centralized or decentralized architecture can be used. With a centralized architecture, there is a single central point of collection and analysis of all audit data. This eases the task of correlating incoming reports but creates a potential bottleneck and single point of failure. With a decentralized architecture, there are more than one analysis centers, but these must coordinate their activities and exchange information.
A good example of a distributed intrusion detection system is one developed at the University of California at Davis [HEBE92, SNAP91]. Figure 20.2 shows the overall architecture, which consists of three main components:

- **Host agent module**: An audit collection module operating as a background process on a monitored system. Its purpose is to collect data on security-related events on the host and transmit these to the central manager.
- **LAN monitor agent module**: Operates in the same fashion as a host agent module except that it analyzes LAN traffic and reports the results to the central manager.
- **Central manager module**: Receives reports from LAN monitor and host agents and processes and correlates these reports to detect intrusion.

The scheme is designed to be independent of any operating system or system auditing implementation. Figure 20.3 [SNAP91] shows the general approach that is taken. The agent captures each audit record produced by the native audit collection system. A filter is applied that retains only those records that are of security interest. These records are then reformatted into a standardized format referred to as the host audit record (HAR). Next, a template-driven logic module analyzes the records for suspicious activity. At the lowest level, the agent scans for notable events that are of interest independent of any past events. Examples include failed file accesses, accessing system files, and changing a file’s access control. At the next higher level, the agent looks for sequences of events, such as known attack patterns (signatures). Finally, the agent looks for anomalous behavior of an individual user based on a historical profile of that user, such as number of programs executed, number of files accessed, and the like.
When suspicious activity is detected, an alert is sent to the central manager. The central manager includes an expert system that can draw inferences from received data. The manager may also query individual systems for copies of HARs to correlate with those from other agents.

The LAN monitor agent also supplies information to the central manager. The LAN monitor agent audits host-host connections, services used, and volume of traffic. It searches for significant events, such as sudden changes in network load, the use of security-related services, and network activities such as rlogin.

The architecture depicted in Figures 20.2 and 20.3 is quite general and flexible. It offers a foundation for a machine-independent approach that can expand from stand-alone intrusion detection to a system that is able to correlate activity from a number of sites and networks to detect suspicious activity that would otherwise remain undetected.

Honeypots

A relatively recent innovation in intrusion detection technology is the honeypot. Honeypots are decoy systems that are designed to lure a potential attacker away from critical systems. Honeypots are designed to

- divert an attacker from accessing critical systems
- collect information about the attacker’s activity
- encourage the attacker to stay on the system long enough for administrators to respond
These systems are filled with fabricated information designed to appear valuable but that a legitimate user of the system wouldn’t access. Thus, any access to the honeypot is suspect. The system is instrumented with sensitive monitors and event loggers that detect these accesses and collect information about the attacker’s activities. Because any attack against the honeypot is made to seem successful, administrators have time to mobilize and log and track the attacker without ever exposing productive systems.

Initial efforts involved a single honeypot computer with IP addresses designed to attract hackers. More recent research has focused on building entire honeypot networks that emulate an enterprise, possibly with actual or simulated traffic and data. Once hackers are within the network, administrators can observe their behavior in detail and figure out defenses.

Intrusion Detection Exchange Format

To facilitate the development of distributed intrusion detection systems that can function across a wide range of platforms and environments, standards are needed to support interoperability. Such standards are the focus of the IETF Intrusion Detection Working Group. The purpose of the working group is to define data formats and exchange procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion detection and response systems and to management systems that may need to interact with them. The outputs of this working group include:

1. A requirements document, which describes the high-level functional requirements for communication between intrusion detection systems and requirements for communication between intrusion detection systems and with management systems, including the rationale for those requirements. Scenarios will be used to illustrate the requirements.

2. A common intrusion language specification, which describes data formats that satisfy the requirements.

3. A framework document, which identifies existing protocols best used for communication between intrusion detection systems, and describes how the devised data formats relate to them.

As of this writing, all of these documents are in an Internet-draft document stage.

Password Protection

The front line of defense against intruders is the password system. Virtually all multiuser systems require that a user provide not only a name or identifier (ID) but also a password. The password serves to authenticate the ID of the individual logging on to the system. In turn, the ID provides security in the following ways:

- The ID determines whether the user is authorized to gain access to a system. In some systems, only those who already have an ID filed on the system are allowed to gain access.
• The ID determines the privileges accorded to the user. A few users may have supervisory or “superuser” status that enables them to read files and perform functions that are especially protected by the operating system. Some systems have guest or anonymous accounts, and users of these accounts have more limited privileges than others.

• The ID is used in what is referred to as discretionary access control. For example, by listing the IDs of the other users, a user may grant permission to them to read files owned by that user.

The Vulnerability of Passwords

To understand the nature of the threat to password-based systems, let us consider a scheme that is widely used on UNIX, in which passwords are never stored in the clear. Rather, the following procedure is employed (Figure 20.4a). Each user selects a password of up to eight printable characters in length. This is converted into a 56-bit value (using 7-bit ASCII) that serves as the key input to an encryption routine. The encryption routine, known as crypt(3), is based on DES. The DES algorithm is modified using a 12-bit “salt” value. Typically, this value is related to the time at which the password is assigned to the user. The modified DES algorithm is exercised with a data input consisting of a 64-bit block of zeros. The output of the algorithm then serves as input for a second encryption. This process is repeated for a total of 25 encryptions. The resulting 64-bit output is then translated into an 11-character sequence. The hashed password is then stored, together with a plaintext copy of the salt, in the password file for the corresponding user ID. This method has been shown to be secure against a variety of cryptanalytic attacks [WAGN00].

The salt serves three purposes:

• It prevents duplicate passwords from being visible in the password file. Even if two users choose the same password, those passwords will be assigned at different times. Hence, the “extended” passwords of the two users will differ.

• It effectively increases the length of the password without requiring the user to remember two additional characters. Hence, the number of possible passwords is increased by a factor of 4096, increasing the difficulty of guessing a password.

• It prevents the use of a hardware implementation of DES, which would ease the difficulty of a brute-force guessing attack.

When a user attempts to log on to a UNIX system, the user provides an ID and a password. The operating system uses the ID to index into the password file and retrieve the plaintext salt and the encrypted password. The salt and user-supplied password are used as input to the encryption routine. If the result matches the stored value, the password is accepted.

The encryption routine is designed to discourage guessing attacks. Software implementations of DES are slow compared to hardware versions, and the use of 25 iterations multiplies the time required by 25. However, since the original design of this algorithm, two changes have occurred. First, newer implementations of the algorithm itself have resulted in speedups. For example, the Morris worm described in Chapter 21 was able to do online password guessing of a few hundred passwords
in a reasonably short time by using a more efficient encryption algorithm than the standard one stored on the UNIX systems that it attacked. Second, hardware performance continues to increase, so that any software algorithm executes more quickly.

Thus, there are two threats to the UNIX password scheme. First, a user can gain access on a machine using a guest account or by some other means and then run a password guessing program, called a password cracker, on that machine. The attacker should be able to check hundreds and perhaps thousands of possible passwords with little resource consumption. In addition, if an opponent is able to obtain a copy of the password file, then a cracker program can be run on another machine.
at leisure. This enables the opponent to run through many thousands of possible passwords in a reasonable period.

As an example, a password cracker was reported on the Internet in August 1993 [MADS93]. Using a Thinking Machines Corporation parallel computer, a performance of 1560 encryptions per second per vector unit was achieved. With four vector units per processing node (a standard configuration), this works out to 800,000 encryptions per second on a 128-node machine (which is a modest size) and 6.4 million encryptions per second on a 1024-node machine.

Even these stupendous guessing rates do not yet make it feasible for an attacker to use a dumb brute-force technique of trying all possible combinations of characters to discover a password. Instead, password crackers rely on the fact that some people choose easily guessable passwords.

Some users, when permitted to choose their own password, pick one that is absurdly short. The results of one study at Purdue University are shown in Table 20.4. The study observed password change choices on 54 machines, representing approximately 7000 user accounts. Almost 3% of the passwords were three characters or fewer in length. An attacker could begin the attack by exhaustively testing all possible passwords of length 3 or fewer. A simple remedy is for the system to reject any password choice of fewer than, say, six characters or even to require that all passwords be exactly eight characters in length. Most users would not complain about such a restriction.

Password length is only part of the problem. Many people, when permitted to choose their own password, pick a password that is guessable, such as their own name, their street name, a common dictionary word, and so forth. This makes the job of password cracking straightforward. The cracker simply has to test the password file against lists of likely passwords. Because many people use guessable passwords, such a strategy should succeed on virtually all systems.

One demonstration of the effectiveness of guessing is reported in [KLEI90]. From a variety of sources, the author collected UNIX password files, containing nearly 14,000 encrypted passwords. The result, which the author rightly characterizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Fraction of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3035</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2917</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5772</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13787</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as frightening, is shown in Table 20.5. In all, nearly one-fourth of the passwords were
guessed. The following strategy was used:

1. Try the user’s name, initials, account name, and other relevant personal
   information. In all, 130 different permutations for each user were tried.
2. Try words from various dictionaries. The author compiled a dictionary of over 60,000
   words, including the online dictionary on the system itself, and various
   other lists as shown.

Table 20.5  Passwords Cracked from a Sample Set of 13,797 Accounts [KLEI90]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Password</th>
<th>Search Size</th>
<th>Number of Matches</th>
<th>Percentage of Passwords Matched</th>
<th>Cost/Benefit Ratioa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>User/account name</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character sequences</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place names</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common names</td>
<td>2239</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female names</td>
<td>4280</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male names</td>
<td>2866</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncommon names</td>
<td>4955</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myths &amp; legends</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakespearean</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports terms</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science fiction</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movies and actors</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartoons</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famous people</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrases and patterns</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surnames</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biology</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System dictionary</td>
<td>19683</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine names</td>
<td>9018</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnemonics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King James bible</td>
<td>7525</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous words</td>
<td>3212</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiddish words</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asteroids</td>
<td>2407</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>62727</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aComputed as the number of matches divided by the search size. The more words that needed to be tested for
a match, the lower the cost/benefit ratio.
3. Try various permutations on the words from step 2. This included making the first letter uppercase or a control character, making the entire word uppercase, reversing the word, changing the letter “o” to the digit “zero,” and so on. These permutations added another 1 million words to the list.

4. Try various capitalization permutations on the words from step 2 that were not considered in step 3. This added almost 2 million additional words to the list.

Thus, the test involved in the neighborhood of 3 million words. Using the fastest Thinking Machines implementation listed earlier, the time to encrypt all these words for all possible salt values is under an hour. Keep in mind that such a thorough search could produce a success rate of about 25%, whereas even a single hit may be enough to gain a wide range of privileges on a system.

**Access Control**

One way to thwart a password attack is to deny the opponent access to the password file. If the encrypted password portion of the file is accessible only by a privileged user, then the opponent cannot read it without already knowing the password of a privileged user. [SPAF92a] points out several flaws in this strategy:

- Many systems, including most UNIX systems, are susceptible to unanticipated break-ins. Once an attacker has gained access by some means, he or she may wish to obtain a collection of passwords in order to use different accounts for different logon sessions to decrease the risk of detection. Or a user with an account may desire another user’s account to access privileged data or to sabotage the system.

- An accident of protection might render the password file readable, thus compromising all the accounts.

- Some of the users have accounts on other machines in other protection domains, and they use the same password. Thus, if the passwords could be read by anyone on one machine, a machine in another location might be compromised.

Thus, a more effective strategy would be to force users to select passwords that are difficult to guess.

**Password Selection Strategies**

The lesson from the two experiments just described (Tables 20.4 and 20.5) is that, left to their own devices, many users choose a password that is too short or too easy to guess. At the other extreme, if users are assigned passwords consisting of eight randomly selected printable characters, password cracking is effectively impossible. But it would be almost as impossible for most users to remember their passwords. Fortunately, even if we limit the password universe to strings of characters that are reasonably memorable, the size of the universe is still too large to permit practical cracking. Our goal, then, is to eliminate guessable passwords while allowing the user to select a password that is memorable. Four basic techniques are in use:

- User education
- Computer-generated passwords
• Reactive password checking
• Proactive password checking

Users can be told the importance of using hard-to-guess passwords and can be provided with guidelines for selecting strong passwords. This user education strategy is unlikely to succeed at most installations, particularly where there is a large user population or a lot of turnover. Many users will simply ignore the guidelines. Others may not be good judges of what is a strong password. For example, many users (mistakenly) believe that reversing a word or capitalizing the last letter makes a password unguessable.

Computer-generated passwords also have problems. If the passwords are quite random in nature, users will not be able to remember them. Even if the password is pronounceable, the user may have difficulty remembering it and so be tempted to write it down. In general, computer-generated password schemes have a history of poor acceptance by users. FIPS PUB 181 defines one of the best-designed automated password generators. The standard includes not only a description of the approach but also a complete listing of the C source code of the algorithm. The algorithm generates words by forming pronounceable syllables and concatenating them to form a word. A random number generator produces a random stream of characters used to construct the syllables and words.

A reactive password checking strategy is one in which the system periodically runs its own password cracker to find guessable passwords. The system cancels any passwords that are guessed and notifies the user. This tactic has a number of drawbacks. First, it is resource intensive if the job is done right. Because a determined opponent who is able to steal a password file can devote full CPU time to the task for hours or even days, an effective reactive password checker is at a distinct disadvantage. Furthermore, any existing passwords remain vulnerable until the reactive password checker finds them.

The most promising approach to improved password security is a proactive password checker. In this scheme, a user is allowed to select his or her own password. However, at the time of selection, the system checks to see if the password is allowable and, if not, rejects it. Such checkers are based on the philosophy that, with sufficient guidance from the system, users can select memorable passwords from a fairly large password space that are not likely to be guessed in a dictionary attack.

The trick with a proactive password checker is to strike a balance between user acceptability and strength. If the system rejects too many passwords, users will complain that it is too hard to select a password. If the system uses some simple algorithm to define what is acceptable, this provides guidance to password crackers to refine their guessing technique. In the remainder of this subsection, we look at possible approaches to proactive password checking.

The first approach is a simple system for rule enforcement. For example, the following rules could be enforced:

• All passwords must be at least eight characters long.
• In the first eight characters, the passwords must include at least one each of uppercase, lowercase, numeric digits, and punctuation marks.
These rules could be coupled with advice to the user. Although this approach is superior to simply educating users, it may not be sufficient to thwart password crackers. This scheme alerts crackers as to which passwords \textit{not} to try but may still make it possible to do password cracking.

Another possible procedure is simply to compile a large dictionary of possible “bad” passwords. When a user selects a password, the system checks to make sure that it is not on the disapproved list. There are two problems with this approach:

- **Space**: The dictionary must be very large to be effective. For example, the dictionary used in the Purdue study \cite{SPAF92a} occupies more than 30 megabytes of storage.

- **Time**: The time required to search a large dictionary may itself be large. In addition, to check for likely permutations of dictionary words, either those words must be included in the dictionary, making it truly huge, or each search must also involve considerable processing.

Two techniques for developing an effective and efficient proactive password checker that is based on rejecting words on a list show promise. One of these develops a Markov model for the generation of guessable passwords \cite{DAVI93}. Figure 20.5 shows a simplified version of such a model. This model shows a language consisting of an alphabet of three characters. The state of the system at any time is the identity of the most recent letter. The value on the transition from one state to another represents the probability that one letter follows another. Thus, the probability that the next letter is b, given that the current letter is a, is 0.5.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{markov_model.png}
\caption{An Example Markov Model}
\end{figure}

\begin{equation*}
M = \{3, \{a, b, c\}, T, 1\}
\end{equation*}

\begin{equation*}
T = \begin{bmatrix}
0.0 & 0.5 & 0.5 \\
0.2 & 0.4 & 0.4 \\
1.0 & 0.0 & 0.0
\end{bmatrix}
\end{equation*}

\begin{itemize}
\item e.g., string probably from this language: abbcacaba
\item e.g., string probably not from this language: aacccbaaa
\end{itemize}
In general, a Markov model is a quadruple \([m, A, T, k]\), where \(m\) is the number of states in the model, \(A\) is the state space, \(T\) is the matrix of transition probabilities, and \(k\) is the order of the model. For a \(k\)th-order model, the probability of making a transition to a particular letter depends on the previous \(k\) letters that have been generated. Figure 20.5 shows a simple first-order model.

The authors report on the development and use of a second-order model. To begin, a dictionary of guessable passwords is constructed. Then the transition matrix is calculated as follows:

1. Determine the frequency matrix \(f\), where \(f(i, j, k)\) is the number of occurrences of the trigram consisting of the \(i\)th, \(j\)th, and \(k\)th character. For example, the password \(\text{parsnips}\) yields the trigrams \(\text{par}, \text{ars}, \text{rsn}, \text{smi}, \text{nip},\) and \(\text{ips}\).

2. For each bigram \((i, j)\), calculate \(f(i, j, \infty)\) as the total number of trigrams beginning with \((i, j)\). For example, \(f(a, b, \infty)\) would be the total number of trigrams of the form \(\text{aba}, \text{abb}, \text{abc},\) and so on.

3. Compute the entries of \(T\) as follows:

\[
T(i, j, k) = \frac{f(i, j, k)}{f(i, j, \infty)}
\]

The result is a model that reflects the structure of the words in the dictionary. With this model, the question “Is this a bad password?” is transformed into the question “Was this string (password) generated by this Markov model?” For a given password, the transition probabilities of all its trigrams can be looked up. Some standard statistical tests can then be used to determine if the password is likely or unlikely for that model. Passwords that are likely to be generated by the model are rejected. The authors report good results for a second-order model. Their system catches virtually all the passwords in their dictionary and does not exclude so many potentially good passwords as to be user unfriendly.

A quite different approach has been reported by Spafford [SPAF92a, SPAF92b]. It is based on the use of a Bloom filter [BLOO70]. To begin, we explain the operation of the Bloom filter. A Bloom filter of order \(k\) consists of a set of \(k\) independent hash functions \(H_1(x), H_2(x), \ldots, H_k(x)\), where each function maps a password into a hash value in the range 0 to \(N - 1\). That is,

\[
H_i(X_j) = y \quad 1 \leq i \leq k; \quad 1 \leq j \leq D; \quad 0 \leq y \leq N - 1
\]

where

\[
X_j = j\text{th word in password dictionary}
\]

\[
D = \text{number of words in password dictionary}
\]

The following procedure is then applied to the dictionary:

1. A hash table of \(N\) bits is defined, with all bits initially set to 0.
2. For each password, its \(k\) hash values are calculated, and the corresponding bits in the hash table are set to 1. Thus, if \(H_i(X_j) = 67\) for some \((i, j)\), then the sixty-seventh bit of the hash table is set to 1; if the bit already has the value 1, it remains at 1.
When a new password is presented to the checker, its $k$ hash values are calculated. If all the corresponding bits of the hash table are equal to 1, then the password is rejected. All passwords in the dictionary will be rejected. But there will also be some “false positives” (that is, passwords that are not in the dictionary but that produce a match in the hash table). To see this, consider a scheme with two hash functions. Suppose that the passwords *undertaker* and *hulkhogan* are in the dictionary, but *xG%jj98* is not. Further suppose that

\[
H_1(\text{undertaker}) = 25 \quad H_1(\text{hulkhogan}) = 83 \quad H_1(\text{xG%jj98}) = 665 \\
H_2(\text{undertaker}) = 998 \quad H_2(\text{hulkhogan}) = 665 \quad H_2(\text{xG%jj98}) = 998
\]

If the password *xG%jj98* is presented to the system, it will be rejected even though it is not in the dictionary. If there are too many such false positives, it will be difficult for users to select passwords. Therefore, we would like to design the hash scheme to minimize false positives. It can be shown that the probability of a false positive can be approximated by:

\[
P \approx \left(1 - e^{kD/N}\right)^k = \left(1 - e^{k/R}\right)^k
\]

or, equivalently,

\[
R \approx \frac{-k}{\ln(1 - P^{1/k})}
\]

where

- $k$ = number of hash functions
- $N$ = number of bits in hash table
- $D$ = number of words in dictionary
- $R = N/D$, ratio of hash table size (bits) to dictionary size (words)

Figure 20.6 plots $P$ as a function of $R$ for various values of $k$. Suppose we have a dictionary of 1 million words and we wish to have a 0.01 probability of rejecting a password not in the dictionary. If we choose six hash functions, the required ratio is $R = 9.6$. Therefore, we need a hash table of $9.6 \times 10^6$ bits or about 1.2 MBytes of storage. In contrast, storage of the entire dictionary would require on the order of 8 MBytes. Thus, we achieve a compression of almost a factor of 7. Furthermore, password checking involves the straightforward calculation of six hash functions and is independent of the size of the dictionary, whereas with the use of the full dictionary, there is substantial searching.\(^1\)

---

\(^1\)Both the Markov model and the Bloom filter involve the use of probabilistic techniques. In the case of the Markov model, there is a small probability that some passwords in the dictionary will not be caught and a small probability that some passwords not in the dictionary will be rejected. In the case of the Bloom filter, there is a small probability that some passwords not in the dictionary will be rejected. Again we see that taking a probabilistic approach simplifies the solution (e.g., see the Miller-Rabin algorithm in Chapter 8).
Two thorough treatments of intrusion detection are [BACE00] and [PROC01]. A more concise but very worthwhile treatment is [SCAR07]. Two short but useful survey articles on the subject are [KENT00] and [MCHU00]. [NING04] surveys recent advances in intrusion detection techniques. [HONE01] is the definitive account on honeypots and provides a detailed analysis of the tools and methods of hackers.

Recommended Web Sites:

- **CERT Coordination Center**: The organization that grew from the computer emergency response team formed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Site provides good information on Internet security threats, vulnerabilities, and attack statistics.
- **Packet Storm**: Resource of up-to-date and historical security tools, exploits, and advisories.
- **Honeynet Project**: A research project studying the techniques of predatory hackers and developing honeypot products.
- **Honeypots**: A good collection of research papers and technical articles.
- **Intrusion Detection Working Group**: IETF group developing standards for exchange formats and exchange procedures for intrusion detection systems. Includes RFCs and Internet drafts.
- **STAT Project**: A research and open-source project at the U. of California, Santa Barbara that focuses on signature-based intrusion detection tools for hosts, applications, and networks.
- **Password Usage and Generation**: NIST documents on this topic.

### 20.5 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

**Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>audit record</th>
<th>intruder</th>
<th>password</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayes’ Theorem</td>
<td>intrusion detection</td>
<td>rule-based intrusion detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>base-rate fallacy</td>
<td>intrusion detection exchange format</td>
<td>salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>honeypot</td>
<td></td>
<td>statistical anomaly detection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Review Questions**

20.1 List and briefly define three classes of intruders.
20.2 What are two common techniques used to protect a password file?
20.3 What are three benefits that can be provided by an intrusion detection system?
20.4 What is the difference between statistical anomaly detection and rule-based intrusion detection?
20.5 What metrics are useful for profile-based intrusion detection?
20.6 What is the difference between rule-based anomaly detection and rule-based penetration identification?
20.7 What is a honeypot?
20.8 What is a salt in the context of UNIX password management?
20.9 List and briefly define four techniques used to avoid guessable passwords.
Problems

20.1 In the context of an IDS, we define a false positive to be an alarm generated by an IDS in which the IDS alerts to a condition that is actually benign. A false negative occurs when an IDS fails to generate an alarm when an alert-worthy condition is in effect. Using the following diagram, depict two curves that roughly indicate false positives and false negatives, respectively.

![Conservativeness of signatures vs. Frequency of alerts](image)

20.2 The overlapping area of the two probability density functions of Figure 20.1 represents the region in which there is the potential for false positives and false negatives. Further, Figure 20.1 is an idealized and not necessarily representative depiction of the relative shapes of the two density functions. Suppose there is 1 actual intrusion for every 1000 authorized users, and the overlapping area covers 1% of the authorized users and 50% of the intruders.

a. Sketch such a set of density functions and argue that this is not an unreasonable depiction.

b. What is the probability that an event that occurs in this region is that of an authorized user? Keep in mind that 50% of all intrusions fall in this region.

20.3 An example of a host-based intrusion detection tool is the tripwire program. This is a file integrity checking tool that scans files and directories on the system on a regular basis and notifies the administrator of any changes. It uses a protected database of cryptographic checksums for each file checked and compares this value with that recomputed on each file as it is scanned. It must be configured with a list of files and directories to check, and what changes, if any, are permissible to each. It can allow, for example, log files to have new entries appended, but not for existing entries to be changed. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using such a tool? Consider the problem of determining which files should only change rarely, which files may change more often and how, and which change frequently and hence cannot be checked. Hence consider the amount of work in both the configuration of the program and on the system administrator monitoring the responses generated.

20.4 A taxicab was involved in a fatal hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are told that:

- 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue.
- A witness identified the cab as Blue.

The court tested the reliability of the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and concluded that the witness was correct in identifying the color of the cab 80% of the time. What is the probability that the cab involved in the incident was Blue rather than Green?

20.5 Explain the suitability or unsuitability of the following passwords:

- YK 334
- mfmitm (for “my favorite movie is tender mercies”)
- Natalie1
- Washington
- Aristotle
- tv9stove
- 12345678
- dribgib
20.6 An early attempt to force users to use less predictable passwords involved computer-supplied passwords. The passwords were eight characters long and were taken from the character set consisting of lowercase letters and digits. They were generated by a pseudorandom number generator with $2^{16}$ possible starting values. Using the technology of the time, the time required to search through all character strings of length 8 from a 36-character alphabet was 112 years. Unfortunately, this is not a true reflection of the actual security of the system. Explain the problem.

20.7 Assume that passwords are selected from four-character combinations of 26 alphabetic characters. Assume that an adversary is able to attempt passwords at a rate of one per second.
   a. Assuming no feedback to the adversary until each attempt has been completed, what is the expected time to discover the correct password?
   b. Assuming feedback to the adversary flagging an error as each incorrect character is entered, what is the expected time to discover the correct password?

20.8 Assume that source elements of length $k$ are mapped in some uniform fashion into a target elements of length $p$. If each digit can take on one of $r$ values, then the number of source elements is $r^k$ and the number of target elements is the smaller number $r^p$.
   A particular source element $x_i$ is mapped to a particular target element $y_j$.
   a. What is the probability that the correct source element can be selected by an adversary on one try?
   b. What is the probability that a different source element $x_k(x_i \neq x_k)$ that results in the same target element, $y_j$, could be produced by an adversary?
   c. What is the probability that the correct target element can be produced by an adversary on one try?

20.9 A phonetic password generator picks two segments randomly for each six-letter password. The form of each segment is CVC (consonant, vowel, consonant), where $V = \langle a, e, i, o, u \rangle$ and $C = \bar{V}$.
   a. What is the total password population?
   b. What is the probability of an adversary guessing a password correctly?

20.10 Assume that passwords are limited to the use of the 95 printable ASCII characters and that all passwords are 10 characters in length. Assume a password cracker with an encryption rate of 6.4 million encryptions per second. How long will it take to test exhaustively all possible passwords on a UNIX system?

20.11 Because of the known risks of the UNIX password system, the SunOS-4.0 documentation recommends that the password file be removed and replaced with a publicly readable file called /etc/publickey. An entry in the file for user A consists of a user’s identifier $ID_A$, the user’s public key, $PU_A$, and the corresponding private key $PR_A$. This private key is encrypted using DES with a key derived from the user’s login password $P_a$. When A logs in, the system decrypts $E(P_a, PR_A)$ to obtain $PR_A$.
   a. The system then verifies that $P_a$ was correctly supplied. How?
   b. How can an opponent attack this system?

20.12 The encryption scheme used for UNIX passwords is one way; it is not possible to reverse it. Therefore, would it be accurate to say that this is, in fact, a hash code rather than an encryption of the password?

20.13 It was stated that the inclusion of the salt in the UNIX password scheme increases the difficulty of guessing by a factor of 4096. But the salt is stored in plaintext in the same entry as the corresponding ciphertext password. Therefore, those two characters are known to the attacker and need not be guessed. Why is it asserted that the salt increases security?

20.14 Assuming that you have successfully answered the preceding problem and understand the significance of the salt, here is another question. Wouldn’t it be possible to thwart completely all password crackers by dramatically increasing the salt size to, say, 24 or 48 bits?

20.15 Consider the Bloom filter discussed in Section 20.3. Define $k = \text{number of hash functions}; N = \text{number of bits in hash table};$ and $D = \text{number of words in dictionary}.$
APPENDIX 20A / THE BASE-RATE FALLACY 20-33

a. Show that the expected number of bits in the hash table that are equal to zero is expressed as

\[ \phi = \left(1 - \frac{k}{N}\right)^D \]

b. Show that the probability that an input word, not in the dictionary, will be falsely accepted as being in the dictionary is

\[ P = (1 - \phi)^k \]

c. Show that the preceding expression can be approximated as

\[ P \approx \left(1 - e^{-kD/N}\right)^k \]

20.16 Design a file access system to allow certain users read and write access to a file, depending on authorization set up by the system. The instructions should be of the format:

READ (F, User A): attempt by User A to read file F
READ (F, User A): attempt by User A to store a possibly modified copy of F

Each file has a header record, which contains authorization privileges; that is, a list of users who can read and write. The file is to be encrypted by a key that is not shared by the users but known only to the system.

APPENDIX 20A THE BASE-RATE FALLACY

We begin with a review of important results from probability theory, then demonstrate the base-rate fallacy.

Conditional Probability and Independence

We often want to know a probability that is conditional on some event. The effect of the condition is to remove some of the outcomes from the sample space. For example, what is the probability of getting a sum of 8 on the roll of two dice, if we know that the face of at least one die is an even number? We can reason as follows. Because one die is even and the sum is even, the second die must show an even number. Thus, there are three equally likely successful outcomes: (2, 6), (4, 4) and (6, 2), out of a total set of possibilities of \([36 - (\text{number of events with both faces odd})] = 36 - (3 \times 3) = 27\). The resulting probability is \(3/27 = 1/9\).

Formally, the conditional probability of an event \(A\) assuming the event \(B\) has occurred, denoted by \(\Pr[A \mid B]\), is defined as the ratio

\[ \Pr[A \mid B] = \frac{\Pr[AB]}{\Pr[B]} \]

where we assume \(\Pr[B]\) is not zero.

In our example, \(A = \{\text{sum of 8}\}\) and \(B = \{\text{at least one die even}\}\). The quantity \(\Pr[AB]\) encompasses all of those outcomes in which the sum is 8 and at least one die is even. As we have seen, there are three such outcomes. Thus, \(\Pr[AB] = 3/36 = 1/12\). A moment’s thought should convince you that \(\Pr[B] = 3/4\). We can now calculate
This agrees with our previous reasoning.

Two events $A$ and $B$ are called **independent** if $\Pr[AB] = \Pr[A]\Pr[B]$. It can easily be seen that if $A$ and $B$ are independent, $\Pr[A|B] = \Pr[A]$ and $\Pr[B|A] = \Pr[B]$.

### Bayes’ Theorem

One of the most important results from probability theory is known as Bayes’ theorem. First we need to state the total probability formula. Given a set of mutually exclusive events $E_1, E_2, \ldots, E_n$, such that the union of these events covers all possible outcomes, and given an arbitrary event $A$, then it can be shown that

$$\Pr[A] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Pr[A|E_i]\Pr[E_i]$$

(20.1)

Bayes’ theorem may be stated as follows:

$$\Pr[E_i|A] = \frac{\Pr[A|E_i]\Pr[E_i]}{\Pr[A]} = \frac{\Pr[A|E_i]\Pr[E_i]}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} \Pr[A|E_j]\Pr[E_j]}$$

(20.2)

Figure 20.7a illustrates the concepts of total probability and Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem is used to calculate “posterior odds,” that is, the probability that something really is the case, given evidence in favor of it. For example, suppose we are transmitting a sequence of zeroes and ones over a noisy transmission line. Let $S_0$ and $S_1$ be the events a zero is sent at a given time and a one is sent, respectively, and $R_0$ and $R_1$ be the events that a zero is received and a one is received. Suppose we know the probabilities of the source, namely $\Pr[S_0] = p$ and $\Pr[S_1] = 1 - p$. Now the line is observed to determine how frequently an error occurs when a one is sent and when a zero is sent, and the following probabilities are calculated: $\Pr[R_0|S_0] = p_a$ and $\Pr[R_1|S_0] = p_b$. If a zero is received, we can then

![Diagram illustrating concepts](image1)

(a) Diagram to illustrate concepts

![Example](image2)

(b) Example

**Figure 20.7** Illustration of Total Probability and Bayes’ Theorem
calculate the conditional probability of an error, namely the conditional probability that a one was sent given that a zero was received, using Bayes’ theorem:

\[
\Pr[S1 \mid R0] = \frac{\Pr[R0 \mid S1] \Pr[S1]}{\Pr[R0 \mid S1] \Pr[S1] + \Pr[R0 \mid S0] \Pr[S0]} = \frac{p_a p}{p_a p + (1 - p_b)(1 - p)}
\]

Figure 20.7b illustrates the preceding equation. In the figure, the sample space is represented by a unit square. Half of the square corresponds to S0 and half to S1, so \(\Pr[S0] = \Pr[S1] = 0.5\). Similarly, half of the square corresponds to R0 and half to R1, so \(\Pr[R0] = \Pr[R1] = 0.5\). Within the area representing S0, 1/4 of that area corresponds to R1, so \(\Pr[R1/S0] = 0.25\). Other conditional probabilities are similarly evident.

**The Base-Rate Fallacy Demonstrated**

Consider the following situation. A patient has a test for some disease that comes back positive (indicating he has the disease). You are told that

- The accuracy of the test is 87% (i.e., if a patient has the disease, 87% of the time, the test yields the correct result, and if the patient does not have the disease, 87% of the time, the test yields the correct result).
- The incidence of the disease in the population is 1%.

Given that the test is positive, how probable is it that the patient does not have the disease? That is, what is the probability that this is a false alarm? We need Bayes’ theorem to get the correct answer:

\[
\Pr[\text{well/positive}] = \frac{\Pr[\text{positive/well}] \Pr[\text{well}]}{\Pr[\text{positive/disease}] \Pr[\text{disease}] + \Pr[\text{positive/well}] \Pr[\text{well}]}
\]

\[
= \frac{(0.13)(0.99)}{(0.87)(0.01) + (0.13)(0.99)} = 0.937
\]

Thus, in the vast majority of cases, when a disease condition is detected, it is a false alarm.

This problem, used in a study [PIAT91], was presented to a number of people. Most subjects gave the answer 13%. The vast majority, including many physicians, gave a number below 50%. Many physicians who guessed wrong lamented, “If you are right, there is no point in making clinical tests!” The reason most people get it wrong is that they do not take into account the basic rate of incidence (the base rate) when intuitively solving the problem. This error is known as the *base-rate fallacy*.

How could this problem be fixed? Suppose we could drive both of the correct result rates to 99.9%. That is, suppose we have \(\Pr[\text{positive/disease}] = 0.999\) and \(\Pr[\text{negative/well}] = 0.999\). Plugging these numbers into the Equation (20.2), we get \(\Pr[\text{well/positive}] = 0.09\). Thus, if we can accurately detect disease and accurately detect lack of disease at a level of 99.9%, then the rate of false alarms will be 9%. This is much better, but still not ideal. Moreover, again assume 99.9% accuracy, but now suppose that the incidence of the disease in the population is only \(1/10000 = 0.0001\). We then end up with a rate of false alarms of 91%. In actual situations, [AXEL00] found that the probabilities associated with intrusion detection systems were such that the false alarm rate was unsatisfactory.
This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 21

MALICIOUS SOFTWARE

21.1 Types Of Malicious Software
- Backdoor
- Logic Bomb
- Trojan Horses
- Mobile Code
- Multiple-Threat Malware

21.2 Viruses
- The Nature of Viruses
- Viruses Classification
- Virus Kits
- Macro Viruses
- E-Mail Viruses

21.3 Virus Countermeasures
- Antivirus Approaches
- Advanced Antivirus Techniques

21.4 Worms
- The Morris Worm
- Worm Propagation Model
- Recent Worm Attacks
- State of Worm Technology
- Mobile Phone Worms
- Worm Countermeasures

21.5 Distributed Denial Of Service Attacks
- DDoS Attack Description
- Constructing the Attack Network
- DDoS Countermeasures

21.6 Recommended Reading And Web Sites

21.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, And Problems
CHAPTER 21 / MALICIOUS SOFTWARE

What is the concept of defense: The parrying of a blow. What is its characteristic feature: Awaiting the blow.

—On War, Carl Von Clausewitz

KEY POINTS

◆ Malicious software is software that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose.
◆ A virus is a piece of software that can “infect” other programs by modifying them; the modification includes a copy of the virus program, which can then go on to infect other programs.
◆ A worm is a program that can replicate itself and send copies from computer to computer across network connections. Upon arrival, the worm may be activated to replicate and propagate again. In addition to propagation, the worm usually performs some unwanted function.
◆ A denial of service (DoS) attack is an attempt to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service.
◆ A distributed denial of service attack is launched from multiple coordinated sources.

Perhaps the most sophisticated types of threats to computer systems are presented by programs that exploit vulnerabilities in computing systems. Such threats are referred to as malicious software, or malware. In this context, we are concerned with threats to application programs as well as utility programs, such as editors and compilers, and kernel-level programs.

This chapter examines malicious software, with a special emphasis on viruses and worms. The chapter begins with a survey of various types of malware, with a more detailed look at the nature of viruses and worms. We then turn to distributed denial-of-service attacks. Throughout, the discussion presents both threats and countermeasures.

21.1 TYPES OF MALICIOUS SOFTWARE

The terminology in this area presents problems because of a lack of universal agreement on all of the terms and because some of the categories overlap. Table 21.1 is a useful guide.

Malicious software can be divided into two categories: those that need a host program, and those that are independent. The former, referred to as parasitic, are essentially fragments of programs that cannot exist independently of some actual application program, utility, or system program. Viruses, logic bombs,
Table 21.1 Terminology of Malicious Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virus</td>
<td>Malware that, when executed, tries to replicate itself into other executable code; when it succeeds the code is said to be infected. When the infected code is executed, the virus also executes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worm</td>
<td>A computer program that can run independently and can propagate a complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic bomb</td>
<td>A program inserted into software by an intruder. A logic bomb lies dormant until a pre-defined condition is met; the program then triggers an unauthorized act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan horse</td>
<td>A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the Trojan horse program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backdoor (trapdoor)</td>
<td>Any mechanism that bypasses a normal security check; it may allow unauthorized access to functionality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile code</td>
<td>Software (e.g., script, macro, or other portable instruction) that can be shipped unchanged to a heterogeneous collection of platforms and execute with identical semantics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploits</td>
<td>Code specific to a single vulnerability or set of vulnerabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downloaders</td>
<td>Program that installs other items on a machine that is under attack. Usually, a downloader is sent in an e-mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-rooter</td>
<td>Malicious hacker tools used to break into new machines remotely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kit (virus generator)</td>
<td>Set of tools for generating new viruses automatically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spammer programs</td>
<td>Used to send large volumes of unwanted e-mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flooders</td>
<td>Used to attack networked computer systems with a large volume of traffic to carry out a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyloggers</td>
<td>Captures keystrokes on a compromised system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootkit</td>
<td>Set of hacker tools used after attacker has broken into a computer system and gained root-level access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zombie, bot</td>
<td>Program activated on an infected machine that is activated to launch attacks on other machines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyware</td>
<td>Software that collects information from a computer and transmits it to another system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adware</td>
<td>Advertising that is integrated into software. It can result in pop-up ads or redirection of a browser to a commercial site.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and backdoors are examples. Independent malware is a self-contained program that can be scheduled and run by the operating system. Worms and bot programs are examples.

We can also differentiate between those software threats that do not replicate and those that do. The former are programs or fragments of programs that are activated by a trigger. Examples are logic bombs, backdoors, and bot programs. The latter consist of either a program fragment or an independent program that, when executed, may produce one or more copies of itself to be
activated later on the same system or some other system. Viruses and worms are examples.

In the remainder of this section, we briefly survey some of the key categories of malicious software, deferring discussion on the key topics of viruses and worms until the following sections.

Backdoor

A **backdoor**, also known as a **trapdoor**, is a secret entry point into a program that allows someone who is aware of the backdoor to gain access without going through the usual security access procedures. Programmers have used backdoors legitimately for many years to debug and test programs; such a backdoor is called a **maintenance hook**. This usually is done when the programmer is developing an application that has an authentication procedure, or a long setup, requiring the user to enter many different values to run the application. To debug the program, the developer may wish to gain special privileges or to avoid all the necessary setup and authentication. The programmer may also want to ensure that there is a method of activating the program should something be wrong with the authentication procedure that is being built into the application. The backdoor is code that recognizes some special sequence of input or is triggered by being run from a certain user ID or by an unlikely sequence of events.

Backdoors become threats when unscrupulous programmers use them to gain unauthorized access. The backdoor was the basic idea for the vulnerability portrayed in the movie *War Games*. Another example is that during the development of Multics, penetration tests were conducted by an Air Force “tiger team” (simulating adversaries). One tactic employed was to send a bogus operating system update to a site running Multics. The update contained a Trojan horse (described later) that could be activated by a backdoor and that allowed the tiger team to gain access. The threat was so well implemented that the Multics developers could not find it, even after they were informed of its presence [ENGE80].

It is difficult to implement operating system controls for backdoors. Security measures must focus on the program development and software update activities.

Logic Bomb

One of the oldest types of program threat, predating viruses and worms, is the logic bomb. The logic bomb is code embedded in some legitimate program that is set to “explode” when certain conditions are met. Examples of conditions that can be used as triggers for a logic bomb are the presence or absence of certain files, a particular day of the week or date, or a particular user running the application. Once triggered, a bomb may alter or delete data or entire files, cause a machine halt, or do some other damage. A striking example of how logic bombs can be employed was the case of Tim Lloyd, who was convicted of setting a logic bomb that cost his employer, Omega Engineering, more than $10 million, derailed its corporate growth strategy, and eventually led to the layoff of 80
workers [GAUD00]. Ultimately, Lloyd was sentenced to 41 months in prison and ordered to pay $2 million in restitution.

**Trojan Horses**

A Trojan horse\(^1\) is a useful, or apparently useful, program or command procedure containing hidden code that, when invoked, performs some unwanted or harmful function.

Trojan horse programs can be used to accomplish functions indirectly that an unauthorized user could not accomplish directly. For example, to gain access to the files of another user on a shared system, a user could create a Trojan horse program that, when executed, changes the invoking user’s file permissions so that the files are readable by any user. The author could then induce users to run the program by placing it in a common directory and naming it such that it appears to be a useful utility program or application. An example is a program that ostensibly produces a listing of the user’s files in a desirable format. After another user has run the program, the author of the program can then access the information in the user’s files. An example of a Trojan horse program that would be difficult to detect is a compiler that has been modified to insert additional code into certain programs as they are compiled, such as a system login program [THOM84]. The code creates a backdoor in the login program that permits the author to log on to the system using a special password. This Trojan horse can never be discovered by reading the source code of the login program.

Another common motivation for the Trojan horse is data destruction. The program appears to be performing a useful function (e.g., a calculator program), but it may also be quietly deleting the user’s files. For example, a CBS executive was victimized by a Trojan horse that destroyed all information contained in his computer’s memory [TIME90]. The Trojan horse was implanted in a graphics routine offered on an electronic bulletin board system.

Trojan horses fit into one of three models:

- Continuing to perform the function of the original program and additionally performing a separate malicious activity
- Continuing to perform the function of the original program but modifying the function to perform malicious activity (e.g., a Trojan horse version of a login program that collects passwords) or to disguise other malicious activity (e.g., a Trojan horse version of a process listing program that does not display certain processes that are malicious)
- Performing a malicious function that completely replaces the function of the original program

\(^1\)In Greek mythology, the Trojan horse was used by the Greeks during their siege of Troy. Epeios constructed a giant hollow wooden horse in which thirty of the most valiant Greek heroes concealed themselves. The rest of the Greeks burned their encampment and pretended to sail away but actually hid nearby. The Trojans, convinced the horse was a gift and the siege over, dragged the horse into the city. That night, the Greeks emerged from the horse and opened the city gates to the Greek army. A bloodbath ensued, resulting in the destruction of Troy and the death or enslavement of all its citizens.
Mobile Code

Mobile code refers to programs (e.g., script, macro, or other portable instruction) that can be shipped unchanged to a heterogeneous collection of platforms and execute with identical semantics [JANS01]. The term also applies to situations involving a large homogeneous collection of platforms (e.g., Microsoft Windows).

Mobile code is transmitted from a remote system to a local system and then executed on the local system without the user’s explicit instruction. Mobile code often acts as a mechanism for a virus, worm, or Trojan horse to be transmitted to the user’s workstation. In other cases, mobile code takes advantage of vulnerabilities to perform its own exploits, such as unauthorized data access or root compromise. Popular vehicles for mobile code include Java applets, ActiveX, JavaScript, and VBScript. The most common ways of using mobile code for malicious operations on local system are cross-site scripting, interactive and dynamic Web sites, e-mail attachments, and downloads from untrusted sites or of untrusted software.

Multiple-Threat Malware

Viruses and other malware may operate in multiple ways. The terminology is far from uniform; this subsection gives a brief introduction to several related concepts that could be considered multiple-threat malware.

A multipartite virus infects in multiple ways. Typically, the multipartite virus is capable of infecting multiple types of files, so that virus eradication must deal with all of the possible sites of infection.

A blended attack uses multiple methods of infection or transmission, to maximize the speed of contagion and the severity of the attack. Some writers characterize a blended attack as a package that includes multiple types of malware. An example of a blended attack is the Nimda attack, erroneously referred to as simply a worm. Nimda uses four distribution methods:

- **E-mail:** A user on a vulnerable host opens an infected e-mail attachment; Nimda looks for e-mail addresses on the host and then sends copies of itself to those addresses.
- **Windows shares:** Nimda scans hosts for unsecured Windows file shares; it can then use NetBIOS86 as a transport mechanism to infect files on that host in the hopes that a user will run an infected file, which will activate Nimda on that host.
- **Web servers:** Nimda scans Web servers, looking for known vulnerabilities in Microsoft IIS. If it finds a vulnerable server, it attempts to transfer a copy of itself to the server and infect it and its files.
- **Web clients:** If a vulnerable Web client visits a Web server that has been infected by Nimda, the client’s workstation will become infected.

Thus, Nimda has worm, virus, and mobile code characteristics. Blended attacks may also spread through other services, such as instant messaging and peer-to-peer file sharing.
21.2 VIRUSES

The Nature of Viruses

A computer virus is a piece of software that can “infect” other programs by modifying them; the modification includes injecting the original program with a routine to make copies of the virus program, which can then go on to infect other programs. Computer viruses first appeared in the early 1980s, and the term itself is attributed to Fred Cohen in 1983. Cohen is the author of a groundbreaking book on the subject [COHE94].

Biological viruses are tiny scraps of genetic code—DNA or RNA—that can take over the machinery of a living cell and trick it into making thousands of flawless replicas of the original virus. Like its biological counterpart, a computer virus carries in its instructional code the recipe for making perfect copies of itself. The typical virus becomes embedded in a program on a computer. Then, whenever the infected computer comes into contact with an uninfected piece of software, a fresh copy of the virus passes into the new program. Thus, the infection can be spread from computer to computer by unsuspecting users who either swap disks or send programs to one another over a network. In a network environment, the ability to access applications and system services on other computers provides a perfect culture for the spread of a virus.

A virus can do anything that other programs do. The difference is that a virus attaches itself to another program and executes secretly when the host program is run. Once a virus is executing, it can perform any function, such as erasing files and programs that is allowed by the privileges of the current user.

A computer virus has three parts [AYCO06]:

- **Infection mechanism**: The means by which a virus spreads, enabling it to replicate. The mechanism is also referred to as the infection vector.
- **Trigger**: The event or condition that determines when the payload is activated or delivered.
- **Payload**: What the virus does, besides spreading. The payload may involve damage or may involve benign but noticeable activity.

During its lifetime, a typical virus goes through the following four phases:

- **Dormant phase**: The virus is idle. The virus will eventually be activated by some event, such as a date, the presence of another program or file, or the capacity of the disk exceeding some limit. Not all viruses have this stage.
- **Propagation phase**: The virus places a copy of itself into other programs or into certain system areas on the disk. The copy may not be identical to the propagating version; viruses often morph to evade detection. Each infected program will now contain a clone of the virus, which will itself enter a propagation phase.
- **Triggering phase**: The virus is activated to perform the function for which it was intended. As with the dormant phase, the triggering phase can be caused by a variety of system events, including a count of the number of times that this copy of the virus has made copies of itself.
EXECUTION PHASE: The function is performed. The function may be harmless, such as a message on the screen, or damaging, such as the destruction of programs and data files.

Most viruses carry out their work in a manner that is specific to a particular operating system and, in some cases, specific to a particular hardware platform. Thus, they are designed to take advantage of the details and weaknesses of particular systems.

Virus Structure: A virus can be prepended or postpended to an executable program, or it can be embedded in some other fashion. The key to its operation is that the infected program, when invoked, will first execute the virus code and then execute the original code of the program.

A very general depiction of virus structure is shown in Figure 21.1 (based on [COHE94]). In this case, the virus code, V, is prepended to infected programs, and it is assumed that the entry point to the program, when invoked, is the first line of the program.

The infected program begins with the virus code and works as follows. The first line of code is a jump to the main virus program. The second line is a special marker that is used by the virus to determine whether or not a potential victim program has already been infected with this virus. When the program is invoked, control is immediately transferred to the main virus program. The virus program may first seek out uninfected executable files and infect them. Next, the virus may perform some action, usually detrimental to the system. This action could be performed every time the program is invoked, or it could be a logic bomb that triggers only under certain conditions. Finally, the virus transfers control to the original program. If the infection

```plaintext
program V :=
{ goto main;
  1234567;

  subroutine infect-executable :=
    { loop:
      file := get-random-executable-file;
      if (first-line-of-file = 1234567)
        then goto loop
      else prepend V to file; }

  subroutine do-damage :=
    { whatever damage is to be done }

  subroutine trigger-pulled :=
    { return true if some condition holds }

  main: main-program :=
    { infect-executable;
      if trigger-pulled then do-damage;
      goto next; }

  next: goto main;
}
```

Figure 21.1  A Simple Virus
phase of the program is reasonably rapid, a user is unlikely to notice any difference between the execution of an infected and an uninfected program.

A virus such as the one just described is easily detected because an infected version of a program is longer than the corresponding uninfected one. A way to thwart such a simple means of detecting a virus is to compress the executable file so that both the infected and uninfected versions are of identical length. Figure 21.2 [COHE94] shows in general terms the logic required. The key lines in this virus are numbered, and Figure 21.3 [COHE94] illustrates the operation. We assume that program P1 is infected with the virus CV. When this program is invoked, control passes to its virus, which performs the following steps:

1. For each uninfected file P2 that is found, the virus first compresses that file to produce P2’, which is shorter than the original program by the size of the virus.
2. A copy of the virus is prepended to the compressed program.
3. The compressed version of the original infected program, P1’, is uncompressed.
4. The uncompressed original program is executed.
In this example, the virus does nothing other than propagate. As previously mentioned, the virus may include a logic bomb.

Initial Infection Once a virus has gained entry to a system by infecting a single program, it is in a position to potentially infect some or all other executable files on that system when the infected program executes. Thus, viral infection can be completely prevented by preventing the virus from gaining entry in the first place. Unfortunately, prevention is extraordinarily difficult because a virus can be part of any program outside a system. Thus, unless one is content to take an absolutely bare piece of iron and write all one’s own system and application programs, one is vulnerable. Many forms of infection can also be blocked by denying normal users the right to modify programs on the system.

The lack of access controls on early PCs is a key reason why traditional machine code based viruses spread rapidly on these systems. In contrast, while it is easy enough to write a machine code virus for UNIX systems, they were almost never seen in practice because the existence of access controls on these systems prevented effective propagation of the virus. Traditional machine code based viruses are now less prevalent, because modern PC OSs do have more effective access controls. However, virus creators have found other avenues, such as macro and e-mail viruses, as discussed subsequently.

Viruses Classification

There has been a continuous arms race between virus writers and writers of antivirus software since viruses first appeared. As effective countermeasures are developed for existing types of viruses, newer types are developed. There is no simple or universally agreed upon classification scheme for viruses. In this section, we follow [AYCO06] and classify viruses along two orthogonal axes: the type of target the virus tries to infect and the method the virus uses to conceal itself from detection by users and antivirus software.

A virus classification by target includes the following categories:

- **Boot sector infector:** Infects a master boot record or boot record and spreads when a system is booted from the disk containing the virus.
- **File infector:** Infects files that the operating system or shell consider to be executable.
- **Macro virus:** Infects files with macro code that is interpreted by an application.

A virus classification by concealment strategy includes the following categories:

- **Encrypted virus:** A typical approach is as follows. A portion of the virus creates a random encryption key and encrypts the remainder of the virus. The key is stored with the virus. When an infected program is invoked, the virus uses the stored random key to decrypt the virus. When the virus replicates, a different random key is selected. Because the bulk of the virus is encrypted with a different key for each instance, there is no constant bit pattern to observe.
• **Stealth virus:** A form of virus explicitly designed to hide itself from detection by antivirus software. Thus, the entire virus, not just a payload is hidden.

• **Polymorphic virus:** A virus that mutates with every infection, making detection by the “signature” of the virus impossible.

• **Metamorphic virus:** As with a polymorphic virus, a metamorphic virus mutates with every infection. The difference is that a metamorphic virus rewrites itself completely at each iteration, increasing the difficulty of detection. Metamorphic viruses may change their behavior as well as their appearance.

One example of a *stealth virus* was discussed earlier: a virus that uses compression so that the infected program is exactly the same length as an uninfected version. Far more sophisticated techniques are possible. For example, a virus can place intercept logic in disk I/O routines, so that when there is an attempt to read suspected portions of the disk using these routines, the virus will present back the original, uninfected program. Thus, *stealth* is not a term that applies to a virus as such but, rather, refers to a technique used by a virus to evade detection.

A *polymorphic virus* creates copies during replication that are functionally equivalent but have distinctly different bit patterns. As with a stealth virus, the purpose is to defeat programs that scan for viruses. In this case, the “signature” of the virus will vary with each copy. To achieve this variation, the virus may randomly insert superfluous instructions or interchange the order of independent instructions. A more effective approach is to use encryption. The strategy of the encryption virus is followed. The portion of the virus that is responsible for generating keys and performing encryption/decryption is referred to as the *mutation engine*. The mutation engine itself is altered with each use.

**Virus Kits**

Another weapon in the virus writers’ armory is the virus-creation toolkit. Such a toolkit enables a relative novice to quickly create a number of different viruses. Although viruses created with toolkits tend to be less sophisticated than viruses designed from scratch, the sheer number of new viruses that can be generated using a toolkit creates a problem for antivirus schemes.

**Macro Viruses**

In the mid-1990s, macro viruses became by far the most prevalent type of virus. Macro viruses are particularly threatening for a number of reasons:

1. A macro virus is platform independent. Many macro viruses infect Microsoft Word documents or other Microsoft Office documents. Any hardware platform and operating system that supports these applications can be infected.

2. Macro viruses infect documents, not executable portions of code. Most of the information introduced onto a computer system is in the form of a document rather than a program.

3. Macro viruses are easily spread. A very common method is by electronic mail.

4. Because macro viruses infect user documents rather than system programs, traditional file system access controls are of limited use in preventing their spread.
Macro viruses take advantage of a feature found in Word and other office applications such as Microsoft Excel, namely the macro. In essence, a macro is an executable program embedded in a word processing document or other type of file. Typically, users employ macros to automate repetitive tasks and thereby save keystrokes. The macro language is usually some form of the Basic programming language. A user might define a sequence of keystrokes in a macro and set it up so that the macro is invoked when a function key or special short combination of keys is input.

Successive releases of MS Office products provide increased protection against macro viruses. For example, Microsoft offers an optional Macro Virus Protection tool that detects suspicious Word files and alerts the customer to the potential risk of opening a file with macros. Various antivirus product vendors have also developed tools to detect and correct macro viruses. As in other types of viruses, the arms race continues in the field of macro viruses, but they no longer are the predominant virus threat.

E-Mail Viruses

A more recent development in malicious software is the e-mail virus. The first rapidly spreading e-mail viruses, such as Melissa, made use of a Microsoft Word macro embedded in an attachment. If the recipient opens the e-mail attachment, the Word macro is activated. Then

1. The e-mail virus sends itself to everyone on the mailing list in the user’s e-mail package.
2. The virus does local damage on the user’s system.

In 1999, a more powerful version of the e-mail virus appeared. This newer version can be activated merely by opening an e-mail that contains the virus rather than opening an attachment. The virus uses the Visual Basic scripting language supported by the e-mail package.

Thus we see a new generation of malware that arrives via e-mail and uses e-mail software features to replicate itself across the Internet. The virus propagates itself as soon as it is activated (either by opening an e-mail attachment or by opening the e-mail) to all of the e-mail addresses known to the infected host. As a result, whereas viruses used to take months or years to propagate, they now do so in hours. This makes it very difficult for antivirus software to respond before much damage is done. Ultimately, a greater degree of security must be built into Internet utility and application software on PCs to counter the growing threat.

21.3 VIRUS COUNTERMEASURES

Antivirus Approaches

The ideal solution to the threat of viruses is prevention: Do not allow a virus to get into the system in the first place, or block the ability of a virus to modify any files containing executable code or macros. This goal is, in general, impossible to achieve,
although prevention can reduce the number of successful viral attacks. The next best approach is to be able to do the following:

- **Detection:** Once the infection has occurred, determine that it has occurred and locate the virus.
- **Identification:** Once detection has been achieved, identify the specific virus that has infected a program.
- **Removal:** Once the specific virus has been identified, remove all traces of the virus from the infected program and restore it to its original state. Remove the virus from all infected systems so that the virus cannot spread further.

If detection succeeds but either identification or removal is not possible, then the alternative is to discard the infected file and reload a clean backup version.

Advances in virus and antivirus technology go hand in hand. Early viruses were relatively simple code fragments and could be identified and purged with relatively simple antivirus software packages. As the virus arms race has evolved, both viruses and, necessarily, antivirus software have grown more complex and sophisticated.

[STEP93] identifies four generations of antivirus software:

- First generation: simple scanners
- Second generation: heuristic scanners
- Third generation: activity traps
- Fourth generation: full-featured protection

A **first-generation** scanner requires a virus signature to identify a virus. The virus may contain “wildcards” but has essentially the same structure and bit pattern in all copies. Such signature-specific scanners are limited to the detection of known viruses. Another type of first-generation scanner maintains a record of the length of programs and looks for changes in length.

A **second-generation** scanner does not rely on a specific signature. Rather, the scanner uses heuristic rules to search for probable virus infection. One class of such scanners looks for fragments of code that are often associated with viruses. For example, a scanner may look for the beginning of an encryption loop used in a polymorphic virus and discover the encryption key. Once the key is discovered, the scanner can decrypt the virus to identify it, then remove the infection and return the program to service.

Another second-generation approach is integrity checking. A checksum can be appended to each program. If a virus infects the program without changing the checksum, then an integrity check will catch the change. To counter a virus that is sophisticated enough to change the checksum when it infects a program, an encrypted hash function can be used. The encryption key is stored separately from the program so that the virus cannot generate a new hash code and encrypt that. By using a hash function rather than a simpler checksum, the virus is prevented from adjusting the program to produce the same hash code as before.

**Third-generation** programs are memory-resident programs that identify a virus by its actions rather than its structure in an infected program. Such programs
have the advantage that it is not necessary to develop signatures and heuristics for a wide array of viruses. Rather, it is necessary only to identify the small set of actions that indicate an infection is being attempted and then to intervene.

**Fourth-generation** products are packages consisting of a variety of antivirus techniques used in conjunction. These include scanning and activity trap components. In addition, such a package includes access control capability, which limits the ability of viruses to penetrate a system and then limits the ability of a virus to update files in order to pass on the infection.

The arms race continues. With fourth-generation packages, a more comprehensive defense strategy is employed, broadening the scope of defense to more general-purpose computer security measures.

**Advanced Antivirus Techniques**

More sophisticated antivirus approaches and products continue to appear. In this subsection, we highlight some of the most important.

**Generic Decryption**

Generic decryption (GD) technology enables the antivirus program to easily detect even the most complex polymorphic viruses while maintaining fast scanning speeds [NACH97]. Recall that when a file containing a polymorphic virus is executed, the virus must decrypt itself to activate. In order to detect such a structure, executable files are run through a GD scanner, which contains the following elements:

- **CPU emulator**: A software-based virtual computer. Instructions in an executable file are interpreted by the emulator rather than executed on the underlying processor. The emulator includes software versions of all registers and other processor hardware, so that the underlying processor is unaffected by programs interpreted on the emulator.
- **Virus signature scanner**: A module that scans the target code looking for known virus signatures.
- **Emulation control module**: Controls the execution of the target code.

At the start of each simulation, the emulator begins interpreting instructions in the target code, one at a time. Thus, if the code includes a decryption routine that decrypts and hence exposes the virus, that code is interpreted. In effect, the virus does the work for the antivirus program by exposing the virus. Periodically, the control module interrupts interpretation to scan the target code for virus signatures.

During interpretation, the target code can cause no damage to the actual personal computer environment, because it is being interpreted in a completely controlled environment.

The most difficult design issue with a GD scanner is to determine how long to run each interpretation. Typically, virus elements are activated soon after a program begins executing, but this need not be the case. The longer the scanner emulates a particular program, the more likely it is to catch any hidden viruses. However, the antivirus program can take up only a limited amount of time and resources before users complain of degraded system performance.
**Digital Immune System** The digital immune system is a comprehensive approach to virus protection developed by IBM [KEPH97a, KEPH97b, WHIT99] and subsequently refined by Symantec [SYMA01]. The motivation for this development has been the rising threat of Internet-based virus propagation. We first say a few words about this threat and then summarize IBM’s approach.

Traditionally, the virus threat was characterized by the relatively slow spread of new viruses and new mutations. Antivirus software was typically updated on a monthly basis, and this was sufficient to control the problem. Also traditionally, the Internet played a comparatively small role in the spread of viruses. But as [CHES97] points out, two major trends in Internet technology have had an increasing impact on the rate of virus propagation in recent years:

- **Integrated mail systems:** Systems such as Lotus Notes and Microsoft Outlook make it very simple to send anything to anyone and to work with objects that are received.
- **Mobile-program systems:** Capabilities such as Java and ActiveX allow programs to move on their own from one system to another.

In response to the threat posed by these Internet-based capabilities, IBM has developed a prototype digital immune system. This system expands on the use of program emulation discussed in the preceding subsection and provides a general-purpose emulation and virus-detection system. The objective of this system is to provide rapid response time so that viruses can be stamped out almost as soon as they are introduced. When a new virus enters an organization, the immune system automatically captures it, analyzes it, adds detection and shielding for it, removes it, and passes information about that virus to systems running IBM AntiVirus so that it can be detected before it is allowed to run elsewhere.

Figure 21.4 illustrates the typical steps in digital immune system operation:

1. A monitoring program on each PC uses a variety of heuristics based on system behavior, suspicious changes to programs, or family signature to infer that a virus may be present. The monitoring program forwards a copy of any program thought to be infected to an administrative machine within the organization.
2. The administrative machine encrypts the sample and sends it to a central virus analysis machine.
3. This machine creates an environment in which the infected program can be safely run for analysis. Techniques used for this purpose include emulation, or the creation of a protected environment within which the suspect program can be executed and monitored. The virus analysis machine then produces a prescription for identifying and removing the virus.
4. The resulting prescription is sent back to the administrative machine.
5. The administrative machine forwards the prescription to the infected client.
6. The prescription is also forwarded to other clients in the organization.
7. Subscribers around the world receive regular antivirus updates that protect them from the new virus.
The success of the digital immune system depends on the ability of the virus analysis machine to detect new and innovative virus strains. By constantly analyzing and monitoring the viruses found in the wild, it should be possible to continually update the digital immune software to keep up with the threat.

**Behavior-Blocking Software** Unlike heuristics or fingerprint-based scanners, behavior-blocking software integrates with the operating system of a host computer and monitors program behavior in real-time for malicious actions [CONR02, NACH02]. The behavior blocking software then blocks potentially malicious actions before they have a chance to affect the system. Monitored behaviors can include:

- Attempts to open, view, delete, and/or modify files;
- Attempts to format disk drives and other unrecoverable disk operations;
- Modifications to the logic of executable files or macros;
- Modification of critical system settings, such as start-up settings;
- Scripting of e-mail and instant messaging clients to send executable content; and
- Initiation of network communications.

Figure 21.5 illustrates the operation of a behavior blocker. Behavior-blocking software runs on server and desktop computers and is instructed through policies set by the network administrator to let benign actions take place but to intercede when unauthorized or suspicious actions occur. The module blocks any suspicious software from executing. A blocker isolates the code in a sandbox, which restricts the code’s access to various OS resources and applications. The blocker then sends an alert.

Because a behavior blocker can block suspicious software in real-time, it has an advantage over such established antivirus detection techniques as fingerprinting or
1. Administrator sets acceptable software behavior policies and uploads them to a server. Policies can also be uploaded to desktops.

2. Malicious software manages to make it through the firewall.

3. Behavior-blocking software at server flags suspicious code. The blocker “sandboxes” the suspicious software to prevent it from proceeding.

4. Server alerts administrator that suspicious code has been identified and sandboxed, awaiting administrator’s decision on whether the code should be removed or allowed to run.

5. Behavior-Blocking Software Operation

Figure 21.5

heuristics. While there are literally trillions of different ways to obfuscate and rearrange the instructions of a virus or worm, many of which will evade detection by a fingerprint scanner or heuristic, eventually malicious code must make a well-defined request to the operating system. Given that the behavior blocker can intercept all such requests, it can identify and block malicious actions regardless of how obfuscated the program logic appears to be.

Behavior blocking alone has limitations. Because the malicious code must run on the target machine before all its behaviors can be identified, it can cause harm before it has been detected and blocked. For example, a new virus might shuffle a number of seemingly unimportant files around the hard drive before infecting a single file and being blocked. Even though the actual infection was blocked, the user may be unable to locate his or her files, causing a loss to productivity or possibly worse.

21.4 WORMS

A worm is a program that can replicate itself and send copies from computer to computer across network connections. Upon arrival, the worm may be activated to replicate and propagate again. In addition to propagation, the worm usually performs some unwanted function. An e-mail virus has some of the characteristics of a worm because it propagates itself from system to system. However, we can still
classify it as a virus because it uses a document modified to contain viral macro content and requires human action. A worm actively seeks out more machines to infect and each machine that is infected serves as an automated launching pad for attacks on other machines.

The concept of a computer worm was introduced in John Brunner’s 1975 SF novel *The Shockwave Rider*. The first known worm implementation was done in Xerox Palo Alto Labs in the early 1980s. It was nonmalicious, searching for idle systems to use to run a computationally intensive task.

Network worm programs use network connections to spread from system to system. Once active within a system, a network worm can behave as a computer virus or bacteria, or it could implant Trojan horse programs or perform any number of disruptive or destructive actions.

To replicate itself, a network worm uses some sort of network vehicle. Examples include the following:

- **Electronic mail facility:** A worm mails a copy of itself to other systems, so that its code is run when the e-mail or an attachment is received or viewed.
- **Remote execution capability:** A worm executes a copy of itself on another system, either using an explicit remote execution facility or by exploiting a program flaw in a network service to subvert its operations.
- **Remote login capability:** A worm logs onto a remote system as a user and then uses commands to copy itself from one system to the other, where it then executes.

The new copy of the worm program is then run on the remote system where, in addition to any functions that it performs at that system, it continues to spread in the same fashion.

A network worm exhibits the same characteristics as a computer virus: a dormant phase, a propagation phase, a triggering phase, and an execution phase. The propagation phase generally performs the following functions:

1. Search for other systems to infect by examining host tables or similar repositories of remote system addresses.
2. Establish a connection with a remote system.
3. Copy itself to the remote system and cause the copy to be run.

The network worm may also attempt to determine whether a system has previously been infected before copying itself to the system. In a multiprogramming system, it may also disguise its presence by naming itself as a system process or using some other name that may not be noticed by a system operator.

As with viruses, network worms are difficult to counter.

**The Morris Worm**

Until the current generation of worms, the best known was the worm released onto the Internet by Robert Morris in 1988 [ORMA03]. The Morris worm was designed to spread on UNIX systems and used a number of different techniques for propagation.
When a copy began execution, its first task was to discover other hosts known to this host that would allow entry from this host. The worm performed this task by examining a variety of lists and tables, including system tables that declared which other machines were trusted by this host, users’ mail forwarding files, tables by which users gave themselves permission for access to remote accounts, and from a program that reported the status of network connections. For each discovered host, the worm tried a number of methods for gaining access:

1. It attempted to log on to a remote host as a legitimate user. In this method, the worm first attempted to crack the local password file and then used the discovered passwords and corresponding user IDs. The assumption was that many users would use the same password on different systems. To obtain the passwords, the worm ran a password-cracking program that tried
   a. Each user’s account name and simple permutations of it
   b. A list of 432 built-in passwords that Morris thought to be likely candidates
   c. All the words in the local system dictionary

2. It exploited a bug in the UNIX finger protocol, which reports the whereabouts of a remote user.

3. It exploited a trapdoor in the debug option of the remote process that receives and sends mail.

If any of these attacks succeeded, the worm achieved communication with the operating system command interpreter. It then sent this interpreter a short bootstrap program, issued a command to execute that program, and then logged off. The bootstrap program then called back the parent program and downloaded the remainder of the worm. The new worm was then executed.

**Worm Propagation Model**

[ZOU05] describes a model for worm propagation based on an analysis of recent worm attacks. The speed of propagation and the total number of hosts infected depend on a number of factors, including the mode of propagation, the vulnerability or vulnerabilities exploited, and the degree of similarity to preceding attacks. For the latter factor, an attack that is a variation of a recent previous attack may be countered more effectively than a more novel attack. Figure 21.6 shows the dynamics for one typical set of parameters. Propagation proceeds through three phases. In the initial phase, the number of hosts increases exponentially. To see that this is so, consider a simplified case in which a worm is launched from a single host and infects two nearby hosts. Each of these hosts infects two more hosts, and so on. This results in exponential growth. After a time, infecting hosts waste some time attacking already infected hosts, which reduces the rate of infection. During this middle phase, growth is approximately linear, but the rate of infection is rapid. When most vulnerable computers have been infected, the attack enters a slow finish phase as the worm seeks out those remaining hosts that are difficult to identify.

---

2The complete list is provided at this book’s Web site.
Clearly, the objective in countering a worm is to catch the worm in its slow start phase, at a time when few hosts have been infected.

Recent Worm Attacks

The contemporary era of worm threats began with the release of the Code Red worm in July of 2001. Code Red exploits a security hole in the Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) to penetrate and spread. It also disables the system file checker in Windows. The worm probes random IP addresses to spread to other hosts. During a certain period of time, it only spreads. It then initiates a denial-of-service attack against a government Web site by flooding the site with packets from numerous hosts. The worm then suspends activities and reacts periodically. In the second wave of attack, Code Red infected nearly 360,000 servers in 14 hours. In addition to the havoc it caused at the targeted server, Code Red consumed enormous amounts of Internet capacity, disrupting service.

Code Red II is a variant that targets Microsoft IISs. In addition, this newer worm installs a backdoor, allowing a hacker to remotely execute commands on victim computers.

In early 2003, the SQL Slammer worm appeared. This worm exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft SQL server. The Slammer was extremely compact and spread rapidly, infecting 90% of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes. Late 2003 saw the arrival of the Sobig.f worm, which exploited open proxy servers to turn infected machines into spam engines. At its peak, Sobig.f reportedly accounted for one in every 17 messages and produced more than one million copies of itself within the first 24 hours.
Mydoom is a mass-mailing e-mail worm that appeared in 2004. It followed a growing trend of installing a backdoor in infected computers, thereby enabling hackers to gain remote access to data such as passwords and credit card numbers. Mydoom replicated up to 1000 times per minute and reportedly flooded the Internet with 100 million infected messages in 36 hours.

A recent worm that rapidly became prevalent in a variety of versions is the Warezov family of worms [KIRK06]. When the worm is launched, it creates several executable in system directories and sets itself to run every time Windows starts, by creating a registry entry. Warezov scans several types of files for e-mail addresses and sends itself as an e-mail attachment. Some variants are capable of downloading other malware, such as Trojan horses and adware. Many variants disable security related products and/or disable their updating capability.

State of Worm Technology

The state of the art in worm technology includes the following:

- **Multiplatform:** Newer worms are not limited to Windows machines but can attack a variety of platforms, especially the popular varieties of UNIX.
- **Multi-exploit:** New worms penetrate systems in a variety of ways, using exploits against Web servers, browsers, e-mail, file sharing, and other network-based applications.
- **Ultrafast spreading:** One technique to accelerate the spread of a worm is to conduct a prior Internet scan to accumulate Internet addresses of vulnerable machines.
- **Polymorphic:** To evade detection, skip past filters, and foil real-time analysis, worms adopt the virus polymorphic technique. Each copy of the worm has new code generated on the fly using functionally equivalent instructions and encryption techniques.
- **Metamorphic:** In addition to changing their appearance, metamorphic worms have a repertoire of behavior patterns that are unleashed at different stages of propagation.
- **Transport vehicles:** Because worms can rapidly compromise a large number of systems, they are ideal for spreading other distributed attack tools, such as distributed denial of service bots.
- **Zero-day exploit:** To achieve maximum surprise and distribution, a worm should exploit an unknown vulnerability that is only discovered by the general network community when the worm is launched.

Mobile Phone Worms

Worms first appeared on mobile phones in 2004. These worms communicate through Bluetooth wireless connections or via the multimedia messaging service (MMS). The target is the smartphone, which is a mobile phone that permits users to install software applications from sources other than the cellular network operator. Mobile phone malware can completely disable the phone, delete data on the phone, or force the device to send costly messages to premium-priced numbers.
An example of a mobile phone worm is CommWarrior, which was launched in 2005. This worm replicates by means of Bluetooth to other phones in the receiving area. It also sends itself as an MMS file to numbers in the phone’s address book and in automatic replies to incoming text messages and MMS messages. In addition, it copies itself to the removable memory card and inserts itself into the program installation files on the phone.

**Worm Countermeasures**

There is considerable overlap in techniques for dealing with viruses and worms. Once a worm is resident on a machine, antivirus software can be used to detect it. In addition, because worm propagation generates considerable network activity, network activity and usage monitoring can form the basis of a worm defense.

To begin, let us consider the requirements for an effective worm countermeasure scheme:

- **Generality:** The approach taken should be able to handle a wide variety of worm attacks, including polymorphic worms.
- **Timeliness:** The approach should respond quickly so as to limit the number of infected systems and the number of generated transmissions from infected systems.
- **Resiliency:** The approach should be resistant to evasion techniques employed by attackers to evade worm countermeasures.
- **Minimal denial-of-service costs:** The approach should result in minimal reduction in capacity or service due to the actions of the countermeasure software. That is, in an attempt to contain worm propagation, the countermeasure should not significantly disrupt normal operation.
- **Transparency:** The countermeasure software and devices should not require modification to existing (legacy) OSs, application software, and hardware.
- **Global and local coverage:** The approach should be able to deal with attack sources both from outside and inside the enterprise network.

No existing worm countermeasure scheme appears to satisfy all these requirements. Thus, administrators typically need to use multiple approaches in defending against worm attacks.

**Countermeasure Approaches** Following [JHI07], we list six classes of worm defense:

A. **Signature-based worm scan filtering:** This type of approach generates a worm signature, which is then used to prevent worm scans from entering/leaving a network/host. Typically, this approach involves identifying suspicious flows and generating a worm signature. This approach is vulnerable to the use of polymorphic worms: Either the detection software misses the worm or, if it is sufficiently sophisticated to deal with polymorphic worms, the scheme may take a long time to react. [NEWS05] is an example of this approach.

B. **Filter-based worm containment:** This approach is similar to class A but focuses on worm content rather than a scan signature. The filter checks a message to
determine if it contains worm code. An example is Vigilante [COST05], which relies on collaborative worm detection at end hosts. This approach can be quite effective but requires efficient detection algorithms and rapid alert dissemination.

C. **Payload-classification-based worm containment**: These network-based techniques examine packets to see if they contain a worm. Various anomaly detection techniques can be used, but care is needed to avoid high levels of false positives or negatives. An example of this approach is reported in [CHIN05], which looks for exploit code in network flows. This approach does not generate signatures based on byte patterns but rather looks for control and data flow structures that suggest an exploit.

D. **Threshold random walk (TRW) scan detection**: TRW exploits randomness in picking destinations to connect to as a way of detecting if a scanner is in operation [JUNG04]. TRW is suitable for deployment in high-speed, low-cost network devices. It is effective against the common behavior seen in worm scans.

E. **Rate limiting**: This class limits the rate of scanlike traffic from an infected host. Various strategies can be used, including limiting the number of new machines a host can connect to in a window of time, detecting a high connection failure rate, and limiting the number of unique IP addresses a host can scan in a window of time. [CHEN04] is an example. This class of countermeasures may introduce longer delays for normal traffic. This class is also not suited for slow, stealthy worms that spread slowly to avoid detection based on activity level.

F. **Rate halting**: This approach immediately blocks outgoing traffic when a threshold is exceeded either in outgoing connection rate or diversity of connection attempts [JHI07]. The approach must include measures to quickly unblock mistakenly blocked hosts in a transparent way. Rate halting can integrate with a signature- or filter-based approach so that once a signature or filter is generated, every blocked host can be unblocked. Rate halting appears to offer a very effective countermeasure. As with rate limiting, rate halting techniques are not suitable for slow, stealthy worms.

We look now at two approaches in more detail.

**Proactive Worm Containment** The PWC scheme [JHI07] is host based rather than being based on network devices such as honeypots, firewalls, and network IDSs. PWC is designed to address the threat of worms that spread rapidly. The software on a host looks for surges in the rate of frequency of outgoing connection attempts and the diversity of connections to remote hosts. When such a surge is detected, the software immediately blocks its host from further connection attempts. The developers estimate that only a few dozen infected packets may be sent out to other systems before PWC quarantines that attack. In contrast, the Slammer worm on average sent out 4000 infected packets per second.

A deployed PWC system consists of a PWC manager and PWC agents in hosts. Figure 21.7 is an example of an architecture that includes PWC. In this example, the security manager, signature extractor, and PWC manager are implemented in a single network device. In practice, these three modules could be implemented as two or three separate devices.
The operation of the PWC architecture can be described as follows:

A. A PWC agent monitors outgoing traffic for scan activity, determined by a surge in UDP or TCP connection attempts to remote hosts. If a surge is detected, the agent performs the following actions: (1) issues an alert to local system; (2) blocks all outgoing connection attempts; (3) transmits the alert to the PWC manager; and (4) starts a relaxation analysis, described in D.

B. A PWC manager receives an alert. The PWC propagates the alert to all other agents (beside the originating agent).

C. The host receives an alert. The agent must decide whether to ignore the alert, in the following way. If the time since the last incoming packet has been sufficiently long so that the agent would have detected a worm if infected, then the alert is ignored. Otherwise, the agent assumes that it might be infected and performs the following actions: (1) blocks all outgoing connection attempts from the specific alerting port; and (2) starts a relaxation analysis, described in D.

D. Relaxation analysis is performed as follows. An agent monitors outgoing activity for a fixed window of time to see if outgoing connections exceed a threshold. If so, blockage is continued and relaxation analysis is performed for another window of time. This process continues until the outgoing connection rate drops below the threshold, at which time the agent removes the block. If the threshold continues to be exceeded over a sufficient number of relaxation windows, the agent isolates the host and reports to the PWC manager.
Meanwhile, a separate aspect of the worm defense system is in operation. The signature extractor functions as a passive sensor that monitors all traffic and attempts to detect worms by signature analysis. When a new worm is detected, its signature is sent by the security manager to the firewall to filter out any more copies of the worm. In addition, the PWC manager sends the signature to PWC agents, enabling them to immediately recognize infection and disable the worm.

**Network-Based Worm Defense** The key element of a network-based worm defense is worm monitoring software. Consider an enterprise network at a site, consisting of one or an interconnected set of LANs. Two types of monitoring software are needed:

- **Ingress monitors:** These are located at the border between the enterprise network and the Internet. They can be part of the ingress filtering software of a border router or external firewall or a separate passive monitor. A honeypot can also capture incoming worm traffic. An example of a detection technique for an ingress monitor is to look for incoming traffic to unused local IP addresses.

- **Egress monitors:** These can be located at the egress point of individual LANs on the enterprise network as well as at the border between the enterprise network and the Internet. In the former case, the egress monitor can be part of the egress filtering software of a LAN router or switch. As with ingress monitors, the external firewall or a honeypot can house the monitoring software. Indeed, the two types of monitors can be collocated. The egress monitor is designed to catch the source of a worm attack by monitoring outgoing traffic for signs of scanning or other suspicious behavior.

Worm monitors can act in the manner of intrusion detection systems and generate alerts to a central administrative system. It is also possible to implement a system that attempts to react in real time to a worm attack, so as to counter zero-day exploits effectively. This is similar to the approach taken with the digital immune system (Figure 21.4).

Figure 21.8 shows an example of a worm countermeasure architecture [SIDI05]. The system works as follows (numbers in figure refer to numbers in the following list):

1. Sensors deployed at various network locations detect a potential worm. The sensor logic can also be incorporated in IDS sensors.
2. The sensors send alerts to a central server that correlates and analyzes the incoming alerts. The correlation server determines the likelihood that a worm attack is being observed and the key characteristics of the attack.
3. The server forwards its information to a protected environment, where the potential worm may be sandboxed for analysis and testing.
4. The protected system tests the suspicious software against an appropriately instrumented version of the targeted application to identify the vulnerability.
5. The protected system generates one or more software patches and tests these.
6. If the patch is not susceptible to the infection and does not compromise the application’s functionality, the system sends the patch to the application host to update the targeted application.
The success of such an automated patching system depends on maintaining a current list of potential attacks and developing general tools for patching software to counter such attacks. Examples of approaches are as follows:

- Increasing the size of buffers
- Using minor code-randomization techniques [BHAT03] so that the infection no longer works because the code to be attacked is no longer in the same form and location
- Adding filters to the application that enable it to recognize and ignore an attack

### 21.5 DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks present a significant security threat to corporations, and the threat appears to be growing [VIJA02]. In one study, covering a three-week period in 2001, investigators observed more than 12,000 attacks against more than 5000 distinct targets, ranging from well-known ecommerce companies such as Amazon and Hotmail to small foreign ISPs and dial-up connections [MOOR01]. DDoS attacks make computer systems inaccessible by flooding servers, networks, or even end user systems with useless traffic so that legitimate users can no longer gain access to those resources. In a typical DDoS attack, a large number of
compromised hosts are amassed to send useless packets. In recent years, the attack methods and tools have become more sophisticated, effective, and more difficult to trace to the real attackers, while defense technologies have been unable to withstand large-scale attacks [CHAN02].

A denial of service (DoS) attack is an attempt to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service. When this attack comes from a single host or network node, then it is simply referred to as a DoS attack. A more serious threat is posed by a DDoS attack. In a DDoS attack, an attacker is able to recruit a number of hosts throughout the Internet to simultaneously or in a coordinated fashion launch an attack upon the target. This section is concerned with DDoS attacks. First, we look at the nature and types of attacks. Next, we examine means by which an attacker is able to recruit a network of hosts for attack launch. Finally, this section looks at countermeasures.

DDoS Attack Description

A DDoS attack attempts to consume the target’s resources so that it cannot provide service. One way to classify DDoS attacks is in terms of the type of resource that is consumed. Broadly speaking, the resource consumed is either an internal host resource on the target system or data transmission capacity in the local network to which the target is attacked.

A simple example of an **internal resource attack** is the SYN flood attack. Figure 21.9a shows the steps involved:

1. The attacker takes control of multiple hosts over the Internet, instructing them to contact the target Web server.
2. The slave hosts begin sending TCP/IP SYN (synchronize/initialization) packets, with erroneous return IP address information, to the target.
3. Each SYN packet is a request to open a TCP connection. For each such packet, the Web server responds with a SYN/ACK (synchronize/acknowledge) packet, trying to establish a TCP connection with a TCP entity at a spurious IP address. The Web server maintains a data structure for each SYN request waiting for a response back and becomes bogged down as more traffic floods in. The result is that legitimate connections are denied while the victim machine is waiting to complete bogus “half-open” connections.

The TCP state data structure is a popular internal resource target but by no means the only one. [CERT01] gives the following examples:

1. In many systems, a limited number of data structures are available to hold process information (process identifiers, process table entries, process slots, etc.). An intruder may be able to consume these data structures by writing a simple program or script that does nothing but repeatedly create copies of itself.
2. An intruder may also attempt to consume disk space in other ways, including
   - generating excessive numbers of mail messages
   - intentionally generating errors that must be logged
   - placing files in anonymous ftp areas or network-shared areas
Figure 21.9 Examples of Simple DDoS Attacks
Figure 21.9b illustrates an example of an **attack that consumes data transmission resources**. The following steps are involved:

1. The attacker takes control of multiple hosts over the Internet, instructing them to send ICMP ECHO packets with the target’s spoofed IP address to a group of hosts that act as reflectors, as described subsequently.
2. Nodes at the bounce site receive multiple spoofed requests and respond by sending echo reply packets to the target site.
3. The target’s router is flooded with packets from the bounce site, leaving no data transmission capacity for legitimate traffic.

Another way to classify DDoS attacks is as either direct or reflector DDoS attacks. In a **direct DDoS** attack (Figure 21.10a), the attacker is able to implant zombie software on a number of sites distributed throughout the Internet. Often, the DDoS attack involves two levels of zombie machines: master zombies and slave zombies. The hosts of both machines have been infected with malicious code. The attacker coordinates and triggers the master zombies, which in turn coordinate and trigger the slave zombies. The use of two levels of zombies makes it more difficult to trace the attack back to its source and provides for a more resilient network of attackers.

A **reflector DDoS** attack adds another layer of machines (Figure 21.10b). In this type of attack, the slave zombies construct packets requiring a response that contains the target’s IP address as the source IP address in the packet’s IP header. These packets are sent to uninfected machines known as reflectors. The uninfected machines respond with packets directed at the target machine. A reflector DDoS attack can easily involve more machines and more traffic than a direct DDoS attack and hence be more damaging. Further, tracing back the attack or filtering out the attack packets is more difficult because the attack comes from widely dispersed uninfected machines.

**Constructing the Attack Network**

The first step in a DDoS attack is for the attacker to infect a number of machines with zombie software that will ultimately be used to carry out the attack. The essential ingredients in this phase of the attack are the following:

1. Software that can carry out the DDoS attack. The software must be able to run on a large number of machines, must be able to conceal its existence, must be able to communicate with the attacker or have some sort of time-triggered mechanism, and must be able to launch the intended attack toward the target.
2. A vulnerability in a large number of systems. The attacker must become aware of a vulnerability that many system administrators and individual users have failed to patch and that enables the attacker to install the zombie software.
3. A strategy for locating vulnerable machines, a process known as scanning.

---

3The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is an IP-level protocol for the exchange of control packets between a router and a host or between hosts. The ECHO packet requires the recipient to respond with an echo reply to check that communication is possible between entities.
In the scanning process, the attacker first seeks out a number of vulnerable machines and infects them. Then, typically, the zombie software that is installed in the infected machines repeats the same scanning process, until a large distributed network of infected machines is created. [MIRK04] lists the following types of scanning strategies:

- **Random**: Each compromised host probes random addresses in the IP address space, using a different seed. This technique produces a high volume of
Internet traffic, which may cause generalized disruption even before the actual attack is launched.

- **Hit-List**: The attacker first compiles a long list of potential vulnerable machines. This can be a slow process done over a long period to avoid detection that an attack is underway. Once the list is compiled, the attacker begins infecting machines on the list. Each infected machine is provided with a portion of the list to scan. This strategy results in a very short scanning period, which may make it difficult to detect that infection is taking place.

- **Topological**: This method uses information contained on an infected victim machine to find more hosts to scan.

- **Local subnet**: If a host can be infected behind a firewall, that host then looks for targets in its own local network. The host uses the subnet address structure to find other hosts that would otherwise be protected by the firewall.

**DDoS Countermeasures**

In general, there are three lines of defense against DDoS attacks [CHAN02]:

- **Attack prevention and preemption (before the attack)**: These mechanisms enable the victim to endure attack attempts without denying service to legitimate clients. Techniques include enforcing policies for resource consumption and providing backup resources available on demand. In addition, prevention mechanisms modify systems and protocols on the Internet to reduce the possibility of DDoS attacks.

- **Attack detection and filtering (during the attack)**: These mechanisms attempt to detect the attack as it begins and respond immediately. This minimizes the impact of the attack on the target. Detection involves looking for suspicious patterns of behavior. Response involves filtering out packets likely to be part of the attack.

- **Attack source traceback and identification (during and after the attack)**: This is an attempt to identify the source of the attack as a first step in preventing future attacks. However, this method typically does not yield results fast enough, if at all, to mitigate an ongoing attack.

The challenge in coping with DDoS attacks is the sheer number of ways in which they can operate. Thus DDoS countermeasures must evolve with the threat.

**21.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES**

For a thorough understanding of viruses, the book to read is [SZOR05]. Another excellent treatment is [AYCO06]. Good overview articles on viruses and worms are [CASS01], [FORR97], [KEPH97a], and [NACH97]. [MEIN01] provides a good treatment of the Code Red worm. [WEAV03] is a comprehensive survey of worm characteristics. [HYPP06] discusses worm attacks on mobile phones.

[PATR04] is a worthwhile survey of DDoS attacks. [MIRK04] is a thorough description of the variety of DDoS attacks and countermeasures. [CHAN02] is a good examination of DDoS defense strategies.
Recommended Web Sites:

- **AntiVirus Online**: IBM’s site on virus information.
- **Vmyths**: Dedicated to exposing virus hoaxes and dispelling misconceptions about real viruses.
- **VirusList**: Site maintained by commercial antivirus software provider. Good collection of useful information.
- **DDoS Attacks/Tools**: Extensive list of links and documents.

## 21.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

### Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>backdoor</th>
<th>distributed denial of service (DDoS)</th>
<th>macro virus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>behavior-blocking software</td>
<td>downloaders</td>
<td>malicious software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blended attack</td>
<td>e-mail virus</td>
<td>malware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boot-sector virus</td>
<td>flooder</td>
<td>metamorphic virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>digital immune system</td>
<td>logic bomb</td>
<td>mobile code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct DDoS attack</td>
<td></td>
<td>parasitic virus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
polymorphic virus
reflector DDoS attack
scanning

stealth virus
trapdoor
Trojan horse

virus
worm
zero-day exploit

Review Questions

21.1 What is the role of compression in the operation of a virus?
21.2 What is the role of encryption in the operation of a virus?
21.3 What are typical phases of operation of a virus or worm?
21.4 What is a digital immune system?
21.5 How does behavior-blocking software work?
21.6 In general terms, how does a worm propagate?
21.7 Describe some worm countermeasures.
21.8 What is a DDoS?

Problems

21.1 There is a flaw in the virus program of Figure 21.1. What is it?
21.2 The question arises as to whether it is possible to develop a program that can analyze
a piece of software to determine if it is a virus. Consider that we have a program D
that is supposed to be able to do that. That is, for any program P, if we run D(P), the
result returned is TRUE (P is a virus) or FALSE (P is not a virus). Now consider the
following program:

```c
Program CV :=
{ ...
main-program :=
{ if D(CV) then goto next:
   else infect-executable;
}
next:
}
```

In the preceding program, infect-executable is a module that scans memory for executable
programs and replicates itself in those programs. Determine if D can correctly
decide whether CV is a virus.

21.3 The point of this problem is to demonstrate the type of puzzles that must be solved in
the design of malicious code and therefore, the type of mindset that one wishing to
counter such attacks must adopt.
   a. Consider the following C program:

```c
begin
  print (*begin print (); end.*);
end
```

What do you think the program was intended to do? Does it work?
   b. Answer the same questions for the following program:

```c
char [] = {'0', ' ', '}', ';', 'm', 'a', 'i', 'n',
  '(', ')', '{', and so on... 't', ')', '0'};
main ()
{
  int I;
  printf(*char t[] = (*);
```
for (i=0; t[i]!=0; i=i+1)
  printf("%d, ", t[i]);
printf("%s", t);
}

c. What is the specific relevance of this problem to this chapter?

21.4 Consider the following fragment:

```c
if data is Friday the 13th;
  crash_computer();
```

What type of malicious software is this?

21.5 Consider the following fragment in an authentication program:

```c
username = read_username();
password = read_password();
if username is "133t h4ck0r"
  return ALLOW_LOGIN;
if username and password are valid
  return ALLOW_LOGIN
else return DENY_LOGIN
```

What type of malicious software is this?

21.6 The following code fragments show a sequence of virus instructions and a metamorphic version of the virus. Describe the effect produced by the metamorphic code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Code</th>
<th>Metamorphic Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mov eax, 5</td>
<td>mov eax, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add eax, ebx</td>
<td>push ecx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>call [eax]</td>
<td>pop ecx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>add eax, ebx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>swap eax, ebx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>swap ebx, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>call [eax]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nop</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21.7 The list of passwords used by the Morris worm is provided at this book’s Web site.

a. The assumption has been expressed by many people that this list represents words commonly used as passwords. Does this seem likely? Justify your answer.

b. If the list does not reflect commonly used passwords, suggest some approaches that Morris may have used to construct the list.

21.8 Suggest some methods of attacking the PWC worm defense that could be used by worm creators and suggest countermeasures to these methods.
CHAPTER 22

FIREWALLS

22.1 The Need for Firewalls

22.2 Firewall Characteristics

22.3 Types of Firewalls
   - Packet Filtering Firewall
   - Stateful Inspection Firewalls
   - Application-Level Gateway
   - Circuit-Level Gateway

22.4 Firewall Basing
   - Bastion Host
   - Host-Based Firewalls
   - Personal Firewall

22.5 Firewall Location and Configurations
   - DMZ Networks
   - Virtual Private Networks
   - Distributed Firewalls
   - Summary of Firewall Locations and Topologies

22.6 Recommended Reading and Web Site

22.7 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
The function of a strong position is to make the forces holding it practically unassailable.

—On War, Carl Von Clausewitz

On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries.

—The Art of War, Sun Tzu

**KEY POINTS**

- A firewall forms a barrier through which the traffic going in each direction must pass. A firewall security policy dictates which traffic is authorized to pass in each direction.
- A firewall may be designed to operate as a filter at the level of IP packets, or may operate at a higher protocol layer.

Firewalls can be an effective means of protecting a local system or network of systems from network-based security threats while at the same time affording access to the outside world via wide area networks and the Internet.

### 22.1 THE NEED FOR FIREWALLS

Information systems in corporations, government agencies, and other organizations have undergone a steady evolution. The following are notable developments:

- Centralized data processing system, with a central mainframe supporting a number of directly connected terminals
- Local area networks (LANs) interconnecting PCs and terminals to each other and the mainframe
- Premises network, consisting of a number of LANs, interconnecting PCs, servers, and perhaps a mainframe or two
- Enterprise-wide network, consisting of multiple, geographically distributed premises networks interconnected by a private wide area network (WAN)
- Internet connectivity, in which the various premises networks all hook into the Internet and may or may not also be connected by a private WAN

Internet connectivity is no longer optional for organizations. The information and services available are essential to the organization. Moreover, individual users within the organization want and need Internet access, and if this is not provided via their LAN, they will use dial-up capability from their PC to an Internet service provider (ISP). However, while Internet access provides benefits to the organization,
it enables the outside world to reach and interact with local network assets. This creates a threat to the organization. While it is possible to equip each workstation and server on the premises network with strong security features, such as intrusion protection, this may not be sufficient and in some cases is not cost-effective. Consider a network with hundreds or even thousands of systems, running various operating systems, such as different versions of UNIX and Windows. When a security flaw is discovered, each potentially affected system must be upgraded to fix that flaw. This requires scaleable configuration management and aggressive patching to function effectively. While difficult, this is possible and necessary if only host-based security is used. A widely accepted alternative or at least complement to host-based security services is the firewall. The firewall is inserted between the premises network and the Internet to establish a controlled link and to erect an outer security wall or perimeter. The aim of this perimeter is to protect the premises network from Internet-based attacks and to provide a single choke point where security and auditing can be imposed. The firewall may be a single computer system or a set of two or more systems that cooperate to perform the firewall function.

The firewall, then, provides an additional layer of defense, insulating the internal systems from external networks. This follows the classic military doctrine of “defense in depth,” which is just as applicable to IT security.

### 22.2 FIREWALL CHARACTERISTICS

[BELL94b] lists the following design goals for a firewall:

1. All traffic from inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the firewall. This is achieved by physically blocking all access to the local network except via the firewall. Various configurations are possible, as explained later in this chapter.

2. Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be allowed to pass. Various types of firewalls are used, which implement various types of security policies, as explained later in this chapter.

3. The firewall itself is immune to penetration. This implies the use of a hardened system with a secured operating system. Trusted computer systems are suitable for hosting a firewall and often required in government applications.

[SMIT97] lists four general techniques that firewalls use to control access and enforce the site’s security policy. Originally, firewalls focused primarily on service control, but they have since evolved to provide all four:

- **Service control:** Determines the types of Internet services that can be accessed, inbound or outbound. The firewall may filter traffic on the basis of IP address, protocol, or port number; may provide proxy software that receives and interprets each service request before passing it on; or may host the server software itself, such as a Web or mail service.

- **Direction control:** Determines the direction in which particular service requests may be initiated and allowed to flow through the firewall.
• **User control:** Controls access to a service according to which user is attempting to access it. This feature is typically applied to users inside the firewall perimeter (local users). It may also be applied to incoming traffic from external users; the latter requires some form of secure authentication technology, such as is provided in IPsec (Chapter 19).

• **Behavior control:** Controls how particular services are used. For example, the firewall may filter e-mail to eliminate spam, or it may enable external access to only a portion of the information on a local Web server.

Before proceeding to the details of firewall types and configurations, it is best to summarize what one can expect from a firewall. The following capabilities are within the scope of a firewall:

1. A firewall defines a single choke point that keeps unauthorized users out of the protected network, prohibits potentially vulnerable services from entering or leaving the network, and provides protection from various kinds of IP spoofing and routing attacks. The use of a single choke point simplifies security management because security capabilities are consolidated on a single system or set of systems.

2. A firewall provides a location for monitoring security-related events. Audits and alarms can be implemented on the firewall system.

3. A firewall is a convenient platform for several Internet functions that are not security related. These include a network address translator, which maps local addresses to Internet addresses, and a network management function that audits or logs Internet usage.

4. A firewall can serve as the platform for IPsec. Using the tunnel mode capability described in Chapter 19, the firewall can be used to implement virtual private networks.

Firewalls have their limitations, including the following:

1. The firewall cannot protect against attacks that bypass the firewall. Internal systems may have dial-out capability to connect to an ISP. An internal LAN may support a modem pool that provides dial-in capability for traveling employees and telecommuters.

2. The firewall may not protect fully against internal threats, such as a disgruntled employee or an employee who unwittingly cooperates with an external attacker.

3. An improperly secured wireless LAN may be accessed from outside the organization. An internal firewall that separates portions of an enterprise network cannot guard against wireless communications between local systems on different sides of the internal firewall.

4. A laptop, PDA, or portable storage device may be used and infected outside the corporate network, and then attached and used internally.
A firewall may act as a packet filter. It can operate as a positive filter, allowing to pass only packets that meet specific criteria, or as a negative filter, rejecting any packet that meets certain criteria. Depending on the type of firewall, it may examine one or more protocol headers in each packet, the payload of each packet, or the pattern generated by a sequence of packets. In this section, we look at the principal types of firewalls.

### Packet Filtering Firewall

A packet filtering firewall applies a set of rules to each incoming and outgoing IP packet and then forwards or discards the packet (Figure 22.1b). The firewall is typically configured to filter packets going in both directions (from and to the internal network). Filtering rules are based on information contained in a network packet:

- **Source IP address**: The IP address of the system that originated the IP packet (e.g., 192.178.1.1)
- **Destination IP address**: The IP address of the system the IP packet is trying to reach (e.g., 192.168.1.2)
- **Source and destination transport-level address**: The transport-level (e.g., TCP or UDP) port number, which defines applications such as SNMP or TELNET
- **IP protocol field**: Defines the transport protocol
- **Interface**: For a firewall with three or more ports, which interface of the firewall the packet came from or which interface of the firewall the packet is destined for

The packet filter is typically set up as a list of rules based on matches to fields in the IP or TCP header. If there is a match to one of the rules, that rule is invoked to determine whether to forward or discard the packet. If there is no match to any rule, then a default action is taken. Two default policies are possible:

- **Default = discard**: That which is not expressly permitted is prohibited.
- **Default = forward**: That which is not expressly prohibited is permitted.

The default discard policy is more conservative. Initially, everything is blocked, and services must be added on a case-by-case basis. This policy is more visible to users, who are more likely to see the firewall as a hindrance. However, this is the policy likely to be preferred by businesses and government organizations. Further, visibility to users diminishes as rules are created. The default forward policy increases ease of use for end users but provides reduced security; the security administrator must, in essence, react to each new security threat as it becomes known. This policy may be used by generally more open organizations, such as universities.

Table 22.1, from [BELL94b], gives some examples of packet filtering rulesets. In each set, the rules are applied top to bottom. The “*” in a field is a wildcard
Internal (protected) network (e.g., enterprise network)  
Firewall  
External (untrusted) network (e.g., Internet)

(a) General model

(b) Packet filtering firewall  
(c) Stateful inspection firewall

(d) Application proxy firewall  
(e) Circuit-level proxy firewall

Figure 22.1  Types of Firewalls
### Table 22.1 Packet-Filtering Examples

#### Rule Set A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action</th>
<th>ourhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>theirhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>block</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>SPIGOT</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>we don’t trust these people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>OUR-GW</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>connection to our SMTP port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Rule Set B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action</th>
<th>ourhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>theirhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>block</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>default</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Rule Set C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action</th>
<th>ourhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>theirhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>connection to their SMTP port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Rule Set D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action</th>
<th>src</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>dest</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>flags</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>[our hosts]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>our packets to their SMTP port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>ACK</td>
<td>their replies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Rule Set E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action</th>
<th>src</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>dest</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>flags</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>[our hosts]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>our outgoing calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>ACK</td>
<td>replies to our calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>&gt;1024</td>
<td></td>
<td>traffic to nonservers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

designator that matches everything. We assume that the default = discard policy is in force.

A. Inbound mail is allowed (port 25 is for SMTP incoming), but only to a gateway host. However, packets from a particular external host, SPIGOT, are blocked because that host has a history of sending massive files in e-mail messages.

B. This is an explicit statement of the default policy. All rulesets include this rule implicitly as the last rule.

C. This ruleset is intended to specify that any inside host can send mail to the outside. A TCP packet with a destination port of 25 is routed to the SMTP server on the destination machine. The problem with this rule is that the use of port 25 for SMTP receipt is only a default; an outside machine could be configured to have some other application linked to port 25. As this rule is written, an attacker could gain access to internal machines by sending packets with a TCP source port number of 25.

D. This ruleset achieves the intended result that was not achieved in C. The rules take advantage of a feature of TCP connections. Once a connection is set up, the ACK flag of a TCP segment is set to acknowledge segments sent from the other side. Thus, this ruleset states that it allows IP packets where the source IP address
is one of a list of designated internal hosts and the destination TCP port number is 25. It also allows incoming packets with a source port number of 25 that include the ACK flag in the TCP segment. Note that we explicitly designate source and destination systems to define these rules explicitly.

E. This ruleset is one approach to handling FTP connections. With FTP, two TCP connections are used: a control connection to set up the file transfer and a data connection for the actual file transfer. The data connection uses a different port number that is dynamically assigned for the transfer. Most servers, and hence most attack targets, use low-numbered ports; most outgoing calls tend to use a higher-numbered port, typically above 1023. Thus, this ruleset allows

— Packets that originate internally
— Reply packets to a connection initiated by an internal machine
— Packets destined for a high-numbered port on an internal machine

This scheme requires that the systems be configured so that only the appropriate port numbers are in use.

Rule set E points out the difficulty in dealing with applications at the packet-filtering level. Another way to deal with FTP and similar applications is either stateful packet filters or an application-level gateway, both described subsequently in this section.

One advantage of a packet filtering firewall is its simplicity. Also, packet filters typically are transparent to users and are very fast. [WACK02] lists the following weaknesses of packet filter firewalls:

- Because packet filter firewalls do not examine upper-layer data, they cannot prevent attacks that employ application-specific vulnerabilities or functions. For example, a packet filter firewall cannot block specific application commands; if a packet filter firewall allows a given application, all functions available within that application will be permitted.
- Because of the limited information available to the firewall, the logging functionality present in packet filter firewalls is limited. Packet filter logs normally contain the same information used to make access control decisions (source address, destination address, and traffic type).
- Most packet filter firewalls do not support advanced user authentication schemes. Once again, this limitation is mostly due to the lack of upper-layer functionality by the firewall.
- Packet filter firewalls are generally vulnerable to attacks and exploits that take advantage of problems within the TCP/IP specification and protocol stack, such as network layer address spoofing. Many packet filter firewalls cannot detect a network packet in which the OSI Layer 3 addressing information has been altered. Spoofing attacks are generally employed by intruders to bypass the security controls implemented in a firewall platform.
- Finally, due to the small number of variables used in access control decisions, packet filter firewalls are susceptible to security breaches caused by improper configurations. In other words, it is easy to accidentally configure a packet
filter firewall to allow traffic types, sources, and destinations that should be denied based on an organization’s information security policy.

Some of the attacks that can be made on packet filtering firewalls and the appropriate countermeasures are the following:

- **IP address spoofing**: The intruder transmits packets from the outside with a source IP address field containing an address of an internal host. The attacker hopes that the use of a spoofed address will allow penetration of systems that employ simple source address security, in which packets from specific trusted internal hosts are accepted. The countermeasure is to discard packets with an inside source address if the packet arrives on an external interface. In fact, this countermeasure is often implemented at the router external to the firewall.

- **Source routing attacks**: The source station specifies the route that a packet should take as it crosses the Internet, in the hopes that this will bypass security measures that do not analyze the source routing information. The countermeasure is to discard all packets that use this option.

- **Tiny fragment attacks**: The intruder uses the IP fragmentation option to create extremely small fragments and force the TCP header information into a separate packet fragment. This attack is designed to circumvent filtering rules that depend on TCP header information. Typically, a packet filter will make a filtering decision on the first fragment of a packet. All subsequent fragments of that packet are filtered out solely on the basis that they are part of the packet whose first fragment was rejected. The attacker hopes that the filtering firewall examines only the first fragment and that the remaining fragments are passed through. A tiny fragment attack can be defeated by enforcing a rule that the first fragment of a packet must contain a predefined minimum amount of the transport header. If the first fragment is rejected, the filter can remember the packet and discard all subsequent fragments.

**Stateful Inspection Firewalls**

A traditional packet filter makes filtering decisions on an individual packet basis and does not take into consideration any higher layer context. To understand what is meant by *context* and why a traditional packet filter is limited with regard to context, a little background is needed. Most standardized applications that run on top of TCP follow a client/server model. For example, for the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), e-mail is transmitted from a client system to a server system. The client system generates new e-mail messages, typically from user input. The server system accepts incoming e-mail messages and places them in the appropriate user mailboxes. SMTP operates by setting up a TCP connection between client and server, in which the TCP server port number, which identifies the SMTP server application, is 25. The TCP port number for the SMTP client is a number between 1024 and 65535 that is generated by the SMTP client.

In general, when an application that uses TCP creates a session with a remote host, it creates a TCP connection in which the TCP port number for the remote (server) application is a number less than 1024 and the TCP port number for the local
(client) application is a number between 1024 and 65535. The numbers less than 1024 are the “well-known” port numbers and are assigned permanently to particular applications (e.g., 25 for server SMTP). The numbers between 1024 and 65535 are generated dynamically and have temporary significance only for the lifetime of a TCP connection.

A simple packet filtering firewall must permit inbound network traffic on all these high-numbered ports for TCP-based traffic to occur. This creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by unauthorized users.

A stateful inspection packet firewall tightens up the rules for TCP traffic by creating a directory of outbound TCP connections, as shown in Table 22.2. There is an entry for each currently established connection. The packet filter will now allow incoming traffic to high-numbered ports only for those packets that fit the profile of one of the entries in this directory.

A stateful packet inspection firewall reviews the same packet information as a packet filtering firewall, but also records information about TCP connections (Figure 22.1c). Some stateful firewalls also keep track of TCP sequence numbers to prevent attacks that depend on the sequence number, such as session hijacking. Some even inspect limited amounts of application data for some well-known protocols like FTP, IM and SIPS commands, in order to identify and track related connections.

**Application-Level Gateway**

An application-level gateway, also called an application proxy, acts as a relay of application-level traffic (Figure 22.1d). The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FTP, and the gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed. When the user responds and provides a valid user ID and authentication information, the gateway contacts the application on the remote host and relays TCP segments containing the application data between the two endpoints. If the gateway does not implement the proxy code for a specific application, the service is not supported and cannot be forwarded across the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific features of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Address</th>
<th>Source Port</th>
<th>Destination Address</th>
<th>Destination Port</th>
<th>Connection State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.100</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>210.22.88.29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.102</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>216.32.42.123</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.101</td>
<td>1033</td>
<td>173.66.32.122</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.106</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>177.231.32.12</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223.43.21.231</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2122.22.123.32</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210.922.212.18</td>
<td>3321</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.102.32.23</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223.21.22.12</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while denying all other features.

Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying to deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at the TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable applications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application level.

A prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on each connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with the gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in both directions.

Circuit-Level Gateway

A fourth type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway or circuit-level proxy (Figure 22.1e). This can be a stand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level gateway for certain applications. As with an application gateway, a circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end TCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself and a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside host. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP segments from one connection to the other without examining the contents. The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed.

A typical use of circuit-level gateways is a situation in which the system administrator trusts the internal users. The gateway can be configured to support application-level or proxy service on inbound connections and circuit-level functions for outbound connections. In this configuration, the gateway can incur the processing overhead of examining incoming application data for forbidden functions but does not incur that overhead on outgoing data.

An example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package [KOBL92]; version 5 of SOCKS is specified in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following fashion:

The protocol described here is designed to provide a framework for client-server applications in both the TCP and UDP domains to conveniently and securely use the services of a network firewall. The protocol is conceptually a “shim-layer” between the application layer and the transport layer, and as such does not provide network-layer gateway services, such as forwarding of ICMP messages.

SOCKS consists of the following components:

- The SOCKS server, which often runs on a UNIX-based firewall. SOCKS is also implemented on Windows systems.
- The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the firewall.
• SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and TELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves either the recompilation or relinking of TCP-based client applications, or the use of alternate dynamically loaded libraries, to use the appropriate encapsulation routines in the SOCKS library.

When a TCP-based client wishes to establish a connection to an object that is reachable only via a firewall (such determination is left up to the implementation), it must open a TCP connection to the appropriate SOCKS port on the SOCKS server system. The SOCKS service is located on TCP port 1080. If the connection request succeeds, the client enters a negotiation for the authentication method to be used, authenticates with the chosen method, and then sends a relay request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request and either establishes the appropriate connection or denies it. UDP exchanges are handled in a similar fashion. In essence, a TCP connection is opened to authenticate a user to send and receive UDP segments, and the UDP segments are forwarded as long as the TCP connection is open.

22.4 FIREWALL BASING

It is common to base a firewall on a stand-alone machine running a common operating system, such as UNIX or Linux. Firewall functionality can also be implemented as a software module in a router or LAN switch. In this section, we look at some additional firewall basing considerations.

Bastion Host

A bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical strong point in the network’s security. Typically, the bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level or circuit-level gateway. Common characteristics of a bastion host are as follows:

• The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating system, making it a hardened system.
• Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed on the bastion host. These could include proxy applications for DNS, FTP, HTTP, and SMTP.
• The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed access to the proxy services. In addition, each proxy service may require its own authentication before granting user access.
• Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application’s command set.
• Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This means that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems on the protected network.
• Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each connection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for discovering and terminating intruder attacks.

• Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for network security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for security flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 lines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.

• Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host. If there is a problem with the operation of any proxy, or if a future vulnerability is discovered, it can be uninstalled without affecting the operation of the other proxy applications. Also, if the user population requires support for a new service, the network administrator can easily install the required proxy on the bastion host.

• A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read its initial configuration file. Hence, the portions of the file system containing executable code can be made read only. This makes it difficult for an intruder to install Trojan horse sniffer or other dangerous files on the bastion host.

• Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and secured directory on the bastion host.

Host-Based Firewalls

A host-based firewall is a software module used to secure an individual host. Such modules are available in many operating systems or can be provided as an add-on package. Like conventional stand-alone firewalls, host-resident firewalls filter and restrict the flow of packets. A common location for such firewalls is a server. There are several advantages to the use of a server-based or workstation-based firewall:

• Filtering rules can be tailored to the host environment. Specific corporate security policies for servers can be implemented, with different filters for servers used for different application.

• Protection is provided independent of topology. Thus both internal and external attacks must pass through the firewall.

• Used in conjunction with stand-alone firewalls, the host-based firewall provides an additional layer of protection. A new type of server can be added to the network, with its own firewall, without the necessity of altering the network firewall configuration.

Personal Firewall

A personal firewall controls the traffic between a personal computer or workstation on one side and the Internet or enterprise network on the other side. Personal firewall functionality can be used in the home environment and on corporate intranets. Typically, the personal firewall is a software module on the personal computer. In a
home environment with multiple computers connected to the Internet, firewall functionality can also be housed in a router that connects all of the home computers to a DSL, cable modem, or other Internet interface.

Personal firewalls are typically much less complex than either server-based firewalls or stand-alone firewalls. The primary role of the personal firewall is to deny unauthorized remote access to the computer. The firewall can also monitor outgoing activity in an attempt to detect and block worms and other malware.

An example of a personal firewall is the capability built in to the Mac OS X operating system. When the user enables the personal firewall in Mac OS X, all inbound connections are denied except for those the user explicitly permits. Figure 22.2 shows this simple interface. The list of inbound services that can be selectively reenabled, with their port numbers, includes the following:

- Personal file sharing (548, 427)
- Windows sharing (139)
- Personal Web sharing (80, 427)
- Remote login - SSH (22)
- FTP access (20-21, 1024-64535 from 20-21)
- Remote Apple events (3031)
- Printer sharing (631, 515)
- IChat Rendezvous (5297, 5298)
- ITunes Music Sharing (3869)
- CVS (2401)
- Gnutella/Limewire (6346)
- ICQ (4000)
- IRC (194)
- MSN Messenger (6891-6900)
- Network Time (123)
- Retrospect (497)
- SMB (without netbios-445)
- Timbuktu (407)
- VNC (5900-5902)
- WebSTAR Admin (1080, 1443)

When FTP access is enabled, ports 20 and 21 on the local machine are opened for FTP; if others connect to this computer from ports 20 or 21, the ports 1024 through 64535 are open.

For increased protection, advanced firewall features are available through easy-to-configure checkboxes. Stealth mode hides the Mac on the Internet by dropping unsolicited communication packets, making it appear as though no Mac is present. UDP packets can be blocked, restricting network traffic to TCP packets only for open ports. The firewall also supports logging, an important tool for checking on unwanted activity.
firewall also provides a basic level of protection for the remainder of the enterprise network. In this type of configuration, internal firewalls serve three purposes:

1. The internal firewall adds more stringent filtering capability, compared to the external firewall, in order to protect enterprise servers and workstations from external attack.

2. The internal firewall provides two-way protection with respect to the DMZ. First, the internal firewall protects the remainder of the network from attacks launched from DMZ systems. Such attacks might originate from worms, rootkits, bots, or other malware lodged in a DMZ system. Second, an internal firewall can protect the DMZ systems from attack from the internal protected network.
3. Multiple internal firewalls can be used to protect portions of the internal network from each other. For example, firewalls can be configured so that internal servers are protected from internal workstations and vice versa. A common practice is to place the DMZ on a different network interface on the external firewall from that used to access the internal networks.

**Virtual Private Networks**

In today’s distributed computing environment, the **virtual private network (VPN)** offers an attractive solution to network managers. In essence, a VPN consists of a set of computers that interconnect by means of a relatively unsecure network and that make use of encryption and special protocols to provide security. At each corporate site, workstations, servers, and databases are linked by one or more local area networks (LANs). The Internet or some other public network can be used to interconnect sites, providing a cost savings over the use of a private network and offloading the wide area network management task to the public network provider. That same public network provides an access path for telecommuters and other mobile employees to log on to corporate systems from remote sites.

But the manager faces a fundamental requirement: security. Use of a public network exposes corporate traffic to eavesdropping and provides an entry point for unauthorized users. To counter this problem, a VPN is needed. In essence, a VPN uses encryption and authentication in the lower protocol layers to provide a secure connection through an otherwise insecure network, typically the Internet. VPNs are generally cheaper than real private networks using private lines but rely on having the same encryption and authentication system at both ends. The encryption may be performed by firewall software or possibly by routers. The most common protocol mechanism used for this purpose is at the IP level and is known as IPsec.

An organization maintains LANs at dispersed locations. A logical means of implementing an IPsec is in a firewall, as shown in Figure 22.4, which essentially repeats Figure 19.1. If IPsec is implemented in a separate box behind (internal to) the firewall, then VPN traffic passing through the firewall in both directions is encrypted. In this case, the firewall is unable to perform its filtering function or other security functions, such as access control, logging, or scanning for viruses. IPsec could be implemented in the boundary router, outside the firewall. However, this device is likely to be less secure than the firewall and thus less desirable as an IPsec platform.

**Distributed Firewalls**

A distributed firewall configuration involves stand-alone firewall devices plus host-based firewalls working together under a central administrative control. Figure 22.5 suggests a distributed firewall configuration. Administrators can configure host-resident firewalls on hundreds of servers and workstations as well as configure personal firewalls on local and remote user systems. Tools let the network administrator set policies and monitor security across the entire network. These firewalls protect against internal attacks and provide protection tailored to specific machines and applications. Stand-alone firewalls provide global protection, including internal firewalls and an external firewall, as discussed previously.
With distributed firewalls, it may make sense to establish both an internal and an external DMZ. Web servers that need less protection because they have less critical information on them could be placed in an external DMZ, outside the external firewall. What protection is needed is provided by host-based firewalls on these servers.

An important aspect of a distributed firewall configuration is security monitoring. Such monitoring typically includes log aggregation and analysis, firewall statistics, and fine-grained remote monitoring of individual hosts if needed.

Summary of Firewall Locations and Topologies

We can now summarize the discussion from Sections 22.4 and 22.5 to define a spectrum of firewall locations and topologies. The following alternatives can be identified:

- **Host-resident firewall**: This category includes personal firewall software and firewall software on servers. Such firewalls can be used alone or as part of an in-depth firewall deployment.
- **Screening router**: A single router between internal and external networks with stateless or full packet filtering. This arrangement is typical for small office/home office (SOHO) applications.
• **Single bastion inline**: A single firewall device between an internal and external router (e.g., Figure 22.1a). The firewall may implement stateful filters and/or application proxies. This is the typical firewall appliance configuration for small to medium-sized organizations.
• **Single bastion T**: Similar to single bastion inline but has a third network interface on bastion to a DMZ where externally visible servers are placed. Again, this is a common appliance configuration for medium to large organizations.

• **Double bastion inline**: Figure 22.3 illustrates this configuration, where the DMZ is sandwiched between bastion firewalls. This configuration is common for large businesses and government organizations.

• **Double bastion T**: The DMZ is on a separate network interface on the bastion firewall. This configuration is also common for large businesses and government organizations and may be required. For example, this configuration is required for Australian government use (Australian Government Information Technology Security Manual - ACSI33).

• **Distributed firewall configuration**: Illustrated in Figure 22.5. This configuration is used by some large businesses and government organizations.

### 22.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

A classic treatment of firewalls is [CHES03]. [LODI98], [OPPL97], and [BELL94b] are good overview articles on the subject. [WACK02] is an excellent overview of firewall technology and firewall policies. [AUDI04] and [WILS05] provide useful discussions of firewalls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Recommended Web Site:**

- **Firewall.com**: Numerous links to firewall references and software resources.
22.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>application-level gateway</th>
<th>firewall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bastion host</td>
<td>host-based firewall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circuit-level gateway</td>
<td>IP address spoofing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distributed firewalls</td>
<td>IP security (IPsec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>packet filtering firewall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>personal firewall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stateful inspection firewall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tiny fragment attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>virtual private network (VPN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

22.1 List three design goals for a firewall.
22.2 List four techniques used by firewalls to control access and enforce a security policy.
22.3 What information is used by a typical packet filtering firewall?
22.4 What are some weaknesses of a packet filtering firewall?
22.5 What is the difference between a packet filtering firewall and a stateful inspection firewall?
22.6 What is an application-level gateway?
22.7 What is a circuit-level gateway?
22.8 What are the differences among the firewalls of Figure 22.1?
22.9 What are the common characteristics of a bastion host?
22.10 Why is it useful to have host-based firewalls?
22.11 What is a DMZ network and what types of systems would you expect to find on such networks?
22.12 What is the difference between an internal and an external firewall?

Problems

22.1 As was mentioned in Section 22.3, one approach to defeating the tiny fragment attack is to enforce a minimum length of the transport header that must be contained in the first fragment of an IP packet. If the first fragment is rejected, all subsequent fragments can be rejected. However, the nature of IP is such that fragments may arrive out of order. Thus, an intermediate fragment may pass through the filter before the initial fragment is rejected. How can this situation be handled?

22.2 In an IPv4 packet, the size of the payload in the first fragment, in octets, is equal to Total Length – (4 × IHL). If this value is less than the required minimum (8 octets for TCP), then this fragment and the entire packet are rejected. Suggest an alternative method of achieving the same result using only the Fragment Offset field.

22.3 RFC 791, the IPv4 protocol specification, describes a reassembly algorithm that results in new fragments overwriting any overlapped portions of previously received fragments. Given such a reassembly implementation, an attacker could construct a series of packets in which the lowest (zero-offset) fragment would contain innocuous data (and thereby be passed by administrative packet filters), and in which some subsequent packet having a non-zero offset would overlap TCP header information (destination port, for instance) and cause it to be modified. The second packet would be passed through most filter implementations because it does not have a zero fragment offset. Suggest a method that could be used by a packet filter to counter this attack.
Table 22.3  Sample Packet Filter Firewall Ruleset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Address</th>
<th>Source Port</th>
<th>Dest Address</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.0</td>
<td>&gt; 1023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>192.168.1.1</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.1</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>192.168.1.0</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.2</td>
<td>SMTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.3</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22.4  Table 22.3 shows a sample of a packet filter firewall ruleset for an imaginary network of IP address that range from 192.168.1.0 to 192.168.1.254. Describe the effect of each rule.

22.5  SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) is the standard protocol for transferring mail between hosts over TCP. A TCP connection is set up between a user agent and a server program. The server listens on TCP port 25 for incoming connection requests. The user end of the connection is on a TCP port number above 1023. Suppose you wish to build a packet filter rule set allowing inbound and outbound SMTP traffic. You generate the following ruleset:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Either</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a.  Describe the effect of each rule.
b.  Your host in this example has IP address 172.16.1.1. Someone tries to send e-mail from a remote host with IP address 192.168.3.4. If successful, this generates an SMTP dialogue between the remote user and the SMTP server on your host consisting of SMTP commands and mail. Additionally, assume that a user on your host tries to send e-mail to the SMTP server on the remote system. Four typical packets for this scenario are as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicate which packets are permitted or denied and which rule is used in each case.
c. Someone from the outside world (10.1.2.3) attempts to open a connection from port 5150 on a remote host to the Web proxy server on port 8080 on one of your local hosts (172.16.3.4), in order to carry out an attack. Typical packets are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>5150</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Will the attack succeed? Give details.

22.6 To provide more protection, the ruleset from the preceding problem is modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Src Port</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Either</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Describe the change.
b. Apply this new ruleset to the same six packets of the preceding problem. Indicate which packets are permitted or denied and which rule is used in each case.

22.7 A hacker uses port 25 as the client port on his or her end to attempt to open a connection to your Web proxy server.
a. The following packets might be generated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Src Port</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explain why this attack will succeed, using the ruleset of the preceding problem.
b. When a TCP connection is initiated, the ACK bit in the TCP header is not set. Subsequently, all TCP headers sent over the TCP connection have the ACK bit set. Use this information to modify the ruleset of the preceding problem to prevent the attack just described.

22.8 A common management requirement is that “all external Web traffic must flow via the organization’s Web proxy.” However, that requirement is easier stated than implemented. Discuss the various problems and issues, possible solutions, and limitations with supporting this requirement. In particular consider issues such as identifying exactly what constitutes “Web traffic” and how it may be monitored, given the large range of ports and various protocols used by Web browsers and servers.

22.9 Consider the threat of “theft/breach of proprietary or confidential information held in key data files on the system.” One method by which such a breach might occur is the accidental/deliberate e-mailing of information to a user outside to the organization. A possible countermeasure to this is to require all external e-mail to be given a
sensitivity tag (classification if you like) in its subject and for external e-mail to have
the lowest sensitivity tag. Discuss how this measure could be implemented in a firewall
and what components and architecture would be needed to do this.

22.10 You are given the following “informal firewall policy” details to be implemented
using a firewall like that in Figure 22.3:

1. E-mail may be sent using SMTP in both directions through the firewall, but it
must be relayed via the DMZ mail gateway that provides header sanitization and
content filtering. External e-mail must be destined for the DMZ mail server.
2. Users inside may retrieve their e-mail from the DMZ mail gateway, using either
POP3 or POP3S, and authenticate themselves.
3. Users outside may retrieve their e-mail from the DMZ mail gateway, but only if
they use the secure POP3 protocol, and authenticate themselves.
4. Web requests (both insecure and secure) are allowed from any internal user out
through the firewall but must be relayed via the DMZ Web proxy, which provides
content filtering (noting this is not possible for secure requests), and users must
authenticate with the proxy for logging.
5. Web requests (both insecure and secure) are allowed from anywhere on the
Internet to the DMZ Web server.
6. DNS lookup requests by internal users allowed via the DMZ DNS server, which
queries to the Internet.
7. External DNS requests are provided by the DMZ DNS server.
8. Management and update of information on the DMZ servers is allowed using
secure shell connections from relevant authorized internal users (may have differ-
ent sets of users on each system as appropriate).
9. SNMP management requests are permitted from the internal management hosts
to the firewalls, with the firewalls also allowed to send management traps (i.e.,
notation of some event occurring) to the management hosts.

Design suitable packet filter rulesets (similar to those shown in Table 22.1) to be
implemented on the “External Firewall” and the “Internal Firewall” to satisfy the
aforementioned policy requirements.
CHAPTER 23

LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS

23.1 Cybercrime and Computer Crime
   Types of Computer Crime
   Law Enforcement Challenges
   Working With Law Enforcement

23.2 Intellectual Property
   Types of Intellectual Property
   Intellectual Property Relevant to Network and Computer Security
   Digital Millennium Copyright Act
   Digital Rights Management

23.3 Privacy
   Privacy Law and Regulation
   Organizational Response
   Privacy and Data Surveillance

23.4 Ethical Issues
   Ethics and the IS Professions
   Ethical Issues Related to Computers and Information Systems
   Codes of Conduct

23.5 Recommended Reading and Web Sites

23.6 Key Terms, Review Questions, and Problems
There are some dogs who wouldn’t debase what are to them sacred forms. A very fine, very serious German Shepherd I worked with, for instance, grumbled noisily at other dogs when they didn’t obey. When training him to retrieve, at one point I set the dumbbell on its end for the fun of it. He glared disapprovingly at the dumbbell and at me, then pushed it carefully back into its proper position before picking it up and returning with it, rather sullenly.

—Adam’s Task: Calling Animals by Name, Vicki Hearne

The legal and ethical aspects of computer security encompass a broad range of topics, and a full discussion is well beyond the scope of this book. In this chapter, we touch on a few important topics in this area.

### 23.1 CYBERCRIME AND COMPUTER CRIME

The bulk of this book examines technical approaches to the detection, prevention, and recovery from computer and network attacks. One other tool is the deterrent factor of law enforcement. Many types of computer attacks can be considered crimes and, as such, carry criminal sanctions. This section begins with a classification of types of computer crime and then looks at some of the unique law-enforcement challenges of dealing with computer crime.

#### Types of Computer Crime

*Computer crime, or cybercrime*, is a term used broadly to describe criminal activity in which computers or computer networks are a tool, a target, or a place of criminal activity.1 These categories are not exclusive, and many activities can be characterized as falling in one or more categories. The term *cybercrime* has a connotation of the use of networks specifically, whereas *computer crime* may or may not involve networks.

The U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ00] categorizes computer crime based on the role that the computer plays in the criminal activity, as follows:

- **Computers as targets**: This form of crime targets a computer system, to acquire information stored on that computer system, to control the target system without authorization or payment (theft of service), or to alter the integrity of data or interfere with the availability of the computer or server. Using the terminology of Chapter 1, this form of crime involves an attack on data integrity, system integrity, data confidentiality, privacy, or availability.

- **Computers as storage devices**: Computers can be used to further unlawful activity by using a computer or a computer device as a passive storage medium. For example, the computer can be used to store stolen password lists,

---

1This definition is from the New York Law School Course on Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, and Digital Law Enforcement (information-retrieval.info/cybercrime/index.html).
credit card or calling card numbers, proprietary corporate information, pornographic image files, or “warez” (pirated commercial software).

- **Computers as communications tools**: Many of the crimes falling within this category are simply traditional crimes that are committed online. Examples include the illegal sale of prescription drugs, controlled substances, alcohol, and guns; fraud; gambling; and child pornography.

A more specific list of crimes, shown in Table 23.1, is defined in the international Convention on Cybercrime. This is a useful list because it represents an international consensus on what constitutes computer crime, or cybercrime, and what crimes are considered important.

Yet another categorization is used in the CERT 2006 annual E-crime Survey, the results of which are shown in Table 23.2. The figures in the second column indicate the percentage of respondents who report at least one incident in the corresponding row category. Entries in the remaining three columns indicate the percentage of respondents who reported a given source for an attack.

### Law Enforcement Challenges

The deterrent effect of law enforcement on computer and network attacks correlates with the success rate of criminal arrest and prosecution. The nature of cybercrime is such that consistent success is extraordinarily difficult. To see this, consider what [KSHE06] refers to as the vicious cycle of cybercrime, involving law enforcement agencies, cybercriminals, and cybercrime victims (Figure 23.1).

For law enforcement agencies, cybercrime presents some unique difficulties. Proper investigation requires a fairly sophisticated grasp of the technology. Although some agencies, particularly larger agencies, are catching up in this area, many jurisdictions lack investigators knowledgeable and experienced in dealing with this kind of crime. Lack of resources represents another handicap. Some cybercrime investigations require considerable computer processing power, communications capacity, and storage capacity, which may be beyond the budget of individual jurisdictions.

The global nature of cybercrime is an additional obstacle: Many crimes will involve perpetrators who are remote from the target system, in another jurisdiction or even another country. A lack of collaboration and cooperation with remote law enforcement agencies can greatly hinder an investigation. Initiatives such as the international Convention on Cybercrime are a promising sign. The Convention at least introduces a common terminology for crimes and a framework for harmonizing laws globally.

---

2The 2001 Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty seeking to address Internet crimes by harmonizing national laws, improving investigative techniques, and increasing cooperation among nations. It was developed by the Council of Europe and has been ratified by 43 nations, including the United States. The Convention includes a list of crimes that each signatory state must transpose into its own law.

3Note that the sum of the figures in the last three columns for a given row may exceed 100%, because a respondent may report multiple incidents in multiple source categories (e.g., a respondent experiences both insider and outsider denial-of-service attacks).
Table 23.1 Cybercrimes Cited in the Convention on Cybercrime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Article 2 | Illegal access  
The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. |
| Article 3 | Illegal interception  
The interception without right, made by technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data. |
| Article 4 | Data interference  
The damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer data without right. |
| Article 5 | System interference  
The serious hindering without right of the functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data. |
| Article 6 | Misuse of devices  
a. The production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of:  
i. A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance with the above Articles 2 through 5;  
ii. A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in the above Articles 2 through 5; and  
b. The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.i or ii above, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in the above Articles 2 through 5. A Party may require by law that a number of such items be possessed before criminal liability attaches. |
| Article 7 | Computer-related forgery  
The input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible. |
| Article 8 | Computer-related fraud  
The causing of a loss of property to another person by:  
a. Any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data;  
b. Any interference with the functioning of a computer system, with fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic benefit for oneself or for another person. |
| Article 9 | Offenses related to child pornography  
a. Producing child pornography for the purpose of its distribution through a computer system;  
b. Offering or making available child pornography through a computer system;  
c. Distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer system;  
d. Procuring child pornography through a computer system for oneself or for another person;  
e. Possessing child pornography in a computer system or on a computer-data storage medium. |
| Article 10 | Infringements of copyright and related rights |
| Article 11 | Attempt and aiding or abetting  
Aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with the above Articles 2 through 10 of the present Convention with intent that such offence be committed. An attempt to commit any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 3 through 5, 7, 8, and 9.1.a and c. of this Convention. |
Table 23.2  CERT 2006 E-Crime Watch Survey Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Committed (net %)</th>
<th>Insider (%)</th>
<th>Outsider (%)</th>
<th>Source Unknown (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft of intellectual property</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of other (proprietary) info including customer records, financial records, etc.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of service attacks</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virus, worms or other malicious code</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (credit card fraud, etc.)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity theft of customer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal generation of spam e-mail</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phishing (someone posing as your company online in an attempt to gain personal data from your subscribers or employees)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized access to/use of information, systems or networks</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage: deliberate disruption, deletion, or destruction of information, systems, or networks</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web site defacement</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zombie machines on organization’s network/bots/use of network by BotNets</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional exposure of private or sensitive information</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyware (not including adware)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relative lack of success in bringing cybercriminals to justice has led to an increase in their numbers, boldness, and the global scale of their operations. It is difficult to profile cybercriminals in the way that is often done with other types of repeat offenders. The cybercriminal tends to be young and very computer-savvy, but the range of behavioral characteristics is wide. Further, there exist no cybercriminal databases that can point investigators to likely suspects.

The success of cybercriminals, and the relative lack of success of law enforcement, influence the behavior of cybercrime victims. As with law enforcement, many organizations that may be the target of attack have not invested sufficiently in technical, physical, and human-factor resources to prevent attacks. Reporting rates tend to be low because of a lack of confidence in law enforcement, a concern about corporate reputation, and a concern about civil liability. The low reporting
rates and the reluctance to work with law enforcement on the part of victims feeds into the handicaps under which law enforcement works, completing the vicious cycle.

**Working With Law Enforcement**

Executive management and security administrators need to look upon law enforcement as another resource and tool, alongside technical, physical, and human-factor resources. The successful use of law enforcement depends much more on people skills than technical skills. Management needs to understand the criminal investigation process, the inputs that investigators need, and the ways in which the victim can contribute positively to the investigation.
23.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The U.S. legal system, and legal systems generally, distinguish three primary types of property:

- **Real property**: Land and things permanently attached to the land, such as trees, buildings, and stationary mobile homes.
- **Personal property**: Personal effects, moveable property and goods, such as cars, bank accounts, wages, securities, a small business, furniture, insurance policies, jewelry, patents, pets, and season baseball tickets.
- **Intellectual property**: Any intangible asset that consists of human knowledge and ideas. Examples include software, data, novels, sound recordings, the design of a new type of mousetrap, or a cure for a disease.

This section focuses on the computer security aspects of intellectual property.

**Types of Intellectual Property**

There are three main types of intellectual property for which legal protection is available: copyrights, trademarks, and patents. The legal protection is against infringement, which is the invasion of the rights secured by copyrights, trademarks, and patents. The right to seek civil recourse against anyone infringing his or her property is granted to the IP owner. Depending upon the type of IP, infringement may vary (Figure 23.2).

**COPYRIGHTS** Copyright law protects the tangible or fixed expression of an idea, not the idea itself. A creator can claim copyright, and file for the copyright at a national government copyright office, if the following conditions are fulfilled:

- The proposed work is original.
- The creator has put this original idea into a concrete form, such as hard copy (paper), software, or multimedia form.

Examples of items that may be copyrighted include the following [BRAU01]:

- **Literary works**: Novels, nonfiction prose, poetry, newspaper articles and newspapers, magazine articles and magazines, catalogs, brochures, ads (text), and compilations such as business directories
- **Musical works**: Songs, advertising jingles, and instrumentals
- **Dramatic works**: Plays, operas, and skits
- **Pantomimes and choreographic works**: Ballets, modern dance, jazz dance, and mime works

---

4Copyright is automatically assigned to newly created works in countries that subscribe to the Berne convention, which encompasses the vast majority of nations. Some countries, such as the United States, provide additional legal protection if the work is registered.
• **Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works**: Photographs, posters, maps, paintings, drawings, graphic art, display ads, cartoon strips and cartoon characters, stuffed animals, statues, paintings, and works of fine art

• **Motion pictures and other audiovisual works**: Movies, documentaries, travelogues, training films and videos, television shows, television ads, and interactive multimedia works

• **Sound recordings**: Recordings of music, sound, or words

• **Architectural works**: Building designs, whether in the form of architectural plans, drawings, or the constructed building itself

• **Software-related works**: Computer software, software documentation and manuals, training manuals, other manual

The copyright owner has the following exclusive rights, protected against infringement:

• **Reproduction right**: Lets the owner make copies of a work

• **Modification right**: Also known as the derivative-works right, concerns modifying a work to create a new or derivative work

• **Distribution right**: Lets the owner publicly sell, rent, lease, or lend copies of the work.

• **Public-performance right**: Applies mainly to live performances

• **Public-display right**: Lets the owner publicly show a copy of the work directly or by means of a film, slide, or television image

**PATENTS** A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor. The right conferred by the patent grant is, in the language of the U.S. statute and of the grant itself, “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the United States or “importing” the invention into the
United States. Similar wording appears in the statutes of other nations. There are three types of patents:

- **Utility patents**: May be granted to anyone who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof;
- **Design patents**: May be granted to anyone who invents a new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture; and
- **Plant patents**: May be granted to anyone who invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.

An example of a patent from the computer security realm is the RSA public-key cryptosystem. From the time it was granted in 1983 until the patent expired in 2000, the patent holder, RSA Security, was entitled to receive a fee for each implementation of RSA.

**Trademarks**
A trademark is a word, name, symbol, or device that is used in trade with goods to indicate the source of the goods and to distinguish them from the goods of others. A servicemark is the same as a trademark except that it identifies and distinguishes the source of a service rather than a product. The terms trademark and mark are commonly used to refer to both trademarks and servicemarks. Trademark rights may be used to prevent others from using a confusingly similar mark, but not to prevent others from making the same goods or from selling the same goods or services under a clearly different mark.

**Intellectual Property Relevant to Network and Computer Security**
A number of forms of intellectual property are relevant in the context of network and computer security. Here we mention some of the most prominent:

- **Software**: This includes programs produced by vendors of commercial software (e.g., operating systems, utility programs, applications) as well as shareware, proprietary software created by an organization for internal use, and software produced by individuals. For all such software, copyright protection is available if desired. In some cases, a patent protection may also be appropriate.
- **Databases**: A database may consist of data that is collected and organized in such a fashion that it has potential commercial value. An example is an economic forecasting database. Such databases may be protected by copyright.
- **Digital content**: This category includes audio files, video files, multimedia, courseware, Web site content, and any other original digital work that can be presented in some fashion using computers or other digital devices.
- **Algorithms**: An example of a patentable algorithm, previously cited, is the RSA public-key cryptosystem.

**Digital Millennium Copyright Act**
The U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has had a profound effect on the protection of digital content rights in both the United States and worldwide. The
DMCA, signed into law in 1998, is designed to implement World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, signed in 1996. In essence, DMCA strengthens the protection of copyrighted materials in digital format.

The DMCA encourages copyright owners to use technological measures to protect copyrighted works. These measures fall into two categories: measures that prevent access to the work and measures that prevent copying of the work. Further, the law prohibits attempts to bypass such measures. Specifically, the law states that “no person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” Among other effects of this clause, it prohibits almost all unauthorized decryption of content. The law further prohibits the manufacture, release, or sale of products, services, and devices that can crack encryption designed to thwart either access to or copying of material unauthorized by the copyright holder. Both criminal and civil penalties apply to attempts to circumvent technological measures and to assist in such circumvention.

Certain actions are exempted from the provisions of the DMCA and other copyright laws, including the following:

- **Fair use**: This concept is not tightly defined. It is intended to permit others to perform, show, quote, copy, and otherwise distribute portions of the work for certain purposes. These purposes include review, comment, and discussion of copyrighted works.

- **Reverse engineering**: Reverse engineering of a software product is allowed if the user has the right to use a copy of the program and if the purpose of the reverse engineering is not to duplicate the functionality of the program but rather to achieve interoperability.

- **Encryption research**: “Good faith” encryption research is allowed. In essence, this exemption allows decryption attempts to advance the development of encryption technology.

- **Security testing**: This is the access of a computer or network for the good faith testing, investigating, or correcting a security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of the owner or operator.

- **Personal privacy**: It is generally permitted to bypass technological measures if that is the only reasonable way to prevent the access to result in the revealing or recording of personally identifying information.

Despite the exemptions built into the Act, there is considerable concern, especially in the research and academic communities, that the act inhibits legitimate security and encryption research. These parties feel that DMCA stifles innovation and academic freedom and is a threat to open source software development [ACM04].

**Digital Rights Management**

Digital Rights Management (DRM) refers to systems and procedures that ensure that holders of digital rights are clearly identified and receive the stipulated payment for their works. The systems and procedures may also impose further restrictions on the use of digital objects, such as inhibiting printing or prohibiting further distribution.
There is no single DRM standard or architecture. DRM encompasses a variety of approaches to intellectual property management and enforcement by providing secure and trusted automated services to control the distribution and use of content. In general, the objective is to provide mechanisms for the complete content management life cycle (creation, subsequent contribution by others, access, distribution, use), including the management of rights information associated with the content.

DRM systems should meet the following objectives:

1. Provide persistent content protection against unauthorized access to the digital content, limiting access to only those with the proper authorization.
2. Support a variety of digital content types (e.g., music files, video streams, digital books, images).
3. Support content use on a variety of platforms, (e.g., PCs, PDAs, iPods, mobile phones).
4. Support content distribution on a variety of media, including CD-ROMs, DVDs, and flash memory.

Figure 23.3, based on [LIU03], illustrates a typical DRM model in terms of the principal users of DRM systems:

- **Content provider**: Holds the digital rights of the content and wants to protect these rights. Examples are a music record label and a movie studio.
- **Distributor**: Provides distribution channels, such as an online shop or a Web retailer. For example, an online distributor receives the digital content from
the content provider and creates a Web catalog presenting the content and rights metadata for the content promotion.

- **Consumer**: Uses the system to access the digital content by retrieving downloadable or streaming content through the distribution channel and then paying for the digital license. The player/viewer application used by the consumer takes charge of initiating license request to the clearinghouse and enforcing the content usage rights.

- **Clearinghouse**: Handles the financial transaction for issuing the digital license to the consumer and pays royalty fees to the content provider and distribution fees to the distributor accordingly. The clearinghouse is also responsible for logging license consumptions for every consumer.

In this model, the distributor need not enforce the access rights. Instead, the content provider protects the content in such a way (typically encryption) that the consumer must purchase a digital license and access capability from the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse consults usage rules provided by the content provider to determine what access is permitted and the fee for a particular type of access. Having collected the fee, the clearinghouse credits the content provider and distributor appropriately.

Figure 23.4, from [IANN06], shows a generic system architecture to support DRM functionality. The system is access by parties in three roles. **Rights holders** are the content providers, who either created the content or have acquired rights to the content. **Service providers** include distributors and clearinghouses. **Consumers** are
those who purchase the right to access to content for specific uses. There is system
interface to the services provided by the DRM system:

- **Identity management**: Mechanisms to uniquely identify entities, such as
  parties and content
- **Content management**: Processes and functions needed to manage the content
  lifestyle
- **Rights management**: Processes and functions needed to manage rights, rights
  holders, and associated requirements

Below these management modules are a set of common functions. The
**security/encryption** module provides functions to encrypt content and to sign
license agreements. The identity management service makes use of the
**authentication** and **authorization** functions to identify all parties in the relationship.
Using these functions, the identity management service includes the following:

- Allocation of unique party identifiers
- User profile and preferences
- User’s device management
- Public-key management

**Billing/payments** functions deal with the collection of usage fees from con-
sumers and the distribution of payments to rights holders and distributors. **Delivery**
functions deal with the delivery of content to consumers.

---

**23.3 PRIVACY**

An issue with considerable overlap with computer security is that of privacy. On the
one hand, the scale and interconnectedness of personal information collected and
stored in information systems has increased dramatically, motivated by law enforce-
ment, national security, and economic incentives. The last mentioned has been
perhaps the main driving force. In a global information economy, it is likely that the
most economically valuable electronic asset is aggregations of information on individ-
uals [JUDY09]. On the other hand, individuals have become increasingly aware of the
extent to which government agencies, businesses, and even Internet users have access
to their personal information and private details about their lives and activities.

Concerns about the extent to which personal privacy has been and may be
compromised have led to a variety of legal and technical approaches to reinforcing
privacy rights.

**Privacy Law and Regulation**

A number of international organizations and national governments have intro-
duced laws and regulations intended to protect individual privacy. We look at two
such initiatives in this subsection.

**EUROPEAN UNION DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE** In 1998, the EU adopted the
Directive on Data Protection to both (1) ensure that member states protected
fundamental privacy rights when processing personal information, and (2) prevent
member states from restricting the free flow of personal information within the EU.
The Directive is not itself a law, but requires member states to enact laws
encompassing its terms. The Directive is organized around the following principles
of personal information use:

- **Notice:** Organizations must notify individuals what personal information they
are collecting, the uses of that information, and what choices the individual
may have.

- **Consent:** Individuals must be able to choose whether and how their personal
information is used by, or disclosed to, third parties. They have the right not to
have any sensitive information collected or used without express permission,
including race, religion, health, union membership, beliefs, and sex life.

- **Consistency:** Organizations may use personal information only in accordance
with the terms of the notice given the data subject and any choices with
respect to its use exercised by the subject.

- **Access:** Individuals must have the right and ability to access their information
and correct, modify, or delete any portion of it.

- **Security:** Organizations must provide adequate security, using technical
and other means, to protect the integrity and confidentiality of personal
information.

- **Onward transfer:** Third parties receiving personal information must provide
the same level of privacy protection as the organization from whom the infor-
mation is obtained.

- **Enforcement:** The Directive grants a private right of action to data subjects
when organizations do not follow the law. In addition, each EU member
has a regulatory enforcement agency concerned with privacy rights
enforcement.

**United States Privacy Initiatives** The first comprehensive privacy legislation
adopted in the United States was the Privacy Act of 1974, which dealt with personal
information collected and used by federal agencies. The Act is intended to

1. Permit individuals to determine what records pertaining to them are collected,
maintained, used, or disseminated.

2. Permit individuals to forbid records obtained for one purpose to be used for
another purpose without consent.

3. Permit individuals to obtain access to records pertaining to them and to correct
and amend such records as appropriate.

4. Ensure that agencies collect, maintain, and use personal information in a manner
that ensures that the information is current, adequate, relevant, and not excessive
for its intended use.

5. Create a private right of action for individuals whose personal information is
not used in accordance with the Act.
As with all privacy laws and regulations, there are exceptions and conditions attached to this Act, such as criminal investigations, national security concerns, and conflicts between competing individual rights of privacy.

While the 1974 Privacy Act covers government records, a number of other U.S. laws have been enacted that cover other areas, including the following:

- **Banking and financial records**: Personal banking information is protected in certain ways by a number of laws, including the recent Financial Services Modernization Act.

- **Credit reports**: The Fair Credit Reporting Act confers certain rights on individuals and obligations on credit reporting agencies.

- **Medical and health insurance records**: A variety of laws have been in place for decades dealing with medical records privacy. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) created significant new rights for patients to protect and access their own health information.

- **Children’s privacy**: The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act places restrictions on online organizations in the collection of data from children under the age of 13.

- **Electronic communications**: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act generally prohibits unauthorized and intentional interception of wire and electronic communications during the transmission phase and unauthorized accessing of electronically stored wire and electronic communications.

**Organizational Response**

Organizations need to deploy both management controls and technical measures to comply with laws and regulations concerning privacy as well as to implement corporate policies concerning employee privacy. ISO 17799 (*Code of Practice for Information Security Management*) states the requirement as follows:

**ISO 17799: Data protection and privacy of personal information**

An organizational data protection and privacy policy should be developed and implemented. This policy should be communicated to all persons involved in the processing of personal information. Compliance with this policy and all relevant data protection legislation and regulations requires appropriate management structure and control. Often this is best achieved by the appointment of a responsible person, such as a data protection officer, who should provide guidance to managers, users, and service providers on their individual responsibilities and the specific procedures that should be followed. Responsibility for handling personal information and ensuring awareness of the data protection principles should be dealt with in accordance with relevant legislation and regulations. Appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal information should be implemented.
Privacy and Data Surveillance

The demands of homeland security and counterterrorism have imposed new threats to personal privacy. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have become increasingly aggressive in using data surveillance techniques to fulfill their mission. In addition, private organizations are exploiting a number of trends to increase their ability to build detailed profiles of individuals, including the spread of the Internet, the increase in electronic payment methods, near-universal use of cellular phone communications, ubiquitous computation, sensor webs, and so on.

Both policy and technical approaches are needed to protect privacy when both government and nongovernment organizations seek to learn as much as possible about individuals. In terms of technical approaches, the requirements for privacy protection for information systems can be addressed in the context of database security. That is, the approaches that are appropriate for privacy protection involve technical means that have been developed for database security.

A specific proposal for a database security approach to privacy protection is outlined in [POPP06] and illustrated in Figure 23.5. The privacy appliance is a tamper-resistant, cryptographically protected device that is interposed between a database and the access interface, analogous to a firewall or intrusion prevention device. The device implements privacy protection functions, including verifying the user’s access permissions and credentials and creating an audit log. Some of the specific functions of the appliance are as follows:

- **Data transformation**: This function encodes or encrypts portions of the data so as to preserve privacy but still allow data analysis functions needed for effective use. An example of such data analysis functions is the detection of terrorist activity patterns.

- **Anonymization**: This function removes specific identifying information from query results, such as last name and telephone number, but creates some sort of anonymized unique identifier so that analysts can detect connections between queries.

- **Selective revelation**: This is a method for minimizing exposure of individual information while enabling continuous analysis of potentially interconnected data. The function initially reveals information to the analyst only in sanitized form, that is, in terms of statistics and categories that do not reveal (directly or indirectly) anyone’s private information. If the analyst sees reason for concern, he or she can follow up by seeking permission to get more precise information. This permission would be granted if the initial information provides sufficient cause to allow the revelation of more information, under appropriate legal and policy guidelines.

- **Immutable audit**: A tamper-resistant method that identifies where data go and who has seen the data. The audit function automatically and permanently records all data accesses, with strong protection against deletion, modification, and unauthorized use.

- **Associative memory**: This is a software module that can recognize patterns and make connections between pieces of data that the human user may have missed or didn’t know existed. With this method, it can discover relationships quickly between data points found in massive amounts of data.
Figure 23.5 Privacy Appliance Concept

- Government owned
- Independently operated
- Private or agency owned

- Contains associative memory index (AMI)
- Update in real time

- Cross-source privacy appliance

- Authentication
- Authorization
- Anonymization
- Immutable audit trail
- Inference checking

- Selective revelation
- Data transformation
- Policy is embedded
- Create AMI
As Figure 23.5 indicates, the owner of a database installs a privacy appliance tailored to the database content and structure and to its intended use by outside organizations. An independently operated privacy appliance can interact with multiple databases from multiple organizations to collect and interconnect data for their ultimate use by law enforcement, an intelligence user, or other appropriate user.

23.4 ETHICAL ISSUES

Because of the ubiquity and importance of information systems in organizations of all types, there are many potential misuses and abuses of information and electronic communication that create privacy and security problems. In addition to questions of legality, misuse and abuse raise concerns of ethics. Ethics refers to a system of moral principles that relates to the benefits and harms of particular actions, and to the rightness and wrongness of motives and ends of those actions. In this section, we look at ethical issues as they relate to computer and information system security.

Ethics and the IS Professions

To a certain extent, a characterization of what constitutes ethical behavior for those who work with or have access to information systems is not unique to this context. The basic ethical principles developed by civilizations apply. However, there are some unique considerations surrounding computers and information systems. First, computer technology makes possible a scale of activities not possible before. This includes a larger scale of recordkeeping, particularly on individuals, with the ability to develop finer-grained personal information collection and more precise data mining and data matching. The expanded scale of communications and the expanded scale of interconnection brought about by the Internet magnify the power of an individual to do harm. Second, computer technology has involved the creation of new types of entities for which no agreed ethical rules have previously been formed, such as databases, Web browsers, chat rooms, cookies, and so on.

Further, it has always been the case that those with special knowledge or special skills have additional ethical obligations beyond those common to all humanity. We can illustrate this in terms of an ethical hierarchy (Figure 23.6), based on one discussed in [GOTT99]. At the top of the hierarchy are the ethical values professionals share with all human beings, such as integrity, fairness, and justice. Being a professional with special training imposes additional ethical obligations with respect to those affected by his or her work. General principles applicable to all professionals arise at this level. Finally, each profession has associated with it specific ethical values and obligations related to the specific knowledge of those in the profession and the powers that they have to affect others. Most professions embody all of these levels in a professional code of conduct, a subject discussed subsequently.

Ethical Issues Related to Computers and Information Systems

Let us turn now more specifically to the ethical issues that arise from computer technology. Computers have become the primary repository of both personal
information and negotiable assets, such as bank records, securities records, and other financial information. Other types of databases, both statistical and otherwise, are assets with considerable value. These assets can only be viewed, created, and altered by technical and automated means. Those who can understand and exploit the technology, plus those who have obtained access permission, have power related to those assets.

A classic paper on computers and ethics [PARK88b] points out that ethical issues arise as the result of the roles of computers, such as the following:

- **Repositories and processors of information:** Unauthorized use of otherwise unused computer services or of information stored in computers raises questions of appropriateness or fairness.

- **Producers of new forms and types of assets:** For example, computer programs are entirely new types of assets, possibly not subject to the same concepts of ownership as other assets.

- **Instruments of acts:** To what degree must computer services and users of computers, data, and programs be responsible for the integrity and appropriateness of computer output?

- **Symbols of intimidation and deception:** The images of computers as thinking machines, absolute truth producers, infallible, subject to blame, and as anthropomorphistic replacements of humans who err should be carefully considered.
Another listing of ethical issues, from [HARR90], is shown in Table 23.3. Both of these lists are concerned with balancing professional responsibilities with ethical or moral responsibilities. We cite two areas here of the types of ethical questions that face a computing or IS professional. The first is that IS professionals may find themselves in situations where their ethical duty as professionals comes into conflict with loyalty to their employer. Such a conflict may give rise for an employee to consider “blowing the whistle,” or exposing a situation that can harm the public or a company’s customers. For example, a software developer may know that a product is scheduled to ship with inadequate testing to meet the employer’s deadlines. The decision of whether to blow the whistle is one of the most difficult that an IS professional can face. Organizations have a duty to provide alternative, less extreme opportunities for the employee, such as an in-house ombudsperson coupled with a commitment not to penalize employees for exposing problems in-house. Additionally, professional societies should provide a mechanism whereby society members can get advice on how to proceed.

Another example of an ethical question concerns a potential conflict of interest. For example, if a consultant has a financial interest in a certain vendor, this should be revealed to any client if that vendor’s products or services might be recommended by the consultant.

**Codes of Conduct**

Unlike scientific and engineering fields, ethics cannot be reduced to precise laws or sets of facts. Although an employer or a client of a professional can expect that the
professional has an internal moral compass, many areas of conduct may present ethical ambiguities. To provide guidance to professionals and to articulate what employers and customers have a right to expect, a number of professional societies have adopted ethical codes of conduct.

A professional code of conduct can serve the following functions [GOTT99]:

1. A code can serve two inspirational functions: as a positive stimulus for ethical conduct on the part of the professional, and to instill confidence in the customer or user of an IS product or service. However, a code that stops at just providing inspirational language is likely to be vague and open to an abundance of interpretations.

2. A code can be educational. It informs professionals about what should be their commitment to undertake a certain level of quality of work and their responsibility for the well being of users of their product and the public, to the extent the product may affect nonusers. The code also serves to educate managers on their responsibility to encourage and support employee ethical behavior and on their own ethical responsibilities.

3. A code provides a measure of support for a professional whose decision to act ethically in a situation may create conflict with an employer or customer.

4. A code can be a means of deterrence and discipline. A professional society can use a code as a justification for revoking membership or even a professional license. An employee can use a code as a basis for a disciplinary action.

5. A code can enhance the profession’s public image, if it is seen to be widely honored.

We illustrate the concept of a professional code of ethics for computer professionals with three specific examples. The ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (Figure 23.7) applies to computer scientists. The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) Code of Ethics (Figure 23.8) applies to computer engineers as well as other types of electrical and electronic engineers. The AITP (Association of Information Technology Professionals, formerly the Data Processing Management Association) Standard of Conduct (Figure 23.9) applies to managers of computer systems and projects.

A number of common themes emerge from these codes, including (1) dignity and worth of other people; (2) personal integrity and honesty; (3) responsibility for work; (4) confidentiality of information; (5) public safety, health, and welfare; (6) participation in professional societies to improve standards of the profession; and (7) the notion that public knowledge and access to technology is equivalent to social power.

All three codes place their emphasis on the responsibility of professionals to other people, which, after all, is the central meaning of ethics. This emphasis on people rather than machines or software is to the good. However, the codes make little specific mention of the subject technology, namely computers and information

---

5Figure 23.7 is an abridged version of the ACM Code.
1. GENERAL MORAL IMPERATIVES.

1.1 Contribute to society and human well-being.
1.2 Avoid harm to others.
1.3 Be honest and trustworthy.
1.4 Be fair and take action not to discriminate.
1.5 Honor property rights including copyrights and patent.
1.6 Give proper credit for intellectual property.
1.7 Respect the privacy of others.
1.8 Honor confidentiality.

2. MORE SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

2.1 Strive to achieve the highest quality, effectiveness and dignity in both the process and products of professional work.
2.2 Acquire and maintain professional competence.
2.3 Know and respect existing laws pertaining to professional work.
2.4 Accept and provide appropriate professional review.
2.5 Give comprehensive and thorough evaluations of computer systems and their impacts, including analysis of possible risks.
2.6 Honor contracts, agreements, and assigned responsibilities.
2.7 Improve public understanding of computing and its consequences.
2.8 Access computing and communication resources only when authorized to do so.

3. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVES.

3.1 Articulate social responsibilities of members of an organizational unit and encourage full acceptance of those responsibilities.
3.2 Manage personnel and resources to design and build information systems that enhance the quality of working life.
3.3 Acknowledge and support proper and authorized uses of an organization’s computing and communication resources.
3.4 Ensure that users and those who will be affected by a system have their needs clearly articulated during the assessment and design of requirements; later the system must be validated to meet requirements.
3.5 Articulate and support policies that protect the dignity of users and others affected by a computing system.
3.6 Create opportunities for members of the organization to learn the principles and limitations of computer systems.

4. COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE.

4.1 Uphold and promote the principles of this Code.
4.2 Treat violations of this code as inconsistent with membership in the ACM.

Figure 23.7  ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (Copyright ©1997, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.)

systems. That is, the approach is quite generic and could apply to most professions and does not fully reflect the unique ethical problems related to the development and use of computer and IS technology. For example, these codes do not specifically deal with the issues raised in Table 23.3 or by [PARK88b] listed in the preceding subsection.
We, the members of the IEEE, in recognition of the importance of our technologies in affecting the quality of life throughout the world, and in accepting a personal obligation to our profession, its members and the communities we serve, do hereby commit ourselves to the highest ethical and professional conduct and agree:

1. to accept responsibility in making decisions consistent with the safety, health and welfare of the public, and to disclose promptly factors that might endanger the public or the environment;
2. to avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest whenever possible, and to disclose them to affected parties when they do exist;
3. to be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates based on available data;
4. to reject bribery in all its forms;
5. to improve the understanding of technology, its appropriate application, and potential consequences;
6. to maintain and improve our technical competence and to undertake technological tasks for others only if qualified by training or experience, or after full disclosure of pertinent limitations;
7. to seek, accept, and offer honest criticism of technical work, to acknowledge and correct errors, and to credit properly the contributions of others;
8. to treat fairly all persons regardless of such factors as race, religion, gender, disability, age, or national origin;
9. to avoid injuring others, their property, reputation, or employment by false or malicious action;
10. to assist colleagues and co-workers in their professional development and to support them in following this code of ethics.

Figure 23.8  IEEE Code of Ethics
(Copyright ©2006, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)

In recognition of my obligation to management I shall:

- Keep my personal knowledge up-to-date and insure that proper expertise is available when needed.
- Share my knowledge with others and present factual and objective information to management to the best of my ability.
- Accept full responsibility for work that I perform.
- Not misuse the authority entrusted to me.
- Not misrepresent or withhold information concerning the capabilities of equipment, software or systems.
- Not take advantage of the lack of knowledge or inexperience on the part of others.

In recognition of my obligation to my fellow members and the profession I shall:

- Be honest in all my professional relationships.
- Take appropriate action in regard to any illegal or unethical practices that come to my attention. However, I will bring charges against any person only when I have reasonable basis for believing in the truth of the allegations and without any regard to personal interest.
- Endeavor to share my special knowledge.
- Cooperate with others in achieving understanding and in identifying problems.

(continued)

Figure 23.9  AITP Standard of Conduct
(Copyright ©2006, Association of Information Technology Professionals)
23.5 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITES

The following are useful articles on computer crime and cybercrime: [KSHE06], [CYMR06], and [TAVA00]. [BRAU01] provides a good introduction to copyrights, patents, and trademarks. [GIBB00] provides a concise description of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. A useful introduction to Digital Rights Management is [LIU03]. [CAMP03] discusses legal aspects of DRM and describes some commercially available systems.

[ISAT02] is an illuminating discussion of the relationship between security and privacy with suggestions on technical security measures to protect privacy. [GOTT99] provides a detailed discussion of the software engineering code of ethics and what it means to individuals in the profession. [CHAP06] is a thoughtful discussion of basic ethical issues related to the creation and use of information systems. [HARR90] is a detailed discussion of training employees on how to integrate ethics into decision making and behavior related to the use of information systems and computers. [ANDE93] is a very useful analysis of the practical implications of the ACM Code of Ethics, with a number of illustrative case studies.
**Recommended Web Sites:**

- **Criminal Justice Resources: CyberCrime:** Excellent collection of links maintained by Michigan State University.

- **International High Technology Crime Investigation Association:** A collaborative effort of law enforcement and the private sector. Contains useful set of links and other resources.

- **Computer Ethics Institute:** Includes documents, case studies, and links.

**23.6 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS**

**Key Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code of conduct</th>
<th>Digital rights management ethics</th>
<th>Patent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer crime</td>
<td>Infringement</td>
<td>Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright</td>
<td>Intellectual property</td>
<td>Trademark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybercrime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Review Questions

23.1 Describe a classification of computer crime based on the role that the computer plays in the criminal activity.

23.2 Define three types of property.

23.3 Define three types of intellectual property.

23.4 What are the basic conditions that must be fulfilled to claim a copyright?

23.5 What rights does a copyright confer?

23.6 Briefly describe the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

23.7 What is digital rights management?

23.8 Describe the principal categories of users of digital rights management systems.

23.9 What are the key principles embodied in the EU Directive on Data Protection?

23.10 What functions can a professional code of conduct serve to fulfill?

Problems

23.1 For each of the cybercrimes cited in Table 23.1, indicate whether it falls into the category of computer as target, computer as storage device, or computer as communications tool. In the first case, indicate whether the crime is primarily an attack on data integrity, system integrity, data confidentiality, privacy, or availability.

23.2 Repeat Problem 23.1 for Table 23.2.

23.3 Review the results of a recent Computer Crime Survey such as the CSI/FBI or AusCERT surveys. What changes do they note in the types of crime reported? What differences are there between their results and those shown in Table 23.2?

23.4 An early controversial use of the DMCA was its use in a case in the United States brought by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) in 2000 to attempt to suppress distribution of the DeCSS program and derivatives. These could be used to circumvent the copy protection on commercial DVDs. Search for a brief description of this case and its outcome. Determine whether the MPAA was successful in suppressing details of the DeCSS descrambling algorithm.

23.5 Consider a popular DRM system like Apple's FairPlay, used to protect audio tracks purchased from the iTunes music store. If a person purchases a track from the iTunes store by an artist managed by a record company such as EMI, identify which company or person fulfils each of the DRM component roles shown in Figure 23.3.

23.6 Table 23.4 lists the privacy guidelines issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Compare these guidelines to the categories the EU adopted in the Directive on Data Protection.

23.7 Many countries now require organizations that collect personal information to publish a privacy policy detailing how they will handle and use such information. Obtain a copy of the privacy policy for an organization to which you have provided your personal details. Compare this policy with the lists of principles given in Section 23.3. Does this policy address all of these principles?

23.8 Assume you are a midlevel systems administrator for one section of a larger organization. You try to encourage your users to have good password policies and you regularly run password-cracking tools to check that those in use are not guessable. You have become aware of a burst of hacker password-cracking activity recently. In a burst of enthusiasm you transfer the password files from a number of other sections of the organization and attempt to crack them. To your horror, you find that in one section for which you used to work (but now have rather strained relationships with), something like 40% of the passwords are guessable (including that of the vice-president of the section, whose password is “pre$ident!”). You quietly sound out a few former colleagues and drop hints in the hope things might improve. A couple of weeks later you again transfer the password file over to analyze in the hope things
Table 23.4 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection limitation</th>
<th>There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data quality</td>
<td>Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose specification</td>
<td>The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use limitation</td>
<td>Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with the preceding principle, except with the consent of the data subject or by the authority of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security safeguards</td>
<td>Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Individual participation | An individual should have the right:  
(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him.  
(b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him within a reasonable time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form that is readily intelligible to him;  
(c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and  
(d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended. |
| Accountability        | A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above. |

have improved. They haven’t. Unfortunately, this time one of your colleagues notices what you are doing. Being a rather “by the book” person, he notifies senior management, and that evening you find yourself being arrested on a charge of hacking and thrown out of a job. Did you do anything wrong? Which of the potential ethical dilemmas listed in Table 23.3 does this case illustrate? Briefly indicate what arguments you might use to defend your actions. Make reference to the Professional Codes of Conduct shown in Figures 23.7 through 23.9.
related to social power. Construct a table that shows for each theme and for each code, the relevant clause or clauses in the code that address the theme.

23.10 This book’s Web site includes a copy of the ACM Code of Professional Conduct from 1982. Compare this Code with the 1997 ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (Figure 23.7).
   a. Are there any elements in the 1982 Code not found in the 1997 Code? Propose a rationale for excluding these.
   b. Are there any elements in the 1997 Code not found in the 1982 Code? Propose a rationale for adding these.

23.11 This book’s Web site includes a copy of the IEEE Code of Ethics from 1979. Compare this Code with the 2006 IEEE Code of Ethics (Figure 23.8).
   a. Are there any elements in the 1979 Code not found in the 2006 Code? Propose a rationale for excluding these.
   b. Are there any elements in the 2006 Code not found in the 1979 Code? Propose a rationale for adding these.

23.12 This book’s Web site includes a copy of the 1999 Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice (Version 5.2) as recommended by an ACM/IEEE-CS Joint Task Force. Compare this Code with each of the three codes reproduced in this chapter (Figure 23.7 through 23.9). Comment in each case on the differences.
APPENDIX C

SAGE EXERCISES

By Dan Shumow
University of Washington

C.1 Getting Started With Sage ........................................ C-2
C.2 Programming With Sage ............................................. C-4
  Input to the Interpreter ............................................. C-4
  Data Types .......................................................... C-4
  Mathematical Operators .......................................... C-6
  Control Statements ................................................. C-6
  Functions .......................................................... C-7
C.3 Chapter 2: Classical Encryption ................................. C-8
C.4 Chapter 3: Block Ciphers And The Data Encryption Standard .... C-9
C.5 Chapter 4: Basic Concepts In Number Theory And Finite Fields .... C-10
C.6 Chapter 5: Advanced Encryption Standard ....................... C-12
C.7 Chapter 6: Pseudorandom Number Generation And Stream Ciphers .. C-13
C.8 Chapter 8: Number Theory ........................................ C-14
C.9 Chapter 9: Public-Key Cryptography And RSA .................... C-18
C.10 Chapter 10: Other Public-Key Cryptosystems .................... C-19
C.11 Chapter 11: Cryptographic Hash Functions ..................... C-22
C.12 Chapter 13: Digital Signatures .................................. C-22
This appendix contains a number of exercises that reinforce cryptographic concepts, organized by the chapter in which those concepts were discussed. All the exercises use Sage. We begin with a discussion of how to get started using Sage and a brief introduction to the syntax and operations.

C.1 GETTING STARTED WITH SAGE

Sage is a free open source program that collects many open source math packages into one easily usable environment.

The following are step-by-step instructions to installing and getting started using Sage for the examples and exercises in this book.1

1. Go to http://www.sagemath.org/download/
2. You have two options:
   a. Building from source: If you are well versed in compilers and building software, you can build from source. Select this option.
   b. Installing Binaries: You can install precompiled binaries, the process is different on several different operating systems.
      • Linux: Download the Linux binaries, download, and follow the instructions in the README file.
      • Mac OS X: Download the Mac OS X binaries and follow the instructions in the README file.
      • Windows: With Windows the process is a little bit more complicated. At the time of printing the only complete option for Sage on Windows requires running ubuntu in a virtual machine. The directions are contained in the windows section of the download. However, copied here for reference they are:
         i) Download the VMWare player: http://www.vmware.com/products/player/ (this is a free download for students / educators.)
         ii) Download the VMWare image from the Sage website and follow the directions in the README file.
            There is also a native port of windows, in progress, at the time of this printing. You can try it and see if it works for your purposes at: http://windows.sagemath.com
3. Once you have Sage installed, On Linux or Mac OS X you can just type Sage from a shell prompt and it will run the interpreter (if you installed the Sage script in the correct location, as in the README files.) On windows, you run Sage by starting the VMWare player to open the Sage virtual hard drive. Once the VMWare player is started, you can use the player to enter data into the command line, you can SSH to your virtual machine (useful for copy and paste functionality) and use the notebook.
4. Sage also has notebook functionality, similar to that of Maple or Mathematica worksheets. This runs through the web browser. On Linux and Mac OS X,

1Please note that Sage is an open source package that is constantly under development, and much functionality changes from release to release. If any of the steps in this section do not work, please check http://www.sagemath.org for new up-to-date information.
you start the notebook by typing `notebook()` from the command prompt, or by running Sage with the `-notebook` argument. In the VMWare image, this is run by selecting `notebook` from the login options when the VMWare image starts up.

5. If you wish to execute the Sage examples from Appendix B, you can now download the relevant Sage files. If you are using a Linux or Mac OS X machine, then you just download your files to a folder and run Sage to access them. However, if you are using the VMWare player then you need to get the files into your virtual machine. This can be done using the shared folder’s option in VMWare player, or copying the files using `wget` or `scp` from inside the virtual machine. You can access the underlying Ubuntu operating system in the Sage virtual machine by selecting the manage option when the VMWare image starts up.

6. As mentioned in step 3, Sage is an interpreted language, and you interact with it through a prompt. However you can also write batch scripts. These files have the suffix `.sage` and each line is a line that you would type into the interpreter. You can load these into the interpreter by using the “load” and “attach” commands. The command “load” runs the file once. On the other hand, the command “attach” monitors the underlying `.sage` file and reloads it if there are any changes.

7. The Sage interpreter keeps track of your underlying path, running `attach` and `load` is relative to this path. You can change the current path by using `cd` like you would in a shell. Suppose that you want to run a file `example.sage`, you can do this by typing:

   ```
   load example.sage
   ```

   While the current directory of the Sage interpreter is the directory containing `example.sage`.

   There is significantly more information and documentation on Sage and how to run it at `http://www.sagemath.org/doc`. This page includes a tutorial, a reference manual, a Sage programmer’s manual, and an installation guide. See this documentation for the most up to date information on Sage. Even more documentation and help is available at `http://www.sagemath.org/help.html`. Particularly worthwhile is the downloadable book *Sage for Newbies*.

   Sage is a rich, powerful facility, and the amount of documentation may seem overwhelming. However, if you study the examples in Appendix B and the discussion in this section and the next, you should be able to write Sage code to solve the problems with little reference to the documentation. Furthermore, any time devoted to learning Sage is a worthwhile investment, because Sage is a general-purpose mathematical tool that you will be able to use throughout your academic and professional career.

---

2All of the Sage code in Appendix B is available online at this book’s Web site in `.sage` files, so that you can load and execute the programs if you wish. See Preface for access information.
The following is a basic introduction to Sage programming. Sage is a collection of open source mathematics packages that are loaded into a Python interpreter. Input to Sage is lightly preprocessed and sent to a Python interpreter. Thus, all programming in Sage is essentially just Python programming. Readers familiar with Python can skip much of this section, however Sage does modify the Python environment some, so reading some of the sections especially about numeric data types may be useful. The following are some of the basic Sage programming constructs.\(^3\)

### Input to the Interpreter

Python is an interpreted language, so you can interact with the program line by line. Python is object-oriented, so as long as you are not using built in data types, you can use the following technique to learn about the member functions and variables of the class you are working with. Suppose \texttt{foo} is a variable of \texttt{FooClass} type, then typing \texttt{foo.<tab>}, (<tab> means, hit tab) will auto complete. If you begin typing the name of a variable, hitting tab will list all members that start with what you have already typed, if there is only one such member, it will autocomplete.

Suppose \texttt{foo} has a member bar, to learn about this member, you can type \texttt{foo.bar?} and hit enter, this will display documentation on the function bar if it exists. You can also type \texttt{foo.bar??} and hit enter to display the documentation and the source code.

You can also use the print function to try to print a Sage object. So if \texttt{foo} is some variable, the expression \texttt{print foo} will try to convert \texttt{foo} into a string and print it. Also the function \texttt{type(foo)} will return the type of the variable \texttt{foo}, which is also useful.

### Data Types

One basic data type is \texttt{Str}. This is the built-in data type for strings in Python. They are entered into the interpreter by putting a literal string in single quotes ’’ or double quotes “”. These are sequential, and can be accessed as such. For example if \texttt{foo = ’foo’}, then \texttt{foo[0] = ’f’} and \texttt{foo[1]=’o’}.

Sage provides the following numeric data types.

- \texttt{int}: This is the built-in, fixed precision signed integer data type of Python. This is the default data type used to access sequential data (like tuples and lists) as well as the default loop counter.
- \texttt{long}: This is the built-in, arbitrary precision integer data type of Python. If an operation on operands of type \texttt{int} overflows, the result will be a \texttt{long}.
- **Integer**: This is a Sage data type that implements arbitrary precision integers. This is the default type ascribed to integers typed into the Sage interpreter. The object for the integers is \texttt{ZZ}. Variables of type \texttt{int} or \texttt{long} can be cast to an \texttt{Integer} as follows, if \texttt{foo} is an \texttt{int} or a \texttt{long} then \texttt{ZZ(foo)} casts \texttt{foo} to an \texttt{Integer}. (\texttt{Integer(foo)} will work as well.)

\(^3\)Note that Sage does change from release to release, so be sure to check http://www.sagemath.org/doc for the most up to date documentation.
• **Rational**: This is the Sage data type that implements arbitrary precision rational numbers. If you type something like 2/3 into the Sage interpreter, this is the default type that the value will be given. The object for the rational numbers is `QQ`. Variables of type `int`, `long`, or `Integer` can be cast to a `Rational` as follows, if `foo` is such a numeric type, then `QQ(foo)` casts `foo` to a `Rational`. (`Rational(foo)` will work as well.) This is important to bear in mind, as in many programming languages 2/3 would evaluate to the integer 0.

Two important sequential data types in Sage are `list` and `tuple`. The `list` type is the built-in Sage type for lists (arrays). The syntax for lists is an open and close square brackets, with items separated by commas.

- The empty list is
  
  ```python
  foo = []
  ```

- A list of the first three integers is
  
  ```python
  foo = [1, 2, 3]
  ```

- A list of some different types is
  
  ```python
  foo = ['2/3', 2, 2/3]
  ```

  The first element is a string, the second is an `Integer` and the third is a `Rational`.

  The function `range([start,] end)` returns the list of integers from start through `end-1`. If start is omitted 0 is assumed. Also, you can initiate a list with a variable number of arguments explicitly by doing:

  ```python
  foo = [<expression in j> for j in xrange(M)]
  ```

  Where `M` is some integral data type, and `<expression in j>` is some Python expression that is allowed to reference the loop counter `j`. You access list elements by square brackets after the name of the variable, so `foo[i]` returns the `i`th element of a list. Lists are mutable, so you can assign values to the elements as follows: `foo[i] = bar`. You can also extend lists by using the append function, as in: `foo.append(bar)`. You can get a length of a list with the built in function `len(...)`, by calling it as `len(foo)`.

  The `tuple` data type is the built in Sage type for immutable lists of elements. They syntax is like that for lists but parenthesis are used instead of square brackets. As with the examples for lists:

  - The empty tuple is
    
    ```python
    foo = ()
    ```

  - A tuple of the first three integers is
    
    ```python
    foo = (1, 2, 3)
    ```

  - A tuple of some different types is
    
    ```python
    foo = ('2/3', 2, 2/3)
    ```
Tuples are accessed just as lists, so `foo[i]` returns the $i$th element of the tuple `foo`. As mentioned, tuples are immutable, so you cannot assign values to the elements after the tuple has been initialized.

**Mathematical Operators**

The usual mathematical operators work in Sage. So, $+$, $-$, and $\ast$ all work as you would expect. As noted above `/` performs division, but if the operands are integers it promotes them to rational numbers. The `%` operator performs modular reduction. $a \mod n$ is the remainder of $a$ divided by $n$, for $a$ and $n$ integral data types. You can accomplish integral division as follows. If $a$ is an integer, and you want the quotient and remainder after division by $n$, `a.quotientrem(n)` returns a tuple $(q, r)$ where $q$ is the quotient and $r$ is the remainder.

One of the major differences between Sage and Python is that the operator $\wedge$ is not xor, as it is in Python. Rather, this means exponentiation. So $a\wedge n$ is $a$ raised to the $n$th power. Alternately, this can be performed with the `**` operator as $a**n$.

**Control Statements**

*If-else statements* are written as follows:

```python
if <boolean statement> :
    <tab> <block of code>
elif <boolean statement> :
    <tab> <block of code>
else:
    <tab> <block of code>
```

Where `<boolean statement>` indicates a valid statement in Python that evaluates to a Boolean expression, and `<block of code>` indicates a multi-line block of Python code. It is important to note that with if statements (and also loop statements), the blocks of code must be indented, and the subsequent control statement must return to the original level of indentation. This is how the interpreter knows how to match if elif and else statements. In the if and elif statements, the Boolean expression must be followed by a semicolon. For else statements the semicolon immediately follows the keyword else. For the Boolean statements the standard operators of Boolean (and, or) are spelled out exactly as `‘and’` and `‘or’`. Meaning for a number less than 0 and greater than 3 one writes: `(x < 0) or (3 < x)`. For a number greater than 0 and less than 3 one writes: `(0 < x) and (x < 3)`.

The syntax for a `for` loop is as follows:

```python
for <variable> in <iteratable object>:
    <tab> <block of code>
```

In Python `<iteratable objects>` are sequential objects like lists or tuples (there are some others as well, but lists and tuples are the main case.) For example
for A in foo:
    print A

prints the list of the elements in the list foo. Or

for j in range(10):
    print j

prints the integers from 1 to 10.

The most common exception to using a list or a tuple as an iterable object is iterating through a list of integers using the `xrange` function. For example:

```python
for j in xrange(len(foo)):
    print 'j=', j, foo[j]
```

prints a list of the indices and the elements at that index in the array.

The `xrange` function allows loops to iterate through the integers \([0, 1, \ldots, (\text{len}(\text{foo})-1)]\) without instantiating the list as the function range would. The function `xrange` takes the parameters are the same as the range function does, the only difference is the output.

**While loops** have the syntax:

```python
while <boolean expression> :
    <tab> <block of code>
```

For example:

```python
while ( x < 1):
    y = y + x
    x = x/2
```

With both while and for loops, the `break` keyword cause execution of the loop to stop, and `continue` causes control to begin executing at the next iteration of the loop.

**Functions**

Creating functions is very easy:

```python
def <function-name>(< comma separated list of parameters>):
    <tab> <block of code>
```

Just like control statements, the body of the function must be delimited by indentation. The `return` statement specifies the value of the function to return. If
the function does not have a \texttt{return} statement, or the end of the body of the function is reached without hitting a \texttt{return} statement, then the function returns the value \texttt{None}. For example, the following function:

\begin{verbatim}
def f1(x, y):
    if (0 == x % 2):
        z = x^2 + x + 1
    else:
        z = x-y
return y
\end{verbatim}

For more information on Python programming, see http://www.Python.org/. At this time Sage uses Python 2.x, and not Python 3.0 or higher. This is not likely to change, but as the differences in the language are significant, if the examples here are not working, it may be worth checking out if the underlying version of Python that Sage uses has changed.

C.3 CHAPTER 2: CLASSICAL ENCRYPTION

2.1 Implement Sage functions that perform affine cipher encryption/decryption, given a key that consists of a pair of integers \(a, b\), both in \([1, 2, \ldots, 25]\) with \(a\) not divisible by 2 or 13. The functions should work on strings, and leave any non-alphabetic characters unchanged. Show the operation of your functions on an example. See problem 2.1 in Chapter 2 for a definition of an affine cipher.

2.2 This question is to implement some functions useful to performing classical cipher attacks.

\textbf{a.} Implement a Sage function that performs frequency attacks on a mono-alphabetic substitution ciphers. This function should take a ciphertext string, compute a histogram of the incidence of each letter (ignoring all non alphabetic characters), and return a list of pairs (letter, incidence percentage) sorted by incidence percentage.

\textbf{b.} Implement a Sage function that takes a partial mono-alphabetic substitution and a ciphertext and returns a potential plaintext. The partial mono-alphabetic substitution should be specified as follows: As a 26 character string where the character at position \(i\) is the substitution of \(i\)th character of the alphabet, OR an underscore ‘\_’ if the corresponding substitution is unknown. The potential plaintext should be the ciphertext with values specified by the mono-alphabetic substitution replaced by the lower-case plaintext. If the corresponding character is unknown (i.e. ‘\_’ in the monoalphabetic substitution cipher) print the cipher text as an uppercase character.

\textbf{c.} Use your functions from (a) and (b) to decrypt the following ciphertext:
“ztmn pxtn efa peqef kecp cjt tmn zcwsenp ontmsw ztnws tf wsvp xtfwvfefw, c feb fcvtwf, xtfxevqea vfgvoenwk, cfa eavxcwea wt wse rnrtpvwvtf wscw egg lef cne xnecwea eymcg.”

2.3 Implement Sage functions to perform encryption/decryption with \(2 \times 2\) Hill Cipher. The key should be an invertible Sage matrix over the integers mod 26.
Do not just call the built in Sage functionality for the Hill cipher. Show the
operation of your functions on a plaintext of your choice.

2.4 Implement a Sage function to perform encryption/decryption with an $m \times m$ Hill
Cipher. The key should be an invertible Sage matrix over the integers mod 26. Do
not just call the built in Sage functionality for the Hill cipher. Show the operation
of your function on the functions you write on a plaintext of your choice. You may
use any functions you wrote for the previous question to answer this question.

2.5 This question is to implement and use a known plaintext attack on the Hill
cipher. You may use functions from examples or previous questions, but do not
use the built in Sage functions for the Hill Cipher. [Hint: The built in functions
for MatrixSpace and FreeModule objects may be useful, but if they are too
confusing to use, do not get caught up on them.]

a. Implement a known plaintext attack on the hill cipher.
b. Use the function that you wrote in part (a) to attack the following plaintext/
ciphertext pairs:
   plaintext = "friday" ciphertext = "izrvey"
   plaintext = "diamondisinstatue" ciphertext = "zisxlhiwdingthyqq"
   plaintext = "thesecretdietistofuhotdogs" ciphertext = "qbayzelwiksscipqps
   vkafvssyy"

C.4 CHAPTER 3: BLOCK CIPHERS AND THE DATA
ENCRYPTION STANDARD

3.1 This problem references the Sage implementation from Appendix B.3 Example 1.

a. Copy the diagram of the function $f_K$ of the Simplified DES Encryption details
   (Figure G.3 in Appendix G) and label each wire with the corresponding vari-
   able name from the Sage code that implements SDES Encryption.

b. Copy the diagram of the Simplified DES Encryption Key Generation
   (Figure G.2) and label each wire with the corresponding variable names
   from the Sage code that implements the SDES Key Generation.

3.2 a. Let temp_block denote a Sage variable that contains the output of the first
   application of function $f_K$ ($f_k$ in the Sage example code) while encrypting
   with Simplified DES. Using subroutines from the example Sage code, write
   Sage code to recover the input block passed to Simplified DES Decrypt.
   That is, reverse the first steps in Simplified DES Encrypt. You may assume
   that you have the first round key in a variable $K1$.

b. Using subroutines from the Sage example code for Simplified DES, write a
   function to compute Simplified DES Decrypt.

3.3 a. Consider EP, the expansion permutation. Find an inverse contraction
   permutation. That is, find a function that takes 8 bits down to 4 and inverts
   EP. Note that these are not unique. Implement this function EPinv as in the
   example Sage code.

b. Take the function $f_K$ from the example Sage code and modify it so that
   instead of calling the SBoxes, it calls EPinv after the round key is XORed
   in. Rename the modified function $f_K_{NoSBox}$.

c. Modify the functions SDESEncrypt [see example Sage code], and SDES-
   Decrypt (see question 3.1) so that they then call $f_K_{NoSBox}$ (from
part b). Call the new functions SDESEncryptNoSBox and SDESDecryptNoSBox.
d. Do these new functions function as Encrypt/Decrypt functions of each other? (i.e. will SDESDecryptNoSBox give you back the input of SDESEncryptNoSBox, given that they are using the same key)?
e. Does SDESEncryptNoSBox make a good Encryption function, why or why not? Hint: Can you mount a known or chosen plaintext attack on the functions you wrote in part (d)?

C.5 CHAPTER 4: BASIC CONCEPTS IN NUMBER THEORY AND FINITE FIELDS

4.1 In the examples functions for the Euclidean and extended Euclidean GCD, the first input must be greater than the second. Furthermore, each argument must be a positive integer. Implement these functions such that these assumptions need not be made about the input. Also for the extended Euclidean GCD, if the gcd of \( a \) and \( b \) is 1, return \( a \) inverse mod \( b \) and \( b \) inverse mod \( a \) (Your Sage functions may call the example Sage functions, or you may write these implementations from scratch. Do not merely call the built in Sage functionality.) Show your functions work on a few inputs.

4.2 Suppose that polynomials are represented by lists of coefficients, where the coefficient at index \( i \) is the coefficient of \( x^i \). Using this representation, write Sage functions that perform the following polynomial operations (don’t just call the underlying Sage functions):
   a. Scalar multiply, given a scalar \( c \), and a polynomial \( f \), computes \( c * f \).
   b. Addition, given two polynomials \( f, g \), computes \( h = f + g \).
   c. Subtraction, given two polynomials \( f, g \) computes \( h = f - g \).
   d. Multiplication, given two polynomials \( f, g \) computes \( h = f^g \).
   e. For each of the above functions that you wrote show the output of the function on 1 set of inputs.

4.3 Either using the functions you wrote in the preceding question or the built in polynomial arithmetic in Sage, as well as, either the given polynomial extended gcd, or the built in Sage extended gcd, implement a four function calculator for GF(2^4) with modulus \( x^4 + x + 1 \). Consider elements of GF(2^4) to be degree 4 (fixed precision) polynomials in the primitive element, i.e., GF(2^4), elements are represented by lists of 4 binary values. You may use the underlying polynomial functions in Sage, or any functions you wrote for the previous questions.
   a. addition
   b. scalar multiplication
   c. multiplication
   d. inversion

4.4 This question asks about using the Sage functionality for computing in Finite Fields.
   a. Use Sage to create a finite field with 17 elements. In this field calculate:
      The difference: 13 \(-\) 16
The sum: $11 + 10$
The quotient: $1/2$
The product: $3 \times 8$
The multiplicative inverse of: $5$

b. Use Sage to create a finite field with 32 elements. Let 'a' denote the primitive element. In this field Calculate:
The difference: $(a^2 + a) - (a + 1)$
The multiplicative inverse of: $a^4 + a + 1$
The quotient $(a^2 + 1)/(a^4 + a + 1)$

c. Use Sage to create a finite field with $5^3$ elements. Let 'alpha' denote the primitive element. In this field Calculate:
The sum: $(3*alpha^2 + 4*alpha) - (alpha^2 + 3)$
The multiplicative inverse of: $(alpha + 1)$
The product: $(alpha + 2)*(alpha + 3)$

d. Use Sage to create a finite field with 503,777,509 elements. In this field calculate:
The quotient: $123,456,789/456,555,333$
The multiplicative inverse of: $987,654,321$
The difference: $789,123,456 - 444,333,111$

4.5 This question is to use the built-in gcd functionality of Sage.

a. Using the gcd functionality in Sage, compute the greatest common divisor of:
24 and 300
4567 and 4731907
100 and 1015

b. Using the xgcd functionality in Sage, compute the extended greatest common divisor:
36 and 624
4321 and 9226177
45 and 12345

c. Find two numbers, both greater than 100,000 that have a greatest common divisor of exactly 3.
Show the output of Sage that verifies your answer is correct.

4.6 The purpose of this question is to show familiarity with the Sage polynomial arithmetic functionality.

a. Use Sage to initialize a polynomial ring over the field with two elements. Let $f = x^2 + 1$ and $g = x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$. Compute $f + g$, $f \times g$, the quotient and remainder of $g$ divided by $f$, and the greatest common divisor of $f$ and $g$.

b. Use Sage to initialize a polynomial ring over the field with 31 elements. Let $f = x^5 + 17x + 13$ and $g = x^3 + 10x^2 + 24x + 3$. Compute $f - g$, $f \times g$, the quotient and remainder of dividing $f$ by $g$, and the greatest common divisor of $f$ and $g$.

c. Use the GF(...) function to initialize a finite field with 16 elements, and suppose that $a$ is the generator of this field. Then initialize a polynomial ring over this field. Compute the quotient and remainder of dividing $(a^3 + a + 1)x^4 + a^2x^2 + (a^2 + a)x + (a + 1)$ by $(a)x^2 + (a^3 + 1)x + a^2$
d. In Sage initialize a degree 3 extension of the finite field with 5 elements with defining polynomial $x^3 + x + 4$. Further suppose that 'theta' is the primitive element of this field. Compute $1/\text{theta}$.

C.6 CHAPTER 5: ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD

5.1 The purpose of this question is to become more familiar with the algorithm for generating the Simplified AES S-Box. Each part of this problem is to write one part of the algorithm in Sage, and in the last part put them all together. The construction closely follows the description of the algorithm specification in the text.

a. Consider the positive integers between 0 and 15 (inclusive) as 4 bit strings, so that 3 is 1100 (this ordering is known as little endian.) Define the mapping from $\{0, 1, 2, \ldots, 15\}$ to $\text{GF}(2^4)$ by mapping the element with bit string $b_0b_1b_2b_3$ to the element $b_0 + b_1a + b_2a^2 + b_3a^3$ of $\text{GF}(2^4)$. The following snippet of Sage code sets $F$ to the finite field with two elements $L$ the finite field with 16 elements (extension of $F$ with modulus $a^4 + a + 1$) and primitive element $a$ (we use $a$ here because $a$ is a special value in Sage.) And $V$ is the vector space of dimension 4 over $F$ (you can think of this as 4 bit strings with addition defined on them.)

```sage
F = GF(2);
L.<a> = GF(2^4);
V = L.vector_space();
```

As in the example code for Simplified AES we can map a bit list $b$ to the corresponding integer element of $L$ by $L(V(b))$. Write a Sage function that maps a positive integer in $\{0, 1, 2, \ldots, 15\}$ to an element of $L$. (Hint: If $x$ is a Sage Integer, $x\text{.bits()}$ is a little-endian list of the bits of $x$, however $z$ only has as many elements as the bit length of $z$. So, for example if $z$ is 0, this function returns an empty list. However, $L(V(b))$ only works if $b$ is a bit list of length 4. You will have to work around this.)

b. Use the function from part (a) to write a Sage function to initialize a 2-dimensional array (either a list of lists or a matrix over $L$) so that the element at position $(r, c)$ is the element of $\text{GF}(2^4)$ mapped to by $4r + c$.

c. Write a function that takes $M$, a 2-dimensional array of elements in $L = \text{GF}(2^4)$ (either a list of lists or a matrix over $L$) and maps each non-zero element to its inverse and 0 to 0. That is, your function should return $M'$, the 2-dimensional array of elements in $L$ where the element at row $r$ and column $c$ of $M'$ is the inverse of $M_{rc}$ (or 0 if $M_{rc} = 0$). (Hint: If $z$ is a non-zero element of $L$, in Sage, $z^\wedge(-1)$ is the multiplicative inverse of $z$. If $z$ is zero, this will raise an error.)

d. Write a function that takes a 2-dimensional array of elements in $L = \text{GF}(2^4)$ and for each element converts it to an element of $V$ and applies the Linear transformation in step 4 of the S-Box generation algorithm. Then returns the resulting 2-dimensional array. The Sage code to initialize $A$ and $b$ would be:
A = Matrix(F, [
    [ 1, 0, 1, 1],
    [ 1, 1, 0, 1],
    [ 1, 1, 1, 0],
    [ 0, 1, 1, 1] ]);

b = V([1, 0, 0, 1]);

And the linear equation is $A*v + b$. Then take the resulting element of V and map it back to an element of L (if v is an element of V, then L(v) is the corresponding element of L). (Hint: If z is an element of L and $v = z.vector()$, the linear transformation as is defined in the algorithm expects that the bits of v are reverse of how Sage orders them. To deal with this, you will either have to reverse the bits of v, or appropriately modify the A matrix.)

e. Use the functions you just wrote to write a function that initializes the SBox matrix for simplified DES. Check your answer versus the SBoxes of the simplified AES function in the book.

5.2 In the previous question we computed the SBox for Simplified DES. There are multiple ways to compute the inverse SBox. You can find each element of L in the SBox and figure out which element maps to it. Or you can reverse each of the steps in the previous algorithm. Write a Sage function to calculate the inverse SBox matrix.

5.3 The algorithm for computing the Simplified AES SBox table does exactly that, it computes a table. However, this algorithm shows us how we can compute the SBox directly, without doing a table look up. Write a Sage function to compute the Simplified AES SBox and Inverse SBox directly. Meaning, write functions that take elements of L and return the element of L that the SBox table (or Inverse SBox) lookup would map to. (This is more than a textbook exercise. Some people consider the AES SBox lookups to be insecure because they can leak information through the cache. Such vulnerabilities are called Side Channels. Computing SBoxes without lookups is one way to mitigate this type of attack. Although there is a conditional statement in this SBox computation, which could be exploited by a side channel attack.)

C.7 CHAPTER 6: PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATION AND STREAM CIPHERS

6.1 (With regard to the code for this exercise, see www.pearsonhighered.com/stallings) Breaking Blum Blum Shub is provably (polynomial time) equivalent to factoring. While this question does not prove this, it does show how to create a Sage function that gives considerable evidence for this fact. Specifically, we will show that given a function that gives you the previous Blum Blum Shub state from a Blum Blum Shub state, that we can write a probabilistic program that factors. The following function will break Blum Blum Shub (for small $N$):

```python
def previous_BBS_state(state):
    return

This function returns the previous Blum-BlumShub state.
Note that this is a toy function and will only work on small $N$. 

```python
N = state[0];
R = IntegerModRing(N);
X = R(state[1]);

if (not X.is_square()):
    print "Not a valid Blum-Blum-Shub RNG state."
    return None

return [N, X.sqrt().lift()];
```

a. The first part of the problem is to notice that if you have integers $x, y$ such that $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{N}$ and $(x^2 - y^2) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$, then the usual difference of squares equation gives that $(x^2 - y^2) = (x - y)(x + y)$. And so we can hope that gcd $(x - y, N)$ or gcd $(x + y, N)$ yield a nontrivial factor of $N$. Write a Sage function that takes $x, y$ such that $x \not\equiv \pm y \pmod{N}$ and $(x^2 - y^2) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ and tries to find a nontrivial factor of $N$.

b. Using the function you wrote in part (a) and the supplied function previous_BBS_state, write a function that takes a number $N$ (that is a product of two primes $p, q$ both congruent to 3 mod 4) and returns the factors $p$ and $q$. [Hint: you have to create your own BBS state, so you will have to choose your square. How do you choose a square such that you know you have $x, y$?]

6.2 Write a Sage function that takes 3 successive outputs from a linear congruential RNG, as well as the modulus $m$ of the internal state, that returns $a$ and $c$ OR indicates that it cannot find these values. Generate a linear congruential state, and 3 successive outputs and show your function working.

6.3 The purpose of this function is to become more familiar with the ANSI X9.17 PRNG. For this problem you may use any solutions to other problems, or example code.

a. Implement a function for a variant of the ANSI X9.17 PRNG using the simplified DES block encrypt, instead of two key triple-DES. Your function should take the current state (the seed, $V$, and the date/time, $DT$, variables as 8 bit long bit lists) as well as the SDES key as a 10 bit long bit list. Note that because this function uses SDES, instead of two key triple DES, you do not need two keys.

b. Implement a function for ANSI X9.17 PRNG using the simplified AES block encrypt. Your function should take the current state (the seed, $V$, and the date/time, $DT$, variables as 16 bit long bit lists) as well as a key as 16 bit long bit lists. Note that because this function uses SAES, instead of two key triple DES, you do not need two keys.

C.8 CHAPTER 8: NUMBER THEORY

8.1 Write a Sage function to implement Euler’s Totient function [Hint: You may find the Sage “factor” function useful here.]
8.2 Note that the sample code for the Miller Rabin test returns True if the test finds, conclusively, that \( n \) is composite, otherwise the function returns False to indicate that the function did not find anything conclusively. As noted in this book, we can decide with high probability if \( n \) is prime or composite if we run this test multiple times. This exercise is to implement a version of the Miller Rabin test that does so.

a. Implement a function that performs the “witness procedure” of Miller Rabin, that is, the code that checks whether or not an integer in \( \{1, 2, \ldots, n - 1\} \) has the specified properties.

b. Use the function that you wrote for part (a) to implement a function that takes a positive integer \( n( > 2) \), and a list of integers in \( \{1, 2, \ldots, n - 1\} \) and performs the “witness procedure” on each one. If any one of these determines that \( a \) is composite, then return False (to indicate a is composite) otherwise return True, to indicate that (with high probability) \( n \) is prime.

8.3 Previously we saw that factoring can be reduced to breaking Blum Blum Shub’s security. In this problem we will see the other direction, namely that Blum Blum Shub’s security can be broken by factoring. For this problem you may use the fact that finding a square root mod a prime is a solved problem. In fact if \( p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \) and \( x \) is a square mod \( p \) then the square root of \( x \) is given by \( x^{(p+1)/4} \pmod{p} \). Either use this formula or the built in Sage functionality to compute square roots in a prime field to write a function that takes a Blum Blum Shub internal state, and the two prime factors \( p, q \) (both 3 mod 4) of the modulus, and outputs a list of at most 4 possibilities for the previous Blum Blum Shub State. Generate a Blum Blum Shub state (with your own \( p, q \)) and show that your function works. [Hint: use the CRT.]

8.4 Sage has a command "time" that works similar to "print." Specifically "time <expr>" runs the expression <expr> and displays some timing information. This exercise is to use this time command to try some experiments timing modular exponentiation with different parameters. For varying values of \( m \) and \( n \) (positive integers) generate a prime \( p \) at most \( 2^n \), and a random positive integer \( a \) less than \( p \), then time calculating \( \text{ModExp} \ (a, e, p) \), for \( e = 2^n \) and \( 2^n - 1 \). (See Appendix B.7 Example 3.) For each different value of \( e \) run the experiment several times. Try this with at least two different values for \( (m, n) \). Be sure to try varying the sizes of these parameters drastically (i.e. on the order of 10s and 100s.) What do you notice? What does this tell you? [Hint: If you do the experiment correctly, you should make an observation that forms the basis for side channel attacks, a powerful type of attack on crypto systems.]

8.5 The purpose of this question is to show how to generalize the Square and Multiply Exponentiation method to different radices besides 2. This approach to modular exponentiation is known as a “fixed window” exponentiation.

a. Write a Sage function that, given an integer \( x \), a modulus \( N \), and a base \( b \), computes a list of length \( b \), where the \( i \)th element of the list is \( x^i \pmod{N} \). You may use the \text{ModExp} function or any other method to compute the exponentiation (but you don’t have to.) (See Appendix B.7 Example 3.)

b. Write a Sage function that takes an integer \( x \), an exponent \( e \), a base \( b \), and a modulus \( N \). This function should compute a power table using the function you wrote in part (a) and then use it by using the base \( b \) expansion of \( e \) to
determine where to index into the table. You may use modular exponentiation, but only to calculate \( y^b \mod N \), for any integer \( y \).

c. Given that you use ModExp as a routine in the function you wrote in part (b) what can you conclude about the optimal base to use for modular exponentiation?

8.6 Suppose we want to create a Random Number Generator with hardness based on the Discrete Log problem. In this problem we will investigate such an RNG and show that it has some weaknesses. First, suppose that we have primes \( P, Q \) such that \( P = 2 \cdot Q + 1 \). Now suppose that we have two points \( X \) and \( Y \) with multiplicative order \( Q \mod P \). This means that \( X^Q = Y^Q = 1 \mod P \). Let \( s[i] \) denote the value of the internal state at time \( i \). We generate the following values as follows:

- The intermediate data value: \( t[i] = s[i] \)
- The next internal state \( s[i + 1] = X^{t[i]} \mod P \)
- The output of the Generate function \( o[i] = Y^{t[i]} \mod P \)

The following diagram shows the flow of the RNG.

\[
\begin{align*}
X^{t[i]} \mod P & \quad \leftarrow \quad \downarrow \\
\frac{s[i + 1]}{s[i]} & \quad \rightarrow \quad t[i] \rightarrow \quad \downarrow \\
Y^{t[i]} \mod P & \quad \rightarrow \quad o[i]
\end{align*}
\]

We will call this RNG the Dual DL RNG (for Dual Discrete Log Random Number Generator). For the following questions feel free to use Sage’s built in modular exponentiation functionality, the example function for modular exponentiation, or any functions from previous problems.

a. Implement a Sage function that takes primes \( P, Q \) and integers \( X, Y \) of multiplicative order \( Q \mod P \) and generates a random initial internal state \( s \) (an integer reduced mod \( Q \)). Have this function return a list with entries \([P,Q,X,Y,s]\).

b. Implement a Sage function that takes as a parameter a five element list corresponding to the internal state initialized by the function you wrote for part (a). This function should generate a single block of output, and update the list parameter’s last element to correspond to the next RNG state.

c. Suppose that we have \( P = 15116301544809716639, Q = 7558150772404858319, X = 10655637283854386401, Y = 5886823825742381258, \) and furthermore we know that \( X^Q = Y \mod P \), where \( e = 1534964830632783921 \). Find the positive integer \( f \) such that \( Y^f = X \mod P \). [Hint: remember that \( XQ = 1 \mod P \). Find the positive integer \( f \) such that \( e \cdot f = 1 + k \cdot Q \).]

d. Now, using the values for \( P, Q, X, Y \) from part (c), write a Sage function that, given one output of the generate function (from part (b)) and gives the output from the next call to the generate function. Use the functions you wrote in part (a) and (b) to show that your function works. [Hint: What happens if you exponentiate the output of the generate function by the value you found in part (c)?]

e. Write a version of the function that you wrote in part (b) that takes only \( P, Q, \) and \( X \). Have it generate the value \( Y \) in a manner such that you know the
positive integer $f$ such $Y' = X \mod P$. Your function should return a tuple 
(rngstate, $f$) where rngstate, is a valid rng state like the function from part 
(b) returns.
f. Generalize your attack function from part (d) to work given a block of output, 
with the $Y$ and $f$ values you generated in part (e).
g. How would you modify this RNG to overcome this problem?

8.7 The example version of the Chinese Remainder Theorem has several inefficiencies. 
Observe that in the Chinese Remainder Theorem the first step is to initialize the M array, 
where the value of M[i] is the product of all the moduli except moduli[i]. This is performed at 
the beginning of every function call, which is somewhat inefficient, because it could just be 
done once, for a single set of moduli. Furthermore, the output of this function is larger than it 
needs to be, indeed, it need be no larger than the product of all the moduli. In this 
question, do not merely call built in Sage functions.
a. Write a function to pre-compute the M array, it should also compute the 
product of all the moduli.
b. Write a version of the CRT function that takes the precomputed M array 
and a list of residues. Make sure that the output of this function is no larger 
than it needs to be.

8.8 The purpose of this question is to become more familiar with the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem functionality in Sage. Use Sage to compute the following 
questions about the CRT.
a. Find a number that reduces to 3 and 6 modulo 10 and 17, respectively 
b. Find a number that reduces to 17, 89, 77, 65, and 100 modulo 23, 199, 503, 
647, and 593, respectively 
c. Find a number that reduces to 98189, 78089, and 13418 mod 519787, 722299 
and 166169, respectively.
d. Compute the CRT basis of the moduli 100, 501, 999.
e. Find three numbers that reduce mod the moduli 49, 99, 1003, and 33191 to 
i) 1,2,3,4 
ii) 2,3,5,7 
iii) 101, 99, 102, 98 
f. Use Sage to compute an integer that is relatively prime to 1 through 5 
modulo the first 5 primes, respectively.

8.9 The purpose of this question is to become more familiar with the Sage function-
ality for modular exponentiation. Use Sage to compute:
a. $123^{456} \mod 789$
b. $100^{797} \mod 797$
c. $15^{30} \mod 1000$
d. $111^{222} \mod 987654321$
e. $121^{2833} \mod 3836311$
f. Compute N, a product of two primes, both greater than 1,000,000 and then 
compute

8.10 The purpose of this function is to show how to use the Euler totient function-
ality built into Sage. Using the built-in functionality in Sage, compute the
Euler totient function on the following inputs:

a. 781
b. 10245
c. 110
d. Find an exponent $x$ and one or two integers such that raising to the $x$ power mod 547689 results in 1. Find at least one integer such that modular exponentiation with $x$ and this modulus does not result in 1.
e. Find an exponent $x$ and one or two integers such that raising to the $x$ power mod 999999 results in 1. Find at least one integer such that modular exponentiation with $x$ and this modulus does not result in 1.

C.9 CHAPTER 9: PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND RSA

9.1 Use Sage to answer the following questions. Show all your Sage input/output:

a. Suppose your RSA public key factors as $p = 6569$ and $q = 8089$, and the public exponent $e$ is 11. Suppose you were sent the Ciphertext 28901722. Perform the RSA Decryption and recover the plaintext.
b. Suppose that you want to encrypt the number 449 and send it to someone with public key $N = 37617577$, and $e = 529$
c. Suppose that you forgot your public exponent, but you know that the prime factors of your key’s modulus are 1723 and 5381 and your private exponent is 223. Find the public exponent.
d. Use Sage to generate an RSA public/private key pair and perform an encryption and decryption.

9.2 Use Sage to solve the following problems: In part (a)-(c) determine if the following signatures are good or bad:

a. $N = 13962799$ and $e = 3$ value to sign = 821 and signature = 8674413
b. $N = 34300129$ and $e = 61$ value to sign = 2478 and signature = 27535246
c. $N = 5898461$ and $e = 23$ value to sign = 419 and signature = 2607727
d. Suppose that you have an RSA modulus with prime factors $p = 3181$ and $q = 2677$ and the public exponent is 163. Calculate the signature of 521 and then verify it.

9.3 The purpose of this question is to implement RSA encrypt and decrypt functions with Sage.

a. Implement an RSA key generation function.
b. Implement an RSA encrypt function.
c. Implement an RSA decrypt function.
d. Show that your functions work by simulating an RSA encrypt and decrypt with them.

9.4 The purpose of this question is to implement Sage functions for creating and verifying RSA signatures. For these questions you may use any answers from previous questions.

a. Implement a Sage function that takes an integer and an RSA private key and produces an RSA signature of it.
b. Implement a Sage function that takes an RSA signature and a hash value and determines if the signature is valid.

c. Show your functions work by simulating a sign and verify. Show at least one sign and verify and also show an example that if the hash or signature are incorrect, your verify function correctly fails. (You may use the key generation function from an earlier problem.)

C.10 / OTHER PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS

10.1 For all of the following questions related to Diffie-Hellman show all of your Sage input and output.

a. Suppose that you are Bob and you have agreed on the domain parameters \( p = 70849 \) and \( g = 2 \). Further suppose that Alice has sent the value \( X = 39674 \). Compute a secret value \( y \) and compute \( Y \), and the shared secret.

b. Suppose that Alice and Bob have agreed on the domain parameters \( p = 6779 \) and \( g = 3 \), further suppose that Alice chooses the secret value \( x = 384 \) and Bob chooses the secret value \( y = 152 \). Perform a simulated key exchange as in the example.

c. Find a prime \( q \) and a prime \( p \) such that \( p = 2q + 1 \), find an element in the finite field with \( p \) elements that has multiplicative order \( q \). Perform a simulated DH Secret Exchange as in the examples.

10.2 a. Implement a Sage function that takes a bound and returns 4 elements: \( p, q, g, \) and \( F \). Satisfying: \( p \) and \( q \) are prime, such that \( p = 2q + 1 \), \( g \) is an integer with multiplicative order \( q \) in the finite field with \( p \) elements, \( F \) is a Sage field object with \( p \) elements.

b. Implement a Sage function that takes the output from your function in part (a) and returns the pair \((X, x)\) where \( X = g^y \mod p \) and \( x \) is greater than 1 and less than \( q \).

c. Implement a Sage function that takes a public value from the other party in the DH key exchange and the secret value and returns the shared secret.

d. Show an example key exchange with your functions from parts (a) – (c).

10.3 The purpose of this question is to use Sage to explore how solving the discrete logarithm can break DH. In Sage, if \( a \) is an element of a finite field, and \( g \) generates \( a \), then if the order of the finite field is small enough \( a.log(g) \) will return the discrete log of \( g \) with respect to \( a \). Use this functionality to solve the following problems.

a. Suppose \( p = 499, g = 7, \text{ and } X = 297 \). Find \( x \) such that \( X = g^x \).

b. Suppose \( p = 863, g = 5, X = 543, \text{ and } Y = 239 \). Find \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( X = g^x \) and \( Y = g^y \).

c. Suppose \( p = 7589, g = 2, X = 6075 \text{ and } Y = 1318 \). Find the shared secret value.

10.4 Recall the Dual DL PRNG (Problem 8.6). There is an actual crypto algorithm, called the Dual EC DL PRNG, where instead of an element in a multiplicative group mod a prime and exponentiation, we consider a point on an elliptic curve over a prime order finite field and scalar multiplication (see NIST SP-800-90,
Recommenation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators.) We need to define some auxiliary functions:

- \(x(P)\): maps the x-coordinate of an elliptic curve point, \(P\), to the integer the smallest positive integer that maps to \(x \mod P\).
- \(\text{LSB}_m(a)\): returns the least significant \(m\) bits of integer \(a\).

And we also denote the following values:

- \(p\): a prime, with \(n\) bits.
- \(E\): an elliptic curve over a finite field with \(p\) elements, given by equation \(y^2 = x^3 + ax + b\).
- \(P\): a point on \(E\), with prime order \(q\) (for maximum security \(q\) should be roughly the same size as \(p\)).
- \(Q\): a point in the cyclic subgroup of \(E\) generated by \(P\).

At the beginning of iteration \(i\) we have internal state \(s[i]\), and we define the following values:

1. \(t[i] = s[i]\)
2. \(s[i + 1] = x(t[i] \cdot P)\)
3. \(r[i] = x(t[i] \cdot Q)\)
4. \(o[i] = \text{LSB}_{n-8}(r[i])\)

Here \(o[i]\) is the output of the \(i\)th iteration block, and \(s[i + 1]\)

The following diagram shows the flow for generating one block of output with this Crypto Algorithm.

\[s[i + 1]/s[i] \rightarrow t[i] \rightarrow x(t[i] \cdot Q) \rightarrow r[i] \rightarrow \text{LSB}_{n-8}(r[i]) \rightarrow o[i]\]

The following problems outline a similar problem with this algorithm as the one described in Problem 8.6.

a. Implement a Sage function to generate a single output block from this algorithm (Your function should take an internal state represented as a list with the following elements \([E,P,Q,s_i]\), where \(E\) is a Sage Elliptic Curve object, \(P\) is a point on \(E\), with prime order \(q\), and \(Q\) is a point on \(E\), generated by \(Q\)).

b. Write a Sage function that takes an output of this PRNG (i.e., the x coordinate of a point with the top 8 bits truncated off) and returns the possible values for \(R = t[i] \cdot Q\) that could have generated that output [Hint: try the is_x_coordinate function on Elliptic Curve objects.]

c. Suppose you have \(E\) defined by \(y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 4\), \(P = (42,98095628488211854)\), \(Q = (6396452788131036613,9671497098832291002)\), and you know that the \(P\) has order \(q = 1227273995918533091\) and also \(Q = 99689 \cdot P\). Write a Sage function that takes an output from one iteration of this function and returns a list of the possible next internal states.
d. Suppose you know that $o[i] = 58246156843038996$, and $o[i + 1] = 64511473570997445$, use the fact that you have two subsequent outputs to determine the possible internal states that could have generated these two outputs.

10.5 For all of the following questions show your Sage input/output.

a. Compute the order of the curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 7*x + 25$ over the finite field with 47 elements.

b. On the curve defined by $y^2 + x*y = x^3 + x$ over $GF(2^5)$ compute the inverse of the point $(1,1)$.

c. On the curve defined by $y^2 + y = x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ over the finite field with 701 elements, find a generator and show its order.

d. On the curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 4187*x + 3814$ over finite field of size 6421 compute the sum of the points $(3711,373)$ and $(4376,2463)$.

e. On the elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 3361*x + 6370$ over finite field of size 8461 compute 1001 times the point $(1735, 3464)$.

f. On the elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 1800*x + 1357$ over finite field of size 8191, let P1 = $(1794, 1318)$ and P2 = $(3514, 409)$, compute the sum of 13 times P1 plus 28 times P2.

10.6 In this problem, use the domain parameters. E is the elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 8871*x + 7063$ over the finite field with order 70177. The generator point $G = (49359,30149)$ has order 70393. Show your Sage input/output.

a. Suppose you are Bob and Alice has sent the point $(10117, 64081)$ compute an integer $y$ the point $Y$ and the shared secret.

b. Suppose that Alice chooses the secret value $x = 2532$ and Bob chooses the secret value $y = 15276$.

c. Perform a full simulated secret agreement between Alice and Bob.

10.7 The purpose of this question is to implement Sage functions to perform ECDH.

a. Write a function that takes a curve, and a base point on the curve and generates the secret value $x$ and the public value $X$ as per ECDH.

b. Write a function that takes a public value and a secret value and computes the shared secret.

c. Assume that your domain parameters are:
   Elliptic Curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 26484*x + 15456$ over Finite Field of size 63709
   $q = 63839$
   $G = (53819,6786)$

Show your functions work by simulating an ECDH key exchange.

10.8 Recall that for cryptographic purposes, we use curves with prime order. The purpose of this question is to show why. Let $E$ be the elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 7489*x + 12591$ over Finite Field of size 23431. This curve has order 23304. Let the base point be $(20699, 19493)$.

a. Compute 10 random multiples of this base point. What do you notice?

b. Why is this bad? (*Hint: What would happen if this was Alice or Bob’s public point?)
C.11 CHAPTER 11: CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS

The following describes a simple hash function: Choose \( p, q \) primes and compute \( N = pq \). Choose \( g \) relatively prime to \( N \) and less than \( N \). Then a number \( n \) is hashed as follows:

\[
H = g^n \mod N
\]

If there is an \( m \) that hashes to the same value as \( n \), then

\[
g^m = g^n \mod N
\]

so

\[
g^{m-n} = 1 \mod N
\]

which implies that

\[
m - n = 0 \mod \phi(N)
\]

So breaking this amounts to finding a multiple of \( \phi(N) \), which is the hard problem in RSA.

a. Write a function that takes a bitlength \( n \) and generates a modulus \( N \) of bitlength \( n \) and \( g \) less than \( N \) and relatively prime to it.

b. Show the output of your function from part (a) for a few outputs.

Using \( N, g, n \) as arguments write a function to perform the hashing.

For parts (c) – (e) compute the simple hash:

c. \( N = 600107, g = 154835, n = 239715 \)
d. \( N = 548155966307, g = 189830397891, n = 44344313866 \)
e. \( N = 604766153, g = 12075635, n = 443096843 \)

f. Write a function that creates a collision given \( p \) and \( q \). Show that your function works for a couple of examples.

C.12 CHAPTER 13: DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Use Sage to solve the following problems. For these questions assume that we are using DSA with domain parameters:

\[
p = 7,877,914,592,603,328,881
\]

\[
q = 44449
\]

\[
g = 2,860,021,798,868,462,661
\]

Use these domain parameters to determine if the signatures are valid in parts (a) – (c).

a. public key \( y = 3798043471854149631 \), hash value \( H = 59367 \), and signature \( (r,s) = (31019,4047) \)

b. public key \( y = 1829820126190370021 \), hash value \( H = 77241 \), and signature \( (r,s) = (24646,43556) \)

c. public key \( y = 4519088706115097514 \), hash value \( H = 48302 \), and signature \( (r,s) = (36283,32514) \)

Perform a signing operation in parts (d)-(e).
d. private key \( x = 8146 \), hash value \( H = 22655 \)
e. private key \( x = 1548 \), hash value \( H = 32782 \)

13.2 The purpose of this question is to implement a DSA signature verification function.

a. Implement a function that takes domain parameters \( p, q, \) and \( g \). Also, a Hash value \( H \) (in \([1, 2, \ldots, p - 1]\)), a public key \( y \), and a signature \((r, s)\).
b. Use the function you wrote in part (a) as well as the functions from the DSA examples to simulate a DSA signature and verify as in the examples.
This page intentionally left blank
In studying the Imperium, Arrakis, and the whole culture which produced Maud’Dib, many unfamiliar terms occur. To increase understanding is a laudable goal, hence the definitions and explanations given below.

—Dune, Frank Herbert

Some of the terms in this glossary are from the Internet Security Glossary[RFC 2828]. These are indicated in the glossary by an asterisk.

asymmetric encryption A form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using two different keys, one of which is referred to as the public key and one of which is referred to as the private key. Also known as public-key encryption.

authentication* The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity.

authenticator Additional information appended to a message to enable the receiver to verify that the message should be accepted as authentic. The authenticator may be functionally independent of the content of the message itself (e.g., a nonce or a source identifier) or it may be a function of the message contents (e.g., a hash value or a cryptographic checksum).

avalanche effect A characteristic of an encryption algorithm in which a small change in the plaintext or key gives rise to a large change in the ciphertext. For a hash code, the avalanche effect is a characteristic in which a small change in the message gives rise to a large change in the message digest.

bacteria Program that consumes system resources by replicating itself.

birthday attack This cryptanalytic attack attempts to find two values in the domain of a function that map to the same value in its range.

block chaining A procedure used during symmetric block encryption that makes an output block dependent not only on the current plaintext input block and key, but also on earlier input and/or output. The effect of block chaining is that two instances of the same plaintext input block will produce different ciphertext blocks, making cryptanalysis more difficult.

block cipher A symmetric encryption algorithm in which a block of plaintext bits (typically 64 or 128) is transformed as a whole into a ciphertext block of the same length.

byte A sequence of 8 bits. Also referred to as an octet.

cipher An algorithm for encryption and decryption. A cipher replaces a piece of information (an element in plaintext) with another object with the intent to conceal meaning. Typically, the replacement rule is governed by a secret key.

ciphertext The output of an encryption algorithm; the encrypted form of a message or data.

code An unvarying rule for replacing a piece of information (e.g., letter, word, phrase) with another object not necessarily of the same sort. Generally, there is no intent to conceal
meaning. Examples include the ASCII character code (each character is represented by 7 bits) and frequency-shift keying (each binary value is represented by a particular frequency).

**computationally secure**  Secure because the time and/or cost of defeating the security are too high to be feasible.

**confusion**  A cryptographic technique that seeks to make the relationship between the statistics of the ciphertext and the value of the encryption key as complex as possible. This is achieved by the use of a complex scrambling algorithm that depends on the key and the input.

**conventional encryption**  Symmetric encryption.

**covert channel**  A communications channel that enables the transfer of information in a way unintended by the designers of the communications facility.

**cryptanalysis**  The branch of cryptology dealing with the breaking of a cipher to recover information or forging encrypted information that will be accepted as authentic.

**cryptographic checksum**  An authenticator that is a cryptographic function of both the data to be authenticated and a secret key. Also referred to as a message authentication code (MAC).

**cryptography**  The branch of cryptology dealing with the design of algorithms for encryption and decryption, intended to ensure the secrecy and/or authenticity of messages.

**cryptology**  The study of secure communications, which encompasses both cryptography and cryptanalysis.

**decryption**  The translation of encrypted text or data (called ciphertext) into original text or data (called plaintext). Also called *deciphering*.

**differential cryptanalysis**  A technique in which chosen plaintexts with particular XOR difference patterns are encrypted. The difference patterns of the resulting ciphertext provide information that can be used to determine the encryption key.

**diffusion**  A cryptographic technique that seeks to obscure the statistical structure of the plaintext by spreading out the influence of each individual plaintext digit over many ciphertext digits.

**digital signature**  An authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a message to attach a code that acts as a signature. The signature is formed by taking the hash of the message and encrypting the message with the creator's private key. The signature guarantees the source and integrity of the message.

**digram**  A two-letter sequence. In English and other languages, the relative frequency of various digrams in plaintext can be used in the cryptanalysis of some ciphers. Also called *digraph*.

**discretionary access control*  An access control service that enforces a security policy based on the identity of system entities and their authorizations to access system resources. This service is termed "discretionary" because an entity might have access rights that permit the entity, by its own volition, to enable another entity to access some resource.
**divisor**  One integer is said to be a divisor of another integer if there is no remainder on division.

**encryption**  The conversion of plaintext or data into unintelligible form by means of a reversible translation, based on a translation table or algorithm. Also called *enciphering*.

**firewall**  A dedicated computer that interfaces with computers outside a network and has special security precautions built into it in order to protect sensitive files on computers within the network. It is used to service outside networks connections, especially the Internet and dial-in lines.

**greatest common divisor**  The greatest common divisor of two integers, $a$ and $b$, is the largest positive integer that divides both $a$ and $b$. One integer is said to divide another integer if there is no remainder on division.

**hash function**  A function that maps a variable-length data block or message into a fixed-length value called a hash code. The function is designed in such a way that, when protected, it provides an authenticator to the data or message. Also referred to as a message digest.

**honeypot**  A decoy system designed to lure a potential attacker away from critical systems. A form of intrusion detection.

**initialization vector**  A random block of data that is used to begin the encryption of multiple blocks of plaintext, when a block-chaining encryption technique is used. The IV serves to foil known-plaintext attacks.

**intruder**  An individual who gains, or attempts to gain, unauthorized access to a computer system or to gain unauthorized privileges on that system.

**intrusion detection system**  A set of automated tools designed to detect unauthorized access to a host system.

**Kerberos**  The name given to Project Athena’s code authentication service.

**key distribution center**  A system that is authorized to transmit temporary session keys to principals. Each session key is transmitted in encrypted form using a master key that the key distribution center shares with the target principal.

**logic bomb**  Logic embedded in a computer program that checks for a certain set of conditions to be present on the system. When these conditions are met, it executes some function resulting in unauthorized actions.

**mandatory access control**  A means of restricting access to objects based on fixed security attributes assigned to users and to files and other objects. The controls are mandatory in the sense that they cannot be modified by users or their programs.

**man-in-the-middle attack**  A form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts and selectively modifies communicated data in order to masquerade as one or more of the entities involved in a communication.

**master key**  A long-lasting key that is used between a key distribution center and a principal for the purpose of encoding the transmission of session keys. Typically, the master keys are distributed by noncryptographic means. Also referred to as a *key-encrypting key*. 
**meet-in-the-middle attack**  This is a cryptanalytic attack that attempts to find a value in each of the range and domain of the composition of two functions such that the forward mapping of one through the first function is the same as the inverse image of the other through the second function—quite literally meeting in the middle of the composed function.

**message authentication**  A process used to verify the integrity of a message.

**message authentication code (MAC)**  Cryptographic checksum.

**message digest**  Hash function.

**modular arithmetic**  A kind of integer arithmetic that reduces all numbers to one of a fixed set $[0, \ldots, n - 1]$ for some number $n$. Any integer outside this range is reduced to one in this range by taking the remainder after division by $n$.

**mode of operation**  A technique for enhancing the effect of a cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for an application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of data blocks or a data stream.

**multilevel security**  A capability that enforces access control across multiple levels of classification of data.

**multiple encryption**  Repeated use of an encryption function with different keys to produce a more complex mapping from plaintext to ciphertext.

**nibble**  A sequence of four bits.

**nonce**  An identifier or number that is used only once.

**one-way function**  A function that is easily computed, but the calculation of its inverse is infeasible.

**password***  A secret data value, usually a character string, that is used as authentication information. A password is usually matched with a user identifier that is explicitly presented in the authentication process, but in some cases, the identity may be implicit.

**plaintext**  The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption function.

**primitive root**  If $r$ and $n$ are relatively prime integers with $n > 0$ and if $\phi(n)$ is the least positive exponent $m$ such that $r^m \equiv 1 \mod n$, then $r$ is called a primitive root modulo $n$.

**private key**  One of the two keys used in an asymmetric encryption system. For secure communication, the private key should only be known to its creator.

**pseudorandom number generator**  A function that deterministically produces a sequence of numbers that are apparently statistically random.

**public key**  One of the two keys used in an asymmetric encryption system. The public key is made public and is to be used in conjunction with a corresponding private key.

**public-key certificate**  Consists of a public key plus a User ID of the key owner with the whole block signed by a trusted third party. Typically, a trusted third party is a certificate authority (CA) that is trusted by the user community, such as a government agency or a financial institution.

**public-key encryption**  Asymmetric encryption.
public-key infrastructure (PKI)  The set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography.

relatively prime  Two numbers are relatively prime if they have no prime factors in common; that is, their only common divisor is 1.

replay attacks  An attack in which a service already authorized and completed is forged by another “duplicate request” in an attempt to repeat authorized commands.

residue  When the integer $a$ is divided by the integer $n$, the remainder $r$ is referred to as the residue. Equivalently, $r = a \mod n$.

residue class  All the integers that have the same remainder when divided by $n$ form a residue class $(\mod n)$. Thus, for a given remainder $r$, the residue class $(\mod n)$ to which it belongs consists of the integers $r, r \pm n, r \pm 2n, \ldots$.

RSA algorithm  A public-key encryption algorithm based on exponentiation in modular arithmetic. It is the only algorithm generally accepted as practical and secure for public-key encryption.

secret key  The key used in a symmetric encryption system. Both participants must share the same key, and this key must remain secret to protect the communication.

security attack*  An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat; that is, an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system.

security mechanism  A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that is designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack.

security service  A processing or communication service that enhances the security of the data processing systems and the information transfers of an organization. The services are intended to counter security attacks, and they make use of one or more security mechanisms to provide the service.

security threat*  A potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm. That is, a threat is a possible danger that might exploit a vulnerability.

session key  A temporary encryption key used between two principals.

steganography  Methods of hiding the existence of a message or other data. This is different than cryptography, which hides the meaning of a message but does not hide the message itself.

stream cipher  A symmetric encryption algorithm in which ciphertext output is produced bit-by-bit or byte-by-byte from a stream of plaintext input.

symmetric encryption  A form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using the same key. Also known as conventional encryption.

trapdoor  Secret undocumented entry point into a program used to grant access without normal methods of access authentication.
**G-6**  GLOSSARY

**trapdoor one-way function**  A function that is easily computed, and the calculation of its inverse is infeasible unless certain privileged information is known.

**Trojan horse**  A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program.

**trusted system**  A computer and operating system that can be verified to implement a given security policy.

**unconditionally secure**  Secure even against an opponent with unlimited time and unlimited computing resources.

**virtual private network**  Consists of a set of computers that interconnect by means of a relatively unsecure network and that make use of encryption and special protocols to provide security.

**virus**  Code embedded within a program that causes a copy of itself to be inserted in one or more other programs. In addition to propagation, the virus usually performs some unwanted function.

**worm**  Program that can replicate itself and send copies from computer to computer across network connections. Upon arrival, the worm may be activated to replicate and propagate again. In addition to propagation, the worm usually performs some unwanted function.

**zombie**  A program that secretly takes over another Internet-attached computer and then uses that computer to launch attacks that are difficult to trace to the zombie’s creator.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3DES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDoS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IETF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPsec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU-T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/MIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNMPv3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>